View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

,

Wotm JFVR. 181

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Office Correspondence
To

Chairman Ecclea

From

Lauchlin Currie

_____

Date
Subject:

October 12,

Comments on the Meeting with
Secretary Ilorgenthau.

I had a feeling that a good deal was left unexplored last night.
One thing of great importance is whether any understanding exists as
to the present alignment of exchanges. On the one hand the Secretary
stated that there was no agreement as to the future ratio of the
dollar to the franc and sterling. On the other hand he stated that
the risk of fluctuations in the exchange market over (short?) periods
was over, which implies some understanding. It is perhaps of some
significance that the statement of the British Treasury played down
the importance of the development, saying merely that it would "facilitate the technical operations of exchange control".
I am not sure I am right, but the following appears to me to be
sound. Sterling can fall in relation to the dollar unless our Stabilization Fund is prepared to take a loss on its operations. Suppose
the English raise the price of gold. Sterling will tend to fall in
reflection of this. (Or if sterling falls the price of gold in England
will tend to rise). We can prevent a further fall by buying sterling
and converting it into gold. We cannot bring about a rise in sterling
or maintain the previous dollar sterling rate if the price of gold
is raised in London, unless we are prepared to pay more dollars for
sterling than we will recover when we convert into gold. This amounts
to saying that we cannot prevent a fall in sterling -unless we are
prepared to pay more than #35*00 an ounce for gold, and if we do, this
will entail a "loss", i. e., in a bookkeeping sense, so ].ong as our
gold stocks are valued at $35.00 an ounce• I have worked out various
possibilities, and I come to this conclusion every time.
If this is so I think the Treasury should be prepared to take a
loss on the Fund if by so doing we prevent a greater loss to the farmer,
wage earner, etc. Of course, this may not prove necessary, as the
English may cooperate in keeping the pound around the present level.
I feel quite strongly that we should not permit a further significant depreciation of sterling, which would mean not only a fall of
sterling but of all the currencies linked with sterling, which comprise
a good part of the world. The dollar was, if anything, overvalued
(in terms of relative incomes and prices) before the recent depreciation
of practically all foreign currencies. As I pointed out last night,
we have much further to go on the road to full recovery than have the
sterling countries. For full employment our national income will probably have to expand twenty to thirty billion dollars more. This means




-2-

that our demand for foreign goods, both to buy and to look at, may be
expected to increase substantially as our income grows• Moreover,
when, as and if we approach full employment the general level of our
prices will doubtless rise somewhat. On two counts, therefore, we may
expect our imports (including tourist expenditures) to grow more rapidly
than our exports, to that excluding capital movements we will be more
likely to lose than to gain gold*
This possible development has two aspects, one, if anything,
favorable, and the other unfavorable* The one I have in mind as being,
if anything, favorable, is the possible loss of gold which, as you
pointed out, would be more of an aid than a hindrance to us. The other,
and unfavorable aspect, while not so apparent, is, I think, real* It
is that the increase in imports relative to exports, while a symptom
of recovery, constitutes at the same time a drag on the recovery movement* It means that progressively more of the monetary circulation in
the production-consumption stream is being withdrawn for foreign purchases
than is being regained by sales to foreigners. This may be construed
as an additional reason why it would be undesirable for the dollar to
appreciate substantially in terms of other currencies. Of course, this
possible drag might conceivably be defended as a desirable check on the
recovery movement getting out of hand, but we have other instruments of
control for that purpose.

Copies to Governors
Ransom and Davis.