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Interview of Milton Friedman Conducted by Robert L. Hetzel March 3, 2002 Milton Friedman: ...one, at least one large part of the economic recession had nothing to offer. And Keynes comes along and he [unintelligible - 00:00:18] this one, which provides him with a sort of [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: That would have to be followed a period of deflation and there was nothing you could do about that. It stabilizes [skip] Milton Friedman: believe that. That was a split in the reserve system. New York did not Robert L. Hetzel: Well, they did on [skip] increasingly seemed to be coming to that [skip] see we talked about Harrison. Harrison is not clear, he’s a lawyer and it’s not clear that [skip] Harrison’s main thing was never putting himself in a position [skip] Milton Friedman: He and Carl Snyder, Carl Snyder certainly did not have that. Robert L. Hetzel: No, certain, but he was [skip] Milton Friedman: But he was sort of a protogenic Strong, I think. Maybe [skip] I think Harrison’s, when he expressed his view about the situation, if he was, he was pretty much echoing what Strong had said. You say, he didn’t have the character to carry the system with him [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: It was interesting to the topic, but I kept thinking, this is going to be [skip] green in that [skip] solution to a problem which, where he might fail. If they repeated what Schacht had done [skip] would stop speculation and then [skip] in desperation, the Reichsbank did that [skip] very negative feeling about Harrison and I talked to the [skip] at the New York Fed who has an interest in the personal [skip] came out publicly and people never knew [skip] Milton Friedman: [skip] probably before Congress and I guess he must have [skip] mostly in Columbia, I think. Robert L. Hetzel: Well, the New York Fed [skip] short, but he talked about [skip] experience with the [skip] plus I needed a better theme for an entire century because where does the concept of a modern central bank come from, that is, we take for granted today, the idea of a modern central bank. Where the modern central bank controls the subjective. Either the [skip] through manipulation [skip] put it in realigned government direct intervention [skip] polls or change rate controls or price controls [skip] period of time and now of course we just take it for granted [skip] the departure was to start from something you talked about which is [skip] say a thing is to go back and try to have it through association, people think they learn how the [skip] the conclusion people draw from episodes of financial and economic instability, then [skip] then shape the kinds [skip] in the early ’50s before there was any sort of general [skip] if you want free markets, if you believe in free markets, then you’re very constrained in terms of the kinds of monetary arrangements [skip] we don’t have it in trans, you know, central banks talk about [skip] kind of the idea is where did that come from? It came through this series of experiments, of disastrous experiments and also through a change in attitudes toward free markets where eventually we began [skip] financial stability correlated with economic stability. It was really instability in monetary arrangements. We had to yet [skip] it’s then, constrains you in terms of the kinds of monetary arrangements [skip] Milton Friedman: When does the The Bundesbank start? Robert L. Hetzel: Well, the The Bundesbank, the- there was something called Bund deutscher Länder that was promulgated by the allies before the currency reform in March of 1948 [skip] German law. Milton Friedman: When did... Robert L. Hetzel: The Bundesbank received its mandate in 1958. Milton Friedman: [unintelligible - 00:04:26]. Robert L. Hetzel: The Bund deutscher Länder. -2- Milton Friedman: And when did that get started? Robert L. Hetzel: March, 1948. Milton Friedman: Well, that didn’t... Robert L. Hetzel: June, 1948 was the... Milton L. Hetzel: Well, there was a central bank during, I'm confused, I’m not thinking of the particular name, but when did the A Central Bank, the initial Central Bank get started in Germany? Robert L. Hetzel: Oh, you mean the Reichs Bank in the 19th century? Well, it was created [skip] with the gold reparations from France. Milton Friedman: To receive all that gold, yeah... Robert L. Hetzel: And those gold reparations formed the reserves of the Reichsbank so that would have been 187 [skip] [00:05:03] Milton Friedman: That’s when they... Robert L. Hetzel: It was a quasi-private government. Milton Friedman: And that’s when they really bought up all the silver in order to convert from a bi-metallic to a gold standard. Robert L. Hetzel: Right. Milton Friedman: And your history dates from what? Robert L. Hetzel: My history dates, I start with the hyper[skip] Milton Friedman: Oh with the hyperinflation after World War I. At which point the Reichsbank was still the operative central bank. -3- Robert L. Hetzel: Right. [skip] a wonderful section where he says [skip] his quality of outcome because they associated that with the material progress of the 19th century [skip] inequalities of wealth. But, in