View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

1

.

/1/0 6R44/41- coppa,e, Coorit- \--2)00-4/4/


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

(/V/C/3

2 11-7)ci


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

..A-L'""?

..L-' Z i-- C =-=
r

i
e

/,

,
..'"

_x
'7
I, ,
- ,/
•ir:/
:.
22(
C: :). 4,

I)

i

iitd-

4
4Y,V-----H;4-7-,v
- v1/4.
.
.
. ., _.. ... ,..1."-ter..._

, t:

t,

r

r

.

i

i ,

A7

t.- ci.---#2-,'
'/

-ef,v;,

i
1 .7- r-//
/ --/

Vol. 6

(No. 38)

June 15, 1937

Pages 749-764

NEBRASKA

•

SUPREME COURT
JOURNAL
Published Weekly except during recess of the Supreme Court of Nebraska

Devoted to the Interests of the Judiciary and Bar of Nebraska
Cornelius Gant, Publisher, Terminal Bldg., Lincoln, Nehrasks
Notice—There was no issue of the SCJ for June 8, 1937.
Frazier-Lemke Act—
This entire Act is published in this issue for convenience to subscribers—page 761.

•

INDEX FOR TM ISSUE
Connely v. Hesselberth (York Co.) ____ 30045_6 SCJ
Continental Company of Lincoln v.
Rathbone (Lancaster Co.)
30051_6 SCJ
Estate of Rosenbery, Rosenbery v. Rosenbery (Douglas Co.)
29993_6 SCJ
Grimes v. Baker (Douglas Co.)
30000_6 SCJ
Meierjurgen v. City of Lincoln (Lancaster Co.)
30123_6 SCJ
Mitchell v. State (Dawes Co.)
30084_6 SCJ
State ex rdl Sorensen v. Hoskins State
Bank, Luikart, Receiver (Wayne
•
Co.)
29941_0 SCJ

'757
755
758
759
756
755
760

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Labor Unions—Picketing
US658_6 SCJ 749
Senn, Paul v. Tile Layers Protective Union
US658_6 SCJ 749
CONGRESS OF UNITED STATES
Alien Immigrants—Deportation
HR28_6 SCJ 754
HR26_6 SCJ 754
Alien Poor People—Relief
Cooperative Farm Forestry Act ____ HR4728_6 SCJ 754
MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
front of book IV
Rulings on Motions For Rehearing
INDEX TO OPINIONS (Cumulative)
Index to Opinions, cumulative, down
front of book V to XI
to this Issue

•


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

CITATIONS
Citations to Nebraska Cases
back of book (a)
Citations to State Constitution
back of book (f)
Citations to Compiled Statutes, Supplements and Laws
back of book (f)
back of book (j)
Restatement of the T ow
DIGEST
Digest for this Number
Abstracters
Law Book Exchange

front of book I to IV
front of book XII
back of book (k)

DIGEST
Agriculture
COOPERATIVE FARM FORESTRY ACT-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FARM FORESTS-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FORESTS ON FARMS-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
REFORESTATION-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.

•

of forest
of forest
of forest
of forest

Bills and Notes
FORGERY-Alteration of instrument. Construction. See subdiv.
Definitions under Forgery.
—Material change of instruments. Construction. See subdiv. Definitions under Forgery.
Collateral Attack
JUDICIAL SALES-Tax liens. See subdiv. Tax Liens under Foreclosure.
Colleges and Universities
AGRICULTURE-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
COOPERATIVE FARM FORESTRY ACT-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.

Aliens
ASSISTANCE—.
--Cause for deportation. HR26__6 SCJ 754
CITIZENSHIP-Also see subdiv. Immigration, below.
FARM FORESTS—.
DEPORTATION-—Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
-Fraud in obtaining immigration visa, nonquota visa or trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
preference-quota visa. Effect. HR28__6 SCJ 754.
FORESTS ON FARMS—Grounds for. HR266 SCJ 754.
-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
—Grounds for. HR28__6 SCJ 754.
—Immigration entry through fraud. Effect. HR28__6 trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
SCJ 754.
—Paupers. Assistance. Bar to readmission. HR26__6 REFORESTATION—.
—Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
SCJ 754.
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
ENTRY OF COUNTRY UNLAWFULLY•
-Deportation. See subdiv. Deportation, above.
Cooperative Farm Forestry Act
EXPULSION-Also see subdiv. Deportation, above.
AFFORESTATION-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
IMMIGRATION-Admission through fraud. See subdiv Deportation, trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
above.
AGRICULTURE—Deportation. See subdiv. Deportation, above.
-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
— Nonquota visa obtained through fraud. HR28__6 SCJ trees and
shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
754.
ESTABLISHMENT—Paupers. Assistance. Deportation. Bar to readmission. -Act of Congress,
May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
HR266 SCJ 754.
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
—Preference-quota visa obtained through fraud. HR28-- FARM FORESTS6 SCJ 754.
-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
Appeal and Error
REFORESTATIONCONSTITUTIONALITY-Attack on constitutionality of statute cannot be made -Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
for first time in supreme court. Continental Co. v. Rathbone 30051_6 SCJ 755.
RECEIVERSConstitutional Law
-Judgment appointing receiver. Appeal. See subdiv. APPEAL AND ERRORJudgments and Decrees under Receivers.
-Attack on constitutionality of a statute cannot be made
for first time in supreme court. Continental Co. v. RathBanks and Banking
bone 30051_6 SCJ 755.
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING-Eligibility for appointment as receiver. The DepartContracts
ment of Banking is ineligible to be appointed a judicial
receiver because it is not a qualified legal entity. State CONSIDERATIONv. Hoskins State Bank Luikart Rcvr., 29941__6 SCJ 760. -Enforcement of nudum pactum contract. 30000_6 SCJ
759.
RECEIVERS-Appeal from judgment appointing receiver. 29941__6 —Nudum pactum. An agreement without consideration
is nudum pactum and unenforceable. Grimes v. Baker,
SCJ 760.
—Appointment. The power of appointment and removal 30000_6 SCJ 759.
of judicial receivers ordinarily rests in the sound dis- ENFORCEMENTcretion of the trial court. State v. Hoskins State Bank, -Nudum pactum agreement is unenforceable. Grimes v.
Baker 30000__6 SCJ 759.
Luikart, Rcvr., 29941__6 SCJ 760.
—Department of Banking is ineligible. See subdiv. De- REPURCHASE-Agreement to buy stocks recommended to friend, is
partment of Banking, above.
—Judgment appointing receiver. Appeal. When a judg- nudum pactum and unenforceable. Grimes v. Baker,
ment discharges a judicial receiver, appoints as receiver 30000__6 SCJ 759.
one who is legally ineligible, and directs the former to
turn over all assets to the latter, the former has a right
Courts
to appeal. State v. Hoskins State Bank, Luikart,
DISCRETION29941__6 SCJ 760.
-Receivers. Appointment. See subdiv. Appointment un—Persons eligible for appointment. 29941__6 SCJ 760.
der Receivers.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

11
Criminal Law
FORGERY-Also see main head Forgery.

REFORESTATION-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.

Decedents' Estates
HEIRS-Also see subdiv. Heirs under Wills.

Forgery
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS-Construction. See subdiv. Definitions, below.
—Injury to another. See subdiv. Definitions, below.
BILLS AND NOTES-Alterations. See subdiv. Definitions, below.
—Material change. See subdiv. Definitions, below.
DEFINITIONS-Alterations. It is forgery fraudulently to alter any part
of an instrument when the alteration is capable of working injury to another. Consequently, it is forgery fraudulently to erase one signature and insert another. Mitchell v. State, 30084_6 SCJ 755.
—Forgery is the false making, or materially altering,
with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine,
might apparently he of legal efficacy, or the foundation
of a legal liability. Mitchell v. State, 30084__6 SCJ 755.
—Material change. Any change in the personality, number, or relations, of the parties to such an instrument
which gives the instrument a different legal effect is
material. Mitchell v. State, 30084__6 SCJ 755.
EVIDENCE-Forgery, construction and definition. See subdiv. Definitions, above.
—Intent is established by the evidence in this case. Mitchell v. State, 30084_6 SCJ 755.
—Sufficient in this case to sustain conviction. 30084__6
SCJ 755.
—Sustaining the indictment. To sustain an indictment
for forgery it is generally necessary that the instrument
alleged to be forged should be one which would expose
a particular person to legal process. Apparent legal
efficiency, however, is enough. It is not necessary .that
such suit should have in it the elements of ultimate
legal success. It is enough if the forged instrument be
apparently sufficient to support a legal claim. Mitchell
v. -State, 30084__6 SCJ 755.

Descent and Distribution
HEIRS-Also see subdiv. Heirs under Wills.
Discretion
RECEIVERS--Appointment. See subdiv. Appointment under Receivers.
Due Process of Law
LABOR UNIONS-Picketing. See subdiv. Picketing under Labor Unions.
Estates
HEIRS-Also see subdiv. Heirs under Wills.
Equal Protection of Laws
LABOR UNIONS—.
—Picketing. See subdiv. Picketing under Labor Unions.

Foreclosure
TAX LIENS-Collateral attack. A decree foreclosing a tax sale certificate is not vulnerable to collateral attack for irregularities or defects in the foreclosure proceedings that lo
not go to the jurisdiction of the court. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045_6 SCJ 757.
—Defects. Effect. 30045__6 SCJ 757.
—Interest to protect. Persons eligible to redeem. 30045_6 SCJ 757.
—Irregularities. Effect. 30045__6 SCJ 757.
—Notice of sale, when required. 30045_6 SCJ 757.
—Personal notice required in sale of land for taxes, as INTENT-provided in section 3, art. VIII of the Constitution, applies -Evidence reveals clear intent in this case. 30084_6
in all cases where a tax deed is sought, but is not re- SCJ 755.
quired in sales under tax foreclosures in section 77-2039,
Comp. St. 1929. Commercial Savings & Loan Ass'n. v.
Guaranty
Pyramid Realty Co., 1g1 Neb. 493, 237 N. W. 575. ConCONSIDERATIONnely v. Hesselberth, 30045_6 SCJ 757.
—Persons eligible to redeem. One having no property -Nudum pactum agreement is unenforceable. Grimes v.
rights to preserve or protect by redemption from a ju- Baker, 30000_6 SCJ 759.
dicial sale foreclosing a valid sale certificate will not be CONTRACTpermitted to redeem. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045__G -Nudum pactum agreement is unenforceable. Grimes v.
SCJ 757.
Baker, 30000_6 SCJ 759.
—Redemption, bar. Owners and others interested in real- REPURCHASEty, sold under decree foreclosing valid tax sale certifi- -Agreement without consideration is nudum pactum and
cate, where foreclosure was commenced more than two unenforceable. Grimes v. Baker, 30000__6 SCJ 759.
years subsequent to issuance of tax sale certificate, are
barred from the right of redemption on confirmation
Immigration
of such judicial sale. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045_6
ALIENS—.
SCJ 757.
—Deportation. See subdiv. Deportation under Aliens.
—Redemption, persons eligible. 30045_6 SCJ 757.
—Paupers. Deportation. See subdiv. Paupers under
Aliens.
Forests
AGRICULTURE-Judicial Sales
-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest REDEMPTIONtrees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
-Tax sale. See subdiv. Tax Liens under Foreclosure.
COOPERATIVE FARM FORESTRY ACTSALE-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest TAX
-Redemption. See subdiv. Redemption under Tax Sale.
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FARM FORESTSLabor
-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
Also see main head Labor Unions.
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

III
Labor Unions
LABOR DISPUTES-Evidence in this case shows a labor dispute under Wisconsin Labor Code. US658__6 SCJ 749.
LAWS REGULATING LABOR-Also see subdiv. Picketing, below.
--Picketing. Wisconsin statute authorizing peaceful picketing held constitutional. US658__6 SCJ 749. PICKETING-Wisconsin Labor Code which provides that peaceful picketing shall be legal is not unconstitutional as construed to
authorize a tile layers union to picket the place of business
of a tile contractor in an attempt to induce him to unionize
his shop and enter into a contract with the union which
would prohibit him from working as a tile layer in the
performance of his contracts. The statute does not, as he
contends, deprive him of liberty or property without due
process of law and deny him equal protection of the laws,
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Senn v Tile
Layers Protective Union, US658__6 SCJ 749.
Limitation of Actions
TAX SALE-Redemption, bar to. See subdiv. Tax Liens under Foreclosure.
Moratorium
APPLICATION-Burden of proof. In a hearing on an application for
a moratory stay under section 20-21,159, Comp. St. Supp.
1935, the burden of proof is upon the party resisting the
application to show that he falls within the exception,
"unless upon hearing on said application, good cause is
shown to the contrary," contained in that statute. Continental Co. v. Rathbone, 300516 SCJ 755.
Mortgages
FORECLOSURE-Moratorium. Application for stay. Burden of proof.
See subdiv. Application under Moratorium.
MORATORIUM-Application for stay. Burden of proof. See subdiv.
Application under Moratorium.
Process and Writs
NOTICE BY PUBLICATION-Tax sale. See subdiv. Notice of Sale under Tax Sale.
Receivers
APPEAL AND ERROR-Discharged receiver's rights. See subdiv. Judgments
and Decrees, below.
APPOINTMENT-Appeal from judgment discharging receiver. See subdiv. Judgments and Decrees, below.
—Department of Banking is ineligible to be appointed a
judicial receiver because it is not a qualified legal entity.
State v. Hoskins State Bank, Luikart, Rcvr., 29941__6
SCJ 760.
—Discretion of court. The power of appointment and
removal of judicial receivers ordinarily rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Hoskins State Bank,
Luikart, Rcvr., 29941__6 SCJ 760.
—Persons eligible for appointment. Dept. of Banking
as receiver. 29941__6 SCJ 760.
ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTMENT-Dept.'of Banking. See subdiv. Appointment, above.
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES-Appeal. When a judgment discharges a judicial receiver, appoints as receiver one who is legally ineligible,
and directs the former to turn over all assets to the latter, the former has a right to appeal. State v. Hoskins
State Bank, Luikart, Rcvr., 29941__6 SCJ 760.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Redemption
JUDICIAL SALES-Tax lien foreclosure. See subdiv. Tax Liens under
Foreclosure.
LIMITATION OF RIGHT-Application of two-year redemption period. A discussion. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045_6 SCJ 757.
—Bar to redemption. See subdiv. Tax Liens under Foreclosure.
—Two-year redemption period construed. 30045__6 SCJ
757.
PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION-Also see subdiv. Limitation of Right, above.
TAX LIENS-See subdiv. Tax Liens under Foreclosure.
Reforestation
AGRICU LTURE--Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
COOPERATIVE FARM FORESTRY ACT-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FARM FORESTS—.
—Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FORESTS ON FARMS-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.

of forest
of forest
of forest
of forest

Taxation
REDEMPTION-Tax sale. See subdiv. Tax Liens under Foreclosure.
TAX SALE-Redemption. See subdiv. Redemption under Tax Sale.
Tax Sale
ADMINISTRATIVE SALE-Foreclosure, Redemption. See subdiv. Redemption, below.
—Redemption, two-year period. See subdiv. Redemption,
below.
COLLATERAL ATTACK-Decree foreclosing a tax sale certificate is not vulnerable to collateral attack for irregularities or defects in
the foreclosure proceedings that do not go to the jurisdiction of the court. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045_6
SCJ 757.
DEFECTS-Collateral attack. See subdiv. Collateral Attack, above.
FORECLOSURE-Notice of sale. See subdiv. Notice of Sale, below.
—Redemption. See subdiv. Redemption, below.
IRREGULARITIES-Collateral attack. See subdiv. Collateral Attack, above.
JUDICIAL SALE-Foreclosure. Redemption. See subdiv. Redemption, below.
—Redemption, two-year period. See subdiv. Redemption,
below.
NOTICE OF SALE-Personal notice required in sale of land for taxes, as
provided in section 3, art. VIII of the Constitution, applies in all cases where a tax deed is sought, but is not
required in sales under tax foreclosures in section 772039 Comp. St. 1929. Commercial Savings & Loan Ass'n.
v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237 N. W. 575. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045_6 SCJ 757.
REDEMPTION-Administrative and judicial sales. An action to fereclose a tax lien is not properly brought until after a sale
of the land for taxes and two years allowed for re-

IV
demption, but this is not jurisdictional, and if an action
so brought proceeds to decree of foreclosure and sale, and
a deed is duly issued upon confirmation of such sale,
the owner of the land may redeem the same within two
years after such sale and confirmation, but not later.
Owners and others interested in realty, sold under decree foreclosing valid tax sale certificate, where forecolsure was commenced more than two years subsequent
to issuance of tax sale certificate, are barred from the
right of redemption on confirmation of such judicial sale.
Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045__6 SCJ 757.
—Defects in sale. Collateral attack. See subdiv. Collateral Attack, above.
—Notice of sale. See subdiv. Notice of Sale, above.
One having no property
—Persons entitled to redeem.
rights to preserve or protect by redemption from a judicial sale foreclosing a valid tax sale certificate will not
be permitted to redeem. Connely v. Hesselberth, 30045_
6 SCJ 757.
Water and Water Courses
AGRICULTURE-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
COOPERATIVE FARM FORESTRY ACT-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FARM FORESTS-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
FORESTS ON FARMS-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.
REFORESTATION-Act of Congress, May 18, 1937, for distribution of forest
trees and shrubbery. HR4728__6 SCJ 754.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Wills
DEFINITIONS-Heirs. See subdiv. Heirs, below.
—Lawful heirs. See subdiv. Heirs, below.
HEIRS-Definition and construction under Nebr. statutes.
29993__6 SCJ 758.
—Surviving spouse as included in term "heirs". 29993_.
6 SCJ 758.
—Widow or widower as included in term. Unless excluded by unambiguous words or by clear implication from
the language used in a will, the description therein of
'heirs' includes a surviving spouse as well as a surviving child or surviving children. In re Estate of Hanson,
118 Neb. 208, 244 N. W. 2. Rosenbery v. Rosenbery,
29993__6 SCJ 758.

•

Words and Phrases
Alteration (of instrument)—definition, 30084__6 SCJ 755.
Forgery—definition, 300846 SCJ 755.
Heirs—definition. 29993__6 SCJ 758.
Lawful Heirs—definition. 29993_6 SCJ 758.
Material change (of instrument)—definition, 30084_6
SCJ 755.
Workmen's Compensation
BACK-Strain. Cause of injury. Evidence sufficient to sustain award. Meierjurgen v. City of Lincoln 30123__6
SCJ 756.
EVIDENCE-Sufficient in this case to sustain award for injury to
back caused by lifting. Meierjurgen v. City of Lincoln, 30123__6 SCJ 756.
LIFTING-Back strain. Cause of injury. Evidence sufficient to
sustain award. Meierjurgen v. City of Lincoln, 301236
SCJ 756.

MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
-JUNE 5
29803 Steeves v Nispel, overruled
29821 In re approp of Lands, McGinley v Platte Valley Pub Pwr &
Irr Dist, oral argmt ord on mot for
rehear at session begin Sept 20
29826 Markussen v Mengedoht,
overruled
29892 Mabry v Mudd, same
29895 Rogers v Rebbe, same
29921 Rundall v Grace, same
29930 Schobert v Zimmerman
Drainage Dist, same
29956 Lindholm v Resnick, same
29849 Butke v Nachschoen on mot
for rehear jt request for consideration of amended ans sustd. Reargmt
ord at session begin Sept 20 on issues as amended
29961 Anderson v Byrd, oral argrnt
ord on mot for rehear at session begin Sept 20

•

V
NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL

Appropriations of Lands, McGinley v.
Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District (Keith Co.) ____ 29821_6 SCJ
Asmus v. Longenecker (Saline Co.) ___ 29716_6 SCJ
Associated Press, KVOS, Inc. v.
US28_6 SCJ
OFFICE
Associated Press v. National Labor ReTelephone B-2518
lations Board
US365_6 SCJ
B1 Terminal Bldg.
Avery, Almy, Exr v. (Lancaster Co.) 29928_6 SCJ
Lincoln. Nebraska
Baker Ice Machine Co., Prescher v.
(Douglas Co.)
30087_6 SCJ
Published Weekly except during recess of the Supreme
Bank of Benkelman, Luikart, Receiver
Court of Nebraska
v. (Dundy Co.)
29954_6 SCJ
Entered as second class matter November 24th, 1931 at
Bankers Life Insurance Company v.
the post office at Lincoln, Nebraska under the Act of
Ohrt (Douglas Co.)
29767_6 SCJ
Bankruptcy—Corporate Reorganization.
March 3d, 1879.
Adequate protection of claims _ __ US271_6 SCJ
SUBSCRIPTION RATES
Bankruptcy—Corporate Reorganization.
For Single Copy
$ 1.00
Administrator's claim in tort action US19_6 SCJ
1.50
For One Month
Bankruptcy—Corporate Reorganization.
For Six Months
7.50
Denial of reorganization under 77B
For One Year
15.00
US48_6 SCJ
(0
Bankruptcy—Judgments in Action for
EXTRA COPIES
Negligence
S2302_6 SCJ
To our subscribers: If you let us know before five
o'clock Saturday evening following release of opinions, Bankruptcy—Reorganization of Railroads
S3841_6 SCJ
we can furnish you extra copies at 25 cents each.
Bankruptcy—Tax Claims of States and
Cities
US3_6 SCJ
Banks; Period Extended in Which U. S. Obligations May Be Used as Collateral Security
6 SCJ
Adelson, Higgins v. (Merrick Co.) ____ 29754_6 SCJ 143
Barlow, State ex rel Wright v. (OrigAdjusted Compensation Act—
inal)
29868_6 SCJ
Amendment
HR13001 _6 SCJ
4
Barnebey, General Car Advertising Co.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
v. (Douglas Co.)
29749_6 SCJ
v. Haworth
US446_6 SCJ 261 Bartels v. Seefus (Douglas
Co.)
30037_6 SCJ
Agricultural Adjustment Act—Adjustment
Bass, State v. (Lancaster Co.)
29711_6
SCJ
of Crop Producers Contracts
S4786_6 SCJ
9 Bauman, Chicago & Northwestern
RailAgricultural Adjustment Act—Correction
way Co. v. (Douglas Co.)
29938_6 SCJ
in Reduction of Processing
Bauman, Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
Taxes
HR11821 _6 SCJ
9
& Omaha Ry. Co. v. (Douglas Co.) 29939_6 SCJ
Agricultural Adjustment Act—ModificaBelder v. Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co.
tions of Sugar Beets and Sugar(Douglas Co.)
29919_6 SCJ
cane as Commodities
SJRes278_6 SCJ
8 Bell v. Reed (Douglas Co.)
29707_6 SCJ
Agricultural Adjustment Act. RegulaBell, Malone v. (Lancaster Co.)
29802_6 SCJ
tions by Department in re Refunds
C SCJ 49 Ben B. Wood Realty Co v. Wood (DougAgriculture—Grasshopper Control _ HJRes642_6 SCJ
9
las 0o.)
29940_6 SCJ
Agriculture—Investigation of Traffic
Berbig, Estate of Schram, Schram v. _ 29844_6 SCJ
Conditions
7 Bernhardt. Admr. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
HR10591_6 SCJ
Ahrens v. American Smelting & RefinCo. (Lancaster Co.)
29862_6 SCJ
ing Co. (Douglas Co.)
29866_6 SCJ 346 Bixby, Davis v. (Sheridan Co.)
29737_6 SCJ
Almy, Exr, v. Avery (Lancaster Co.) 29928_6 SCJ 337 Blind Persons
HR4688_6 SCJ
American Central Life Insurance Co. v.
Bliss, Recr. v. White (Dawes Co.) ____ 29946_6 SCJ
Brown (Deuel Co.)
29725_6-SCJ 96 Bodie v. Epler (Cass Co.)
29798_6 SCJ
Amercian Central Life Insurance Co. v.
Bodkin v. State (Lancaster Co.)
29918_6 SCJ
Brown (Garden Co.)
29751_6 SCJ 97 Bolton, Wiltse v. (Washington Co.)
29830_6 SCJ
American National Bank, Tennessee PubBorden, Nebraska Mutual Insurance Co.
lishing Co. v.
US48_6 SCJ 66
v. (Pawnee Co.)
29811_6 SCJ
American Smelting & Refining Co.,
Boseman v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co. US531_6 SCJ
Ahrens v. (Douglas Co.)
29866_6 SCJ 346 Bourke, Parker v. (Cass Co.)
29718_6 SCJ
American Trust Co. v. Brubaker (York
Brady, Village of, Griffis v. (Lincoln
Co.)
29896_6 SCJ 271
Co.)
29867_6 SCJ
American Writing Paper Co., Holyoke
Bredthauer, Luikart, Receiver v. (GreeWater Power Co. v.
US180_6 SCJ 265
ley Co.)
29796_6 SCJ
Anderson v. Byrd (Phelps Co.)
29961_6 SCJ 466 Brinn-Jensen Co., Porter v. (Otoe Co.) 29863_6 SCJ
Anderson, Fluckey v. (Holt Co.)
29897_6 SCJ 507 Brodsky v. Brodsky (Douglas Co.)
29837_6 SCJ
Animals—Live Stock Industry
I1R10094_6 SCJ
2 Brown, American Central Life InsurAnniston Manufacturing Company v.
ance Co. v. (Deuel Co.)
29725_6 SCJ
Horwell G. Davis, Collector
U S667_6 SCJ 615 Brown, American Central Life InsurApplication of Furstenberg, Furstenberg
ance Co. v. (Garden Co.)
29751_6 SCJ
v. Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co. (RailBrownfield v. Edwards (Dawson Co.) _ 29819_6 SCJ
way Corn.)
29841_6 SCJ 425 Brubaker, American Trust Co. v. (York
Application of Platte Valley Public
Co.)
29896_6 SCJ
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal RevPower and Irrigation District,
Stock v. Platte Valley Public Power
enue
US451_6 SCJ
& Irrigation District (Lincoln Co.) 29971_6 SCJ 622 Buck, Luikart v. (Otoe Co.)
29768_6 SCJ
Cornelius Gant
Edgar A. Cole

Editor
Assistant Editor

284
31
181
453
337
487
385
158
69
64
66
30
29
68

INDEX TO OPINIONS(Cumulative)


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

301
225
135
623
21
196
196
328
24
391
625
250
291
161
6
491
343
413
293
489
500
35
384
188
34
508
96
97
282
271
302
149

VI
Buckley v. State (Lincoln Co.)
29816_6 SCJ 104
Burlington Refrigerator Express Co.,
Price v. (Cass Co.)
29878_6 SCJ 39
Burns, State ex rel Box berger v. (Douglas Co.)
30003_6 SCJ 168
Burton, Admr. v. Defenbaugh, Exr.
(Greeley Co.)
29969_6 SCJ 740
Butke v Nachschoen (Douglas Co.) __-_ 29849_6 SCJ 387
Byrd, Anderson v. (Phelps Co.)
29961_6 SCJ 466
Cagle, Melchert v. (Pierce Co.)
29789_6 SCJ 170
California, State Board of Equalization
of, v. Young's Market Co.
US22_6 SCJ 107
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co. US724_6 SCJ 732
Central Market, Inc. v. King, (Douglas
Co.)
29843_6 SCJ 312
Carlin Construction Co. v. Heaney
US9_6 SCJ 110
Carmichael V. Southern Coal & Coke
Co.
U S724_6 SCJ 732
Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District, Cozad Ditch Co. v.
(Dept. of Roads & Irrig.)
30092_6 SCJ 462
Central States Life Insurance Co.,
29'785_6 SCJ 253
Woods v. (Brown Co.)
Chain Store State Taxes—Iowa Law Held
US13_6 SCJ 69
Illegal
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v.
Bauman (Douglas Co.)
29938_6 SCJ 196
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., Bernhardt,
29862_6 SCJ 291
Admr. v. (Lancaster Co.)
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co., Hayes, Spec. Admx. v.
29742_6 SCJ 60
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha
Ry. Co. v. Bauman (Douglas Co.) _ 29939_6 SCJ 196
US271_6 SCJ 69
Church Street Building Corp. (620)
City of Fairbury, Cornhusker Electric
29778_6 SCJ 157
Co. v. (Jefferson Co.)
City of Lincoln v. Jordan (Lancaster
Co.)
30021_6 SCJ 148
City of Mitchell, Roberts v. (Scotts Bluff
29722_6 SCJ 56
Co.)
City of Omaha, Dabelstein v. (Douglas
29839_6 SCJ 505
Co.)
City of Omaha, Dunlap v. (Douglas Co.) 29875_6 SCJ 46
City of Omaha, Faiman v. (Douglas
29701_6 SCJ 156
Co.)
City of Plattsmouth v. Hazzard (Cass
29902_B SCJ 270
Co.)
City of Wilber, Speier's Laundry Co. v.
29715_6 SCJ 31
(Saline Co.)
29713_6 SCJ 138
Clarke v. Weatherly (Douglas Co.)
29714_6 SCJ 57
Association (Douglas Co.)
Clausen v. Omaha Loan & Building
29981_6 SCJ 527
Clough v. Clough (Dodge Co.)
30029_6 SCJ 209
Cochran, Laverty v. (Lancaster Co.)
29720_6 SCJ 151
Coleman v. Crosthwaite (Butler Co.)
Conservative Savings & Loan Association v. Mancuso (Douglas Co.) ____ 29913_6 SCJ 307
Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha (Lancas29874_6 SCJ 128
ter Co.)
Cooper, State ex rel Good v. (Original) 29084_6 SCJ 124
Cornhusker Electric Company v. City of
29778_6 SCJ 157
Fairbury (Jefferson Co.)
Cosmopolitan Old Line ,Life Insurance
Co. Howie v. (Lancaster Co.) ____ 29889_6 SCJ 311
Cover, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
29911_6 SCJ 327
Co. v. (Dawson Co.)
Cozad Ditch Co. v. Central Nebraska
Public Power and Irrigation District
30092_6 SCJ 462
(Dept. of Roads & Irrigation)
29784_B SCJ 465
Crafts v. Sawtelle (Douglas Co.)
Crawford State Bank v. McEwen
29790_B SCJ 333
(Dawes Co.)
Crete Mills v. Nebraska State Board of
29766_6 SCJ 255
Agriculture (Lancaster Co.)

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Crocker, State ex rel Hunter v. (Orig30079_6 SCJ 242
inal)
Crop Production and Harvesting Loans (1937) 6 SCJ 247
Crosthwaite, Coleman v. (Butler Co.) __ 29720_6 SCJ 151
Culhane, Mechanics Universal Joint Co.
US17_6 SCJ 108
v.
Dabelstein v. City of Omaha (Douglas
29839_6 SCJ 505
Co.)
29880_6 SCJ 744
Danbom v. Danbom (Douglas Co.)
Danielson, First Trust Co. of Lincoln v.
29791_6 SCJ 217
(Lancaster Co.)
29737_6 SCJ 161
Davis v. Bixby (Sheridan Co.)
29744_6 SCJ 125
Dean, Pester v. (Custer Co.)
Defenbaugh, Exr., Burton, Admr. v.
(Greeley Co.)
29969_6 SCJ 740
Department of Banking v. Stenger
29883_6 SCJ 417
(Platte Co.)
Department of Banking v. Walker
29926_6 SCJ 98
(Boone Co.)
Department of Roads and Irrigation,
30050_6 SCJ 252
Laudenklos v. (Dodge Co.)
Dickens, Village of, Pinches v. (Lincoln
29693_6 SCJ
1
Co.)
Dill V. Farmers Co-operative Co. of Oc29649_6 SCJ 248
onto (Custer Co.)
Dillie, Tenborg v. (Douglas Co.)
29825_6 SCJ 237
Dirk DeJonge v. State of Oregon ____ US123_6 SCJ 178
Disaster Loan Corporation (1937)
6 SCJ 261
Doan v. Hoppe (Lancaster Co.)
29935_6 SCJ 492
Doescher v. Robinson (Douglas Co.)
29822_6 SCJ 276
Dornacker, Oft v. (Douglas Co.)
29723_6 SCJ 43
Dover, Reifenrath v. (Madison Co.)
29812_6 SCJ 567
Downs v. Myers (Burt Co.)
29847_6 SCJ 310
Drewes, Gonschior v. (Jefferson Co.)
(29696, 5 SCJ 913 vacated)
29696_6 SCJ 120
Drewes, Gonschior v. (Jefferson Co.)
(29700, 5 SCJ 915 vacated)
29700_6 SCJ 123
Duke Power Co. v Greenwood County US32_6 SCJ 131
Duncan, Mercurio v. (Richardson Co.) _ 29738_6 SCJ 101
Dunlap v. City of Omaha (Douglas Co.) 29875_6 SCJ 46
Durbin, Hassett v. (Chase Co.)
29893_6 SCJ 279
Dymak v. Haskins Bros. & Co. (Douglas
29975_6 SCJ 282
Co.) .
Eckstein, Hladky v. (Saunders Co.)
29877_6 SCJ 489
Edwards, Brownfield v. (Dawson Co.) _ 29819_6 SCJ 282
Egan v. Standard Oil Co. (Dawes Co.) 29805_6 SCJ 383
29933_6 SCJ 420
Elson v. Nelson (Frontier Co.)
Ely, Hatch v. (Morrill Co.)
29777_6 SCJ 147
Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,
Updike Invest. Co. v. (Douglas Co.) 29755_6 SCJ 102
Enright v. Enright (Lancaster Co.)
29799_6 SCJ 193
Epler, Bodie v. (Cass Co.)
29798_6 SCJ 343
Ericsson v. Streitz (Lincoln Co.)
29865_6 SCJ 514
Estate of Cagle, Melchert v. Cagle
(Pierce Co.)
29789_6 SCJ 170
Estate of Enright, Enright v. Enright
(Lancaster Co.)
29799_6 SCJ 193
Estate of Gibbons, McDonald v. Gibbons
(Buffalo Co.)
29932_6 SCJ 416
Estate of Hunter, Almy Exr. v. Avery
(Lancaster Co.)
29928_6 SCJ 337
Estate of King, Downs v. Myers (Burt
Co.)
29847_6 SCJ 310
Estate of Kothe, Gonschior v. Drewes
(Jefferson Co.) (29696, 5 SCJ 913
vacated)
29696_6 SCJ 120
Estate of Kothe, Gonschior v. Drewes
(Jefferson Co.) (29700, 5 SCJ 915
vacated)
29700_6 SCJ 123
Estate of Mattingly, Coleman v. Crosthwaithe (Butler Co.)
29720_6 SCJ 151
Estate of Nelson, Nelson v. Frey (Pierce
Co.)
29922_6 SCJ 307
Estate of Parvin, Parvin v. Hagenbuch
(Lancaster Co.)
29571_6 SCJ 139

•

•

—Alba

VII

S

•

Estate of Schram, Schram v. Berbig
(Buffalo Co.)
29844_6 SCJ
Estate of Shierman, Shierman v. Shea
(Adams Co.)
29836_6 SCJ
Evidence—Admissibility
HR11690_6 SCJ
Faiman v. City of Omaha (Douglas Co.) 29701_6 SCJ
Fairbury, City of, Cornhusker Electric
Co. v. (Jefferson Co.)
29778_6 SCJ
Fair-Way Oil Co. v. State (Washington
Co.)
29834_6 SCJ
Faith v. Hamilton County (Hamilton
Co.)
29949_6 SCJ
Falkinburg v. Inter-State Business
Men's Accident Co. of Des Moines,
Ia. (Douglas Co.)
29945_6 SCJ
Falkinburg v. Prudential Insurance Co.
(Douglas Co.)
29903_6 SCJ
Farlow, McDaniel v. (Scotts Bluff Co.) 29864_6 SCJ
Farm Mortgage Act Amendment ____ HR9484_6 SCJ
Farmers Co-operative Co. of Oconto, Dill
v. (Custer Co.)
29649_6 SCJ
Farmers Irrigation District, Vonburg v.
(Scotts Bluff Co.)
29916_6 SCJ
Farmers Security Bank Maywood v.
Wood (Saunders Co.)
29772_6 SCJ
Farmers State Bank, Clarks v. Luikart
(Merrick Co.)
29708_6 SCJ
Federal Credit Co. v. Reynolds (Lancester Co.)
29934_6 SCJ
Federal Income Tax—Exemption of Salary of
City Employee
6 SCJ
Feltz v. Platte Valley Public Power and
Irrigation District (Keith Co.) ____ 29807_6 SCJ
Feltz, Platte Valley Public Power and
Irrigation District v. (Keith Co.) 29806_6 SCJ
First Bk. Stock Corp v. State of Minn. 1JS647_6 SCJ
First National Bank and Trust Company of Bridgeport, Conn. v. Francis E. Beach
US621_6 SCJ
First State Bank of Gothenburg v. Prudential Insurance Co.(Dawson Co.) _29763_6 SCJ
First Trust Company, L. P. Larson Real
Property Company v. (Dodge Co.) 29962_6 SCJ
First Trust Co. v. Rathbone (Lancaster
Co.)
29876_6 SCJ
First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Danielson
(Lancaster Co.)
29791_6 SCJ
First Trust Company of Lincoln v. Waller (Lancaster Co.)
29800_6 SCJ
Fisher v. National Mortgage Loan Company (Lancaster Co.)
29728_6 SCJ
Fluckey v. Anderson (Holt Co.)
29897_6 SCJ
Foust, Adm. v. Munson Steamship Lines US19_6 SCJ
Frades v. State (Thayer Co.)
29873_6 SCJ
Frazier-Lemke Act As Amended in 1935
held Constitutional
US530_6 SCJ
Frey, Estate of Nelson, Nelson V.
(Pierce Co.)
29922_6 SCJ
Frey, Nelson v. (Pierce Co.)
29922_6 SCJ
From v. General American Life Ins. Co.
(Lancaster Co.)
29977_6 SCJ
Fuller, Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v.
(Chase Co.)
29964_6 SCJ
Furst v. Kruger (Otoe Co.)
29775_6 SCJ
Furstenberg v. Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co.
(Railway Corn.)
29841_6 SCJ
General American Life Ins. Co., From v.
(Lancaster Co.)
29977_6 SCJ
General American Life Ins. Co., Hahn v.
(Douglas Co.)
29947_6 SCJ
General American Life Insurance Co.,
State ex rel Smrha v.
30078_6 SCJ
General Car Advertising Co. v. Bernebey (Douglas Co.)
29749_6 SCJ


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

250
163
5
156
157
504
120
503
626
268
248
171
222
61
383
302
236
235
499
619
88
739
241
217
249
229
507
64
136
375
307
307
531
510
185
425
531
388
421
135

George and Mary Reisch Company, Miller v. (Hamilton Co.)
29948_6 SCJ 287
Gerhard, Wilson v. (Cass Co.)
29586_6 SCJ 125
Gibbons Estate, McDonaid v. Gibbons
(Buffalo Co.)
29932_6 SCJ 416
Glassmeyer, Markel v. (Cass Co.)
30012_6 SCJ 529
Glassmeyer, Markel v. (Cass Co.)
29988_6 SCJ 529
Glissmann v. Happy Hollow Club (Douglas Co.)
29870_6 SCJ 240
Gold Clause Resolution Applies to Rental of Lease Payable in Quantity of
Gold
6 SCJ 265
Gold Reserve Act of 1934 Amended ____ S416_6 SCJ 221
Gonschior v. Drewes (Jefferson Co.)
(29696, 5 SCJ 913 vacated)
29696_6 SCJ 120
Gonschior v. Drewes (Jefferson Co.)
(29700, 5 SCJ 915 vacated)
29700_6 SCJ 123
Good, State ex rdl v. Cooper (Original) 29084_6 SCJ 124
Stanosheck
Goodall v.
(Gage Co.)
29752_6 SCJ 86
Goodman v. State (Lincoln Co.)
29998_6 SCJ 40
Grace, Rundall v. (Douglas Co.)
29921_6 SCJ 389
Grasshoppers, Plant Insects & Disease; Appropriation to Control
6 SCJ 502
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Alice Lee Grosjean, Supervisor __ US652_6 SCJ 611
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Valentine v.
US13_6 SCJ 69
Greenwood County, Duke Power Co. v. US32_6 SCJ 131
Griffin, McWilliams v. (Lancaster Co.) 29931_6 SCJ 578
Griffis v. Village of Brady (Lincoln Co.) 29867_6 SCJ 384
Griffith, Keller v. (Douglas Co.)
29912_6 SCJ 308
Group Insurance; Law Governing Policy Issued
in One State to Cover Employee Resident
and Working in Another
6 SCJ 500
Gulzow, Tagge v. (Hall Co.)
29824_6 SCJ 271
Guse v. Wessels (York Co.)
29985_6 SCJ 164
Hagenbuch, Parvin v. (Lancaster Co.)_ 29571_6 SCJ 139
Hahn v. General American Life Ins. Co.
(Douglas Co.)
29947_6 SCJ 388
Hamilton County, Faith v. (Hamilton
Co.)
29949_6 SCJ 120
Happy Hollow Club, Glissmann v.
(Douglas Co.)
29870_6 SCJ 240
Harrison, Major v. (Washington Co.)
29848_6 SCJ 286
Haskins Bros. & Co., Dymak V. (Douglas Co.)
29975_6 SCJ 282
Hassett v. Durbin (Chase Co.)
29893_6 SCJ 279
Hatch v. Ely (Morrill Co.)
29777_6 SCJ 147
Haworth, Aetna Life Insurance Co. of
Hartford, Conn. v.
US446_6 SCJ 261
Hayes, Spec. Admx. v. Chicago, Burlington & Q. Rr. Co. (Richardson Co.)_29742_6 SCJ 60
Hazzard, City of Plattsmouth V. (Cass
Co.)
29902_6 SCJ 270
Health and Sanitation Funds
6 SCJ 301
Heaney, Carlin Construction Co. v.
US9_6 SCJ 110
Heffner, State Life Ins. Co. v.
29764_6 SCJ 62
Hellerich v. Tyson (Otoe Co.)
29885_6 SCJ 270
Helvering v. Davis
US910_6 SCJ 729
Heineman v. Wilson (Lancaster Co.) ___29833_6 SCJ 227
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.
US418_6 SCJ 380
Henton v. State (Douglas Co.)
29787_6 SCJ 32
Herpolsheimer Bldg. Co., Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. (Lancaster Co.) 29792_6 SCJ 219
Higgins v. Adelson (Merrick Co.)
29754_6 SCJ 143
Hladky v. Eckstein (Saunders Co.)
29877_6 SCJ 489
Hoffmark, Lemon v. (Lancaster Co.)
29900_6 SCJ 330
Hollibaugh v. School District No. 89
(Dawes Co.)
29760_6 SCJ 88
Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American
Writing Paper Co.
US180_6 SCJ 265
Home Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Schmitt
(Cheyenne Co.)
29967_6 SCJ 742
Hopkins, Krug v. (Douglas Co.)
29908_6 SCJ 571

