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SUMMARY OF STA13MENTB
By
Marriner S. Eccles
Oil
THE BAMING BILL OF 1935

Page 18 - Elipibility for Discount
w

It is proposed to give the Federal Reserve Board authority
by regulation to determine tiie character of paper that may be
eligible as a basis for borrowing at the Federal Reserve banks.
This is particularly important at this time because it would encourage member banks to pay less attention to the form and maturity
of paper that is offered by would-be borrowers and to concentrate
their attention on the soundness of such paper. . .
"What is proposed, is not, as has been sometimes alleged, a
policy of opening the doors of the Federal Reserve banks to all
kinds of paper, regardless of its soundness. On the contrary, it
is proposed to place emphasis on soundness rather than on the
technical form of the paper that is presented. "
Page 21
rt

. . .As soon as the Energency Banking Act of 1935 permitted
the banks, both member and nonmember,to get credit in the form of
currency from the Reserve banks upon all of their sound assets, the
people of the country no longer wanted their deposits in currency.
The currency began to come back into the banks and deposits in
banks increased.
"Many of the assets considered eligible and held to be liquid
were less sound than other assets held by banks which could not
qualify for rediscount or as security for borrowing from the Reserve
banks.
n

An asset that may be considered sound and liquid when business
is active and there is a high rate of employment and national income
is large, may become frozen and unsound if the national income diminishes. Liquidity and soundness are not determined merely by
the substance of a loan or asset at the time the asset is purchased
or the loan is made; they depend upon the state of trade and business
which follows."



-2-

Summary of statements on
Banking Bill of 1935 - by
M. S. Eccles

Page 22
"It is up to the banking system in so far as it ie possible, to
maintain a state of trade and business that will preserve soundness•
"To the extent that forced deflation through forced credit contraction is obviated through making available the discount facilities of
the Reserve banks—to that extent liquidity is provided. The only
liquidity that really exists in a serious depression is the liquidity
that is provided through the money-issuing agency, the Federal Reserve
banks."
Page 51 - Real Estate Loans
"The fact that bonds are listed and, therefore, are supposed to be
marketable, is considered a justification for the investment of funds
in bonds in preference to real estate loans. The depression proved
that during a period of deflation a ready market for bonds existed only
at prices that bankrupted the banks,if they were forced to sell. More
banks became insolvent as a result of the depreciation of their bond
accounts than as the result of their real estate loans. The fact that
bonds were listed and were greatly depreciated put the banks into a
condition of insolvency when they were examined, because of the differenc
between the quoted market price and the cost; whereas in the case of real
estate loans it was not expected that there should be a ready market for
them, and so long as they were not in default, they were valued according
to the amount loaned.
"If we want to be so restrictive in the matter of real estate loans,
because they represent long-term investments of funds which may be withdrawn on demand, we should also be restrictive with reference to other
long-term investments. Either the banks holding $10,000,000,000 of time
funds must lose those funds to the savings and loan associations, to
mutual savings banks, or to similar agencies, or they must be permitted
to use the time funds in the long-term investment field."
/




MONETARY PROBLEMS OF RECOVERY
Address of Marriner S. Eccles, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board,
before Annual Midwinter Meeting of the Ohio Bankers Association,
at Columbus, Ohio, February IS, 1935„

"Banks in this country perform two main services. They act as
middlemen for the investment of a substantial portion of the community's savings, and, through the provision of checking facilities,
they supply the bulk of the community1s means of payment. So far
as the investment of savings is concerned, a large degree of local
autonomy should be left with the individual bankers. The state
should lay down minimum standards to be observed in the interests of
protecting savings of individuals, but these standards can only be
minima, and chief reliance for the safe investment of the community's
savings must rest on the judgment arid knowledge of the individual
banker."
P. 16
"The restriction of the rediscounting privilege to a particular
and narrowly restricted type of bank loan is in accordance with a
theory of reserve banking which I think we have now outgrown. The
major task of the Reserve Administration is not to encourage the extension of a particular type of loan. The restriction of the borrowing privilege to commercial loans has no connection with regulation
of the volume of bank credit or of the access to the Reserve banks. . .
"Hence, the elimination of technical restrictions on eligibility
does not involve any danger of excessive use of Reserve bank facilities.
But it does enable the Reserve banks to come to the assistance of banks
who may have sound assets but may be devoid of eligible paper. For the
emergency such a provision was made by the Glass-Steagall Act, but not
until great harm had resulted from the inability of the member banks
to receive help from the Reserve banks in the emergency."
P. 17
". . # I refer to the provision permitting banks to make loans on
improved real estate up to 75 percent of its appraised value and on an
amortization basis for a twenty-year period, and in an aggregate amount
up to 60 percent of their time deposits.
"It has been asserted that this is an invitation to banks to make
loans of a character that does not conform to sound banking principles



-2-

Address by Chairman Eccles
before Annual Midwinter Meeting
of Ohio Bankers Association, Feb, 12, 1955

