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Diary
Book 713

March 22-24, 1944

-ABook Page
Agudas Israel World Organization
See War Refugee Board

Appointments and Resignations

Schoeneman, George J. : Assistant Commissionership

of Internal Revenue discussed by 9:30 group -

3/24/44
Army: Navy

713 269

See Banking Facilities
B-

Banking Facilities
Army and Navy Posts: Bell reports 235 facilities

now established: private plant facilities also

discussed by Treasury group - 3/24/44
Byrd, Harry F.
See Financing, Government: Non-essential Expenditures,
Committee on Reduction of

260

China

See also War Refugee Board

Economic report transmitted by Adler - 3/23/44
Correspondence

Mrs. Forbush's mail report - 3/24/44

236

311

-DDexter, Robert C. (Unitarian Service Committee)
See War Refugee Board

-FFinancing, Government

Non-essential Expenditures, Committee on Reduction of
Report on unexpended balances: Treasury comment

thereon - 3/22/44

21

a) Discussion of meeting called by Byrd - 3/28/44
See Book 715, page 20

b) HMJr-Byrd conversation Book 715, page 22

c) Heffelfinger describes meeting of - 3/29/44:
Book 716, page 125

Economy stand by FDR discussed by HMJr, Bell,

Heffelfinger, Smith: Harold Smith and Appleby
(Bureau of Budget) - 3/24/44
Bell memorandum on possibilities of reduced
expenditures - 3/29/44: Book 716, page 127

300

- F - (Continued)
Book

Page

Financing, Government (Continued)
War Savings Bonds

Lottery statute quoted by O'Connell - 3/22/44
a) Discussion by 9:30 group - 3/23/44
1) U.S.S.R. experience reported by Haas

713

19

248
251

5th War Loan Drive

Quota for drive (after leak on amount from bankers)
discussed by HMJr and Ransom - 3/23/44

Quota discussed by Treasury group and state
chairmen - 3/23/44
a) Memorandum to HMJr from state chairmen

93

102
109

Foreign Funds Control
Yugoslavia: Funds in United States and United Kingdom

Cable from National Committee of Liberation -

137,232

3/23/44

Article in PM - 3/23/44

138

-GGoldmann, Nahum

See War Refugee Board

Guaranty Trust Company of New York
See Procurement Division

-HCarlton J.H.
Hayes Ambassador
See War Refugee Board: Spain

-IIndia
See War Refugee Board
-L--

Latin America
See War Refugee Board
Lend-Lease

"Recording and reporting of Lend-Lease transactions
and Government expenditures abroad": Interdepartmental

Committee report (Bartelt) - 3/24/44

Lottery
See Financing, Government: War Savings Bonds

-NNansen Passport
See War Refugee Board
Navy: Army

See Banking Facilities

279

- N - (Continued)

Book Page

Non-essential Expenditures, Committee on Reduction of
See Financing, Government

-0011

See United Kingdom

Olrich, Ernest L. (Munsingwear Company. Minneapolis)
See Procurement Division: Merchandising Men

-PPassports

For history of Nansen Passport see War Refugee Board
Petroleum
See United Kingdom
Poland

See War Refugee Board
Portugal
See War Refugee Board

Procurement Division
Necessity for Reorganization
Fred Smith memorandum on lack of action from

Public Relations point of view - 3/24/44

713

289

292

HMJr-Sullivan conversation - 3/24/44
Merchandising Men

Stetson (Guaranty Trust Company of New York)-HMJr
conversation concerning outstanding ones - 3/24/44
(See also Book 714, pages 136.148.150 - 3/27/44)
Edward Brown-HMJr conversation - 3/29/44: See Book 716,
pages 11.20

Sullivan suggestions: Book 716, page 31
McBain, HMJr, Sullivan, and Gaston conference:
Book 716, page 311

a) Olrich, E. L. discussed

Congressman Patman and Crawford criticism at Banking and
Currency Committee hearings on surplus property O'Connell resume - 3/25/44: Book 714. page 1
a) Sullivan supporting memorandum: Book 714, page,125
Conference: present: Treasury group together with Mack,
Widmann, Loeb, and Frey (Procurement) - 3/27/44
5.

Book 714, page 82

a) Sullivan's answers to criticism not found
satisfactory by HMJr
b) Centralized records - improvement described by
Sullivan: Book 714, page 90
c) Mapes transfer discussed by Mack: Book 714, page 94
d) May 27, 1943, date Sullivan was placed in charge
of Procurement: Book 714, page 112
e) Transfer of Procurement to some other agency by

authority of the President or through bill now

under consideration setting up an Administration
under War Mobilization discussed: Book 714, page 115
f) See next page

294

- P - (Continued)

Book 713

Procurement Division (Continued)
Conference (Continued)

f) Mack's qualifications discussed: See Book 714,
page 118

g) New personnel already hired listed: Book 714,
page 120

h) Hancock-HMJr conversation - 3/28/44: Book 715,
page 50

1) HMJr suggests conference to discuss surplus
property disposal
Conference: present: HMJr. Gaston, Smith, O'Connell,
McConnell, and Lynch - 3/28/44: Book 715, page 55
a) Sullivan's adequacy for job discussed
b) Clayton-HMJr conversation: Book 715, page 56

c) Patman bill taking Procurement out of picture
and making Reconstruction Finance Corporation

agency to dispose of all surplus discussed:

Book 715. page 58

d) HMJr will tell Sullivan he has decided "it's
better to have disposal all in one place":
Book 715, pages 60,62

1) Sullivan-HMJr conversation: Book 715,
pages 64.71

2) Sullivan's attitude reported by HMJr to
Gaston: Book 715, page 69

3) Sullivan's plan for an organization

within Procurement Division reviewed:

Book 715, pages 91,99

4) Sullivan's speech at Manchester,
New Hampshire, on surplus property
disposal: Book 715, page 103

e) Bill creating Office of War Mobilization and
Demobilisation: Book 715. page 112

Status of surplus property reported tc Procurement
Division by War Department during encember 19:3
Haas memorandum: Book 715, page 114

Conference: present: HMJr, Gaston. Smith, O'Connell,
McConnell, and Lynch - 3/28/44: Book 715. page 138

a) Smith drafts of letters to FDR and
Senator George discussed

Conference: present: HMJr. Hancock, Clayton, Sullivan,
McConnell, O'Connell, Lynch, Gaston, and Smith 3/29/44: Book 716. page 1
a) HMJr: George's bill provided good time to
reconsider whole situation; advocates "one
Department and one head"

b) Hancock originally held this view - has now
changed his mind

c) Clayton agrees with Hancock: his organization
is simply a policy-making one
Treasury group discussion after Clayton and Hancock
leave - 3/29/44: Book 716, page 5
a) McConnell worried at Clayton-Hancock reactions
to Treasury attitude - 3/30/44: Book 716, page 232
Transactions by volume, July 1943 to date - 3/29/44:
Book 716, page 32

-SBook Page
Schoeneman, George J.

See Appointments and Resignations
Spain

See Var Refugee Board
State Department

Hull's speech on foreign policy comments on finance:

not cleared with Treasury; decision is to ignore 3/23/44

713 145

Surplus Property
See Procurement Division

-TTurkey

See War Refugee Board

-UU.S.S.R.

See Financing, Government: Lottery
War Refugee Board

.

Unitarian Service Committee
See War Refugee Board
United Kingdom
See also War Refugee Board

Petroleum: Cox memorandum on inventories - 3/23/44

171

-WWar Refugee Board

Nansen Passport - history of - 3/22/44

44

China: American Embassy, Chungking, reports on

"protection of victims of enemy oppression" -

3/22/44

Portugal: Unitarian Service Committee European
representative, Robert C. Dexter, to represent
Board in Lisbon - 3/22/44

Spain: Hayes cable vigorously criticises Sequerra; all
Embassy business to be transmitted through Blickenstaff 3/22/44

51

65

69,71

Turkey:

Board cable to Steinhardt and Hirschmann concerning
shipping for evacuation of refugees from Balkans 3/22/44

78

Zionist Party membership: Rumor that paid-up members

receive priority in getting exit visas from Balkans
and entry certificates into Palestine reported by

Hirschmann - 3/23/44
Latin American passports for internees in French-German
camps discussed in memorandum from Agudas Israel

World Organization - 3/23/44,

227

175

- W - (Continued)
Book

Page

War Refugee Board (Continued)

United Kingdom: Ministry of Economic Warfare meeting

to discuss Swiss reception of children from

German-occupied countries - 3/23/44

India: Payment of quota for Intergovernmental Relief
Committee approved - 3/23/44
Poland: Jewish National Committee memoranda forwarded

713

182
189
196

by Nahum Goldmann - 3/23/44

U.S.S.R.: Ambassador Harriman reports on progress of

negotiations for cooperation - 3/24/44

354

War Savings Bonds

See Financing, Government
White House

Defense of: Realignment of troops - Major General Lewis
(Headquarters, Military District of Washington, D.C.)
memorandum - 3/24/44

-YYugoslavia

See Foreign Funds Control

-Zionist Party
See War Refugee Board

320

March 22, 1944

10:29 a.m.

HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

She's coming on.

Other

Operator:
Dorothy

Here's Mrs. Brady.

Brady:

Hello, Mr. Secretary.

HMJr:

How are you all?

B:

HMJr:
B:

HMJr:

All right. How are you?
Fine. Look, Dorothy, have you got a pencil?
Yes, sir.
The President has with him a declaration about

the refugees and -- uh -- directing it at the

Germans and so forth -- that they should treat
them better. You see?

B:

HMJr:

Uh huh.

He's had that for a week or ten days and when
I saw him Saturday -- then Saturday afternoon
Sam saw him -- and they sent it over to the
State Department and they gave the English two

days to say that they'd join them. You see?

B:

HMJr:

Uh huh.

Now, when I saw the President, he said he
needed something to hang it onto. You see?

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

Well, now that the Germans have marched into

Hungary, it's an ideal time to issue such a
statement.

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

You see?

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

And I just would like to bring that to his
attention.

1

2

-2B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

That this would be perfect timing.

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

And, of course

B:

You mean, to release it to the Press?

HMJr:

That's right.

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

And he -- Mr. Hull told us yesterday that -that his instructions were only to give the
English two days.

B:

HMJr:

Uh huh.

But this is a late afterthought -- of course,
if it could come -- if this statement could
not only come from Roosevelt and Churchill,
but also from Stalin, it would be pretty strong
notice that they -- the Germans can't murder all
these people in Hungary and Rumania. You see?

B:

Uh huh. Uh huh.

HMJr:

And if somebody doesn't say something, there's

going to be a million or more people most likely
murdered in Hungary and Rumania.

B:

Uh huh. All right, well, I'll get -- make a

HMJr:

Would you? And....

memorandum of this and get it to the President.

HMJr:

Yes, sir.
And then one other thing -- I spoke to the
President about making John Pehle full Director.
He's only Acting Director.

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

And the President also said that he wanted some

B:

occasion. Well, you can tell the President I've

brought it up at the War Refugee Board meeting
yesterday and -- making Mr. Pehle permanent is
both agreeable to Mr. Hull and to Mr. Stimson.

3

-3B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

See?

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

And I think if he tied the whole thing up in
one package

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

You see?

B:

Uh huh.

would be..

HMJr:
B:

HMJr:

All right.
This would be -- and he -- would be -- and he
said he wanted to do the Pehle thing when there
was some occasion to do it. You see?

B:

Yes.

HMJr:

So

B:

All right. Well, I'11 get word to him.

HMJr:

I thank you.

B:

You're welcome.

HMJr:

Hello.

4

March 22, 1944
2:36 p.m.

HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Miss Tully is with the President. Mrs. Brady is

HMJr:

Okay.

Operator:

All right.

HMJr:

Hello.

Dorothy
Brady:

Hello.

HMJr:

Hello, Dorothy.

B:

Yes, sir.

HMJr:

Have you a pencil handy?

B:

I have.

HMJr:

Last Saturday when I saw the President, I discussed

there.

with him at great length the fact that Mr. Randolph
Paul wanted to resign as General Counsel.

B:

HMJr:

B:

Uh huh.

And the President told me to accept his resignation
promptly. As he is a Presidential appointee
Uh huh.

HMJr:

....he resigns to the President.

B:

Uh huh.

HMJr:

I have his resignation here

B:

Uh huh.

and a suggest -- a draft of a letter

HMJr:
B:

HMJr:
B:

Yes.

for the President to sign.
Uh huh.

5

-2HMJr:
B:

HMJr:

I would like to send that over to you.
I would be happy to receive it.
And get the President to sign it.

B:

Uh huh. All right.

HMJr:

Now, when they want to give it out, if Mr.

Early would collaborate with Mr. Gaston over

here
B:

HMJr:

Uh huh.

.... they can decide how they want to give it

out.

B:

All right.

HMJr:

Now, do you think -- if Grace is with the

B:

President, does that mean that you won't get
to him today to sign anything more?
No, sir, it does not mean that.

HMJr:

I see.

B:

I will -- as soon as you send it over to me,

I will send it over to her and I'll put a
little note -- I think it will probably be a
good idea if I took your draft and wrote it up
so that if he likes, it, he can sign it.

HMJr:

Well, it's on White House stationery already.

B:

Oh, it's already -- uh huh -- but it doesn't
say "draft"?

HMJr:

No.

B:

Uh huh. So thay in case he wants to sign it,
he can.

HMJr:
B:

He can.

All right. Well, that will be fine. Then I'll
just put a little note on it for -- if it's to

be released, for Mr. Early to get in touch with

Mr. Gaston and we'll let you know.

6

-3-

B:

It will be there within fifteen minutes.
All right, sir. Thank you.

HMJr:

Thank you.

HMJr:

7

THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I transmit herewith the original of my
letter to the President, resigning as General
Counsel.

I assume that you will see that the
letter is forwarded to the President.

I should like to accept your kind offer

to make a temporary appointment as Assistant to

the Secretary. In doing so, I would like to be
free to resign from this appointment on short notice.
So far as I know, I shall be around town

for a period, and I shall be very glad to do what-

over is necessary to help my successor in the
assumption of his new duties.
Sincerely,

General Counsel are
Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,

Secretary of the Treasury.
Enclosure
PORVICTORY

BUY

BONDS
WAR
STAMPS

8

Paul druft
MAR 22 that used
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I transmit herewith the original of
my letter to the President, resigning as General
Counsel.

I assume that you will see that the
letter is forwarded to the President.

I should like to accept your kind

offer to make a temporary appointment as Assistant

to the Secretary in order that I may for the
present draw leave pay. In doing so, I would
like to be free to resi; E from this appointment
on short notice.

So far as I know, I shall be around
town for a period, and I shall be very glad to

do whatever is necessary to help my successor in
the assumption of his new duties.
Sincerely,
(Migned) Bandoluk Paul

General Counsel

Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,

Secretary of the Treasury.
Enclosure

(

REP/kfa

9

March 22, 1944

My dear Mr. President:
I came to Washington in 1941 with a commitment

to devote myself to the then forthcoming Revenue Bill.
Since that time I have represented the Administration and
the Treasury before Congress on three tax bills. The
fourth one, a technical measure to simplify the individual

income tax, is, I am glad to say, well on its way to
enactment. I believe I can contribute little more at
present in this special field and I should, therefore,

like to submit my resignation as General Counsel of the
Treasury.

I take this occasion to express again my warm
admiration for your steadfast courage in advocating the
realistic tax program which the times demand. It has
been a great pleasure and satisfaction to work under your
leadership and that of Secretary Morgenthau.
Please believe me always at your service for any

further contribution I can make to the war effort.
Sincerely yours,
(Bigned) Randolph Pas3

General Counsel.

The President,
The White House
REP/kfa

10

Acceptance letter prepared
Q.for President's
signature

11

March 22, 1944.
Dear Randolph:

In view of your decision as expressed in your

letter of March 22, I accept with great regret

your resignation as General Counsel of the Treasury
Department.

The difficult labors you have performed during

the last three years, particularly in the field of

tax policy and in the formation and presentation to
the Congress of a wartime revenue program, have

been of the highest value to your country.

You have my personal gratitude and good wishes.
Sincerely,

Mr. Randolph Paul
General Counsel, Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.

wer

12

March 22, 1944.

Dear Randolph:

I am forwarding your letter of resignation

as General Counsel to the President as you requested.

This I do with a great deal of reluctance,
as I have already indicated to you. You have done
invaluable work in your career in the Treasury and

I am personally grateful for it.
I appreciate also your offer to help your

successor when he is chosen. We shall naturally want
to take advantage of it.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. Randolph Paul
General Counsel, Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.

