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y

ar THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Office Correspondence
Xo

Chairmen Eccles

pynm

Smile Despres

Date October ?ot
Subject:

You may find the attached two items on gold of interest.

ft)




Form F. R. 131
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
or THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

j f f i c e Correspondence
To

Chairman Bccles

From

Emile Despres

Date c^er 19. 1939
Subject:

ITote on Gold

On thinking over our discussion of Wednesday, I airstrongly inclined to believe that i t would be most umrise to
suggest at this time any spectacular action with respect to
gold, such as a cessation of gold purchases. In the f i r s t
place, unless we had a fully developed spending program to
take i t s place and were confident of being able to put the
program through, cessation of gold purchases would have a substantial depressing effect on our internal economy. Our e;cport
surplus averaged about £100,000,000 a month during 193§ s^cl
about $55,000,000 a month during the f i r s t eight months of t h i s
year.
In the second place, i t seens to me unlikely that the
President would give serious consideration at this time to any
proposed measure which vrould substantially impair the ability
of Great Britain and France to obtain American goods.
In the third place, cessation of gold purchases would
anount to a virtual admission by the Administration that we are
stuck with the gold we have, and the internal political effects
of such an admission make action of t h i s sort impracticable on
these grounds.
Your objective of eventually achieving a rational gold
policy would best be served, in my judgment, by merely proposing
at this time that we quietly and informally ask the British and
French Governments that, so far as possible, they finance their
purchases of goods from us through the sale in the United States
of income producing assets, and that they try to keep their sales
of gold to us within reasonable limits. First, such a step would
not interfere with British and French purchases in t h i s country and,
in fact, would help to assure Britain and FrBnch access to .American
supplies. There is a widespread popular feeling in this country that
we are getting stuck when we exchange our goods for useless gold,
and the public's attitude towards British and French purchases here




-2-

n
be far more favorable if these purchases were being financed
through the sale to us of income producing assets. The prevalence
of t h i s sentiment is revealed in the many wisecracks about digging
gold out of a hole in South .Africa and burying i t in a hole in
Kentucky* To the average person, selling our goods in exchange
for gold seems only slightly less foolish than selling on long
term credit, (if you wish to use this point, i t seems to me highly
important to make i t clear that you are merely describing the
temper of popular opinion. The effectiveness of your argument
would be greatly weakened if the impression vrere given that you
were expressing your own opposition to our supplying economic aid
to Great Eritain and Fraice. )
Second, our chances of not getting stuck with the gold
we already have will be somewhat improved if we ask Great Britain
and France to sell us their earning assets f i r s t and to regard
their gold holdings as a last reserve. If these countries, which
together hold nearly half of the monetary gold outside the United
States, dispose of the bulk of their holdings during the course of
a prolonged war, the prospects of a return to soire form of international gold standard will be slight. After the close of the
war, their need for .American goods in connection with their OTjn
reconstruction will be much more urgent than their need for gold,
and there can be l i t t l e doubt that they will develop a monetary
system liiieh obviates the use of gold. If, on the other hand, these
countries retain a portion of their gold reserves, their interest in
restoring gold as a basis for currency and crddit and as an instrument for settling international balances will be somewhat greater.
Third, the substitution of securities for gold \vould help
to minimize the further expansion of our already redundant credit
base.
The attached table summarizes our estimates of foreign
holdings of gold, dollar balances, and .American investments at the
outbreak of -war. For France, Great Britain and the British Empire,
these three items amounted to about 010,000,000,000; the British
EmpireTs gold production was 0750,000,000 in 1938, and can probably be stepped up by about 15 per cent within two years. The
table does not include privately hoarded gold, nor does i t include
the large volume of earning assets apart from American investments
which could be disposed of in this country to obtain needed supplies
of dollar exchange. Our trade with all foreign countries produced an
export surplus of 011,000,000,000 during the last war. Under




present conditions, commodity prices are likely to rise less
sharply in response to wartime demands than during the last war,
Moreover, Great Britain and France, during the present •war, will
obtain a much larger proportion of their foodstuffs and raw materials
from Empire sources and a considerable portion of the export proceeds accruing to the Dominions will be used to retire their outstanding long term debts to Great Britain.




-

^
FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF GOLD, DOLL/K B/LiNCES, &® /1D2RICAN
li-iV£S THEFTS — END OF HJffUST 1 9 5 9

(in millions of d o l l r r s )

Type of holding

7; or Id
Un.Egdn. [ Germany
(Out side ' France ' I t a l y &
U.S.) • & Br.Emp.: U.S.S.R.

Smaller
; llonHur.
liui-opc-anf
Countries | Neutral*

Gold reserves
Dollar balances
Securities readily nego- .
tiable(Sst.market value^

2,820

1,1^0

Gold, dollar balances
and securities
Investments not readily
negotiable (Various
bases of value)

Total gold end U.
Assets

10,000

1,1400

6,120

I 2,390

Annual Gold Production

1958i

1,150

l / Small amounts, not shown leperately in avcdloble sources; included in
figure for smeller European countries.
2/ Includes Gormen, It alien, and Russian holdings; soc note l / .




