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held in Landsberg Prison under death sentence. He is extending clemency to 11 war
criminals by commuting death sentences to
life imprisonment and is denying clemency
to two others under like sentences.
The death sentences Imposed by the trial
courts in these cases were originally approved
by Gen. Lucius D. Clay in 1948. General
Clay ordered further reviews of these cases
on the basis of petitions which were filed
on behalf of the prisoners.
J} War Crimes Board of Review and the
then Judge Advocate, European command,
concurred in the finding! that the 13 were
Justly convicted, properly sentenced, and
that there were no reasons or evidence set
forth in the petitions which Justified modification of the death sentences imposed.
General Clay reaffirmed the death sentences
in early 1949.
The cases were aito reviewed by the Judge
Advocate General ht the Army; by a committee headed by/Justice Gordon B. Simpson of the Texas Supreme Court, appointed
by the then Secretary of the Army, Royall
and by committee's of the United States
Congress. Nothing was found by them to
disturb the finding of guilty arrived at by
the courts which tried these prisoners.
Subsequent to reaffirmation of the sentences, the condemned again addressed petitions to General Clay; additionally, to.^the
President of the United States and 6ther
high official^ of the executive department,
to Members of Congress, and petitions to the
United States Supreme Court for writs of
%abeas corpus, two of which were as late as
February 10, 1950. All applications for writs
of habeas corpus were denied by the United
States Supreme Court.
"Since being |n this command," General
Handy stated, " I have received numerous
petitions to extend clemency to these men.
All of these petitions have received thorough
consideration. Each has had ample opportunity to refute evidence against him. Additionally, out of an abundance of oaution,
the trial records have been reviewed many
times. Even at this time, I am Asked to
consider more petitions for clemency. To
allow them could only occasion further delay. Previously submitted petitions have
contained no new evidence of material value
and there is no reason to presume that, If
allowed, additional ones would. I have
studied each of these cases most carefully
and particularly with a view of determining
If there were any reasonable doubts in any
case as to the guilt of the accused or the
severity of the sentence. The sentences of
11 prisoners have been commuted to life.
Their guilt as charged is unquestioned and
their offenses are of such a nature that each
should be required to serve a sentence covering his natural life.
"There are two prisoners to whom I cannot rightfully grant clemency. These prisoners are Schallermair and Schmidt. They
were guilty of atrocities in concentration
camps. I found that they not only contributed to the Infamous record of torture
and killing which Characterised the worst
of the concentration camps but also went
beyond what they were expected to do in
performance of theit duties at their respective camps and, oh their own intlative,
caused'the death of many Inmates.
" I n the concentration camps established
and operated in Germany, hvmdreds of thousands of victims \fere beaten, tortured,
starved, and exterminated by various procedures. The records found at Mauthausen
reflected approximately 72,000 deaths. At
Buchenwald, during the later part of the
war, approximately 5,000 inmates perished
monthly. It was the same in other camps,
and in addition to the main camps, many of
the hundreds of subcamps carried on the
same type of tortures and exterminations.
The infamy of these concentration camps is
well known and requires no further comment.

"George Schallermair, denominated a roll
call leader, was directly in charge of prisoners at Muehldorf, a subcamp of Dachau.
Large numbers of Inmates died as a result
of beatings which he personally administered. Of 300 people brought to the camp
in the fall of 1944, $«ily 72 survived some
4 months later. He visited the morgue daily
with an Inmate dentist to extract the gold
teeth from the dpad bodies from the camp.
There are no factors or arguments which
can possibly Justify clemency in this case.
"Hans Schmidts was the acknowledged
adjutant of,The Buchenwald concentration
camp for approximately" 3 years.
It was
estimated that at one period while Schmidt
was assigned to this camp, approximately
5,000 prisoners, l a u d i n g substantial numbers of/Prench r Russian, Polish, and Czech
nationals, die<( each mohth as a result of
the copdltioite under which they were forced
to livq anjl the Cruelties Inflicted upon them
by thfc >SS. As the SS Adjutant, Schmidt
was la a vqfy responsible position in the
administration of the camps, frequently acting as* the temporary commander during the
absenie of Colonel Pister, the camp commandant. According to the statement of
Pister,' Schmidt participated very actively
in the activities of the camp, and had to be
restrained because he frequently assumed
greater authority than was actually delegated to him.- He was in charge of -fell executions of inmates,, including the execution of
Several hundred phsQners of war by a special
unit called "Commando 99." These executions were carried out to a former horse
stable converted into wha\ appeared to be
a dispensary. As the unsuspecting victims
were purportedly being measured for height,
they were shot in the back! of head with
a powerful air pistol concealed behind the
wall. Sometimes as many as B0 victims were
thus disposed of on a single qfccaslon. Some
of the executions supervised by ' Schmidt
took place in the camp crematory where
the victims were hung frotn hooks of the
wall and slowly strangled /to death. I can
find no basis for clemency in this case.