VIII
29935_6 SCJ
Hoppe, Doan v. (Lancaster Co.)
Hotel Stratton. Plaza Hotel Co. V.
29917_6 SCJ
(Wayne Co.)
Howie v. Cosmopolitan Old Line Life In29889_6 SCJ
surance Co. (Lancaster Co.)
29831_6 SCJ
Hrauda, Potach v. (Douglas Co.)
29857_6 SCJ
Hudson v. Schmid (Lancaster Co.)
US97_6 SCJ
Hudson, United States v.
•
Huffman, Sanderson v. (Banner Co.) _ 29859_6 SCJ
Hunter Estate, Almy v. Avery (Lan29928_6 SCJ
caster Co.)
Hunter, Slosburg v. (Douglas Co.) ____ 29909_6 SCJ
29756_6 SCJ
Hyslop, State v. (Hall Co.)
Illinois Central R. R. Co., Kentucky
US138_6 SCJ
Whip & Collar Co. v.
In re 620 Church Street Building Corp. US271_6 SCJ
US456_6 SCJ
Ingels, Director v. Monf
Insurance—Declaratory Judgment Juris6 SCJ
diction of Federal Courts
Inter-State Business Men's Accident Co.
of Des Moines, Ia., Falkinburg v.
29945_6 SCJ
(Douglas Co.)
HR9009_6 SCJ
Irrigation—Farm Loans
US151_6 SCJ
Irving Trust Co., Meadows v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
29911_6 SCJ
Cover (Dawson Co.)
29927_6 SCJ
Johnson v. Loewen (Polk Co.)
Johnson v. Olson (Saunders Co.) ___ 29929_6 SCJ
Jordan, City of Lincoln v. (Lancaster
30021_6 SCJ
Co.)
Jose Rivera Soler & Co. v. United Firemen's Insurance Co. of Philadelphia US31_6 SCJ
Kansas City Bridge Co., McGuire v.
29879_6 SCJ
(Douglas Co.)
Kearney, Lennon v. (Dakota Co.)
29813_6 SCJ
29912_6 SCJ
Keller v. Griffith (Douglas Co.)
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
US138_6 SCJ
Central R. R. Co.
Kimble, Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
(Saunders Co.)
29820_6 SCJ
King, Central Market, Inc., v. (Douglas
29843_6 SCJ
Co.)
King Estate, Downs v. Myers (Burt Co.) 29847_6 SCJ
Kothe Estate, Gonschior v. Drewes
(Jefferson Co.) (29696, 5 SCJ 913
vacated)
29696_6 SCJ
Kothe Estate, Gonschior v. Drewes
(Jefferson Co.) (29700, 5 SCJ 915
vacated)
29700_6 SCJ
Kramper v. St. John's Church of Vista
29773_6 SCJ
(Dakota Co.)
Krejci, Securities Investment Corp. v.
(Cass Co.)
29846_6 SCJ
Krug v. Hopkins (Douglas Co.)
29908_6 SCJ
Krug Park Amusement Co., Platner
Lumber Co. v. (Douglas Co.)
29689_6 SCJ
Kruger, Furst v. (Otoe Co.)
29775_6 SCJ
Kucera v. Pellan (Butler Co.)
29978_6 SCJ
KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press
US28_6 SCJ
L. P. Larson Real Property Company v.
The First Trust Company (Dodge
Co.)
29962_6 SCJ
Labor Unions—Interference with
Picketing
S9039_6 SCJ
Landis v. North America Co.
US221_6 SCJ
Laudenklos v. Department of Roads and
Irrigation (Dodge Co.)
30050_6 SCJ
Laverty v. Cochran (Lancaster Co.,) __ 30029_6 SCJ
Le Bron Electrical Works, Inc. v. Pizinger (Douglas Co.)
29855_6 SCJ
Lee, State Life Insurance Company v.
(Hayes Co.)
29979_6 SCJ
Lemon v. Hoffmark (Lancaster Co.)
29900_6 SCJ
Lennon v. Kearney (Dakota Co.)
29813_6 SCJ


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

492
327
311
267
424
183
275
337
419
52
175
69
263
261
503
7
174
327
309
576
148
111
161
223
308
175
331
312
310
120
123
133
215
571
141
185
530
181
739
12
113
252
209
221
484
330
223

Lincoln, City of, v. Jordan (Lancaster
30021_6 SCJ 148
Co.)
Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Fuller
29964_6 SCJ 510
(Chase Co.)
Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co. v.
School District 41 (Brown Co.)
29753_6 SCJ 122
Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Rich29888_6 SCJ 269
ards (Deuel Co.)
29956_6 SCJ 511
Lindholm v. Resnick (Douglas Co.)
Lindquist, Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
(Douglas Co.)
29957_6 SCJ 239
Loewen, Johnson v. (Polk Co.)
29927_6 SCJ 309
London Guarantee & Accident Co., McCleneghan v. (Douglas Co.)
29678_6 SCJ 212
Longenecker, Asmus v. (Saline Co.) __ 29716_6 SCJ 31
Luikart v. Buck (Otoe Co.)
29768_6 SCJ 149
Luikart, Farmers State Bank, Clarks v. 29708_6 SCJ 61
Luikart, Receiver v. Bank of Benkelman
29954_6 SCJ 385
(Dundy Co.)
Luikart, Receiver v. Bredthauer (Greeley
29796_6 SCJ 188
Co.)
Luikart, Receiver v. Miles (Sarpy Co.) 29794_6 SCJ 194
29907_6 SCJ 340
Lundeen, Triplett v. (Adams Co.)
McAndrews v. Prudential Insurance Co.
29795_6 SCJ 289
of America (Douglas Co.)
McCleneghan v. London Guarantee &
29678_6 SCJ 212
Accident Co. (Douglas Co.)
McDaniel v. McDaniel (Saunders Co.) 29197_6 SCJ 41
McDaniel v. Farlow (Scotts Bluff Co.) _ 29864_6 SCJ 268
McDonald v. Gibbons (Buffalo Co.) ----29932_6 SCJ 416
McEwen, Crawford State Bank v.
29790_6 SCJ 333
(Dawes Co.)
McGinley v. Platte Valley Public Power
& Irrigation District (Keith Co.) --29821_6 SCJ 284
McGuire v. Kansas City Bridge Company (Douglas Co.)
29879_6 SCJ 161
McWilliams v. Griffin (Lancaster Co.) 29931_6 SCJ 578
29892_6 SCJ 467
Mabry v. Mudd (Douglas Co.)
Major v. Harrison (Washington Co.)
29848_6 SCJ 286
Malone v. Bell (Lancaster Co.)
29802_6 SCJ 391
Mancuso, Conservative Savings &
Loan Association v. (Douglas Co.) 29913_6 SCJ 307
Markel v. Glassmeyer (Cass Co.)
30012_6 SCJ 529
29988_6 SCJ 529
Markel v. Glassmeyer (Cass Co.)
Markussen v. Mengedoht (Douglas Co.) 29826_6 SCJ 336
Mason v. State (Douglas Co.)
29861_6 SCJ 166
Mauel, Vanburg v. (Lancaster Co.)
29726_6 SCJ 54
US151_6 SCJ 174
Meadows v. Irving Trust Co.
Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane US17_6 SCJ 108
Medow v. Riggert (Seward Co.)
29884_6 SCJ 339
Melchert v. Cagle (Pierce Co.)
29789_6 SCJ 170
Mengedoht, Markussen v. (Douglas
Co.)
29826_6 SCJ 336
Menssen, Reinhardt v. (Jefferson Co.) _ 29838_6 SCJ 238
Mercurio v. Duncan (Richardson Co.) _ 29738_6 SCJ 101
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Serven v.
29965_6 SCJ 485
(Lancaster Co.)
Mettlen v. Sandoz (Sioux Co.)
29710_6 SCJ 36
Meyer, Peters v. (Wheeler Co.)
29769_6 SCJ 134
Miles, Luikart, Receiver v. (Sarpy Co.) 29794_6 SCJ 194
Miller v. George and Mary Reisch Company (Hamilton Co.)
29948_6 SCJ 287
Minimum Wage Law of Washington for
Women and Children Held ConstituUS293_6 SCJ 368
tional
US3_6 SCJ 68
Missouri, State of v. Ross
Mitchell, City of, Roberts v. (Scotts
29722_6 SCJ 56
Bluff Co.)
29890_6 SCJ 59
Moffitt v. Reed (Lancaster Co.)
Monopolies and Combinations—AmendH12)1442_6 SCJ 10
ment
Morf, Ingles, Director v.
US456_6 SCJ 263
Motor Vehicles—California Caravan Li6 SCJ 263
cense Fee held Unconstitutional
29892_6 SCJ 467
Mudd, Mabry v. (Douglas Co.)

•

DC

I

Mulhair, Schindler v. (Boyd Co.) ____ 29840_6 SCJ
Munson Steamship Lines, Foust, Adm. v. US19_6 SCJ
Myers, Downs v. (Burt Co.)
29847_6 SCJ
Myers, Estate of King, Downs v. (Burt
Co.)
29847_6 SCJ
Nachschoen, Butke v. (Douglas Co.)
29849_6 SCJ
Naeve v. Shea (Douglas Co.)
29989_6 SCJ
National Fire Insurance Co., Quisenberry v. (Douglas Co.)
29973_6 SCJ
National Housing Act; Amendment Insuring
Catastrophe Loans
S1228_6 SCJ
National Housing Act, Extension
6 SCJ
National Labor Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co.
U S420_6 SCJ
National Labor Relations Board v.
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Co., Inc.
US422_6 SCJ
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.
US419_6 SCJ
National Mortgage Loan Company,
Fisher v. (Lancaster Co.)
29728_6 SCJ
National Window Cleaning Co., White v.
(Douglas Co.)
30032_6 SCJ
Nebraska Mutual Insurance Co. v. Borden (Pawnee Co.)
29811_6 SCJ
Nebraska State Board of Agriculture,
Crete Mills v. (Lancaster Co.)
29766_6 SCJ
Nelson V. Frey (Pierce Co.)
29922_6 SCJ
Nelson, Elson v. (Frontier Co.)
29933_6 SCJ
Newell v. Pierce (Adams Co.)
29634_6 SCJ
Nispel, Steeves • v. (Deuel Co.)
29803_6 SCJ
Norris v. United States of America
USCCA 10553_6 SCJ
North American Co., Landis v.
US221_6 SCJ
Oft v. Dornacker (Douglas Co.)
29723_6 SCJ
Ohrt, Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. (Douglas
Co.)
29767_6 SCJ
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.
US226_6 SCJ
Olson, Johnson v. (Saunders Co.) ____ 29929_6 SCJ
Olson, Weidenfeld v. (Cedar Co.) ____ 29809_6 SCJ
Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co., Application
of Furstenberg, Furstenberg v.
(Railway Corn.)
29841_6 SCJ
Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co., Belder V.
(Douglas Co.)
29919_6 SCJ
Omaha, City of. Dabelstein v. (Douglas
Co.)
29839_6 SCJ
Omaha, City of, Dunlap v (Douglas Co.)
29875_6 SCJ
Omaha, City of, Faiman v. (Douglas
Co.)
29701_6 SCJ
Omaha Loan & Building Association,
Clausen v. (Douglas Co.)
29714_6 SCJ
Omaha & Council Bluffs $t. Ry. Co.,
Peterson v. (Douglas Co.)
29683_6 SCJ
Oregon, State of, Dirk DeJonge v.
US123_6 SCJ
Parker v. Bourke (Cass Co.)
29718_6 SCJ
Parvin v. Hagefibuch (Lancaster Co.) _ 29571_6 SCJ
Pastime Amusement Co., Southeastern
Express Co. v.
US46_6 SCJ
Pellan, Kucera v. (Butler Co.)
29978_6 SCJ
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kimble
(Saunders Co.)
29820_6 SCJ
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lindquist
(Douglas Co.)
29957_6 SCJ
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Sweeney (Douglas Co.)
29963_6 SCJ
Pep Boys, Manny, Moe & Jack of California v. Pyroil Sales Co. Inc. _ ___US55_6 SCJ
Perishable Commodities Act—
Amendment
HR8759 6 SCJ
Perjury Purging—Questions of Law and
Fact. Grocer Norris Case - USCCA 10553_6 SCJ


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

565
64
310

Perjury—Retractions of False Testimony
U S600_6 SCJ 359
Pester v. Dean (Custer Co.)
29744_6 SCJ 125
Peters v. _Meyer (Wheeler Co.)
29769_6 SCJ 134
310 Petersen, Reitz v. (Madison Co.)
29758_6 SCJ 84
387 Peterson v. Omaha & Council Bluffs
569
Street Ry. Co. (Douglas Co.)
29683_6 SCJ 54
Petters v. Storm (Scotts Bluff Co.)
29860_6 SCJ 415
573 Pierce, Newell v. (Adams Co.)
29634_6 SCJ 137
Pinches v. The Village of Dickens (Lincoln
565
Co.)
29693_6 SCJ
1
275 Pizinger, LeBron Electrical Works, Inc.
v. (Douglas Co.)
29855_6 SCJ 221
458 Platner Lumber Co. v. Krug Park
Amusement Co. (Douglas Co.)
29689_6 SCJ 141
Platte Valley Public Power & Irriga459
tion District, Application of Platte
Valley Public Power and Irrigation
439
District, Steck v. (Lincoln Co.)
29971_6 SCJ 622
Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation
229
District, Appropriation of Lands,
McGinley v. (Keith Co.)
29821_6 SCJ 284
216 Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District v. Feltz (Keith Co.) _ 29806_6 SCJ 235
489 Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, Feltz v. (Keith Co.) _ 29807_6 SCJ 236
255 Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation
307
District, McGinley v. (Keith Co.)
29821_6 SCJ 284
420 Plattsmouth, City of, Hazzard v. (Cass
137
Co.)
. 29902_6 SCJ 270
471 Plaza Hotel Co. v. Hotel Stratton
(Wayne Co.)
29917_6 SCJ 327
93 Potach v. Hrauda (Douglas Co.)
29831_6 SCJ 267
113 Potter v. Brinn-Jensen Co. (Otoe Co.) 29863_6 SCJ 34
43 Prescher v. Baker Ice Machine Co.
(Douglas Co.)
30087_6 SCJ 487
158 Price v. Burlington Refrigerator Express Co. (Cass Co.)
29878_6 SCJ 39
115 Prudential Insurance Co., Falkinburg v.
576
(Douglas Co.)
29903_6 SCJ 626
277 Prudential Ins. Co., First State Bank of
Gothenburg v. (Dawson Co.)
29763_6 SCJ 88
Prudential Insurance Co. of America,
425
McAndrews v. (Douglas Co.)
29795_6 SCJ 289
PWA—Regulation As to Jurisdiction
328
and Taxation
S3247_6 SCJ 11
Pyroil Sales Co. Inc., Pep Boys, Manny,
505
Moe & Jack of Calif. v.
US55_6 SCJ 119
Quein, Willson v. (Morrill Co.)
29719_6 SCJ 33
46 Quisenberry v. National Fire Insurance
Co. (Douglas Co.)
29973_6 SCJ 573
156 Railway Labor Act Relating to Negotiation With Labor Leaders held Con57
stitutional
US324_6 SCJ 361
Rasmussen v. Rasmussen (Douglas Co.) 29762_6 SCJ 87
54 hathbone, First Trust Co. v. (Lancaster
178
Co.)
29876_6 SCJ 241
35 Rebbc, Rogers v. (Dodge Co.)
29895_6 SCJ 465
139 Reed, Bell v. (Douglas Co.)
29707_6 SCJ 24
Reed, Moffitt v.
29890_6 SCJ 59
112 Reichenbach, Ricketts v. (Lancaster Co.) 29869_6 SCJ 347
530 Reifenrath v. Dover (Madison Co.)
29812_6 SCJ 567
Reinhardt v. Menssen (Jefferson Co.) 29838_6 SCJ 238
331 Reitz v. Petersen (Madison Co.)
29758_6 SCJ 84
Resettlement Administration, Emergency
239
Relief Act—Regulations As to Jurisdiction and Taxation
HR12876_6 SCJ 12
486 Resnick, Lindholm v. (Douglas Co.) __ 29956_6 SCJ 511
Revenue Act of 1932 —Amendment _ HR12324 _6 SCJ
8
119 Reynolds, Federal Credit Co. v. (Lancaster Co.)
29934_6 SCJ 383
3 R. F. C. Functions Extended
S415_6 SCJ 221
Richards. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co.
93
v. (Deuel Co.)
29888_6 SCJ 269

Ricketts v. Reichenbach (Lancaster
Co.)
29869-6 SCJ
Riggert, Medow v. (Seward Co.)
29884_6 SCJ
Riggs Optical Co. v. Riggs (Lancaster
Co.)
29797_6 BCJ
Riggs, Riggs Optical Co. v. (Lancaster
Co.)
29797_6 SCJ
Roberts v. City of Mitchell (Scotts Bluff
Co.)
29722_6 SCJ
Robinson, Doescher v. (Douglas Co.)
29822_6 SCJ
Rogers v. Rebbe (Dodge Co.)
29895_6 SCJ
Rolland v. School District No. 4 of Dakota County (Dakota Co.)
29881_6 SCJ
Ross, State of Missouri v.
US3_6 SCJ
Royal Arcanum, Whitehorn v. (Douglas
Co.)
29724_6 SCJ
Rundall v. Grace (Douglas Co.)
29921_6 SCJ
St. John's Church of Vista, Kramper v.
(Dakota Co.)
29773_6 SCJ
Sanderson v. Huffman (Banner Co.)
29859_6 SCJ
Sandoz, Mettlen v. (Sioux Co.)
29710_6 SCJ
Sawtelle, Crafts v. (Douglas Co.) ____ 29784_6 SCJ
Schindler v. Mulhair (Boyd Co.) ____ 29840_6 SCJ
Schleif v. State (Thayer Co.)
29906_6 SCJ
Schmid, Hudson v. (Lancaster Co.) ____ 29857_6 SCJ
Schmitt, Home Savings & Loan Ass'n. v.
(Cheyenne Co.)
29967_6 SCJ
Schobert-Zimmerman Drainage District
v. Soil (Sarpy Co.)
29930_6 SCJ
Schoenleber (Charlotta A), Bankrupt US2630 6 SCJ
School District No. 4 of Dakota County,
Rolland v. (Dakota Co.)
29881_6 SCJ
School District 41, Lincoln National
Bank & Trust Co. v. (Brown Co.) 29753_6 SCJ
School Dist. No. 89, Hollibaugh v. (Dawes
Co.)
29760_6 SCJ
Schram v Berbig (Buffalo Co.)
29844_6 SCJ
Scott v. Scott (Otoe Co.)
29801_6 SCJ
Scott v. Swank (Johnson Co.)
29887_6 SCJ
Seagram-Distillers Corp., Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v.
US226_6 SCJ
Securities Investment Corp. v. Krejci
(Cass Co.)
29846_6 SCJ
Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Herpolsheimer Bldg. Co. (Lancaster Co.) 29792_6 SCJ
Seefus, Bartels v. (Douglas Co.)
30037_6 SCJ
Serven v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
(Lancaster Co.)
29966_6 SCJ
Shagool v. Young (Nemaha Co.)
30010_6 SCJ
29989_6 SCJ
Shea, Naeve v. (Douglas Co.)
29836_6 SCJ
Shea, Shierman v. (Adams Co.)
Shierman v. Shea (Adams Co.)
29836_6 SCJ
29909_6 SCJ
Slosburg v. Hunter (Douglas Co.)
Smith, Snyder v. (Douglas Co.)
29958_6 SCJ
Smrha, Continental Ins. Co. v. (Lancas29874_6 SCJ
ter Co.)
Snyder v. Smith (Douglas Co.)
29958_6 SCJ
Social Security Act—Regulations 91 in
re Employees' and Employers' Tax
under Title VIII
_6 SCJ
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act—Amendment
SJRes291_6 SCJ
Soil, Schobert-Zimmerman Drainage
District v. (Sarpy Co.)
29930_6 SCJ
Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime
Amusement Co.
US46_6 SCJ
Speier's Laundry Co. v. City of Wilber
(Saline Co.)
29715_6 SCJ
Spier v. Thomas (Douglas Co.)
29982_6 SCJ
Standard Oil Co., Egan v. (Dawes Co.) 29805_6 SCJ
Stanosheck, Geldall v. (Gage Co.)
29752_6 SCJ
State v. Bass (Lancaster Co.)
29711_6 SCJ
State v. Hyslop (Hall Co.)
29756_6 SCJ
State Board of Equalization of California
v. Young's Market Co.
US22_6 SCJ

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

347
339
165
165
56
276
465
268
68
89
389
133
275
36
465
565
150
424
742
488
480
268
122
88
250
163
534
115
215
219
623
485
528
569
163
163
419
386
128
386
71
8
488
112
31
27
383
86
21
52
107

_ 29918_6 SCJ
State, Bodkin v. (Lancaster Co.)
29816_6 SCJ
State, Buckley v. (Lincoln Co.)
State ex rel Boxberger v. Burns (Douglas Co.)
30003_6 SCJ
State ex rel Good v. Cooper (Original) 29084_6 SCJ
State ex rel Hunter v. Crocker (Original)
30079_6 SCJ
State ex rel Smrha v. General American
Life Insurance Co.
30078_6 SCJ
State ex rel Wright v. Barlow (Original) 29868_6 SCJ
State, Fair-Way Oil Co. v. (Washington
Co.)
29834_6 SCJ
State, Frades v. (Thayer Co.)
29873_6 SCJ
State, Goodman v. (Lincoln Co.)
29998_6 SCJ
State, Henton v. (Douglas Co.)
29787_6 SCJ
State Life Ins. Co. v. Heffner (Lincoln
Co.)
29764_6 SCJ
State Life Insurance Company v. Lee
(Hayes Co.)
29979_6 SCJ
State, Mason v. (Douglas Co.)
_ 29861_6 SCJ
State of Missouri v. Ross, Trustee
US3_6 SCJ
State of Nebraska ex rel Wm. H.
Wright v. Van Kirk
30014_6 SCJ
State of Oregon, Dirk DeJonge v. ____ US123_6 SCJ
State, Schleif v. (Thayer Co.)
29906_6 SCJ
State, Stump v. (Fernas Co.)
29952_6 SCJ
State, Swanson v. (Original)
30064_6 SCJ
Stay of Proceedings, Pending Determination of Another Case—Abuse
of Power
US221_6 SCJ
Steck v. Platte Valley Public Power & •
Irrigation District (Lincoln Co.) __ 29971 _6 SCJ
Steeves v. Nispel (Deuel Co.)
29803_6 SCJ
Stenger, Department of Banking v.
(Platte Co.)
29883_6 SCJ
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis
US837_6 SCJ
Storm, Petters v. (Scotts Bluff Co.) _ 29860_6 SCJ
Stratton Hotel, Plaza Hotel Co. v. (Wayne
Co.)
29917_6 SCJ
Strawhacker v. Strawhacker (Jefferson
Co.)
29951_6 SCJ
Streitz, Ericsson v. (Lincoln Co.) ____ 29865_6 SCJ
Stump v. State (Furnas Co.)
29952_6 SCJ
Supreme Court Judges' Retirement Act ____ 6 SCJ
Sutherland v. Sutherland (Douglas Co.) _29886_6 SCJ
Swank, Scott v. (Johnson Co.)
29887_6 SCJ
Swanson v. State (Original)
30064_6 SCJ
Sweeney, Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. (Douglas Co.)
29963_6 SCJ
Tagge v. Gulzow (Hall Co.)
29824_6 SCJ
Tax as an Additional Compensating Tax
on Personal Property Used in a
State Where There Is a Sales Tax
but Bought in a State Without a
Sales Tax
US418_6 SCJ
Tax Upon Carriers and Their Employees Extended to June 30, 1938
6 SCJ
Taxing Bank Stock in Two States
6 SCJ
Tenborg v. Dillie (Douglas Co.)
29825_6 SCJ
Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American
National Bank
US48_6 SCJ
,Thomas v. Thomas (Scotts Bluff Co.) _ 30031_6 SCJ
Thomas, Spier v. (Douglas Co.)
29982_6 SCJ
Trade Practices. Unfair Competition.
Fair Trade Act of California
US55_6 SCJ
Trade Practices. Unfair Competition.
Fair Trade Act of Illinois
US226_6 SCJ
Triplett v. Lundeen (Adams Co.) ____ 29907_6 SCJ
Trust Powers of National Banks
6 SCJ
Tyson, Hellerich v. (Otoe Co.)
29885_6 SCJ
United Firemen's Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, Jose Rivera Soler & Co. v. US31_6 SCJ
United States v. George Norris ____ US600_6 SCJ
United States v. Hudson
US97_6 SCJ

413
104
168
124
242
421
225
504
136
40
32•
62
484
166
68
38
178
150
187
200
113
622
471
417
717
415
327
469
514
187
301
413
534
200
486
271

380
301
499
237
66
621
27
119
115
340
13
270
111
359
183

•

XI
United States of America, Norris v.
USCCA 10553 6 SCJ 93
Updike Investment Co. v. The Employers
Liability Assurance Corporation
(Douglas Co.)
297 55_6,SCJ 102
Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.
US13_6 SCJ 69
Van Kirk, State of Nebraska ex rel
Win. H. Wright v.
30014_6 SCJ 38
Vanburg v. Mauel (Lancaster Co.) ____ 29726_6 SCJ 54
Vaughan v. Vaughan (Douglas Co.) __ 29779_6 SCJ 122
Village of Brady, Griffis v. (Lincoln
Co.)
29867_6 SCJ 384
Village of Dickens, Pinches v. (Lincoln
Co.)
29693_6 SCJ
1
Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation
No. 40
US324_6 SCJ 361
Vonburg v. Farmers Irrigation District
(Scotts Bluff Co.)
29916_6 SCJ 171
Walker, Department of Banking v.
(Boone Co.)
29926_6 SCJ 98
Waller, First Trust Company of Lincoln
v. Lancaster Co.)
29800_6 SCJ 249
Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board
US469 6 SCJ 461
Weatherly, Clarke v. (Douglas Co.) __ 29713_6 SCJ 138
Weidenfeld v. Olson (Cedar Co.)
29809_6 SCJ 277

•


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Wessels, Guse v. (York Co.)
29985_6 SCJ
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish ____ US293_6 SCJ
White v. National Window Cleaning Co.
(Douglas Co.)
30032_6 SCJ
White, Bliss, Recr. v. (Dawes Co.) ____ 29946_6 SCJ
Whitehorn v. Royal Arcanum -(Douglas
Co.)
29724_6 SCJ
Wilber, City of, Speier's Laundry Co. v.
(Saline Co.)
29715_6 SCJ
Willson v. Quein (Morrill Co.)
29719_6 SCJ
Wilson v. Gerhard (Cass Co.)
29586_6 SCJ
Wilson, Heineman v. (Lancaster Co.) _ 29833_6 SCJ
Wiltse v. Bolton (Washington Co.) ____ 29830_6 SCJ
Winn v. Winn (Antelope Co.)
29743_6 SCJ
Wood, Ben B. Wood Realty Co. v (Douglas Co.)
29940_6 SCJ
Wood, Farmers Security Bank Maywood
v. (Saunders Co.)
29772_6 SCJ
Woods v. Central States Life Insurance
Co. (Brown Co.)
29785_6 SCJ
Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain
Trust Bank of Roanoke Va.
US530_6 SCJ
Wright v. Wright (Otoe Co.)
29955_6 SCJ
Wright, Wm. H., State ex rel v.
Van Kirk
30014_6 SCJ
Young, Shagool v. (Nemaha Co.)
30010_6 SCJ
Young's Market Co., State Board of
Equalization of California v.
US22_6 SCJ

164
368
216
491
89
31
33
125
227
293
44
625
222
253
375
468
38
528
107

XII

ABSTRACTERS
Lancaster County

Buffalo County
W. W. BARNEY & -SON (Ralph M. Barney
abstracter)
Only set of abstract books in the county
KEARNEY, NEBRASKA

VERNE HEDGE
Abstracts of Title & Title Insurance
First National Bank Bldg., LINCOLN. NEBR.

Butler County

Otoe County

HAROLD H. SCHAAF
Bonded Abstracter
DAVID CITY, NEBRASKA

GEORGE M. LATHROP
Bonded Abstracter
NEBRASKA CITY, NEBRASKA

•

Franklin County
Polk County

FRANKLIN COUNTY ABSTRACT COMPANY
Since 1881. National Surety Corporation bond.
BLOOMINGTON and FRANKLIN, NEBRASKA

CAMPBELL & NYBERG
Bonded Abstracters
OSCEOLA, NEBRASKA

Hall County
GRAND ISLAND ABSTRACT CO.
Bonded Abstracters
GRAND ISLAND, NEBRASKA
-o-o-oHERMAN F. BUCKOW, BONDED ABSTRACTER
Business Established 1889
GRAND ISLAND, NEBRASKA

Red Willow County
FIRST TITLE 8z LOAN CO. OF McCOOK, NEBR.
Abstracters since 1885,
John E. Kelley, President.

Stanton County

Johnson County

GEORGE E. PUGH, bonded abstracter,
Established 1887
STANTON, NEBRASKA

SYDNEY S. STEWART, attorney & abstracter.
Over 30 Years Experience
TECUMSEH, NEBRASKA


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

"A SUCCESSFUL PERSON
is one who does what he ought to do
when he ought to do it whether he
wants to do it or not"
That is why all successful persons
own ample life insurance. Are you a
success?

THE SECURITY MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
of

Lincoln, Nebraska

•

6
IN U. S. SUSREME COURT
Paul Senn
v.
Tile Layers Protective Union, Local
No. 5, et al.
No. 658

Decided May 24, 1937

On appeal from the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin.
Leon B. Lamfrom for appellant; Joseph A. Padway for appellees;
Francis Biddle, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Lloyd K. Garrison, Nathan
Greene and V. Henry Rothschild,
2nd, filed brief of American Civil
Liberties Union and International
Juridical Association as amici
curiae.

I

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the
opinion of the Court:
This case presents the question
whether the provisions of the Wisconsin Labor Code which authorizes giving publicity to labor disputes, declare
peaceful picketing and patroling lawful and prohibit granting of an injunction against such conduct, violate, as
here construed and applied, the due
process clause or equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Labor Code occupies Secs. 103.51 to 103.63 of the Wisconsin Statutes,
1935 (Wis. Laws, 1931, c. 376; Laws,
1935, c. 551. Sec. —). But only the
following provisions of Sec. 103.63
are directly involved on this appeal:
"(1) The following acts, whether
performed singly or in concert, shall
be legal;
*
*
*
* *
"(e) Giving publicity to and obtaining or communicating information regarding the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any dispute, whether by
advertising, speaking, patrolling any
public street or place where any person or persons may lawfully be, without intimidation or coercion, or by
any other method not involving fraud,
violence, breach of the peace, or
threat thereof."
* * * * *
"(1) Peaceful picketing or patrolling, whether engaged in singly or in
numbers, shall be legal. (Note No. 1.)
"(2) No court, nor any judges
thereof, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, or temporary
or permanent injunction
which, in specific or general terms,
prohibits any persons or persons from
doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the foregoing acts."
On December 28, 1935, Senn
brought this suit in the Circuit Court
of Milwaukee County against Tile
Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5,
Tile Layers Helpers Union, Local No.
47, and their business agent, seeking
an injunction to restrain picketing,
and particularly "publishing, stating
or proclaiming that the plaintiff is

•


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

S C J 749

unfair to organized labor or to the
defendant unions"; and also to restrain some other acts which have
since been discontinued, and are not
now material. The defendants answered; and the case was heard upon
extensive evidence. The trial court
found the following facts.

749
members of the Tile Layers Protective Union Local No. 5."

The unions endeavored to induce
Senn to become a union contractor;
and requested him to execute an
agreement in form substantially
identical with that entered into by the
The journeymen tilelayers at Mil- Milwaukee contractors who employ
waukee were to a large extent, mem- union men. Senn expressed a willingbers of Tile Layers Protective Union ness to execute the agreement providNo. 5, and the helpers, members of ed Article III was eliminated. The
Tile Layers Helpers Union Local No. union declared that this was impos47. Senn was engaged at Milwaukee sible; that the inclusion of the proviin the tile contracting business under sion was essential to the unions' inthe name of "Paul Senn & Co., Tile terests in maintaining wage standContracting." His business was a ards and spreading work among their
small one, conducted in the main, members; and, moreover, that to
from his residence, with a showroom eliminate Article III from the conelsewhere. He employed one or two tract with Senn would discriminate
journeymen tile layers and one or against existing union contractors, all
two helpers, depending upon the of whom had signed agreements conamount of work he had contracted to taining the Article. As the unions
declared its elimination impossible,
do at the time. But, working with
his own hands with tools of the Senn refused to sign the agreement
trade he performed personally on the and unionize his shop. Because af
jobs much work of a character com- his refusal, the unions picketed his
monly done by a tile layer or helper. place of business. The picketing
Neither Senn, nor any of his em- was peaceful, without violence, and
ployees, was at the time this suit without any unlawful act. The eviwas began a member of either union, dence was that the pickets carried
and neither had any contractual re- one banner with the inscription "P.
lations with them. Indeed, Senn, Senn Tile Company is unfair to the
could not become a member of the Tile Layers Protective Union", anothtile layers union, since its constitution er with the inscription, "Let the
and rules require, among other things, Union tile layer install your tile
that a journeyman tile setter shall work." (Note No. 2.)
have acquired his practical experience
The trial court denied the injuncthrough an apprenticeship of not less
than three years, and Senn had not tion and dismissed the bill. On the
served such an apprenticeship.
findings made, it ruled that the conFor some years the tile laying in- troversy was "a labor dispute" withdustry had been in a demoralized in the meaning of Section 103.62; that
state because of lack of building op- the picketing, done solely in further
erations; and members of the union ance of the dispute, was "lawful" un
had been in competition with non- der Section 103.53; that it was not
union tile layers and helpers in their unlawful for the defendants "to adeffort to secure work. The tile con- vise, notify or persuade, without
tractors by whom members of the un- fraud, violence or threat thereof, any
ions were employed had entered into person or persons, of the existence of
collective bargaining agreements with said labor dispute; * * *
the unions governing wages, hours
"That the agreement submitted by
and working conditions. The wages
paid by the union contractors had for the defendants to the plaintiff, secsome time been higher than those ting forth terms and conditions prevailing in that portion of the indu,
paid by Senn to his employees.
Because of the peculiar composition try which is unionized, is sought by
of the industry, which consists of em- the defendants for the purpose of
ployers with small numbers of em- promoting their welare and enhancployees, the unions had found it ne- ing their own interests in their trade
cessary for the protection of the in- and craft as workers in the industr:.
dividual rights of their members in
"That Article III of said agree
the prosecution of their trade to require all employers agreeing to con- ment is a reasonable and lawful rule
duct a union shop to assent to the fol- adopted by the defendants out of the
lowing provision:
necessities of employment within the
"Article III. It is definitely under- industry and for the protection of
stood that no individual member of a themselves as workers and craftsmen
partnership or corporation engaged in the industry."
in the Tile Contracting Business shall
Senn appealed to the Supremt
work with the tools or act as Helper
but that the installation of all mater- Court of the State, which affirmed
ials claimed by the party of the sec- the judgment of the trial court and
ond part as listed under the caption denied a motion for rehearing, two
'Classification of Work' in this agree- judges dissenting. (268 N. W. 274,
ment, shall be done by journeymen 872.) The case is here on appeal.

750
First. The defendants moved to
dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. They contend that the federal question presented is not substantial. And friends of the court
suggest that the appeal should be
dismissed because the decision below
was based upon non-federal grounds,
or that there was an alternative, independent non-federal ground broad
enough to sustain the judgment; that
the challenge here is not to a statute, but to a judicial decision based
upon principles of general law which
have been approved by some judges
and disapproved by others (Note No.
3); and that there is nothing to show
that the provisions of the Wisconsin
Labor Code here questioned are not
merely declaratory of the common
law of Wisconsin as it existed prior
to the statute. But it sufficiently
appears that the provisions of the
Labor Code were relied upon; that
their validity under the Fourteenth
Amendment was duly challenged below; and that the rulings by the state
courts were based ultimately on the
Labor Code. Whether the statute as
construed and applied violates the
Fourteenth Amendment presents issues never expressly passed upon by
this Court. We deny the motion to
dismiss.
Second. The hearings below were
concerned mainly with questions of
state law. Senn insisted there that
the statute was no defense, because
the controversy was not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of Sec.
103.62. (Note No. 4.) The courts
ruled that the controversy was a "labor dispute"; and that the acts done
by the defendant were among those
declared "lawful" by Sec. 103.53. See
also American Furniture Co. v. I. R.
etc. Chauffeurs etc. General Local
No. 200, 268 N. W. 250. Those issues involved the construction and
application of the statute and the
Constitution of the State. As to them
the judgment of its highest court is
conclusive. The question for our decision is whether the statute, as applied to the facts found, took Senn's
liberty or property or denied him
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Senn does not claim broadly that the
Federal Constitution prohibits a
State from authorizing publicity and
peaceful picketing. His claim of.. invalidity is rested on the fact that he
refused to unionize his shop solely
because the union insisted upon the
retention of Article III. He contends
that the right to work in his business with his own hands is a right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the State may not
authorize unions to employ publicity
and picketing to induce him to refrain
from exercising it.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 S C J 750
The unions concede that Senn, so
long as he conducts a nonunion shop,
has the right to work with his hands
and tools. He may do so, as freely
as he may work his employees longer
hours and at lower wages than the
union rules permit. He may bid for
contracts at a low figure based upon
low wages and long hours. But the
unions contend that, since Senn's exercise of the right to do so is harmful to the interests of their members,
they may seek by legal means to induce him to agree to unionize his
shop and to refrain from exercising
his right to work with his own hands.
The judgment of the flighest court
of the state establishes that both the
means employed and the end sought
by the unions are legal under its law.
The question for our determination
is whether either the means or the end
sought is forbidden by the Federal
Constitution.
Third. Clearly the means which the
statute authorizes—picketing and
publicity—are not prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Members of
a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State, make
known the facts of a labor dispute,
for freedom of speech is guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution. The
State, may, in the exercise of its
police power regulate the methods
and means of publicity as well as the
use of public streets. If the end
sought by the unions is not forbidden
by the Federal Constitution the State
may authorize working men to seek
to attain it by combining as pickets,
just as it permits capitalists and employers to combine in other ways to
attain their desired economic ends.
The Legislature of Wisconsin has
declared that "peaceful picketing and
patrolling" on the public streets and
places shall be permissible "whether
engaged in singly or in numbers"
provided this is done "without intimidation or coercion" and free from
"fraud, violence, breach of the peace
or threat thereof." The statute provides that the picketing must be
peaceful; and that term as used implies not only absence of violence, but
absence of any unlawful act. It precludes the intimidation of customers.
It precludes any form of physical obstruction or interference with the
plaintiff's business. It authorizes giving publicity to the existence of the
dispute "whether by advertising, patrolling any public streets or places
where any person or persons may
lawfully be"; but precludes misrepresentation of the facts of the controversy. And it declares that "nothing herein shall be construed to legalize a secondary boycott." See Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443, 466. Inherently, the means
authorized are clearly objectionable.
In declaring such picketing permis-

sible Wisconsin has put this means
of publicity on a par with advertisements in the press.
The state courts found that the
unions observed the limitations prescribed by the statute. The conduct
complained of is patrol with banners
by two or four pickets. Compare American Steel Foundaries v. Tr -City
Central Trade Council, 257 U. S. 184,
207. The picketing was peaceful. The
publicity did not involve a misrepresentation of fact, nor was any claim
made below that relevant facts were
suppressed. Senn did not contend
that it was untruthful to characte,
ize him as "unfair", if the requirement that he refrain from working
with his own hands was a lawful one.
He did not ask that the banners be
required to carry a fuller statement
of the facts. Compare American
Furniture Co. v. I. B. etc. Chauffeurs
etc. General Local No. 200, 222 Wis.
338, 340, 347, 268 N. W. 250, 251, 255.
Moreover, it was confessedly open t.)
Senn to disclose the facts in such
manner and in such detail as he
deemed desirable, and on the strength
of the facts to seek the patronage of
the public.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 512,
is not applicable. The statute there
in question was deemed to have been
applied to legalize conduct which was
not simply peaceful picketing, not
"lawful persuasion or inducing", not
"a mere appeal to the sympathetic aid
of would-be customers by a simple
statement of the fact of the strike
and a request to withhold patronage." It consisted of libelous attacks and abusive epithets against
the employer and his friends; libelous
and disparaging statements againt-t
the plaintiff's business; threat and
intimidation directed against customers and employees. The means employed, in other words, were deemed
to constitute "an admitted tort", conduct unlawful prior to the statute
challenged. See pp. 327-8, 337, 346.
In the present case the only means
authorized by the statute and in fact
resorted to by the unions have been
peaceful and accompanied by no unlawful act. It follows, that if the
end sought is constitutional—if the
unions may constitutionally induce
Senn to agree to refrain from exercising the right to work in his business with his own hands, their acts
were lawful.
Fourth. The end sought by the
unions is not unconstitutoinal. Article III, which the unions seek to
have Senn accept, was found by the
state courts to be not arbitrary or
capricious, but a reasonable rule
"adopted by the defendants out of
the necessities of employment within
the industry and for the protection
of themselves as workers and crafts-

6 S C J 751
men in the industry." That finding
is amply supported by the evidence.
There is no basis for a suggestion
that the unions' request that Senn
refrain from working with his own
hands, or their employment of picketing and publicity, was malicious;
or that there was a desire to injure
Senn. The sole purpose of the picketing was to acquaint the public with
the facts and, by gaining its support,
to induce Senn to unionize his shop.
There was no effort to induce Semi
to do an unlawful thing. There was
no violence, no force was applied, ro
molestation or interference, no coercion. There was only the persuasion
incident to publicity. As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin said:
"Each of the contestants is desirous of the advantage of doing business in the community where he or
they operate. He is not obligated to
yield to the persuasion exercised upon
him by respondents." "The respondents do not question that it is appellants' right to own his own business and earn his living in any lawful manner which he chooses to adopt.
What they are doing is asserting
their rights under the acts of the
Legislature for the purpose of enhancing their opportunity to acquire
work for themselves and those whom
they represent." . . . The respondents
act of peaceful picketing is a lawful
form of appeal to the public to turn
its patronage from appellant to the
concerns in which the welfare of the
members of the unions is bound up."
The unions acted and had the
right to act as they did, to protect the
interests of their members against
the harmful effect upon them of
Senn's action. Compare American
Steel Foundries v. Tr -City Central
Trades Council, supra, 208, 209. Because his action was harmful, the fact
that none of Senn's employees was a
union member, or sought the union's
aid, is immaterial.
The laws of Wisconsin, as declared
by its highest court, permits unions
to endeavor to induce an employer,
when unionizing his shop, to agree
to refrain from working in his business with his own hands—so to endeavor although none of his employees is a member of a union.
Whether it was wise for the State
to permit the unions to do so is a
question of its public policy—not our
concern. The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit it.
Fifth. There is nothing in the
Federal Constitution which forbids
unions from competing with nonunion concerns for customers by
means of picketing as freely as one
merchant competes with another by
means of advertisements in the press,
by circulars, or by his window display. Each member of the unions, as
well as Senn, has the right to strive

