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March 2, 19U5-

Dear Dan:
I am attaching a copy of a statement
I have given out in an effort to clear up the
very widespread misunderstanding of what 1 proposed when members of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee questioned me the other day
on what oould be done about checking the inflationary rise of homes, farms and other capital
values.
While I had not intended to send up
any trial balloon, my recommendation of the
wartime capital gains tax seems to have stirred
up a good deal of discussion, much of it based
on complete misunderstanding, which I hope this
statement will remove.
Sincerely yours,

Honorable D. W. Bell,
Under Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D- C.

Enclosure




March 2, 19U5-

Dear Fred:
Enclosed is a copy of the clarifying
statement on my suggestions in regard to a
capital gains tax. As I said to you over the
phone the other day, it has been so greatly
nisunderstood that I felt it particularly important to put out a statement that would say
just what I had suggested when I ivas questioned
on this subject by members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee and the reasons why
I favor this tax.
If, as I hope, this statement helps
clear the ^ir and remove some of the opposition,
so much the better.
Sincerely yours,

Honorable Pred M. Vinson,
Director,
Office of Economic Stabilization,
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure

Z-1588
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
FOR THE PRESS
For release in morning newspapers of
Saturday, March 3, 19^5

March 2, 19U5

STATEMENT BY MARRINER 3. ECCLES ON A CAPITAL GAINS TAX
TO CURB RISING PRICES OF CAPITAL VALUES
Mien questioned by members of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee last week as to what could be done to prevent further inflation
of capital values, I reiterated my opinion that the most effective single
instrument would be a wartime penalty rate on capital gains. Since the
proposal, which was only briefly discussed before the Committee, has been
widely misunderstood and misrepresented in some quarters, I feel that I
should outline what I advocated and why.
I did not propose any change in the present capital gains tax#
My proposal would apply only to the sale of capital assets (as defined
under the present law) acquired during a period to be fixed by Congress*
My suggestion was that this period be from January lf 19U5 until such time
as inflationary dangers have passed, which might be two, or possibly three
years after the war. This special wartime capital gains tax would not be
superimposed upon the existing tax, but would apply only to assets purchased during this period. It would not apply to real estate, stocks or
other assets acquired at any time prior to January 1, 19U5* These assets,
if sold, would continue to be subject to the existing capital gains taxf
The special tax I have in mind would impose a 90 per cent rate on capital
gains derived from the sale, within two years, of capital assets acquired
during the specified period; thereafter it would diminish by 10 per cent,
or more, annually until equal to the existing rate* Capital losses incurred on transactions subject to the special rate would be deductible
against profits.
The special tax, like any other anti-inflation control^ should
be discontinued when the need for it no longer exists. Since the purpose
of the special tax is anti-inflationary, revenue is not the objective and
the more effective the tax, the less it would yield. However, such yield
as resulted would be based on rates in line with those imposed under the
wartime individual and corporate income tax structure.
The reasons for such a special capital gains tax may be summarized
as follows:




- p -

1. Capital values, as reflected in current prices of homes,
farms9 business properties and stocks, have increased sharply since this
country entered the war, and are still increasing. If unchecked, this
trend would undermine the entire price and wage stabilization program, with
grave consequences to postwar reconversion. It would make war-financing
problems more difficult and increase the cost of the war* It would make a
mirage of the hopes of millions of war veterans who are counting on being
able to obtain a home, or a farm, or to get started in business when they
return from the front. Congress has encouraged this hope in the so-called
G. I. Bill of Rights, and by providing dismissal pay and otherwise. Those
on the home front have an inescapable obligation to take whatever steps may
be necessary to protect the values of homes, farms and other necessities so
that they will not be hopelessly out of reach of the veteran's purse. There
are no war profits in that purse.
2. While other sectors on the home front have been protected by
direct measures, such as rationing, allocations, price and wage controls,
no effective controls have been applied to curb rising prices of homes,
farms, stocks and other capital assets. The wartime expansion of liquid
assets presents a vast and growing danger to these unprotected sectors.
Currency, demand deposits and Government securities held principally by
individuals and corporations are rapidly approaching 200 billion dollars
and have nearly tripled since we entered the war. This huge inflation
potential will continue to grow as long as deficit-financing continues. Un^
less effective action is taken to prevent these liquid funds from increasingly
inflating capital values, it will become more and more difficult, if not
impossible, to hold the line against inflationary price and wage increases.
Veterans of the last war, especially farmers, have not forgotten the infla^
tion and the consequent ruinous deflation resulting from failure to control
a relatively small volume of liquid funds in the last war. The present
volume of such funds is already four times as great as it was in 1920. The
national debt is nearly ten times larger today and is still growing.
3. The most serious gap in the line of defense against inflationary forces is the capital gains loophole in the wartime tax structure,
While Congress has provided sharply progressive surtax rates, rising to a
high of 91 per cent on individual incomes, and a maximum excess profits tax
of 95 Pe** cent levied upon operating profits of corporations, no corresr
ponding curb has been put upon capital gains, which continue to be subject
to prewar rates, with a 25 per cent maximum. This huge differential in
favor of the capital gains tax benefits only the larger taxpayers. The
bigger they are, the greater the inducement today to dispose of or refuse
to put money into fixed interest-bearing obligations that return only a
small yield and have little chance for a capital gain, and to put money
instead into capital assets, which, when sold on a rising market, yield
profits subject only to a capital gains tax of 25 per cent, or less.




