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BOARD DF GDVERNDRS
• F THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Office Correspondence
*Po

Chair nan Eccles

F r o m W a l t e r R. Gardner

Date—May 25, 1942
Subject: Congressional questions on the

^Q(V/'

Inter-American Bank

There is attached a set of comments on half a dozen questions
which might come up if Congressional hearings are held on the InterAmerican Bank plan. Senator Glass stated in his letter of April 22,
1942, to Under Secretary Welles that it was his intention to hold
such hearings at an early date.
Only a few copies of this question-answer sheet have been run
off, since I hope to receive suggestions for improvements from those
to whom it is being sent.




22,

ANSWERS TO SOME qU33TI01.S TEAT M Y BE MI3ED
AT CONGBESSIONAL HBlEHSS OK THE HT2H-AMSIICA1T
1 • What could the Inter-American 3ank do that the Export-Import 3anl: is
not now doing?
In his letter of April 2.2 to Under-Secretary Jelles, Senator
Glass stated that he had held action on the Inter-American Bank
plan in abeyance "because Jesse Jones had told him that iie was
already making all the loins to South American countries that should
be made. This raises the question of what r6lo the Intor-American
Bank might "be expected to play that is not already filled by the
Export-Import Bank.
•
The Export-Import Ban!: has wide powers. It can do a general
banking business. It can receive deposits; purchase, sell, and
negotiate notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and acceptances; accept
bills drawn upon it and issue letters of credit; borrow and lend
money; and purchase and sell securities other than shares. It cannot
guarantee the availability and rates of exchange of a foreign currency, nor can it guarantee loans; but otherwise its legal powers are
almost as broad as those planned for the Inter~American Bank*

Better
creditorborrower
relationship

c



The chief difference between the two institutions will be in
their ownership and management. The Export-Import Bank is an agency
of the U.S. Government, It extends credits to a series of countries,
each one of which appears as fi borrower making the best case it can
for accommodation from the United States. The Inter-American Bank,
en the other hand, would be owned jointly by all the participating
Governments, Each participating Government would subscribe to its
capital and each would be represented on its Board of Directors.
A country desiring a loan would submit its case, not to the sole
judgment of the United States, but to the representatives cf a group
cf American countries. Tl-is group wculd go into tho record of the
prospective borrower and appraise the project from the standpoint
of its probable effect upon the economy as a whole and upon the
ability of the borrowing country to service and repay the lean
through its international balance of payments. The fact that the
prospective borrower had on other occasions acted in the role of
creditor and appraised the projects of other countries in the group
would be both educative ana sobering. And the fact that the loan
was being made and collected by American countries as a group should
establish £ better relationship between lender and borrower than is
possible when many countries are dealing with the United States as
the sole creditor.
Because it is a joint enterprise, the participating Governments
will grant the Inter-American Bank an extraordinary degree cf immunity from their exchange controls. All funds placed in a country
by the Bank may be freely withdrawn at the most favorable rate of
exchange being'granted by the exchange authorities •* that country

-2In any transaction. Hence the Inter-American Bank will have a
freedom of movement among the exchange controls of Latin American
countries that the Export-Import Bank lacks. If loans mature at a
period when the borrowing country is faced with an adverse balance
of payments the Inter-American Bank can take payment in local currency, or, what amounts to the same thing, can make local currency
deposits in the Central Bank cf the borrowing country equivalent
to the loan being repaid. These deposits can be withdrawn et the
privileged rate of exchange whenever the situation develops tc the
point at which smooth transfers through the balance of payments
become possible. Hot only are such stabilizing operations feasible for the Intor-American Bank because of its privileged exchange
position, but they should prove far more acceptable to the countries concerned by reason of the international Character of the
Bank and the fact that those countries are themselves represented
on its Board.

Greater
range
of operation

Construetive use
of Latin
American
funds

Again, because of its international character the InterAmerican Bank may be able to attract Latin American capital and
put it to more constructive use. Standard investment Instruments
are in general lacking in the Central and South American, countries.
Local capital tends to find its way into land or special situations,
It is possible that debentures of the Inter-American Bant may in
time become a popular investment instrument. The Bank may also
receive deposits from the public, though it cannot pay interest on
such deposits and it is, t-iorefore, unlikely to offer much competit ion In this sphere to the corrjncrcial banks except on funds that
might otherwise gravitate to Kcw York, Such local funds as the
Inter-American Bank acquires either through deposits or sale of
debentures it will be able to reinvest in the country ox origin
in accordance with a broadly conceived investment pro .Tori, This
type of work within the Latin American countries, turning their
own funds to productive use at homo, is something iralch the ExportImport Bank could hardly hope to carry on.