desperate attempt of the Battle of the Bulge.
General Clay said in his final affirmation of
Peiper's death sentence, 'there is no question
In my mind that Peipey-was, in fact, the
principal in the Malmedy case.' I am
likewise convinced that Peiper was the motivating spirit of/the terror-spreading, killing-prisoners-ojiwar procedure of this spearhead. The vei-y arguments presented in
Peiper's behalf as to his ability as a leader
will convince' any unprejudiced observer that
the killings of prisoners of war which took
place in so many different localities covered
by the operations of his unit could not have
taken pjace without his knowledge and consent, aiid, in fact, without the force of his
driving personality behind them, No fairminded man who knows th3 facts would give
a more severe penalty to any other participant In the Malmedy massacre than is given
to Peiper.
"The record of trial is detailed and voluminous. The evidence is compelling and
has coivyiced everyone who has read it objectively th^t these criminals committed the
acts as founcTby-.the court which tried them.
For four "and a
years the execution of
the sentences has been delayed by a continuous and organized flood of accusations and
statements made to discfedit the trial and
the repeated reviews and studies requested
by and on behalf of the prisoners themselves. However, the record is convincing
that these men are guilty. Investigations
carried on by congressional committees and
the reviews by trained judges have failed to
unearth any facts which support a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of these prisoners.
"The commutation has been based upon
other facts, which are deemed to mitigate
in favor of less severe punishment than
death. First, the offenses are associated with
a confused fluid and jiesperate combat action,
a last attempt to turn the tide of Allied
successes and to reestablish a more favorable
tactical position/ for the Germany Army.
The crimes ar# • definitely distinguishable
from the more deliberate killings in concentration Carfips. Moreover, these prisoners
were of comparatively lower rank and, other
" I have decided to commute the death
than Peiper, they were neither shown to be
sentence imposed on six war criminals conthe ones who initiated nor as far as we know
victed in the Malmedy case to terms of life
the idea of creating a wave of
imprisonment. The commutation of the
frightfulness to precede the advance which
death sentences does'not mean that there
we usually refer to as the Battle of the
is any doubt whatsoever that each was guilty
Bulge. I cannot overlook the fact that the
of the offenses charged. The crimes for
army commander, his chief of staff, and the
which these men were convicted occurred
corps commander are each serving only
in the area of operations of one specific comterms, of Imprisonment. Four of the six
bat unit that spearheaded the Ardennes
condemned in this case were sergeants, one
offensive. No one who has actually read the
was a major, and the highest ranking, Peiper,
record of the trials can question the fact
was a lieutenant colonel.
that 142 unarmed American soldiers who
"Lastly, the Board, headed by Judge Simphad surrendered were" grouped in a field at
son, of the Texas Supreme Court, which rethe Malmedy crossroads and were <hen maviewed this case, though not questioning
chine gunned from armored vehicles which
the guilt of these accused, recommended that
were deployed partially around the group.
these sentences be commuted to life imMany were lattr individually sl>6t and killed
prisonment. The Secretary of the Army
as they lay /wounded on the/ground. One
upon the recommendation of the Judge
hundred thirty-six frozen bodfes in four close
Advocate General recommended that the
rows were found where th«ry had fallen in
sentences to death be reconsidered.
ranks in the snow wherv'the 'bulge' was
"The sentences of GUsfav Heigel, and Max
reduced. All were without'firearms and many
Seidl, both SS sergeants, have been comhad their hands above their heads as they
muted to life iniprfeonment. Although
were held prisoners. Likewise, specific killthese individuals participated actively in the
ings of unarmed, sujrlrendered prisoners of
brutalities of the/concentration camps to
war or civilians at other definite places to wit:
which they were^tisigned for duty, their posiBullingen, Cheneiuf, La Gleize, Stoumont,
tions were relatively subordinate. Though
Wanne, and Petit Thler, were each conclunothing cajr Justify the brutality of their
sively shown to have been committed by
personal conduct, still the records do not
certain specified ones of these nix prisoners.
show that they went out of their way to
"The leader of the combat group which
add 10 the brutalities. I have decided in
perpetrated these crimes was Joachim Pelper.
thepC' cases to commute each of their senHis protagonists represent him as a most
to imprisonment for life.
forceful, Inspiring leader who was the active
. "Hermann Dammann, Richard Schulze and
moving spirit in the actions of his organization. Many petitions submitted in his b e - > Kurt Hans, were sentenced for participating
half have been based solely on the statement
In the murder of American and Allied airmen who parachuted from disabled planes.
that as fine an officer and soldier as he, eOuld
There Is no question as to their responsinot have been guilty of the crimes charged.
bility of these murders. However, certain
I am convinced that Peiper was a remarkmitigating circumstances, such as the ex<j"
able leader; that he was the moving spirit
ment resulting from the aerial activlt
of the armored unit which spearheaded the