•


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

to earn his living. Senn seeks to do
so through exercise of his individual
skill and planning. The union members seek to do so through combination. Earning a living is dependent
upon securing work; and securing
work is dependent upon public favor.
To win the patronage of the public
each may strive by legal means. Exercising its police power, Wisconsin
has declared that in a labor dispute
peaceful picketing and truthful publicity are means legal for union. It
is true that disclosure of the facts of
the labor dispute may be annoying tp
Senn even if the method and means
employed in. giving the publicity are
inherently unobjectionable. But such
annoyance, like that often suffered
from publicity in other connections,
is not an invasion of the liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Compare Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
United States Railroad Labor Board,
261 U. S. 72. (Note No. 5.) It is
true, also, that disclosure of the facts
may prevent Senn from securing jobs
which he hoped to get. But a hopedfor job is not property guaranteed by
the Constitution. And the diversion
of it to a competitor is not an invasion of a constitutional right.
Sixth. It is contended that in prohibiting an injunction the statute denied to Senn equal protection of the
laws, and Truax v. Corrigan, supra,
is invoked. But the issue suggested
by plaintiff does not arise. For we
hold that the provisions of the Wisconsin statute which authorized the
conduct of the unions are constitutional. One has no constitutional
right to a "remedy" against the lawful conduct of another.
Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
Note No. 1.—Subsections (h), (i)
and (k) are likewise relevant to the
present issue, as supplementing subsections (e) and (1), but do not require special discussion.
Note No. 2.—The complaint as to
certain action of defendants other
than the picketing was disposed of
by defendants' agreement to discontinue the same, and is not now in
question. It had been shown that,
with a view to picketing Senn's jobs,
the unions had caused his automobile
to be followed from his place of business to the jobs where he and his
men were working. It had also been
shown that, some months earlier, the
unions had sent letters to local architects and contractors requesting them
not to patronize Senn because he was
conducting a non-union shop and
threatening to picket them if they
did so; but that there had been no
picketing of any architect or contractor and no such steps had been taken
by the unions. Through counsel, the
unions agreed: (1) that thereafter

751
they would not pursue plaintiff'1;
automobile from his residence to his
jobs; and (2) that they would refrain
from sending any further letters to
architects or contractors, and would
not indulge in any acts or conduct
referred to in the letters theretofore
sent. The court treated this agreement by counsel as disposing of the
claim for relief on this ground.
Note No. 3.—Compare Zaat v.
Building Trades Council, 17Z Wash.
445; Rorabeck v Motion Pictures
Operators' Union, 140 Minn. 481;
Hughes v. Motion Pictures Machine
Operators' Union, 282 Mo. 304; Fink
v. Schwartz, 28 Ohio (N.P.) 407. See
Thompson v. Boekhout, 291 N. Y.
Supp. 572 (N. Y. App. Div.).
Note No. 4.—That section provides:
"The term 'labor dispute' include.;
any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment
relations, or any other controversy
arising out of the respective interests
of employer and employee, regardles;;
of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employe."
Note No. 5.—The State has, of
course, power to afford protection to
interests of personality, such as "the
right of privacy". The protection by
decision or statute of such interests
of personality rests on other considerations than are here involved. See
Moreland, The Right of Privacy Today (1931) 19 Ky. L. J. 101; Lisle.
The Right of Privacy, id., 137; Green,
The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 III.
L. Rev. 237, 238.
Mr. Justice Butler dissenting:
Plaintiff is a tile layer and has
long been accustomed to work as a
helper and mechanic in that trade. The
question presented is whether, consistently with the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State may by
statute authorize or make it lawful
for labor unions to adopt and cam
into effect measures intended and calculated to prevent him from obtaining or doing that work. The decision just announced answers that
question in the affirmative. The facts
are not in controversy. Let them
disclose the concrete application of
the legislation now held valid.
Plaintiff lives and works in Milwaukee. Since the latter part of 1931
he has been engaged in performing
small tile laying jobs. He has personally performed almost half the
manual labor required. He usually
employs a tile setter and helper;
occasionally he has more than one
of each. He has never been a mem

752
ber of the tile layers union. Though
a competent mechanic in that trade,
he is excluded from membership because he takes contracts and because
he has not served the apprenticeship
required by union rules. In 1935 he
had about 40 jobs. His net income
was $1,500, of which $750 was attributed to his own labor. The balance,
constituting his profit as contractor,
was not enough to support him and
family.
Defendant Local No. 5 is composed
of tile layers. Its membership, 112 in
1929, had fallen to 41 at the time
of the trial in January, 1936. Early
in 1935 it proferred to all local contractors including plaintiff a contract
fixing wages, hours and the like.
About half of them signed; the others
did not. It contained the following:
"It is definitely understood that no
individual, member of a partnership
or corporation engaged in the Tile
Contracting Business shall work with
the tools or act as Helper, but that
the installation of all materials claimed by the party of the second part
(Local No. 5) as listed under the caption 'Classification of Work' in this
agreement, shall be done by journeymen members of Tile Layers Protective Union Local No. 5." Because of
that provision plaintiff declined to
sign. But repeatedly he declared to
representatives of the union that he
was willing to employ its members
and to comply with its rules as to
wages, hours and working conditions;
he assured them that, when his business was sufficient to permit, he
would refrain from manual labor, and
explained that without personally
working he could not now continue in
business. Conceding the truth of that
statement, the union nevertheless persistently declined to modify its demands.
The president of Local No. 5 testified that, if plaintiff did not sign the
contract, it would di; everything "to
harass and put things in his way";
that it intended to announce to the
world that he is a non-union contractor and on that account should not
be patronized, to picket his place of
business, to ascertain where he had
jobs and to picket them and in that
way bring pressure to bear upon him
to become a union contractor, to put
him in the category of a non-union
contractor unless he agrees to lay
aside the tools of the trade. The program so declared corresponds with
what the unions had already done
against him.
In July, 1935, Local No. 5 sent to
all contractors and architects letters
stating: "Some time ago we presented to each individual tile contractor in the city a copy of our new
agreement (this refers to the one
plaintiff was called on to sign) in
which we specified what constitutes
a bona fide contractor and who should

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 13 C J 752
install the work. Not having heard
from some of these so called tile contractors in a given time, we beg of
you to contact the list of fair contractors listed below in awarding the
tile work in your building operations.
If in two weeks time anyone outside
this list is awarded tile work we will
then picket such jobs, contractors' or
architects' offices, or employ other
lawful means to help us in our fight
to better the conditions of our trade."
Pl'aintiff's name was not on the list
approved by the union. Therefore
the letter meant that, in order to
prevent him from working, the union
would apply the described pressure
to him, his work, the jobs of which
his tile laying was a part, the contractors and the architects from
whom he got work.
Commencing December 6, 1935, it
put in front of his house two men
carrying signs, one being: "P. Senn
Tile Company (meaning the plaintiff)
is unfair to the Tile Layers Protective Union", and the other: "Let the
Union tile layers install your tile
work." And regularly from eight in
the morning until noon and from one
to four in the afternoon it carried on
picketing of that sort, sometimes using four men. They refrained from
speaking to plaintiff or others and
committed no breach of the peace. In
that sense they carried on "peaceful
picketing." The union sent men in
automobiles to follow plaintiff when
going from his home to his work, and
instructed all its members to discover where he had jobs in order to
picket them.
To justify the elimination of plaintiff, counsel told the court that "because of the demoralized conditions
of the trade, the union decides it does
not want a contractor, whether he be
skilled in the trade or unskilled, to
work with the tools of the trade with
the men because there is not enough
work to go around." And on the witness stand the president of Local No.
5 expressed the idea that, if the contractors did not work, members of
the union would be taken off relief.
The trial court found the picketing peaceful and lawful; it did not
pass on other acts constituting pressure put on plaintiff. But the unions themselves deemed unlawful
much that they had threatened and
done to coerce him. The findings
say that "the defendants, by their
counsel, have stated in open court
that they will not pursue the automobile of the plaintiff from his place
of business to his jobs; that they will
refrain from sending any further letters to architects or contractors, and
will not indulge in any acts or conduct referred to in said letters towards said contractors and architects." The trial court held plain-

tiif not entitled to relief. The supreme court affirmed. 222 Wis. 383.
Following its decision in American
Furn. Co. v. I. B. of T. C. & H., 222
Wis. 338, construing Sec. 103.62, it
held that within the meaning of that
section a "labor dispute" existed between plaintiff and defendants and
that under Sec. 103.53 the picketing
was legal.
The clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment invoked by plaintiff are:
"No State shall * * * deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
Our decisions have made it everywhere known that these provisions
forbid state action which would take
from the individual the right •to engage in common occupations of life,
and that they assure equality of opportunity to all under like circumstances. Lest the importance or wisdom of these great declarations be
forgotten or neglected there should
be frequent recurrence to decisions of
this court that expound and apply
them.
"While this Court has not Attempted to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some
of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men". Meyer y.
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399.
"The right to follow any of the
common occupations of life is an inalienable right. It was formulated
as such under the phrase 'pursuit of
happiness' in the Declaration of Independence, which commenced with
the fundamental proposition that 'all
men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.' * * * I hold that the liberty of pursuit—the right to follow
any of the ordinary callings of life-is one of the privileges of a citizen
of the United States." Concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U. S. 746, 762, approvingly
quoted in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U. S. 578, 589.
"Included in the right of personal
liberty and the right of private" property—partaking of the nature of each

4

frit 1

6 S C J 753
—is the right to make contracts for
the acquisition of property. Chief
among such contracts is that of personal employment by which labor and
other services are exchanged for
money or other forms of property. If
this right be struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the
long-established constitutional sense.
The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to poor as to
the rich; for the vast majority of
persons have no other honest way
to begin to acquire property, save
by working for money." Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 14.
"It requires no argument to show
that the right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity
that it was the purpose of the amendments to secure." Truax v. Raich,
239 U. S. 33, 41.
"Under that amendment, nothing is
more clearly settled than that it is
beyond the power of a state, 'under
the guise of protecting the public,
arbitrarily (to) interfere with private
business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.'"
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U. S. 262, 278.
"The Fourteenth Amendment * * *
undoubtedly intended not only that
there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary
spoilation of property, but that equal
protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in
the enjoyment of their personal and
civil rights; that all persons should
be equally entitled to pursue their
happiness and acquire and enjoy
property; that they should have like
access to the courts of the country
for the protection of their persons and
property, the prevention and redress
of wrongs, and the enforcement of
contracts; that no impediment should
be interposed to the pursuits of any
one except as applied to the same
pursuits by others under like circumstances; that no greater burdens
should be laid upon one than are laid
upon others in the same calling and
condition. * * *" Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U. S. 27, 31.
"For, the very idea that one man
may be compelled to hold his life,
or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment
of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself." Yick
Wo. v. Hopkins, 11 U. S. 356, 370.
The legislative power of the State
can only be exerted in subordination
to the fundamental principles of right
and justice which the guaranties of
the due process and equal protection

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are intended to preserve. Arbir
trary or capricious exercise of that
power whereby a wrongful and highly injurious, invasion of rights of liberty and property is sanctioned,
stripping one of all remedy, is wholly at variance with those principles.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 327.
It may be assumed that the picketing, upheld in virtue of the challenged
statute, lawfully might be employed
in a controversy between employer
and employees for the purpose of persuading the employer to increase pay,
etc., and dissuading non-union workers from displacing union members.
The right of workers, parties to a
labor dispute, to strike and picket
peacefully to better their condition
does not infringe any right of the
employer. Amer. Foundaries v. Tr City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259
U. S. 344, 386. Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 540, 541.
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 289.
But strikes or peaceful picketing for
unlawful purposes, are beyond any
lawful sanction. The object being unlawful, the means and end are alike
condemned. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.
S. 306, 311. Toledo, A. A. & N. M.
Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed.
730, 737-739. And see Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 327; Exchange Bakery
& Restaurant, Inc. v. Rilkin, 245 N. Y.
260, 262-263.
The object that defendants seek to
attain is an unlawful one.
Admittedly, it is to compel plaintiff
to quit work as a helper or tile layer.
Their purpose is not to establish on
his jobs better wages, hours, or conditions. If permitted, plaintiff would
employ union men and adhere to union requirements as to pay and
hours. But, solely because he works,
the unions refuse to allow him to
unionize and carry on his business.
By picketing, the unions would prevent him working on jobs he obtained from others and so destroy that
business. Then, by enforcement of
their rules they would prevent him
from working as a journeyman for
employers approved by the union or
upon any job employing union men.
Adhering to the thought that there
is not enough work to go around, unquestionably the union purpose is to
eliminate him from all tile laying
work. And highly confirmatory of that
purpose is the failure of the contract
proposed by the union to permit
plaintiff personally to do work in the
performance of jobs undertaken by
him for prices based upon union rates
of pay for all labor, including his
own.
The principles governing competition between rival individuals seeking contracts or opportunity to work
as journeymen cannot reasonably be
applied in this case. Neither the
union nor its members take tile lay-

75:!,
ing contracts. Their interests arc
confined to employment of helpers
and layers, their wages, hours 01
service, etc.
The contest is not between tin'
ized and other contractors or betwet „
one employer and another. The immediate issue is between the unions
and plaintiff in respect of his right
to work in the performance of his own
jobs. If as to that they shall succeed, then will come the enforcern
of their rules which make him inc, .
ible to work as a journeyman. It cannot be said •that, if he should be prevented from laboring as helper or
layer, the work for union men to do
would be increased. The unions exclude their members from jobs taken
by non-union employers. About half
the tile contractors are not unionized.
More than 60 per cent of the tile layers are non-union men. The value of
plaintiff's labor as helper and tile layer is very small—about $750 per year.
Between union members and plaintiff
there is no immediate or direct corn ,
tition. If under existing circumsu.
ces there ever can be any, it must
come about through a chain of unpredictable events making its occurrence a mere matter of speculation.
The interest of the unions in the manual labor done by plaintiff is so remote, indirect and minute that they
have no standing as competitors.
Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 358.
Under the circumstances here disclosed, the conduct of the unions was
arbitrary and oppressive. Roraback
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators
Union, 140 Minn. 481, 486; Hughes
v. Motion Picture Machine Operators,
282 Mo. 304.
Moreover, the picketing was unlawful because the signs used constitute
a misrepresentation of the facts. One
of them declared plaintiff "unfair" to
the tile layers union and, upon the
basis of that statement, the other sign
solicited tile work for union tile layers. There was given neither definition of the word nor any fact on which
the accusation was based. By the
charge made, there was implied something unjust or inequitable in his attitude toward labor unions. But there
was no foundation of fact for any
such accusation. There was no warrant for characterizing him as "unfair" or opposed to any legitimate
purpose of the tile layers union or
as unjust to union men. There is no
escape from the conclusion that the
unions intended by the picketing they
carried on to misrepresent plaintiff
in respect of his relation to, or dealing with, the tile layers union and by
that means to deprive him of his occupation. The burden may not justly be held to be on him, by counterpicketing or otherwise, to refute ov
explain the baseless charge.
The judgment of the state court,

6 S C J 754

754
here affirmed, violates a principle of
fundamental law: That no man may
be compelled to hold his life or the
means of living at the mere will of
others. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ubi supra. The state statute, construed to
make lawful the employment of the
means here shown to deprive plaintiff
of his right to work or to make lawful the picketing carried on in this
case, is repugnant to the due process
and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Truax v.
Corrigan, supra, 328.
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Sutherland join in the dissent.

ALIEN IMMIGRANTS—
DEPORTATION
(Public, No. 79, 75th Congress)
(Chapter 182, 1st Session)
(H. R. 28)
AN ACT
To authorize the deportation of
aliens who secured preference-quota
or non-quota visas through fraud by
contracting marriage solely to fraudulently expedite admission to the
United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That subdivision (f)
of section 9 of the Immigration Act
of 1924, as amended (43 Stat. 158;
U. S. C., title 8, sec. 209, subdivision
(f)), is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 9. (f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle an
immigrant, in respect of whom a petition under this section is granted,
either to enter the United States as a
nonquota immigrant if, upon arrival
in the United States, he is found not
to be a nonquota immigrant, or to
enter the United States as a preference-quota immigrant if, upon arrival in the United States, he is found
not to be a preference-quota immigrant."
Sec. 2. That subdivision (a) of
section 13 of the Immigration Act of
1924, as amended (43 Stat. 161; U. S.
C., title 8, sec. 213 (a)), is amended
to read as follows:
"No immigrant shall be admitted
to the United States unless he (1)
has an unexpired immigration visa or
was born subsequent to the issuance
of the immigration visa of the accompanying parent; (2) is of the nationality specified in the visa in the im
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

migration visa; (3) is a nonquota im- of which they are citizens or submigrant if specified in the visa in the jects, at any time after entry, at the
immigration visa as such; (4) is a expense of the appropriations for the
preference-quota immigrant if spec- enforcement of this Act, such as fall
ified in the visa in the immigration into distress or need public aid from
visa as such; and (5) is otherwise causes arising subsequent to their
admissible under the immigration entry and are desirous of being so
removed, but any person thus relaws."
Sec. 3. That any alien who at any moved shall forever be ineligible for
time after entering the United States readmission except upon the approval
is found to have secured either non- of the Secretary of State and the
quota or preference-quota visa through Secretary of Labor;".
Approved, May 14, 1937.
fraud, by contracting a marriage
which, subsequent to entry into the
United States, has been judicially
annulled retroactively to date of
marriage, shall be taken into custody and deported pursuant to the pr3visions of section 14 of the Immigration Act of 1924 on the ground that
at the time of entry he was not entitled to admission on the visa presented upon arrival in the United COOPERATIVE FARM
States. This section shall be effective
FORESTRY ACT
whether entry was made before or
(Public, No. 95, 75th Congress)
after the enactment of this Act.
When it appears that the immi(Chapter 226, 1st Session)
grant fails or refuses to fulfill his
promises for a marital agreement
(H. R. 4728)
made to procure his entry as an immigrant he then becomes immediateAN ACT
To authorize cooperation in the dely subject to deportation.
velopment of farm forestry in the
Approved, May 14, 1937.
States and Territories, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to aid
agriculture, increase farm-forest income, conserve water resources, increase employment, and in other ways
ALIEN POOR PEOPLE—RELIEF
advance the general welfare and im(Public, No. 78, 75th Congress)
prove living conditions on farms
through reforestation and afforesta(Chapter 181, 1st Session)
tion in the various States and Territories, the Secretary of Agriculture
(H. R. 26)
is authorized in cooperation with the
AN ACT
land-grant colleges and universities
To amend section 23 of the Immi- and State forestry agencies, each
gration Act of February 5, 1917 (39 within its respective field of activStat. 874), as amended (U. S. C., title ities, according to the statutes, if
8, sec. 102).
any, of the respective States, wherBe it enacted by the Senate and ever such agencies can and will coHouse of Representatives of the operate, or in default of such coopUnited States of America in Con- eration to act directly, to produce or
gress assembled, That so much of sec- procure and distribute forest trees
tion 23 of the Act of February 5, and shrub planting stock; to make
1917, as reads as follows: "and shall necessary investigations; to advise
have authority to enter into contract farmers regarding the establishment,
for the support and relief of such protection, and management of farm
aliens as may fall into distress or forests and forest and shrub plantaneed public aid, and to remove to tions and the harvesting, utilization,
their native land, at any time within and marketing of the products therethree years after entry, at the ex- of; and to enter into cooperative
pense of the appropriations for the agreements for the establishment, proenforcement of this Act", is amended tection, and care of farm- or other forto read as follows: "and shall have est-land tree and shrub plantings
authority to enter into contract for within such States and Territories;
the support and relief of such aliens and, whenever suitable Governmentas may fall into distress or need owned lands are not available, to
public aid, and to remove to their na- lease, purchase, or accept donations
tive country, or the country from of land and develop nursery sites for
whence they came, or to the country the production of such forest plant-

6 S C J 755
ing stock as is needed .to effectuate
the purposes of this Act, but not including ornamental or other stock
for landscape plantings commonly
grown by established commercial nurserymen, and no stock grown in Government and Cooperating nurseries
shall be allowed to enter regular
trade channels. No cooperative reforestation or afforestation shall be
undertaken pursuant to this Act unless the cooperator makes available
without charge the land to be planted. There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated annually not to exceed
$2,500,000 for carrying out the purposes of this Act. This Act shall be
known as the Cooperative Farm Forestry Act.
Approved, May 18, 1937.

ruled defendants' application for a
moratory stay and confirmed the sale.
It is from this action of the trial court
that this appeal was taken.
Appellee in its brief attempts to
question the constitutionality of section 20-21, 159, Comp. St. Supp. 1935,
commonly called the Moratorium Act.
The question was not raised in the dis.,
trict court and consequently cannot be
raised in this court for the first time
on appeal. Howarth v Becker, 128
Neb. 580, 4 SCJ 331, 259 N. W. 505;
Clark v. Hass, 129 Neb. 112, 4 SCJ
537, 260 N. W. 792.
Appellants contend that the trial
court erred in not allowing a moratory
stay. Appellee offered no evidence of
the value of the property. Neither
did appellee produce any evidence
showing that appellants had no interest in the property over and above appellee's first lien. While this court
has repeatedly held that, where it appears from the evidence that the
amount of the mortgage lien on the
property under foreclosure exceeds its
value, the moratory stay will be denied, yet, we have also held that the
burden of proof is upon the party resisting the application for a moratory
stay to establish that fact. Howarth
v. Becker, supra. The undisputed evidence of the appellants is that the
value of the property exceeds the
amount of appellee's lien. Appellee
offered no evidence whatever on this
subject. Under such circumstances,
the trial court should have allowed the
moratory stay. A trial court cannot
deny an application for a moratory
stay under the provisions of section
20-21, 159, Comp. St. Supp. 1935, unless it affirmatively appears that
"good cause is shown to the contrary"
as by the act provided. Good cause
to the contrary not having been established by evidence, the trial court
erred in overruling the application of
appellants for a moratory stay.
REVERSED.

755
fraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal
liability.
2. Any change in the personality,
number, or relations, of the parties to
such an instrument which gives the
instrument a different legal effect is
material.
3. It is forgery fraudulently to
alter any part of an instrument when
the alteration Is capable of working
injury to another. Consequently, it Is
forgery fraudulently to erase one
signature and insert another.
4. Evidence in the record examined, and held ample to sustain conviction.

Heard before Goss, C. J., Rose,
Good, Eberly, Day, Paine and Carter,
Ji.
EBERLY, J.
The plaintiff in error, hereinafter
called
defendant, was informed
against for forgery by falsely and feloniously altering a promissory note
CONTINENTAL COMPANY OF
belonging to one Robert 0. Jones,
LINCOLN v. RATHBONE
with the intent to defraud Jones. Upon trial a verdict of guilty was re30051
Filed June 11, 1937.
turned against defendant, and from
the order of the trial court overruling
Appeal. Lancaster county; Shephis motion for a new trial, he proseherd, Judge.
cutes error.
There is practically little dispute in
Reversed and remanded.
the evidence. Defendant was secreBeghtol, Foe & Rankin (Lincoln)
tary-treasurer of the Northwest Finfor plaintiff, appellee.
ancial Service, Inc., hereafter referred
Chambers & Holland; John H.
to as the "Finance Company." This
Keriakedes (Lincoln) for defendant,
was a corporation engaged partly in
appellants.
the business of handling and investing
money belonging to others and entrusted to the Finance Company for
(SYLLABUS)
that purpose. Defendant was also the
In a hearing on an application for
secretary-treasurer and managing ofa moratory stay under section 20-21,
ficer of the Northwest Agricultural
159, Comp. St. Rupp. 1935, the burden
Credit Corporation, an inactive but exof proof is upon the party resisting
isting corporation, hereinafter rethe, application to show that he falls
ferred to as the "Agricultural Corporwithin the exception, "unless upon
ation," which was formerly engaged
hearing on said application, good
in the business of rediscounting live
cause is shown to the contrary," constock paper to the Federal Intermetained in that statute.
diate Credit Bank.
Fred A. Hood was president of the
Heard before Goss, C. J., Rose,
Finance Company from 1925 to the
Good, Eberly, Day, Paine and Carter,
Spring of 1933. Hood had induced R.
JJ.
0. Jones to place with the Finance
CARTER, J.
Company the sum of $1,200 on JanuThis is ah appeal from an order
MITCHELL v. STATE
ary 31,1928, to be invested by the comconfirming the sale of the mortgaged
pany on "monthly payment contracts."
Filed June 11, 1937. This written
property in a foreclosure action and 30084
contract further provided
from the denial of defendants' appliError. Dawes county; Meyer, that these "monthly payment concation for a moratory stay.
tracts" are "always to be subject to
The record shows that, after de- Judge.
the approval of the party of the first
fault, foreclosure was commenced
part (Jones) and belong to him exAffirmed.
against the property involved in this
clusively, and will be held in trust by
action. The property was sold on
R. 0. Reddish (Alliance) for plain- the party of the second part for colApril 21, 1936, for $10,000. The trial tiff in error.
lection." And it was further providcourt sustained defendants' objections
Richard C. Hunter, Atty. Gen.; ed by the terms of this written conto confirmation and ordered a new Francis V. Robinson, Ass't. Atty. Gen. tract that the sum of $1,200 so ensale. The property was again sold on (Lincoln) for defendant in error.
trusted to the Finance Company
August 25, 1936, for $15,000. Demight be supplemented at any time
fendants objected to the confirmation
(SYLLABUS)
and in any amount as party of the
of the sale and again applied for a
1. Forgery is the false making, or first part (Jones) might determine.
moratory stay. The trial court over- materially altering, with intent to de- and that such additional sums should

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

756
come under the same provisions as
this contract. It also appears that
this investment was later increased
to $5,500, and, in addition, it was orally agreed that Jones' money might
be loaned on automobiles, furniture,
and different kinds of merchandise
contracts providing for payment on
the monthly basis. It appears that
on June 27, 1932, defendant made and
delivered to the Finance Company, as
payee, a promissory note for $490 in
usual form, payable in three months
after date, with interest, which was
signed by "Northwest Agr. Credit
Corp. (Signed) by C. W. Mitchell,
Secy-Treas." On the same day, by
an assignment in writing purporting
to be executed by the Finance Company by the defendant, this note was
assigned to the "Jones Trust," and
reported thereafter from time to
time as an investment made in Jones'
behalf. All this was done without
knowledge or authority from any of
the other officers of the Finance Company, or the officers of the Agricultural Corporation, and, in like manner, the defendant took and received
from the Jones funds the sum of $490
which he appropriated to his own private use. This $490 investment was
not in conformity with the controlling
contract already referred to. Some
time thereafter the situation came to
the knowledge of the attorney for the
Agricultural Corporation, who was
also a stockholder thereof, and who
immediately challenged the legality of
the entire transaction involving the
$490 note, as it had been carried out
by defendant. Thereupon the defendant, without knowledge of, or authority from R. 0. Jones, the owner of the
instrument, and without knowledge
of, or authority from, any other of
the officers of the Finance Company
or of the Agricultural Corporation,
and without the Agricultural Corporation ever receiving any part of the
consideration of the $490- note, by erasures and additions, altered and
changed the signature as it originally
appeared on the note, viz., from
"Northwest
Agr.
Credit
Corp.
(Signed) by C. W. Mitchell, SecyTreas." to "Northwest Agr. Credit
Co.
(Signed) by C. W. Mitchell, C. W.
Mitchell."
It appears to be admitted that the
"Northwest Agr. Credit Co. has no
existence, and, as a name, is fictitious.
We are committed to the view:
"The signing of a fictitious name of
a person to an instrument which is
the subject of a forgery, with an intention to defraud, is a false and
fraudulent making of such instrument, and constitutes the offense of
forgery." Randolph v State, 65 Neb.
520, 91 N. W. 356.
Our statutes, in effect, provide that
forgery is the false making, or materially altering, with intent to de
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 S C J 756
fraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a legal
liability. Cooper v. State, 123 Neb.
605, 243 N. W. 837; Uerling v. State,
125 Neb. 3'74, 250 N. W. 243; Roush
v. State, 34 Neb. 325, 51 N. W. 755.
Here, the instrument alleged to
have been feloniously altered was a
negotiable instrument. On the subject of materiality of alteration, our
negotiable instruments act provides:
"Any alteration which changes * * *
the number or the relations of the
parties, * * * or any other change or
addition which alters the effect of the
instrument in any respect, is a material alteration." Comp. St. 1929, sec.
62-807. See, also, 8 C. J. 728.
Our statute quoted best expresses
the common law on this subject.
"Any change in the personality,
number, or relations, of the parties to
an instrument which gives the instrument a different legal effect is material." 2 C. J. 1214. See, also, Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553,
8 So. 498; Haskell v Champion, 30
Mo. 136.
"To sustain an indictment for forgery it is generally necessary that
the instrument alleged to be forged
should be one which would expose a
particular person to legal process.
Apparent legal efficiency, however, is
enough. It is not necessary that such
suit should have in it the elements of
ultimate legal success. It is enough
if the forged instrument be apparently sufficient to support a legal claim."
2 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed.)
1190, sec. 887. But, in the instant
case, the forgery of the original instrumcnt is not relied upon. The conviction must be sustained, if at all,
on the fact of alteration.
The rule clearly established by the
authorities, applicable to forgery as
defined by our statute, is: "It is
forgery fraudulently to alter any part
of an instrument when the alteration
is capable of working injury to ancther. Thus, it is forgery to alter
the dates, names, or any other material parts of an instrument when the
alteration gives it a new operation.
Consequently, it is forgery fraudulently to * * * erase one signature or
indorsement and insert another. * * *
It is even forgery for a. person fraudulently to alter an instrument previously forged by himself." 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed.) 1188,
sec. 684.
It is quite clear that the alterations
admittedly made bring the subject of
our present consideration within our
forgery statute. We do not overlook
the defendant's contention that he is
not chargeable with forgery of an instrument executed by himself. As
thus breradly stated the doctrine is not
maintainable. "If, for example, after
he had signed, sealed, and delivered
a deed, he should surreptitiously, getting it into his temporary possession,

alter it to accomplish some fraud, this
would be forgery. If one alters a
document which he has previously
forged, he commits a new offense."
2 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed.) 454.
This language is quite descriptive of
what actually occurred in the instant
case. It may well be said, in passing,
that there is nothing in this entire
transaction as actually carried out by
defendant that is consistent with honest dealirg and sound business ethics.
There is sufficient evidence, if believed, that clearly establishes the
necessary criminal intent on part of
defendant to commit the crime here
charged, and amply supports the
judgment. The objections to instructions given do not appear meritorious.
In addition, it may be said that in
this class of cases this court is bound
by the rule early announced, viz.: "In
criminal cases, as in civil, the credihility of witnesses and the weight to
be given their testimony are matters
for the determination of the jury. It
is for the jury to determine whether
it is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt, not for
the reviewing court to say whether it
is so convinced. A reviewing court
can only inquire whether the evidence
was sufficient to warrant the jury in
finding the defendant guilty." Bartlett v. State, 115 Neb. 148, 211 N. W.
994. See, also, O'Connor v State,
123 Neb. 471, 243 N. W. 650.
It follows that the judgment of the
trial court is in all respects correct,
and it is
AFFIRMED.

MEIERJURGEN v.
CITY OF LINCOLN
30123

Filed June 11, 1937.

Appeal, Lancaster county; Broady,
Judge.
Affirmed.
Lloyd E. Chapman (Lincoln) for
plaintiff, appellee.
Loren H. Laughlin, Geo. A. Piper
(Lincoln) for defendant, appellant.
(SYLLABUS)
Evidence examined and found to
nupport finding of trial court.
Heard before Goss, C. J., Rose,
Good, Eberly, Day and Carter, JJ.
DAY, J.
Meierjurgen seeks compensation for
total disability arising from an injury
he claims to have received while employed by the city of Lincoln in its
parks. The city appeals from a judgment under the compensation law.
The only question presented is one of
fact, whether or not the disability results from an injury to the workman.

tr(ti,)

6 S C J 757

•

Meierjurgen claims the injury occurred on September 9, 1935, at which
time he was helping to load a truck
and move some benches from one park
to another. He says that in lifting
one of the benches he strained his
back. He states that he complained
immediately to his fellow workmen,
who deny that any complaint was
made at that time. The employee
worked for two or three days, when
he complained to his superior and was
taken to a doctor for the city. He received medical attention from his
physician for a period of three or four
weeks during which time he became
worse. Another physician then cared
for him. After X-ray pictures were
taken he was hospitalized for about
ten days. While he was in the hospital a body cast was put on which he
wore for about six weeks, when it was
taken off because it hurt him so much.
Afterwards a body brace was worn
for some months. This could be taken
off for a half day at a time to relieve
him. He was later put in Bryan Memorial Hospital by the city's physician,
where heat was applied. As a part
of the treatment all this time serum
was injected in his arm at intervals.
The city assumed the obligation of all
medical expenses from September 9,
1935, to July 2, 1935, and, in addition,
paid the amount iequired by the law
during that time as compensation.
It is not questioned that the plaintiff is in a serious physical condition
and that he is unable to work as he
was prior to September 9, 1935. The
only difference of opinion is among the
expert witnesses as to the cause of the
disability. An expert witness testified for the plaintiff that his present
physical condition was due to the injury which he received on September
9, 1935. An expert witness testifying
for the city is of the opinion that the
condition as disclosed by the X-ray
pictures was not so caused, though it
may have been aggravated by an injury. Another expert witness for the
city is of the positive opinion that the
injury claimed by plaintiff was not
and could not be the cause of the condition or of the disability.
There are other surrounding circumstances which must be considered
in connection with the testimony of
the experts. There is no claim that
the plaintiff is a malinger. He had
not been ill or injured for many years.
He worked two or three days after
the injury and has been unable to
work since. Upon a consideration of
all the evidence in the record, of which
only a brief outline has been given
here, we are of the opinion that the
cvidence supports the finding of the
trial judge.
In view of this finding, it is not
necessary to consider the effect of
chapter 57, Laws 1935, which provides
among other things that the judgment of a district court in a compensation case may not be set aside or


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

757

modified unless it appears "that the
findings of fact are not conclusively
supported by the evidence as disclosed
by the record, and if so found, the
cause shall be considered de nova upon the record." The court does not
find it necessary to modify or set
aside the judgment in this case.
AFFIRMED.

CONNELY v HESSELBERTH
30045
Appeal.
Judge.

Filed June 11, 1937.
York

county;

Landis,

Affirmed.
Kirkpatrick, Good & Dougherty
(York) for Henry Teinert & Harry
Teinert, applicants & appellants.
Calvin Webster (York); Coufal &
Shaw (David City) for Teresa Lou
Connely et al objectors & appellees.
(SYLLABUS)
1. Owners and others interested in
realty, sold under decree foreclosing
valid tax sale certificate, where foreclosure was commenced more than
two years subsequent to issuance of
tax sale certificate, are barred from
the right of redemption on confirmation of such judicial sale.
2. "Personal notice required in
sale of land for taxes, as provided in
section 3, art. VIII of the Constitution, applies in all cases where a tax
deed is sought, but is not required in
sales under tax foreclosures in section
77-2039, Comp. St. 1929." Commercial
Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Pyramid
Realty Co., 121 Neb. 493, 237 N. W.
575.
3. One having no property rights
to preserve or protect by redemption
from a judicial sale foreclosing a
valid tax sale certificate will not be
permitted to redeem.
4. A decree foreclosing a tax sale
certificate is not vulnerable to collateral attack for irregularities or defects in the foreclosure proceedings
that do not go to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Heard before Rose, Good, Eberly,
Day, Paine and Carter, JJ., and Rine,
District Judge.
GOOD, J.
Henry and Harry Teinert, as tenants and occupants of the east half of
the southwest quarter of section 4,
township 9 north, range 2 west, in
York county, seek to redeem that land
from a judicial sales made pursuant to
a decree of court, foreclosing a tax
sale certificate. Their application

was filed in the foreclosure action, and
that accounts for the title to this appeal. Persons acquiring interest in
the land subsequent to the foreclosure
sale were made parties. The application was resisted by the purchaser and
her grantee. The trial court denied
the applicants the right to redeem,
and they have appealed.
The record discloses the following
facts: The record title to the land in
question has stood in the name of
Charles A. Hesselberth for many
years. Hesselberth departed this life
leaving surviving his widow, Rosa
Hesselberth, and. a son, Charles 0.
Hesselberth. His estate has not been
probated in York county. The record
does not disclose whether he died testate or intestate. Apparently, Rosa
Hesselberth and Charles 0. Hesselberth for a number of years have
rented the land to the Teinerts. The
taxes for the years 1928, 1929 and
1930 became delinquent. July 5, 1932,
the county treasurer of York county
sold the land for the delinquent taxes
to N. C. Caldwell. Caldwell paid the
subsequent taxes on the land, and
January 19, 1935, sold and assigned
the tax sale certificate to Teresa Lou
Connoly, plaintiff in the foreclosure
action. August 9, 1935, more than
three years subsequent to the tax sale
by the county treasurer, Connely commenced an action in the district court
for York county to foreclose the tax
sale certificate and the lien of the
subsequent taxes that had been paid
by her and her assignor. In this foreclosure action she made defendants
Rosa Hesselberth, Charles 0. Hesselberth,
Hesselberth
(real name unknown), wife of Charles
0. Hesselberth; all persons having or
claiming any interest in or to the real
estate described (real names unknown); the unknown heirs, devisees,
legatees. personal representatives, and
all persons interested in the estate of
Charles A. Hesselberth, deceased (real
names unknown). In the affidavit to
obtain service by publication, it was
stated that Rosa Hesselberth was a
resident of the state of Illinois, and
that the residence of Charles 0. Hesselberth and of the other named defendants was unknown. Order for
service by publication was made by
the judge of the district court. Notice of the pendency of the action was
duly published. Decree of foreclosure
was entered, and, pursuant to the decree, a sale was had in which the
plaintiff Connely was purchaser. The
sale was confirmed December 4, 1935,
and deed issued the following day.
The application to redeem was not
made until April, 1936, and during the
second term of court after the confirmation of sale.
Appellants invoke section 3, art.
VIII of the Constitution, which provides: "The right of redemption from
all sales of real estate for the nonpayment of taxes or special assess-

758
ments of any character whatever,
shall exist in favor of owners and persons interested in such real estate, for
a period of not less than two years
from such sales thereof. Provided,
that occupants shall, in all cases, be
served with personal notice before the
time of redemption expires."
The notice to occupant, provided for
in this section of the Constitution,
was never served upon the appellants,
and they were not made parties to
the foreclosure action. They contend
that, under the constitutional provision, they are entitled to two years
from and after the , order of confirmation of the judicial sale in which to
redeem. They cite and rely upon a
number of decisions made by this
court in which it was held that the
two-year period for redemption, contamed in the constitutional provision,
applies to judicial as well as to administrative sales. Among the cases
so holding are: Logan County v.
Carnahan, 66 Neb. 685, 92 N. W. 984;
Selby v. Pueppka, 73 Neb. 179, 102 N.
W. 263; Wood v. Speck, 78 Neb. 435,
110 N. W. 1001; Butler v. Libe, 81
Neb. 740, 116 N. W. 663; Smith v.
Carnahan, 83 Neb. 667, 120 N. W. 212;
Barker v. Hume, 84 Neb. 235, 120 N.
W. 1131; Commercial Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Pyramid Realty Co., 121 Neb.
493, 237 N. W. 575. In none of the
above cases had there been a prior
valid administrative sale and a twoyear period allowed to elapse after
sale before commencement of the action to foreclose.
Under the scavenger tax law, counties, cities, villages and other municipalities may institute foreclosure
action to collect delinquent taxes
without there having been a previous
administrative sale. In such cases,
this court has consistently held that
the two-year redemption period, provided by the Constitution, applies
from the date of confirmation of judicial sale. In such cases, there had
been no other sale. This court has
also held that where there was an invalid administrative sale, wherein the
sale was not for all the delinquent
taxes, the two-year redemption period
applied to the judicial sale in foreclosure proceeding. Adams v. Osgood,
42 Neb. 450, 60 N. W. 869; Harker v.
Hume, supra.
In Hardwick v. Snedeker, 88 Neb.
515, 129 N. W. 986, after administrative sale an action was brought for
foreclosure without waiting the twoyear period for redemption. It was
therein held: "An action to foreclose
a tax lien is not properly brought until after a sale of the land for taxes
and two years allowed for redemption,
but this is not jurisdictional, and if an
action so brought pro'ceeds to decree
of foreclosure and sale, and a deed is
duly issued upon confirmation of such
sale, the owner of the land may redeem the same within two years after such sale and confirmation, but

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 S C J 758
not later."
Where there has been a valid administrative sale by the county treasurer to a private individual and he
has not brought foreclosure action until more than two years after the issuance of the tax sale certificate, the
owner, or other person interested, is
not entitled to two years in which to
redeem from the confirmation of sale
under decree of foreclosure. He is
entitled to only one two-year period,
and that has been given from the
time of the administrative sale and
before the commencement of the foreclosure action. It is true, however,
that in such case he is entitled to an
additional period in which to redeem;
that is, at any time prior to the confirmation of the sale. The correct
rule is that owners and others interested in realty, sold under decree foreclosing valid tax sale certificate,
where foreclosure was commenced
more than two years subsequent to issuance of tax sale certificate, are
barred from the right of redemption
on confirmation of such judicial sale.
Appellants contend that they had a
right to redeem which could be cut
off only by the giving of the notice
mentioned in the quoted constitutional
provision. In our opinion, this contention cannot be sustained for a number of reasons:
First. This court has held on several occasions that such notice to occupant was required only where the
holder of a valid tax sale certificate
sought to obtain a county treasurer's
tax deed, as provided by section 772025, Comp. St. 1929, and has no application to a proceeding to foreclose
a valid tax sale certificate. In Hardwick v. Snedeker, supra, it was held
that a statute requiring notice to occupant is not applicable in case of
sale under decree of foreclosure. In
Commercial Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
Pyramid Realty Co., supra, it was
held: "Personal notice required in
sale of land for taxes, as provided
in section 3, art. VIII of the Constitution, applies in all cases where a tax
deed is sought, but is not required in
sales under tax foreclosures in section
77-2039, Comp. St. 1929."
Second. The record in this case
fails to show that appellants had any
interest as tenants to protect by a redemption from the sale in the foreclosure action. Whether their lease
had expired; whether they had any
planted or unharvested crops, is not
disclosed. Before they could redeem
they must, of course, have some interest to protect.
Third. It appears from the evidence in this case that one of the appellants, on behalf of both of them,
has, since the foreclosure sale had in
this case, leased the land again from
the purchaser at the judicial sale. Under these circumstances, the appellants had no right to preserve by a
redemption.