HEG/mah

13

March 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S DIARY:

Secretary Morgenthau called me at 5:42 p.m. today

and said that Miss Tully had called him at 5:40 p.m.
and indicated that the President was going to give
out his statement at his Friday press conference, and
that he was not going to wait for the British or anyone
else to join in the statement.
Secretary Morgenthau asked Miss Tully whether the
President would, at the same time, announce the "Acting"

had been dropped from my title. Miss Tully said that
she had not heard of this and the Secretary told her
of his previous conversation with Mrs. Brady. Miss
Tully had not heard of this conversation but said that
she would pass along to the President the thought that
the issuance of his statement would be a good time
for him to make the announcement concerning the change

in title.

Jose

14

March 22, 1944

Dear Mr. Jones:

In accordance with your request, I am

enclosing herewith, for your confidential
information, a copy of the stenographic minutes
of the meeting held in Secretary Morgenthau's
office Friday, March 17, 1944.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Assistant General Counsel

Mr. Howard T. Jones
Executive Secretary

Distilled Spirits Institute

Room 1137 National Press Building
Washington, D. C.
Attachment

JJO'C.Jr/lsw

allsentby

Today

15

March 22, 1944

Dear Mr. Baldridge:

In accordance with your request, I am

enclosing herewith, for your confidential
information, a copy of the stenographic minutes
of the meeting held in Secretary Morgenthau's
office Friday, March 17, 1944.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Assistant General Counsel

Mr. Holmes Baldridge

Special Assistant to the
Attorney General

Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Attachment

JJO'C.Jr/lsw

16

March 22, 1944

Dear Mr. Emerson:

In accordance with your request, I am

enclosing herewith, for your confidential
information, a copy of the stenographic minutes
of the meeting held in Secretary Morgenthau's
office Friday, March 17, 1944.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Assistant General Counsel

Mr. Thomas I. Emerson,

Deputy Administrator

Office of Price Administration
Washington, D. C.

Attachment

JJO'C.Jr/lsw

17

March 22, 1944

Dear Mr. Sourwine:

In accordance with your request, I am

enclosing herewith, for your confidential
information, a copy of the stenographic minutes
of the meeting held in Secretary Morgenthau's
office Friday, March 17, 1944.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) Joseph J. O'Connell, Sr.

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Assistant General Counsel

Mr. J. G. Sourwine
Counsel

Liquor Investigating Subcommittee

Senate Judiciary Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Attachment

JJO'C.Jr/1sw

18

March 22, 1944

Dear Dr. Morgan:

In accordance with your request, I am

enclosing herewith, for your confidential
information, a copy of the stenographic minutes
of the meeting held in Secretary Morgenthau's
office Friday, March 17, 1944.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) Joseph J. O'Connell,

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

Assistant General Counsel

Dr. D. P. Morgan

War Production Board
Room 1007 Temporary S

Sixth and Jefferson Drive 8. W.

Washington, D.C.
Attachment

JJO*C.Jr/lsw

19

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE

TO

Secretary Morgenthau

FROM

Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.

March 22, 1944

Mr. Haas has asked me to advise you whether there

is authority under existing law to distribute prizes

to holders of outstanding savings bonds as an inducement for the continued holding of such bonds; and also

as to whether there is authority under existing law

to make a similar arrangement with respect to bonds

still to be issued.

Unfortunately, we are confronted at the very out-

set with the Federal anti-lottery statute (section 213
of the Criminal Code). The statute is quite un-

compromising in its terms and, in my judgment, operates

as an effective bar to any plan involving a lottery
feature.

The statute provides that "no letter, package,
postcard, or circular concerning any lottery, gift,
enterprise, or similar scheme offering prizes
dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance ***
shall be deposited in or carried by the mails of the
United States, or be delivered by any postmaster or

letter carrier." " A similar provision exists with respect
to the use of the radio.
In this connection, you might be interested in a

bill introduced several months ago by Congressman Gale,

a Republican Congressman from Minnesota, which was
referred to the Committee on Ways and Means (where

it has remained inactive up to the present time), a
copy of which is attached. This bill would, if enacted
into law, authorize the practice of distributing prizes

as an incentive to individuals to purchase and to hold
Series E bonds.

Attachment

20

78TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3784

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DECEMBER 6,1943

Mr. GALE introduced the following bill: which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL
To promote the sale of United States savings bonds by means
of a premium plan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

1

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and

4 directed to pay premiums to individuals who are registered
5 owners of United States savings bonds, series E, which may
6 have been heretofore issued or which may be issued in the
7 future.
8

SEC. 2. From among all the bonds of the issue or issues

9 heretofore described in section 1, the Secretary of the
10 Treasury shall select by number or symbol, and by lot, in
11 an impartial manner, those bonds which shall be entitled to

2

1 premiums, except that no bond which has been selected for

2 any premium shall be eligible for participation in any sub3 sequent selection.
4

SEC. 3. In making selections by lot, every United States

5 savings bond, series E, as described in section 1 and bear-

6 ing a maturity value of $25, shall have an equal chance of
7 selection. Bonds of the issue described in this section, but

8 of greater maturity value than $25, shall have as many
9 chances of being selected by lot as the number twenty-five
10 is contained in the maturity value of the bond.
11

SEC. 4. Beginning within ninety days after the enact-

12 ment of this Act, selections shall be made from time to time
13 at stated intervals by the Secretary of the Treasury, but shall
14 not be made more than ninety days apart.
15

SEC. 5. The Secretary shall, by regulations, prescribe a

16 schedule of premiums for the bonds so selected except that

17 the first premium shall not be less than $25,000, and no
18 premium shall be less than $100.
19

SEC. 6. The premiums provided for in section 1 shall be

20 paid in the form of bonds of the United States issued under
21 the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, and the purposes

22 for which bonds may be issued under that Act are hereby
23 extended to include the purposes for which bonds may be
24 issued pursuant to this section. The bonds issued pursuant to

25 this section shall have maturities and bear interest at such

3

rate (in no event less than 21 per centum per annum) as

1

2 the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.
SEC. 7. Premiums paid under this Act, and the proceeds

3

4 of any bond issued pursuant to this Act upon redemption or
5 sale by the person to whom issued shall not be includible in

6 gross income for the purpose of chapter 1 of the Internal
7 Revenue Code.
8

SEC. 8. There are authorized to be appropriated such

9 sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this

10 Act.

21

MAR 22 1944
25

My dear Mr. Chairmant

Receipt is admosledged of your letter of March 15. 1944,
enclosing copy of a proposed additional report of the Joint
Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures
entitled "Report on the Budget and Unexpended Balances of the
Federal Government* and requesting ay convents and suggestions.

with respect to the proposed report, it seems to me that

its general tener is one of criticism, either directly or by

implication, of the Appropriations Committees of the Congress.

I refer, for example, to page 3 where attention is called to
the fact that appropriations are outrusing expenditures to an
inerdinate degree, resulting in large and unverrented unex-

pended balances being available to the agencies of the Government engaged in was activities, and to page 4 where the statement is made that such large continuing excesses can result

only in unjustifiable extravagence and waste. I - sure you
appreciate that as Secretary of the Treasury I would not want
to join in any direct or implied criticism of the Appropriations

Committees, even if such criticism should be warranted, and I do
not believe any criticism of these Committees is warranted.

The nature and else of our far-flung war activities make 11
imperative that the armed forces be given ample appropriations
with which to plan their programs. The Var and Navy Departments
must formulate long-range plane for the complete mobilisation of
our combat foress and for the provision and equipment of our Army
and Navy. and before they ess make contracts or issur obligations
under our laws, Congress must first make the necessary appropriatione for such purposes. The eise of our armed foress and the

extent of our participation is the war require that huge appreprintions be placed under their centrol. The Appropriations
Committees of the Congress have recognised this situation and

have granted to the services appropriations of sums that are
needed for a successful preseration of the war. There may be
cases where exbsequent events show that too many funds have been

greated for particular purposes, but on the whole I believe the

Committees have performed a wonderful job is support of our
armed foress. These matters are under constant scrutiny by
the Budget Bureau and the Connittees from time to time and
adjustments is appropriations are made as the situations

warrant. Is seens to me that this is as 18 should be.

22

-2There are other phases of the Committee repert es which I
should like to comment.