offenses being committed after heavy bombing, and the fact that their crimes did not
Bhow a pattern of their character have been
advanced along with many other reasons
which I deem less Important. I feel that
I can commute the death sentence of each
to Imprisonment for life.
"In addition to the review of the cases
of prisoners under death sentence, the European Command War Crimes Modification
Board is in the process of reviewing the
cases of all war criminals confined in Landsberg Prison under the Jurisdiction of the
European Command. Reviews of some 120
cases have been completed. There remain
over 300 noncapital additional cases to be
reviewed. The review of this Board has resulted in recommendations for substantial
modification of sentences. A system of giving credit to prisoners for good conduct time
in line with the best prison practices in the
United States has also been instituted. This
credit for good conduct time has resulted in
the release of 91 war criminals prior to the
expiration of sentences Imposed by the
Mr. President, It Is
apparent to all patriots that our energies must be dedicated to building a
completely adequate defense for our
cov.ntry. A^y preparedness program is
futile if it results in runaway inflation.
It makes little difference to future generations whether our cherished freedoms
are lost through failure to stop C o m munist infiltration at home or through
failure to avoid economic disaster at
home. Our two major problems, therefore. concern manpower and money.
Both are limited.
All our foreign and domestic policies
must be framed in the light of limited
manpower and limited financial resources. W e have hundreds of plans for
various foreign and domestic programs,
but taken together they exceed the
money and manpower available.
example, the Acheson containment plan
involves policing the 20,000-mile Soviet
perimeter with American ground forces.
It would bleed us white both physically
and financially. The Ewing plan for socialized medicine, the Foley plan for socialized defense housing, and the Brannan plan for socialized agriculture are
but a few of the plans based on the assumption that the Federal Treasury is a
bottomless well. W e have many material shortages, Mr. President, but there is
no shortage of administration plans or
Government coordinators. In fact, we
probably have more coordinators than
there are functions to coordinate.
have a plan on almost every conceivable
subject except one—a plan to save
The latest plans to spring into being
are those of the Economic Stabilization
Agency for the control of prices and
wages. As yet, no one, including the
stabilizers themselves, has the faintest
idea about how prices and wages will be
However, the statement
which accompanied the first general
price regulation contains some very i m portant observations on the place of Price
and wage controls in the fight against inflation.
This statement contains some
h a l f - t r u t h s and omits some significant
facts, but it also expresses a great deal
of good commonsense.





