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245 -4- (c) For the purpose of keeping to a minimum the cost to the United States of participation in the Fund and the Bank, the Score- tary of the Treasury, after paying the subscription of the United States to the Fund, and any part of the subscription of the United States to the Bank required to be made under article II, Section 7(i) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank, is authorized and directed to issue special notes of the United States from time to time at par and to doliver such notes to the Fund and the Bank in exchange for dollars to the extent permitted by the respective articles of Agreement. The special notes provided for in this subsection shall be issued under the authority and subject to 6 the provisions of the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, and the purposes for which securities may be issued under that Act are extended to include the purposes for which special notes are authorized and directed to be iss ed under this subsection, but such notes shill bcar no interest, shall be nonnegotiable and shall be payable on demand of the Fund or the Bank as the case may be. The face amount of special notos issued to the Fund under the authority o' this subsection and outstanding at any one time shall not exceed in the aggregate the amount of the subscrip- tion of the United States actually paid to the Fund, and the face amount of such notes issued to the Bank and outstanding at any one time shall not exceed in the aggregate the amount of the sub- scription of the United States actually paid to the Bank under Article II, Section 7(i) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank. (d) Any payment made to the United States by the Fund or the Bank as a distribution of not income shall bc covered into the Treasury as 3 miscellaneous receipt. Obtaining and Furnishing Information Sec. 9. So long as the United States is n member of the Fund or of the Bank, the President may require at any time, in the mannor and under the ponaltics provided in section 5(b) of the Trading with the enemy Act (40 Stat. 415, U.S.C., 1940 cd., 246 -5- title 50 App., Sec. 5), as amended, the furnishing of-(a) any data that may be requested by the Fund under Article VIII, Section 5, of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund; and (b) any data of the type which may be required under such section 5(b) and which in his judgment is essential for the guid- ance of the United States in its participation in the Fund or the Bank. Financial Transactions with Foreign Governments in Default Sec. 10. The Act entitled "An Act to prohibit financial transactions with all foreign government in default on its obligations to the United States", approved April 13, 1934 (48 Stat. 574, U.S.C., 1940 ed., title 31, SOC. 804a), is amended by adding at the end thereof a new section to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Chile any foreign government is n member both of the International Monetary Fund and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, this Act shall not apply to the sale or pur chase of bonds, securities, or other obligations of such government or any political subdivision thereof or of any organization or association acting for or on behalf of such govern- ment or political subdivision, or to the making of any loan to such [overnment, political subdivision, organization or associntion." Jurisdiction and Venue of Actions Sec. 11. For the purpose of any action which may be brought within the United States or its territorios or possessions by or against the Fund or the Bank in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund or the articles of Agreement of the Bank, the Fund or the Bank, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be an inhabitant of the Federal judicial district in which its principal office in the United States is located, and any such action 247 -6- at law or in equity to which either the Fund or the Bank shall be a party, shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of any such action. When either the Fund or the Bank is a defendant in any such action, it may, at any time before the trial thereof, remove such action from a State court into the district court of the United States for the proper district by following the procedure for removal of causes otherwise provided by law. Status, Immunities and Privileges Sec. 12. The provisions of Article IX, Sections 2 to 9, both inclusive, and the first sentence of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund and the provisions of Article VII, Sections 2 to 9, both inclusive, and Article VI, Section 5(i) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank shall have full forco and effect in the United States and its territories and possessions upon acceptance of membership by the United States in, and the establishment of, the Fund and the Bank respectively. 