On page 1 the estimated public debt is projected far beyond
the President's budget for the fiscal year ending June 30. 19th.
which is predicated upon a continuance of the war, and a figure

of a potential debt of over 400 billion dollars is arrived at.
I do not think that 18 is practical at this time for any agency
to enderver to project the public debt or the state of the

Federal finances beyond June 30. 1945 in view of the many moortainties which such projections involve. The paramount factor
in these projections depends on the termination of the war.
On page 5 the statement is made that "we are rapidly
reaching a situation whereby the magnitude of our public debt

is a great peril to our future security." I do not believe

that any committee, especially one which has enjoyed such
prestige as the Joint Committee on Reduction of Noncessential
Federal Expenditures, should make any statements which might

raise questions in the minds of the general public as to the
integrity of the public debt without a searching inquiry and a
precise statement of the resulting conclusions. The securities

representing our debt are owned by the American people and their

institutions. The individual citison of this country now holds
a greater proportion of our debt than ever before in its history.

We are constantly being advised of remore with which enemies at
home are undoubtedly trying to influence our people to lessen

their support of the war effort by not purchasing var bonds. I
as sure you appreciate that the continuance of confidence in the

public credit is of the highest necessity for our security.

On page 5 of the proposed report, a recommendation is made
that the Appropriations Committees analyse the unobligated
balances submitted by all agencies to determine wherein their
requests for appropriations were excessive. This seens to me
to be unnecessary at this time because it has been my experience
that the Appropriations Committees go thoroughly into all requests

for appropriations, and in this operation they have access to all
data with respect to appropriations and expenditures of the exective agencies.

It is my opinion that the second recommendation that unobligated balances of annual appropriations be lapsed and returned to

the Treasury at the end of each fiscal year is not practicable.
Experience has shown that is is not possible to arrive at a
definite amount of unliquidated obligations on the last day of
a fiscal year. and the present law recognises this situation by

providing a two-year period during which the amount of such

23

-3obligations can be determined and liquidated. Even if such
unobligated balances could be accurately assertained I do not
see that any money would be saved because no further obliga-

tions eas be incurred after the close of the year.

It is not clear as to what is contemplated by the third
recommendation that the practice of granting deficiency and
supplemental appropriations during the fiscal year be reerganised and a more practical procedure be put into effect innodi-

ately. By virtue of the fact that new situations and changed

conditions are constantly developing, and during the war more

so than in ordinary times, is is impossible to foresee all
requirements for appropriations in advance of their actual
need.

Very truly yours,

/ E Morganthes, J:
Sesretary of the Treasury

Honorable,Harry F. Byrd
Chairman, Committee Year Reduction of

Nonessential Federal Expenditures
Congress of the United States
Washington, D. C.

WTH:alb 3-21-44

States

TESS
I

Maroh 15. 1944

Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
The Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:
I am enclosing a copy of the Committee's
report on Unexpended Balances. I should appreciete your comments, suggestions and approval.

It is our hope that it can be presented
to Congress within the next few days.

with kindest regards, I Faithfully yours,

Ham 7 Puss
oil

law

R NO

25

March 22, 1944

FROM:

SECRETARY MORGENTHAU

TO:

DR. WHITE

All matters between the Treasury and the
Bureau of the Budget must be cleared through the

office of the Under-Secretary. I have, therefore,
sent your letter giving the Treasury's views on
the proposed Executive Order "establishing the

Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy"

to Mr. Bell for clearance.

26

Taken from the Wednesday, March 22, 1944
Congressional Record.

27

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOU

A. A. A. to act as a board or an agency

to determine who is entitled to farm
machinery. or has the Congress ever au-

thorized the A. A A. to determine under

the A.A.A program which farmers are

entitled to gasoline to be used not in their

tractors but on the highways? If the
gentleman can answer those questions
and say that those of us who have crit-

icized the A. A. A. for sending out information to farmers now that these
things I have just mentioned will be used

in considering whether they are going
to permit a farmer to have machinery
or whether they are going to permit him
to be deferred, that is another thing en-

much of anything else. I did. however,
find that I could not get the War Food
Administrator, my friend, Mr. Marvin
Jones, to write me that the employee
had exceeded his legal authority. One
of Mr. Jones' underemployees wrote me
quoting the provisions of the Executive
order, where this authority was supposed
to come from. This is where these small
people in big places can harm any program. They should be replaced by people who have the right attitude in regard
to the public. I imagine that is part of
the directive under which these other

things you complain about operate,

tirely. I have criticized the A. A. for

though I do not want to be too sure on
that point.

know where the Congress has ever au-

tieman yield?

that and I still criticize it. I do not

thorized them to do anything of that

kind.

Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin. I may say
to the gentleman from Oklahoma that he
has not asked one question, but several
questions. If I were to answer the ques-

tions from the knowledge I have at this
moment, I would say: I presume what
the gentleman refers to are the activities of the War Food Administration
which do not necessarily come under the

A.A.A. In most, If not all the States, the
Chairman of the A. A. A. happens to be
the head of the War Food Board. I pre-

sume that those things that the gentleman complains of are done under the
War Food Boards rather than by the
A. set-up That would be my understanding of the organization at the
present time. In most cases they are the
same individuals If there is any law it
comes under the powers that have been

delegated to the War Food Administrator

by Executive order and is not part of any
law passed by the Congress.

Mr. RIZLEY. Does the gentleman
say that by Executive order the War
Food Administration has now been given

authority to determine who is entitled to

a draft deferment as an essential
farmer?

Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin. I would

say it may have been so construed
There is a rather broader interpretating
of many laws and orders.

Mr. RIZLEY. Does the gentleman say

further that the War Food Administration, by Executive decree, has been

Mr. CUNNINGHAM will the gen-

Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin I yield
to the gentleman from Iowa
Mr. CUNNINGHAM What will the
situation be in 1944 in regard to the
farmers being able to get more machinery?

Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin. It is going to be the same problem as to whether

the farmer will get more overalls or not
There is plenty of steel for farm machinery. It is simply a matter of manpower. As far as the overalls are concerned, there is plenty of cotton, because we are pretty nearly giving it away

to make insulating material. It 16 a

matter of manpower and getting It into
the cheaper garments. Those are prob-

lems we have to meet.

Mr. TARVER. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent to revise and extend
the remarks I made in the Committee of
the Whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection
to the request of the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. TARVER]?

There was no objection

Mr. TARVER Mr. Chairman, I move
that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and
the Speaker having resumed the chair,
Mr. WHITTINGTON, chairman of the Com-

mittee of the Whole House on the state

of the Union, reported that that committee. having had under consideration the
bill H. R. 4443, the Department of Agri-

culture appropriation bill. 1945, had
come to no resolution thereon.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

authorized to determine who shall be en-

titled to a quota of farm machinery?

Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin If the
gentleman will look up the law under
which this power has been delegated, I

am sure he will find it is quite broad,
and he will find that the interpretation
of it is very, very broad. It will include
most anything. as I found out last summer when a certain employee of the War

Meat Board was telling all the farmer
butchers in my particular district that,
If they did not have a new slaughterhouse within 10 days. he would cancel
their permit to slaughter. That is what

I ran into last summer. I later found

the writer of the letter did not have per-

mission to write the letter from any superior officeholder. I did find out that
he must have been a political appointee,

as his service record showed no experience whatsoever in regard to meats, or

Mr. HARE. Mr. Speaker, I ask uani-

mous consent to extend my own remarks

In the RECORD at the conclusion of the

debate on the rivers and harbors bill
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from South

Carolina?

There was no objection.
(Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin asked and

was given permission to extend his own

remarks in the RECORD.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent that the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. LUTHER A. JOHNSON] be

permitted to revise and extend the remarks he made today and include therein a letter from Mr. Leo Crowley.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to

the request of the gentleman from

Texas?

There was no objection.

MARCH 22
PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. DIRKBEN Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent that on tomorrow,
at the conclusion of the legislative program of the day and following any special orders heretofore entered, I may be
permitted to address the House for 15

minutes

The SPEAKER Is there objection to

the request of the gentleman from

Illinois?
There was no objection.