P. 17 (contd.)
or standards. The collapse of real estate values is cited as an
illustration of the dangers associated with such loans. It is constantly stated that the troubles of our banking system were due entirely to the acquisition of long-term assets by the banks. It is
suggested that banks in the future should confine themselves to shortdated commercial loans and investments. But I need not tell you that,
if this suggestion were acted upon, the result would be fatal to the
banks. In October 1934, the eligible paper of member banks, within
the meaning of the Federal Reserve Act, amounted to only slightly more
than two billion dollars. . . n
PP. 18 and 19
"I am fully aware of the fear with which bankers view the extension
of other lending agencies and the uneasiness they feel at having to rely
more and more on holdings of Government obligations to keep up their
income. I might point out, however, that these developments are a consequence of the failure of the banking system to perform its functions
adequately. If the banking system would utilize in real estate loans
and other long-term investments the savings and excess funds that it
now possesses, business activity would be greatly stimulated, and the
Government would then be able to withdraw rapidly from the lending field
* *m
I am, you will carefully note, criticizing the banking system and
not the bankers as individuals. I do not see how you as individual bank
ers, having to secure liquidity alone and unaided, could safely have
followed a different lending policy than you did.
n

"This, then, is the dilemma that faces the banks. If they go into
the longer term lending business, they run the risk of depreciation and
of inability to realize quickly upon their assets in case of need. If
they do not go into this business, they cannot find an outlet for their
funds. Their earnings xrill suffer and the justification for their
existence diminishes. How can this dilemma be solved? It is proposed
in the bill to solve it by removing the problem of liquidity as such
from the concern of the banks, by bestowing liquidity on all sound
assets through making them eligible as a basis of borrowing at the
Reserve banks in case of need. This will enable the banks to concentrate their effort on keeping their assets sound and to pay less
attention to their form and maturity.




Address by Chairman Eccles
before Annual Midwinter Meeting
of Ohio Bankers Association, Feb. IS, 1955

Pp. 18 and 19 (contd.)
"Reliance on the form of paper as a guide to soundness and
eligibility has not protected the banking system from disaster. We
wish to divert bankers1 attention from the semblance of paper to its
substance; to emphasise soundness, rather than liquidity. To require
that a real estate loan shall be repaid in five years, as the present
law requires, does not even improve liquidity but rather, through the
excessive strain it places on the borrower, acts to promote foreclosures
and insolvency*

\

"V/hat we are proposing is that the problem of liquidity shall cease
to be an individual concern and shall become the collective concern of
the banking system. A single bank which adopts a policy calculated to
pay off all of its deposits at a moment's notice, even though the national
income is cut in two, cannot adequately perform its duty of serving its
community. Since good local loans go bad when a depression sets in, the
bank's portfolio would have to consist of super-liquid open-market paper.
What we want to accomplish is to make it possible for banks, without
abandoning prudence or care, to meet local needs both for short and for
long time funds + We want to make all sound assets liquid by making them
rediscountable at the Reserve banks, and then to use the powers of monetary control in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of national conditions which result in radical declines of national income, in the
freezing of all bank assets whether they are technically in liquid form
or not, and in general unemployment and destitution. . . w




THE BANKING BILL OF 1955
Address by Marriner S. Eccles, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board
before the Annual Convention of Pa. Bankers Association at
Scranton, Pa., June 5, 1935

Pp, 17 and 18
"Another line of criticism of the banking bill is that it would
result in a deterioration of the quality of banking assets. On this
ground proposed changes in the eligibility and real estate provisions
are attacked. The first point to be mentioned in this connection is
one that I, from my experience in banking, have well in mind. It
is that no matter how desirable short, self-liquidating commercial
loans may be, they are not available in sufficient quantity to afford
an adequate outlet for the banks' funds.
* # *
n

. . .If banks are to make a living and serve the borrowing needs
of their communities, they must make longer-term loans. If they are
to be permitted to accept savings deposits, they should also be permitted
to make real estate loans under proper safeguards. We are simply
recognizing hard facts, and are endeavoring to make it as safe as possible
for banks to serve adequately their own interests and the interests of
their communities. We most emphatically are not proposing that banks
should make poor loans. For the first time it is proposed to write the
phrase, fsound assets,* into the Federal Reserve Act, and if experience
means anything, assets will have to be sound before the Reserve banks will
accept them as collateral for advances.
n

As bankers, I should think that you would heartily approve a step
which looks toward the substance rather than the form of loans; to their
quality, rather than to their maturity, I recently had occasion to have
an examination made of the form of the assets of all national banks
that were suspended in the years 1930-1932, and discovered that on the
call dates immediately prior to suspension, real estate loans comprised
only 11 percent of total loans and investments; securities held, 30 percent; loans on securities, 18 percent; and all other loans, 41 percent.
The bulk of the latter was nominally short-term. It is obvious that a
large proportion of paper that is in form short-time commercial paper
does not protect the solvency of a bank."




THE CURRENT HJSIEESS M D ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Address by Marriner S. Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, before the Ifew Jersey Bankers Association
Convention in Atlantic City, May 15, 1938

P.

22

"Banks can assist in restoring prosperity by affording every
possible constructive aid to the revival of sound private financing,
and in adapting the lending functions of the banking system to presentday conditions. Federal and state bank examination policies, as well
as the Comptroller's regulation governing investment policy, need to
be brought into conformity with changed conditions and modern requirements of business and industry. Bankers cannot justly be held responsible
for such restrictive governmental banking policies as confuse soundness
with liquidity or true worth with current depressed market values. I
favor modernization of these practices and regulations, to encourage the
bankers to meet changed credit conditions and needs within their own communities,
and thus to discourage the alternative which is multiplication of governmental
agencies set up to provide credit accommodation that the banking community
could and should in normal times be adapted to extend to the public. That
accords with my fundamental view that the responsibility of government banking and monetary agencies is to assist the banks to function in the most
efficient way to serve the public interest."