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CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY OF SPECIAL REPORTS ON LOANS TO COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BUSINESSES Y.ITF MATURITIES OF ONE YEAR OR MORE, SUBMITTED BY
WEEKLY REPORTING MEMBER BANKS IN 101 LEADING CITIES
(Preliminary)

June 1 ,

1939

I t should be bcrne in mind that the reports cover only such loans
as are represented by notes with maturities of one year or more; they do
not include advances on notes given f o r shorter periods or on demand notes
even i f the banks and the borrowers have an understanding t h a t , in the
absence of unforeseen developments, the advances w i l l be extended for periods
of a year or more. Furthermore, t h i s i s the f i r s t time data of t h i s type
have been asked f o r , and i t is quite probable that a l l of the banks have not
interpreted the questionnaire uniformly* One large bank stated that i t was
impracticable f o r i t to segregate i t s small business loans from other loans
made by the personal loan department. If other banks had the same d i f f i c u l t y
the number of loans as reported may be considerably understated.
It i s
b e l i e v e d , however, that the d o l l a r amount of loans as reported represents a
f a i r picture of the volume of loans extended t o commercial and industrial
businesses on notes with maturities of one year or more.
NUMBER AMD ORIGINAL OR FACE AMOUNT OF LOANS TO COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BUSINESSES ITF MATURITIES OF ONE YEAR OR MORS HELD ON APRIL 19. 1939*
BY ABOUT UOO WEEKLY REPORTING MEMBER BANKS IN 101 LEADING CITIES
Number
of loans
Installment loans
Non-installment loans
Total
Size of loans;
Less than $100,000
$100,000 t o $999,909
$1,000,000 and over
Maturities of loans:
1 year or more but less
than 3 years
3 years or more

Amount

21,800
2,800

$950,000,000
Ii.60,000,000

2l<,600

1,L10,000,000

22,600

170,000,000
ij.50,000,000
790,000,000

113,000

l.]20,000,000
990,000,000

1,700
300

6,600

Examination of the reports and data compiled therefrom shows that —
1. Of the t o t a l commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , and a g r i c u l t u r a l loans of
weekly reporting member banks outstanding on April 19, 1939, nearly $1,000,000000 or about 25 por cent had a maturity when o r i g i n a l l y iiiade of one year or
more. In a d d i t i o n the banks held on the same date about $175,000,000 of loans
secured by r e a l estate made t o commercial and i n d u s t r i a l businesses.




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2« The o r i g i n a l or f a c e amount of these intermediate and l o n g term loans to commercial and i n d u s t r i a l businesses was $1,1.1.00,000,000. Of
t h i s t o t a l , somewhat more than 50 per cent represented loans made by New
York City banks; in f a c t , 6 banks in New York and 6 outside of New York
accounted f o r $860,000,000 of the t o t a l .
3. Of the approximately I4-OO weekly reporting banks, 65 reported
no intermediate or long-term loans t o commercial or i n d u s t r i a l businesses,
and 70 reported l e s s than 5 such l o a n s . As p r e v i o u s l y pointed out, however,
some of the banks have extended a s u b s t a n t i a l volume of such c r e d i t on the
b a s i s of demand or short-term n o t e s .
II. The t o t a l number of intermediate and long-term loans reported
by the weekly r e p o r t i n g banks was approximately 2i).,600. Of t h i s t o t a l , L\0
per cent represents loans by the 9 banks which reported 500 or more loans.
The i n d i c a t e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n in the number of loans doubtless i s due in part
t o d i f f e r e n c e s in methods of reporting"". Some banks, f o r example, may have
considered that a l l notes discounted under a s i n g l e l i n e of c r e d i t c o n s t i t u ted one loan, while other banks counted each customer's, note discounted f o r
a borrower as a separate loan. At l e a s t one bank, a l s o , excluded small
business loans made through i t s personal loan department.
5. Of the 2lj,600 intermediate and long-term l o a n s , about 22,600
amounting t o $170,000,000 were f o r l e s s than $100,000 each, approximately
1,700 amounting t o $[£0,000,000 were f o r $100,000 or more but l e s s than
$1,000,000, and about 300 loans amounting t o $790,000,000 were f o r $1,000,000
or more.
6. The average s i z e of the loans in the group of loans of l e s s than
$100,000 each was $7,000, and ranged from $[j00 t o $20,000 at the 9 banks
which reported 1>0 per cent of these l o a n s .
7 . About 75 per cent of the t o t a l number of intermediate and. l o n g term loans t o commercial and i n d u s t r i a l businesses matured in l e s s than three
y e a r s , but measured in d o l l a r s only 30 per cent matured in l e s s than three
y e a r s . At New York banks, about 50 per cent of the number and 25 per cent of
the d o l l a r amount had maturities of l e s s than three y e a r s . Apparently the
large l o a n s , made mostly by the New York banks, are f o r longer maturities
than the small loans made mostly by banks outside of New York.
8. Approximately 90 per cent of the t o t a l number and 67 per cent of
the d o l l a r amount of loans wore made on an installment or amortization b a s i s .
9* About 800 of the loans wore made in p a r t i c i p a t i o n with other
banks (some apparently in p a r t i c i p a t i o n with the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Finance
Corporation or the Federal Reserve banks).
10. Approximately 100 of the 1;00 weekly r e p o r t i n g banks ansv/ercd
a f f i r m a t i v e l y the question whether or not they knew of any commercial or i n d u s t r i a l b u s i n e s s e s , in the t e r r i t o r i e s served by the r e s p e c t i v e banks, which
had requested but were unable t o obtain intermediate or long-term c r e d i t f o r
working c a p i t a l or other purposes. Nearly a l l of these 100 banks indicated
that there was no reasonable- basis f o r bank c r e d i t in the cases coming t o
t h e i r a t t e n t i o n and that what was needed in most cases was equity c a p i t a l .
Poor earnings and unfavorable prospects were the p r i n c i p a l reasons given why
bank c r e d i t could not be extended.
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