248 Strictly Confidential Letter VII American Embassy Chungking February 25, 1945 Dear Mr. White: Have gone into the question of the cotton barter plan in some detail in my letter to Friedman, where I indicated that it is worth trying out subject to a number of qualifications, some of a non-economic character. These non-economic qualifications raise far-reaching military and political considerations which are not altogether impertinent, but which it is outside my duties to raise with the Army authorities here. After all, it is they who decide whether and under what conditions to train Central Government divisions, and how many, just as it is for them to decide whether to undertake to feed them for the Chinese Government. Nevertheless, one cannot refrain from expressing skepticism as to the wisdom of those decisions. But granted those decisions, a prima facie case exists for trying out the cotton barter plan. As for the political situation here, more and more evidence is accumulating tending to support the view that the Central Government intends to do as little fighting as it possibly can against the Japanese, that it has no serious intention of arriving at a compromise with the Communists (Time's correspondent here sent an excellent story to his paper on the course of the Kuomintang-Communist Party negotiations, but Henry Luce killed it after it had been passed by our Army censors and the Chinese authorities. The Newsweek correspondent also sent in a fair story, but I don't know whether his paper took it or not.) and that it would prefer to use such training and equipment as we give its armies to squash the Communists by force. 249 -21. There has recently been a reorganization of the top leadership of the Chinese Army. Strange to say, this has been in the direction of strengthening the hold of Ho Ying-chin and his satellites over the Army in the field and of depriving those generals who have proved themselves in actual combat against the Japanese of active command of troops in favor of Ho's men and of men with more ex- perience in gendarme work than on the field of battle. Ho himself has been put in charge of the best Chinese Army in Yunnan - the American general attached to this Army has a purely advisory capacity. Hu Tsung-nan, whose armies have maintained the tight blockage in the Northwest, has been promoted to the commandership of the First War Zone. Li Tsung-ren who with Chang Fa-kwei has contributed to the high esteem in which the Kwangsi armies have been held is replaced by the head of the Chungking gendarmerie who enjoys a particularly odious reputation for corruption and general skulduggery. Ho's man Koo Je-dung retains command of the crucial zone of Kiangsi, Hunan, and Anhwei. Li Tsung-ren is not the only field commander who has been taken off active duty. Chang Fa-kwei has no independent command and Cheng Chen is holding a desk job. Cheng Chen is reputed by foreigners to be China's ablest field commander. As Minister of War he can do very little for the Army without the Generalissimo's consent and he cannot fight the Japanese. One might be tempted to say plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose, were it not for the fact that the changes are for the worse. 2. In line with the above appointments are the appointment of Admiral Chan Shak as Mayor of Canton and General Ho Kwo-gong as Governor of 250 -3Formosa. The Generalissimo is not paying any attention to helping in the recapture of Canton. Instead he appoints a man as Mayor who has had no civil administrative experience but whose chief qualification is that he is one of Tai Li's leading operatives, and whose specific assignment is to organize "guerrillas" to wipe out the Communist guerrillas in Kwangtung. As for Ho Kwo-gong, his appointment must send a shudder through the hearts of the Formosan Chinese. Ho is a former national head of the gendarmerie, an organization whose reputation in China there is no need to spell out. 3. There has recently been fierce fighting south of the Yangtze between Communist guerrillas - presumably of the New Fourth Army - on the one hand and Central Government troops and Tai Li "guerrillas", some of them trained and equipped by Miles formerly of the O.S.S. and now of the Navy, on the other. Apparently the Communists were trying to get behind the Japanese lines south of the Yangtze, where they wanted to carry on the same kind of warfare against the Japanese in South China as they have in North China. With respect to Miles, the following two stories are worth narrating. (a) He has indicated to other Americans that he is in favor of the complete extermination of the Chinese Communists by the Central Government by force. (b) Tai Li's organization has asked Lend-Lease for dictaphones and lie-detectors four times, only to be turned down each time; as Joyner of Lend-Lease says, what Tai Li needs is truth-detectors. Nevertheless, Miles has supplied them with some dictaphones and lie-detectors. 