It is encouraging to see that the Economic Stabilization Agency recognizes
the enemy it is supposed to fight. Its
statement says in part:
The fact that prices have been frozen by
this regulation should not be Interpreted as
ending the danger of inflation. This would
be to confuse controlling the symptoms of a
disease with its cure. The effect of price
control is not to eliminate inflation, but to
suppress it. Inflation comes about as a
result of a gap between the available supply of goods and the amounts which consumers, business firms, and governments
would like to buy and can pay for. Price
control does not eliminate ihis gap.
According to the ESA statement,
"since June 1950 the country has been in
the throes of a mounting inflation."
That is a half-truth. W e have been the
victims of creeping inflation ever since
the conclusion of World W a r II and of
galloping inflation since January 1950.
The inflation of the past 4 years cannot
be blamed on shortages. From 1947
through 1950 we had the greatest production of civilian goods in our history.
Nevertheless, we have had inflation because the Government's fiscal and credit
policies produced new money and credit
faster than American farms and factories could produce goods.
The Economic Stabilization Agency
says that inflationary pressures began to
develop after the invasion of Korea.
Recognizing that defense spending in
1950 had only a negligible impact on the
economy, the ESA says:
Scare buying and profiteering were major
factors In the sharp price advances which
occurred In the last half of 1950.
Unquestionably, the outbreak of war
in Korea inspired some speculative and
panic buying beginning in July 1950.
However, the ma.1or cause of inflation
throughout 1950 was the administration
EOlto 0LdefiQiL§2g2iding. W e were told
by the Fair Deal medicine men that a
little inflation was a good thing and that
a $43,000,000,000 budget did not have to
be balanced. The myth that the Federal Government does not have to live
within its income has finally been exploded. Mr.
against trying to balance a peacetime
budget of $43,000,000,000 in the fiscal
year 1950, now insists that the 1952
budget of over $71,000,000,000 must be
balanced. However, if we accept all of
the defense mobilization plans offered by
Mr. Truman and his lieutenants, we will
fall many billions of dollars short of paying as we go.

In discussing prior efforts to stabilize
Agency refers to increased taxes, selective credit controls, and the use of priorities and allocations powers. The statement of the ESA continues:
Moreover, the President, prior to the passage of the Defense Production Act and since,
has repeatedly urged business, labor, farmers,
and consumers to exercise restraint In their
buying and selling.
The ESA maintains a discreet silence
about the necessity of having the President exercise a similar restraint. It is



futile for Mr. Truman to denounce business as usual and spending as .usual as
long as his administration continues to
be the worst example of these attitudes.
W e have already passed legislation which
seems adequate to protect us against
profiteering on Government contracts
and on war-created shortages. Our
most dangerous type of profiteer, however, is the political profiteer. In the
1952 budget we see how the political
profiteer has dressed up all of his discredited proposals in the uniform of national defense. Congress not only must
cut out all nonessential spending, but
also must learn to distinguish between
the less essential and more essential
forms of Government spending.
In speaking of its general ceiling-price
regulation, ESA says:
Because of the comprehensive character
of this action and the need for speed. It has
not been practicable to establish committees of representatives of the persons substantially affected by this general ceilingprice regulation and to consult with them.
The truth of the statement just quoted is questionable. The Defense Production Act was signed by the President
on September 8, 1950. The Economic
Stabilization Agency was created less
than 2 weeks later. It has had ample
time to consult with representatives of
business and labor in the formulation of
its regulations. In that bill Congress
made such consultation mandatory. If
officials of the ESA had followed the procedure prescribed by law, a great deal
of confusion and countless inequities
made inevitable by the present regulations might have been avoided, and thus
we might have been able to avoid the
very critical situation which exists at
this very hour; for if the ceiling on
wages, as fixed by the Board, is broken,
there likely will be no stability to the
economic stabilization program at any
time in the future.
The fact that some of the Members of
Congress do not agree, and then bring
political pressure to bear upon the heads
of the agency, is no reason why the
American people should not be protected
by a sound wage-scale regulation fixed
by the majority.
Even though price and wage controls
merely suppress inflation temporarily,
there is no question but that the American people are entitled to this temporary
relief against rising prices. It is certainly not the fault of the American
housewife that the effective weapons
against inflation have not yet been fully
and effectively utilized. The Congress
was persuaded on the ground that such
authority was needed immediately, to
pass price- and wage-control legislation without even holding hearings.
Now, after almost 5 months, the pricecontrol agency is reported to have only
about 600 employees with which to con-*
trol billions of daily sales transactions.
With such a limited staff, any general
price-control order can be nothing more
than an empty gesture.