It is insisted, however, that appellants were acting for and on behalf
of the owners of the land, as well as
for themselves. They did so testify
as witnesses, but the written application made by them does not disclose
that they were acting for any one
other than themselves and in their
own individual rights.
It is argued that there were irregularities and defects in the foreclosure proceeding, in that the affidavit
which was made for the purpose of
obtaining an order authorizing service
by publication did not literally comply with the statute, and, further, that
the published notice did not literally
comply with the statutory requirement. We are of the opinion that
whatever irregularities or defects, if
any, there were in the affidavit and
in the notice cannot be raised at this
time, because that would be a collateral attack upon the decree in the foreclosure proceeding. No appeal was
taken from that decree, and any irregularities or defects that do not go
to the jurisdiction of the court could
not be raised in a collateral proceeding. But, regardless of that, the appellants in this case are in no position to complain, since they were not
necessary parties to the foreclosure
proceeding and, as already mentioned,
have no property rights to protect by
a redemption.
Error prejudicial to appellants has
not been pointed out. The judgment
appears to be right and is
AFFIRMED.•

IN RE ESTATE OF ROSENBERY,
ROSENBERY v ROSENBERY
29993
Appeal.
Judge.

Filed June 11,1937.
Douglas - county; Yeager,

Affirmed.
Benj. S. Baker; Cranny & Moore
(Omaha) for plaintiff, appellants.
Brown, Fiitch & West; B. N. Robertson (Omaha) for defendant, appellees.
(SYLLABUS)
"Unless excluded by unambiguous
words or by clear implication from
the language in a will, the description thereof of `heirs' includes a
surviving spouse as well as a surviving child or surviving children." In
re Estate of Hanson, 118 Neb. 208,
224 N. W. 2.

6 S C J 759
Heard before Goss, C. .1., Rose,
Eberly, Day, Paine and Carter, JJ.,
and Lightner, District Judge.
ROSE, J.
This is a controversy over the
meaning of the words "lawful heirs"
as used in the probated will of Abraham Rosenbery, deceased. The pertinent parts of the will are the second
and third paragraphs, which read as
follows:
"2. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Mina Rosenbery, all moneys and credits due
and payable to me, or payable to my
estate as life insurance, by, from or
in, any and all life insurance companies, on account of or in connection
with life insurance on my life, and also one-third of all the balance of my
property, both real and personal, of
which I may die seised, wherever situated, to have and to hold in her own
right for ever. These items are given
in lieu of her dower or statutory interest in my property as my wife; and
in case I survive her, the property
that would have gone to her, if living,
I hereby will, devise and bequeath to
my children, hereinafter named, to be
distributed as herein provided in paragraph 3.
"3. All the balance of my property
of which I may die seised, and wherever situated, I hereby will, devise
and bequeath to my children, G. W.
Rosenbery, C. D. Rosenbery and Mrs.
E. M. Miller, share and share alike,
and in case of the death of any one of
them during my lifetime, the lawful
heirs of such deceased child shall receive the share that would have gone
to him (or her) had he (or she) survived me."
The will was executed December 8,
1926. Testator died June 28, 1935.
His wife, Mina Rosenbery, died June
24, 1933. The son, G. W. Rosenbery,
died February 15, 1931, leaving surviving him his widow, Helen E. Rosenbery, his adult son Charles W. Rosenbery, and his minor daughter, Dorothy D. Rosenbery, of whom the Omaha National Bank is acting as guardian. Helen E. Rosenbery is not the
mother of Charles W. Rosenbery but
is the mother of Dorothy D. Rosenbery. Helen E. Rosenbery claims
that she is a "lawful heir" of her deceased husband, G. W. Rosenbery, and
that as such she is entitled to a share
of what he would have received under
his father's will had he survived his
father. Charles W. Rosenbery and
Dorothy D. Rosenbery asserted they
are the only lawful heirs of G. W.
Rosenbery, deceased. For the purpose
of a partial distribution of testator's
estate, B. N. Robertson, executor, and
C. D. Rosenbery, administrator, petitioned the county court to define the
words "lawful heirs," as used in the
will. The rival parties named presented the issue of heirship by proper
pleadings. The county court found
"That the word 'heirs' has a fixed

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

meaning, both in law and in fact, and
that said word 'heirs' includes the
widow of deceased G. W. Rosenbery,"
and entered a decree in her favor.
Charles W. Rosenbery and Dorothy D.
Rosenbery, by her guardian, appealed
to the district court, where the findings and decree were the same as in
the county court. Appellants in the
district court appealed to the supreme
court.
Appellants take the position that
the widow is not an heir of her deceased husband. They argue that the
Nebraska statute, adopting applicable
portions of the common law of England, defines an heir to be "He who
is born or begotten in lawful wedlock
and upon whom the law casts the estate in lands, tenements or hereditaments immediately upon the death of
his ancestor;" that the rights of the
surviving wife are limited to her stat_
utoty interests in the estate of her
husband at the time of his death; that
the legislature made her a distributee
of the property of which her husband
died seised, but not an heir. These
propositions were elaborately presented by appellants at the bar and in
their brief, including references to
statutes, text-books and opinions of
courts. There is a diversity of judicial
opinion on this subject, but the present chief justice, after referring to
statutes and cases, ruled as follows:
"So, under the substantive law existing in Nebraska since 1907, either
spouse may be an heir of the other.
Unless excluded by unambiguous
words or by clear implication from
the language used in a will, the description therein of 'heirs' includes a
surViving spouse as well as a surviving child or surviving children." In
re Estate of Hanson, 118 Neb. 208,
224 N. W. 2.
In the present instance, neither by
"unambiguous words" nor by "clear
implication from the language used"
does the will exclude the surviving
wife as an "heir" of her deceased husband. Both the county court and the
district court applied strictly the ruling of the supreme court in the Hanson case on the issue of heirship and
in doing so did not err.
The surviving widow applied to the
district court for an order correcting
its dectee by allowing her one-ninth
of testator's estate instead of onetwelfth as recited therein. The application was renewed here but cannot
be considered, since there is no crossappeal presenting that question.
The administrator and the executor
were impartial in their attitude
toward the rival litigants on the controverted issue and will not be taxed
with any costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED.

759

GRIMES v. BAKER
30000

Filed Jun,! 11, 1937.

Appeal.. Douglas
Judge.

county, Sears,

Reversed and dismissed.
Clarence T. Spier (Omaha) for
plaintiff, appellee.
Gaines, McLaughlin & Gaines (Omaha) for defendant, appellant.
(SYLLABUS)
An agreement without consideration is n,udum pactum and unenforceable.
Heard before Goss, C. J., Good,
Eberly, Day, Paine and Car 2r, JJ.,
and Lightner, District Judt,
PAINE, J.
Plaintiff brought suit in ,.he district
court to recover damages sustained
by reason of defendant's fa.1 ale and
refusal to fulfill a verbal statement
to save plaintiff harmless from any
loss she might suffer by reason of her
purchase of shares of stocl: of the
Universal Gypsum & Lime Company,
of Chicago, Illinois, recommended by
him.
Defendant alleged in his answer
that he acted purely as the agent of
the plaintiff in the purcln re of said
stock from George E. Sipp1J, its owner, and that the agreement alleged by
plaintiff to repurchase the stack was
barred by the statute of imitations,
and void under the statute of frauds,
and was nudum pactum. 1 he jury returned a verdict for $1,379.23, from
which the defendant appeal;.
The plaintiff alleged that defendant
was a substantial stockholder and director in said company, with full and
complete knowledge with respect to
the financial status of said corporation; that in 1926 defendant solicited
plaintiff to purchase stcck of said
company, and verbally agreed with
plaintiff that defendant would repurchase said stock and would save her
harmless from any loss which she
might sustain through such investment; that swill solicitation and negotiations were carried on between the
defendant and the mother of the
plaintiff, who was acting for and on
behalf of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, relying upon defendant's agreement, paid $1,530 for the .4 irk so purchased through defendant; that the
said company later went into bankruptcy, and was merged w'th 'mother
company under the name of National
Gypsum Company, and the stock becoming practically worthless, the

4

760
plaintiff on February 16, 1935, demanded that defendant repurchase
her stock. Upon defendant's refusal,
this action was brought, asking for
verdict and judgment for the amount
of her outlay, less the present value
of the stock into which the original
shares of stock had been merged.
The jury deducted $241, being the
value of the new shares substituted,
and added 6 per cent, interest from
the date of the demand to the date of
the verdict, and thus arrived at the
verdict of $1,379.23, for which amount
judgment was entered..
Among the errors relied upon for
reversal by the defendant are that
the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence, and in holding that defendant was under any
contractual obligation to plaintiff. Defendant especially insists that the
court erred in holding that the
statement made by the defendant constituted a binding contract, and insists there was no consideration whatever for the alleged agreement, which
is nudum pactum and unenforceable,
and being oral it was void under the
statute of frauds, and, finally, that
the court erred in holding that the
claim was not barred by the statute
of limitations.
It appears that the defendant, in
conversation with plaintiff's mother at
Fremont, recommended this stock as
a good investment, and later the
mother came to Omaha, and, while
taking lunch with defendant at the
Omaha Athletic Club, the conversation occurred upon which the suit is
founded.
The appellee insists that four times
this court has rendered opinions which
support a recovery by the plaintiff in
this case, and it is necessary to examine these opinions.
In the case of Griffin v. Bankers
Realty Investment Co., 105 Neb. 419,
181 N. W. 169, it is stated that the
plaintiff purchased certain shares of
stock, and that the agent of the defendant company in making the sale
of such stock made an oral contract
and agreement with the plaintiff
whereby the defendant company
agreed, if said stock was presented to
it at any time within a period of four
years, to repurchase such stock with
interest at 7 per cent, on demand. It
was held that the sale of the stock and
the repufchase agreement were one
and the same transaction, and that
such a contract made by a corporation
is not ultra vires, and that the defendant company could not be heard to say
that the sale was valid so far as the
purchase of the stock was concerned,
and void so far as its repurchase was
concerned, as it was a single transaction and constituted but one contract.
In Trenholm v. Kloepper, 88 Neb.
236, 129 N. W. 436, plaintiff purchased ten shares of the capital stock

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 S C J 760
of a corporation, and claims that the
defendant, to induce her to buy the
stock, orally agreed to repurchase the
same. The defendant testified that in
these negotiations he acted solely as
the agent of the corporation whose
stock he was selling.
In Stratbucker v. Bankers Realty
Investment Co., 107 Neb. 194, 185 N.
W. 271, plaintiff purchased shares of
stock in the defendant company upon
the promise made by its agent at the
time of purchase that the defendant
company would repurchase such stock
at any time after the expiration of
one year upon plaintiff giving 30 days'
notice to the defendant company. He
further made representations that
said defendant company had a fund
of $100,000, duly deposited in a bank,
for the express purpose of meeting
such demands of those who bought
stock.
In Grotte v. Rachman, 114 Neb. 284,
207 N. W. 204, the plaintiff owned
stock in the Burgess Nash Company,
and the defendant Rachman was an
agent engaged in the sale of the stock
of Stroud & Company, and he induced
plaintiff to switch her Burgess Nash
stock for the stock which he was selling at the same face value. As part of
the transaction the defendants agreed
that they would, at any time that
plaintiff needed money, repurchase
such Stroud & Company stock at its
face value with 7 per cent. interest.
It will be seen from this brief statement of the facts in these four Nebraska cases that no one of them is
quite in point with the case at bar.
In the instant case, when the mother of the plaintiff disclosed that her
daughter had a little money for which
she was seeking investment, what was
more natural than that the defendant
would recommend to her as an investment stock in the Universal Gypsum
& Lime Company of Chicago, in which
his stock holdings were substantial?
He stated that he had received not
only regular dividends,'but that there
had been stock dividends issued, and
that there was a plan for buying up
small gypsum companies and forming
a larger company. He was so certain
of the intrinsic value of this Universal
Gypsum & Lime Company stock that
he made the statement white they
were lunching at the Omaha Athletic
Club that he would take it off the
daughter's hands at any time she desired to sell it. He consented, at the
mother's request, to go into the open
market and arrange for the purchase
of stock for them. The defendant did
not sell stock of the company itself,
as a promoter or agent would have
done, to increase the assets of the
company, nor did he arrange to sell
stock which he owned. He did not receive one cent of commission, nor benefit in any way through the purchase
of these few shares of stock in the
open market in this large corporation.
No complaint of any kind was made

to the defendant for more than five
years after the purchase was made.
Several of the cases cited by appellee, and other Nebraska cases, are
discussed in 12 Neb. Law Bulletin,
200, and it is indicated that the original sale affords a good consideration
for the option to return the stock to
the original seller and receive the
money paid under such an agreement,
but nowhere is it stated that a third
party, who has no financial interest
therein, can be so held. See recent
annotations on this question in 88 A.
L. R. 842 and 101 A. L. R. 154.
In our opinion, the statement of the
defendant that he would repurchase
the stock was naked of any obligation,
and, being a nudum pactum, is not
enforceable. Judgment reversed and
action dismissed.
REVERSED AND DISMISSED.

STATE EX REL SORENSEN v
HOSKINS STATE BANK,
LUIKART, RECEIVER
29941
Appeal.
Judge.

Filed June 11, 1937.
Wayne

county;

Chase,

Reversed and remanded.
F. C. Radke (Lincoln) for E. H.
Luikart, Receiver, appellant.
Richard C. Hunter, Atty. Gen.;
Robert R. Moodie (West Point) for
Wm. H. Wright, Atty. Gen., Applicant, appellee.
(SYLLABUS)
1. The power of appointment and
removal of judicial receivers ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court.
2. The Department of Banking is
ineligible to be appointed a judicial
receiver because it is not a qualified
legal entity.
3. When a judgment discharges a
judicial receiver, appoints as receiver
one who is legally ineligible, and directs the former to turn over all assets to the latter, the former has a
right to appeal.
Heard before Goss, C. J., Rose,
Good, Eberly, Day, l'aine and Carter,
JJ.
GOSS, C. J.
This is an appeal from a decree removing E. H. Luikart as judicial receiver of the Hoskins State Bank and
appointing the Department of Banking of the State of Nebraska as receiver in his stead.
The main suit was begun by the filing of the petition for receivership
December 17, 1931, and Luikart was
appointed by the district court for

6 S C J 761

S

Wayne county judicial receiver of the cessor the assets, records, files and
bank on December 24, 1,931, under the papers in his hands as receiver.
then existing provisions of section 8This leads us to the next inquiry.,
192, Comp. St. 1929, he being the then which is whgther Luikart has any
secretary of the Department of Trade right of appeal remaining in the acand Commerce. On May 9, 1933, Sen- tion. Logically it follows from an acate File No. 263, passed by the 1933 ceptance of the previous point that he
legislature, became effective. Laws has no right to name his successor.
1933, ch. 18. It created the Depart- But the court, in the very same parament of Banking, superseding the De- graph of the judgment in which Luirartment of Trade and Commerce, and kart was removed, named as his sucnamed its chief officer as the Super- cessor the Department of Banking,
intendent of Banks. It undertook to and in the same order Luikart was dicreate a system of administrative re- rected to deliver to that successor all
ceivership and liquidation of insolvent assets, records, files and papers in his
state banks by the Department of custody as receiver. Luikart asserts
Banking as Receiver and Liquidating that the Department of Banking is
Agent, not subject to judicial control not such a legal entity or person as is
by the district courts.
capable of being a judicial receiver,
E. H. Luikart held the office of Su- and that he has a right of appeal to
perintendent of Banks under the new test that question. It seems reasonact until January 3, 1935, on which able that he ought not to be compelled
date B. N. Saunders succeeded him as to deliver valuable assets to a successuch officer and held the office at the sor lacking the qualities necessary to
time of filing the present petition be a judicial receiver, but that he
praying for the discharge of E. H. should have the right to withhold such
Luikart as judicial receiver of the delivery until an eligible successor is
Hoskins State Bank and that the De- appointed; and, in the meantime, to
partment of Banking be appointed as test by and on appeal that question
receiver in his place. Since January presented. He claims that the ap3, 1935, Luikart has not been an em- pointment of the Department of Bankploye3 of the banking department. He ing as a judicial receiver is no apfiled olcjections to the application of pointment at all-that it is a nullity.
the attorney general for his removal.
It would seem that to make valid
Simon Strate and five others inter- the appointment
of an entity other
vened and filed a petition of inter- than a natural person
vention. They claim to be a deposit- ceiver, such entity as a judicial reors' committee representing all cred- qualified by statute must be legally
be so appointitors and acting in an advisory capac- ed. This principle to involved
in Beity to the receiver and to the court dell v. Moores, 63 was
219, 88 N. W.
in the liquidation. They resisted the 243, wherein it wasNeb.
"So far as
application on the ground of the un- a city is concerned, said:
considered in the
necessary expense, alleging that the character of an artificial
being, it is
final liquidation was near at hand.
a creature of the legislature. It can
Upon consideration of the pleadings have no rights save those bestowed
and the evidence the district court, in upon it by its creator."
an order made February 25, 1936, reHas the Department of Banking
moved E. H. Luikart as receiver and been clothed
with the power by the
appointed the Department of Banking legislature
be eligible for appointin his stead, directing Luikart to de- ment by a to
court as a judicial receivliver to the department all assets, rec- er? In State
State Bank of Minaords, files and papers in his custody tare, supra, it v.was
said in the arguas such receiver. Strate and his as- ment: "No doubt the
legislature has
sociates filed no motion for a new power to create an
trial, filed no bond of any sort and ministrative board executive or adwith power to lidid not appeal. Luikart appealed and quidate the affairs of
insolvent state
is the sole appellant.
banks independently of the judiciary,
It is fundamental that the power of but legislation of that kind has not
appointment and removal of judicial been enacted id Nebraska." Perhaps,
receivers ordinarily rests in the sound as a sequel to this opinion, adopted
discretion of the district court. Cress- April 16, 1932, the 1933 legislature
man v. Bonham, 129 Neb. 201, 4 SCJ passed an act known as Senate File
569, 260 N. W. 818, Howell v. Poff, 122 No. 263, greatly amending the bankNeb. 793, 241 N. W. 548; Duffy v. ing laws. Among them former secOmaha Merchants Express & Trans- tion 8-192, Comp. St. 1929, was
fer Co., 127 Neb. 273, 255 N. W. 1; amended to read as follows: "The
State v. State Bank of Minatare, 123 Department of Banking is hereby desNeb. 109, 242 N. W. 278. So, there ignated the Receiver and Liquidating
appearing no valid claim that the trial Agent of failed or insolvent banks."
court abused sound judicial discretion Laws, 1933, ch. 18, sec. 52; Comp St.
in removing Luikart as judicial re- Supp. 1933, sec. 8-192. The act furceiver, no proper ground for reversal ther contains provisions to make the
exists in the fact that the court re- administrative receivership effective
moved him. If and when an eligible so far as it goes and is able to go
successor is appointed it will be Lui- without evoking the aid of the courts.
kart's duty to turn over to that suc- When that occurs it is in such respect


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

761
amenable to equity rules. The record
shows that it has been used ih many
instances. The diligence of counsel
and our own search disclose nothing
in this act or elsewhere in the statutes showing that the Department of
Banking is a legal entity capable of
being appointed a judicial receiver.
Nowhere do the statutes so declare.
Formerly the secretary of the De- •
partment of Trade and Commerce as
a person was the receiver. Comp. St.
1929, sec. 8-192. When in 1933 Senate File No. 263 changed the name to
the Department of Banking and its
chief administrator to Superintendent
of Banks, it amended the section as
heretofore quoted.
Lacking the quality of being a person or of being a legal entity authorized by the statute, we are of the
opinion the trial court erred in appointing the Department of Banking
as the judicial receiver of the bank
under consideration.
Plaintiff cites as authoritatively analogous, the case of State v. National
Old Line Ins. Co., 129 Neb. 473, 4
SCJ 746, 261 N. W. 902. wherein the
Department of Insurance was appointed as receiver for the purposes
of liquidation under section 44-204,
Comp. St. 1929. The section is very
different. Whether it does or does
not authorize a district court to appoint the state Department of Insurance as a judicial receiver was not an
issue and was therefore not discussed
in the opinion in that case. The controversy there was over the right of
the department or the governor to discharge an attorney and was raised
by his petition of intervention seeking to prevent that discharge. The
interest of all parties was adverse to
any move to raise the question of the
eligibility of a receiver already appointed and so the issue was not
raised and nowhere appears in the
record or in the opinion.
The judgment of the district court,
in so far as it appoints the Department of Banking receiver and orders
Luikart, as receiver, to attorn to it, is
REVERSED.

BANKRUPTCY
(Agricultural Compositions and
Extensions)
(Editor's Note: The following is the
entire Frazier-Lemke Act.)
Conciliation Commissioners
(a) Within thirty days after June
7, 1934, every court of bankruptcy of
which the jurisdicton or territory includes a county or counties having an
agricultural population (according to
the last available United States census) of five hunlred or more farmers

762
shall appoint one or more referees to
be known as "conciliation commissioners", one such conciliation commissioner to be appointed for each
county having an agricultural population of five hundred or more farmers
according to said census: Provided
further, That where any county in
any such district contains a smaller
number of farmers according to said
census, for the purposes of this paragraph such county shall be included
with one or more adjacent counties
where the population of the counties
so combined includes five hundred or
more farmers, according to said census. In case more than one conciliation commissioner is appointed for
a county, each commissioner shall act
separately and shall have such territorial jurisdiction within the county as the court shall specify. A conciliation commissioner shall have a
term of office of one year and may
be removed by the court if his services
are no longer needed or for other
cause. No individual shall be eligible to appointment as a conciliation
commissioner unless he is eligible for
appointment as a referee and in addition is a resident of the county,
familiar with agricultural conditions
therein and not engaged in the farmmortgage business, the business of
financing farmers or transactions in
agricultural commodities or the business of marketing or dealing in agricultural commodities or of furnishing
agricultural supplies. In each judicial district the court may, if it finds
it necessary or desirable, appoint a
suitable person as a supervising conciliation commissioner. The supervising conciliation commissioner shall
have such supervisory functions under
this section as the court may by order specify.
Fees and Orders
(b) Upon filing of any petition by
a farmer under this section there shall
be paid a fee of $10 to be- transmitted
to the clerk of the court and covered
into the Treasury. The conciliation
commissioner shall receive as compensation for his services a fee of $25
for each case submitted to him, and
when docketed, to be paid out of the
Treasury. A supervising conciliation
commissioner shall receive, as compensation for his services, a per diem
allowance to be fixed by the court,
in an amount not in excess of $5
per day, together with subsistence
and travel expenses in accordance
with the law applicable to officers
of the Department of Justice. Such
compensation and expenses shall be
paid out of the Treasury. If the creditors at any time desire supervision
over the farming operations of a
farmer, the cost of such supervision
shall be borne by such creditors or
by the farmer, as may be agreed upon by them, but in no instance shall
the farmer be required to pay more
than one-half of the cost of such supervision. Nothing contained in this

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 S C J 762
section shall prevent a conciliation
commissioner who supervises such
farming operations from receiving
such compensation therefor as may be
so agreed upon_ No fees, costs, or
other charges shall be charged or taxed to any farmer or his creditors by
any conciliation commissioner or with
respect to any proceeding under this
section, except as hereinbefore in this
section provided. The conciliation
commissioner may accept and avail
himself of office space, equipment,
and assistance furnished him by other Federal officials, or by any State,
county, or other public officials. The
Supreme Court is authorized to make
such general orders as it may find
necessary properly to govern the administration of the office of conciliation commissioner and proceedings
under this section; but any district
court of the United States may, for
good cause shown and in the interests of justice, permit any such general order to be waived.
Limitation on Filings
(c) At any time within five years
after March 3, 1933, a petition may
be filed by any farmer, stating that
the farmer is insolvent or unable to
meet his debts as they mature, and
that it is desirable to effect a composition or an extension of time to pay
his debts. The petition or answer of
the farmer shall be accompanied by
his schedules. The petition and answer shall be filed with the court,
but shall, on request of the farmer
or creditor, be received by the conciliation commissioner for the county
in which the farmer resides and
promptly transmitted by him to the
clerk of the court for filing. If any
sucli petition is filed, an order of adjudication shall not be entered except
as provided hereinafter in this section.
Inventory
(d) After the filing of such petition
or answer by the farmer, the farmer
shall within such time and in such
form as the rules provide, file an inventory of his estate.
Creditors' Meeting; Notice;
Examinations
(e) The conciliation commissioner
shall promptly call the first meeting
of creditors, stating in the notice that
the farmer proposes to offer terms
of composition or extension, and inclosing with the notice a summary of
the inventory, a brief statement of the
farmer's indebtedness as shown by
the schedules, and a list of the names
and addresses of the secured creditors and unsecured creditors, with the
amounts owing to each as shown by
the schedules. At the first meeting
of the creditors the farmer may be
examined, and the creditors may appoint a committee to submit to the
conciliation commissioner a supplementary inventory of the farmer's estate. The conciliation commissioner
shall, after hearing the parties in interest, fix a reasonable time within

which application for confirmation
shall be made, and may later extend
such time for cause shown. After
the filing of the petition and prior to
the confirmation or other disposition
of the composition or extension proposal by the court, the court shall exercise such control over the property
of the farmer as the court deems in
the best interests of the farmer and
his creditors.
Final Inventory
(f) There shall be prepared by, or
under the supervision of, the conciliation commissioner a final inventory
of the farmer's estate, and in the preparation of such inventory the commissioner shall give due consideration
to the inventory filed by the farmer
and to any supplementary inventory
filed by a committee of the creditors.
Acceptance by Creditors
(g) An application for the confirmation of a composition or extension
proposal may be filed in the court
of bankruptcy after, but not before,
it has been accepted in writing, by
a majority in number of all creditors
whose claims have been allowed, including secured creditors whose
claims are affected, which number
shall represent a majority in amount
of such claims.
Hearing on Application for
Confirmation
(h) A date and place, with reference to thd convenience of the parties in interest, shall be fixed for a
hearing upon each application for the
confirmation of the composition or extension proposal and upon such objections as may be made to its confirmation.
Confirmation
(i) The Court shall confirm the
proposal if satisfied that (1) it includes an equitable and feasible method of liquidation for secured creditors
and of financial rehabilitation for the
farmer; (2) it is for the best interests of all creditors; and (3) the offer and its acceptance are in good
faith, and have not been made or procured except as herein provided, or
by any means, promises, or acts herein forbidden. In applications for extensions the court shall require proof
from each creditor filing a claim that
such claim is free from usury as defined by the laws of the place where
the debt is contracted.
Terms of Proposals; Exemptions
(j) The terms of a composition or
extension proposal may extend the
time of payment of either secured or
unsecured debts, or both, and may
provide for priority of payments to
be made during the period of extenson as between secured and unsecured
creditors. It may also include specific undertakings by the farmer during
the period of the extension, including
provisions for payments on account,
and may provide for supervisory or
other control by the conciliation commissioner over the farmer's affairs
during such period, and for the ter-

6 S C J 763

•

•

•

mination of such period of supervision or control under conditions specified: Provided, That the provisions
of this section shall not affect the allowances and exemptions to debtors
as are provided for bankrupts under
section 24 of this title, and such allowances and exemptions shall be set
aside for the use of the debtor in the
manner provided for bankrupts.
Effect of Confirmation
(k) Upon its confirmation, a composition or extension proposal shall
be binding upon the farmer and his
secured and unsecured creditors affected thereby: Provided, however,
That such extension and/or composition shall not reduce the amount of
or impair the lien of any secured
creditor below the fair and reasonable market value of the property securing any such lien at the time that
the extension and/or composition is
accepted, but nothing herein shall
prevent the reduction of the future
rate of interest on all debts of the
debtor, whether secured or unse•
cured.
Distribution on Confirmation;
Priorities; Modification
(1) Upon the confirmation of a
composition the consideration shall be
distributed under the supervision of
the conciliation commissioner as the
court shall direct, and the case dismissed: Provided, That the debts having priority of payment under section
104 of this title, for bankrupt estates,
shall have priority of payment in the
same order as set forth in said section 104 under the provisions of this
section in any distribution, assignment, composition or settlement herein provided for. Upon the confirmation of an extension proposal the
court may dismiss the proceeding or
retain jurisdiction of the farmer and
his property during the period of the
extension in order to protect and preserve the estate and enforce through
the conciliation commissioner the
terms of the extension proposal. The
court may, after hearing and for good
cause shown, at any time during the
period covered by an extension proposal that has been confirmed by the
court, set the same aside, reinstate
the case, and modify the terms of the
extension proposal.
Setting Aside Confirmation
(m) The judge may, upon the application of any party in interest, file
at any time within six months after
the composition or extension proposal
has been confirmed, set the same
aside and reinstate the case, if it
stall be made to appear upon a trial
that fraud was practiced in the procuring of such composition or extension, and that knowledge thereof has
come to the petitioners since the confirmation thereof.
Jurisdiction—Debtor, Property,
Pleadings, Redemption Periods
(n) The filing of a petition or
answer with the clerk of the court, or
leaving it with the conciliation com-


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
11111111160Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

missioner for the purpose of forwarding same to the clerk of court,
praying for relief under section 75
of this act, as amended, shall immedi,
ately subject.the farmer and all his
property, wherever located, for all
the purposes of this section, to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court, including all real or personal property,
or any equity or right in any such
property, including, among others,
contracts for purchase, contracts for
deed, or conditional sales contracts,
the right or the equity of redemption
where the period of redemption has
not or had not expired, or where a
deed of trust has been given as security or where the sale has not or
had not been confirmed, or where
deed had not been delivered, at the
time of filing the petition.
In all cases where, at the time of
filing the petition, the period of redemption has not or had not expired,
or where the right under a deed of
trust has not or had not become absolute, or where the sale has not or
had not been confirmed, or where
deed had not been delivered, the period of redemption shall be extended
or the confirmation of sale withheld
for the period necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of this section. The words 'period
of redemption' wherever they occur in
this section shall include any State
moratorium, whether established by
legislative enactment or executive
proclamation, or where the period of
redemption has been extended by a
judicial decree. In proceedings under
this section, except as otherwise provided herein, the jurisdiction and powers of the courts, the title, powers,
and duties of its officers, the duties
of the farmer, and the rights and
liabilities of creditors, and of all persons with respect to the property of
the farmer and the jurisdiction of the
appellate courts, shall be the same
as if a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed and a decree
of adjudication had been entered on
the day when the farmer's petition,
asking to be adjudged a bankrupt,
was filed with the clerk of court
or left with the conciliation commissioner for the purpose of forwarding
same to the clerk of court.
Exemptions From Certain
Proceedings
(o) Except upon petition made to
and granted by the judge after hearing and report by the conciliation
commissioner, the following proceedings shall not be instituted, or if instituted at any time prior to the filing of a petition under this section,
shall not be maintained, in any court
or otherwise, against the farmer or
his property, at any time after the
filing of the petition under this section, and prior to the confirmation or
other disposition of the composition
or extension proposal by the court:
(1) Proceedings for any demand,
debt, or account, including any money

763
demand;
(2) Proceedings for foreclosure of
a mortgage on land, or for cancellation, rescission, or specific performance of an agreement for :;a!e of land
or for recovery of possessic:r of land;
(3) Proceedings to acquire title to
land by virtue of any tax sale;
(4) Proceedings by way of execution, attachment, or garmshment;
(5) Proceedings to sell land under
or in satisfaction of any j.:dgment or
mechanic's lien; and
(6) Seizure, distress, sale, or other
proceedings under an exe:ution or under any lease, lien, chattel mortgage,
conditional sale agreement, crop payment agreement, or mortgage.
Application Of Exemptions
f subsec(p) The prohibitions
tion (o) shall apply to all judicial
or official proceedings in any court
or under the direction of any official, and shall apply to all creditors,
public or private, and to all of the
debtor's property, whercvc r located.
All such property shall be under the
sole jurisdiction and contrrd cf the
court in bankruptcy, and 1.,object to
the payment of the debtor farmer's
ction
i
creditors, as provided fm
75 of this act.
Conciliation Commissioner 2*sisting
Farmer
(q) A conciliation commissioner
shall upon request assist any farmer
in preparing and filing a petition under this section and in :•11 !natters
; under this
subsequent thereto arisin,
section and farmers shall not be required to be represented by an attorney in any proceedin 7 under this
section.
Farmer Define
(r) For the purposes (f this section, section 22 (b), and section 202,
the term "farmer" incli'd, not only
an individual who is primarily bona
producing
fide personally engaged
products of the soil, but also any indivdual who is primarily bona fide
personally engaged in dairy farming,
the production of poultry or livestock,
or the production of poultry products
or livestock products in their unmanufactured state, or the principal part
of whose income is derived from any
one or more of the foregoing operations, and includes the personal representative of a deceased farmer;
and a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any county in which such operations occur.
Failure in Adjudication; Procedure
(s) Any farmer failing to obtain
the acceptance of a majority in number and amount of all ereclito,•s whose
claims are affected by a composition
end /or extension proposal, or if he
feels aggrieved by the composition
and/or extension, may am2nd his petition or answer, asking to be adjudged a bankrupt. Such farmer may,
at the same time, or at the time
of the first hearing, petition the court
that all of his property, wherever
located, whether pledged, encumber-

764
ed, or unencumbered, be appraised,
and that his unencumbered exemptions, and unencumbered interest or
equity in his exemptions, as prescribed by State law, be set aside to him,
-and that he be allowed to retain possession, under the supervision and
control of the court, of any part or
parcel or all of the remainder of his
property, including his encumbered
exemptions, under the terms and conditions set forth in this section. Upon such a request being made, the referee, under the jurisdiction of the
court, shall designate and appoint appraisers, as provided for in this act.
Such appraisers shall appraise all of
the property of the debtor, wherever
located, at its then fair and reasonable market value. The appraisals
shall be made in all other respects
with rights of objections, exceptions,
and appeals, in accordance with this
act: Provided, that in proceedings
under this section, either party may
file objections, exceptions, and take
appeals within four months from the
date that the referee approves the
appraisal.
(1) After the value of the debtor's
property shall have been fixed by the
appraisal herein provided, the referee
shall issue an order setting aside to
such debtor his unencumbered exemptions, and his unencumbered interest
or equity in his exemptions, as prescribed by the State law, and shall
further order that the possession, under the supervision and control of the
court, of any part or parcel or all of
the remainder of the debtor's property shall remain in the debtor, as
herein provided for, subject to all existing mortgages, liens, pledges, or
encumbrances. All such existing mortgages, liens, pledges, or encumbrances
shall remain in full force and effect,
and the property covered by such
mortgages, liens, pledges, or encumbrances shall be subject to the payment of the claims of the secured
creditors, as their interests mak appear.
(2) When the conditions set forth
in this section have been complied
with, the court shall stay all judicial
or official proceedings in any court,
or under the direction of any official,
against the debtor or any of his property, for a period of three years. During such three years the debtor shall
be permitted to retain possession of
all or any part of his property. in
the custody and under the supervision
and control of the court, provided he
pays a reasonable rental semi-annually for that part of the property
of which he retains possession. The
first payment of such rental shall be
made within one year of the date of
the order staying proceedings, the
amount and kind of such rental to be
the usual customary rental in the
community where the property is located, based upon the rental value,
net income, and earning capacity of
the property. Such rental shall be

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

6 S C J 764
paid into court, to be used, first, for
(4) The conciliation commissioner,
payment of taxes and upkeep of the appointed under subsection (a) of secproperty and the remainder to be dis- tion 75 of this act, as amended, shall
tributed among the secured and un- continue to act, and act as referee,
secured creditors, and applied on their when the farmer debtor amends his
claims as their interest may appear. petition or answer, asking to be adThe court, in its discretion, if it judged a bankrupt under the provideems it necessary to protect the cred- sions of subsection (s) of section 75
itors from loss by the estate, and/or of this act, and continue so to act unto conserve the security, may order til the case has been •finally disposed
sold any unexempt perishable proper- of. The conciliation commissioner, as
ty of the debtor; or any unexempt per- such referee, shall receive such an adsonal property not reasonably neces- ditional fee for his services as may
sary for the farming operations of the be allowed by the court, not to exdebtor, such sale to be had at private ceed $35 in any case, to be paid out of
or public sale, and may, in addition to the bankrupt's estate. No additional
the rental, require payments on the fees or cost of administration or supprincipal due and owing by the debtor ervision of any kind shall be charged
to the secured or unsecured creditors, to the farmer debtor when or after
as their interests may appear, in ac- he amends his petition or answer,
cordance with the provisions of this asking to be adjudged a bankrupt, unact, and may require such payments der subsection (s) of section 75 of
to be made quarterly, semiannually, this act, but all such additional filing
or annually, not inconsistent with the fees or costs of administration or
protection of the rights of the cred- supervision shall be charged against
itors and the debtor's ability to pay, the bankrupt's estate. Conciliation
with a view to his financial rehabili- (enunissioners, and referees appointtation.
ed under section 75 of this act shall
be entitled to transmit in the mails,
(3) At the end of 3 years, or prior free of postage, under cover
thereto, the debtor may pay into court penalty envelope, all matters of a
which
the amount of the appraisal of the relate exclusively to the
business of
property of which he retains posses- the courts, including notices
to credsion, including the amount of encum- itors, if, at the time
that the farmer
brances on his exemptions, up to the debtor amends his petition
amount of the appraisal, less the swer, asking to be adjudged or ana bankamount paid on principal: Provided, rupt, a receiver is
That upon request of any secured or of his property, suchin charge of any
receiver shall be
unsecured creditor, or upon request divested of possession,
and the propof the debtor, the court shall cause erty returned
to the
a reappraisal of the debtor's property, such farmer, under the possession of
or in its discretion set a date for this act. The provisionsprovisions of
of this act
hearing, and after such hearing fix shall be held to apply
also
to partthe value of the property, in accord2rships, common, entirety, joint,
ance with the evidence submitted, and community ownerships, or
to farming
the debtor shall then pay the value corporations where at
least 75 per
so arrived at into court, less pay- cent of the stock is owned
by actual
ments made on the principal, for dis- farmers, and any such
parties may
tribution to all secured and unse- join in one petition.
cured creditors, as their interests may
(5) This act shall be held to apappear, and thereupon the court shall, ply to all existing cases now pending
by an order, turn over full posses- in any Federal court, under this
sion and title of said property, free as well as to future cases; and act,
all
and clear of encumbrances to the cases that have been dismissed
debtor: Provided, that upon request any conciliation commissioner, by
refin writing by any secured creditor or eree, or court because of the
creditors the court shall order the Court decisions holding theSupreme
former
property upon which such secured subsection (s) unconstitutional,
shall
creditors have a lein to be sold at be promptly reinstated, without any
public auction. The debtor shall have additional filing fees or charges.
Any
90 days to redeem any property sold farm debtor who has filed
under the
at such sale, by paying the amount General Bankruptcy Act may
for which any such property was vantage of this section upon take adwritten
sold, together with 5 per cent per an- request to the court; and
a previous
num interest, into court, and he may discharge of the debtor
under any
app'-- for his discharge, as provided other section of this act shall
for by this act. If, however, the debt- grounds for denying him the not be
benefits
or at any time fails to comply with of this -ection.
the provisions of this section, or with
(6) This act is hereby declared
any orders of the court made pur- to be an emergency measure and if
in
suant to this section, or is unable the judgment of the court such ernerto refinance himself within 3 years, vency ceases to exist in its locality,
the court may order the appointment then the court, in its discretion,
may
of a trustee, and order the property shorten the stay of proceedings heresold or otherwise disposed of as pro- in provided for and proceed to liquivided for in this act.
date the estate.