251 -4. A representative of Wang Ping-shen, the Generalissimo's expert on Japan and also a Secret Service man, approached the British with a scheme for declaring a large part of Shanghai an open city. This open city was not to be bombed or shelled, it was to be run by some prominent Chinese now in Shanghai in conjunction with a representative of Wang and the foreigners now interned in Shanghai who were to be released (the scheme contains no indication of how the enemy was to be persuaded to relinquish control of the most important sections of Shanghai or to release internees), and the Japanese were to withdraw from it. The presumed objectives of the scheme among others were to facilitate the restoration of China's economic life, to protect foreign property, to test out Soviet policy toward Japan and China, and to provide a haven for "pacifistic" Japanese. There are several points worthy of comment. (a) It is significant that Wang Ping-shen approached the British and not us. After all, it is we who are running the war in the Far East and we should have been the logical people to approach. (Wang was not to know that the British would turn the scheme over to us.) But the Chinese feel that the British are more likely to agree to an appeasement scheme with respect to the Japanese than we would; fortunately they turned out to be wrong. (b) Many high officials in Chungking possess property in Shanghai which they hate to see subjected to the fortunes of war. It is common knowledge that Wu Tei-chen, of whom more anon, continues to draw income from his Shanghai real estate, and he is by no means the largest holder. 252 -5 (c) Wang Ping-shen is known to favor a soft peace for Japan; therefore his talk of providing a haven of refuge for "pacifistic" Japanese (they were very pacifistic at Pearl Harbor1) is merely a cloak for covering up appeasement activities. (d) The Central Government wishes to ensure its control over Shanghai and to limit, if not to eliminate, American military and Chinese guerrilla activity to a minimum in the vicinity. It is not important to them that Shanghai is a key military and economic base for the Japanese. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the whole proposal smacks of appeasement. (e) The reference to testing out Soviet policy is somewhat cryptic. Presumably it is an allusion to Chinese Communist guerrilla activities or possible activities. 5. You will suspect that I am appending the following story in order to tax your credulity, but it was guaranteed to me by one of the highest American authorites here whose judgment and veracity I have never had any occasion to doubt. Wu Tei-chen, the Secretary-General of the Kuomintang, is a former gangster and leader of the Shanghai underworld. He recently approached a foreign Catholic on what he said was a very urgent question. He understood that the American Jesuits had a surefire method of combatting Communism, and it was most vital for the Kuomintang to find out about it. Wu is now trying to contact American Jesuits here in order to learn what the sure-fire weapon is. I suppose there is no use in telling him that the American way of fighting communism, the best that has ever been devised, is to have the highest standard of living in the world. 253 -6- To indicate the present status of Kuomintang-Communist Party relations, in line with 5 above, but from the opposite angle, it is worth mentioning that a recent broadcast from Yenan monitored by our O.W.I. here, while welcoming the position of honor given to China at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference, demands that the Kuomintang be given only a third of China's representation and that the other 2/3 be given the Communists and the democratic parties. Obviously such a proposal would never have been made if the Communists thought there was much chance of a successful compromise between them and the Kuomintang. By making such a demand they are saying about as unmistakeably as possible that they have no faith in the Central Government's intentions. The fighting reported in 3 above should not be regarded as an immediate prelude to civil war; the Central Government still feels itself too weak and is waiting until its armies in Yunnan and Kweichow are trained and equipped by the USAF in China. At the same time, it is necessary to stress that the internal situation in China is deteriorating and will continue to deteriorate unless outside forces bring about a change for the better. Unfortunately it cannot be said that the present trend of American policy either in the military or political sphere is calculated to bring about such a change. It is not an unfair interpretation of U.S. policy under Hurley to state that it has underwritten a regime which is utilizing the underwriting to prepare for civil war and that if things go on as at present this policy is, to quote Hamlet, "miching mallecho", though with less awareness than Hamlet had when he planned the play within a play. 254 -Nothing is more likely to precipitate a civil war than our training and equipping 36 Chinese Divisions without any political conditions and even with - under Hurley - a guarantee that we shall wholly or solely support the Central Government. It is a terrible and frightening conclusion to have to arrive at that if civil war does eventuate in China we shall not be able to escape a large part of the responsibility. Yet it is one borne out by all the facts and evidence. Fortunately it is still too early to conclude that civil war is inevitable. It can be prevented by one or both of the following: 1. A change in American policy. While it is arbitrary to separate military from political policy in this context, it helps to simplify the discussion. (a) Political. The Hurley policy is doomed to failure. We don't know yet whether he is returning or not, but if he does it would make a change more difficult