Bankers1
Club




In short, the Inter-American Bank, by reason of its international character more than because of the scope of its banking
and investment powers, Can carry out its program in ways which
arc denied the Export-Import Bank. In doing so it will afford
the U.S. director and the U.S. officers of the Bank a notable opportunity tq attain an understanding of Inter-American financial
problems and to influence the approach to these problems of the
leading financiers of Latin America.
In his testimony on May 5, 19^1, before a •ubconmittee of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate to which the
Inter-American Bank Convention had been referred, Mr. Clayton,
the Deputy Federal Loan Administrator, said "It would bo ny hope
that in time, so far as Latin America is concerned, or lot us
say any other American ropuolics, the Inter-American Bank would
take over the functions of the Export-Import Bank. It will take
some tine for the bank to do that." Under questioning he repeated the substance of this statement several tinier..

-3-

Continued
usefulness
of Exportlaport
Bank

2.

There nay, however, still be a field for Export-Import
Bank loans in Latin America even when the Intor-inorlcaa Bcnk
has reached maturity. The latter will hardly lend directly to
the public without Government or Central Bank guarantee. Aid
to American exporters and importers may still have to be given
by the Export-Import Bank. Cr there may be loans for developmental purposes In Latin America that this country Trill '.?ish
to see made even though the chances of an adequate financial
return upon them are too uncertain to warrant investment by
the Inter-American Bank, which must prove itself a real banking
institution, and not an instrument of subsidy, if it is to command the confidence of the public. In any case the ExportImport Bank will continue to occupy a world sphere of business
outside the Latin American countries.

Should Federal Reserve Bank acquisition of Inter-American Bank obligations
be limited to an amount equivalent to the surplus of Foderal Roserve Banks?
Senator Glass has proposed that the Federal Reserve Banki
should be permitted to land to the Inter-American 3ank no more
than their surplus as of December 31, 19^-1. The draft of the
enabling legislation as sent to Congress by the President would
permit the Federal Reserve Banks to purchase obligations of the
Inter-American Bank without limit subject to the consent of the
Board of Governors of tho federal Reserve System and to such
regulations as the Board oay establish. While the limitation
proposed by Senator Glass appears to be unnecessary in view of
the long experience of tho Federal Reserve Bonks and the supervisory powers of the Board, it would make little difference in
the early years. As of the end of 19U1 the Federal Reserve
Banks had an earned surplus of 157«5 million dollars and a surplus under Section 13b of 2b.S million dollars, Even if surplus
under 13b were excluded, there would be room for considerably
more accommodation to tho Inter-American Bank than the Federal
Reserve Banks will want to extend for some tine to come. If
later on it should appear advisable to expand the limits of
Federal Reserve accommodation, an appropriate recommendation
could be made to Congress in the light of what the Inter-American
Bank had by then accomplished and the further activities that it
contemplated,

o

3.

Should the Federal Reserve Banks extend credit to the Inter-American Bank
only through notes with a maturity not in excess of 4 months?




Senator Glass has also proposed that "no loan, advance or
extension of credit shall be made by any Federal Reserve Benjc
to the Inter-American Bank except upon its time or demand nctes
having maturities of not more than four months and which are
secured to the satisfaction cf the Federal Reserve Banks".

This is a more serious limitation than that confining the
aggregate credit extended tc an amount equivalent to the
surplus cf the Banks. Several questions suggest themselves.
Is the term "notes" sufficiently "broad to cover the wliclo
range cf credit operations in which the federal Eosorve
Banks might properly engage with regard to the Inter-American Bank? Might the requirement of security on every operation prove onerous in some types of transaction or does the
phrase Mto the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Banl:"
provide sufficient flexibility in such cases? Finally,
there is the question posed by the ^-months maturity* Latin
American banking busiaccc tends to longer-term arrangements
than are characteristic in the United States, Freight is
slower. The proportion of agricultural credit is higher.
For the Inter-American Bank to borrow for only U month* or
less in connection with itsftatinAmerican business might
seem somewhat unrealistic.
In particular this might be the case where the issue
of debentures was involved* The debentures of the Bank
have been considered more as a form of intermediate or longterm borrowing. The "federal Reserve System mast have freedom
to buy the Bank's debentures if action is to be taken through
the Open-Market Committee. This is probably the most efficient form of action that the Federal Reserve System can
take since all 12 Banbg oust share pro rata and individual
boards of directors will not have to pass upon the operation,

c

ITcne of these difficulties apj>ears to be insuperable.
The Inter-American Bank cruld accommodate itself to the Glass
amendment by issuing ^-months debentures fully secured and
selling their, to the Federal Reserve Banks with an understanding that the Federal Reserve Banks would renew their
purchases ^vor, say, n period of a year. It would probably
be more satisfactory, however, to permit Federal Reserve
credit to be extended to the Inter-American Bank in any
form (not just secured notes) for periods ranging, acccrding
to the type of credit, up to a r.axinun of 0110 year. With
this arrangement renewal agreements, while still permissible,
night seldom be needed.