O

(a)

CITATIONS-NEBRASKA CASES
(Cumulative from September 1, 1936)

a

Neb Reports
Vol Pg
1-211
-305
-508 (Unof)
-528 (Unof)
-730 (Unof)
-754 (Unof)
-877 (Unof)
2-145 (Unof)
-377
-879 (Unof)
3-530 (Unof)
-540 (Unof)
-681 (Unof)
4-52 (Unof)
-537
-406 (Unof)
-722 (Unof)
-880 (Unof)
5-105
-260 (Unof)
-500
-505
-540 (Unof)
6-216
260
-516
8-109
-124
-192
-319
9-26
-57
-109
10-1
-92
11-154
-348
-388
-423
-423
12-69
-596
13-445
-445
14-198
-214
381
-453
15-1
-295
-679
16-96
-572
-699
17-39
-330
-334
-548
19-33
-128
-128
-262
-511
20-98
-375
-486
21-233
-534
-599


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Neb Sup Ct Jourl
Pg
Vol
Case
343
29798__6SCJ
29744__6SCJ__ 125
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29802__6SCJ__ 391
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29728_6SCJ__ 229
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29744__6SCJ__ 125
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29928__6SCJ__ 337
29958__6SCJ__ 386
29837__6SCJ__ 508
29753__6SCJ__ 122
29720__6SCJ__ 151
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29798__6SCJ__ 343
291976SCJ__ 41
29743__6SCJ__ ,L4
298656SCJ__ 514
29886__6SCJ__ 413
29790_ 6SCJ__ 333
300646SCJ_ 200
29790_6SCJ__ 333
29963_ 6SCJ_ 486
29802__6SCJ_ 391
29803_ 6SCJ_ 471
510
29964__6SCJ
200
300646SCJ
297676SCJ_ 158
298026SCJ__ 391
29917__6SCJ_ 327
297906SCJ_ 333
29769__6SCJ_ 134
41
29197_ 6SCJ_
29778__6SCJ_ 157
297286SCJ_ 229
297906SCJ_ 333
29934__6SCJ__ 383
297726SCJ__ 222
29908__6SCJ__ 571
299336SCJ__ 420
29683__6SCJ__ 54
29868__6SCJ__ 225
29885__6SCJ_ 270
29933__6SCJ__ 420
29964__6SCJ__ 510
298096SCJ__ 277
29805_6SCJ__ 383
298036SCJ__ 471
299636SCJ__ 486
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29964__6SCJ__ 510
29805__6SCJ__ 383
29963__6SCJ__ 486
298846SCJ__ 339
297846SCJ__ 465
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29803__6SCJ__ 471
30092__6SCJ__ 462
29955__6SCJ__ 468
300316SCJ__ 621
299526SCJ__ 187
29802__6SCJ__ 391
29796__6SCJ
188
29874__6SCJ__ 128
29963__6SCJ__ 486
29696__6SCJ__ 120
29884__6SCJ__ 339
29803__6SCJ__ 471

Neb Reports
Vol Pg
22-470
23-306
-617
-690
24-818
-193
25-42
-207
-368
-457
-864
28-189
-294
-612
30-302
-512
-843
32-162
-269
-602
-666
33-35
137
-381
34-240
752
-857
35-228
-487
896
-898
-898
-898
36-160
-642
-683
-749
-858
37-235
-353
-394
-394
-535
38-396
-756
-847
-891
39-92
-93
-158
1-229
-485
-745
-776
40-281
-294
-298
-508
-559
-676
-695
-792
41-73
-105
-277
-374
-818
42-177
43-326

Neb Sup Ct Jourq
Vol
Pg
Case
298036SCJ__ 471
300316SCJ__ 621
299586SCJ__ 386
29754__6SCJ__ 143
29957_6SCJ__ 239
297786SCJ__ 157
298216SCJ__ 284
29821__6SCJ__ 284
291976SCJ__ 41
300296SCJ__ 209
30064__6SCJ__ 200
299346SCJ__ 383
298136SCJ__ 223
29197__6SCJ__ 41
298096SCJ__ 277
29971__6SCJ__ 622
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29917__6SCJ__ 327
29933__6SCJ__ 420
29964__6SCJ__ 510
29977__6SCJ__ 531
300036SCJ__ 168
297786SCJ__ 157
298216SCJ__ 284
298216SCJ__ 284
29902__6SCJ__ 270
29964__6SCJ__ 510
29649__6SCJ__ 248
29790__6SCJ__ 333
296966SCJ__ 120
29822__6SCJ
276
299556SCJ__ 468
30031__6SCJ__ 621
29906__6SCJ__ 150
298116SCJ__ 489
299986SCJ__ 40
29813__6SCJ__ 223
29649__6SCJ__ 248
299066SCJ__ 150
297546SCJ__ 143
29767__6SCJ__ 158
299546SCJ__ 385
29762__6SCJ__ 87
296896SCJ__ 141
29798__6SCJ__ 343
298066SCJ__ 235
29998__6SCJ__ 40
29955__6SCJ__ 468
300926SCJ__ 462
29865_6SCJ__ 514
29870__6SCJ__ 240
29710__6SCJ__ 36
29938__6SCJ
196
299296SCJ__ 576
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29830__6SCJ__ 293
300646SCJ__ 200
29738__6SCJ__ 101
29763__6SCJ
88
29711__6SCJ__ 21
29796__6SCJ
188
29738_6SCJ__ 101
299466SCJ__ 491
295866SCJ__ 125
300646SCJ 200
297286SCJ__ 229
29744__6SCJ__ 125
29837__6SCJ__ 508
299646SCJ__ 510

Neb Reports
Vol Pg
-334
473
-509
-690
-854
44-136
-463
-463
-684
-631
-724
-777
45-29
-67
-67
-871
-871
46-10
-10
-10
13
-13
-51
-88
-149
-252
-390
-402
-861
-900
47-108
-589
48-247
-514
-715
49-567
-717
50-687
51-5
-17
-94
.108
-162
-214
-365
52-556
801
53-259
-431
-509
54-33
—173
-217
-228
-287
-514
-592
-626
-626
55-103
-133
-243
-324
-353
-559
66-67
132
-212
-229

Neb Sup Ct Jourl
Case
Vol
Pg
298776SCJ__ 489
297956SCJ__ 289
29940__6SCJ__ 625
29931__6SCJ__ 578
29764_6SCJ__ 62
29998__6SCJ__ 40
29938__6SCJ__ 196
298096SCJ__ 277
29711__6SCJ__ 21
299556SCJ__ 468
297636SCJ__ 88
298776SCJ__ 489
29964__6SCJ__ 510
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29908__6SCJ__ 571
299556SCJ__ 468
30031__6SCJ__ 621
298686SCJ__ 225
299556SCJ__ 468
300316SCJ__ 621
29868__6SCJ__ 225
29955__6SCJ__ 468
29805__6SCJ__ 383
299386SCJ__ 195
29868__6SCJ__ 225
297986SCJ__ 343
29873__6SCJ__ 136
29868__6SCJ__ 225
298976SCJ__ 507
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29809__6SCJ__ 277
29696_6SCJ__ 120
297546SCJ__ 143
30029__6SCJ__ 209
298666SCJ__ 346
297756SCJ__ 185
297726SCJ__ 222
29812__6SCJ__ 567
297246SCJ__ 89
29837_6SCJ__ 508
298036SCJ__ 471
298806SCJ__ 744
296896SCJ__ 141
29869__6SCJ__ 347
298376SCJ__ 508
29877_6SCJ__ 489
300646SCJ__ 200
297226SCJ._ 56
29906__6SCJ__ 150
29883__6SCJ__ 417
30037__6SCJ__ 623
29720__6SCJ__ 151
29870_6SCJ__ 240
29772__6SCJ__ 222
297726SCJ__ 222
298776SCJ__ 489
291976SCJ__ 41
299556SCJ__ 468
30031__6SCJ__ 621
298936SCJ__ 279
300316SCJ__ 621
298206SCJ__ 331
297446SCJ__ 125
29772__6SCJ__ 222
299776SCJ__ 531
29772__6SCJ__ 222
297786SCJ__ 157
298656SCJ__ 514
29762__6SCJ__ 87

A

(b)
Neb Reports
Vol Pg
-229
-358
648
-792
57-51
-544
-765
58-225
-265
-466
-548
-713
-756
59-17
-23
-100
-219
-253
-296
-460
-667
-689
60-101'
-208
-322
-338
-364
-368
-423
-423
-600
-722
61-249
-254
-262
-276
-317
-329
-615
-841
-892
62-10
-66
-80
-159
-344
-364
-549
-639
-672
-832
-869
63-130
-130
-242
-271
-339
-349
-539
-859
64-122
-135
-220
-276
-288
-342
-413
-834
65-158
-340
-432
-469
697

Neb Sup Ct Jour'l Neb Reports
Case
Vol
Pg I Vol Pg
29893__6SCJ__ 279
-826
29696__GSCJ
120 66-26
29743__6SCJ__ 44
-60
29981__6SCJ__ 527
-312
29897__6SCJ__ 507
-685
29790__6SCJ
333
-712
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-712
29861__6SCJ__ 166 67-36
298466SCJ__ 215
-276
29861__6SCJ _ 166
-325
297076SCJ-_ 24
-469
29967__6SCJ__ 742 68-27
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-107
299676SCJ
742
-724
29862__6SCJ
291
-779
30092__6SCJ__ 462 69-180
29767__6SCJ__ 168
-203
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-356
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-364
29711__6SCJ__ 21
-456
298806SCJ__ 744
623
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-630
29840__6SCJ__ 565
-730
29764__6SCJ__ 62
-800
29921__6SCJ__ 389 70-159
297556SCJ__ 102
-211
297736SCJ__ 133
-465
298036SCJ__ 471
-523
29722 _6SCJ__ 56
-632
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-753
29767__6SCJ__ 158 71-1
298936SCJ__ 279
-160
297146SCJ__ 67
169
29982__GSCJ__ 27
-180
298126SCJ__ 567
-280
298616SCJ__ 166
-424
29722__6SCJ__ 56
-691
29722 _6SCJ__ 56
-708
29693__6SCJ_1 72-136
29764__6SCJ__ 62
162
297076SCJ_- 24
-200
29940__6SCJ__ 625
_228
29826__6SCJ__ 336
-372
29744__6SCJ__ 125
-518
298486SCJ__ 286
-661
29964_ 6SCJ__ 510 73-84
29877_ 6SCJ__ 489
-193
29964__6SCJ__ 510
-208
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-354
29689__6SCJ__ 141
-809
29933__6SCJ__ 420
-858,
29197_ 6SCJ__ 41 74-108
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-246
29880_ 6SCJ__ 744
_303
30003_ OSCJ__ 168 75-263
300106SCJ__ 528
-381
29841_ 6SCJ__ 425
-426
29887__6SCJ__ 534
575
29977.__6SCJ__ 531
-637
29720__6SCJ__ 151
-698 -29870_ 6SCJ__ 240
-698
29837__6SCJ__ 508
-706
296966SCJ__ 120 76-109
29763__6SCJ__ 88
-114
29819__6SCJ__ 282
-352
29715__6SCJ__ 31
-612
29711__6SCJ__ 21
-616
29723__6SCJ__ 13
-652
297906SCJ__ 333
-761
29803__6SCJ__ 471 77-12
29887__6SCJ__ 534
-418
298266SCJ__ 336
-438
300036SCJ__ 168
-612


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Neb Sup Ct Jour'l Neb Reports
Case
Vol
Pg Vol Pg
29714__6SCJ__ 67
-626
29710__6SCJ__ 36
-821
29860__6SCJ__ 415 78-62
29861__6SCJ__ 166
-98
29803__6SCJ_ 471
_103
29586__6SCJ_ 125
_175
29877__6SCJ__ 489
_274
29873__6SCJ__ 136
-274
29884__6SCJ__ 339
479
298216SCJ_ 284
_552
29720__6SCJ__ 151
_616
29933__6SCJ- 420
-631
298806SCJ_ 744
_00
29880__6SCJ__ 744
-804
29940__6SCJ__ 623
-840
298606SCJ-- 415 79-128
300296SCJ__ 209
-421
297206SCJ__ 151
-504
30037__6SCJ__ 623
566
29906__6SCJ__ 150
-685
297626SCJ__ 87
-834
297626SCJ__ 87 80-123
291976SCJ__ 41
-216
297226SCJ__ 56
-237
29722__6SCJ__ 56
-296
30064__6SCJ__ 200
-322
29848__6SCJ_ 286
-473
30078__6SCJ__ 421
-754
298036SCJ__ 471
-843
296966SCJ__ 120 81-133
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-148
30037__6SCJ__ 623
-180
29866__6SCJ__ 346
-237
29866__6SCJ__ 346
-368
29978__6SCJ__ 530
-740
29777__6SCJ__ 147
-790
297906SCJ__ 333 82-37
298036SCJ__ 471
-191
30092__6SCJ__ 462
-302
298216SCJ__ 284
-669
29883__6SCJ__ 417
744
29903__6SCJ__ 626 83-111
29998__6SCJ__ 40
-546
30078__6SCJ__ 421
-550
29795_...6SCJ__ 289
-835
29867__6SCJ__ 384 84-51
29957__6SCJ__ 239
-179
299066SCJ__ 150
-179
29998__6SCJ_
40
-217
29880__6SCJ__ 744
-296
29903__6SCJ__ 626
344
29934__6SCJ_ 383
-422
298696SCJ__ 347
-682
298926SCJ__ 467
-708
298616SCJ__ 166 85-128
29933__6SCJ__ 420
-248
29797__6SCJ__ 165
-406
297076SCJ__ 24
-477
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-722
29798__6SCJ__ 343
-760
299631_6SCJ__ 486 86-256
29718__6SCJ_
-285
35
29813__6SCJ__ 223
-285
29893__6SCJ__ 279
-334
29917__6SCJ_ 388
-372
29877.._6SCJ_ 489
-372
29754__6SCJ_ 143
-553
297236SCJ__ 43
-615
29722__6SCJ__ 56 87-60
29772__6SCJ__ 222
-117
29197__6SCJ__ 41
-266
300926SCJ__ 462
-331
29964__6SCJ__ 510
-770

Neb Sup Ct Jour'l
Case
Vol
Pg
29714__6SCJ__ 57
29867__6SCJ__ 384
29696__6SCJ__ 120
297236SCJ__ 43
29772__6SCJ__ 222
29755_ _6SCJ_ _ 102
29197__6SCJ__ 41
29855__6SCJ__ 221
30064_ _6SCJ _ _ 200
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
30003_ _6SCJ_ _ 168
29803_ _6SCJ_ _ 471
29762_ _6SCJ__ 87
297246SCJ__ 89
29714_ _6SCJ_ _ 57
29798_ _GSCJ_ _ 343
298646SCJ__ 268
29861__6SCJ_ _ 166
29777_ _GSCJ_ _ 147
29954__6SCJ__ 385
29903_ _6SCJ _ _ 626
29571_ _6SCJ_ _ 139
29893_ _6SCJ_ _ 279
29803__6SCJ__ 471
29868__6SCJ__ 225
29803_ _6SCJ_ _ 471
29893__6SCJ__ 279
29865_ _6SCJ_ _ 514
300926SCJ__ 462
29861__6SCJ__ 166
29840_ _6SCJ_ _ 565
29977_ _GSCJ_ _ 531
29848_ _6SCJ_ _ 286
29790_ _6SCJ_ _ 333
29890_ _6SCJ_ _ 59
29848__6SCJ__ 286
29981__6SCJ__ 527
29880_ _6SCJ_ _ 744
29820_ _6SCJ_ _ 331
29893__6SCJ__ 279
29861_ _6SCJ_ _ 166
29938_ _6SCJ __ 196
29977_ _6SCJ __ 531
29778_ _6SCJ_ _ 157
29988__6SCJ__ 529
29790_ _6SCJ__ 333
29965_ _6SCJ__ 485
29977_ _6SCJ__ 631
29819_ _6SCJ_ _ 282
29928_ _6SCJ__ 337
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29931__6SCJ__ 578
29889__6SCJ__ 311
29861_ _6SCJ_ _ 166
30092__6SCJ__ 462
29723_ _6SCJ_ _ 43
29794_ _6SCJ_ _ 194
30092_ _6SCJ_ _ 462
29893.._6SCJ__ 279
29767_ _6SCJ __ 158
298866SCJ__ 413
29795__6SCJ__ 289
29977__6SCJ__ 531
29998__6SCJ__ 40
29859_ _6SCJ_ _ 275
29903_ _6SCJ_ _ 626
29790__6SCJ__ 333
29689_ _6SCJ_ _ 141
2'9866_ _6SCJ_ _ 346
29907_ _6SCJ_ _ 340
29957_ _6SCJ_ _ 239
29855_ _6SCJ__ 221
30092_ _6SCJ_ _ 462

•

•

•

(c)
Neb Reports
Vol Pg
-812
-819
-845
88-95
-619
-707
-707
89-334
-382
-479
-563
-776
90-112
-122
-683
-704
91-31
-269
-426
-493
-511
-553
-587
-654
-798
92-121
-506
-807
93-108
-190
-658
-670
94-210
-217
415
-442
-708
-794
95-238
-255
-384
-394
-417
-535
96-213
-245
-245
-245
-346
-584
-584
-596
-682
-751
97-14
139
-238
-392
-397
-466
-731
-825
98-141
-272
-763
99-20
-821
-527
100-46
-113
-140
-173
-268

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Neb Sup Ct Jouel
Vol
Case
Pg
29897_6SCJ__ 507
29790__6SCJ__ 333
29868__6SCJ-_ 225
29710__6SCJ__ 36
29978__6SCJ__ 630
29678__6SCJ__ 212
29889__6SCJ__ 311
29928__6SCJ__ 337
297266SCJ__ 54
29916__6SCJ__ 171
298406SCJ_ 565
299886SCJ__ 529
29571__6SCJ_ 139
29683__6SCJ_
54
299036SCJ_ 626
29840__6SCJ__ 565
300296SCJ__ 209
298096SCJ_ 277
29809__6SCJ_ 277
29848__6SCJ_ 286
29714__6SCJ_
57
29883__6SCJ__ 417
298676SCU__ 384
298196SCJ_ 282
29978__6SCJ_ 530
299166SCJ__ 171
300926SCJ_ 462
29775__6SCJ_ 185
424
298576SCJ
299816SCJ_ 627
31
29715_6SCJ_
29952_ 6SCJ_ 187
29689__6SCJ_ 141
29932__6SCJ 416
297236SCJ_
43
29811__6SCJ_ 489
299296SCJ_ 576
300296SCU
209
54
296836SCJ
29753__6SCJ_ 122
29978__6SCJ
530
29803__6SCJ_ 471
30037__6SCJ _ 623
29634__6SCJ
137
29755__GSCJ__ 102
30064_6SCJ__-_ ZOO
29841_6SCJ__ 425
30092__6SCJ__ 462
29744__6SCJ__ 125
29841__6SCJ__ 425
300926SCJ__ 462
298496SCJ__ 387
29764__6SCJ__ 62
298776SCJ__ 489
29811__6SCJ__ 489
29916__6SCJ__ 111
29988__6SCJ__ 629
29586__6SCJ__ 125
298166SCJ__ 164
29859__6SCJ__ 275
29840__6SCJ__ 565
29971_6SCJ__ 622
298416SCJ__ 425
29969__6SCJ__ 740
299286SCJ__ 337
299696SCJ__ 740
29948__6SCJ__ 287
300646SCJ__ 200
298206SCJ__ 331
29836__6SCJ__ 163
29841__6SCJ__ 425
29778__6SCJ__ 157
299386SCJ__ 196

Neb Reports
Vol Pg
-298
-584
-745
101-155
223
-254
-349
-743
-820
-855
102-324
-349
-475
-511
-537
-629
-629
-728
10344
-125
-136
-194
-219
-229
-442
-538
-695
-763
-791
-791
-872
104-18
-56 ---62
-70
-88
-93
-122
-122
-619
-672
-678
105-212
-288
-691
-754
106-173
.351
-417
,679
-779
107-18
-18
-74
-180
-199
-223
-233
-411
-496
-516
-585
593
-676
-716
-716
-858
108-74
--146
-275
-352
-473
-729

Neb Sup Ct Jouel
Case
Pg
Vol
300646SCJ__ 200
29866_6SCJ__ 346
29803__6SCJ__ 471
29916__GCSJ__ 171.
297246SCJ__ 89
2972868CJ__ 229
30092__6SCJ__ 462
29888__6SCJ__ 269
29722__6SCJ__ 56
29973__6SCJ__ 573
29683__6SCJ__ 54
297556SCJ__ 102
29826__6SCJ__ 336
29918__6SCJ__ 413
298486SCJ__ 286
29742__6SCJ__ 60
29903__6SCJ__ 626
298616SCJ__ 166
29975__6SCJ__ 282
298616SCJ__ 166
297236SCJ__ 43
298836SCJ__ 417
298066SCJ__ 235
29841__6SCJ__ 425
29887__6SCJ__ 534
29197_6SCJ__ 41
29841_6SCJ__ 425
29876_6SCJ__ 241
29965__6SCJ__ 485
29977__GSCJ__ 531
299756SCJ__ 282
297626SCJ__ S7
2986.1_6SCJ__ 166
298616SCJ__ 166
299456SCJ__ 503
298306SCJ__ 293
29938__6SCJ__ 196
291976SCJ__ 41
298556SCJ__ 221
298846SCJ__ 339
297986SCJ__ 343
29951__6SCJ__ 469
297146SCJ__ 57
297846SCJ__ 465
29948__6SCJ__ 287
298096SCJ__ 277
299696SCJ__ 740
29977__6SCJ__ 531
29973__6SCJ__ 573
29809__6SCJ__ 277
298166SCJ__ 104
296786SCJ__ 212
299656SCJ__ 485
29868__6SCJ__ 225
299516SCJ__ 469
297546SCJ__ 143
29809__6SCJ__ 277
298096SCJ__ 277
29948__6SCJ__ 287
297986SCJ__ 343
299756SCJ__ 282
298806SCJ__ 744
297626SCJ__ 87
29710__6SCJ__ 26
29765__6SCJ__ 192
29889_.6SCJ__ 311
29908__6SCJ__ 571
29798__6SCJ__ 343
299736SCJ__ 573
29826__GSCJ__ 336
29848__6SCJ__ 286
29877___6SCJ
489
29775__6SCJ__ 185

Neb Reports
Vol Pg
109-152
-167
-335
-441
-441
-472
-514
-558
-579
-667
-683
-729
-853
-859
-865
110-56
-329
383
-390
-495
-511
-672
-784
-800
-814
111-65
-141
-162
-300
-414
-414
-465
-508
-609
-609
-698
-753
-827
112-22
-201
-424
-500
-509
-675
-675
-675
-692
-797
113-149
-173
-256
-275
-346
1-408
-576
-801
-827
830
114-257
-420
-432
475
-777
-804
-813
-813
115-1
-58
-136
-199
271
-277
-302

Neb Sup Ct Jouel
Case
Pg
Vol
29883__6SCJ__ 417
29841__6SCJ__ 425
299036SCJ__ 626
29801__6SCJ__ 163
300316SCJ__ 621
30010__6SCJ__ 528
29833_6SCJ__ 227
298616SCJ__ 166
29816__6SCJ__ 104
29998__6SCJ__ 40
29841__6SCJ__ 425
30037__6SCJ__ 623
29723__6SCJ__ 43
298006SCJ__ 249
29861__6SCJ__ 166
29867....ASCJ__ 384
299486SCJ__ 287
297426SCJ__ 60
299356SCJ__ 492
29816__6SCJ__ 104
29802__6SCJ__ 391
29883__GSCJ__ 417
29969_6SCJ__ 740
297446SCJ__ 125
29768_6SC.1 _ 149
29975__6SCJ__ 282
29710__GSCJ__ 36
297446SCJ__ 125
29875_6SCJ__ 46
29762__6SCJ__ 87
29893__6SCJ__ 279
298856SCJ__ 270
29884__6SCJ__ 339
29875__6SCJ__ 46
29879__6FCJ
161
29903__6SCJ__ -626
29867__6SCJ__ 384
29848__6SCJ__ 286
298616SCJ__ 166
298866SCJ__ 413
29985.....6SCJ__ 164
29806_6SCU__ 235
299486SCJ__ 287
29777__GSCJ__ 147
29934_6SCJ__ 383
30037__6SCJ__ 623
29938__6SCJ__ 196
299856SCJ__ 164
29878__6SCJ__ ?9
29952__6SCJ__ 187
29716_6SCJ__ 31
29586__6SCJ__ 126
297106SCJ__ 36
2972863CJ__ 229
29816__6SCJ__ 101
29791_6SCJ__ 217
299546SCJ__ 385
29973__6SCJ__ 573
298616SCJ__ 166
29869__6SCJ__ 347
30050__6SCJ__ 252
29875__6SCJ__ 46
29954__6SCJ__ 385
29954__6SCJ__ 385
29982__6SCJ__ 27
30064__6SCJ__ 200
29833__6SCJ__ 227
29805__6SCJ__ 383
29883__6SCJ__ 417
29890_6SCJ
59
298806SCJ__ 744
298166SCJ__ 104
29873_6SCJ__ 136

(d)
Neb Reports
Vol Pg
-385
-579
-621
-711
-892
116-18
-25
-112
305
-549
-553
-629
-633
-648
-713
-740
117-1
-6
-29
-52
-85
-198
-257
-262
-265
.619
-636
-661
710
723
765
813
813
-813
118-5
-47
-150
-231
-337
-346
-459
-557
-634
.-651
-835
119-58
-121
-178
-188
-188
-212
-212
-365
-432
-469
-471
-571
653
-676
-725
-776
-795
120-84
-84
-141
-299
-404
-421
-421
-462
468
-491
-499

Neb Sup Ct Jour'l Neb Reports
Case
Vol
Pg Vol Pg
29718__6SCJ__ 36
-525
29766__6SCJ_ 255
-561
29861_6SCJ__ 166
-616
29803__6SCJ_ 471
-6.25
29778__6SCJ
157
-689
29864__6SCJ_ 268
-751
29790_ 6SCJ_ 333
-790
29869_ 6SCJ_ 347 121-11
29718_6SCJ _ 35
-25
297146SCJ
57
-28
29826__6SCJ__ 336
-122
29952__6SCJ__ 187
-146
29841__6SCJ_ 425
-184
300646SCJ_. 200
-471
297906SCJ__ 333
-493
29826__6SCJ__ 336
-504
29710__6SCJ__ 36
-532
29931__6SCJ__ 578
-619
29767__6SCJ__ 158
-647
29753__6SCJ__ 122
-658
29826__6SCJ__ 336
-823
29724__6SCJ__ 89
-862
29928__6SCJ__ 337
-870
29791_ASCJ__ 217 122-3
299656SCJ__ 485
-94
29880__6SCJ__ 744
-157
29720_6SCJ__ 151
-183
298756SCJ__ 46
374
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-385
29728__6SCJ__ 229
-576
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-583
29846__6SCJ__ 215
-613
29825__6SCJ__ 237
-676
29961__6SCJ__ 466
-676
29880__6SCJ__ 744
-688
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-720
30064__6SCJ__ 200
-755
298806SCJ__ 744
-783
29768__6SCJ__ 149
-793
29571__6SCJ__ 139 123-56
29919__6SCJ__ 328
129
29897__6SCJ__ 507
-138
29848__6SCJ__ 286
-161
29890_6SCJ__ 59
-194
30029__6SCJ__ 209
-227
299486SCJ__ 287
-241
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-253
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-368
297556SCJ__ 102
-388
298896SCJ__ 311
-396
29715__6SCJ__ 31
-407
298746SCJ__ 128
-517
29935__6SCJ__ 492
-558.
298206SCJ__ 331
-599
300316SCJ__ 621
-599
298266SCJ__ 336
-648
300786SCJ__ 421
-726
29887__6SCJ__ 634
-766
298486SCJ__ 286
-791
29820__6SCJ__ 331
-838
29971__6SCJ__ 622
-844
298976SCJ__ 507
-851
298656SCJ__ 514 124-1
29940__6SCJ__ 625
-28
299386SCJ__ 196
-51
29878__6SCJ__ 39
-67
29816__6SCJ__ 104
-102
29846__6SCJ__ 215
-142
29825__6SCJ__ 237
-181
29720_6SCJ__ 151
-207
29787__6SCJ__ 32
-210
298866SCJ__ 413
-260
29742__6SCJ__ 60
-274


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Neb Sup Ct Jourl Neb Reports
Case
Vol
Pg Vol Pg
298166SCJ__ 104
-274
29714__6SCJ__ 57
-274
29982__6SCJ__ 27
-274
29982__6SCJ__ 27
-280
298216SCJ__ 284
-312
29764_6SCJ__ 62
-316
298786SCJ__ 39
-342
29947__6SCJ__ 388
-347
29888__6SCJ__ 269
-347
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-363
30078_6SCJ__- 421
-449
29886__6SCJ__ 413
-523
29907__6SCJ__ 340
-538
297526SCJ__ 86
-542
29902__6SCJ__ 270
-566
29945__OSCJ__ 503
-591
297686SCJ__ 149
-594
29918__6SCJ__ 413
-620
29755__6SCJ__ 102
-639
29957__6SCJ__ 239
-652
29903__6SCJ__ 626
-754
29768__6SCJ__ 149
-754
300316SCJ__ 621
-762
29963__6SCJ__ 486
-816
299736SCJ__ 573
-841
29928__6SCJ__ 337
-841
29887__6SCJ__ 634
-841
297586SCJ__ 84
-841
296346SCJ__ 137
-864
298656SCJ__ 514 125-87 '
29768_6SCJ__ 149
-172
298206SCJ__ 331
-185 --29876_6SCJ__ 241
-223
298886SCJ__ 269
-302
29855__6SCJ__ 221
-302
29728__6SCJ__ 229
-310
29866__6SCJ__ 346
-329
29866__6SCJ__ 514
-414
29728__6SCJ__ 229
-455
30087_6SCJ__ 487
-457
299516SCJ__ 469
-463
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-468
29787__6SCJ__ 32
-497
29971__6SCJ__ 622
-570
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-593
300796SCJ__ 242
-621
29777__6SCJ__ 147
-644
29855__6SCJ__ 221
-672
298776SCJ__ 489
-672
29812__6SCJ__ 567
-731
29935__6SCJ__ 492
-745
298756SCJ__ 46
-825
29948__6SCJ__ 287
-871
29863__6SCJ__ 34 126-93
29878__6SCJ__ 19
-106
300296SCJ__ 209
-133
298346SCJ__ 504
-138
29957__6SCJ__ 239
-263
29863__6SCJ__ 34
-377
299066SCJ__ 150
-398
29975__6SCJ__ 282
-398
298866SCJ__ 413
-403
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-477
29863__6SCJ__ 34
-518
30029__6SCJ__ 209
-554
29571__6SCJ__ 139
-560
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-610
29870__6SCJ__ 240
-610
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-640
30078__6SCJ__ 421
-695
29867__6SCJ__ 384
-730
29865__6SCJ__ 514
-744
29801__6SCJ__ 163 127-66

Neb Sup Ct Jour'!
Case
Vol
Pg
298686SCJ__ 225
29955__6SCJ__ 468
300316SCJ__ 621
29848__6SCJ__ 286
30050__6SCJ__ 252
29887__6SCJ__ 534
29790GSCJ__ 333
29875__6SCJ__ 46
29879__6SCJ__ 161
29868__6SCJ__ 225
299296SCJ__ 576
29876__6SCJ__ 241
297686SCJ__ 149
29909_6SCJ__ 419
29945__6SCJ__ 503,
29964__6SCJ__ 510
29929__6SCJ__ 576
299036SCJ__ 626
29886__6SCJ__ 413
30078__6SCJ__ 421
297136SCJ__ 138
299006SCJ__ 330
29863__6SCJ__ 34
29869__6SCJ__ 347
297556SCJ__ 102
29758__6SCJ__ 253
299656SCJ__ 485
299776SCJ__ 531
29795_6SCJ__ 289
29755__6SCJ__ 102
29863__6SCJ__ 34
29634__6SCJ__ 137
298636SCJ__ 34
29863_66CJ__ 34
298786SCJ__ 39
297586SCJ__ 84
29678_66CJ__ 212
297686SCJ__ 149
29878__6SCJ__ 39
29917__6SCJ__ 327
29948__6SCJ__ 287
298636SCJ__ 34
298766SCJ__ 241
300796SCJ__ 242
298766SCJ__ 241
29880__6SCJ__ 744
29954__6SCJ__ 385
29965__6SCJ__ 485
29977__6SCJ__ 531
29713__6SCJ__ 138
297136SCJ__ 138
29841__6SCJ__ 425
29713__6SCJ__ 138
299356SCJ__ 492
29728__6SCJ__ 229
29885_6SCJ__ 270
29841__6SCJ__ 425
29839__6SCJ__ 505
299176SCJ__ 327
29802__6SCJ__ 391
29812__6SCJ__ 567
29800__6SCJ__ 249
29865__6SCJ__ 514
299036SCJ__ 626
29713__6SCJ__ 138
29713__6SCJ__ 138
29825_6SCJ__ 237
299616SCJ._ 466
297916SCJ__ 217
299776SCJ__ 531
297916SCJ__ 217
298836SCJ__ 417
29728__6SCJ__ 229

(e)
Neb Reports
Vol Pg
-124
-132
-193
-231
-253
-253
-340
-360
-424
-424
-505
-589
-625
-625
-730
-767
-812
-820
128-17
-78
-160
-160
-165
-173
-173
-188
-188
-191
-191
-199
-202
-219
-266
-295
-316
-368
-374
-418
432
-535
-537
-580
-619
-619
-654
-693
-748
-763
-766
-783
129-9
-112
-112
-112
-112
-112
-112
-150
-184
-230
-306
-329
-338
-394
-416
-433
-493
-493
-493


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Neb Sup Ct Jour'l Neb Reports
Neb Sup Ct Jour'l
Pg Vol Pg
Vol
Case
Case
Pg
Vol
29975_ _6SCJ__ 282
-499
29951__6SCJ__ 469
29982__6SCJ__ 27
-521
29833_ _6SCJ_ _ 227
-541
29809__6SCJ__ 277
29726__6SCJ__ 54
29935__6SCJ__ 492
296896SCJ__ 141
-545
29869__6SCJ__ 347
-645
29764__6SCJ__ 62
29917__6SCJ__ 327
-645
29798_ _6SCJ__ 343
30079__6SCJ__ 242
-645
29963_ _6SCJ__ 486
29791__6SCJ__ 217
-651
30078__6SCJ__ 421
30029__6SCJ__ 209
-669
29874__6SCJ__ 128
30078__6SCJ__ 421
-703
29795_ _6SCJ_ _ 289
29879__6SCJ__ 161
29838__6SCJ__ 238
-751
29571__6SCJ__ 139
-764
299656SCJ__ 485
29713__6SCJ__ 138
29977__6SCJ__ 531
-764
29900__6SCJ__ 3'30
29719__6SCJ__ 33
-806
29978__6SCJ__ 530
-806
29888_ _6SCJ__ 269
29878__6SCJ__ 39
29909__6SCJ__ 419
-806
299826SCJ__ 27
29979__6SCJ__ 484
-806
29977__6SCJ__ 531
29728__6SCJ__ 229
-838
29935__6SCJ__ 492
29878_6SCJ__ 39
-888
29884__GSCJ__ 339
29879__6SCJ__ 161
-888
29833__6SCJ__ 227
-892
29798__6SCJ__ 343
29907__6SCJ__ 340 130-32
29790__6SCJ__ 333
29816_ _6SCJ_ _ 104
-79
29715__6SCJ__ 31
29785__6SCJ__ 253
-94
29864_ _6SCJ_ _ 268
29977__6SCJ__ 531
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-99
298386SCJ__ 238
-121
29836__6SCJ__ 163
29907__6SCJ__ 340
-133
29940_ _6SCJ__ 625
29998__6SCJ__ 40
-181
29724__6SCJ__ 89
29764__6SCJ__ 62
-233
298316SCJ__ 267
29945__6SCJ__ 503
-233
29840__6SCJ__ 565
29863__6SCJ__
-249
29809__6SCJ__ 277
29696L_6SCJ__ 120
-258
29935__6SCJ__ 492
29763__6SCJ__ 88
-351
29888_ _6SCJ__ 269
29755__6SCJ__ 10
-354
30078__6SC3__ 421
299886SCJ__ 529
-354
29940_ _6SCJ_ _ 625
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-365
29678_ _6SCJ_ _ 212
29989__6SCJ__ 569
-365
29889_ _6SCJ_ _ 311
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-395
30064_ _6SCJ__ 200
30050__6SCJ__ 252
-401
29841__6SCJ__ 425
29825__6SCJ__ 237
-511
29833_ _6SCJ_ _ 227
29865__6SCJ__ 514
-558
29836_ _6SCJ_ _ 163
29719__6SCJ__ 33
-564
29988_ _6SCJ_ _ 529
29754__6SCJ__ 143
-576
29833__6SCJ__ 227
29830_ _6SCJ__ 293
-654
29724__6SCJ__ 89
29720_ _OSCJ__ 151
-662
29795__6SCJ__ 289
29870__6SCJ__ 240
-674
30078__6SCJ__ 421
29916_ _6SCJ_ _ 171
-674
29940__6SCJ__ 625
29846__6SCJ__ 215
-702
29900_ _6SCJ_ _ 330
29718__6SCJ__ 85
-736
29792__6SCJ__ 219
29892_ _6SCJ_ _ 467
-736
29876__6SCJ__ 241
29713_ _6SCJ_ _ 138
-736
29888__6SCJ__ 269
29719_ _GSCJ__ 33
-736
29912_ _6SCJ_ _ 308
29792__GSCJ__ 219
-736
29911__6SCJ__ 327
29876__6SCJ__ 241
-739
29789_ _6SCJ__ 170
29888__6SCJ__ 269
-750
29792__6SCJ__ 219
29911__6SCJ__ 327
-750
29888__65CJ__ 269
29909__6SCJ__ 419
-763
29888__6SCJ__ 269
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-813
29957__6SCJ__ 239
29977_ _6SCJ_ _ 531
-850
297086SCJ__ 61
29836_ _6SCJ_ _ 163
-924
29764__6SCJ__ 62
30087__6SCJ__ 487
-924
29725__6SCJ__ 96
30050__6SCJ__ 252
-924
29751_ _6SCJ__ 97
29909__6SCJ__ 419
-924
29792_ _6SCJ_ _ 219
V880_ _6SCJ__ 744
-924 --- 29876__6SCJ__ 241
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-924 —
298886SCJ__ 269
30029_ _6SCJ__ 209
-924
29896_ _6SCJ__ 271
29754__6SCJ__ 143
-924
29912__6SCJ__ 308
29802__6SCJ__ 391
-924
299116SCJ__ 327
29945__6SCJ__ 503

Neb Reports
Neb Sup Ct Jour'l
Vol Pg
Case
Pg
Vol
131-42
29900__6SCJ__ 330
-42
29931_ _6SCJ __ 578
-52
29928__6SCJ__ 337
-233
29803_ _6SCJ_ _ 471
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-294
-294
29885__6SCJ__ 270
-312
30078__6SCJ__ 421
-356
30092_ _6SCJ_ _ 462
-415
29678__6SCJ__ 212
-475
29792__6SCJ__ 219
-475
29876__6SCJ__ 241
-476
29912__6SCJ__ 308
-475
29911_ _6SCJ__ 327
615
29911__6SCJ__ 327
-700
29792__6SCJ__ 219
-724
29893_ _6SCJ__ 279
-761
29912__6SCJ__ 308
-761
29911__6SCJ__ 327
-764
29912__6SCJ__ 306
-764
29911__6SCJ__ 327
-791
30078__6SCJ__ 421
-858
29954__6SCJ__ 385
131-___ (29868_5_781) cited in
29982__OSCJ__ 27
131-_ (29710_6_36) cited in
29723__6SCJ__ 43
131-___ (29690_6_771) cited in
29764__6SCJ__ 62
131-___ (29690_5_771) cited in '
2972.5_ _6SCJ_ _ 96
131-___ (29690_5_771) cited in
29751__6SCJ__ 97
131-___ (29696_5_913) cited in
29696__6SCJ__ 120
131-___ (29696_6SCJ_120) cited in
29700_ _6SCJ_ _ 12:3
131-___ (29715_6SCJ_31) cited in
29874__6SCJ__ 128
131-___ (29780_5_802) cited in
29754__6SCJ__ 143
131-___ (29916_6_171) cited in
29836_ _6SCJ_ _ 163
131-___ (29792_6SCJ_219) cited in
298966SCJ__ 271
131-___ (29824_65CJ_271) cited in
29881_ _6SCJ__ 268
131-___ (29876,_6SCJ_241) cited in
29912__6SCJ__ 308
131-___ (29876_6SCJ_241) cited in
29911__6SCJ__ 327
131-___ (30029_6SCJ_209) cited in
29841__6SCJ__ 425
131-___ (29868_6SCJ_225) cited in
29955_ _6SCJ_ _ 468
131-___ (29678_6_212) cited in
29965__6SCJ__ 485
131-___ (29785_6_253) cited in
29965__6SCJ__ 485
131-___ (29917_6_327) cited in
29897__6SCJ__ 507
131-___ (29864_6_268) cited in
29945__6SCJ__ 503
131-___ (29831_6_267) cited in
29840__6SCJ__ 565
131-___ (29868_6_225) cited in
30031_ _6SCJ__ 621
131-___ (29955_6A68) cited in
30031__6SCJ__ 621

CITATIONS-NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION
(Cumulative from September I. 1936)

Case
Vol
Pg
Art IV, Sec 1 (1875)
30064__6SCJ__ 200
Art V, Sec 1 (1875)
30064__6SCJ__ 200
Art V, Sec 26 (1875)
30064__6SCJ__ 200
30078__6SCJ_.. 421
Art I, Sec 1
Art I, Sec 3-30078__6SCJ__ 421
29868__6SCJ__ 225
Art I, Sec 11
Art I, Sec 12 - 29868__6SCJ__ 225
Art I, Sec 13 - 29713__6SCJ__ 138
Art II, Sec 1 - 30029__6SCJ__ 209
Art II, Sec 1 - 29766__6SCJ__ 255
Art II, Sec 1-29841__6SCJ__ 425
Art III, Sec 4 - 30064__6SCJ__ 200
Art III, Sec 5 - 30064__6SCJ__ ZOO
trt III, Sec 14 - 29982__6SCJ__ 2'7
Art III, Sec 14 - 30064__6SCJ__ 200
Art III, Sec 17 - 30029__6SCJ__ 209

Vol
Pg
Case
Art III, Sec 18 - 29874__6SCJ__ 128
Art III, Sec 18 - 29841__6SCJ__ 425
Art III, Sec 25 - 29766__6SCJ__ 255
Art IV
LB 60__GSCJ__ 630
Art IV, Sec 1 - 30064__6SCJ__ 200
Art IV, Sec 1 - 29766__6SCJ__ 255
Art IV, Sec 1, 2, 3
LB 60__6SCJ__ 630
Art IV, Sec 10 LB 60__6SCJ__ 630
Art IV, Sec 13 LB 60__6SCJ__ 630
Art IV, Sec 20 - 29841__6SCJ__ 425
Art IV, Sec 21 __ 30064__6SCJ__ 200
Art IV, Sec 21, 28
LB 60__6SCJ__ 630
Art IV, Sec 25 - 29766__6SCJ__ 265
Art IV, Sec 26 - 30029__6SCJ__ 209
Art V, Sec 1 - 30029__6SCJ__ 209
30078__6SCJ__ 421
Art V, Sec 2
Art V, Sec 22 - LB4386SCJ__ 713
2971I__6SCJ__ 21
Art VII

Case
Vol
Art VII, Sec 1 - 30064__6SCJ__
Art VII, Sec 1 LB 60__6SCJ__
Art VII, Sec 1
LB483__6SCJ__
Art VII, Sec 5 LB 50__6SCJ__
Art VII, Sec 6 - 29824__6SCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 1 - 29874__GSCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 1- 30078__6SCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 2-29766__6SCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 4-29902__6SCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 4 __ 29908__6SCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 5-30003__6SCJ__
Art VIII, Sec 9- 29766__6SCJ__
Art XI, Sec 2 - 29918__6SCJ__
Art XII, Sec 2- 29841__6SCJ__
Art XII, Sec 7 LB262__6SCJ__
Art XVI, Sec 1 -300646SCJ__
Art XVII, Sec 3 30064__6SCJ__
Art XVII, Sec 3 LB 60__6SCJ__
Art XVII, Sec 4 30064__6SCJ__
Art XVII, Sec 5 30064__6SCJ__

Pg
200
630
636
409
2'71
128
421
265
270
571
168
255
413
425
633
200
ZOO
630
200
200

O

CITATIONS-NEBRASKA STATUTES,
SUPPLEMENTS AND LAWS
(Cumulative from September 1, 1936)
Pg
Case
Vol
MISCELLANEOUS
PP 530, 531 Laws 1855-1865
29766_ _6SCJ_ _ 255
Part I, Ch 1 Agri, Laws 1866
29766__6SCJ__ 255
Vol 2, p 4, Laws 1866-1877
29766__6SCJ__ 255
Sec 1, p 396, Laws 1879
29766__6SCJ__ 255
Ch 1, Laws 1883 29766__6SCJ__ 265
Ch 10, Sec 79 Laws 1887
29938__6SCJ__ 196
Ch 10, Sec 85 Laws 1887
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 10, Sec 86 Laws 1887
29938__6SCJ__ 196
Ch 10, Sec 92 Laws 1887
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 68 Laws 1889 29916__6SCJ__ 171
Ch 68, Sec 1 Laws 1889
29916_ _6SCJ__ 171
Ch 7, Sec 10 Laws 1891
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 10, Sec 138 Laws 1897
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Art I, Sec 1, ch 2, C S 1899
29766__6SCJ__ 255
Ch 1, Laws 1899 29766__6SCJ__ 255
Ch 1, Laws 1901 29766__6SCJ__ 255
Ch 466, Sec 17 Laws 1901
30064_ _6SCJ_ _ 200
Ch 73 Laws 1903 29908__6SCJ__ 571
Ch 73, Sec 59 Laws 1903
30078__6SCJ__ 421
Ch 14, Sec 143 Laws 1905
29938__6SCJ__ 196
Ch 14, Sec 144 Laws 1905
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 14, Sec 144a Laws 1906
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 14, Sec 145 Laws 1905
29938__6SCJ__ 196