to initiate. It is interesting to note that the boys in the Embassy are planning to recommend to the State Department that we begin sending arms to the Communists with which to fight the Japs without asking for the Generalisa mo's consent. They want to make this recommendation first on military grounds and second on the ground that it would be the most effective means of achieving internal Chinese unity, for the Generalissimo would soon have to change his tune if he knew that he did not enjoy a monopoly of American support. The Embassy boys hope to get this recommendation in before Hurley reaches Washington so as to indicate their strong disapproval 255 -of the line he has been following. However, one should not expect too much in the way of the initiation of a change of this character from the State Department. The people in the field have to cross many hurdles, including Dooman and Ballantine not to mentionDunn, even before their proposal reaches Grew, Stettinius and Hopkins. (b) Military. I have already indicated that Wedemeyer is beginning to have doubts about the extent to which the Kuomintang forces we are training will really participate in an offensive against the Japanese; many people believe if they are not convinced that they will only participate to the minimum extent necessary to save Chinese face and to ensure that the supplies brought in by any American force landing on the China coast will reach Chiang's own troops. Wedemeyer already feels that it is worthwhile broaching the question of supplying the Communists with small arms with Marshall and with the President, if possible. Naturally he is groping and feeling his way. But his attitude will certainly be strengthened with the passage of time and with increasing disillusionment with the Kuomintang armies (this is precisely what happened to Stilwell and Wedemeyer's position will be stronger precisely because of what did happen to Stilwell). Here again, so much depends on the reaction in Washington, which will in turn partly depend on our grand strategy against Japan, that it is impossible to make a definitive prediction from this end. 2. A change in the Far Eastern situation resulting from Russian participation in the war against Japan. The exact impact of Russian participation will naturally depend on the conditions under which it takes place, and specifically on whether her strategy will be co-ordinated with ours. 256 -The continuance of the present situation in China hardly contributes to either the hastening of Russia's entry into the Far Eastern War or the facilitating of co-ordination between us and Russia, if she does enter. The very possibility of such entry should enhance our anxiety to do whatever we can to bring about Chinese unity, or otherwise there may well be messy complications both in the military and political sheres. One of the strongest points of the Embassy people advocating a forward policy in China is that we are missing a magnificent opportunity to establish friendly relations with the Chinese Communists and to win their confidence. They argue that at present the Chinese Communists are not tied with Russia and that we can make a link with them before the Russians can, but that the way we are going about things will inevitably result in alienating them and throwing them into the arms of the Russians. But it would be a mistake to assume that Russian participation in the Far Eastern War will of itself and automatically bring about an improvement in the Chinese situation. A couple of years ago, in vastly different circumstances it must be admitted, the Generalissimo was most anxious to involve Russia in the war against Japan because he thought it would provide him with the pretext for pushing the Chinese Communists out of their bases in North China which he would then be able to occupy painlessly. Now he is afraid of Russian participation because whatever else it does it will not strengthen his hand in Manchuria and North China. The trouble is that he is so stubborn and Bourbon-like in his inability to learn that the policies he might be tempted to pursue on Russia's entry might result in the bifurcation of China. The aim of our policy 257 - 10 in such a situation should be to maximize Allied military and political cooperation and to facilitate the political unity of China, in the accomplishment of neither of which aims will the Generalissimo be a ready partner, unless he sees no alternative. It is clear that, however we envisage the various possible contingencies in China, American policy is a factor of decisive weight and significance. In any case, the widely held view that Russian participation in the Far Eastern War is not merely a possibility but a probability gives the whole question of our policy toward China an urgency it might not other- wise have. Certainly, it cannot be left in the hands of bunglers like Hurley, if we wish to arrive at the kind of international understanding in the Far East we have reached in Europe. Without such understanding only Polyannas would expect the Chinese situation to improve spontaneously. And without such improvement, China may well experience troubles on a scale which will make what has happened in the liberated European countries look like small potatoes. With