It is encouraging to note that Mr.
Johnston and Mr. DiSalle seem to be
aware of the dangers which general



price and wage control involve.
very great danger is described by them
in this language:
It must be clearly understood that, even
If price control does a perject job In holding the prices of Individual commodities, It
Is powerless to Insure that the essential
commodities will be produced in the right
quantitiesIn a free economy, prices reflect the
combined judgment of millions of producers, distributors, and consumers.
W h e n the votes of millions of consumers in the market-place register an increased demand through a higher price,
increased production of the article
comes quickly and automatically-. Even
if the most able men in America were
assigned to the job of price control,
they would be unable to satisfy the demands of the public one-tenth as effectively as a free economy can. It is inevitable that price and wage controls will
curtail production of many things which
are vitally needed. Instead of blaming
the price administrators for mistakes
which are inevitable, we should hold
them accountable for first, providing m a chinery f o r the prompt correction of
mistakes and inequities; second, acting
in accordance with the price- and wagecontrol statute—and I dare say they
have not done so; and, third, adopting
policies which will facilitate the removal
of price and wage controls at the earliest possible date.
Another danger inherent in price and
wage controls is that they breed disunity
and social conflict.
Many employers
who suffer as a result of price ceilings
put the blame on excessively high wages.
Many workers trace their hardships in
a controlled economy to profiteering by
business. Furthermore, many consumers charge that farmers have been
favored for political reasons, and many
farmers try to shift the blame to that
familiar devil the middleman. People
who live on static incomes blame the
price-control agency for sacrificing them
in favor of business, labor, and farm
pressure groups. Price and wage controls are politically attractive because
they sugar-coat, at least temporarily,
the sacrifices which an emergency requires. In the past, price and wage controls have been proposed as a painless
remedy for inflation. It is hardly surprising that every group in our society
seeks to avoid that pain by transferring
it to some other group. The fact, of
course, is that our present mobilization
effort will require a lower standard of
living for everyone who is not already
at the subsistence level. In the long
run, it is much better to face these sacrifices by resorting to measures which
prevent inflation instead of concealing
it temporarily. No matter how hard the
sacrifices may seem, we could at least
accept them as a united—not divided—

Mr. Eric Johnston has stated on several occasions that price and wage controls should be viewed only as stop-gap
measures in the fight against inflation.
I n issuing its general price-control order,
the ESA observed that in preventing inflation " m a j o r reliance must be placed