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Pg
Vol
Case
Ch 14, Sec 146 Laws 1905
299386SCJ_- 196
Ch 14, Sec 160 Laws 1905
29938__6SCJ__ 196
Ch 14, Sec 161 Laws 1905
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 14, Sec 163 Laws 1905
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 14, Sec 166 Laws 1905
29938_ _6SCJ_ _ 196
Ch 14, Sec 185 Laws 1905
29938_ _6SCJ__ 196
Ch 14, Sec 216 Laws 1905
29938__6SCJ__ 196
Sec 3379 Laws 1907
29907_ _6SCJ_ _ 340
Sec 3000, Ann St 1909
29766__6SCJ__ 255
Ch 194, Laws 1913
30029_ _6SCJ_ _ 209
Art VIII, Ch 35 (Rev St 1913)
29755__6SCJ__ 102
Ch 1, Sec 1, Rev St 1913
29766__6SCJ__ 255
5946 (Rev St. 1913)
29806__GSCJ__ 235
7560 (Rev St 1913)
29880_ _6SCJ_ _ 744
Ch 198 Laws 1913 29755__6SCJ__ 102
Ch 85 Laws 1917 29755._6SCJ__ 102
20-216 (C S 1919) 29803__6SCJ__ 471
Ch 91 Laws 1919 29755__6SCJ__ 102
Ch 190 Laws 1919 29982__6SCJ_- 27
Ch 190, Laws 1919
29766__6SCJ__ 255
Ch 116 Laws 1921 29938__6SCJ__ 196
Ch 122 Laws 1921 29755__6SCJ__ 102
P1895 (House Journal 1935)
LB577_ _6SCJ_ _ 663
P1388 (Senate Journal 1935)
LB577__6SCJ__ 663

Case
Vol
Pg
COMPILED STATUTES 1922
1201
299826SCJ__ 27
1202
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1203
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1204
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1205
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1206
29982__6SCJ__ 27
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1207
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1208
1209
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1213
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1214
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1215
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1216
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1217
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1218
29982__6SCJ__ 27
1219
29982__6SCJ__ 27
6070
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
6071
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
8507
29803__6SCJ__ 471
LAWS 1925
Ch 64
29803__6SCJ__ 471
COMPILED STATUTES 1929
Art 2, Ch 72-29711__6SCJ__ 21
Art II, Ch 76 - 29803__6SCJ__ 471
Ch 17, Art 4 - LB1406SCJ__ 560
Ch 18, Art 1 - LB140__6SCJ__ 560
Ch 22
29982__6SCJ__ 27
Ch 24, Arts 13 or 14
LB4996SCJ__ 670
Ch 29, sec 2021 - 29'756-6SCJ-- 52
Ch 29, sec 2314-29756__6SCJ__ 52
Ch 29, sec 2315 - 29756__6SCJ__ 52
Ch 29, sec 2316- 29756__6SCJ__ 52
Ch 39, Art 11 - LB386SCJ__ 434
Ch 43
LB425__6SCJ__ 646
Ch 60, Art 3 - LB 36SCJ__ 563
Ch 60, Art 3 - LB 38__6SCJ__ 434
Ch 66
LB158__6SCJ__ 366
Ch 71
LB425__6SCJ__ 646
Ch 76, Art IV - LB152__6SCJ__ 352
Ch 77, Art 24 - LB225__6SCJ__ 652

•

(s)
Case
Vol
Pg
Ch 79, Arts 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 24,
25, 26, 27 — LB445__6SCJ__ 675
LB425__6SCJ__ 646
Ch 81
Ch 81, Art 10 — LB499__6SCJ__ 670
Ch 81, Art 54 — LB367__6SCJ__ 602
29766_ _6SCJ__ 255
2-101
LB 81__6SCJ__ 273
-101
LB163__6SCJ_ 409
-111
LB194__6SCJ__ 430
-1010
L131.94__6SCJ__ 430
-1011
LB194__6SCJ_ 430
-1012
LB194__6SCJ_ 430
-1013
29868__6SCJ__ 225
7-101
29940__6SCJ_ 625
-113
29926__6SCJ_
98
8-140
29926__6SCJ_
98
-149
29926__6SCJ_
98
-189
29708__OSCJ
61
-190
29816__6SCJ_ 104
-266
LB316__6SCJ
496
-302
405
-309
LB 53__GSCJ
LB316__6SCJ_ 496
311
29926__6SCJ
-1,102
98
LB163__6SCJ
409
11-117
514
29865_ _6SCJ
12-112
29938__6SCJ_ 196
14-110
29938__6SCJ
196
-501
29938__6SCJ__ 196
-514
LB431__6SCJ__ 679
-514
29938__6SCJ
196
-548
29938__6SCJ_ 136
-549
316
LB 1_ 6SCJ
-553
29938_ _6SCJ__ 196
-554
LB350__6SCJ__ 708
15-110
LB431__6SCJ_ 679
-803
LB 1__6SCJ_ 316
-822
LB350__6SCJ
16-105
708
LB1116SCJ__ 559
-201
LB111__6SCJ_ 559
-202
LB123__6SCJ_ 354
-204
-254
LB 15__6SCJ_ 402
LB506__6SCJ_ 583
-301
-650
LB 59__6SCJ__ 297
-655
LB 68__6SCJ__ 354
-702
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-702
LB123__6SCJ__ 354
-702
LB4316SCJ__ 679
17-209
LB 83__6SCJ__ 436
-435
29722__6SCJ__ 56
-436
29715__6SCJ__ 31
-441 (m)
LB108__6SCJ__ 399
-506
LB 15__6SCJ__ 402
-509
LB506__6SCJ__ 583
-523
LB456__6SCJ__ 645
-524
LB456__6SCJ__ 645
-525
LB456__6SCJ__ 645
-526
LB456_ _6SCJ_ _ 645
-527
LB456__6SCJ__ 645
-562
LB 71__6SCJ__ 549
18-105
LB107_ ASCJ_ _ 354
20-101
29880__6SCJ__ 744
,202
29777__6SCJ__ 117
-202
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-206
29865__6SCJ__ 514
-210
29884__6SCJ__ 339
-212
29865_ _6SCJ__ 514
-216
29803__6SCJ__ 471
-321
LB152__6SCJ__ 352
-328
29778__6SCJ__ 157
-403
29883__6SCJ__ 417
-406
LB196__6SCJ__ 401
-409
LB196__6SCJ_ _ 401
-410
29988__6SCJ__ 529

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Case
Vol
Pg
-517
LB152__6SCJ__ 352
-519
LB152__6SCJ__ 352
-525
29893__6SCJ__ 279
-526
LB152__6SCJ__ 352
-531
29929__6SCJ__ 576
-701
29769__6SCJ__ 134
-703
29769__6SCJ__ 134
-816
29940__6SCJ__ 625
-821
LB 55__6SCJ__ 406
-821
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-842
29880__6SCJ__ 744
29696__6SCJ__ 120
-852
29849__6SCJ__ 387
-852
-852
29865__6SCJ_ 514
-853
29696__6SCJ__ 120
-853
29933__6SCJ_ 420
-853
29903__6SCJ_ 626
-855
29849__6SCJ__ 387
-1003
29726 _6SCJ
54
-1026
29880__6SCJ__ 744
29934__6SCJ__ 383
-1082
-1102
29954__6SCJ_ 385
29921__6SCJ_ 389
-1108
29988__6SCJ__ 529
-1140
-1145
29957__6SCJ_ 239
29935__6SCJ_ 492
-1151
LB438__6SCJ_ 713
-1151
29758__6SCJ__ 84
-1202
295716SCJ__ 139
-1202
-1206
29903__6SCJ 626
-1210
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-1246
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-1246
29945__6SCJ__ 503
-1261
29822__6SCJ__ 276
-1269
29907__6SCJ__ 340
-1308
29880__6SCJ__ 744
-1315
29855__6SCJ__ 221
-1519
29880__6SCJ__ 744
-1520
298806SCJ__ 744
-1529
29772__6SCJ__ 222
-1530
29772__6SCJ__ 222
-1531
29772__6SCJ__ 222
-1708
29865__63CJ__ 514
-1901
29722__6SCJ__ 56
-1902
300926SCJ__ 462
-1903
29722__GSCJ__ 56
-1912
30092__6SCJ__ 462
-1931
29998__6SCJ__ 40
-2001
29693__6SCJ__
1
-2003
29963__6SCJ__ 486
-2121
29801__6SCJ__ 163
-2123
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-2144
29954__6SCJ__ 385
-2170
30937__6SCJ__ 623
-2190
300376SCJ__ 623
-2193
30037__6SCJ__ 623
-21,145
29940__6SCJ__ 625
21-1306
29696__6SCJ__ 120
-1617
29908__6SCJ__ 571
-1621
29908OSCJ__ 571
-1805
LB350__6SCJ__ 708
-1807 —
LB350GSCJ_ 708
-21,140 to 20-21,155
300786SCJ__ 421
22-103
29982__6SCJ__ 27
LB 47__6SCJ__ 260
-203
24-113
LB152__6SCJ__ 352
-205
LB520__6SCJ__ 432
-607
LB4986SCJ__ 642
26-115
LB416__6SCJ__ 521
.416
300036SCJ__ 168
-732
30003__GSCJ__ 168
-733
30003__6SCJ__ 168

Case
Vol
Pg
LB1836SCJ__ 557
-748
-1309 to 26-1312
LB310__6SCJ__ 524
-1314
LB3106SCJ__ 524
LB232__6SCJ__ 588
-1701
27-209
LB101__6SCJ__ 296
-319
LB223__6SC
‘J__ 521
-321
LB223__6SCJ__ 521
-545
29865__OSCJ__ 514
-546
29865__6SCJ__ 614
28-411
29906__6bCJ__ 150
-435
LB537__6SCJ__ 431
-436
LB537__6SCJ__ 431
-511
29873_ASCJ__ 136
-544
29816__6SCJ__ 104
-547
29873__GSCJ__ 136
-557
LB133__6SCJ__ 351
-558
LB133__6SCJ__ 351
-559
LB133__GSCJ__ 351
LB167__6SCJ__ 353
-1033
29-110
29868__6SCJ__ 225
-611
LB 46__6SCJ__ 259
-801
LB 75__6SCJ__ 296
-1904
LB269__6SCJ__ 634
-2217
LB1266SCJ__ 298
-2218
LB1266SCJ__ 298
-2301
29998__GSGJ__ 40
-2306
29998__GSC.T__ 40
-2308
29906__6SCJ__.150
29861__6SCJ__ 166
-2308
LB412__6SCJ__ 518
-2632
30-101
30037__6SCJ__ 623
-118
29812__6SCJ__ 567
-205
29789__6SCJ__ 170
-223
LB202__6SCJ__ 431
-226
29812__6SCJ__ 567
-332
LB202__6SCJ__ 431
-619
29720__OSCJ__ 151
-621
29819__GSCJ__ 282
-810
LB566__6SCJ__ 549
-1103
LB157__6SCJ__ 355
-1104
LB157__6SCJ__ 365
-1114
29964__GSCJ__ 510
-1138
29844__6SC.1__ 250
-1303
29819__6SCJ__ 282
-1411
— LB263__6SCJ__ 586
-1502
29819__6SCJ__ 282
-1503
29819_ .6SCJ__ 282
-1504
29819__6SCJ__ 282
-1505
29819__GSCJ__ 282
-1511
29819__6SCJ__ 282
-1606
29696__GSCJ__ 120
-1701 to 30-1704
LB202__6SCJ__ 431
31-302
29701__6SCJ__ 156
-515
LB404__6SCJ__ 355
32-213
LB350__6SCJ__ 708
-215
LB350__6SCJ__ 708
-216
LB3506SCJ_- 708
217
LB350__GSCJ__ 708
-808
LB297__6SCJ__ 599
-1134
LB165__6SCJ__ 551
-1704
LB442__GSCJ__ 646
-1705
LB144__6SCJ__ 592
-1809
LB298__6SCJ__ 599
36-103
29773__6SCJ__ 133
-103
298206SCJ__ 331
-202
299336SCJ__ 420
-202
LB179__6SCJ__ 353
-405
298026SCJ__ 391
-406
29802__6SCJ__ 391
502
LB 22__6SCJ__ 258
37-201
LB312__6SCJ__ 637

(h)
Case
Vol
Pg
-206
- LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-211
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-213
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-303
- LB3126SCJ__ 637
-308
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-309 - LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-501
- LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-502
- LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-511
- LB312__6SCJ__ 637
- LB3126SCJ__ 637
-513
-604
- LB312__6SCJ__ 637
- LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-605
- LB3126SCJ__ 637
-706
38-109
- 29884__6SCJ__ 339
LB202__6SCJ__ 431
-604
29946__6SCJ__ 491
40-105
29946__6SCJ__ 491
-106
-117
- 30037__6SCJ__ 623
42-335
- 29886__6SCJ__ 413
43-221
- LB 2__6SCJ__ 243
-404
- LB450__6SCJ__ 684
-406
- LB450__6SCJ__ 584
44-207
- LB122__6SCJ__ 315
LB308__6SCJ__ 710
-310
LB227__6SCJ__ 435
-217
29989__6SCJ__ 569
-218
-219
- 29989__6SCJ__ 569
29678__6SCJ__ 212
-322
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-322
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-344
29865__6SCJ__ 514
-346
-402
29811__6SCJ__ 489
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-701
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-702
29973__6SCJ__ 573
-703
-901 to 44-911 29811__6SCJ__ 489
46-101
LB129__6SCJ__ 401
29806__6SCJ__ 235
-603
LB129__6SCJ__ 401
-111
LB2116SCJ__ 398
-115
LB1986SCJ__ 397
-609
29985__6SCJ__ 164
48-106
30032__6SCJ__ 216
-116
29975__6SCJ__ 282
-121
29948__6SCJ__ 287
-133
29878__6SCJ__ 39
-138
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-138
29948__6SCJ__ 287
-138
29875__6SCJ__ 46
-139
-152
LB 90__6SCJ__ 557
LB216__6SCJ__ 497
49-408
LB389__6SCJ__ 647
50-113
LB 72__6SCJ__ 315
61-210
LB204__6SCJ__ 632
54-709
L131.75__6SCJ__ 350
-921
LB206__6SCJ__ 397
55-103
59-501 to 59-508 LB137__6SCJ__ 519
LB131__6SCJ__ 518
-801
LB178__6SCJ__ 553
60-101
LB178__6SCJ__ 553
-102
LB178__6SCJ__ 563
-103
L15178__6SCJ__ 553
-104
LB178__6SCJ__ 553
-105
LB388__6SCJ__ 589
-322
-322
LB 3__6SCJ__ 563
-401
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-402
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-403
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-404
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-408
LB1.47__6SCJ__ 593
-409
-410
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-412
LB 38__6SCJ__ 434

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Case
Vol
Pg
-412
LB1476SCJ__ 593
-413
LB1476SCJ__ 593
-415
LB147_..6SCJ__ 593
62-201
29917__6SCJ__ 327
-205
29917__6SCJ__ 327
-218
298036SCJ__ 471
-219
29803__6SCJ__ 471
66-405
LB158__6SCJ__ 356
68-101
30003__6SCJ__ 168
-102
30003__6SCJ__ 168
-103
30003__6SCJ__ 168
-104
300036SCJ__ 168
-104
LB 5__6SCJ__ 260
-105
30003__6SCJ__ 168
69-467
296496SCJ__ 248
-469
296496SCJ__ 248
71-701
IJ3405__6SCJ__ 585
-2108
LB3656SCJ__ 624
72-201
LB483__6SCJ__ 636
-706
LB392__6SCJ__ 561
-707
LB383__6SCJ__ 600
-707
LB3926SCJ__ 561
-902
LB3836SCJ__ 600
75-501 to 509 inc LB178__6SCJ__ 553
-505
29841__6SCJ__ 425
-505
LB1466SCJ__ 399
-601
29824__6SCJ__ 271
-602
29824 _6SCJ_ 271
-707
30064__6SCJ_ 200
-1001
L13178 _6SCJ_ 553
-1002
LB178 _6SCJ_ 553
76-109
29928__OSCJ__ 337
-217
29758 _6SCJ__ 84
77-902
30078 _6SCJ_ 421
-904
30078__6SCJ_ 421
-1434
LB 50__6SCJ__ 409
-1435
LB 50__6SCJ_ 409
-1436
LB 50__6SCJ__ 409
-1502
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-1903
LB 1 _6SCJ__ 316
-1904
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-1908
LB231__6SCJ_ 525
-1908
LB 16SCJ_ 316
-1910
LB 16SCJ_ 316
-1916
29908 _6SCJ__ 571
-1920
29908__6SCJ__ 571
-1922
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-1923
29938__6SCJ__ 196
-1931
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2006 to 77-2011
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-2010
29930__6SCJ__ 488
-2013
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-2014
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-2018
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2021
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2022
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2023
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-2039
— 29902__6SCJ__ 270
-2039
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2040
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-2041
29930__6SCJ__ 488
-2041
LB 16SCJ__ 316
2045
29930__6SCJ__ 488
-2101
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2105
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2106
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2107
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2117
LB 1_-6SCJ__ 316
-2120
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316
-2142
LB 16SCJ__ 316
-2306
LB374__6SCJ__ 697
-2506
LB311__6SCJ__ 610

Case
Vol
Pg
79-212
LB431__6SCJ__ 679
-1901
29824__6SCJ__ 271
-301 to 79-311 LB4316SCJ__ 679
-301 to 79-311 inc
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-401 to 79-418 L1321.2__6SCJ__ 640
-411
LB212__6SCJ__ 640
-601 to 79-604 LB431__6SCJ__ 679
-603
LB212__6SCJ__ 640
-808
LB212__6SCJ__ 640
-1008
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1301
LB4456SCJ__ 675
-1302
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1303
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1304
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1305
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1309
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1401
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1404
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1405
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1406
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1407
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1408
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1410
LB4456SCJ__ 675
-1501
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
-1902
29760__6SCJ__ 88
-2508
LB212__6SCJ__ 640
-2608
LB212__6SCJ__ 640
-2617
LB4456SCJ--675
-2710
LB212__6SCJ__ 640
-2717
LB445_ _6SCJ_ _ 675
-2722
LB431__6SCJ__ 679
-2722
LB314__6SCJ__ 548
-2724
LB314__6SCJ__ 648
-2726
LB314__6SCJ__ 648
80-101
LB206__6SCJ__ 397
81-103
LB258__6SCJ__ 633
-501
29766_ _6SCJ_ _ 255
-1001
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1002
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1004
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1006
LB4996SCJ__ 670
-1007
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1008
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1010
LI1499__6SCJ__ 670
-1011
LB4996SCJ__ 670
-1012
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1013
LB499__6SCJ__ 670
-1015
LB4996SCJ__ 670
-1801
LB205__6SCJ__ 409
-5111
LB526__6SCJ__ 669
-5402 to 81-5410 inc
LB367__6SCJ__ 602
-5412 to 81-5418 inc
LB367__6SCJ__ 602
-5419
LB367_ _6SCJ_ _ 602
-5420 to 81-5427 inc
LB3676SCJ__ 602
-5428
LB367__6SCJ__ 602
-5429
LB367__6SCJ__ 602
-5432
LB3676SCJ__ 602
-5432
LB3676SCJ_._ 602
-6315
30092__6SCJ__ 462
83-301
LB280__6SCJ__ 629
-504
LB3236SCJ__ 436
-732
LB 6__6SCJ__ 260
-732
LB237_ _6SCJ__ 429
-732
LB569__6SCJ__ 647
-955
LB4126SCJ__ 518
84-401
30064__6SCJ__ 200
-402 to 411 - 300646SCJ__ 200
-710
LB124__6SCJ__ 350
85-304
LB2016SCJ__ 569

•

•

o

Case
Vol
P
LB201__6SCJ__ 56
LB201__6SCJ__ 560
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
LB201__6SCJ__ 560
LB201__6SCJ__ 560
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
LB201__6SCJ__ 560
LB445__6SCJ__ 675
LB 84__6SCJ__ 274
LAWS OF 1929
29982__6SCJ__ 27
Ch 82
C. S. SUPPLEMENT 1931
29900__6SCJ__ 330
39-1129
29760__6SCJ__ 88
79-1902
LAWS 1931
Ch 116, Secs 1, 2, 3
LB522__6SCJ__ 648
C. S. SUPPLEMENT 1933
Ch 18 Art 14 - LB481__6SCJ__ 643
Ch 54, Art 12 - LB 55__6SCJ__ 406
Ch 60, Art 3 - LB 3__6SCJ__ 563
LB194__6SCJ_ 430
2-1014
8-109 (a)-LB319__6SCJ__ 601
-109 (b)-LB319__6SCJ__ 601
Ch 71, art 32 - LB300__6SCJ__ 494
-141
LB 776SCJ_ 316
-142
LB 786SCJ__ 298
143
LB 796SCJ_- 298
LB319__6SCJ__ 601
-201
LB 16SCJ__ 316
15-812
LB140__6SCJ__ 560
16-661
LB515__6XJ
-713
562
17-401
LB 71__6SCJ__ 549
LB 736SCJ__ 397
-515
-567
LB 16SCJ__ 316
LB431__6SCJ__ 679
-567
LB481__6SCJ
18-1401
643
LB481__6SCJ__ 643
-1402
LB481__6SCJ
-1405
643
LB481__6SCJ
-1406
643
-21,159 to 20-21,164
LB 46SCJ__ 244
20-208
LB 49__6SCJ__ 274
-21,159
29896__6SCJ_ 271
LB350__6SCJ__ 708
22-102
LB3506SCJ__ 708
-201
LB1906SCJ__ 400
27-601
LB5376SCJ _ 431
28-437
-438
LB537_ _6SCJ__ 431
LB2996SCJ__ 600
32-903
-1133
LB1656SCJ__ 551
LB2026SCJ__ 431
33-127
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
37-101
LI3212__6SCJ__ 637
-301
-302
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
-304
-305
LB312__6SCJ__ 637
LB312_ 6SCJ__ 637
-505
-610
LB312_ 6SCJ__ 637
39-1101
LB1476SCJ__ 593
-1106
LB 38__6SCJ__ 434
-1194 to 39-1199
LH5606SCJ__ 522
-1129
29713__6SCJ__ 138
-1129
29931__6SCJ__ 578
-1135
29825_ _6SCJ_ - 237
44-804
LB352__6SCJ__ 585
-912
LB 586SCJ__ 349
54-710
LB204_ _6SCJ__ 632
60-319
LB3886SCJ_ 589
LB3886SCJ__ 589
-328
-330
LBW_ -6SCJ_ _ 589
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-405
-309
-310
-311
-316
-317
-318
-319
-319
89-168


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Case
Vol
Pg
Case
Vol
Pg
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-214
30029__6SCJ__ 209
LB147__6SCJ__ 593
-215
30029__6SCJ__ 209
LB139__6SCJ__ 352
-224
300296SCJ__ 209
LB1586SCJ__ 356 20-21,159
29764__6SCJ__ 62
LB158__6SCJ__ 356
-21,159
29725__6SCJ__ 96
LB158__6SCJ__ 356
-21,159
29751__6SCJ__ 97
LB1586SCJ__ 356 39-1129
29900_ _6SCJ__ 330
LB5226SCJ__ 648
-1148
29935GSCJ__ 492
LB522__6SCJ__ 648 48-115
29985__6SCJ__ 164
-174
29948__6SCJ__ 287
LB522__6SCJ__ 648
-174
LB5226SCJ__ 648
29975__6SCJ__ 280
29756__6SCJ__ 52
LB5226SCJ__ 648 53-301
-322
29756__6SCJ__ 52
LB5226SCJ__ 648
29918__6SCJ__ 413
-338
LB5226SCJ__ 648
-363
29756__6SCJ__ 52
LB5226SCJ__ 648
300646SCJ__ 200
LB522__6SCJ__ 648 72-201
30003__&SCJ__ 168
LB5226SCJ__ 648 77-1820
297666SCJ__ 255
LB522__6SCJ__ 648 81-107
LAWS 1935
LB 32__6SCJ__ 259
LB221__6SCJ__ 358
LB301_6SCJ__ 475 Ch 3
LB3016SCJ__ 475 Ch 4, Sec 1-LB 806SCJ__ 316
LB3016SCJ__ 475 Ch 5, Sec 2-LB515__6SCJ__ 562
LB 37__6SCJ__ 297 Ch 10, Sec 1 - LB 78__6SCJ__ 298
LB244__6SCJ__ 587 Ch 14, Sec 3 - LB 536SCJ__ 405
29708__6S0J__ 61
LB2466SCJ__ 550 Ch 16
LB 16SCJ__ 316 Ch 16, Sec 1-29708__6SCJ__ 61
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 17, Sec 1 - LB 52__6SCJ__ 400
LB 16SCJ__ 316 Ch 17, Sec 2 - LB 52__6SCJ__ 400
30029__6SCJ__ 209
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 23
300296SCJ2_ 209
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 23, Sec 2
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 23, Sec 4-30029__6SCJ__ 209
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 23, Sec 13 - 30029__6SCJ__ 209
LB573__6SCJ__ 701
LB 1__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 29
LB574__6SCJ__ 701
LB 16SCJ__ 316 Ch 29
LB576__6SCJ__ 697
LH4956SCJ__ 584 Ch 29
LB374__6SCJ__ 697 Ch 29, Sec 6, 9, 12
LB5766SCJ__ 697
LB515__6SCJ__ B62
LB 80__6SCJ__ 316 Ch 33, Sec 2 - LB1406SCJ__ 560
Ch 34, Sec 1 - LB108__6SCJ__ 399
LB502__6SCJ__ 592
Ch 36, Sec 4 - LB 836SCJ__ 436
LB5026SCJ__ 592
Ch 41
LB 46SCJ__ 244
LB502__6SCJ__ 592
Ch 41
29751__6SCJ
LB2126SCJ__ 640 Ch 41 (HR1) - 29792__6SCJ __ 97
__ 219
LB 50.._6SCJ__ 409
Ch 46, Sec 1 - LB498__6SCJ
LB117__6SCJ__ 350 Ch 52, Sec 1 - LB244__6SCJ__ 642
587
LB4316SCJ__ 679 Ch 52, Sec 1 - LB246__6SCJ__
__ 550
LB431__6SCJ__ 679 Ch 57, Sec 13 - 300216SCJ__ 148
LB314__6SCJ__ 548 Ch 57, Sec 42 - LB 90__6SCJ__ 557
LB258__6SCJ__ 633 Ch 67, Sec 1 - LB1686SCJ__ 435
LB526__6SCJ__ 669 Ch 68, Sec 1 - LB190__6SCJ__ 400
LB526__6SCJ__ 669 Ch 73, Sec 2 - LB 576SCJ__ 273
LB526__6SCJ__ 669 Ch 99
29874__6SCJ__ 128
LB319__6SCJ__ 601 Ch 103, Sec 1 - LB122__6SCJ__ 315
LB3676SCJ__ 602 Ch 107, Secs 2, 4, 5
LB4256SCJ__ 646
LB189__6SCJ__ 537
LB425__6SCJ__ 646 Ch 188
300646SCJ__ 200
LB1766SCJ__ 398 Ch 111, Sec 1 - LB1916SCJ__ 245
LB176__6SCJ__ 398 Ch 111, Sec 1 - LB5526SCJ__ 274
LB176__6SCJ__ 398 Ch 111, Sec 1 - LB5776SCJ__ 663
LB176__6SCJ__ 398 Ch 113, Sec 1 - LB1916SCJ__ 245
Ch 113, Sec 1 - LB552__6SCJ__ 274
LAWS 1933
Ch 16
29708__6SCJ__ 61 Ch 113, Sec 1 - LB577__6SCJ__ 663
Ch 16, Sec 1-29708__6SCJ__ 61 Ch 115, Sec 3 - LB461__6SCJ__ 585
Ch 18
29708__6SCJ__ 61 Ch 116, Sec 38 LB 39_6SCJ__ 273
Ch 18, Sec 53
29708__6SCJ__ 61 Ch 116, See 50 LB523__6SCJ_- 411
Ch 65
29725__6SCJ__ 96 Ch 116, Sec 96 LB378__6SCJ__ 685
LB388__6SCJ__ 589
Ch 65
29751__6SCJ__ 97 Ch 128, Sec 2
LB388__6SCJ__ 589
Ch 65 (HR600) 297926SCJ
219 Ch 128, Sec 3
LB413__6SCJ__ 635
Ch 134
299386SCJ__ 196 Ch 130, Sec 5
LB411__6SCJ__ 498
Ch 135
299386SCJ__ 196 Ch 130, Sec 6
LB 97__6SCJ__ 437
H R 167
29708__GSCJ__ 61 Ch 130, Sec 1
LB 976SCJ__ 437
Ch 130, Sec 8
C. S. SUPPLEMENT 1935
12-202
300296SCJ__ 209 Ch 130, Sec 11 LB 97__6SCJ__ 437
-213
LB413__6SCJ__ 635
300296SCJ__ 209 Ch 131
-406
-407
66-306
-405
-411
-416
-420
70-601
-602
-603
-701
-702
-703
-704
-706
-709
-712
-713
-704
71-1302
-1303
-1305
72-202
77-1801
-1801
-1814
-1815
-1915
-1959
-2001
-2002
2004
-2020
-2101
-2218
-2302
-2503
-2601
79-518
-519
-520
-1003
-2002
-2408
-2523
-2621
-2721
81-103
-5102
-5103
-5104
-5108
-5401
-5714
-5716
88-323
-324
-330
-331

4

(i)
Ch
Ch
• Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
, Ch
' Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
'Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
• Ch

Case
Vol
131, Sec 1 - LB413__6SCJ__
131, Sec 4
LB388__6SCJ__
134, Sec I - LB147__6SCJ__
134, Sec 2 - LB 38__6SCJ__
139, Sec 1 - LB495__6SCJ__
/40, Sec 1 - LB 80__6SCJ__
140, Sec 2 - LB 73__6SCJ__
142, Sec 34- LB405_6SCJ__
151, Sec 1 - LB 1__6SCJ__
151, Sec 2 - LB 1__6SCJ__
152, Sec 2 - LB515__6SCJ__
152, Sec 3 - LB311__6SCJ__
LB143_ _6SCJ_ _
153 '
LB 1__6SCJ__
156
162, Sec 1 - LB 1__6SCJ__
163, Sec 1 - LB483__6SCJ__
165', Sec 1 - LB445__6SCJ__
175, Secs 1, 2, 3
LB'367__6SCJ__
180
1JB325__6SCJ__
181, Sec 1 - LB 6__6SCJ__
181, Sec 1 - LB237__6SCJ__
181, Sec 1 - LB569__6SCJ__
183, Sec 2 - LB321__6SCJ__
183, Sec 7 - LB320__6SCJ__
189, Sec 2 - LB176__6SCJ__

Pg
635
589
593
434
584
316
397
585
316
316
562
610
352
316
316
636
675
602
433
260
429
647
429
429
398

Case
Vol
Ch 189, Sec 3 - LB176__6SCJ__
H R 404
30064__6SCJ__
SPECIAL LAWS 1935
Ch 6, Sec 1 - LB191__6SCJ__
Ch 6, Sec 1 - LB5776SCJ__
Ch 6, Sec 1 - LB552__6SCJ__
Ch 8, Sec 1 - LB1916SCJ__
Ch 8, Sec 1 - LB552__6SCJ__
Ch 8, Sec 1 - LB577__6SCJ__
Ch 10, Sec 1 - LB 71__6SCJ__
Ch 10, Sec 6 - LB111__6SCJ__
Ch 10, Sec 7 - LB111__6SCJ__
Ch 10, Sec 8 - LB 71__6SCJ__
LB 1__6SCJ__
Ch 15
Ch 16, Sec 1
LB1586SCJ__
LB158__6SCJ__
Ch 16, Sec 2
Ch 16, Sec 3 - LB158__6SCJ__
Chs 20, 21, 24, 28, 30
LB4256SCJ__
Ch 20, Secs 1, 8, 9, 10, 16
LB378_ _6SCJ__
Ch 20, Sec 2 - LB425__6SCJ__
Ch 21, Sec 4 - LB377__6SCJ__
LB378_ _GSCJ__
Ch 24
Ch 28, Sec 2 - LB376__6SCJ__

Pg
Case
Vol
398 Ch 28, Sec 4 - LB376__6SCJ__
200 Ch 28, Sec 28 - LB378__6SCJ__
Ch 30, Sec 13 - LB380__6SCJ__
LAWS 1937
245
663 L B 1, Secs 1, 2 LB231__6SCJ__
274 L B 1, Sec 33 - LB231__6SCJ__
245 L B 6
LB569_ _6SCJ__
274 L B 10, Sec
LI1577__6SCJ_663 L B 10, Sec
LB191__6SCJ__
549 L B 10, Sec
LB552_ _6SCJ_ _
559 L B 32, Sec
LB522__6SCJ__
559 L B 38
LB147__6SCJ__
549 L B 55, Sec 2- LB578__6SCJ__
316 L B 97, Sec 8 - LB411__6SCJ__
356 L B 115, Sec 1- LB561__6SCJ__
356 L B 143, Sec 1- LB374__6SCJ__
356 L B 169, Sec 1, 2 LB579__6SCJ__
L B 189, Sec 2 (h) (6) (6)
646
LB277__6SCJ__
L B 189, Sec 7- LB2776SCJ__
685 L B 191, Sec 1646 L B 191, Sec 1 - LB577__6SCJ__
708 L B 246, Sec 1- LB244__6SCJ__
685 L B 392, Sec 1 - LB383_6SCJ__
708 L B 552, Sec 1- LB577__6SCJ__

Pg
708
685
707
525
525
647
663
245
274
648
593
657
498
552
697
646

o

713
713
274
663
587
600
663

The American Law Institute's
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
(Cumulative from September 1, 1936)
Case
Vol
Pg
AGENCY
•
See 193
29989__6SCJ__ 569 Sec. 90
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Sec. 103
Sec 302
29844__6SCJ__ 250
Sec. 157


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Vol
Pg
Case
CONTRACTS
29897__6SCJ__ 507 Sec. 2
29197__6SCJ__ 41
PROPERTY
29951__6SCJ__ 469

Case
Vol
Pg
TRUSTS
29718__6SCJ__ 36

•

(k)

S. C. J. LAW BOOK EXCHANGE
Salesman Wanted
Law Book Salesman for Nebraska. To represent a publishing house well established,
with local Nebraska publications. Address: Box 210, Nebraska Supreme Court Journal,
Terminal Building, Lincoln, Ne(6-30-37)
braska.

BOOKS FOR SALE
Northwestern 1 to 257 inclusive less
204 to 219 both inclusive. Harvey It.
Ellenberger, Tekamah, Nebraska.
Will sell Ruling Case Law with
several supplements, good condition
for $50. R. C. Hunter, Atty. General,
State House, Lincoln, Nebr.
FOR SALE—Northwestern Reporter, buckram binding, thin phper edition, Vol. 1 to 226 incl., 16 Digests,
$1.00 per vol.; Corpus Juris, buckram
binding, Vol. 1 to 71 incl., $3.00 a vol.
7 books Annotations, $Z.00 vol.; A. L.
R. Vol. 1 to 75 incl. $3.00 vol. 3 Digests to cover, $10.064 CYC, 40 Volumes, Desk Book and Annotations,
complete $45.00.; Complete set L. R.
A. 146 Volumes with 10 Vol. Digests,
Desk Book etc., $2.00 Vol.; Other miscellaneous books. All the above in
fine condition, having been used very
little. Prices cash here. Address
James H. Stewart, P. 0. Box 1207,
Chadron, Nebr.
(9-1-37)

0

FOR SALE—Roses Notes. The set
contains the full twenty volumes and
five volume supplement. Fine condition. Price $50.00. H. B. Tibbels, 2200
E Street, Lincoln, Nebr.
(9-1-37)
The law business, library and office
equipment of the late W. M. Johnston.
Anyone interested call, write or phone
Grace P. Johnston, Osceola, Nebr.
(6-25-37)
For Sale—American State Reports,
140 vols.; L. R. A., all three series
and Digest, 156 vols.; A. & E. An.
Cas.; Am. An. Cas. First Decenial
All sets complete and in good second
hand condition. Priced to sell. Address 209 Sup. Ct. Journal.
For Sale—N. W. Reporter complete; New N. W. Digest; Corpus


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Juris complete; about 35 miscellaneous good text books; Statutes of
Nebraska and Federal; book cases
and office furniture—all in first
class condition. Library of the late
W. G. Kieck, and is located in the
court house in Plattsmouth. Write
or call Clifford L. Rein, Atty., Barkley Bldg., Lincoln, Nebr.
(6-17)
For Sale—U. S. Supreme Court RePorts L. E. D. Vol. 1-73, $300. L. R.
A. First Series and New Series with
Digest and A. B. C. Series $300.
American and English Annotated
Cases $60. Address Box 1178 Nebraska City, Nebr.
(6-14)
For Sale—Nebraska Reports, 1-62
Inc., and Page's Digest, Vol. 1-2 Good
shape, Set of 64 Vol. $50.00; Nebraska Digest, Dame & Moseley, Vol. 12-3-4, Half Price $30.00; American
and English, Annotated Cases, Vol. 132 Inc., Vol. 33, Digest and Index,
Excellent Condition, Set $50.00; Laws
of Nebraska Vol. from years 1870-71
to 1933 Inc., 34 Volumes Complete,
Price $.50 each. Address Box 7, Nelson, Nebraska.
For Sale-1 complete set of Corpus
Juris—Leather
Bound—with
one
large book of Annotations; 1 Set of
Nebraska Reports up to 1925; 1 Set of
Northwestern Reports; Other miscellaneous books, such as Jones on Evidence, etc., Address R. E. Slattery,
Superintendent of Schools, Ardmore,
S. D.
(7-15-37)
For sale—Law library and office
equipment of the late Bert M. Hardenbrook of Ord. A complete list is
in SCJ Law Book Exchange prior to
May 5, 1937. Inquire of Chas. E. Matson, 1020 Fed. Sec. Bldg., Lincoln,
Nebr.
(6-15-37)
For Sale: A. L. R.—N. E.—Federal
with supplements and digest, 2d. series—Neb. 70 vol.—A. S. R. Ann. Cas.
digests, table of cases—R. C. L. with
7 supplements, index 2 vol.—Ency.
Pl. & Prac. 22 vol.—Am. Digest 2nd
Dec. Current Dig. from 3d. Dec. A. R.
Oleson, Wisner, Nebr.
(9-1-37)
For sale: Complete Northwestern
Reporter, vol. 1 to 270, inclusive, and
an old Northwestern Digest, 19 vol.,
plus Annuals to date, all buckrum
binding; first class condition. Pri
$400.00 cash. H. M. Frost, 630
State Bank Bldg., Oma
(9-11-37)

For sale—N. W. Reports vols. 172
to 249 inclusive. Buckrurn. Good condition. Cheap. Also A.L.R. vols. 1-72.
Address Supreme Court Journal 209.
(9-11-37)
For sale—Encyclopedia of Pleading
and Practice, 23 vols,,_ U.,S. Reports,
vols. 1 to 264. Low price. Edith
Beckman, 203 Keeline 131dg., Omaha,
Neb.
(7-11-37)
Books for sale—Law library and
equipment of the late G. C. Porter.
Bargain. Write W. V. Vermeline,
Admr. Mitchell, Nebr.
(7-11-37)
BOOKS WANTED
Wanted to Buy—A set of Nebraska
Reports containing 90 or more volumes. Also, set of Dame & Moseley
Digest and set of A. L. R. Address
401 Supreme Court Journal.
Desire to purchase complete set of
A. L. R. Address Box 20{i, Supreme
Court Journal, Terminal 1Ld., Lincoln, Nebr.
Nebraska Reports, 71 to date. Address P. 0. Box H, Cambridge, Nebraska.
Wanted to buy—Nebra 1.a -Rep-orts
Vols. 83, 99, 101, 103 and 108 to date.
Also Dame & Mosely Nebraska Digest. Albert A. Mann, Gothenburg,
Nebr.
Wanted to buy—Volume.. 171 to 198
inclusive,
Northwestern
Reports.
Clarke & Patterson, Scottsbluff, Nebraska.
Wanted to Buy—Complete set Nebraska Reports and Dame & Moseley
Digest. Box 1071, Alliance, Nebr.
Wanted: Second-hand set of Shepherd's Northwestern and Northeastern Citations in fine condition.. Also
a second-hand set of Lightner Nebraska Forms in fine condition. Address
Box 402, Supreme Court Journal,
Terminal Bldg., Lincoln, Nebr.
Wanted—Dame's Inferior' Court
Pra( tice, 2nd
• Li ethtner's Nebraska Fo
Box 201,
Supreme
minal
Bldg., I
an.

ELCE & SON
2626 North 48th St.
Lincoln, Nebr.

—BOOKBINDERS—
Books, Magazines, Manuscripts

Nebraska Typewriter Co.

American Jurisprudence
A. L. R.; U. S. Rep.
U. S. C. A.; Auto Sets

Used machines of all kinds
1:;() No. 12th St.
Lincoln, Nebr.
—Distributors for—
Mimeograph
Dictaphone
Royal Typewriters

E. H. POTTER
209 Richards Block
Lincoln
Bancroft-Whitney Representative

VANBOSKIRK - REMINGTON
AND
ASSOCIATES
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Lincoln, Nebraska
401 Bankers Life Bldg.

110111101110111411641111111111•••••••••111111041)8

06%•eVeVe%%WeeeeVANYANNiret

Hotel
CORNHUSKER
invites you to make
headquarters
your
here whenever you are
in Nebraska's Capital
City.

300 Excellent
Roo
50


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Corpus Juris System
CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM
J. H. REYNOLDS
128 No. 31St Street
J
Omaha

0678

1

LEGAL NOTICES
PUBLISHED AND FILED
ACCORDING TO LAW
—0—

The
DAILY REPORTER
LINCOLN
Terminal Bldg.

8-2518

_0_
WE KEEP PERMANENT
and
ACCURATE RECORDS

NOW!!
We can supply you with 1937 Session Laws. At great expense
we obtained photostatic copies of all laws and by running our
presses day and night they are printed and bound. Ready for
you now—

•

WORK OF THE FIRST UNICAMERAL
Find out NOW how they affect you
THIS VOLUME CONTAINS:
1. Laws arranged and compiled in order and manner of the 1929
Compiled Statutes, with a complete fact finding index.
2. Alphabetical index of all bills according to their names.
3. Names of all the bills are listed numerically by their Legislative Bill numbers.
4. Emergency bills are all listed in one place.
& Citations to State Constitution, Statutes, Supplements and
Laws found in the new laws are compiled and included.

$1.00 BRINGS YOU A COPY OF 212 LAWS
Any one of these new laws is no doubt worth $1 to you, bnt
we are offering ALL of the 1937 SESSION LAWS, in a bound
volume for $1.
You will need several copies.

212 LAWS
passed by the
Send check or bill to
Supreme Court Journal, Terminal Bldg.,
Lincoln, Neb. We will
your copy by
m •


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

1937
NEBRASKA
LEGISLATURE
In Bound Volume
Delivered to You for $1.00
IATE DELIVERY

•

.41111,111•Mo4111.o.M.A=P,..1..

•11.e■10
,
01“1.11.“.11.411b,-41M.011.41MK.IMP.