MONETARY STABILIZATION

The SPEAKER Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. SMITH) is recognized for 1

hour

(Mr. SMITH of Ohio asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his

remarks in the RECORD.)
A

2990

FURTHER STUDY or THE BATTISH SCHEME TO
SECURE CONTROL or UNITED STATES COLD. COM-

MONLY REFERRED TO AS THE KETNES-MORGENTHAT PROPORAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL STARILINATION FUND

Mr. SMITH of Ohio Mr. Speaker, the
present study should be considered in
connection with a paper I presented on
this subject to the House November 1
1943. In that paper I established what
I believe to be conclusive proof that there
are not two plans, a British plan for an

International clearing union and an
American plan for a united and associ

ated nations stabilization fund, but that

there is in reality only one plan; namely
the British plan. Benjamin M. Anderson
has asserted as much- Anderson, Benja-

min M. Post-war Stabilization of Foreign Exchange: the tynes-Morgenthau
Plan Condemned: Outline of a Fundamental Solution. in the Economic Bulletin, Capital Research Co., Los Angeles,
Calif. May 11. 1943. For many years

nomic adviser to the Chase National
Bank in New York. Dr. Anderson is now

professor of economics, University of

California at Los Angeles

Dr. Melchior Palyi states that the
two plans "deal practically only with
the problem of Great Britain-P
Dr. Melchior, Some Implications of
the Keynes-Morgenthau International

Clearing Pool. an address delivered at
Union League Club, Chicago, April 28,

1943, and reprinted from the Great
Lakes Banker, July 1943.

Indeed. I think the proof is cleando
that paper that the officials of the ad.
ministration who are responsible for
having drawn up the draft for a "united
and associated nations stabilization
fund' did practically nothing but copy

from and reword and rephrase the text of

the British proposal for an International clearing union as outlined in the
British white paper.
Several other points contained in the
November 1 paper should be kept in
mind in considering the present study.
The scheme would involve the complete
abandonment of the international gold
standard as this term has been used and
understood since gold has been used in
International trade and commerce down
to the present time all protests by the
promoters of the scheme to the con-

trary notwithstanding. It would sub-

stitute for the gold standard a fictitious

28

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
International monetary unit called

"unitas" which would not be gold but

whose value would be fixed by politicians

in terms of gold, but not unalterably.

The currency of each country belonging

to the scheme would in turn be arbitrarily fixed by politicians in terms of
unitas, but also not unalterably. The
main characteristic of this device would
be its high degree of political variability
which would give it the desired political
manipulability aimed at by Lord Keynes
and his coworkers. Along with the de-

struction of the international gold

standard, this artifice would, of course,
also destroy the supremacy which the
United States dollar now holds in international trade, which is no doubt one
of the objectives of the scheme
The scheme would also involve the
assumption by the United States of perhaps $5,000,000,000 or more of British
debts which Britain owes South AmerIcan countries, Belgium, Scandinavian
countries, and her colonies and dominions. This would be accomplished subStantially with United States gold. Although the United States would furnish
the vast bulk of the capital in the form
of gold, yet our country would be hopelessly in the minority in respect to control. The present study will show this
picture to be even more unfavorable to
the United States than was shown in
my revious paper.
control of our money, which is
vested in Congress by the Constitution
would be given over to an international
monetary authority which would also
have far-reaching and dictatorial powers over our domestic economy. Great
Britain would be the dominating power
in the scheme.

The computations in the November 1

paper relating to contributions were
based on a total capitalization of $5.

000.000.000. Since then, as stated in a
letter to me by the Treasury. the administration has changed this figure to $8,
000,000,000. Accordingly the computations will in the present study be based
on the latter figure.
It will be noted in referring to column
2 in the table which is to follow that the
aggregate of contributions listed does not
come to $8,000,000,000 but only $6,560.

000.000. The aggregate of the contribu-

tions of the countries not shown on the
table would apparently not be sufficient
to make up this difference. However,
Treasury officials inform me that the percentage figures given me for computing
contributions are tentative and subject
to change. Further, that "before computing individual quotas there shall be
reserved an amount equal to 10 percent
of aggregate quotas to be used special
allotment for equitable adjustment of
quotas," as provided in II-4 of the administration's revised draft. The irreconcilability of these figures would seem
of no particular importance to the
of this study.
In my November 1 paper I raised the
question of the availability of free or unpledged gold in the countries that would
belong to the scheme for their allegedly
assigned contributions to the fund. By
free or unpledged gold is meant gold in
excess of that pledged as cover for deNo. 53-11

mand liabilities The primary purpose
of the present study is to show which
countries have and which countries do
not have free gold to meet their proposed gold quotas.

The accompanying table shows the
pertinent data relating to this problem
for 31 of the so-called United and Associated Nations which we told would
become members of the scheme.

Data relating to the amount of circulating notes and other demand liabilities
and gold holdings were furnished me by
the Federal Reserve. Data relating to
contributions to the scheme were furnished me by the Treasury
Four sources showing the legal require-

ments for gold reserves against demand

liabilities have been made available to
me, namely, the Federal Reserve Bulletin for July 1936; Treasury data for-about
13 Latin-American countries; the Law
Library of the Library of Congress; and
Moody's Manual of Investments for 1943.
A footnote will be appended to the
name of each country on the table showing the legal reserve requirements as

furnished me by one or more of the
above-mentioned sources. As will be
noted the data for some countries are
incomplete, uncertain, and apparently
conflicting. Where doubt or uncertainty

exists I have sought to use the data which

provide the least amount of reserves and

to apply the statute of the most recent

date.

I have quoted the several sources show.

ing legal reserve requirements for the
purpose of presenting the apparent uncertainties, lack of uniformity and generally unsatisfactory conditions in this
part of the monetary field. However, I

have done this more expressly to indicate

something of the progressive deterioration of the standard unit of value and
the gravity of the monetary. pathology
that now afflicts nearly if not all of the
countries we are to believe would become participants in the scheme.

The 31 countries represented on the

table are divided into categories, name-

ly, (a) those countries having no free
gold, which number 14: (b) those countries having free gold, which number 16:
(c) the United States.

2991

In further explanation of the figure

(2) which precedes the percentage fig.

ures in column 2.1t should be stated that
gold exchange, as defined on page 541 in

the July 1936 Federal Reserve Bulletin
means exchange convertible into gold

The percentage figure shown in col.

umn 2 does not always correspond with
the figure actually used in computing re-

serve requirements because of certain

qualifying factors. This apparent dis-

crepancy is clarified in the footnote relating to the country concerned

Observe that, although both the cir.
culating notes and other demand liabill.

ties are shown for each country in col-

umns 4 and 5 that the percentage figure
in column 2 has not always been applied

to both of the above two figures. Some
countries require gold reserves against
circulating notes only and others against
both circulating notes and other demand

liabilities. Furthermore, the require-

ment for notes may be different than the

one for other demand liabilities The
footnote for each country will clarify

these points.

It should be understood that the computations showing the amount of gold-

reserve requirements against demand
liabilities as well as the amount of free
or unpledged gold or lack of same are of

necessity quite inexact. This is true because in most cases up-to-date data and

in many complete figures are unavailable. Figures showing gold holdings and

circulating notes and other demand liabilities are frequently of different dates.

Numerous other qualifying factors are

involved. In several cases I could not be
certain as to the correct percentage fig-

ure to be applied for computing the
amount of required gold reserves and
accordingly some errors are likely to be
found in those computations. The best
have been able to do with the material at

hand is to give a rough approximation
of the true picture. But whatever in.
exactness and error may be involved in
the figures which would show conditions
to be worse than they really are, this
would be more than ouset by the fact
that they are now much worse than the
table shows and are continually growing worse s an accelerated rate of speed.

Neither in this nor my paper of last

With respect to the remaining countries that would become members of the

November has the administration's for-

scheme, I have been unable to obtain any

member countries been strictly adhered

data that are of value to this study.

Those countries are Iceland, the Philippines, Panama, Luxemburg, Iraq. Honduras Halti, Ethiopia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Iran.
According to Federal Reserve and Treas-

ury data, though sometimes conflicting
with each other. Panama Iraq. Ethiopia,
and Dominican Republic make no reports of their gold holdings, while in the
case of some of the others no figures
respecting gold holdings are at present

available. Paraguay and Nicaragua

require no gold reserves against their de-

mand liabilities. From such data as are
available to me it would appear that all
of these countries together must possess
such a very small amount of gold that
leaving them out of consideration could
not possibly make any material difference in the results of this study

muls for determining gold quotas for
to. Section II-3 of the administration's

revised draft of the Keynes scheme provides in most cases that the amount of
free foreign exchange held by a country
is to be given a certain amount of weight

in determining the gold quotas. Both
the Treasury and Federal Reserve informed me that they had no data relating to this Item. This, however, could

not materially affect the results of the
study.