upon vigorous taxation ancLcredit policy." I agree wholeheartedly with that
statement except that I would add as
equally important a drastic reduction in
proposed Government spending and the
encouragement of individual saving.
Taxation is one of our best weapons
in the fight against inflation. To prevent inflation without reducing the
President's budget, it would be necessary
to raise an additional $16,500,000,000 in
taxes and probably more. It is unlikely
that we can raise this much in additional
taxes without impairing the productivity
of our economy. Corporate, individual,
and excise tax rates are already close to
the record levels which prevailed during World W a r II. Increasing existing
tax rates would be a simple matter if
we were not already close to the point
of diminishing returns. Higher taxes
are inflationary when they become
so confiscatory as to stifle production,
kill incentives for profits and efficiency,
and keep workers from entering the
labor force.
To the extent that taxes can be increased without adding to inflationary
pressures, higher taxes are much better
than a price-and-wage-control straitjacket. The great advantage in fighting
inflation with taxation is that consumer
rationing can be avoided. Taxes are, in
effect, a rationing of money. Higher
taxes would give almost all of us less to
spend, but no bureaucrat would tell us
how many shoes or how much meat- we
could buy.
By rationing money and
credit instead of goods we would not have
the black-market problem^ which is
bound to confront us under wage and
price controls in peacetime.
It is now clear that we did not tax
ourselves enough during World W a r n .
Taxes and sales of bonds to nonbank
investors fell about 25 percent short of
paying for the cost of the last war.
This deficit was financed inside the commercial banking structure, with the result that the 1939 dollar is today worth
only 55 cents in purchasing power.
It would be absurd, of course, to reduce
individual income through taxation and
allow the reduced income to be supplemented by easy credit. For that reason
the Defense Production Act provides for
consumer-credit controls and control of
Nothing has been done, however, to
restrain general credit expansion by
making it more expensive for business
to borrow money. The Federal Reserve
Board .has ample power to fight inflation by reducing the over-all supply of
money and credit. However, the Board
cannot make the cost of borrowing
money more expensive for banks and
their customers without also making the
cost higher for the Federal Government.
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder r e cently announced that the cheap-money
policy made possible by Federal Reserve
Board support of the Government securities market would be continued.
is this policy which, in the words of
Marriner S. Eccles, "makes the entire
banking system, through the action of
the Federal Reserve System, an engine
of Inflation." Congress, and not Secretary Snyder, should decide whether it
is more important to have cheap money


ln^the interest of debt management or
to'preserve the value of the dollar by
making the cost of money more expensive.
If we fail to reduce Government spending, restrict credit, or increase taxes
enough to avoid a deficit, our only chance
of preventing inflation is to borrow from
nonbank sources.
agrees with the statement of the Economic Stabilization Agency that inflation "destroys the value of savings and,
therefore, the motive to save," and that
" i t creates a panic flight from liquid
assets to goods."
There is no question
that that situation exists at this very
Any banker or savings and
loan official, if asked, will give the record
of the past few months to show that
money is being withdrawn from savings
and put into materials and goods. There
is grave danger that the economic and
fiscal policies hitherto pursued by this
administration have already destroyed
for millions of Americans the incentive
to save. W e must take our heads out
of the sand and face this question: Do
the American people have enough condefer current spending by investing in
Government bonds?
During the last war bonds were sold
to the public in huge quantities.
that time, however, the Treasury could
point to the fact that the purchasing
power of the dollar had remained fairly
constant for more than 70 years.
man who bought a $75 bond in 1941 was
promised $100 in 1951.
The Federal
Government will fulfill the letter of its
obligation, but the bondholder knows
that he will receive only $55 worth of
purchasing power. There are signs that
existing bondholders and the general
public are weighing the possibility of •
cheaper dollars in the future.
In several recent months bond redemptions
have exceeded sales. The boom in farm
land is attributed in part to attempts
to hedge against inflation.
The greatest mistake we can make is to assume
that no matter what Congress does, the
American people will extend their E
bonds and buy additional bonds in sufficient quantities to prevent inflation. In
my opinion, the American people will
make a substantial investment in Government bonds only if they have reasonable assurance that the value of the
dollar will not be further depreciated.
Sales talk is not enough.
Only by the
following deeds can we assure the American people that the integiito of the
dollar will be maintained: (^irp/elimination of all nonessential (government
spending: <gEconq^a~dherenCjy IU a iiiubliization plan which makes efficient use or
our jjmited manpower and money; and
t a determined effort to finance the
5ilization program on a pay-as-yougo basis.