.m.........mo•Nno+

So$
it•tA/LbjCOt/l
.22
1

NEBRASKA

SUPREME COURT
JOURNAL

of Nebraska.
Published Weekly except during recess of the Supreme Court

Devoted to the Interests of the Judiciary and Bar of Nebraska
VOL. II.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

NO. 6.

LINCOLN, NEBRASKA, NOVEMBER 15, 1932

23, 1932)
Citations to Constitution and Statutes (cumulative from Aug.

Page 12

R
CITATIONS TO STATE CONSTITUTION—THIS NUMBE
(These will be added to standing list in next issue.)
124 Neb__28303__2__ 6__ I
Art. I, sec. 3 Hubbell Bank v Bryan
124 Neb__28276__2__
Art. III, see. 27 Bainter v Appel
CITATIONS TO STATUTES—THIS NUMBER
Chap 110 Laws 1931 Bainter v Appel
8-178 Hubbell Bank v Bryan
8-180 Hubbell Bank v Bryan
20-1202 Bergfield v Bergfield
39-1001 Bainter v Appel
39:1135 (Supp 1931) Bainter v Appel
39-1140-1146 (Supp 1931) Bainter v Appel
39-1416 Bainter v Appel

124
124
124
124
124
124
124
124

Case Vol No‘ Pg
Neb_28276__2__ 6__ 5
Neb_ _28303_ _2_ _ 6_ _ 1
Neb__28303__2__ 6.._ 1
Neb__28134__2__ 6__10
Neb__28276__2__ 6__
Neb__28276__2__ 6__ 5
Neb__28276__2__ 6__ 5
Neb_28276_2_ 6__ 5

INDEX TO OPINIONS
28276__2__ 6__ 5
28134__2__ 6__10
28303__2__ 6__ I
28300__2__ 6__ 5
28275__2__ 6__ 8

bainter v Appel
Bergfield v Bergfield
Hubbell Bank v Bryan
Swift Lumber & Fuel Co. v Hock
Yost v Nelson
DIGEST

not
Action—maintaining an action on a contract to which one is
28300 2_ 6_ 1
a party
by
jury
the
before
ny
testimo
any
be
there
if
Appeal and Error—
which a finding in favor of the party on whom rests the
burden of proof can be upheld, the court is not at liberty
28276_2_ 6_
to disregard it and direct a verdict against him

(Continued on back .1 lov,i•

A

.r.Movio•IMOIIIIIKMMKNIM.,M11.0.111110.111111.04111..111111111.01111.0100,111111.11•••41100.111001=1

•0•1•040111 an,

,..0o4=RoAMPOM,Onwo.1...1M..”200.1b4=00.”

.110.11111.1111114.M.

V00500011 MM.

/4=Kr•

PROCEDURE

a

under

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
of

NEBRASKA
iii

A

New

111111111111111111111111111111111111

ornpend iLIin

11111111111111111111111141111111111.

at $3.50 Post Paid
3 Books for $10.00
Each step, from the start to the finish of the procedure, is supported by
authorities from Commissioner's Rulings from the 1929 Compiled Statutes;
the 1931 Culminative Supplement; and decisions of the Supreme Court.
Service of Process, Jurisdiction, Enforcing Collection of Award—in all about
twenty chapters are given with ten to fifteen subdivisions under each subject, conveniently arranged and properly indexed. Chapters treated include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

a

Action—Who Brings
Commencing the Action
Attorneys
Trial—Before Commissioner
Evidence
Witnesses
Award and Judgment
Appeals
Lump-sum Settlement
Disability

11.
12.
13.
14.
15,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Compensable Injuries
Defenses to Compensation
Dependency
General Liability
Who Within the Law—Who Not
Trial in District Court
Words and Phrases
Commissioner's Records
Physicians' Strvices
Miscellaneous

THE LAW MADE EASY TO FIND

a
Compiled and For Sale by

CORNELIUS GANT, Publisher

a

Terminal Bldg.

LINCOLN, NEBR.

7

"

ii

1.2X..I


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Id

ii

47

4/44
a, )24.„4„,. do—c

X=C

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT
JOURNAL
Cornelius Gant

Editor

OFFICE
Telephone B-2518
B1 Terminal Building
Lincoln, Nebraska

(1:5'

Published Weekly except during recess of the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
Entered as second class matter November 24th, 1931 at the post office at
Lincoln, Nebraska under the Act of
March 3d, 1879.
For
For
For
For

SUBSCRIPTION RATES
$ 1.00
Single Copy
1.50
One Month
8.00
Six Months
15.00
One Year
EXTRA COPIES

To our subscribers: If you let us
know before nine o'clock Monday
morning following release of opinions,
we can furnish you extra copies at
25 cents each.
HUBBELL BANK v. BRYAN
28303

Filed November 10, 1932.

Appeal. Lancaster county; Chappell, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Peterson & Devoe; F. C. Radke;
Barlow Nye (Lincoln) for E. H. Luikart, receiver of failed plaintiff banks;
for plaintiff appellant.
C. A. Sorensen, Atty. Gen.; L. Ross
Newkirk, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Lincoln)
for defendant, appellee.
(SYLLABUS)
1. Legislative act to provide for
guaranty fund by assessments levied
against state banks under the police
power must be related to some public
purpose and must not be arbitrary
and unreasonable.
2. Depositors final settlement fund
act lacked the public purpose necessary to support such legislation as
an exercise of the police power.
3. Such an act, which provides
that solvent banks shall be assessed
in the future, to pay the losses of depositors in banks which had failed
prior to its enactment, is invalid for
that it takes the property of one and
gives it to another, depriving the one
of his property without due process
of law.
4. Public purpose sufficient to support an exercise of the police power
of the state is not imparted into a legislative act, merely because it supersedes and replaces a statutory enactment which did have such public purpose.
5. Provision expressing legislative
intent as to the separability of the


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

r

various parts of a statute is an aid is no issue of fact in controversy.
merely to judicial interpretation.
In 1909 the Nebraska legislature
6. "The legislative intent is the enacted a statute (Laws 1909, ch. 10)
cardinal rule in the construction of establishing a depositors' guaranty
statutes." King of Trails Bridge Co. fund which was created and replenv. Plattsmouth Auto & Wagon Bridge ished from the proceeds of assessCo., 114 Neb. 734.
ments based upon average daily de7. Police regulation, although valid
posits levied upon all state banks.
when made, may become, by reason The claims of all depositors in failed
of later events, arbitrary and confisstate banks were - to be paid, first
catory in operation.
from the assets in the hands of the
8. "A decision of the supreme
receivers thereof, and, secondly, if
court of the United States in a suit said fund was insufficient, the deficit
brought immediately upon the enactwas to be paid from the depositors'
ment of a bank guaranty law, holding
guaranty fund. The statutory prosuch law to be constitutional, does
visions creating and regulating the
not preclude a subsequent suit for the
depositors' guarantee fund are found
purpose of testing, in the light of in sections 8024 to 8028, and 8033,
later actual experience, the validity of Comp. St. 1922, with some amendassessments made thereunder, alleged
ment thereafter which however did
to be unreasonable and confiscatory, not change the general structure of
and hence repugnant to the due prothe depositors' guaranty fund.
cess clause of the Fourteenth AmendThere is no necessity to delineate
ment." Able State Bank v. Bryan, in this opinion the unhappy history
(282 U. S. 765) 75 L Ed. 690.
of the banking business in Nebraska
9. When conditions change so that and particularly those dark pages
what was once an insignificant taking from 1920 until 1930. It is sufficient
of private property for an ulterior for the purpose of this opinion to
public advantage under depositors' state that in 1930 the condition was
guaranty fund law becomes a taking such that the governor called a
of private property exclusively for pri- special session of the legislature private purpose confiscatory in its ap- marily to consider the banking situplication, the law cannot be sustained
ation. This special session (46th
as a constitutional exercise of the
Extraordinary) enacted chapter 6,
police power of the state.
Laws 1930, Special, which is common10. It is established in this case ly known as the depositors' final setthat conditions have so changed that tlement fund law, which became efthe depositors' guaranty fund act is fective March 18, 1930. Among other
deprived of its public purpose; that things it provided for the transfer of
the assessments thereunder are now
assets from the depositors' guaranty
confiscatory; and that it now takes fund to the depositors' final settleprivate property exclusively for a
ment fund, including certain assessprivate purpose. In such a case, one ments against the banks which had
is deprived of his pruperty without not been paid, accruing under the eld
due process of law, in violation of the law, and provided for an assessment
Fourteenth Amendment to federal to be levied upon the state banks for
Constitution and section 3, art. I of a period of ten years, based upon
the Constitution of the State of Ne- their average daily deposits. It probraska.
vided that those who had claims as
depositors in banks which had failed
Heard before Goss, C. J., Rose, prior to March 18, 1930, under the
Dean, Good, Eberly, Day and Paine. old guaranty fund law should be paid
JJ.
from this new fund pro rata. It repealed the old guaranty fund law.
DAY, J.
not only by a specific repealing
This is a suit in equity brought clause, but also by changing the proby the state banks of Nebraska to
visions by almost every section of
enjoin the collection of the regular the new law. Consequently, it markand special assessments levied for ed the end, from a legislative standthe use of the depositors' guaranty
point, of the depositors' guaranty
fund and the assessments levied and fund.
to be levied for the benefit of the
The assessment of state banks for
depositors' final settlement fund unthe payment of ,laims of depositors
der the provisions of legislation which
in failed state banks has from the
became effective March 18, 1930. time of the inception of such
legislaThis suit was brought against the
tion .been sustained as constitutional
department of trade and commerce
as an exercise of the police power
and governor of the state, as ex ofof the state. We quote from the
ficio head of the department. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
defendants filed a i counterclaim in
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
which they sought to recover a judgU. S. 104, (1911), in which he stated
ment against the banks for the
this principle as follows:
amount of the assessments which had
been levied under both statutory pro"Where the mutual advantage i,
visions. The case was decided upon a sufficient compensation, an ulteriot
public advantage may justify a corn- .
a demurrer which resulted in the
banks being denied relief and a judgparatiVely insignificant taking of priment being entered against the banks
vate property for what in its imindividually for the amount of assessmediate purpose is a private use.
ments levied under both the old and
The police power extends to all the
the new law. This suit was detergreat public needs, Canfield v. Unit- mined by the lower court upon a de- ed States, 167 U. S. 518, and includes
murrer to the pleadings, so that there the enforcement of commercial condi-

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
tions such as the protection of bank
deposits and checks drawn against.
them by compelling co-operation so
as to prevent failure and panic."
The Nebraska statute establishing
'the depositors' guaranty fund was
argued before the supreme court of
the United States at the same time
as the Haskell case (Shallenberger
v. First State Bank of Holstein, 219
U. S. 114), and the judgment in the
Haskell case was decisive in the latter. From the date of this decision
of the supreme court of the United
States to the present, there has never
been any deviation in any judicial
expression from the principle that a
depositors' guaranty fund law must
rest for constitutional support on the
exercise of the police power of the
state by its legislature. Further it
is held, also, that such an exercise
of the police power must not be arbitrary and that its exercise must be
related to some public purpose. This
view has been recently reiterated by
this court.
Abie, State Bank v.
Weaver, 119 Neb. 153, and also in
Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114. To
the same effect is the opinion in Abie
State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765.
The depositors' final settlement fund
act Rrovides for a fund to pay partially and pro rata the claims for depositors in state banks closed prior
to March 18, 1930, by transferring
the assets of the old guaranty fund
and the ko/ying of a new assessment
upon every state bank. The claims
of depositors in banks failing after
, March 18, 1930, were not protected
in any manner by this fund.
The public purpose sufficient to
suppert the constitutionality of the
depositors' guaranty fund was the
stabilization of commerce and the
creation of public confidence in the
bank,. It had a public purpose. It
was within the reasonable exercise
of the pole power, but the situation
with respect to the depositors' final
settlement fund is radically different.
It had fol. its sole and only purpose
the payment of the claims of depositors in banks which had failed prior
to its enactment by levying assessments upon solvent state banks whose
depositors did not come within the
purview of the act. ln practical effect, this new act destroyed the confidence in the state banks. It does
not stabilize commerce but 'tends to
idisrupt it. In truth, it serves no pubPic purpose which can justify the exercise of police power of the state.
Considered from the standpoint of
its effect, it does but one thing: It
takes money from the solvent state
banks, and thereby indirectly from
the depositors in these banks, and
pays it to depositors in other state
banks which had failed prior to its
enactment. In this, it creates a
classification that is unreasonable and
unconstititutional, as we have already
held. Weaver v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114.
Due process of law, as a limitation
upon the police power, requires that
it be exercised in such a manner that
it is not arbitrary and unreasonable.
Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U. S. 501; Fairmont Creamery Co.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

1

v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1; State v.
Geest, 118 Neb. 562.
In excluding depositors whose
claims accrued since March 18, 1930,
from participation and giving benefits to depositors in prior failed
banks, it deprives plaintiffs of property without due process of law.
Taking property of one and giving it
to another is not due process. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S.
403; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska,
M. &
217 U. S. 196; Chicago, St.
P.,S. 162.
0. R. Co. v. Holmberg, 282U.
There is no judicial authority to support the view that the final settlement fund is related in any manner
to a public purpose, but it does in
fact, as said by Mr. Justice Dean in
Weaver v. Koehn, supra, constitute
the taking of money belonging to one
class to pay the claims of another
class. From the brief of the attorney general we quote:
"We agree with counsel for plaintiffs that if the depositors final settlement law had been passed as an
entirely new measure, unrelated to
the creation, administration and distribution of the depositors' guaranty
fund, there would be little doubt of
its unconstitutionality on the ground,
so well stated by this court in Weaver
v. Koehn, 120 Neb. 114, that it would
'constitute the taking of money belonging to one class to pay the claims
of those of another class.'"
However, it is then argued that,
since the law replaced the old guaranty fund law which did have a public purpose, the depositors' final settlement fund by some process of
• inetampsychos*now has such public
purpose as is 414,
ntial to support
such legislatio r o support the view
that the legislature has authority,
several eases are cited which are not
strictly in point for the reason that
in no instance has a state legislature
attempt&IA to provide for future assessmenIIIF-to pay off, the losses in
other banks in the pat. In at least
two of the cases cited, the guaranty
fund was voluntlary and the banks
could come under the provisions or
not, as they chose. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Hart, 127 Wash.
541; State v. Bone, 120 Kan. 620. In
State v. Smith, 234 N. W. (S. Dak.)
764, it is shown that the legislature
of South Dakota discarded the old
guaranty system and established a
new and different system whereby
each bank was required to build up
a reserve in the state treasury to be
maintained for the protection of its
own depositors, which remained the
private property of the bank. Wirtz
v. Hostes, 51 N. Dak. 603, 200 N. W.
524, involved the matter of the payment of depositors under the old fund
as did the case of Lacy v. State
Banking Board, 118 Tex. 91, in which
membership in the state guaranty
fund was also optional.
It is contended however, that this
ouestion was adjudicated by Abie
State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765.
The legislation was enacted in the
interval occurring between the decision in this court and its disposition by the supreme court of the
United States. The question of the

constitutionality was not and could
not have been presented to this court.
In the case of Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, the court held:
"The jurisdiction of this court, under section 709, Rev. St. (Sec. 237,
Judicial Code) to review the proceedings of state courts is limited to
specific instances of denials of federal rights specially set up in and
denied b3c the state court." See, also,
Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117; De
Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216;
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U. S. 191.
No ordinary exercise of the judicial
process could import into the legislative act of March 18, 1930, any
public purpose whatsoever which justified the passage of the act under
the exercise of the police power by
the legislature. This question was
not adjudicated in the case of Abie
State Bank v. Bryan, supra. Therefore the said act, insofar as it attempts to levy an assessment on
state banks to create a fund to pay
depositors' claims against banks having failed prior to the enactment
thereof, is in violation of the due process clause of the federal Constitution. It is also violative of section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
is also violative of section 3, art. 1
of the Constitution of Nebraska, in
that it deprives persons of their property without due process of law.
Since we have reached the foregoing conclusion, it is necessary to consider the effects thereof, with reference to the repeal of the statutory
provisions of the depositors' guaranty fund. Section 16, ch. 6, Laws
1930, Special (Comp. St. 1929, sec.
8-178) is an expression of the legislative intent and of the inducement
for the passage of the act, as to the
separability of the various sections.
The legislative expression is that
sections 1 to 5, and 16, ch. 6, Laws
1930, Special, are inseparable. Section 18, Laws 1930, Special (Comp.
St. 1929, sec. 8-180) provides that
sections 6 to 16, inclusive, as far as
inducement is' concerned, are independent of every other section. Since
the legislature expressed itself both
ways upon the matter of legislative
intention and of inducement, in contradictory language, it would seem
to amount to the same thing as an
absence of a clear-cut expression of
intent. In such a case, it would seem
necessary to arrive at the legislative
intent without reference to such expression. Such a provision "is an aid
merely; not an inexorable command,"
said Mr. Justice Brandeis in Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286. See, also,
Nixon v. Allen, 150 Ark, 244; State
v. Montgomery, 177 Ala. 212. The
provision in this statute is novel and
is apparently original with our legislature. The only cases reported
which we have found are concerned
with provisions that various parts
shall be separable. We adopt the
rule that a provision expressing legislative intent as to the separability
of the various parts of a statute is
an aid merely to judicial interpretation. It is obvious that contradictory
provisions are of no aid in this case.

1141r•
-

••■••••••••••JmNPION.P.M,

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
It is emphatically argued that sec- operation has become confiscatory. years. This, obyiously, is a change
tion 16 was included in section 18 These are the same assessments men- of great importance. The appellants
inadvertently and that we should con- tioned in subdivision (c), sec. 1 of the sought an injunction, and their petistrue it as though it referred to sec- depositors' final settlement fund law, tion necessarily related to the assesstions 6 to 15, instead of 6 to 16. It which were transferred to that fund. ments in December, 1928, and thereis not the province of the court to
The defense interposed to this claim after, as the payments previously
amend an act to make it cofiform to is that of res judicata. The supreme
made were not in any event recoverfile unexpressed intent of the legis- court of the United States, after a able by the banks. Considering the
lature. VanHorn v. State, 46 Neb. consideration of our depositors' guar- reduction in the extent of the obli62, 64 N. W. 365. In an early case, antee fund law, held that it was not gation as to future assessments, we
are unable to say that the statute
In re Groff, 21 Neb. 647, we read: violative of the federal Constitution in
Shallenberger v. First State Bank of in this modified form is confiscatory,
"We hold, therefore, that where a
Holstein, 219 U. S. 114. But this is or other than a reasonable method
part of an act is not dependent upon
not so conclusive as to exclude fur- of liquidating the guaranty plan. In
that which is unconstitutional, and
is complete in itself and capable of ther consideration as to whether un- this view, the judgment of the supreme court of the state denying an
being executed, it will be maintained." der changed conditions and under
In State v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, it facts established by experience the injunction should be affirmed."
assessments imposed thereunder have
was said:
The substance of said opinion, as
become confiscatory. In Abie State
"Another test to be applied here
vM understand it, is ,that, due to
is, may the constitutional and uncon- Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765, it was changed conditions' resulting from
said:
stitutional portions of the law in
new legislation, the court was unable
"As to the first objection, it is to determine from the record whether
question be separated, and is the
the assessments were confiscatory.
former so complete within itself and sufficient to say that the bank guarindependent of the latter that the anty law was sustained by this court It therefore follows that the question
former will be operative and can be as a police regulation (Shallenberger
now presented was not adjudicated in
enforced without the latter? If so, v. First State Bank of Holstein, the above case.
the former will be upheld and the supra; Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
The question now squarely prelatter disregarded or rejected. The 219 U. S. 104, 575), and that a police sented is whether or not the special
foregoing is the rule announced and 'regulation, although valid when made, assessments .levied on December 15,
/ may become, by reason of later: 1928, April 17, 1929, and January 2,
enforced by this court."
1930, and the regular assessments
The various sections of these sta- events, arbitrary and confiscatory in
tutes will be operative and can be operation. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel- levied on July 1, 1929, and January
1, 1930, in view of changed condienforced without the invalid provis- ephone Co. 282 U. S. 133, 162; Allen
tions, including our finding herein
ions. Who can say, in view of the v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southcontradictory expressions, which was ern R. Co. 230 U. S. 553, 555, 556; that the depositors' final settlement
Lincoln Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of fund is invalid and the old law, known
the inducement? Perhaps, for some
members of the legislature one sec- Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 268. In the as the depositors' guaranty fund, is
Shallenberger case, the suit was thereby restored to an effective
tion, and for others a different secbrought immediately upon the enact- state, is confiscatory. If under the
tion, was the inducement. "The legislative intent is the cardinal rule in fment of the law, and that decision facts 'it is confiscatory it is violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
the construction of statutes." King sustaining the law cannot be regarded
Federal Constitution. If it is conof Trails Bridge Co. v. Plattsmouth as •recluding a subsequent suit for
fiscatory, then it can no longer be
Auto & Wagon Bridge Co., 114 Neb. the purpose of testing the validity
of
assessments
in
the light of the sustained as a constitutional legisla734, 209 N. W. 497; State v. School
tive enactment under the police power
District, 99 Neb. 338, 156 N. W. 641. later actual experience."
The
rule is stated in the syllabus for a public purpose. If confiscatory,
This court cannot say that the legthe public advantage does not justify
islature would not have passed the to be as follews:
"A decision of the supreme court taking of private property for what,
repealing clause without the other
in its purpose is a private use.
provisions. The various parts are of the United States in a suit brought
In addition to the changed condiseverable. In Cooley, Constitutional immediately upon the enactment of
tion relating to changed statutory enLimitations (8th ed.) pp. 241, 242, a bank guaranty law, holding such '
quoting from Smith v. Janesville, 26 law to be constitutional, does not actments, there are facts and circumpreclude a subsequent suit for the stances inherent in the conditions of
Wis. 291, it is said:
purpose of testing, in the light of the banking business in this state
"No one doubts the general power
of the legislature to make such reg- later actual experience, the validity since December, 1928. These facts
are established by the record. It
ulations and conditions as it pleases of assessments made thereunder, alleged to be unreasonable and con- was a fact determined in 198 that.
with regard to the taking effect or
due to the unprecedent
operation of laws. They may be ab- fiscatory, and hence repugnant to the
number of
solute, or conditional or contingent; due process clause of the Fourteenth' failures of state banl, the deposiAmendment." (75 L. Ed. 690.)
tors' guaranty fund sas faced with
and if the latter, they may take efA further quotation from the
a deficit of millions, nd that it was
fect on the happening of any event
opinion in the case is illuminating: 11111)0‘
1 to rAstore the solvency of,r
which is future and uncertain."
,s-Lh.
"When the suit was brought, these tite_fuatl,- The comparatively small
The taking effect of the law was
not made conditional or contingent, banks were confronted with a situaregular assessments had been levied
but absolute and immediate. Section tion which contained no promise of and collected. In addition, the larger
and more oppressive special assessLaws 1930, Special, provides: relief from the assessments for which
"Whereas, an emergency exists, this the act, as it then existed, provided, ments have been levied regularly for
and the cumulative effect of which
years, in the vain hope of restorine:
act shall be in force and take effect
from and after its passage and ap- was alleged to be disastrous. It was the solvency of the fund. The banks
were faced with an indefinite continproval." There was no provision for the special assessments under the old
the law taking effect conditionally law that were definitely assailed. uance of these reguliii•-'and specia'
Under the modifying act of 1930, on- assessments. At the same tin) , ii,•
or contingently.
public purpose which this legi-latIon
But state banks also challenge the ly three of these special assessments
undoubtedly had in the bevinniwi,
constitutionality of the assessments and two regular assessments remain
no longer served. From the c.ndeh 1,
levied under the provisions of the de- effective; and, for the future, there
of the fund itself, instead of
positors' guaranty fund law beginning is a limitation of the obligation to a
with the special assessment of De- total annual assessment of two-tenths
bilizer of the state banks, it beetinc.
of one per cent, of average daily
cember 15, 1928, and including that
a menace and a threat, sufficient to
of April 17, 1929, and January 2, deposits instead of assessments ag- cause a great loss of public confi
1930, and the regular assessments gregating six-tenths, as were made dence in the banks with subsequent
levied on July 1, 1929, and January
possible by the previous law. The
loss of business and earning Dower
1, 1930, for that by reason of chanvd future assessments, to this restricted
When this question was present e,1'
conditions the regulatory act in its amount, are limited to a period of ten
to this court at an earlier date, .11,i.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

1

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
..,Late Bank v. Weaver, 119 Neb. 153, 1. to earn more than enough to pay the
(December i, 1929), the writer was assessments, although it is now clear
of the opinion that under the pre- from the record, which includes furvailing conditions • the assessments ther experiences since this case was
levied under the law were then con- before this court, that this supposed
fiscatory. However, a majority of 4.tarning was more...jugazant-Ilail.
the court were then of a different for that in the spirit of optimism the
opinion. In that case, the supreme
banks had mot yet charged off some
court of the United States held: of their losses. During the period
"That decision sustaining the law from December 15, 1928, to January
1, 1931, covering approximately two
cannot be regarded as precluding a
years, there is either a loss or a
subsequent suit for the purpose o
profit so small that it is sufficient
testing the validity of assessments in
the light of later actual experience." to meet less than one-third of the
The cases cited by the court, as notea assessments levied against the banks
•Isewhere in this opinion, dealt with for the benefit of the guaranty fund.
rate-making. In the case of Munici- The assessments for this period can
pal Gas Co. v. Public Service Corn-,,.. only be paid by the banks by a direct
,nission, 225 N. Y. 89, 121 N. E. 772,k taking of their capital stock. Such
t he opinion by then Chief Justice a collection would impair the capital
ardozo so clearly states the prin- of the banks and would weaken their
stability. In this respect, the law
iple, that the question of confiscation
is affected by changing conditions, itself defeats the public purpose for
which it had hitherto existed; that
hat we quote herewith:
is, in the interests of the public wel"The argument is that a statute is fare to stabilize banking and business
either valid or invalid at the moment conditions. Such a taking under ast,f its making, and from the promise sessments levied under the guise of
the conclusion is supposed to follow
the police power for the puolic welthat there is a remedy for present fare is a confiscation of property and
confiscation, but none for confiscation
deprives the plaintiffs of their propthat results from changed conditions. erty without due process of law in
We do not view so narrowly the great violation of section 1 of the FourAnmunities of the Constitution, or teenth Amendment to the federal
tur own power to enforce them. A
Constitution and section 3, art. 1 of
statute prescribing rates is one of the Constitution of the state of Neontinuing operation. It is an attempt braska. Under such conditions, the
y the legislature to predict for fu- public advantage having long since
ure years the charges that will yield vanished, and what was once a coma fair return. The prediction must paratively insignificant taking of
..quare with the facts, or be cast
private property having become such
aside as worthless. Ex parte Young, 7that it will impair and in time will
It
muat
147,
148.
S.
123,
209 U.
' dissipate the capital stëk of the
square with them in one year as in banks exclusively for a private purbeginning
but.equally
another; at the
pose, it cannot be sustained under the
at the end. In all such legislation, police power of the state.
Noble
,tom the hour of its enactment,. there i State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104.
thus inheres the seed of an infirmity
Furthermore, whether these assesswhich the future maw develop. It is
ments are levied iiid collected under
the infitmitv that always waits upon
prophecy;• the coming years must tell Ithe old depositors' guaranty fund or
under the later enactment, the dewhether the prophecy is true."
positors' final settlement fund, there
Have conditions so changed in the (is no public purpose involved therein,
:-.tate banking situation that the as- a thing so necessary to the validity
• essments in controversy here were
of said agsessments.
.i- are confiscatory? The result of
It was stipulated by the parties
the operation of all the banks in the
at the time of tiaj in the district
•.tate have been compiled from the
court, February 15, 1932, and made
record by both plaintiffs and defen.lants. The plaintiffs contend that a part of the pleadings by reference:
"That in November, 1920, , there
L he operation of the banks for a twoyear period resulted in a loss of were 1,012 state banks in Nebraska.;
.23,676.09, while the defendants argue that at the time of the filing of the
retition in the case of Able State
:hat the operations resulted in a gain
.•f $994,138.73. The discrepancy is Bank v. Bryan in the district court
of Lancaster county, NelSraska, in
.lue largely to the time when the
December, 1928, the number had been
loss by real estate owned by the
reduced to .728, and that since that
hanks is charged -against them. That
,uch a loss occurred cannot be de- time 222 have become insolvent and
have been closed by the department
tied. The argument that the banks
In January, 1932, were in better con- of trade and commerce and 12 have
gone into voluntary liquidation, redition and that their business was
!nom profitable is not impressive. ducing the number of going banks
It is not supported by the facts plead- in the state as of this 19th day of
ed, and admitted by the demurrer. November, 1931, to 492; that the 726
going banks in December, 1928, had
Even taking the numerical argument
submitted by the defendants, the al- a combined capital of $19,001,000 and
leged operating gain is not one-third a combined surplus of $5,937,557.62."
the amount required to pay the asSince the beginning of this suit
sessments levied during the period. until the time the decree was entered
For a period consisting of some elev- in the district court, a period of apen months prior to December 15. 1928. proximately three months, 50 of the
it appears that the banks were able
plaintiff banks failed and were taken

1


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

over by the department of trade and
commerce for liquidation. For the
period of December 15, 1928, to January 1, 1931, about two years, some
200 state banks were taken over by
the department of trade and commerce as insolvent. Since the date
of the decree in the trial court, February 15, 1932, until the 12th of
September, 1932, 20 more banks have
closed. This would seem to be irre-7
buttable testimony to the confiscatory I
character of the assessments. True,
it has been argued that the banks
have not paid the assessments and
therefore the matter of assessments
for the depositors' guaranty fund or
the depositors' final settlement fond
have in no way affected the banks.
This is not convincing, since it is not
difficult to comprehend the effect of
the collection of almost three million
dollars from the banks of this state.
Can it be doubted that such a collection under the present conditions
would have greatly accelerated and
increased the effects of the catastrophe?
Since the depositors' final, settlement fund act became effective March
18, 1930, to the middle of September,
1932, 157 banks against which these
assessments have been levied have
closed.
Of this, about 30 have
reopened on some plan of reorganization. The total set-up in the 125
failed banks which have not reopened
as a contingent liability for the depositors' final settlement fund is almost 8700,000, while the amount so
set up in the reopened banks is about
$226,000.
The collection of thei
$900,000 from those banks being
liquidated or reorganized by the department of trade and commerce
would be taking the money from one
group of depositors who could not
benefit from the provisions of the
act and paying it to another group
of depositors in banks which have
failed prior to March 18, 1930. There
is. no public purpose involved to sustain such an action. It would be
taking the money from one person
and devoting it to a private use. The
taking of money belonging to one
class to pay claims of those of another class is in violation of the due
process provision of the federal and
state Constitutions.
Weaver v.
Koehn, 120 Neb. 114:
Finally, if these assessments are
collected by the department of trade
and commerce, they will become impressed with the judgment liens I
against the fund. Bliss v. Bryan, 123
Neb. 461, 243 N. W. 625. The pro.
reeds will then be distributed amon,t•
the depositors of a few banks, which
failed more than five years ago.
From any viewpoint from which we
consider these assesments, it is apparent that all public purpose has
been abandoned in relation thereto
and that it now amounts to taking
the property of one class of citizens
to pay another class in contravention
of the constitutional rights of the
plaiptiffs.
The logical conclusion
reached from the foregoing consideration of the questions presented is
that the judgment of the trial court

T •

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
should be reversed and the suit remanded, with directions to enter an
injunction against the defendants, as
petitioned by the plaintiffs.
REVERSED.

"If it does not do so and you advise us at the end of the first heating season, we will remove it, install
your old heating plant as we found
it and refund all money paid us in
full.
"(Signed) SWIFT LUMBER &
LUMBER
&
SWIFT
FUEL CO."
FUEL CO. v. HOCK
The oil burners were installed, and
Filed November 10, 1932. some two months after these con28300
tracts were made Buckstaff leased
Appeal. Lancaster county; Chapthe two apartment houses to the defendant. Defendant, being desirous
pell, Judge.
of knowing the cost of heating, made
Affirmed.
inquiries of Mr. Buckstaff and the
had been
Burkett, Wilson, Brown, Wilson & coal dealers from whom fuel preceding
purchased for the two
Van Kirk (Lincoln) for plaintiff, apyears, and ascertained that the cost
pellee.
of coal ran from $508 to $540 a seaM. M. Schmidt (Lincoln) for de- son
for each building.
Defendant
fendant, appellant.
claims that the contracts between
plaintiff and Buckstaff, together with
(SYLLABUS)
the guaranties,. were submitted to
One may not maintain an action on
a contract to which he is not a party, and considered by him in entering
into the leases with Buckstaff for
unless it is shown that the contract the
two buildings. He also contends
was made for his benefit, or for the
plaintiff was
benefit of a class in which he is in- that a salesman for the
present when he was negotiating with
cluded.
Buckstaff for the leases-of the propHeard before Rose, Dean, Good, erties, and that he, in effect, repeated
the terms of the contracts and guarEberly, Day and Paine, JJ.
anteed and assured defendant that
GOOD, J.
plaintiff would carry out its contracts
Plaintiff sued to recover balance - and make good its guaranty. For
due on an account for fuel oil and
the heating season of 1929 and 1930
other items furnished defendant. defendant purchased fuel oil from
Defendant confessed the amount, and
plaintiff. Defendant alleged, and ofin a cross-petition set up a counter- fered testimony to prove, that the cost
claim, in which he sought recovery of oil for the heating seasons from
on contracts between plaintiff and 1929 to 1931 was largely in excess
one Buckstaff, which he alleges were of the cost of the coal for the two
made for defendant's benefit. After
previous years. He claimed that,
defendant had introduced his evidence
pursuant to the contracts between
and rested, on motion of plaintiff the plaintiff and Buckstaff, defendant
court directed a verdict against defen- was entitled to recover upon these
dant on his counter-claim and for contracts the difference between the
plaintiff for the amount confessed by cost, of the coal and the cost of the
defendant. Defendant has appealed. fuel oil.
The record discloses that Buckstaff
It may be observed that there is
was the owner of two apartment no evidence in the record with refbuildings in the city of Lincoln which erence to the cost of coal for the
were heated by coal-burning furnaces. years 1929 to 1931; nor is there any
June 25, 1929, he entered into con- evidence as to what the janitor's sertracts with plaintiff, whereby the vices would cost for stoking the furlatter agreed to install two oil burnaces and removing the ashes; so
ners in each apartment house, one that, in any event, there is no basis
for the heating of water for domestic for comparing the cost of heating.
use in each of the buildings, the other by oil with the cost of heating by
for heating building. The contracts coal. The cost of coal for the two
between plaintiff and Buckstaff were years ending in June, 1929, would not
in the form of written communica- be a proper basis for determining its
tions which were accepted by Buckcost for the two succeeding years.
staff. We quote the pertinent part Moreover, it is a matter of which evof the communications:
eryone is cognizant that some winters
"With an Electrol properly install- are mild and comparatively warm, as
ed in your furnace and burning fuel
compared with other seasons, and
oil, you can heat your home or place
that the mild seasons renuire less
of business, cleanly, quietly, safely, fuel than the colder ones. What was
absolutely automatically, as cheaply the character of the several heating
as you can with coal and for 30 per seasons as to mildness is not discent, less than it will cost you for closed.
oil in any pot type oil burner. The
This and other courts have frePlectrol is absolutely guaranteed. quently held that, where one makes
We are enclosing a copy of our guar- a contract or promise to another for
antee."
the benefit of a third person, such
The guaranty inclosed is in the third person may maintain an action
following language: "We guarantee upon the promise, although the conthe Electrol Fuel Oil Burner to heat sideration does not move directly
your home or place of business clean- from him. In order that a third perly, quietly, safely and as cheaply as son may maintain an action upon a
you can with coal.
contract to which he is not a party,
"To please you in economy, in per- it must be shown that it was made
formance and in every way.
for his protection and benefit, or for

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

the protection and benefit of a class
of which he belongs.
In 13 C. J. 709, it is said: "By
the weight of authority the action
cannot be maintained merely because
the third person will be incidentally
benefitted by performance of the contract; he must be a party to the consideration, or the contract must have
been entered into for his benefit, and
he must have some legal or equitable
interest in its performance."
In the instant case the contracts
were made between plaintiff and
Buckstaff when the latter was operating his apartment buildings. There
was no suggestion in the contracts
that Buckstaff intended to lease the
buildings; nor is there any suggestion
in the contracts that the provisions
thereof were made for the benefit
of anyone other than Buckstaff. Unless it is proved that the contracts
between plaintiff and Buckstaff were
made for the benefit of third persons, a third person cannot bring
an action thereon. There is a total
failure of proof in this respect.
Defendant further alleged and testified that a salesman for plaintiff
was present when defendant was negotiating with Buckstaff for the leasing of the buildings, and made substantially the same representations.
There is not shown any contractual
relation between plaintiff and defendant in this respect, and no consideration was paid by defendant to
plaintiff; nor is it disclosed that the
salesman had any authority whatsoever to make any such representations that would be binding upon the
plaintiff.
In no view of the case as presented
was defendant entitled to recover on
his counterclaim. The court properly
directed a verdict for plaintiff and
against defendant on 'his counterclaim.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

BAINTER v. APPEL
2827%;

Filed November 10, 1932.

Appeal. ..Sarpy _county; _Begley.
Judge.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Baker, Lower & Sheehan (Omaha)
for plaintiff, appellant.
Ralph J. Nickerson (Papillion);
Crossman, Munger & Barton (Omaha) for defendant, appellee.
(SYLLABUS)
I. If there he any testimony before the jury by which a finding in
favor of the party on whom rests the
burden of proof can be upheld, the
court is not at liberty to disregard it
and direct a verdict against him. In
reviewing such action, this court will
regard as conclusively established
every fact which the evidence proves
or tends to establish, and if. from the
entire evidence thus construed, different minds might reasonably draw d;fferent conclusions, it will be deenied
error on the part of the trial court to
have directed a verdict thereon.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
2. Under the Constitution of this
state, a statute which contains no
emergency clause does not become
operative until three calendar months
after the adjournment of the legislature by which it was passed.
3. Chapter 110, Laws 1931, having
been enacted to secure uniformity in
the state laws regulating the operation of vehicles on highways throughout the nation, should be construed in
the light of the cardinal principles of
the act itself to give effect to this design.
1. In this state, upon highways of
suaicient width, except upon one way
streets, the driver of an automobile
shall drive the same upon the (his)
right half of the highway, unless it
is impracticable to travel on such side
of the highway, and in crossing an intersection of highways shall likewise
cause such vehicle to travel on the
right half of the highway, unless such
right half is obstructed or impassable.
5. In the absence of special provisions of the statute to the contrary,
or the existence of unusual conditions
rendering such speed unsafe, it is
PRIMA FACIE lawful for a driver of
an automobile to drive the same on the
portion of the highway over which he
then has the right of way, at a speed
of not exceeding fifteen miles an hour
when approaching within fifty feet
of, and in traversing, an intersection
of highways, when such driver's view
is obstructed.
6. A driver's view shall be deemed
to be obstrUcted when at any time
during the last fifty feet of his approach to such intersection he do-es
not have a clear and uninterrupted
view of such intersection and of the
traffic upon all highways entering
such intersection for a distance of two
hundred fort from such intersection.
7. Plaintiff, driving his automobile
westward on the right side of the road
and traveling in a lawful manner,
trd
to east-bound traffic having
he exclasive right of way, could assume that one driving in the opposite
direction week! not project his car
e`•-into a cloud of dust on plaintiff's side
of the road and strike hint.
▪
S. To sustain a recovery by the
owner of an automobile for injuries
resulting to him and his car from a
'41 .collision with a truck then transport' ing the property of defendant, the
3's.- plaintiff must show by a preponder• ance of the evidence that the person
• in charge of the truck was the defend";, ant's servant, and was at the time
of the accident engaged in the master's business or pleasure with the
-"-• master's knowledge and direction.