Should the proposed charter of the Intcr~Anerican Bank bo altered to
prevent amendments to the By-laws of the Bank from becoming effective
until ratified l>y our Congress?




Senator 01ass has proposed changing the charter of the
Bank so that anen&nonts nade to the By-laws would bo /ithout
effect until ratified by cur Congress. This hardly appears
feasible. It would require renegotiation of the Convention

-5with the eight other signatories; and i t would stimulate
other countries to demand that amendments should be subject
to ratification by their legislatures as well. Thereafter
inertia on the part of any one of these bodies could hold
up rectification of the Bank's By-laws indefinitely. The
whole move would be a source of much embarrassment to the
United States.
The essence of the proposal so far as this country is
concerned, however, could be achieved without any international negotiation. As the By-laws now stand they can bo
amended only by a four-fifths vote of the Board of Directors,
If the United States acquires more -than one-fifth of the
vote, no amendment to the By-laws can be made without the
consent of the U.S. director. Since the U.S. director represents this country, he may be appointed and controlled in
any way the Government deems best. Under the arrangement
embodied in the tentative b i l l now before Congress the U.S.
director would bo appointed "oy a committee of four — the
Secretaries of State and the Treasury, the Chairman of the
Board of G-overnors of the Peder'al Reserve System, and the
Federal Loan Administrator (presumably the last-named will
now have to be changed to the Secretary of Commerce). The
director must keep this committee informed and is to serve
for two years iubject to i t s pleasure. Congress, however,
may alter this proposed arrangement at will. If it wishes,
i t may require the U.S. director to vote against any amendment to the By-laws of the Bank unless he has the express
consent of Congress, or some Congressional committee, to a
vote in i t s favor. This would, in effect, make every proposed amendment to the By-laws of the Bank subject to approval by our Congress.

c

While it is thus possible to achieve Senator Glass's
end without international negotiation, there may be core
question as to the advisability of tying the American
director down so closely. Conceivably a limitation of
this sort en the director's responsibility might make i t
more difficult to obtain an able man for the post; and the
requirement of a Congressional vote on every amandnont to
the By-laws of the Bank that was under consideration rnight
prove to be too rigid and time-consuming a procedure.

Should the power of the Inter-American Bank to issue debentures and
other obligations be limited with relation to i t s capital and surplus?

c



A question of this character was raised in the May
meeting of the foreign Relations Committee. It seems to
focus attention on the wrong item. If l i a b i l i t i e s are beinglimited, i t is less important to limit long-term obligations

-0-

than it is to limit depoflita that can be withdrawn upon
demand. The limitation should, however, apply to vulnerable assets. Properly considered, capital and surplus of
the Bank should be a protection to all the Bank's creditors
against a shrinkage of assets. Cash and short-term assets
are far less subject to shrinkage than longer-term assets.
Hence it is these longexwtenn assets (rather than debentures, which are irrelevant) that should be limited to some
multiple of capital and surplus. Such a limitation is contemplated in section 3,0 of the 3y~laws, which states:
"The Board of Directors, within a year after
its first meeting, shall noy regulations prescribe
the reserves to be established and maintained
against demand deposits and other obligations of
the 3ank and shall prescribe a limitation on the
amount of intermediate and long-term assets in
relation to capital and surplus; and such regulations shall not be amended, modified, or revolted
except by a four-fifths majority vote of the Board."
A definite limitation Of this character was not imposed
in advance in the By-laws becau.se insufficient evidence was
at hand with regard to the probable nature of tho Bank18
business to enable a precise ratio to be named. It was considered that an appropriate limitation could better be determined by the 3oard of Directors itself after some experience
had been gained with the Bank's operations. Since the Sank
will have to depend largely on official funds until it has
demonstrated its strength, it seems certain that It will
draw little from the general public until after the first
year, "by which time its reserve requirements and the limitation on its longer—term assets with reference to capital
and surplus will have been fixed.

6. Arc tho tax immunities granted to the Bank, and to thoso who derive
income from it, consistent with the effort to get rid of tax ezeir.ptions
in this country?




This question also appears to have been raised in the
May 19^1 meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee. The
Treasury has answered it in the affirmative in a 5-Ija£e
memorandum. The memorandum emphasizes the Governmental and
international character of the Bank, points out the advantages
of protecting the Bank from taxation which might limit its
activities in the various countries, and states that it would
be improper for this country to profit financially from the
fact that the Bank is required to have its head office here.

The Convention per:iits non~discriminatory taxation of
any citizen of tlie taxing country; and the Treasury
memorandum states that the exemptions given to aliens
are similar to those already in effect and that the
immunities granted directly to the Bank are gimllar to
those now being accorded Governmental institutions.
This is by no means a full summary of the Treasury
argument. It is suggested that the question, which is
highly technical, should be held for reference to the
Treasury if it is raised in Congressional hearings.

W.R.G.