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February 17, 1943•
MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF T.O.U.G.
WITH SECRETARY MORGENTHAU AT THE TREASURY,
WASHINGTON, D. C , FEBRUARY 16, 1943.
Those present were Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Under Secretary
Daniel W. Bell; Messrs. M* S. Eccles, Allan Sproul and Alfred H. Williams, Executive
Committee of the Federal Open Market Committee; and others*
Assumed we are working toward a single organization for the sale of all
Government securities under the command of a single director of sales.(The Secretary
indicated acceptance of this objective and stated that lines are out for a director
of sales*)
Proposed meanwhile that, as part of a National organization, there be set
up at the district level, under the chairmanship of the Presidents of the Reserve
Banks, an Executive Committee to have charge of all sales in the district• This
committee would be made up of representatives of the War Savings Staff organization
in the district and, presumably, of the Victory Fund Committees, The Chairman of
the Committee, to be known as the Treasury Coordinator, would have authority delegated to him by the Treasury-*-without, however, "disturbing" the War Savings Staff
organization too much.
We pointed out the following objections to this arrangement:
1#

It perpetuates and seems to section further the present dual arrangement rather than either moving toward a National War Fund or, at
least, doing nothing to make such progress more difficult*

2#

It tends to freeze a type of organization at a time when a new
director of sales is to be appointed who should have a chance to
decide upon the best type of organization,

3*

It does not take sufficient account of the difficulties of bringing the two existing organizations together, given their past
history, their organization on different geographical lines, and
their disparate personnel.

We suggested that, given a National director of sales, and a National publicity program on the right scale, we were ready to take on the next drive as Victory
Fund Committees, with the loan of manpower from the War Savings Staff. In other
words, we suggested that for the period of the drive we be able to draw on the War
Savings Staff, other than its payroll allotment section, so as to avoid competition
in expanding our organizations,
Mr. Graves of the War Savings Staff and Mr. Buffington of the Victory Fund
Committee asked to join the meeting.
Mr. Graves indicated that this would not be acceptable to him, that he had
no people to lend for the drive, that his work is continuing work which must go on,
with attendant publicity* The Secretary asked him how he would solve the problem.
He referred to the logical and practical solution of the "Haas Memorandum," namely,
that the distinction between the Victory Fund Committee and the War Savings Staff
should be on the basis not of the type of securities sold by each, but on the type
of investors covered by each group•
The Victory Fund Committee would contact the




February 17, 1943*

larger investors and the War Savings Staff the smaller investors, and both groups
would sell all the securities offered. This is based on the assumption that a group
of about 4-00,000 having either $15,000 or more annual income or $7,500 in bank
deposits can be listed and placed and sold by the Victory Fund Committee with a
relatively small organization - and made to purchase a very large proportion of the
funds to be obtained from non-bank investors*
(The Secretary asked Messrs, Graves, Buffington, Williams and Sproul to
discuss the matter further and, if possible, to give him a short written proposal
for solution,) We said this again violated the principle of a single organization
which would mobilize the National spirit in support of financing the war, as it is
mobilized in support of the military effort and the production program. We also
questioned the possibility of segregating and placing so neatly this group of
"large investors,11 (some of whom will probably need their income and their bank d e posits to pay taxes) and stressed the need of a wider coverage to reach the "unknown"
investors in the professions, the shops, on the farms, etc, Mr, Graves said the War
Savings Staff is equipped to reach these people. We were not in position to say we
had no great confidence in the War Savings Staff or its organization for doing the
big job which is coming up #
After further discussion, we were unable to agree with Mr. Graves on a
program largely because we disagreed on the need for a single organization and partly
because we retained an unexpressed lack of confidence in the War Savings Staff, We
agreed that there were three alternatives for the next drive:
1.

Turn the whole job over to the War Savings Staff, except bank subscriptions.

2.

Turn the whole job over to the Victory Fund Committee, except payroll allotment*

3.

Proceed as in December, but with the aid of a National publicity
program, in scale with the job and promoting the sale of all
Government securities; and with each organization seeking a more
intensive coverage.

We also agreed that it is probably already too late to adopt either of the
first two alternatives prior to April 1, but that they could be practical if the
drive were postponed until May 1, which is possible.