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April 3, 1947
Margin Requirements» etc»
Ihen the margin requirements were lowered recently from 100 per
cent to 75 per cent, it was explained in a statement by the Chairman of the
Board (copy attached) that the "adjustment to changed economic conditions
is restrictive without being prohibitive" and that "further action will depend on the course of economic events."
There has been no change in the basic economic situation since
that time which would warrant further relaxation of the requirements• Inflationary pressures have not weakened. The price level for commodities
is in fact somewhat higher and the money supply, the "spendable deposits"
in the hands of corporations and individuals, is still very large. In these
circumstances, further increase in the use of credit for purchasing securities would have no economic justification. In fact, the increase of about
40 million dollars during February in the volume of customers1 debit balances
added to existing inflationary pressures» [Bank loans for purchasing securitiesv (other than Government securities) declined by a small amount — about
10 million dollars for the weekly reporting member banks — between the
middle of January and March 26. ]
This is not a time when stock-market activity needs to be stimulated, by credit, for the purpose of encouraging new capital issues to
finance business expansion. Investment funds are ample, and the money
raised by new issues tends to strengthen the already strong demand for basic
materials, such as steel, which are in short supply. It is at present not
lack of financial capital but the shortage of materials and labor that restricts production.
The argument that the present requirements discriminate against
listed securities, as was reiterated recently in the Annual Report of the
President of the New York Stock Exchange, is so familiar as to deserve little
discussion. Congress withheld from the Board authority to regulate bank loans
to purchase unlisted securities — on the two grounds that (l) for such securities there are no dependable quotations against which to compute margins
and (2) that it is activity in the markets for listed securities that generally dominates the market movements for other securities. The exchange
market is where the instability is greatest and most conspicuous. And there
is no reliable evidence that at present people are in fact using much credit
to buy unlisted securities; speculators for the rise seem to be "holding off"
from both markets.
There is some complaint against the present rules in Regulation T
which prohibit "switching" in undermargined accounts (rules sometimes referred
to as the "incidental squeeze"). The claim is made, for example, that they
restrict a customer1 s freedom of action — if his account is not margined
up to the 75 per cent level. They do have this effect, of course, but what
some people fail to understand is why such restriction is needed in order to
support the 75 per cent requirement. Without it, the customer could always



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be using the credit already in his undermargined account to buy securities
that are rising — or to sell short securities that are falling — thus
increasing speculative activity at a time when the regulations are intended
to restrain it. To put this in another way, without the 11 incidental squeeze"
the Board's regulations could apply the same restraint only if (l) the margin requirements were fixed at a level above 75 per cent or (2) the Board
were to use its power to require partial liquidation of undermargined accounts. The pressure from brokers, and from a few of their customers, to
revoke or relax these rules, in short, is merely another form of the argument for reducing the margin requirements and is open to essentially the
same objections. It can also be noted that the recent reduction in margin
requirements had the effect of making the "incidental squeeze" less severe
than it was before, and that any further reduction would of course make it
still less severe.
Both in raising and in lowering margin requirements, as in performing all its statutory duties, the Board undertakes to exercise its best judgment in the light of current economic conditions and prospects. Its decisions are neither arbitrary nor based on prejudice.
One thing the Board must always take into account is the "symbolic"
significance of its action. For the Board, at this time, to lower the margin requirements could easily be mistaken by the public to mean that the
Board anticipates imminent deflation and is getting ready to use all its
powers to expand credit as a means of combatting that development.