With respect to several countries, because of incomplete and unsatisfactory

data, principally in Latin America, no

attempt has been made to compute the
amount of required gold reserves.
By referring to columns 4 and 5 on the
table It will be seen that the grand total

of circulating notes and other demand
liailities of the 13 nonfree gold-holding

28
2992

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

countries China not included- $28,000,000,000. By referring to column
It will be noted that the amount of
gold reserves required against their total

demand liabilities omitting gold re-

serves required by United Kingdom-

would be $7,300,000,000. By now refer-

ring to column will be seen that the

total amount of gold holdings of those 13

nonfree gold-holding countries is only
$3,800,000,000. Thus it will be seen that
those 13 nonfree gold-holding countries
have a shortage of $3,500,000,000 for
meeting their statutory reserve requirements.

Looking now at column 13 we see that

Ible into gold on dewand, the United

States would actually contribute in gold
$3,355,000,000. Her total gold liability
would be the same as her total contribution. The nonfree gold-holding countries, number 14, would have no gold liability whatever. We stated the total gold

that would be available for contribu-

tions by the 16 free gold holding countries would be $420,000,000. Now what
would be the total gold liability of the 16
free gold-holding countries? Would it
be any more than the aggregate of their

gold contributions? Conceivably it

might be more. But here we run into
some questions which show this whole

the total amount of gold contributions

proposal to be positively preposterous.

would come to roundly $894,000,000.
Since, however, those countries are deficient in gold to the amount of $3,500,000,000 for their demand liability coverage as shown in column 9 taking into
consideration that no figure for China
is possible for this column- those countries would, of course, have no available
gold for international use in the form

Her paper and gold contributions are set

of the 13 nonfree gold-holding countries

of such contributions.
Let us now look at column 14 and com-

pare the amount of gold the United

States would be called on to contribute
with that which the other 30 nonfree and
free gold-holding countries combined
would have available to meet their gold
quotas, leaving out of consideration for
the moment the paper portion of the
contributions that would be made by the
United States as well as that of all the
other countries.

The United States would contribute in
gold $1,172,000,000. The 30 other coun-

tries would have available for international use only approximately $420,000.-

Let us consider the case of Russia

at $432,000,000 and $184,000,000, respec-

tively. The Treasury informed me that

Russia makes no reports of her gold hold-

ings. November 22. 1943, the Federal

Reserve gave me the figure of $839,000,000

as the amount of gold Russia held September 1935.

The Soviet Union is an absolutist state.

It is conceivable that she might pool a
portion of her gold on paper, or even by
delivering it into the physical possession
of some other country. That would depend on the benefits she could see accru-

ing to her by doing so. Lend-lease and
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
gifts and "loans" for reconstruction and
development which latter might be available to her in case the proposed international bank should be created, would
no doubt be deciding factors. But it is
unthinkable that the Soviet Union would
consent to giving over to an international

body any power whatsoever over her

000 in gold to meet their quotas. On

money. or any other part of her economy.
The basis of the whole Soviet economy

ital of the scheme while all the other
countries combined would contribute
only 26-plus percent. Yet the United

Haney. professor of economics, New York

this basis the United States would contribute 73-plus percent of the gold cap-

States would be given a voting strength
of only 20 percent while the other countries would have 80 percent. But this by
no means shows the picture to be as bad

as it really it.
In my paper of last November, before

I had completed the present study, I
stated:

The gold liability of the United States

would be nearly four times that of the whole

British Empire, yet the United State would
have only 20 percent of the votes while the
Empire would have 19 percent.

is the political ownership and control of
her gold and paper currency, just as this

is the basts of all dictatorship. Lewis
University in an article in the Washing-

ton Times-Herald December 11, 1943, in

commenting on a certain press dispatch

from Moscow relating to "world banks
and such things" gives the impression
that Russian participation in the Keynes
scheme is impossible. "Russia balks" is
the caption of an article by Ralph Hendershot in the New York World-Telegram December 7. 1943, of which he is
financial
editor. He then goes on to say
of Russia:
And she wants nothing to do with schemes

for an international bank. preferring to do

I now find the United States would be
in a much more unfavorable position
than was indicated at that time. The
Union of South Africa is the only com-

various and varied assets into an Interna-

which possesses any free gold. She is
given a gold quota of $72,000,000. The

against these assets, to be used in the settlement of trade balances between participating

ponent of the entire British Empire
gold quota of the United States would be
$1,172,000,000 Thus It is seen that, on
the basis of available free gold the United

States would contribute more than 16
times as much gold as the entire British
Empire, yet the United States would be
given only approximately the same percentage of basic votes as the Empire, 20
and 19 percent, respectively.

Since United States paper dollars from

an international standpoint are convert-

business on a gold basis, The chances are

this will put a crimp in Britain's plans to

stabilize International currencies by placing

tional bank and Issuing a new currency

nations. And It may very well give our Treas-

ury officials reason to stop, look and listen
before throwing in with the British idea

Furthermore, it would seem another
complication may have arisen in connec-

tion with Russian participation in this

British scheme. refer to the announcement that recently came from Russia to

the effect that the Russian state is to
be divided up into 16 "republics," each
of which is to have power to separately
enter into "direct relations with foreign

MARC-122

states and conclude agreements with
them." See full text of Molotov Plan Enlarging Autonomy of 16 of the Boviet

Republics, New York Times. February 2.
1944.

What the purpose of this new arrange

ment may be is as yet not clear but It

could be used to somehow match the con-

trol of other nations. particularly that of
Great Britain and the United States, in
order to secure greater advantage to her-

self in any international financial arrangements that might be created. But

whatever may be the object of this move,

It is safe to say the Soviet Union could
not in any event give her consent to any
proposal which would involve outside interference with the price at which she
might be willing to buy or sell gold outside of her borders, or with her domestic

currency or any part of her internal

economy. Since the Keyness-Morgenthau scheme would definitely involve
control by an international body over all
of those things in Russia, we can safely
conclude that she would not become a
full-fledged participant in it. Hence the
gold contribution assigned to her becomes more of a fiction than a reality.
Having eliminated Russia as anything
but a possible limited partner in the plan,

let us look for a moment at the other

countries in the free gold holding category with a view of determining the extent to which they could be expect to
he
actually make their gold available
scheme. The extent to which this could
be expected would of course, as in the
case of Russia, depend upon the amount
of concrete benefits they could see in it
for themselves. We may be sure that the
other countries that would join this proposed scheme would be realistic, that they

would do so understandingly and with
their eyes glued to their material interests. The United States seems to be the
only country in the world that not only
has lost much of its mechanism for protecting its own material interests against
foreign exploitation, but whose trusted
government officials willfully assist foreign interests to insinuate themselves into our economy and government and intrude themselves upon our rights as a

sovereign-power.

Section V-8 of the administration's

revised draft holds out a promise of con-

siderable benefit to at least some of the
free gold-holding countries. This is particularly true with respect to those LatinAmerican countries which have large

sterling balances in London The assumption by the scheme of the British
debts which comprise those sterling balances would place those Latin-American

countries in a position of being able to
collect them from the United States.
Like Russia, lend-lease, Export-Import

Bank loans, and loans which might be

made available to them through the cre-

ation of an International bank for reconstruction and development
doubtedly be further inducement
the
Latin-American countries to contribute
some of their gold to the scheme The
extent to which the United States would
indirectly, through these means, furnish
to the Latin-American countries the very

assets they would contribute to the

scheme could not help but be substantial

29

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

If

can believe certain news items, the

Treasury is even now giving away gold
to certain countries which would be used
in making up their gold quotas to the
scheme. See Reader's Digest, February
1944, pages 12-14.