best wishes and kindest regards to your wife and daughters, Yours sincerely, (signed) Sol Adler The New York Times. FEB 25 1945 Text of Hitler's Message to the Nazi twenty-fifth anniversary of the announcement of the National Social- Party Meeting ist Party's program, as trans ment when. for the twenty-fifth time, that date is being com- memorated on which the fundamental program of our movement was proclaimed and approved in Munich The evening of the twenty. fourth of February was, under the auspices of prudence, a develop- ment the significance of which probably only today becomes clear to us in its terrible meaning. An irreconcilable enemy was already at that time united in a common struggle against the German peo- ple. in the same manner as it is today. The unnatural alliance between exploiting capitalism and destructive bolshevism that threatens to strangle the entire world today has been the enemy to which we threw down the gauntlet on Feb. 24. 1920, in order to safeguard the existence of our nation. The same as in these years, the appar- ently contradictory factor in the cooperation of such extreme forces was only the expression of a unique desire of a common in- stigator and profiteer. Interna- tional Jewry has long used both forms for the annihilation of the liberty and social welfare of na- tions. Sees a Different Relch However, there is an enormous difference between the Germany of 1920 and the Germany of 1945. The Germany of 1920 had been completely paralyzed, the Germany of today is defending herself with the utmost fanaticism. The social order of 1920 had been antiquated and was bound to collapse. Today there exists an unshakable community of the people. If the former Germany had pos- seased only a small fraction of the power of resistance inspiring a mitted by Berlin and recorded by The Associated Press, follows: The consciousness of my duty and my work does not allow me to leave headquarters at the mo- and men by this Jewish plague are the most terrible fate ever strucNon, there would be neithe German Empire nor a Germa conceived by human beings. people today. Providence shows no mercy weak nations, but recognizes t The text of a message by Adolf Hitler "on the occasion of the th This Jewish bolshevist annihilation of nations and its west- ern European and American pro- right of existence only of sound curers can be met only in one that and the strong nations. The fact way: by using every ounce of National Socialist move strength with the extreme fanatiment in 1933 succeeded .after clem and stubborn steadfastness roughly thirteen years in gaining that merciful God gives to men power by legal means was the in hard times for the defense of result of a stubborn and hard their own lives. struggle that often seemed to be hopeless. Charges Alliance With Satan Who dares to deny that even All those who weaken will be the strongest will power would crushed and left to decay. In the have not sufficed this dety same manner as once the coward devilish coalition threatening us bourgeois compromise parties today without Germany's successbeen first driven into a corful material rearmament after had ner by the bolahevist wave and the National Socialist revolution then swept away, all those Nobody but the foolish bourgeois states will disappear can believe that the flood from bourgeois whose stupid represents the east would not have come if today think that they can conGermany had met it with theo- tives clude a treaty with the devil. retical international laws instead cherishing the hope that they will of guns, tanks and planes be more cunning than he is Just as the Hun assault could satanic. not be beaten back by plous It is a gruesome repetition of wishes or fair warnings. just as the former inner German process the invasion of our country from that is now going on in a giganto the southeast in the course of can- turies was not warded off by diplomatic tricks, and the Mongolian onslaught did not spare old monuments of culture, this danger also will not be overcome by right in itself but only by strength sup porting this right. Cites Right of Self-Defense Right itself is nothing but the duty to defend the life entrusted in us by the Creator of the world. It is the sacred right of self- preservation Whether this selfpreservation will be successful de- pends solely on the greatness of our efforts and on willingness to make any sacrifice to preserve this life for the future. Attila's power was broken not at a meeting of the League of Nations but in battle on the Catalaunian Plains. Not at a talking shop in Geneva nor by any other convention will bolshevism be beaten. but solely by our determination to win victory and by the strength of our arms. We all know how difficult this struggle is. No matter what we not have capitulated. If the Ger- sall lose. it is by far not what It the Germany of today. she would man people today possessed only would be if this struggle was not a part of the former weakness, it successfully concluded would have ceased to exist long Several areas in the eastern part ago. Feb. 24. 