For the past 18 years we have been
told by economists of the New Deal and
the Fair Deal that the size of the n a tional debt is a matter of no importance.
Their favorite bromide was "we owe it to
ourselves." Tfoe great majority of. our
the significance of ths fact they not only
owe but also own the national debt. T h e



savings of almost every American citizen
would be wiped out if our debt were repudiated either directly or indirectly by
wild inflation. So long as confidence in
the dollar can be maintained we can
handle a national debt even in excess of
what we now have. But if confidence in
the dollar is lost through the prospect
of runaway inflation, it is immaterial
whether the national debt is $100,000,000,000 or $300,000,000,000. No system
of a price control and rationing can
stop a panic-stricken flight from the dollar to obtain real wealth in the form of
materials and property.
The present financial condition of the
Federal Government makes it not only
immoral but probably impossible to
finance our mobilization effort by inflation. While inflation can be regarded
as an indirect form of taxation, it preys
upon the most helpless and most deserving groups in our society. Anyone who
advocates another dose of inflation for
the economy is, in effect, proposing a
capital levy on the value of all annuities, pensions, bonds, life-insurance policies, and savings accounts.
Only by
adopting courageous monetary, fiscal,
and credit policies can we hope to avoid
economic disaster in the years ahead.



Our present national emergency Is
unique in one vital respect. The present
emergency may last for 5,10, 20 years, or
even longer. W e remember that when
General Eisenhower was here he emphasized the fact that it might continue for
a period of 20 years. W e cannot blindly
follow the methods which were employed
in response to emergencies of limited
duration and hope to escape jiisaster.
The need for skillful leadership and
careful planning is far more important
today than it ever was during World
W a r II. After Pearl Harbor there was
never much doubt that victory over the
Axis Powers would come within a relatively short period. It was possible to
adopt economic policies which were suitable for a temporary war period, but
which would have been disastrous as
long-range policies. The last war proved
that our economy can be completely regimented for a short period, that the
American, people will accept all-out controls on a temporary basis, and that the
patriotism kindled by war makes it possible to have inflation without loss of
confidence in the currency. In a longrange preparedness program, however,
we cannot ignore economic principles.
W e must keep the cost of a more or less
permanent mobilization program within
our ability to pay for it. If we fail to
do so, we will lose our freedom through
overwhelming debt and massive inflation
without Russia firing a single shot.
Where is the pver-all plan for a long-

today is executive leadership.
Unfortunately, thftrft is S S m b S S S E S i B S S u f t I
fnr ciir>h loQrforchip avnop*
A y f l g jn
A blueprint for national defense m o bilization would tell us the maximum
number of men we could, in the absence
of all-out war, place in the Armed Forces
without hampering production or exceeding our ability to pay. With this
figure definite, everyone would be able
to form an intelligent conclusion as to
how many American soldiers, if any,
should be provided for international land
Our educational institutions
and our young people would be able
to make plans for the future. But we
have no such blueprint.
The recommended size of the Armed Forces i n creases almost from day to day. Are
we to drift by degrees into an army of
4,000,000, then 6,000,000, and eventually
A blueprint for national defense m o bilization would specify the peacetime
spending which must be curtailed and
the peacetime proposals which must be
shelved for the duration. W e not only
have no such blueprint, but practically
every Government
agency is clamoring for more money and
more employees to perform work in the
magic name of national defense.
A blueprint for national mobilization,
short of all-out war, would indicate exactly how much material would be required for our own Armed Forces and
for military aid to foreign countries.
However, no one, in or out of the executive branch, has any clear idea of what
military spending will amount to or how
it will be spent. As a result business and
labor do not know to what extent they
must shift to defense production.
A blueprint for national mobilization
would, coordinate monetary, fiscal and
credit policies with a view to eliminating
price and wage controls at an early date.
In the absence of such a blueprint, and
in spite of Mr. Johnston's announced intentions, we can never get rid of price
and wage controls.
I have nn rinnht that Congress will do
tirifh ii/hiph tA mnrk— with our specialized committee system, and the absence
of information which the executive departments have, it is practically impossible for us to devise a long-range m o bilization plan. Only Mr. Truman can
provide such a plan
It is. time for him
to caafc asirip all ntiier nlans and r.oncflnkafce nn a nlan which is concerned
prpsprvat.inn n£ thfl
American way of life in the critical years
whirh lip 5E55C " ° W fo tflfiffTTMrfP r
thfi Prurient, tn forget narrow. SPTPid
which .sspm at this time j&Jae,actuating
vprv miif.h of what he does.