the hyperinflations that followed World War I, the creation of wealth was associate [skip] destroyed the moral basis for the earlier capitalist, [skip] so, and this isn’t, well, [skip] it also creates a society where individuals don’t see the enhancement of their [skip] people have that perception, they don’t see the betterment of their own [skip] attack, the speculators then identify them with the [skip]. In a way, you get out of this period and this is eerily like Argentina. So, [skip] economically and this was in your [skip] often continues to increase into early 1920 [skip] of 1923 because the German government intervenes [skip] to continue to force transactions to take [skip] course and because the farmers withhold it and you get food riots, and you get, you come close to [skip] keepers for the associated of being Jewish, and it’s very, and one of the really fascinating things about this is how close Germany came to repeating that experience after [skip]. After World War II, I read the chapter in General Clay [skip] cigarettes are being used as commodity money and [skip] and the German’s very much resent that privileged position of the Americans [skip] furiously enforce a price control so that there’s no black market and try to stamp out [skip] and of course, Clay doesn’t say this [skip] the mood is like 1923, then the farmer stops sending food to the cities and so then the country begins to move into starvation, is actually quite well off in that it’s had this huge influx of well educated [skip] sadly to say, American bombing was not particularly effective. The capital stock is pretty [skip] off. But, you know, they’re [skip] established this commission of German [skip] fully committed to central planning. Well, under his watch, a [skip] shipments of American corn to Germany as chicken feed. Now the Germans were translating from a dictionary [skip] fed corn to chickens. So they thought it was chicken feed. But the American sensors who, the Americans who read this letter, interpreted it as a pejorative term and they fired this guy because of it. And [skip] and Earhard had been listening to the neoliberals, Rupke and Oiken and you know, I’ve often thought about this when you gave your talk at the Western [skip]. Here was an extraordinary example of where ideas were important in the story [skip]. Clay was opposed to lifting price controls and eliminating [skip]. And they saw these rationing coupons as keeping them alive and they didn’t [skip] the ration cards disappeared, they might starve to death. And so, there was no, there was no willingness to change the system and the Americans weren’t willing to change it because [skip] state would be well off and the people who had their deposits [skip] on the social tensions that you had in the hyperinflation. So they weren’t [skip] Hart on his own initiative, signs this decree eliminating the ration cards [skip] authority to do it. And when he walks into the office of General Clay, General Clay confronts him and he says, my experts tell me this won’t work. And Earhart says, that’s what my experts tell me. -4- Milton Friedman: Mine do, too. [00:09:48] Robert L. Hetzel: And Clay trusted him. Clay liked him he was a character. So, you got the [skip] you went from this [skip] whole section on post war Germany where you see the development of political campaigns organized around [skip] boys pointing out black market deals to the policemen, you know, [skip] so you can see it developing all over again, this feeling where the individual [skip] feels the sense of helplessness, so it begins to look to scapegoats and then the politicians, you know, begin to identify scapegoats and [skip] in effect, of how the economy grew after that. [skip] in different ways. And then here’s an example of where monetary arrangements [skip] Milton Friedman: Also what they also must say, is an enormous importance of nominal prices [skip] things right is, just as all it took there was to list those numbers, let those nominal prices go. The same thing as in Argentina, why weren’t they able to let real prices come down [skip] difficulties of Japan, of Argentina, and East Germany, were all examples of the same phenomenon that Earhart was dealing. They’re all examples of price control. Only in those cases, what you have are essentially minimum prices, not maximum prices. Robert L. Hetzel: It’s destroyed the societies that watch the current [skip] even more nefarious through deflation because [skip] dollar had appreciated relative to the Deutsche Mark [skip] by 15%. That was [skip] for the peso and also you had world-wide falling commodity prices which should have further weakened the terms of trade against Argentina [skip] so it was ahead of it something like 25% over value [skip] but, a) there’s no understanding of of [skip] the price system doesn’t... Milton Friedman: And no mechanism for getting it. See, take that, but it is interesting, you take the difference between Argentina then and [skip] after the Civil War [skip] just after the Civil War had the same problem. [skip] back as they wanted to get back to pre-war value in the greenback in terms of gold. And that required almost a halving of prices. [skip] because they had, prices