*
\

Heard before Rose, Dean, Good,
Eberly, Day and Paine, JJ.
EBERLY, J.
This was originally an action at
law instituted in the district court
for Sarpy county by Clarence P.
Bainter, as plaintiff, against Leo
Appel and Western Asphalt Paving
Corporation, as defendants. Plaintiff
sought a recovery from the defendants for damages to his person and
property alleged to have been caused
by the negligence of the defendants

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

in the operation of a truck on and
over "Old U. S. Highway 38," resulting in a collision with plaintiff's
automobile on August 5, 1931, at a
point on that public highway between
three and four miles south of Gretna,
Nebraska.
There was a trial to a jury. At
the close of plaintiff's evidence the
trial court sustained the separate motions of defendants for a directed verdict in their behalf, and dismissed
plaintiff's action. This action of the
district court was predicated upon
the proposition that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to establish a
cause of action against either defendant, and disclosed contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff in a degree sufficient to defeat
a recovery by him. From the judgment thus entered, and the order of
the district court overruling his motion for a new trial, the plaintiff
appeals.
In view of this record, it is obvious
that the correctness of the determination of the trial court is to be
tested by the following established
principles: (a) "If there by any testimony before the jury, by which a
finding in favor of the party in whom
rests the burden of proof can be upheld, the court is not at liberty to
disregard it, and direct a verdict
against him." Grant v. Cropsey, 8
Neb. 205. See, also, Hunt v. State
Ins. Co., 66 Neb. 125; Schmidt v.
Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 95
Neb. 43. (b) "In reviewing the' action of a trial court in directing a
verdict, this court will regard as conclusively established every fact favorable to the unsuccessful party
which the evidence proves or tend:
to establish." Preston v. Stover, 70
Neb. 632; Kepler v. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. R. Co., 111 Neb. 273. (c)
"Where, from the testimony • before
the jury, different minds might draw
different conclusions, it is error to
direct a verdict." Suiter v. Park Nat.
Bank, 35 Neb. 372; Schwerin v. Andersen, 107 Neb. 138.
We promise our discussion of this
appeal with the observaiton that the
fact of the collision, and the damages
suffered therefrom by the plaintiff,
must in this proceeding be taken as
uncontroverted. The determinative
evidence, in view of the issues necessarily determined by the trial court
in directing a verdict for defendants
at the close of plaintiff's evidence,
is therefore restricted to the facts and
circumstances appearing in the record which support • or disprove inferences of negligence in the transaction on the part of the defendant,
or which tend to establish contributive negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.
It may be said that the public
highway referred to in the evidence
as "old thirty-eight," and on which
this collision occurred, at the scene
of the accident was laid out and constructed in a general east and west
direction. A short distance east of
the place of collision "old thirtyeight" was intersected by the new
public highway, then under construction, and which extended from the

southwest to the northeast. These
roads will hereafter be referred to
as the "new highway" and the "old
thirty-eight." This court will take
judicial notice that measured between
their lateral boundaries each of these
public highways was not less than
66 feet in width; and also that the
paved surface of the "new highway"
and the graded and graveled portion
of "old thirty-eight" occupied the
central portion of the respective highways in which situated. It also appears that at the time of the accident
the paving of the "new highway"
(including a portion of the intersection with "old thirty-eight") had been
in part completed, and for its protection had been covered with soil.
The "new highway" was then in use,
at least by trucks engaged in construction work thereon. "Old thirtyeight" from this intersection, inclusive and westerly therefrom, was then
in use by the nublic generally.
The testimony of defendant Appel,
whose truck collided with plaintiff's
automobile, testifying as plaintiff's
witness, is, in substance, that on August 5, 1931, at approximately 4:30
p. m. he was employed in personally
operating this truck and then conveying a load of sand, gravel and
cement, the property of the Western
Asphalt Paving Corporation, over
"old thirty-eight" from "Melia, our
plant, to the mixer." This material
was intended for use in paving the
"new highway."
Plaintiff testified in substance as
follows: On the day of the accident
he, with five others in his Graham
Paige, of which he was the driver,
were traveling from Council Bluffs,
Iowa, via Omaha and Lincoln, to
Fairbury, Nebraska, At 4:30 on that
day this Graham Paige, with plaintiff at the wheel, traveling west over
"old thirty-eight," was approaching
the junction of the two public highways already referred to. At thiplace "two cars passed me "
going a pretty good rate of speed."
"They kicked up some dust" and
caused plaintiff "to slow down." As
he "pulled up" in the intersection
and had just started to cross the
pavement, "something whizzed by"
traveling on the "new highway" and
created a big cloud of dust at this
point. The dust came up "right in
front of my car." He was "into it
before he knew what had happened."
The speed of his car, when crossing
the intersection, was from 5 to 7 miles
an hour. "I couldn't stop on the
highway (intersection) so I just drove
slowly off." While he was in the
cloud of dust he could see a little,
though his view was evidently greatly curtailed. As he was driving
slowly along on his right-hand side
of the road (north half) he saw "this
truck coming out of the dust."
He then knew "there was going to
be a head-on collision" and applied
his brakes. He almost came to a
stop before the impact; he had in
fact put on his brakes while passing
through the cloud of dust so the car
was moving slowly when the approaching truck was first discovered
Plaintiff testifies that the actual

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
impact of the collision with the Appel
truck took place probably fifty or
sixty feet west of the intersection,
resulting in the practical destruction
of his automobile. Other disinterested witnesses place this point of
actual impact as "fifteen feet or so
west of the intersection," and one
witness says on this topic: "I should
judge fifteen or twenty feet west of
the center of the intersection." All
witnesses agree that plaintiff's car
in passing through the dust cloud
was at all times on the "right side"
or north half of "old thirty-eight";
that the collision was head-on, and
that both cars were then north of
the center line of "old thirty-eight."
Indeed, here the two colliding vehicles
stood after the collision, with their
front wheels locked together, the
truck facing eastward and the Graham Paige facing the west. There
is evidence that defendant's truck
had been traveling over the north
half of this highway to the eastward
for some distance west of the point
where the collision occurred. There
is no evidence that this was due to
accident, or in any manner to the
presence of the dust cloud, but the
facts elicited by defendants' attorney on cross-examination support the
inference that the driver of the truck
was intentionally operating it over
the north half of "old thirty-eight"
at the time of impact, and had been
for a period of time prior thereto,
and there are no facts appearing in
the record which would support the
inference that the south half of "old
thirty-eight" was here "impracticable
to travel," "obstructed," or "impassable."
The date of this accident, August
5, 1931, invites our attention to the
fact that the legislature of 1931 at its
forty-seventh session enacted chapter
110, Laws of 1931, entitled: "An
act relating to motor vehicles and
regulating the operation of vehicles
on the highways," etc. This act was
approved by the executive May 7,
1931. The forty-seventh session adjourned sine die on May 2, 1931.
This enactment, having been adopted
without an emergency clause, notwithstanding the date of approval by
the executive, took effect August 3
following, and its provisions, so far
as applicable to the subject-matter
involved in this litigation, are controlling. Const. art. III, sec. 27;
McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427; State
v. City of Kearney, 49 Neb 325.
This legislation evidences the substantial adoption by Nebraska of the
provisions of the "Uniform act regulating the operation of vehicles on
highways" as recommended and approved by the commissioners on uniform state laws in 1926, and which
since that time has been, in effect,
adopted by the legislatures of seventeen of the states of the Federal
Union, in addition to our own. Section 59 of this. chapter 110 provides:
"This act shall be so interpreted and
consti ued as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of
those states which enact similar legislation." In the construction of similar enactments adopted for the purpose of securing uniformity and

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
't?

certainty in certain laws through-out
this nation, this jurisdiction is committed to the view that each of such
statutes should be so construed, in
the light of the cardinal principles of
the act itself, as to give effect to
this design. Peters v. Finzer, 116
Neb. 380; International Milling Co.
v. North Platte Flour Mills, 119 Neb.
325. See, also, Commercial Nat.
Bank v. Canal-Louisiana Bank &
Trust Co., 239 U. S. 520.
This law of 1931 does not in terms
repeal or amend section 39-1001,
Comp. St. 1929, providing: "Whenever any persons, traveling with any
carriages, shall meet on any road in
this state, the persons so meeting
shall seasonably turn their carriages
to the right of the center of the
road, so as to permit each to pass
without interfering or interrupting,"
etc. This enactment of 1931 embraces, however, the following additional requirements and includes certain definitions which are applicable
to the situation disclosed by the
evidence referred to, viz.: "The following words and phrases when used
in this act shall for the purpose of
this act have the meanings respectively ascribe to them in this section,
except in those instances where the
context clearly indicates a different
meaning: (a) Motor Vehicles. Every vehicle as herein defined, which
is self-propelled. * * * (e) Highway.
Every way or place of whatever nature open to the use of the public,
as a matter of right for the purposes
of vehicular travel. * * * (f) Private Road or Driveway. Every road
or driveway not open to the use of
the public for purposes of vehicular
travel. (g) Intersection. The area
embraced within the prolongation of
the lateral curb lines or, if none, then
the lateral boundary lines of two or
more highways which join one another at an angle, whether or not one
such highway crosses the other.
* * * (i) Right of Way. The privilege of the immediate use of the
highway." Comp. St. Supp. 1931,
sec. 39-1132.
"Upbn all highways of sufficient
width, except upon one way streets,
the driver of a vehicle shall drive
the same upon the right half of the
highway and shall drive a slow moving vehicle as closely as possible to
the right-hand edge or curb of such
highway, unless it is impracticable
to travel on such side of the highway." Comp. St. Supp. 1931, sec.
39-1139.
"In crossing an intersection of
highways * * * the driver of a vehicle shall at all times cause such
vehicle to travel on the right half
of the highway unless such right half
is obstructed or impassible." Comp.
St. Supp. 1931, sec. 39-1140.
"Drivers of vehicles proceeding in
opposite directions shall pass each
other to the right, each giving to
the other at least one-half of the
main traveled portion of the roadway
as nearly as possible." Comp. St.
Supp. 1931, sec. 39-1141.
"(a) The driver of a vehicle shall
not drive to the left side of the
( enter line of a highway in overtak-

ing and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless
such left side is clearly visible and
is free of on-coming traffic for a
sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking and passing to be
made in safety." Comp. St. Supp.
1931, sec. 39-1143.
"(a) Except as otherwise provided
in this section, the driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the right
at an intersection shall approach such
intersection in the lane for traffic
nearest to the right-hand side of the
highway and in turning shall keep as
closely as practicable to the righthand curb or edge of the highway,
and when intending to turn to the
left shall approach such intersection
in the lane for traffic to the right
of and nearest to the center line of
the highway and in turning shall
pass beyond the center of the intersection, passing as closely as practicable to the right thereof before
turning such vehicle to the left. For
the purpose of this section, the center of the intersection shall mean
the meeting point of the medial lines
of the highways intersecting one another." Comp. St. Supp. 1931, sec.
39-1146.
"Except in those instances where
a lower speed is specified in this act,
it shall be prima facie lawful for the
driver of a vehicle to drive the same
at a speed not exceeding the following, but in any case when such speed
would be unsafe it shall not be lawful. * * * 3. Fifteen miles an hour
when approaching within fifty feet
and in traversing an intersection of
highways when the driver's view is
obstructed. A driver's view shall be
deemed to be obstructed when at
any time during the last fifty feet
of his approach to such intersection,
he does not have a clear and uninterrupted view of such intersection
and of the traffic upon all highways
entering such intersection for a distance of two hundred feet from such
intersection." Comp. St. Supp. 1931.
sec. 39-1135.
So, also, we are required to take
judicial notice of the provisions of
the official state highway rules and
regulations (1930) as formulated by
the department of public works, pursuant to section 39-1416, Comp. St.
1929. 7 Ency. of Evi. 990. These
are to be construed as in addition
to the Nebraska statutes rather than
in explanation or interpretation
thereof. This court has recognized
the validity of powers thus exercised
by the department of public works.
Trussell v. Ferguson. 122 Neb. 82.
Paragraph (r) of section 13 of these
rules and regulations (page 13) is:
"A vehicle shall not stop within an
* * * intersection."
It thus appears that plaintiff in
continuing the movement of his automobile westward on the right or
north half of the highway after being enveloped by a cloud of dust
which obstructed his view, at a speed
of from five to eight miles an hour.
was not only well within the express
statutory limitation, but was then
proceeding in strict obedience to the
commands of the law. No "lower

peed is specified in this act," and
the record is barren of facts from
which it may be inferred that this
speed was then unsafe.
Defendant Appel's contention is
that when plaintiff's view became
obstructed by the dust cloud in the
intersection he should have stopped
where he was, or blown his horn, or
turned on his lights. The terms of
the statutes and regulations already
quoted wholly fail to support this
contention. Plaintiff was not required to stop, or blow his horn, or turn
on his lights, but the sta.tute contemplates only that he proceed on his
right half of the highway at a rate
of speed not in excess of fifteen
miles an hour, and the "regulations",
as we have noted, expressly denied
to him the right to stop in the intersection.
Neither has the rule that "it is
negligence as a matter of law for a
motorist to drive an automobile so
fast on a highway at night that he
cannot stop in time to avoid a collision with an object within the area
lighted by his lamps" any application to the facts of the instant case.
This court has properly applied the
rule quoted in cases where the collision was between a moving automobile and an object which relative
to the automobile was stationary.
Roth v. Blomquist, 117 Neb. 444.
But to apply it to approaching automobiles colliding with each other
would violate the very reason by
which the rule is supported. Indeed,
its strict observance by both drivers
in the case supposed would not avoid
•
the collision.
In the present case the car of plaintiff was correctly placed and at the
time of the impact, as well as prior
thereto, was traveling in a lawful
manner where and as the terms of
this enactment directed. Plaintiff,
then, as to the north half of this
highway, had the exclusive statutory
right of way as against eastbound
traffic thereon. This being true,
plaintiff, as driver of his car, had
the right to assume that no one, in
violation of the express commands
of this legislation, would pass over
the center line of this highway with
his motor vehicle, travel eastward on
the north half thereof, project his
car into a cloud of dust on plaintiff's
own side of the road, and strike him.
The fact that the accident occurred
in this manner constitutes ample evidence to go to the jury on the question of defendant Appel's negligence,
and fully sustains the inference that
plaintiff was wholly free from contributory
negligence.
Crowe v.
O'Rourke, 146 Wash. 74; Lawrence
v. Bartling & Dull Co., 255 Mich. 280;
Tomlinson v. Clement Bros. 130 Me.
189. The district court erred, therefore, in directing a verdict for the
defendant Appel.
As to the defendant Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, it may be
said that the sole evidence connecting it with the transaction is the
evidence of witness Appel already
set out. Under the issues as made
by the pleadings, to sustain a recovery for injuries occasioned by the

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
operation of the Appel truck, the
burden was imposed on the plaintiff
to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that Appel, who was in
charge of and operating the machine
occasioning the damages, was the
Western Asphalt Paving Corporation's servant, and was at this time
engaged in his master's business or
pleasure with the master's knowledge
and direction. Neff v. Brandeis, 91
Neb. 11; Weber v. Thompson-Belden
& Co., 105 Neb. 606.
As the evidence in the record wholly fails to prove the relation of master and servant as existing between
Appel and the Western Asphalt Paving Corporation, the action of the
trial court in directing a verdict in
favor of the latter is approved. As
to defendant Appel, the judgment is
reversed and the cause remanded for
further proceedings consistent with
this opinion; as to defendant Western
Asphalt Paving Corporation, the
judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
YOST v. NELSON
28275

Filed November 10, 1932.

Appeal.
Judge.

Lancaster county; Frost,

Affirmed.
Flansburg & Lee; Jno. 0. Sheldahl
(Lincoln) for plaintiff, appellee.
Good, Good & Kirkpatrick; H. N.
Mattley (Lincoln) for defendant, appellant.
Flansburg & Lee; Jno. 0. Sheldahl
(Lincoln) for Iowa-Nebraska Light &
Power Co., impleaded appellee.
(SYLLABUS)
I. In a law action, controverted issues of fact, where the evidence is in
dispute, are for the jury to determine.
2. In a personal injury action,
plaintiff may recover for medical and
hospital expenses, necessitated by the
injury, if he has paid or incurred liability for such expenses.
3. In a personal injury action, an
allegation in the petition that plaintiff has suffered injuries consisting
of "bruises, lacerations and contusions
to his * * head; a deep cut and
severe bruise to his right eye, * * *
that plaintiff's nose was severely
fractured," etc., is sufficient to permit evidence to be received, that, as
a result of such injuries, plaintiff's
brain was affected.
4. Two persons riding in an automobile are not engaged in a joint enterprise, where one is the owner and
operator of the car and the other a
mere guest, and when the guest is not
contributing to the expense of operating the car, has a different destination from the owner, a different purpose in going, and has no right to control the action of the owner and operator.
5. A judgment will not be reversed
because of harmless error.
6. "Diminution of earning capacity
is not, of necessity, measured by its
diminution in the particular calling in

which plaintiff was engaged at the
time of the injury, or by the amount
of wages which he was then receiving; hence, plaintiff may show that
he was capable of earning more than
he was earning at the time of the injury, and the jury may consider what
plaintiff might have been able to earn
but for the injury in any employment
for which he was fitted." 17 C. J. 903.
7. Under the evidence outlined in
the opinion, HELD that the verdict
was not excessive.
Heard before Rose, Dean, Good,
Eberly, Day and Paine, JJ.
E BERLY, J.
This is a personal injury action in
which plaintiff recovered judgment,
and defendant has appealed.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision which he charges was
caused by negligence of defendant.
On June 14, 1930, plaintiff was riding
in a Chevrolet coupe, owned and operated by one Gray. They were traveling east on the S. Y. A. highway a
few miles east of Seward. Defendant Nelson, accompanied by his
wife and two guests, was traveling
west on the same highway. The two•
cars collide]. The point of contact
between the two cars was the right
front end of each, to the width of
about 18 inches. After the collision
defendant's car remained almost in
the same position in the highway as
at the time of impact. It was headed
slightly to the south of west. Gray's
car was thrown a considerable distance, and came to rest on the north
side of the highway and off the traveled portion, facing nearly south.
In his petition plaintiff charges
that defendant was traveling at a
high rate of speed and on the south
or left-hand side of the highway, and
that, when it was apparent that
Gray's car could not pass defendant's
car on the south or right-hand side
of the highway, an instant before the
collision Gray sharply turned to the
left to avoid a collision.
On the
other hand, defendant contends that
Gray was traveling on the north or
his left-hand side of the highway
and that, when they were approaching very close together, defendant
turned to the left, trying to avoid a
collision.
Defendant contends that
after the collision his car was near
the center of the highway; that the
left front wheel was a little to the
south of the center of the highway;
the right front wheel to the north
of the center, and that both of the
rear wheels of his car were to the
north of the center. The evidence
on behalf of plaintiff tends to show
that defendant's car came to rest, or
stopped, near the south side of the
highway, and too close to permit a
car, going in the opposite direction,
to pass with safety on the south side
thereof. The evidence on behalf of
plaintiff tends to support his contention, while that on behalf of defendant tends to support defendant's
contention. There is a hopeless and
irreconcilable conflict in the evidence.
In law actions it is the function of
the jury to determine issues of fact

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
as to which the evidence is in conflict. Defendant's contention that
the evidence is insufficient to justify
a finding that defendant was negligent in the premises is not well
founded.
Defendant argues that the trial
court erred in permitting the jury to
consider, as an element of damages,
medical and hospital expenses incurred by plaintiff in treatment and
care of his injuries, sustained in the
automobile collision, on the ground
that plaintiff has not paid nor become legally liable for such expenses.
The evidence shows that the hospital
and medical bills were paid by plaintiff's employer, as an advance of
funds to plaintiff, and that he was
to recompense his employer for the
funds so advanced. Plaintiff, in a
personal injury . action, may recover
for medical and hospital expenses,
necessitated by the injury, if he has
paid such expenses or incurred liability therefor. The question of recovery for medical and hospital expenses was properly submitted to the
jury.
It is argued that it was error to
admit evidence of an injury to plaintiff's brain, on the ground that the
particular injury was not pleaded and
was not the natural and necessary
result of injuries alleged in the petition. In his petition plaintiff alleged
that he had sustained severe and
serious injuries to his person, "consisting, among other things, of
bruises, lacerations and contusions to
his * * * head; a deep cut and severe
bruise to his right eye * * *; that
plaintiff's nose was severely fractured," etc.
We are of the opinion that the allegations of the petition were sufficient to permit proof that the brain
was affected as a result of the bruises
and contusions on his head, and that
the facts do not bring the case within the rules of law contended for by
defendant.
It is contended by defendant that
at the time of the accident plaintiff
and Gray were engaged in a joint enterprise, and that any negligence on
the part of Gray should be imputed
to plaintiff.
The evidence discloses that plaintiff and Gray were employed by the
same corporation; that Gray owned
and operated the car in which plaintiff was riding. The accident occurred late Saturday afternoon.
Plaintiff and Gray had both completed their work for their employer
for that week, and were not returning
to their headquarters or regular
places of abode. Gray's family lived
in Iowa, and he was going there to
spend Sunday. Plaintiff had been
invited to have dinner on Sunday
with friends in Lincoln, and Gray
consented to carry him as far as
Lincoln. There was no joint occupation at the time, no joint purpose in
the trip, and no joinder of the two
in the expenses thereof. Plaintiff
had no authority over the actions of
Gray, and there was no joint control
of the car.
In Judge v. Wallen, 98 Neb. 154,
152 N. W. 318, this court held:

'14
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

"While two traveling salesmen are
engaged in the joint enterprise of
transporting themselves by automobile over the territory canvassed by
both for different merchants, one of
the salesmen owning and operating
the automobile and the other paying
sums about equal to the cost of gasoline and oil consumed, the latter, if
possessing joint control over the automobile, may be liable for the negligence of the other in operating it."
In the opinion .is quoted with approval the following from the case
of Koplitz v. City of St. Paul, 86
Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794; "Negligence
in the conduct of another will not be
imputed to a party if he neither
authorized such conduct, nor participated therein, nor had the right or
power to control it. If, however, two
or more persons unite in the joint
prosecution of a common purpose under such circumstances that each has
authority, expressed or implied, to
act for all in respect to the conduct
or the means or agencies employed
to execute such common purpose, the
negligence of any one of them in the
management thereof will be imputed
to all of the others." The facts disclosed by the record in the instant
case clearly show that plaintiff and
Gray were not engaged in a joint
enterprise.
It is strenuously contended that the
court erred in submitting to the jury
an alleged act of negligence regarding which there was no evidence.
Among the alleged acts of negligence
was that defendant was operating
his car without proper brakes. No
evidence upon this point was introduced. Defendant testified that he
did not apply his brakes. The trial
court, in outlining the issues presented by the pleadings, stated this
as one of the allegations made by
plaintiff in his petition, and further
on it gave specific instructions with
regard to acts of negligence which
were supported by evidence, but not
with reference to this act. The
trial court further instructed the
jury that only such acts of negligence
could be considered as the jury might
find were sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.
It would have been much better
practice for the trial court to have
outlined to the jury only such issues
of fact as were supported by the
evidence. However, in the instant
case it is plain that the only act of
negligence that could have influenced
the jury was that defendant was
driving on the wrong side of the
highway and not keeping a proper
lookout. The further fact that defendant testified that his brakes were
not applied would certainly inform
the jury that, if the brakes were defective, they had nothing to do with
causing the accident.
We are persuaded that the mere
stating that plaintiff alleged in his
petition defective brakes as an act
of negligence could not have influenced the jury in arriving at their
verdict, and, while it may have been
error, it was not prejudicial. Only
errors that are prejudicial to the

9

complaining party are grounds for
reversal of a judgment.
Defendant seems to urge that
plaintiff was permitted to recover for
earning capacity in an occupation in
which he was not employed at the
time of the accident. Without objection, evidence was received that
plaintiff, by occupation, was a lineman, and that the duties of a lineman were working on telephone poles,
installing wires and equipment, and
that a regular lineman received wages
of $140 a month, or more. It is true
that at the time of the accident, resulting in his injuries, plaintiff was
engaged in assisting in the survey of
a gas pipe line between Crete and
Seward, and was receiving but $125
a month. Because of his injuries, he
was unable to resume his occupation
as a lineman; one of his legs was
so injured that he did not have the
full use thereof, and, as a result of
his injuries, he was dizzy and unable
to retain his balance, which rendered
it unsafe and practically impossible
for him to climb poles, or work at
any considerable height, or to resume his former occupation of lineman. The court instrutted the jury
that, in fixing the amount of damages,.they might take .into consideration any impairment shown by the
evidence in plaintiff's earning capacity.
In 17 C. J. 903, it is said: "Diminution of earning capacity is not,
of necessity, measured by its diminution in the particular calling in which
plaintiff was engaged at the time of
the injury, or by the amount of wages
which he was then receiving; hence,
plaintiff may show that he was capable of earning more than he was
earning at the time of the injury,
and the jury may consider what
laintiff might have been able to
earn but for the injury in any employment for which he was fitted."
We think the criticism in this respect
is not justified by the record.
Finally, it is contended that the
verdict is excessive. There is no
rule to determine with exactness the
amount that would compensate a person for personal injuries 'sustained.
It must be left to the good judgment
of the jury, and, unless from the
evidence the court can say, as a matter of law, that the recovery is excessive, the verdict will not be disturbed..
There is evidence in the record
tending to prove that plaintiff's injuries were severe and, in a number
of respects, permanent; that the
bones of his nose were crushed; that
the air passage in one side of th!
nose is entirely obstructed and the
other partially so, so that breathing
through the mouth is necessary. His
face is permanently disfigured. One
leg was permanently injured, resulting in partial loss of its function.
There was an injury to the tenth
dorsal vertebra, resulting in impingement on the nerves and causing pain
and discomfort, which is probably
nermarent. As a result of his injuries, he cannot stoop and lift heavy
objects. He is subject to dizziness

10
and experiences difficulty in maintaining his equilibrium; suffers frequent headaches, and his earning
capacity has been considerably reduced. He is unable to follow his
occupation of lineman. In view of the
facts disclosed, we are unable to
agree with defendant that the court
can say, as a matter of law, that the
recovery is excessive.
Prejudicial error has not been
found. The judgment is
AFFIRMED.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL

Heard before Goss, C. J., Dean,
and Paine, JJ., and Broady and
Rhoades, District Judges.
RHOADES, District Judge.
The plaintiffs, Lewis H. Bergfield
and Viola Bergfield, herein designated as appellants, commenced this
action against their brother, Charles
Bergfield and other children and
grandchildren of their mother Henrietta Bergfield, who died intestate
December Z8, 1929, the prayer of
their petition being for partition of
an 80-acre farm of which their mother held the record title at the time
of her death. The defendant, Charles
HERGFIELD v. BERGFIELD
Bergfield, herein designated as appellee, answered admitting the relaFiled November 10, 1932.
28134
tionship of the parties, and generally
Appeal. Webster county; James, denying the other allegations of the
Judge.
petition, and by way of crosspetition
alleged that in the year 1912 his moA ffir med.
ther was a widow then 67 years of
age, having in her care a mentally
Fred E. Maurer; F. J. Munday (Red
incompetent
granddaughter, a n d
Cloud) for plaintiff, appellant.
Bernard McNeny; L. A. Sprague; possessing no property or means
with which to support herself and
J. S. Gilham (Red Cloud) for defendthe granddaughter; that appellee, the
ant, appellee.
youngest child, was then living on
Fred E. Maurer; F. J. Munday (Red
and farming the place for his moCloud) for Coleman, impleaded appel- ther, all of the other children havlant.
ing left the home; that in the year
Bernard MeNeny; L. A. Sprague; 1912 and while so situated the moJ. S. Gilham (Red Cloud) for appel- ther made an oral contract and agreelees.
ment with appellee by which she
promised that, if appellee would continue to live with her, make a home
(SYLLABUS)
for and support her and assist in
I. Sectioh 20-1202, Comp. St. 1929, taking care of the incompetent grandwhich excludes as incompetent, with
daughter, she would deed or will the
certain specified exceptions, testi- farm to appellee; that appellee, remony of one with direct legal interest lying thereon, fully performed said
in tIie? result of the action concerning
agreement during his mother's lifetransactions and conversations betime and still continues to support
tween the witness and the deceased
the child; that appellee has been in
person, against the representative
continuous possession of the farm
thereof, does not apply where the ever since, paid all taxes thereon and
transaction or conversation was be- improved same. Appellee further
tween a third party and a deceased
states in detail the services rendered
person and not between the latter and
and expenses incurred by him in rethe Ns itne:;s. in which the witness took
liance upon his mother's said promise
no part.
and agreement; that he kept no ac2. Testimony relating to a conver- count of such services, expenses or
improvements, but that same would
,ation between witness and deceased
is inadmissible where such witness in the aggregate greatly exceed the
value of the farm; that appellee's
has a direct legal interest in the acmother neglected to make a will or
tion, and the provisions of the statute
are not waived by the introduction of deed as agreed. Appellee prayed for
specific performance of the oral contestimony relative to transactions and
conversations had between the de- tiact and that the title to said farm
ceased and other witnesses that do be vested in him and quieted against
all the parties.
not relate to the conversation and
Appellants' reply alleged that in
transaction narrated by witness for
about the year 1907 the mother set
the opposing party.
appellee up in farming .and leased
3. Error may not be predicated
the farm to him on shares, which arupon the exclusion of testimony
rangement continued until the mosought on direct examination, where
ther's death; that the mother, and
no offer of proof was made and the
questions asked did not clearly indi- from 1913 to 1926 an incompetent
cate the materiality of the answers sister of appellee, did all the housework and some outside work for apsought.
pellee; and denied generally the al1. Although appellee was a tenant
legations of the cross-petition.
of deceased for a number of years and
A default on the cross-petition of
thereafter both lived on the farm unCharles Bergfield was duly entered
til the mother's death, the rule that against some twelve of the children
a tenant cannot deny his landlord's
and grand-children of Henrietta
title is not applicable. Appellee's Bergfield who were made defendants,
claim of right to specific performance
and a trial was had as to the other
after death is entirely consistent with
parties to the action, resulting in a
his tenancy during her lifetime.
finding in favor of the appellee on
5. Evidence examined and HELD
his answer and crosspetition, and the
sufficient to sustain the decree.
title to the farm was decreed to be

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

in him and quieted as against all
other parties.
1. Appellants' first assignment relates to the ruling of the trial court
by which one of the defendants,
Emma Revel, a daughter of the deceased, when called as a witness for
the appellee, was permitted to testify
as to conversations had between the
deceased and appellee, the objection
being that the prohibition of section
20-1202, Comp. St. 1929, was thereby
violated. The second assignment relates to similar testimony given by
Anna Bergfield, another daughter of
deceased who was also called as a
witness for appellee.
The statute provides: "No person
having a direct legal interest in the
result of any civil action or proceeding, when the adverse party is the
representative of a deceased person,
shall be permitted to testify to any
transaction or conversation had between the deceased person and the
witness," etc.
The testimony of
Emma Revel, given over this objection, clearly shows that the conversation about which she testified was
between the deceased and appellee,
rather than between deceased and
the witness, and that the other witness, Anna Bergfield, was also present, and the answer of Anna Bergfield to which the objection was interposed concluded with the statement "And I have heard my brother
Charles (appellee ,herein) and my
mother talk the matter over several
times since the year 1912."
In Kroh v. Heins, 48 Neb. 691, 67
N. W. 771, 774, Judge Norval, in
referring to the statute in question,
said: "It merely excludes proof of
transactions and conversations between the witness and the deceased.
The provisions of section 329 do not
apply where the transaction or conversation was not between the witness and the decedent, but between
the latter and a third person." To
the same effect are Hajek v. Hajek,
108 Neb. 503, 188 N. W. 181, Warnick v. Warnick, 107 Neb. 747, 187
N. W. 51, and other cases. In the
last mentioned case it is said: "It
is probable that Elizabeth Warnick
took part in some of the conversations
concerning which she testified; but
the record also shows that she took
no part in many of the conversations
as to which her testimony related.
* * * Although the witness may have
a direct legal interest in the result
of a suit, still he is a competent witness against th2 representative of a
deceased person as to any conversation between the deceased and a
third person, in which the witness
took no part." Applying this rule
to the instant case, it is apparent
that the testimony of these two witnesses was not violative of the
statute.
2. Appellants' third and fourth assignments relate to the action of the
trial court in excluding testimony of
Lewis H. Bergfield and Herman Bergfield, both appellants herein, as tel
their conversations with deceased
with reference to the oral agreement
and transaction between their mother
and appellee, the claim being that,

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL •
although these witnesses had a direct
legal interest in the result of the
action, their testimony comes within
the exemption of the statute and was
admissible after the transaction and
agreement was shown by appellee's
witnesses Emma Revel and Anna
Bergfield.
The record shows that neither of
these witnesses were present at the
time of the making of the oral agreement between appellee and his mother. The trial court did not err in
excluding appellant's proferred testimony of a witness having a direct
legal interest in the action, such testimony relating to a conversation between witness and, deceased. The
fact that appellee had produced testimony of a witness as to a transaction and conversation between appellee and deceased does not constitute
a waiver under the terms of section
20%1202, Comp. St. 1929, because
there was no transaction between
appellants' witnesses and the deceased, and the conversation offered
was not the same conversation nor
between the same persons as that
related by appellee's witnesses. The
transaction which is the subject of
this action was between the deceased
person and the appellee. The provision of the statute which appellants
claim constitutes a waiver and rendered the testimony of these witnesses
admissible because appellee's witnesses had previously testified regarding the transaction or conversation is not applicable because the
transaction was not "between the deceased person and the witness."
Neither is it applicable to the conversation "between the deceased person and the witness" because appellee had not introduced any witness
who had testified regarding such
conversation, but on the other hand
had introduced witnesses who had
testified to conversations between the
deceased person and the appellee.
Hence, none of the cases cited by
appellants on this question of waiver
as applied to this proferred testimony
are in point.
3. Furthermore, the record before
us fails to show any offer of proof
made by appellants. This court will
not indulge in speculation or inference as to what answers might have
been made to questions propounded
on the direct examination of a witness where no offer of proof is made
by the party calling the witness. Appellants may not predicate error upon
the exclusion of testimony where no
offer of proof was made. Barr 'v.
City of Omaha, 42 Neb. 841, 60 N. W.
591. Mordhorst v. Nebraska Telenhone Co., 28 Neb. 610. 44 N. W. 469;
Metzger v. Royal Neighbors of America, 86 Neb. 61, 124 N. W. 913. The


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

questions asked did not clearly indicate the materiality of the answers
sought. The record affirmatively
shows the contrary. Questions 451
and 452 were as follows: "451 Q.
And do you know the nature of the
agreement that your mother made
with him when he got there? A. I
do. She told me— 452 Q. What was
it?" This was objected to as incompetent and hearsay and the obThe undisputed
jection sustained.
evidence is that appellee went to live
on his mother's farm in 1907, and
that the oral agreement between appellee and his mother was not made
until the year 1912, and it is adj
mitted that during the 5 years intervening appellee occupied the farm
as a tenant of his mother; hence, the
proferred testimony was wholly immaterial. As regards the proferred
testimony of Herman Bergfield, question 537 is the only one referred to
in the assignment, and that question
was fully answered, and both the
question and the answer referred to
the terms upon which appellee went
onto the farm in 1907. It not being
shown, either by the question or by
any other offer of proof, that either
of the proffered witnesses could have
given any testimony material to the
oral agreement between appellee and
his mother, claimed by appellee to
have been made in 1912, no prejudicial
error is shown in the trial court's
rulings.
4. Appellants' fifth assignment is
based upon the claim that, appellee
having entered into possession of the
farm as a tenant, he is now estopped
to assert a claim of ownership thereto without proof that he surrendered
possession to his landlord. We see
in this case no reason for the application of the rule that a tenant cannot deny his landlord's title. The
fact that appellee is shown to have
been a tenant of his mother from
1907 to 1912, and during that time
and thereafter both lived on the farm
until the mother's death, is not inconsistent with appellee's claim of
title after his mother's death, but is
entirely consistent with such claim.
Appellee would not have been prevented from asserting ownership of
the farm if his mother had actually
conveyed same to him by deed during
her lifetime, or from taking and asserting title thereto by devise from
his mother. It follows, therefore,
that specific performance of the motheris oral contract may be decreed
by the court without violating the
rule. The application of the rule in
the cases cited by counsel for appellants was unon the theory that the
possession of the tenant could not
ripen into a title adverse to his landlord or confer any right whatever

'1 t

upon the tenant in and of itself unless
the tenant either yielded up his possession as tenant, or by an unequivocal act asserted a right of possession
inconsistent with his tenancy. In the
instant case the appellee is not claiming or asserting any title by virtue of
his possession of the land. His claim
of title after his mother's death, in
fulfilment of the oral contract, is
entirely consistent with his tenancy
during his mother's lifetime.
5. The remaining assignments of
error relate to the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the oral contract
of the mother to deed or will the
farm to appellee, and in the consideration of this question we are mindful of the well-established rule that
the evidence necessary to warrant
specific performance of such a contract must be clear and convincing.
The making of the agreement is
established by the direct testimony
of two witnesses. Emma Revel, a
daughter of Henrietta Bergfield, testified: "I think it was in the year
1912 that my mother made an agreement in the presence of myself and
my brother Charles and my sister
Anna, that if he would take care of
her and provide well for her as long
as, until her death, that she would
either deed him the land or make a
will that he should have the land or
property that she left at her, death."
This testimony was corroborated by
the testimony of Anna Bergfield, another daughter, who further said:
"I have heard my brother Charles
and my mother talk the matter over
several times since the year 1912."
James P. Doyle, who lived on a
farm four miles from the Bergfield
place, and was intimately acquainted
with appellee and his mother, testified that the mother told him that
she had agreed to give the place to
aDpellee. William N. Kreps, an implement dealer in the nearby town.
from whom appellee bought a windmill for the farm, testified that the
Mother said to him: "I gave him
(appellee) the place and if he wants
to improve it let him go ahead and
improve it. I gave him the place."
Henry Huselbusch, another farmer
living two miles from the Bergfield
farm, testified that the mother told
him that "she wanted Charles titt have
the place, and that she had neglected
to deed it to him." These, and other
witnesses, testified as to the care
which appellee took of his mother
and the pleasant relations between
the mother and son.
In a trial de novo, we find the
evidence in the record fully justifies
the decree entered by the trial court.
and the same is therefore
AFFIRMED.

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT JOURNAL

CITATIONS-NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION
(Cumulative from August 23, 1932)
Case Vol No Pg
Art. I, sec. 11, Kissinger v State
123 Neb__28291__2__ 4__ 2
Art. I, Sec. 21 Omaha Life Ins. Co. v Gering & Ft. Laramie
Irrig. Dist.
123 Neb._-28246__2__ 1__ 2
Art. I. sec. 24 of Bill of Rights—Paper v Galbreth
123 Neb__28263__2__ 3__ 4

CITATIONS-1929 COMPILED STATUTES
(Cumulative from August 23, 1932)
Case Vol No Pg
16-106 Waubonsie Bridge Co. v City of Nebraska City ____ 123 Neb__28465__2__ 3__ 1
17-517 Union Nat. Bank of Fremont v Village of Beemer _ 123 Neb.__27956__2__ 1__ 3
17-528 Union Nat. Bank of Fremont v Village of Beemer _ 123 Neb__27956__2__ 1__ 3
17-540 Union Nat. Bank of Fremont v Village of Beemer _ 123 Neb__27956__2__ 1__ 3
20-202 Parkin v Parkin
123 Neb__28261__2__ 3__ 3
20-303 Union Nat. Bank v Village of Beemer
123 Neb__27956__2__ 1__ 3
20-1109 Wiegand v Lincoln Traction Co
123 Neb__28321__2__ 1__ 5
20-1142 Wiegand v Lincoln Traction Co
123 Neb__28321__2__ 1__ 5
20-1202 Wright v Wilds
123 Neb__28279__2__ 5__ 3
20-1214 Shaffer v State
123 Neb__28301__2__ 5__ 1
20-1214 Wiegand v Lincoln Traction Co
123 Neb__28321__2__ 1__ 5
20-1313 Wiegand v Lincoln Traction Co
123 Neb__28321__2__ 1__ 5
20-1314 Hamaker v Patrick '
123 Neb27986__2_- 2__ 6
20-1315 Hamaker v Patrick
123 Neb__27986__2__ 2__ 6
20-1912 Wiegand v Lincoln Traction Co
123 Neb__28321__2__ 1__ 5
20-1914 Paper v Galbreth
123 Neb__282632__ 3__ 4
20-1919 Hamaker v Patrick
123 Neb__27986__2__ 2__ 6
20-2225 Hamaker v Patrick
123 Neb__27986__2__ 2__ 6
28-410 Duffey v State
123 Neb__28329__2__ 5__ 6
29-2101 Duffey v State
123 Neb__28329__2__ 5__ 6
29-2308 Lillard v State
123 Neb__28274__2__ 3__ 2
46-132 Omaha Life Ins Co v Gering & Ft. Laramie Irrig.
Dist.
123 Neb__28246__2__ 1__ 2
48-115 (dissenting opinion) Cole v Minnick
123 Neb__28362__2__ 4__ 4
48-120 Wingate v Evans Model Laundry
123 Neb__28553__2__ 3__ 4
48-121 Miller v Central Coal & Coke Co.
123 Neb.__28462__2__ 2__ 3
48-126 Maryland Casualty Co v Geary
123 Neb__285222__ 4__ 7
48-133 Flesch v Phillips Petroleum Co.
123 Neb__285442__ 5__ 2
48-133 Samland v Ford Motor Co
123 Neb__28510__2__ 2__ 8
48-138 Samland v Ford Motor Co
123 Neb__28510__2__ 2__ 8
52-201 (dissenting opinion). Cole v Minnick
123 Neb__28362__2__ 4__ 4
68-109 Fiehn v State
123 Neb__28319__2__ 5__ 4
76-808 Kissinger v State
123 Neb__28291__2__ 4__ 2
77-1612 Rosenbery v County of Douglas
123 Neb__28423__2__ 2__ 2


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Nr,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

rr

Changing Conditions
Present Many Problems
Today's constant shifting and changing of conditions
expose the uninformed lawyer to dangers he cannot
foresee.
His only salvation lies in the use of a service which
is based on accurate up-to-date reports that disclose
the trend of a case or statute.
These requisites are provided by Shepard's Citations
with a speed, accuracy and economy of operation that
enable its subscribers to keep pace with the rapid and
sometimes radical changes of the courts and lawmaking bodies.
Through the medium of this service the pertinent
facts are immediately available. To obtain the history
of a case or statute is but a routine matter.

THE FRANK SHEPARD COMPANY
76-88 Lafayette Street
New York

DIGEST
(Continued from front of cover.)
Case Vol No Pg
282752__ 6__
—harmless error in auto damage case
—error may not he predicated upon the exclusion of testimony sought on direct examination, where no offer of
proof was made and the questions asked did not clearly
28134__2__ 6__10
indicate the materiality of the answers sought
Automobile Damages—regulating travel on highway—speed—intersection—state laws—driver's view obstructed—distance of
view and rule—right of way—damages—accident caused by
servant of defendant—burden of proof—judicial notice of
28276_2_ 6__ 5
rules—commands of law
—personal injuries—recovering for medical and hospital
expenses—allegations in petition to warrant recovery on
brain affection—what is joint enterprise—guest not contributing to operation of car and has different purpose and
destination and no control over driver—harmless error—
28275_ _2_ _ 6_ _ 8
diminution of earning capacity
Banks and Banking—legislative act to provide for guaranty fund by
assessments under the police power—depositors final settlement fund act—assessing future solvent banks to pay losses
in failed banks—taking property without due process of
law—public purpose sufficient for exercise of police
power—aid of provision expressing legislative intent
police regulation—effect of decision of U. S. Supreme
28303_2_ 6_ 1
Court—history of Nebraska's Guaranty Fund Law
Contract—one may not maintain an action on a contract to which
he is not a party unless made for his benefit or for a class
28300__2__ 6__ 1
in which he is included
28134__2__ 6__10
—specific performance of oral contract
Courts—effect of a decision of U. S. Supreme Court on state supreme
court—changing conditions—construing legislative intent—
judicial interpretation—rule as to provision expressing leg28303__2__ 6__ 1
islative intent—power of court to amend a legislative act
—directing a verdict against a party when there is some
28276__2__ 6__ 5
evidence to support the claim
Damages—for personal injuries in automobile accident, see Automobile Damages.
Due Process of Law—as a limitation of—legislative enactments—
28303_2_ 6__
police power—taking private property for private use
Estoppel—rule where tenant is estopped from denying his land28134_ _2_ _ 6__10
lord's title—specific performance of oral contract
Evidence—in a law action, controverted facts are for jury—evidence
28275_2__ 6__ 8
on diminution of earning capacity
—testifying as to the witness's and as to a third party's
conversations or transactions with deceased person when
28134__2__ 6_10
witness has an interest in the result of the action
Excessive Verdicts—rule in damages for personal injuries in auto
28275__2__ 6__
accident
Guaranty Fund—see Banks and Banking.
Ifighwart—regulating travel—speed of autos—intersections—right
side of road—right of way—judicial notice of rules—corn28276__2__ 6__ 5
mantis of law
Landlord and Tenant—rule that tenant cannot deny his landlord's
title not applicable in this case—right to specific perform281342__ 6__10
ance after death consistent with tenancy
Legislative Enactments—power of court to amend an act—public
purpose sufficient for exercise of police power—aid of
provision expressing legislative intent—rule adopted—
taking- private pronerty for private use—enactments replac28303_2_ 6_ T
ing old laws—authority of legislature
-when they take effect—regulating uniformity of driving
28276_2_ 6_ 5
vehicles unon highway
Pleadings—allegations in petition for damages for personal ing
28275_.2_ _
juries to warrant recovery on brain affection
Police Power—proper exercise of—taking private property for pri28303__2__ 6_
vate use
Property—taking property without due process of law—legislative
28303__2__ 6-- 1
intent
Specific Performance—oral contract to convey land—adverse pos28134 2 fI
session—tenant denying his landlord's title


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis