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October 28, 19^3
INFLATIONARY DANGERS Li ThK PRISoEMT BUDGET
The Federal Government budget f i g u r e s f o r f i s c a l year
according t o the l a t e s t o f f i c i a l p u b l i s h e d e s t i m a t e s , a r e as f o l l o w s !
Expenditures
( B i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s )
War a c t i v i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g Government c o r p o r a t i o n s ) 100
I n t e r e s t on debt
3
6
Other
Total
109
Receipts ( n e t )
I n d i v i d u a l income t a x e s
Corporate income and excess p r o f i t s
Other ( n e t )
18
lU
7
D e f i c i t t o be borrowed
_J£
70
Assuming continuance o f t h e war on the present scale and no change
i n taxes t h e
budget may be r o u g h l y o f t h i s same order o f magnitude.
This huge amount o f expenditures adds tremendously t o i n d i v i d u a l i n comes, w h i l e t h e goods being produoed are f o r war purposes and cannot be
purchased w i t h these incomes. This i s an i n h e r e n t and unavoidable r e s u l t
o f war, end the reason why wars a r e g e n e r a l l y accompanied or f o l l o w e d by
i n f l a t i o n . The o n l y way t o be sure t h a t i n f l a t i o n w i l l be avoided i s t o
balance Government expenditures by t a x e s . But i t i s d i f f i o u l t , i f not
i m p o s s i b l e , t o i n c r e a s e taxes as r a p i d l y as e x p e n d i t u r e s . There saust i n e v i t a b l y be a l a g . I t should, however, be t h e aim o f p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r
taxes g r a d u a l l y t o approach t h a t l e v e l , a l t h o u g h perhaps never reaohing i t .
So f a r our taxes equal o n l y a t h i r d of our e x p e n d i t u r e s .
The e f f e c t o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n on i n d i v i d u a l incomes, expenditures, and
savings i s i n d i c a t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g e s t i m a t e s , which have been presented
by the Treasury, f o r the f i s c a l year 19U3-U4* and which are here given i n
round nun&ers i
I n d i v i d u a l incomes w i l l be about 130 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s
Personal taxes
20
"
Goods and s e r v i c e s a v a i l a b l e
90
*
"
f o r purchase by c i v i l i a n s
Balance a v a i l a b l e f o r savings
*
*
or f o r b i d d i n g up p r i c e s
this
I f t h i s 1+0 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s i s a l l saved, t h e r e should be no i n f l a t i o n
year.
Page 2
But, to this I4O b i l l i o n s should bo added about 3k b i l l i o n s tared
l a s t year, 16 b i l l i o n s the year before, and another
or 50 b i l l i o n s
t h a t say be saved next year and possibly the year a f t e r , should var expenditures and $axes oontinue at around present l e v e l s .
Most of these savings are being accumulated i n l i q u i d forms—
eurrenoy, bank deposits, and war savxngs bonds—and are r e a d i l y a v a i l able f o r spending. Holdings of ourreney, bank deposits, and war savings
bonds by individuals now t o t a l close to 90 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s , or about
twice as much as i n prewar years. At present r a t e of expansion they may
bo close to 150 b i l l i o n s a t the end of the war. i n addition, businesses
hold 50 or 60 b i l l i o n s of l i q u i d assets—3 or k tines the prewar l e v e l .
These funds represent a potential of buying power t h a t could bo
added a t any time to current income and thus create a demand f o r goods
and sorvioes i n excess o f current production.
Rationing, i n a b i l i t y to get goods, patriotism, and other wartime
influences may prevent i n f l a t i o n now, hut dependence on these influences
i s r i s k y . The figures indicate t h a t people are saving a largo part of
t h e i r incomes; the record also shows that they are spending more than they
should and t h a t t h i s is i n t e r f e r i n g with the e f f e c t i v e prosecution of the
war;
Consumer expenditures have been l a r g e r than e a r l i e r estimates had
indicated they would be—90 b i l l i o n s compared with estimates of
about 80 b i l l i o n s — t l i i s is duo i n part to higher prices and i n
part to increased production.
This means t h a t scarce f a c i l i t i e s and manpower, needed for war purposes, have been used to maintain consumer l i v i n g standards at
above prewar l e v e l s . This should not bo.
Price control programs are running into great d i f f i c u l t i e s i n keeping
prioes and wages from r i s i n g , and some increases are occurring.
A l l of these figures are admittedly rough estimates, but i t i s believed
t h a t they r e f l e o t conditions i n a broad way and oan bo used safely
as guides to p o l i c i e s . They poosent i n simple sysfools the reasoning
t h a t should form the basis of policy decisions.
Suppose they should bo wrong?
What are t h e possible errors?
Government war expenditures have boon running a t a r a t e of 7 l / 2 b i l l i o n
dollars a month, compared w i t h a budget estimate of 3 l / 2 b i l l i o n s *
but i t was expected t h a t expenditures i n the e a r l i e r months would bo
less than i n l a t e r months, and some f u r t h e r increase i s sohoduled.
Any reduction i n expenditures, therefore, w i l l depend upon revisions
of schedules, and t h i s i s a matter on whioh there i s no published
information.
Page 3
Receipts are running close to schedules) i t is yet too early to judge
the f u l l e f f e o t of the taxes imposed l a s t summer) but i t is not
l i k e l y t h a t f i n a l r e s u l t s w i l l vary fro a estimates by store than one
or two b i l l i o n d o l l a r s .
But suppose, to take an extreias example, the d e f i o i t should be as muoh
as 10 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s less then current estimates, what e f f e o t would
t h i s hare on the estimates and how should t h i s a f f e o t tax policy?
Either national income would be less or consumer goods available for
purchase would be more and personal taxes s l i g h t l y more, with the r e s u l t t h a t the balance available for saving might be reduced from
around kO b i l l i o n s to around 30 b i l l i o n s .
t h i s would s t i l l be tremendous, especially on top of a l l the savings t h a t
have been accumulated.
While, i n view of other controls and influences, a l l of this may be saved
during the war, i t would add to the store of trouble for the f u t u r e . I t should
be kept i n mind t h a t i n a balanced economy current income equals current produc
t i o n and t h a t the spending of accumulated savings would increase buying power
beyond the a v a i l a b l e supply of things t o buy. This may be desirable a t times,
but i f i n large amount i t may create i n f l a t i o n .
Tax programs proposed by the r r e s i d e n t and the Treasury and those enacted
by Congress have a t no time since the beginning of the defense program i n I9I4O
been adequate to f o r e s t a l l i n f l a t i o n a r y dangers inherent i n the war program.
I n f a c t , the expansion i n expenditures has been so rapid t h a t i t was no
doubt inadvisable and c e r t a i n l y inexpedient to impose the necessary
amount of taxes on the p u b l i c . I t has been necessary to approach the
objective gradually, but that objective i s s t i l l f a r away and t h i s i s
no time to f a l t e r .
So amount of curtailment of expenditures, short of seriously r e s t r i c t i n g
the oonduot of the war, can remove the neeessity for a considerable
f u r t h e r inorease i n taxes, i f i n f l a t i o n a r y dangers are to be avoided
now and i n the f u t u r e .
I t i s the task of statesmen to look ahead a t the possible consequences
of t h e i r present actions} to exeroise foresight and v i s i o n .
The p o t e n t i a l dangers i n the present budget s i t u a t i o n are unmistakable)
the way to reduce these dangers i s c l e a r , and the country should and, I believe
is prepared to f o l l o w t h a t road. I t would involve no great personal s a c r i f i c e s
c e r t a i n l y less than would r e s u l t from i n f l a t i o n , and would greatly benefit the
war e f f o r t .
October 28, 1943.
COMPULSORY SAVINGS
There i a a d i s t u r b i n g tendency i n some q u a r t e r s t o underestimate
the importance of s t r o n g f i s c a l a c t i o n a t t h i s t i m e . One reason would seem
t o be t h a t , d e s p i t e a s e r i o u s and growing i n f l a t i o n a r y gap f o r more than a
y e a r , no i n f l a t i o n a r y t o r r e n t has y e t gushed through i t .
The e x p l a n a t i o n
o f t h i s f o r t u n a t e b u t h i g h l y u n r e l i a b l e r e s u l t i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s have
r e f r a i n e d from spending t h e f u l l amount o f t h e i r incomes. They have done so
on a scale t h a t i s e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t precedent — and as a r e s u l t have immob i l i s e d f o r t h e time b e i n g a huge volume o f funds t h a t could have swamped
the markets f o r goods.
This circumstance suggests a f a c t o f c r u c i a l importance. The imm o b i l i z a t i o n o f those funds i s n o t assured. I t remains a m a t t e r o f d i s c r e t i o n w i t h the p u b l i c . And some day the p u b l i c can and may w e l l change the
pace o f i t s buying.
Considered from t h i s approach, a s t r o n g and p o s i t i v e case can and
should be made f o r compulsory savings.
The most common o b j e c t i o n t o compulsory savings i s t h a t v o l u n t a r y
investment by i n d i v i d u a l s i n government s e c u r i t i e s would tend t o be reduced.
The answer r e s t s on the f a c t t h a t t a x increases operate i n t h e
same manner, and t h a t v o l u n t a r y l e n d i n g i s n o t t h e p r i m a r y {goal o f a f i s c a l
program.
The f i r s t aim o f a f i s c a l program i s t o p r o v i d e the Treasury w i t h
assured sources o f revenue by compulsory means — h e r e t o f o r e , taxes. I f i t
were p r a c t i c a b l e t o do the whole j o b t h i s way, no one i n a u t h o r i t y would
w i s h t o r e l y on v o l u n t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Since t h a t i s n o t p r a c t i c a b l e ,
compulsory measures a r e used i n so f a r as t h e judgment o f Congress and the
technique o f w r i t i n g e q u i t y i n t o t a x l e g i s l a t i o n p e r m i t . Then these measures are supplemented by a sustained e f f o r t t o absorb a d d i t i o n a l amounts o f
p r i v a t e funds through the s a l e of government s e c u r i t i e s on a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s
( i n order f u r t h e r t o reduce the need f o r the Treasury t o r e l y on bank c r e d i t ) .
Compulsory savings are proposed as p a r t o f t h e business o f p r o v i d i n g t h e Treasury w i t h assured funds by compulsory means. By d e f i n i t i o n ,
t h e y should t a k e precedence over v o l u n t a r y l e n d i n g t o t h e government.
This leads t o the most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t , t h e f a c t t h a t compulsory
savings p r o v i d e t h e Treasury w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o r r e c t a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y t h e t r e n d toward the accumulation i n p r i v a t e hands o f an excessive
volume o f v i r t u a l demand o b l i g a t i o n s i n t h e f o r m o f savings bonds (now about
$26 b i l l i o n ) .
- 11 -
Compulsory savings can a i d should be r e s t r i c t e d as t o redemption
so as t o a f f o r d the Treasury some measure o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t i m i n g r e p a y ments. So l o n g as we are committed t o the p r e s e t form o f savings bonds f o r
v o l u n t a r y purchasers, t h e r e would be a p o s i t i v e advantage i n s h i f t i n g subs t a n t i a l amounts o f p r i v a t e savings i n t o some form o f compulsory savings —
thus r e s t r i c t e d as t o redemption. This p o i n t i s o f tremendous importance i n
connection w i t h postwar p r o b l e u a .
P r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e t h a t a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount o f
purchasing power be drawn away from the lower income b r a c k e t s . I n the face
o f t h i s n e c e s s i t y , the requirements o f e q u i t y w i l l be b e t t e r served i f the
burden on these groups i s coupled w i t h arrangements f o r repayments a f t e r t h e
peak o f wartime p a y r o l l s has been passed.
A c o r o l s r y p o i n t i s t h a t compulsory savings c o u l d be arranged so
t h a t they could be made a v a i l a b l e a t times when i n d i v i d u a l s and the econosy
o f the c o u n t r y would be most b e n e f i t t e d .
The a t t i t u d e of some people toward even the mention o f compulsory
savings suggests a f e e l i n g t h a t t h e r e i s something p o s i t i v e l y s i n i s t e r about
t h e i d e a . Doubtless, t h i s stems f r o m on i n s t i n c t i v e r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t any
a s s o c i a t i o n between compulsion and t h e a c t o f saving — which some s t i l l
r e g a r d as an e n t i r e l y v o l u n t a r y procedure. But the government 1 s systems o f
unemployment and o l d a^e insurance are forms o f compulsory savings — and
meet w i t h general a p p r o v a l . Or p u t i t t h i s way: compulsory s a v i n g s , l i k e
t a x e s , do i n t e r f e r e w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l ' s program o f v o l u n t a r y savings —
b u t t h e y do have t h e advantage from the t a x p a y e r ' s p o i n t o f view t h a t he
gets them back — t h e y are s a v i n g s .
October 28, 1943.
SALES TAX VERSUS INCOME TAX
I t i s agreed t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l amount o f the a d d i t i o n a l t a x
revenue must bo drawn from the lower income groups i f taxes are t o be an
o f i o c t i v e check t o i n f l a t i o n .
L'ore s p e c i f i c a l l y , a good p a r t o f the a d d i t i o n a l revenue should bo drawn from taxpayers w i t h incomes o f $2,000 o r
l e s s . But t h i s s t i l l leaves open the choice between t a x i n g t h e low income
groups through a s a l e s t a x o r through an income t a x .
P o l i t i c a l Aspects
The sales t a x i s much more l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n demands for higher
wages and p o s s i b l y farm p r i c e s . Should t h i s bo t h e ease, a s a l e s t a x may
w e l l r e s u l t i n a n e t l o s s r a t h a r than gain i n the f i g h t f o r i n f l a t i o n c o n t r o l .
E q u i t y Aspect*
E q u i t y consideraticms remain i m p o r t a n t i n t a x l e g i s l a t i o n , even i n
times o f w a r . They become p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t i f , as i s t h o case now,
taxes must be c o l l e c t e d from the v e r y low income groups. There i s as much
o r more d i f f e r e n c e between t h e t a x p a y i n g a b i l i t y o f a f a n i l y w i t h a $2,000
income ami a f a m i l y w i t h a $1,000 income than between a family- w i t h a #10,000
income and a f a m i l y w i t h a $5,000 income. I n the low income groups, p e r s o n a l
exemptions are t h e most i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n o b t a i n i n g a f a i r d i s t r i b u t i o n o f
the t a x burden ( p r o g r e s s i o n i s more i m p o r t a n t f o r the h i g h e r income groups).
On e q u i t y grounds, tho income t a x , however low t h e exemption, i s thus g r e a t l y
s u p e r i o r t o t h e s s l e s t a x . Tho s m a l l e r a man's income, tho h e a v i e r i s the
burden o f t h e s a l e s t a x .
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Aspects
I f t h e income t a x approach i s taken, i t w i l l bo necessary t o lower
exemptions f o r f a m i l i e s to $1,000, or perhaps oven $300. This would add from
5 to 10 m i l l i o n taxpayers t o the 40 m i l l i o n already covered, and would undoubtedly create an administrative burden. However, t h i s burden should not
bo exaggerated:
1 . As the Treasury oophasises, the r e t a i l sales tax by i t s e l f creates
a most serious administrative burden. I t i s altogether u n l i k e l y t h a t a sales
t a x could bo passed which i s s u f f i c i e n t l y high t o permit a substantial i n crease i n income tax exemptions and thereby o f f s e t the administrative burden.
2 . Tho experience with tho Victory Tax and w i t h c o l l e c t i o n a t tho source
has g r e a t l y improvod our a b i l i t y to doal w i t h tho d i r e c t t a x a t i o n of low
incomes. I f tho income tax applicable t o lower income groups wore s i m p l i f i e d
r a d i c a l l y , tho administrative task would bo qui to msnagoable. Surely, I t
would be l e s s then t h a t o f adding a general s a l e s t a x t o the present income
tax.
3. To s i m p l i f y the income t a x , taxpayers w i t h incomes up t o perhaps
| 2 , 5 0 0 or $3,000 should be r e l i e v e d from having t o f i l e r e t u r n s . The t a x
should be c o l l e c t e d on gross income a f t e r exemptions and t h e w i t h h o l d i n g
t a b l e s used by the employer should s e t the f i n a l t a x .
4 . Rather than a general s a l e s t a x , we should have sharp increases i n
many e x i s t i n g excises as w e l l as new excise taxes on broadly consumed b u t
n o t r e a l l y e s s e n t i a l comcKxiities.
THE IHFLATIOKART OAF
The gross i n f l a t i o n a r y gap i s the amount b j which t h e income which
people have l e f t a f t e r taxes exceeds a v a i l a b l e goods and s e r v i c e s a t present
p r i c e s . I f t h i s excess i s 8 .red, no n e t ^ap i o l e f t , a i d p r i c e s do n o t r i s e .
Item 5 i n Table A shows f o r t h e c u r r e n t f i s c a l year the excess o f income
t h a t s u e t be saved t o aevroid a p r i c e r i s e , t h a t i s , - 4 0 b i l l i o n . Table B
shows t h e forms which these savings n i g h t t a k e .
I f a p a r t o f t h e excess i s n o t saved but s p e n t , p r i c e s w i l l
t o balance a v a i l a b l e goods w i t h money demand.
rise
Note t h a t the whole »gsp approach" r e f e r s o n l y t o t h e use o f c u r r e n t income and leaves o u t p o s s i b l e spending from accumulated funds.
etober SB, 1943
g t r l c t l y Confidential
A.
->f
1042
1.
Iaco»*» Payments t o I n a i r i .a?..is
- ?*r»o»al
F i s c a l roar
104?
1444
129.9
1SO.0
£0.0
07.1
80.7
120.0
150.0
*0.J
16.4
16,9
54.1
28.4
40.0
50.8
16,4
W4
Securities
Savings end Loim Associations
T'rlrmte Insurance
L i q u i d a t i o n o f debt
Total
t.O
11.0
.4
5.0
M
16.4
h f l f f e f t f t i n currency
back
^ - o s i t s held bv i R r f i v i w l s
^djuetaent lt*%
4.7
5.
4.
Pin osable Iac^ne
- ? i | i M t i to o r l n U
S.
Arsons 1
Sariags
er
5.7
iartistry
o f d l s o s t b l e Incase
B.
of
Savings * *
( B i l l i o n Dollars)
6.
Personal savings
A.
7.
8.
10.
11.
B.
IS.
c.
A l l i e d Savings
9.6
14.7
*
16.4
^
54.1
(18.0)
(
.5)
( 5.1)
( S^)
(t*f«)
(15.0)
.LML
Table A. *
Figures f o r 1942 and 1945 by U. S. Treasury D i v i s i o n o f
Research end S t a t i s t i c s . Figures f o r 1944 are estimated.
Item One equals n a t i o n a l income :>lus t r a n s f e r payments minus c o r porate savings end employment t a x e s . ( N a t i o n a l income equals
gross n a t i o n a l product minus d e p r e c i a t i o n reserves and business
taxes).
Item Ttsro equals income t a x , V i c t o r y Tax, e s t a t e t a x , g i f t t a x ,
end c e r t a i n excise t a x e s .
Item Four i n c l u d e s o u t l a y s on r e s i d e n t i a l
construction.
Table B. * •
Based on S.E.C. estimates f o r l i q u i d s a v i n g s .
estimates f o r 1944 are n e c e s s a r i l y rough.
The
Item Seven i n c l u d e s purchases o f U n i t e d States Government, State
and l o c a l governments, as w e l l as p r i v a t e s e c u r i t i e s .
Item Eleven based on S.E.C. estimates end i n f o r m a t i o n obtained
from Federal Reserve Deposit Survey.
Item Twelve. I f the s t a t i s t i c s used i n Table A and B were e n t i r e l y
coaoarable, the t o t a l o f a p p l i e d savings and increase i n currency
and d e p o s i t h o l d i n g s should equal t o t a l personal s a v i n g s . The
f i g u r e s do not check c o m p l e t e l y , p a r t l y because o f conceptual d i f ferences and o a r t l y because o f d i f f e r e n c e s i n s t a t i s t i c a l sources.
October 28, 1943.
POSTWAR LIQUIDITY
Ownership o f U. S. Government S e c u r i t i e s
I.
y
( I n b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s )
June 30,
1941
Total Interest-bearing Securities
U. S. Government Agencies
Federal Reserve Banks
Commercial Banks
Mutual Savings Banks
Insurance Companies
Other I n v e s t o r s
Marketable S e c u r i t i e s
Nonciirkstable S e c u r i t i e s
June 30,
1?4?