-3 Yet these profits are just as much a result of war expenditures
as are high individual and corporate incomes which are subjected to high
wartime tax rates. The inequity of this situation is the more pronounced
because the benefit of the tax differential accrues only to those in the
higher income brackets. The smaller income taxpayers can derive no tax
benefits from it. Large operators, however, -- so-called smart money -are taking more and more advantage of the opening, and this is a principal
factor at present in bidding up real estate, stocks and other capital values.
It is not the bona fide investor or the small taxpayer who is applying this
upward leverage to prices of capital assets. This is speculation -- not
investment. It is speculation in basic essentials such as homes, or farms,
or in stocks representing business investments. It adds nothing to national
wealth. Such forms of gambling as betting on horse races or playing slot
machines do little economic damage. But speculating in the things that
people need and use, speculation that leads to disruption of production und
employment, is the worst form of gambling.
h* The proposal I have in mind would simultaneously reach and
discourage all such speculative transactions, whether in homes, farms,
stocks or commodities, and whether based upon credit or cash — and would
do so without interference with normal, nonspeculative transactions, whereas,
if credit restrictions alone were applied, they would fail entirely to reach
cash transactions for speculative purposes and would interfere with legitimate, nonspeculative credit transactions. The bona fide investor would not
be deterred either now or in the reconversion period by the proposed tax,
for he puts his money into a farm., or into stocks of existing or of new
enterprise for the purpose of obtaining current income and for long-range
appreciation of values. It is the speculator, not the investor, who puts
money into capital assets in anticipation of a quick rise in price from
which a speculative profit can be realized through selling before the price
breaks. However, should the investor be obliged or desire to sell while the
wartime rate is still in effect, he would not be injured, since he had not
purchased in anticipation of selling in order to make a speculative profit.
In any event, under the proposed tax, he would be permitted to retain a
profit of 10 per cent, or more, depending on how long he held the asset.
5» To the extent that the proposed tax would discourage surplus
funds from going into speculative fields, to which they will be attracted
so long as prices are rising, there will be that much more available to go
into Government securities where they should go to help finance this war.
It would appear from criticisms expressed by some of the financial press and
market operators that they fear the tax would be effective in greatly reducing buying activity that might otherwise develop. That is the purpose
of the tax. According to these critics, the proposed tax would dry up the
market because it would deter holders of capital assets from selling. But
it xxeed not deter holders of assets acquired prior to the effective date
of the tax from selling, because it would not apply to them. It would deter the buying and hence the bidding up of capital assets while the tax is
in effect, and that is exactly the result desired. It is the only way to




-h keep the prices of these assets from bein£ bid higher and higher until the
bubble bursts. Nothing would be a greater deterrent to postwar reconversion
than such an inflationary rise in prices, which would inevitably be followed
by a deflationary collapse. Hence nothing would do more to wreck postwar
programs for full employment and economic stability on which a lasting peace
depends,
6. The proposed tax is an essential wartime expedient, like
price, wage and other direct measures of control that deal with the effects,
not with the causes, of inflationary forces resulting from huge deficitfinancing of the war* Had the public and hence the Congress been willing
to deal with inflationary causes, deficit-financing would have been held
to a minimum by far higher taxes and by far greater economy and efficiency
in war expenditures. Some of us urged that course from the outset, but
since it has not been followed, the only alternative is to deal with inflationary effects by such expedients as ere necessary to hold the line so
long as inflationary dangers exist. After reconversion, demand, which has
so vastly exceeded supply in wartime, should be'met by fully employing our
manpower and material resources in peacetime production, and creation of
further inflationary forces should be ended by greatly reducing public expenditures and by maintaining such taxes as are necessary to bring about a
balanced budget*
1 have received a few letters from civilians who fail to see why
we should have either such disagreeable things as taxes sufficient to deal
with inflationary causes or, alternatively, direct control measures necessary to deal with inflationary effects. On the other hand, I have also received a number of letters from men in tho armed forces who hope, if their
lives are spared, to buy a home or a farm. They do see, with a clarity
that should be a warning, why those on the home front should do whatever is
necessary to make this country's economic future secure, with all that portends for the peace of the world*