1920. will later be of Germany now experience bolregarded as a great milestone in abavism. The crimes committed of mankind. Without against our women and children German National Socialist recon- tic world political field of the present war. But just as we for- nerly overcame the narrow- minded party particularism and knocked down the bolshevist op ponent in order to create a Na- tional Socialist people's state, we shall today win a victory over the medley of bourgeois democratic state conceptions and we WILL crown this victory by the ann$ bilation of bolshevism. Just as once all the compromis ing bourgeols parties were swept away by the Bolshevist flood, so today all bourgeois States are disappearing. Their misguided representatives believe that they can come to terms with the devil in the hope of outwitting him. It is a horrid repetition of what once happened in Germany, but on a global scale. Just as we then smashed the Bolahevist enemy de- spite petty-bourgeois particularism and set up a National Social1st state, so victory shall be ours today despite bouregois demo- cratic States. The greatest King of our his tory, Frederick II. was threatened with succumbing to the superiority of a world coalition and Was only because of his heroic soul that a nucleus of the coming Reich was created and remained victor in the end. The New York Times. All peoples whose statesment and strengthen our fronts have made a pact with the Bol- for revenge and attack, to create shevist devil will sooner or later weapons of proved as well as of become its victim. But let there novel design, to put them into be no doubt that National Social- action to stiffen the spirit of our 1st Germany will carry on this resistance and, if necessary. also, struggle until the end. and that as in the past, to eliminate all will be the case this year when those pests who do not want to the historic turning-point comes. participate in the preservation of No power in the world will our nationhood or even oppose it. weaken our hearts I recently read in the British Our enemies have destroyed so much that is beautiful and holy papers that the Allies intend to destroy my Berghof [evidently speaking of the American attack on his mountain home near It is, therefore, our duty to main Berchtesgaden last week]. almost regret that this did not happen thus far, since my persenal property is of no greater tion for the future; not to permit mans. that we can now live for only one task-t create a state that will rebuild what they have destroyed. tain the liberty of the German na- German labor to be carried off to Siberia but to mobilize It for re- construction on behalf of our own people. It is frightful what the homeland has to endure and the tasks of the front are super- human, but If a whole people is to show itself equal to such suffering. as our nation does, then Providence will not deny us in the end the right of survival. We have suffered so much that it only steels us to fanatical re- selve to hate our enemies a thou- and times more and to regard them for what they are destroyCPS of an eternal culture and an- nihilators of humanity Out of this hate a holy will is born to oppose these destroyers of our existence with all the strength that God has given us and to crush them in the end. During value than that of other Ger- I shall be happy- as far as this is possible to anybody bear all that the others have to bear. The only thing that I should not be able to bear would be the weakness of my nation What makes me very happy and proud. however, is the convic- tion that the German people in its greatest distress shows its hard est character. In these weeks and months may every individual Gen that It 18 his duti to sacrifice all for the German nation's preservation for centuries to come. Whoever suffers must know that many Germans have lost more than he. The life that is left to us should serve only one task-namely, to make up for all has survived so many terrible its 2,000-year history our people the wrongs done by the International Jewish criminals and their benchmen to our nation. It must be our unshakable will to think of times that we have no doubt that we will also master our present plight. breath Man after man, woman fter woman in towns and in the Germany alone until our last If the homeland continues to do its duty and even does still more: country, we shall live only for the ask of liberating our nation from the valiant homeland as an example and stakes his life for his na- ermany's culture as well as her ational Socialist life. It is our firm will never to cease if the soldier at the front takes tive land, then the whole world will be shattered in its assault against us. If the front and the homeland are jointly determined to destroy those who renounce the law of self-preservation those who act like cowards or those who sabotage the fight, then they will save the nation. Then, at the end of this struggle, A German victory must come and we will enjoy our proud good fortune. When this war comes end, we shall put victory into the hands of a young generation. This youth is the most precious thing that Germany possesses It will be an example for all generations to come. This, too, is the, work of National Socialist education and the result of a challenge that went out from Munich twenty-five years ago. My own life has only the value that it possesses for the nation's work unswervingly to re-estab distress, of reconstructing