were flexible. And what was it, why is it, that the U.S. and the [skip] after the Civil War? Argentina was not able to achieve [skip] know what they were... -5- Robert L. Hetzel: disrupt [skip]. Milton Friedman: Robert L. Hetzel: unit of account. [skip] Apparently, I mean, and this, I think I’m just [skip] economic Real prices compared to gold. That you could, that you could watch. So gold conserved as a Milton Friedman: ...right. Of course the, it was in the West of the United States that gold continued to be used all during that period. And the West did not suffer very much from that recession. [skip] other than the West. Gold was not really being used, see in the West, gold was being, all throughout was continuing [00:13:29] to be used as a medium of exchange for... Robert L. Hetzel: In terms of long term. Milton Friedman: But yeah, or lending contract cycle. They weren’t eliminated until Roosevelt came along [skip] long term loan contracts. That go from [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: There were always price controls, but they were not, they didn’t Milton Friedman: And it goes forward to the German [skip] army enforcing... [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: I-I-I’m trying to think of using the dollar as a unit of account [skip] just prices and use the Mark as a medium of exchange. But they can separate those two functions of [skip] Milton Friedman: ...it was greater sense there’s no doubt. Now that’s a good... Robert L. Hetzel: But in Argentina, with the currency board [skip] they take these other prices [skip] they go from there to say that price also serves another [skip] Milton Friedman: Somewhere in the hyperinflation [skip] there’s always a free foreign exchange market in dollars and marks if I remember. [skip] One thing you had was that there was publicly available was the dollar price of the mark was [skip] no basis for dollar prices of individual items. That’s a little far-fetched. How do you know what the dollar price of a bushel of wheat is? [skip] wide-spread with who held -6- [00:15:00] Robert L. Hetzel: Very wide-spread. Milton Friedman: Where did they get the dollars? After World War I? Robert L. Hetzel: [skip] ready forcing them a deflation because the value [skip] only were German exporters doing well. A lot of speculative capital was flowing into Germany [skip] there would be this appreciation. So I think there was an inflow of [skip] Milton Friedman: Wait a minute. In a relatively narrow class it would not have been in the population at large [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: Supposed to be a [unintelligible - 00:15:28] that is, [skip] if they could control the ride price of the currency and then [skip] for the finance men should know that stuff [skip]. Milton Friedman: When did Germany go back on gold? Robert L. Hetzel: It went back on gold in [skip] Milton Friedman: ... Earhart come into town, when did he initial his [skip] number of years. Forty-eight, that was three years after [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: ...price controls, Eisenhower could never bring himself to [skip] fault the United States [skip] came in that the change [skip] of attempting to identify [skip] Milton Friedman: the bank was different. ...that sums up [skip] senses in a different concept in 19 [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: There was [skip]. Milton Friedman: Actually it had more power and the banks had less. Robert L. Hetzel: There [skip] to prevent financial panics and recessions you had to [skip] about that and you say, we’re not going to have a major depression because there’s been this change in intellectual environment that makes [skip] well we’ve got the FDIC, but -7- the other side of that is we don’t have an institutional arrangement that can prevent [skip] and the dollar [ 16:44] was somewhat overvalued. But we had most of the world’s gold stock, so we were willing to let our gold stock run down. [skip] system wasn’t able to work for awhile, so your prediction that the [skip] that it was this advantageous [skip] and after World War II because we, because of [skip] we were willing to live with this gold [skip] the system sort of [skip] was important... Milton Friedman: You’re suggesting the parallelism between the post war situations and [skip] staying under that, and pulling gold out of Britain and there [skip] in a sense me pulling gold out of the United States. And then [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: ...came to its other, other under value. Milton Friedman: It was France in the ’20s [skip] kept the gold at home [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: It was unfortunate; everybody thought World War I was going to be repeat of the Franco-Prussian War. Milton Friedman: Right. Robert L. Hetzel: And so [skip] this is because it was would be a way of admitting that Germany wouldn’t have to pay the reparations. [skip] when they inflated, is they pushed the value [skip] line with the pre-war parody that they could not go back to the... Milton Friedman: That’s right. Robert L. Hetzel: And that was the tragedy of it. Milton Friedman: They had to do that. Robert L. Hetzel: it, [skip] Milton Friedman: So they had to change the value of the franc, and when they did ...undervalued the franc. Robert L. Hetzel: Undervalued the franc. And so when the gold came in, they were fresh off this experience with near hyperinflation [skip] and they were afraid to let prices rise because of that experience with the inflation [skip] wasn’t credible one and you know, -8- they would have blown [skip] large amount of money. So the system’s fragile because you don’t have much kind of gold flowing. You don’t have much gold as available to move central bank [skip] reparations are being financed by capital inflows from the United States to Germany. They drive [skip] bonds and in New York and that’s what [skip] have to worry about German military might. So they’re, for them, and this is the big difference after World War II, [skip] about Hitler, but the response period[skip] none of this, none of it need happen [skip] us. Okay, you want us to forgive German reparations while you forgive [skip]. Milton Friedman: [unintelligible - 00:19:21]. Not very receptive to it. Because they really wanted to get back at Germany. They had the whole of Eastern Europe to worry about as well. Robert L. Hetzel: That’s what made [skip] Milton Friedman: Austria... Robert L. Hetzel: That was what was so [skip] was the hysterical newspaper campaign in France and Germany. What became politically acceptable as a [skip] Milton Friedman: ...story on [skip] after the war. After World War II. [00:19:58] Robert L. Hetzel: as [skip] Right. [unintelligible - 00:19:58]. It was because it was viewed Milton Friedman: Post war period. Robert L. Hetzel: You know, thinking about the end of the 19th century... Milton Friedman: [unintelligible - 00:20:04]. Robert L. Hetzel: ... about the lack of monetary in the period when the gold [skip]. I think what you’re pushing me is to, if I’ve got this way of thinking about how [skip] society adapts certain kinds of monetary arrangements [skip] think about you know, why there was support for gold standard[skip]. -9- Milton Friedman: Gold standard was associated with Britain. When you go back to that [skip] [unintelligible - 00:20:28] by all odds the dominant world economy. [skip] quite explicit one. When it went on the gold standard after the Franco-Prussian War. Robert L. Hetzel: By issuing favor in, the [unintelligible - 00:20:44]... Milton Friedman: [unintelligible - 00:20:44]. Robert L. Hetzel: ...and then you needed to be on the gold standard to have your [skip]. Milton Friedman: We had to be just as good as Britain. Show that you could be, after all, you had just won a war against France, you [skip] model. Robert L. Hetzel: That’s one of the [skip] New York would replace London as the world’s financial center and that’s what was pushing the [skip] to for [skip] gold standard rules. Milton Friedman: [skip] to know what would have happened in the actions of World War I. Because [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: [skip] came out of the progressive movement [skip]. Milton Friedman: We would have had the Federal Reserve system, there’s no doubt, it was already enacted before World War I. [skip] [unintelligible - 00:21:30]. Robert L. Hetzel: It began operation in 1913 [skip]. Milton Friedman: Thirteen. Well, because of... Robert L. Hetzel: Yeah, unlike the [skip] stone in the human history we had [skip] for start it was never the same after those three things. [skip] you create [skip] and it has kind of values where [skip] scene of America has been that [skip] hard to get a work ethic you can make yourself better off. So, choice makes [skip] government is [unintelligible - 00:22:09] from the top down. And [skip] particularly in the case of a country like Egypt [skip] so governments are imposed from the top down. You have no, the feeling that you can change something by voting is not there. [skip] somewhere individual initiative aligns with [skip] that they will live in a world where choice is meaningless. It doesn’t affect their welfare. - 10 - There’s a sense of helplessness and despair and that’s the sort of world that you had where people look for scapegoats. They look for [skip] all of this creates anger. [unintelligible 00:22:46] [skip] because I’m in a situation where I feel like somehow I’m out of control. Like my time is being wasted [skip] from this feeling of being out of [skip] scapegoats channel anger and you can [skip] kind of fundamentally about how to create a society where [skip] everybody free rides so people feel like when they go out and they can make a choice, they can make themselves [skip] what we’ve done, if you think about Foreign Aid, for example, and the way that [skip] to feel like we’re doing a good job of, maybe we [skip] a very rare thing to see societies organized around protection. [skip] to think very fundamentally about, you know, what we have and how to... Milton Friedman: We certainly can’t spread it through world bankers through Foreign Aid, no way you can do that. [skip] So how we can spread it? I think we have to remove obstacles to it more than spreading it. [skip] by example, I’ve always done that. Robert L. Hetzel: Free trade. Milton Friedman: [skip] think of it, it’s hard to think of any place, well, the