October 2#, 1939.
FOR IMTgSDIATE REL^/.SS.

From the office of

JOH& o TO-yr.END,JR.
shington, D. C.

IK GOLk POLICY

Although the gold standard is now virtually extinct, the
United States is still steadily adding to its rest hoerd of the
yellow metal, Senator John 0. Townsend,Jr. of Delaware today
advised the Senate*

Although #4,000,000,000 was enough gold to

finance the dangerous speculative boom of 1929, devaluation of
the dollar produoed a stock of #7,438,000,000 in 1934.
Tet in iesa than six years since then, our stook of gold
ha8 increased to more than $17,000,000,000, said the Delaware
Senator, who last Spring introduced a resolution calling for an
investigation of the gold policy*
While no aotlon was taken on the Senator9s resolution, a
similar resolution was later introduced by Senator Wagner and
passed by the Senate.

The investigation for which it provided,

however, has not yet been begun*
The following Is the text of Senator Townsend's statement
today on gold:The problem of gold must be faced by the American
people sooner or later* The longer the delay, the more
costly the solution will be*
In 1933 the Treasury and Federal Reserve banks held
.4,800,000,000 of gold. After the price of gold was increased by almost 70 peroent (from £20.67 a ounce to $35)
our centralized gold stook was valued at #7,438,000,000.
In the less than six years since then it has grown to more
than #17,000,000,000.
Sven in these days of billions, this stook is of
fantastic proportions* It is considerably more gold than
is held by all the other governments and central banks and . ~
stabilization funds of the entire world. It is equal to
three-fifths of the world's gold stock* Our proportion of
the world's gold, moreover, is laorearflng weekly. Merely
during the IS months through September approximately
^3,900,000,000 of the metal was acquired by this country.
laich of this huge gold stook lies idle, a dead asset
in Kentucky. It is owned by the nation, but it is not used
by the people. It earns no interest. It is not at work. The
Federal Reserve System baa #5,500,000,000 of excess reserves*



-2-

The Treasury holds approximately 42,000,000,000 of gold sterilized.
(1}
Indeed, if so muoh gold were not held sterile and idle,
this country might even now be feeling its inflationary effects.
Only #4,000,000,000 of gold was sufficient to support the inflationary boom of 1929* It is easy to imagine how much inflation
our present 417,000,000,000 of the metal could support.
It is practically certain that this country car never dispose
of its surplus gold for what that metal has been costing. Sinoe
we raised the price to ^35 an ounce, gold has come here from all
parts of the globe. Svery gold miner has been on our dole, from
South Africa to Siberia* Current news reports that Russia is
sending 17 tons of gold here for the purchase of American goods
Is typloal of what has been going on for years*
The gold we hare Imported has been paid for dearly* *t has
been bought with the produots of our Industry and our agriculture*
In 1932, before revaluation of the dollar, it took less than 24
bushels of apples to buy an ounoe of imported gold* Today it takes
50 bushels.
In 193? it took about 40 bushels of wheat to buy an ounce
of imported gold* Today, despite the 80 percent increase in the
price of wheat, it still takes over 58 bushels to bfqr an ounce of
gold*
In 1932 it took 313 pounds of cotton to buy an ounce of gold*
Today despite the large increase in the price of ootton, it takes
360 pounds of cotton to buy the same amount of gold*
There would be no objection to paying such increased amounts
of our real wealth for foreign gold if we needed the metal in
our monetary system* But today there is absolutely no n ed for
more gold* Las January the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System reported to Congress that since 1933 reservebalances
of member banks has Increased threefold, due principally to the
gold inflow* The Board pointed out Its helplessness to counteract
(2) "an injurious credit expansion".
Sven though we do not need or use the imported gold, its
purchase might be excusable If only we knew that we could at will
dispose of it again for what it has cost us. The American people
will not wish to use this gold to buy foreign apples, wheat,ootton
or motor oars. Such imports would affect our Industry and agriculture adversely*
Even if there were not this obstacle, it is obvious that the
#9,383,000,000 of gold we have acquired abroad since 1934 could not
be spend abroad for these or other eormoditles In an equal period
of time or even In a much longer time without causing a rapid in-

(1) vl,800,000,000 or more in the Stabilization Fund and 4194,000,000
in the General Fund*
(2)

Twenty-fifth Annual Report, pp 22-3.




-3orease In the prices foreigners would demand for their goods*
It is signifioient that the gold standard is today Tlrtually
extinct. Only one country, Belgium, maintains its currency freely
interohangeable with gold, at a fixed price.
What this country should do with its present surplus of
billions of dollars of gold is a que tion that need not and indeed
cannot be determined now* But it has long been d e a r that the
nation needs no more foreign gold* ithouth changing the monetary
value or price of gold at home, it would be a perfectly simple
matter to cease buying the Imported metal* Such a step today would
involve no deflation* Ye would still neve ^17.000,000,000 of gold*
We should still have #5,500#000,000 of excess reserves. The main
change effected would be that we would not be Increasing our gold
stock and our excess reserves by importing more gold*

"^