I n the coming pionths we will hear much
about shortages of tin, zinc, nickel,
skilled labor, housing, and many others.
All these shortages can be overcome by
the ingenuity of the American people
and their ability to substitute and to
improvise. Our most critical shortage

Mr. HUNT. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate stand in recess until 12
o'clock noon tomorrow.
The motion was agreed to; and (at
2 o'clock and 54 minutes p. m.) the
Senate took a recess until tomorrow,
Tuesday, February 27, 1951, at 12 o'clock



Executive nominations received by the
Senate February 26 (legislative day of
January 29), 1951:


Ben Hibbs, of Pennsylvania, to be a member of the United States Advisory Commission on Information for a term expiring
January 27, 1954, and until his successor has
been appointed and qualified, vice Mark
Foster Ethridge, resigned.

James R. Wright, of Texas, to be United
States marshal for the northern district of
Texas. He is now serving in this office under
an appointment which expired January 24,




James E. Colliflower, for a term of 5 years,
effective on and after March 4, 1951.

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United
States in the grades and corps specified,
under the provisions of section 506 of the
Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law
381, 80th Cong.), title II of the act of August
5, 1947 (Public Law 365, 80th Cong.), PubUc
Law 36, Eightieth Congress, as amended by
Public Law 514, Eighty-first Congress, and
Public Law 625, Eightieth Congress, subject
to physical qualification:
To be lieutenant colonel
John P. Kellogg, Jr., MC, 0230050.
7"o be majors•
Arren C. Buchanan, Jr., MC, 01689921.
Joseph W. Cooch, MC, 0476993.
James R. Drake, MC, 0371656.
Charles F. Kramer, MC, 0461082.
Francisco T. Roque, MC, 01897087.
Peter S. Scoles, MC, 0977064.
Charles E. Tegtmeyer, MC, 0335197.
3*o be captains
James P. Albrite, MC, 0983789.
Cora L. Allebach, ANC, N767038.
Margaret F. Alt, WMSC, M458.
Louise S. Andersland, WMSC, J100042.
Robena C. Anderson, ANC, N760086.
Louise P. Appel, ANC, N776730.
Dorothy M. Atwood, ANC, N800115.
Hazel Belsit, ANC, N736065.
Bernice D. Brandt, ANC, N730555.
Mary Breazeale, WMSC, R84.
Rachel V. Briggs, ANC, N731483.
Treva B. Brookens, ANC, N724687.
Mary L. Burrows, ANC, N762512.
Marjorie J. K. Burts, ANC, N783828.
Samuel W. Caldwell, MC, 0447880.
Helen L. Callentine, ANC, N728324.
Irving H. Canfleld, MC, 0474732.
Margaret R. Cannon, ANC, N771862.
Gracie L. Chapman, ANC, N734009.
Louise M. Clifford, ANC, N700956.
Ruth L. Craig, ANC, N800006.
Bess Crim, ANC, N727499.
Geneva H. Culpepper, ANC, N755251.
Mabel E. Dayton, ANC, N743221.
Pamela E. Duer, WMSC, M2375.
Anita M. Dumas, ANC, N790099.
Anna D'Zurko, ANC, N725880.
Bernice E. Epps, ANC, N763854.
Hazel E. Evans, ANC, N722276.
Adele F. Foreman, ANC, AN703172.
Margaret A. Fournelle, ANC, N703800.
Bruna G. Fusi, ANC, N721750.
John F. Geer, DC, 0960673.
Julia T. Graves, ANC, N754449.
Alice Gunlogson, ANC, N733003.
Pauline A. C. Gustafson, ANC, N735552.
Thomas A. Haedicke, MC, 01756156.
Laura R. Hagen, ANC, N771467.
Helen Harnett, ANC, N744157.
Dorothy B. Harper, ANC, N745335.