only successful example that I can think of is spreading it, is Hong Kong. [skip] when I’ve learned it’s a dictator. [skip] [unintelligible - 00:24:01]. Robert L. Hetzel: So in a sense you need ... Milton Friedman: So you spread it in a sense by the collapse of the Soviet Union we spread it through the former Soviet system. [skip] Czech Republic, Hungary. [skip] Robert L. Hetzel: Yeah. I think... Milton Friedman: So as far as our actions are concerned, in some cases they were perverse rather than favorable. Robert L. Hetzel: In Argentina, there’s just the saddest case of that of [skip] from one extreme to the other from currency board to the hyperinflation from, you know, deflation [skip] Milton Friedman: World War II. Argentina did have a rule of law and in one verse it says [skip] came along. - 11 - Robert L. Hetzel: The wealth was entrance [skip] and ruling class at [skip] support from urban labor unions and [skip]. And for a while countries like Argentina grew probably [skip] and these countries then the [skip] and then they have no way of creating wealth and then they go [skip]. [00:25:09] Milton Friedman: you’ve been working on? History is the Germans started a German history, the main thing Robert L. Hetzel: No, I wrote a, I mean I [skip] I’ve written an overview of U.S. Monetary Policy through [skip] why you got start and stop go monetary policy on pre-wealth. [skip] have gotten an exposition of the [skip] and the difference in explicit return is the market. [skip] monetary policy works because the monetary [skip] by shutting down kind of all the markets and all the margins and then opening them just [skip] work out the analysis by imposing [skip]. They’re not going to go back, and they’re not going to read it. It’s too much work. It’s too hard [skip] so, what I’m, you know, what I’m, my next project when I get back to Richmond, is to [skip] optimizing general equilibrium, dynamic, all the... Milton Friedman: All the Fed [unintelligible - 00:26:14] Robert L. Hetzel: ... all the bells and whistles sort of stuff. But I think that that’s what’s needed to communicate and I think that [skip] those miles is that they aren’t [skip] for Central Bank [skip] that to what is Central Bank like the Fed does when it, when you look at what it does and all it ever talks about it what payroll employment did last month [skip] all this out in a model that economists can [skip]. Extraordinarily few expositions at the quantity theory and [skip] the fingers of your hands. I think we very much need a new exposition [skip] takes to what, you know, what we see Central Bank’s doing, so that’s what I think I sort of got it worked out in my mind, so. [skip] all the chapters are there, I just have to write them and put them together. Milton Friedman: [skip] do you think you have already? Robert L. Hetzel: Well, [skip] Milton Friedman: Still an outline of the book and... - 12 - Robert L. Hetzel: Yeah, I’ve done that and I just, in ways that aren’t ultimately maybe useful, I spent a lot of time [skip]. Milton Friedman: But you’re getting paid for it. Robert L. Hetzel: That’s what I’m getting paid for and ultimately it stimulative in the sense that it [skip] optimistic that I won’t die young and I’ll get it done. [skip] I can’t say, I don’t know quite how you [skip] try to develop a protégé or something, I guess. Milton Friedman: No, you’ve just got to forget about that and just keep going. Robert L. Hetzel: Out of the talking [unintelligible - 00:27:43] Milton Friedman: I think I remember, because I remember [skip] it had contact somehow or another with Aaron. [:27:55]. Robert L. Hetzel: Aaron Director must have known. Well, I guess everybody knew who Hayek was, but Hayek must have known that, or one of the two must have initiated communication, either Hayek wrote to Director, or Director wrote to Hayek. Milton Friedman: No, it came, I think through-I think it came through [unintelligible - 00:28:16]. And I think that, don’t ask me how, because this is just vague memories coming to me now, Hayek appealed to [unintelligible - 00:28:27] to help him [skip] in Washington at that time, too. And so I think it was Hayek, [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: There was a... Milton Friedman: And then, Hayek was invited to come to the United States, or came to the United States [skip] at [skip] Hayek’s trip [skip] not sure of the exact dates because they’re all [unintelligible - 00:28:51]. There was [unintelligible - 00:28:52] who also financed essentially Hayek’s stay at the University of Chicago. Robert L. Hetzel: [skip] [unintelligible - 00:29:03]. Milton Friedman: That’s sort of later. Robert L. Hetzel: Yes. - 13 - Milton Friedman: [skip] come to Chicago? Robert L. Hetzel: In 1950, maybe? Milton Friedman: [skip] or maybe it was ’40... Robert L. Hetzel: Seven. Milton Friedman: Seven. [skip] ’47, as I say. A time when I would have let [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: meetings? Milton Friedman: Were there Americans invited in Mont Pelerin Society Oh, sure. Robert L. Hetzel: So there were. Milton Friedman: Oh, sure the list of people was quite... Robert L. Hetzel: Habiler [phonetic] was, well I can get that, you don’t have to... Milton Friedman: No, no, I can, I have right here. Robert L. Hetzel: Oh, okay. That’s... Milton Friedman: [skip] that was created at the, after the first Mont Pelerin [29:41] conference and with all the pictures about the-- I do have a list right here. John Davenport was invited. Karl Brandt, see he was an ex-German, but he was at the time [unintelligible - 00:29:57] American. Frank Graham [skip] was, not only that, Hazlitt was [unintelligible - 00:30:02] for many, many years. [skip] was now goes to Will and [skip] it’s very important. There’s Morely, he was in [skip] Ropke was probably the leading [unintelligible - 00:30:21] [skip] mixed bag was Ropke. He was an agrarian. [skip] is one side of [unintelligible - 00:30:27]. [00:30:29] Robert L. Hetzel: Well, the order liberals managed, many of them managed to stay sort of, European libertarians [skip] out of the government to maintain free markets. The - 14 - government was supposed to prevent private monopolies and so on. So they gave the government a lot of power assuming the government would do the right thing, would be benevolent in protecting their freedom of choice. So there was a naiveté about.... Milton Friedman: That we were agrarian in our... Robert L. Hetzel: You say agrarian and [skip] some of your letters end before... Milton Friedman: See, these are the pictures of all of us [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: The location. Milton Friedman: Oh, the location. Robert L. Hetzel: Vevey, Switzerland, I’m assuming. Milton Friedman: It’s all Switzerland. But there were, there’s one long day tour which we all went on. [skip] on a [unintelligible - 00:31:18] remember early, early on... Robert L. Hetzel: So, lots of influences on you at this time. But two of the influences in terms of [skip] views that you had, it must have been this [skip] war... Milton Friedman: Much more. Aaron Director, Frank Nye, they certainly were, Arthur Burns, [skip] the Mont Pelerin Society did was to enable me to [skip] was very influential [31:50] just directly, immediately thought of [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: ...environment and also it must have been important to be in debate with [skip] very capable people. Milton Friedman: Robert L. Hetzel: debate with. Oh, hey, it was very [unintelligible - 00:32:03] And it was, it must have been a wonderful group [skip] to Milton Friedman: No, no. It was [skip] be emotionally committed to what they’re saying, you know, saying it because they believe in it enough because they just [skip] - 15 - Robert L. Hetzel: by... Milton Friedman: Did, you never, did you ever know Oskar Lange, had he left Yes. I met Oskar Lange at, in fact in 1934 [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: Is there something about his personality that would make him feel equally comfortable in Poland as in the United States that would be very different from Jacob Marschak for example, I mean, of these people you consider Voltarians, were there, was... Milton Friedman: Oh, I really did not have enough contact with [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: Was there any of the Cowles commission people you were close to in terms of the way you were close to say, Aaron Director, George Stigler, you could just go and talk to, so there wasn’t, yeah. Milton Friedman: I was close to them... Robert L. Hetzel: As colleagues, right. Milton Friedman: As colleagues, but [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: never there. ... I guess was there for a while as, Greiston [phonetic] he was Milton Friedman: He was never there. Robert L. Hetzel: [skip] Christ. Milton Friedman: Carl Christ was there, yeah. [unintelligible - 00:33:18]. [skip] Well, there was a real difference [skip]. Robert Friedman: I met him once, he seemed very... Milton Friedman: He was not a Cowles Commission person. He was at [unintelligible - 00:33:30] and was very [skip]. Robert L. Hetzel: When you think, when you say Cowles Commission person, would they be very different from an Alvin Hansen Keynesian... Milton Friedman: Oh, yes. - 16 - Robert L. Hetzel: So, their first devotion was to statistical inference or they really, were they really solidly Keynesian? Milton Friedman: No, their first devotion was to a mathematical systems. Robert L. Hetzel: [skip] scientists. They weren’t... Milton Friedman: They were not... Robert L. Hetzel: Alvin Hansen economists whose first commitment was to a program of social reform through government. Milton Friedman: scholars. They were not... They were scientists. They were definitely scientists. And Robert L. Hetzel: They were somewhat apolitical. Milton Friedman: Yeah, well they were very apolitical. Robert L. Hetzel: Did you have any, I noticed in reading through your letters, a number of times you were in the situation of having to write character letters for people who had to appear before loyalty boards, did that, at the time, did that seem... Milton Friedman: That’s when McCarthy was in. Robert L. Hetzel: Yeah, did that, at the time, did that seem like a normal thing, or did, even at the time, did that seem distasteful? Milton Friedman: Oh it seemed extremely distasteful. Robert L. Hetzel: Okay. Milton Friedman: Embarrassing, more. - 17 -