54.3
"XT
2.2
20.1
3.4
7.0
139.5
U.2
7.2
52.1
5.3
12.3
»
206.1
OCT
14.0
65.3
6.8
17.3
270.6
19.5
74.3
3.3
21.8
•
19.4
23.4
9.4
4.2
T o t a l Money Supply
II.
Estimates
June 30, June 30,
1944
1945
34.2
49.7
49.7
72.0
y
(In b i l l i o n s of dollars)
June 30,
1941
A l l Banks
Deposits
Demand 2 /
Tins
Total
Currency Outside Banks
T o t a l Money Supply
June 30,
1943
June 30,
1944
June 30,
1945
37,317
27,379
65,196
55,952
30,323
36,230
( 68,000)
( 34,300)
(102,300
( 76,000)
( 37,300)
(113,300)
3,204
15,800
( 19,800)
( 3? t 800?
73,400
102,030
(122,100)
(137,100)
}
1/
Purchases o f U. 3. s e c u r i t i e s by t h e o o m e r c i a l banks and t h e Federal
Reserve System a r e e s t i m a t e d a t $20 b i l l i o n f o r t h e f i s c a l year 1944
and $15 b i l l i o n f o r 1945.
2/
Excludes f l o a t , U. S. Government d e p o s i t s , and i n t e r b a n k d e p o s i t s
- 11 -
III.
L i q u i d Holdings o f I n d i v i d u a l s and Businesses
i/
(In billions of dollars)
Dec.
1930
Businesses (except insurance) - t o t a l
Demand d e p o s i t s and currencyTime d e p o s i t s
U. S. Government s e c u r i t i e s
u
1
Individuals - t o t a l
Demand d e p o s i t s and currency
Time d e p o s i t s
U. S. Government s e c u r i t i e s
15
26
1/
15
1
44
8
June 30,
1943
June 30,
1944
June 30,
1945
|53
3
(73)
(103)
(117)
(147)
l
20
36
86
51
28
30
A l l f i g u r e s are e s t i m a t e d . Businesses i n c l u d e b o t h i n c o r p o r a t e d and
u n i n c o r p o r a t e d concerns. Estimates f o r 1944 and 1945 assume $55 b i l l i o n
borrowed each f i s c a l year from i n d i v i d u a l s , non-insurance businesses and
banks. The r e s u l t i n g gross i n l i q u i d assets i s a l l o c a t e d t o businesses
and t o i n d i v i d u a l s , r o u g h l y , o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e p a s t y e a r ' s experience.
October 23, 1943
Tho I n v e n t o r y S i t u a t i o n
I n v e n t o r i e s , except perhaps i n t h e manufacture of -war p r o d u c t s ,
d e c l i n e d somewhat i n the l a s t h a l f of 1942 and t h e f i r s t h a l f o f 1943, b u t
i n r e c e n t months seem t o have increased a l i t t l e .
I n v e n t o r i e s are s t i l l
l a r g e compared w i t h prewar l e v e l s , b u t n o t l a r g o r e l a t i v e t o t h e volume o f
sales.
Data on I n v e n t o r y
(Billion dollars)
Doc. 1939
Manufacturers 1 T o t a l
June 1942
Doc. 1942
June 1943
Aug. 1943
10.7
17.2
17.7
17.2
17.6
5.1
5.6
4.5
1.9
4.3
9.0
8.2
7.9
4.3
5.0
9.7
3.0
8.3
4.8
4.6
9.3
7.4
B.l
4.8
4.3
9.9
7.7
3.2
4.9
4.4
Wholesale
3.5
4.6
4.0
3.9
3.9
Retail Total
Department Stores
Apparel
Other
5.1
0.7
0.7
3.7
7.5
1.4
1.1
5.0
6.4
1.0
0.9
4.5
5.7
1.0
0.8
3.9
6.1
0.9
0.9
4.3
1.
2.
1/
Durable
Nondurable
Raw Materials
I n process
Finished
Department of Commerce, Bureau o f Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