In my November 1, 1943, paper, I also

raised the question of whether the

scheme would actually have physical

possession of all of the gold assets con-

tributed to it, or whether each country
would keep its gold quota in its central
bank and government vaults, and the
whole operation of the plan, except the
gold contributed by the United States, be
one of bookkeeping.

be made available for use in the operation of the scheme in the sense in which

the term "use" is applied to the capital
of a bank or any other financial institu-

tion? The capital and assets of any

financial institution must either be in its
actual physical possession or in some
manner subject to physical possession by

emerge from Mr. Morgenthau's answer.

does not comprehend actual physical pos-

tries would retain physical possession of

There is no such thing as absentee liquid-

ated Nations Stabilization Fund would be
only a matter of bookkeeping. that the assets

to understand, in answer to direct question,

that the operation of the United and Associ-

follows:

I deaire from you, the Secretary of the
Treasury. a direct answer to the following:

Does the "Preliminary Draft Outline of

Proposal for a United and Associated Nations

Stabilization Fund, United States Treasury
Department, Revised Draft July 10, 1943.
provide for the physical delivery of the gold

assets of the fund at some central point
within the geographic boundary of one of
the United and Associated Nationa? Or. is it

contemplated that the gold assets of the

fund will remain in the physical possession
of the member countries of the fund within
their territorial boundaries?

engraved on superior notepaper, better than

among the technical experts of other countries did not touch on the point of the man-

It is my understanding that the discussions

would be the case, perhaps, under our own
scheme. I have said that, If that is thought
useful and worth while, It does not involve

ner in which the gold contributed by a member country would be physically delivered to

any particular problem (p. 81, Parliamentary
Debates on an International Clearing Union,
British Information Services).

that their respective gold contributions

superior notepaper but would be a bond

underwritten by the Government of the
United States for the delivery of gold on
demand, backed by the actual possession

of said gold. But the paper portion that

would be contributed by the United

Kingdom would not be possessed of this

liquid quality. It would be a political
OU in the truest sense, with no gold
bal it to assure its redemption, and
with nt recourse to any other means or
source of payment.

To what extent would the gold contributions made by countries other than
the United States actually be made avail-

able to the scheme? Would any gold
except that supplied by the United States

contributions at home. too.
We wonder also which countries have

member countries.

On November 13. 1943, Mr. Morgenthau replied to the above as follows:

consist mainly of an engraved on

seem undecided or unwilling to say
whether or not the smaller countries
would be permitted to keep their gold

of the fund would remain in the central

certainly be met If It is thought useful; but

The paper portion that would be contributed by the United States would not

classify the United and Associated Nations in two categories, the larger countries on the one hand and the smaller
ones on the other. but It would be more
interesting still to know how and why he
arrived at determining that the larger
nations would keep their gold contributions at home in their own vaults, yet

of Monetary Research, Treasury Department;

Wishing to have this statement confirmed in writing by the Secretary of the
Treasury, I wrote him in that letter as

the security in question only to a very small
extent consists in an outside security in the
shape of gold. It constate mainly of ANIOU

It should be interesting to have Mr.

Morgenthau's formula which he used to

Mr. Richard B. Brenner is an attorney in the
Treasury Department), in my office, gave me

nothing but overdrafts, except those
made by the United States and other

The American plan requires the member
States to provide so-called security against
their overdrafts, a requirement which could

choice to do likewise.

following letter to Mr. Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury:
Some days ago Mr. E M Bernstein, in

banks and government Institutions of the

but apparently was very careful to refrain from distinguishing between the
paper which would be contributed by
countries whose position is such as to
make it fully redeemable in gold at all
times and those countries whose gold
position is not such as to make their
paper fully redeemable in gold at all
times. He said:

its gold contribution. Furthermore, the

phrase "with respect to the larger countries at least," would certainly imply that
the smaller countries might be given the

On November 10. 1943, I addressed the

The paper contributions that would be
made to the scheme constitute in reality

in expounding his scheme to the
House of Lords, touched upon this point,

namely, that each one of the larger coun:

promissory notes, only then it becomes
a sham and a fraud of the worst sort.

ity any more than there is liquidity in

tionality convertible into gold. Lord

One thing certain. however, does

session of all its capital assets, If the
shares of some are represented by
paid-in gold and of others by political

company with Mr. Brenner (Mr. Edward M.
Bernstein is an assistant director, Division

countries whose currencies are interna-

ask no questions?

it. This proposition holds with respect
to international financial institutions as
well as domestic ones. If the scheme

It is important to know the answer to
this question, for unless the international
body would actually have in its physical
possession the gold contributions of the
so-called member countries, It is difficult
to see how they could serve either as a
true credit base or be of any value in
maintaining the liquidity of its Assets.
The soundness-that is, the liquidity of
the plan would always be dependent upon
the availability to it of its gold assets
futurity.

2993

are lending their support in the promotion of this scheme believe we are either
so naive as to simply take it for granted
that the member countries would be willing to ship their gold to some central
depository, or 80 completely uninformed
and unconcerned about the matter as to

a

1944

the fund. I presume, however, It is likely,
with respect to the larger countries at least

would be kept available on earmark for the

fund at the central banks of those countries.

This is of course an attempt to evade
answering my question. In the first place

how could there be any question about
188'manner in which the gold should be
physically delivered to the scheme? Is
there any other way this could be done
except by the simple act of. shipping?
Surely it would not require the services
of any technical experts to figure that
out.

If we are to infer from Mr. Morgenthau's answer that these technical experts have not discussed with the other
countries the question of whether they

been selected as the elect. The United
States, Great Britain, China, and Russis have been officially designated as the
"big four" powers so it is reasonable to
suppose none of these countries would
be called on to let loose of its gold contribution to be shipped off to any of the
other member countries, though neither
Great Britain nor China has any gold to
let loose of

If It is proposed that the smaller countries should hand their gold contributions
over to the scheme, to which of the self-

chosen few would they be expected to
deliver them: to one or more of them:

and, If so, which one or ones? Since the
Soviet Union would be no more than a
limited partner in the scheme, it is hardly
likely that country would be selected as
the gold depository for the smaller nations. China being so far away from the

financial and industrial center of the
world and for obvious, various, and sun-

dry other reasons would hardly do as a

depository of the gold assets of the
smaller countries. That would leave
only England and the United States to
be considered as suitable places for hold-

ing and guarding those gold assets. To
which of these two would the gold contributions from the smaller countries be
made to flow. or would they be made to
gravitate toward both?
These would not be idle questions if
the scheme really contemplated that the

proposed gold subscriptions of the
smaller countries would actually have to
be delivered at some central point within

the geographic boundary of one of the

so-called member countries. Indeed
these questions would then become vital

as they would go to the very root of the
matter.

other member countries, it should be in-

These questions, of course, answer
themselves, and they are not asked so
much for the purpose of determining

teresting to know what they have discussed. Do administration officials who

would actually deliver their gold quotas

would be willing to ship their gold quotas

to one or possibly even several of the

whether or not the smaller countries

29
2994

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

to some central depository within one of

the member countries, but are asked
more particularly to show both the deception and bizarreness of this scheme.
With respect to the countries having no

free or unpledged gold. the scheme would

the administration's draft of the scheme
that:

It could lend and borrow money. and deal

in securities The fact that 11 could borrow
money and issue its own obligations might
bring the fund's activities nearer the scope

have nothing more than second mort-

of the Keynes Union.

might be promised and with no recourse

Under the Keynee plan foreign countries
could in theory accumulate debits of nearly

gage on any gold contributions that

at that. Is It not likely that the free
gold-holding countries, nearly all of
which come within the category of

Of the Keynes Union be says:

$26,000,000,000. That is a limit

based on the assumption that the United

smaller countries, would prefer to keep

States would be the only creditor country

when the nonfree gold-holding countries
had nothing more to offer than a second

further than none of the safeguarda pro-

their gold quotas in their own pockets

mortgage on their gold quotas without
recourse, and when the so-called larger
countries preferred to retain their gold
contributions at their homes in their own
vaults? Is it possible to draw any other
conclusion than that the operation of
the scheme would be one of bookkeeping,

and the allegedly assigned gold contribu-

tions for both the nonfree and free gold

holding countries, except with respect to
the United States, would consist almost,

if not entirely, of political promises, not
to even pay in any part of such gold con-

tributions, but simply to agree to earmark them in their own countries for

the account of the scheme?
Up to the present we have considered

only the initial amount of gold Hability
the scheme would impose upon the
United States. In the paper heretofore
referred to of last November I mentioned that the initial subscription of
gold by the United States would likely
be no more than a starter, that once the
program were put in operation we should

expect to be called upon to pour addi-

tional amounts into it. In that paper

I said of the scheme:

We are to believe it is something that

could be started and stopped like a watch:
tried out and, If found ineffective abandoned

to its own fate. But it just would not work

that way. Once the scheme were in opera-

tion It would quickly generate forces that
would make for self-perpetuation and expansion. as is the nature of all political ma-

chinery A whole congerles of

vested International Interesta would quick-

ly spring up and concurrent the protective
mechanisms for maintaining them.