orking for the true people's community, far from any ideology classes, firmly believing that eternal values of a nation are best sons and daughters, who, egardless of birth and rank just God gave them to us, must be ducated and employed. Twenty-five years ago I prelicted the victory of our move- nent. Today, filled as always with belief in our nation. I prelict the Jan racefinal victory of I Reconstruction Pledged 200 HM-1558 Athens via Army This telegram must be paraphrased before being Dated February 25, 1945 communicated to anyone other than a Government Agency. (RESTRICTED) Rec'd 10:30 a.m. Secretary of State Washington 212, February 25, Noon FOR BRONEER, GREEK RELIEF, NEW YORK, FROM CURTIS Our 88 Your 70. Detailed budget mailed nineteenth $299,600 best consernative estimate now expenditures here one year, exclusive your foreign office budget for staff or supplies you furnish. Revision necessary within three months. Salary scale unsettled, however, based other Agencies planning estimated monthly doctors, sanitarians, full time $150; subsiding Doctors, part+ (subsidise?) time, stationary clinics, $50; trained nurses $75 assistant nurses, drivers $60; office, clerical $50 to $100. Maintenance in field extra which UNRRA expected provide. Special outfitting JRC personnel details later. 193 tens our clothing shipped provinces so far February, Amoross also shipped 16,000 tons. MACVEACH JT 261 COPY NO. 4 SECRET OPTEL No. 64 Information received up to 10 A.M. 25th Feb. 1945. 1. NAVAL Home Waters 24th/25th (Night) E-boats, probably mine- laying, were active off S.E. coast and 1 sunk by our forces who took 12 prisoners. 25th. An A/S Trawler on escort duty torpedoed and sunk with all hands South of the Lizard. Anti-Submarine Operations 24th. U-Boat probably sunk off Scillies by ships 3rd Escort Group. 2. MILITARY Western Front Southern Sector. On 1st French Army front marked increase enemy patrol activity, while further North troops 7th U.S. Army during last 3 days have advanced South of Saarbrucken 2 miles on 7-mile front against stiff opposition and counter-attacks. South Central Sector. 3rd U.S. Army consolidated bridge-head across Saar, South of Saarburg and has also established 2nd bridgehead 1 mile North of town, while further North troops of same army rapidly overrunning enemy bulge between Echternach and Prum from both South and North against decreasing resistance. North Central Sector. Troops of 1st U.S. Army which crossed River Roer on 23rd in conjunction with 9th U.S. Army attack had by 1200 hrs. same day established bridgehead of average depth 1 mile on 8-mile front astride Duren. 9th U.S. Army have now extended and linked up all bridgeheads across river Roer to depth of 4 miles while Julich has been cleared and good progress made in bridge building and getting supporting arms across river in all sectors. Northern Sector. On 1st Canadian Army Front British troops advanced half mile towards Weeze against stiff opposition. Burma Chinese forces have captured Namtu Northern Sector. where 11 locomotives and some rolling stock taken. 3. AIR Western Front. 23rd/24th (Night) aircraft 639 despatched (missing 14) 375 Pforzheim (1547 tons) 83 shipping Horten (223 tons) 70 Berlin, seamining and other missions 111. Bombing Pforzheim extremely accurate and concentrated, 262 -224th. Bomber Command escorted heavies 316 (missing 1) dropped 996 tons through cloud on Kamen synthetic oil plant (10 miles N.E. Dortmund) with unobserved results. Escorted U.S. heavy bombers 1043 (outstanding bombers 2, fighters 10) attacked 4 oil refineries (892 tons) in Misburg and Hamburg areas, railway centres (308 tons) at Lehrte (8 miles East Hanover) and Bielefeld, U-boat yards, (789 tons) at Hamburg and Bremen and bridges and other targets (637 tons) at Wesel and Bremen. Results unobserved except at Wesel where excellent. SHAEF (Air) bombers dropped 128 tons Rheinberg (South Wesel) and Rees with unobserved results and 348 others attacked Viersen railway centre and communications central sector (128 tons) fighters and fighter bombers 1440 operated successfully Northern Sector. On Central Sector fighters and fighter bombers 1271 (missing 15) destroyed or damaged 177 locomotives, 1330 railway waggons, 487 MT and cut railways 173 places. Fighter Command Spitfires 25 attacked rocket sites Holland with mainly good results. 24th/25th (Night) aircraft 120 despatched, 63 Berlin, 36 sea-mining and 21 other targets. 22nd. Escorted U.S. heavy bombers 371 (missing bombers 3 and fighters 10) dropped 787 tons railway targets South Germany and Austria Mediterranean Front. with excellent results and escort destroying 50 locomotives while tactical aircraft 992 (missing 2) attacked communications Northern Italy, where over 150 road and rail vehicles destroyed or damaged. 23rd. Escorted U.S. heavy bombers 478 (missing 3) dropped 1034 tons on 8 railway centres in Austria and North Italy including Worgl (S.E. Munich) which latter target shows by photographs almost completely destroyed. Tactical aircraft 900 (missing 6) attacked communications and other targets wide area destroying or damaging over 400 vehicles. Burma 22nd. Liberators 50 successfully attacked target N.W. Sagaing (203 tons). 4. HOME SECURITY Rockets. 1 incident reported. I