In this connection we should read some

of the provisions of the administration's
draft under section V. Powers and Operations, wherein are provided the following powers:

To buy. sell, and hold currencies and

government securities of member countries:

to earmark and transfer gold: to Issue its

own obligations. and to offer them for dis.
count or sale in member countries.
To buy from the governments of member
countries
blocked
foreign balances held in
other member
countries
member country obligations owned
byTo
thesell
fund.

To use Its holdings to obtain rediscounts
or advances from the central bank of any

country whose currency the fund needs.

With the approval of the representative

of the government of the country concerned,

sell its own securities or securities It holds,

directly
to the public or to Institutions of
member countries

With these far-reaching powers the
scheme could be greatly expanded beyond

its Initial functions and organization.
J. H. Riddle, economic adviser to the
Bankers Trust Co. in New York says of

and all others would be debtor countries, and

vided for worked That would not occur.
of course, but 11 might be possible after a
period of years for debit balances to reach

half that figure or even more, If creditor
countries should continue to supply the
funds without making any use of their credit

balances.

That is, the Keynes-Morgenthau

scheme could in time involve the United

States in a liability to the extent of upward of perhaps $15,000,000,000. Many
conditions must be taken into consideration in determining the probable extent
to which the scheme would be expanded.

It would be in control of the debtor countries who would determine its operations

and formulate its lending policies. Key.
nesian monetary and financial thinking,
with its flat credit and currency, Its miding of credits, its unlimited govern.
ment deficit financing its totalitarian approach, and, in this instance at least, its
lack of integrity, would give direction to
all of its procedures.

Then we must keep in mind that this
proposed plan is only a part of a larger
and more grandiose scheme that is envisioned by its promoters. Indeed, this is
frankly stated by its prime mover and
spearhead, Lord Keynes, when he says:
It is possible that taken together1. The mechanism of currency and exchange.
2 The framework of a commercial policy

regulating conditions for exchange of goods,
tariffs,
preferences,
tions, and
the like subsidies, import regula-

MARC

in operation in the form of the United
Nations Relief and

ministration Further, that his stabill.
zation scheme

in favor of any supernational policing
body which may be charged with the
duty of preserving the peace and main.
taining International order" that
would provide an excellent
for enforcing a financial blockade that
it "might set up an account in favor
International bodies charged with the
management of a commodity control

and might finance stocks of
held by such bodies, allowing them over-

draft facilities on their accounts up
an agreed maximum

Also that It "might be linked up with
board for international investment that
"there are various methods by which the

clearing union could use its and
its powers to maintain stability of prices

and to control the trade cycle, that "If

an International economic board established this board and the clearing union
might be expected to work in close collaboration to their mutual advantage.

that "If an international Investment

development corporation is also net up,
together with a scheme of commodity
controls for the control of stocks of the
staple primary products, we might come
to possess in these three Institutions
powerful means of combating the evils
of the trade cycle, by exercising TBCtionist or expansionist influence
the
system as whole or on particular sections," and, finally, "the facility of applying the clearing-unlon
the Keynes-Morgenthau scheme which
we are there.considering-to these several purposes arises out of a fundamental
characteristic which is worth pointing
out. since it distinguishes the plan from
those proposals which try to develop the
same basic principle along bilateral lines
and is one of the grounds on which the
plan can claim superior merit," which be
clinches with this sophistry: This might
be described as its 'anonymous' or 'Im-

a Orderly conduct of production, distri-

personal' quality.

4. Investment aid. both medium and long

What else could It possibly be that is
envisioned here but a supernational
brain trust with authority, as Benjamin

bution, and price of primary products

term, for countries whose economic development needs assistance from outside.

may help the world to control

the ebb and flow of the tides of economic
activity which have. in the past, destroyed
security ofpeace.
livelihood and endangered international

Lord Keynes looks upon his International stabilization scheme as the nucleus

for the construction of a universal and
all-pervasive centralized international
power to regulate the economies, governments, and individual lives of the
people of the whole earth. To the fore.
going he adds that It "might become the

instrument and the support of International policies in addition to those which
its primary purpose to promote that
it "might become the pivot of the future
economic government of the world" that
"without it, other more desirable developments will find themselves impeded
and unsupported" that "with they will
fall into their place as parts of an ordered scheme" that It "might set up
clearing account in favor of international bodies charged with post-war relief,

rehabilitation and reconstruction'

which segment of his scheme is already

M. Anderson has designated it?

As just mentioned. one of the parts of
this all-embracing scheme has already
been perfected, namely, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which, according to resolutions
adopted at the Atlantic City conference,
is to undertake everything, from the furnishing of soup kitchens to the construction of railroads in all the war-stricken
areas of the world: further, still another
part of this global program. an "international bank for reconstruction and development' with an initial capitalization of
$10,000,000,000, is now in the process
concoction by the Administration
Then there is a vast assemblag

Inted forces and conditions are

giving impetus or allowing freedom
this movement, though perhaps not so
directly or manifestly connected with it

such as the totalitarian planning cuit
which in conjunction with the Federal
bureaucracy all but completely domi-

nates our economy and government, the
disordered and corrupt currency and the

long way our Nation has already gone

to

30
194

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

in substituting a society of status for

It is plainly seen that the meat of the

that of contract.
There is one more point which is of
great importance to the consideration of
the Keynes-Morgenthau scheme and

which is very pertinent to this study.

Seldom if ever are the expectations or
promises of legislators in setting up political agencies fulfilled. It is an almost
unbroken law that such bodies are, when
once established and put in operation.
never limited to their original size and
functions. but tend always to enlarge and
expand the scope of their activities.
This is so universally true and so selfevident that it should require no substantiating proof, though B thousand 11Iustrations are ready at hand to support
this contention, if that should be deemed

ldge plan.

objectives by destroying the dollar as the

for Lord Keynes to say:

The existence of the clearing union does

not deprive a member state of any of the

facilities which It now for receiving
payment for its exports. In the absence of

be construed by the Supreme Court so as

the clearing union. a creditor country can
employ the proceeds of its exports to buy
goods or to buy investments, or to make

to make the growing of wheat interstate
commerce and empower a Federal buresu to dictate to the farmer how much
wheat he can grow?

The Congress devotes nine-tenths of

functions that were not intended and for
disobeying the laws which brought them

into existence.

The Keynes-Morgenthau scheme
would be no exception to the law of

own economy and the economies of other

countries. It would do exactly what Lord
Keynes formally denies it would do when

he says:

Nor is it reasonable to ask the United

States to demonetize the stock of gold which

This would in one single stroke destroy

perb international gold position the
United States now holds, in International

trade and commerce. It would at the

Keynes by saying:
The fund would deal only with treasuries

and, of course, to Great Britain in particular an unearned, precious, and vital

Mr. Morgenthau, to chime in with Lord

same time yield to the debtor countries

and central banks. It would not compete

national resource.

with private banks or existing agencies. Its

operations would be maintained only to sup-

The alleged capital formation of the

plement the efforts made by each member
government to maintain monetary stability.

Keynes-Morgenthau scheme is a fraud.
The dishonesty and deception which un-

retained in full for all international transsc.
tions. (Statement of Secretary Morgenthau

bureaucracy, take on new functions and

before the Senate Committees on Foreign Re-

expand in directions not now thought of
or intended, most likely even by Lord

lations and Banking and Currency and the
Special Committee on Post-War Economic
Policy and Planning, April 5. 1943, 3.)

deed, the nature of this scheme is such
as to make It particularly liable to anar-

If these gentlemen mean that gold
could still be used in the settlement of
international trade balances in the orthodox way. That view postulates the

chic growth.

genthau scheme to grasp the fact that
It would involve not merely the amount
of gold the United States would contribute to it but our entire stock pile of
gold. It envisions the complete demonetization of our total gold reserves for international use just as they have been
demonetized for domestic use within our

And for the Secretary of the Treasury.

endogenous growth of political machin-

Keynes and some of his coworkers,
should be a foregone conclusion. In-

It is of the utmost importance to a

full comprehension of the Keynes-Mor-

in large measure if not entirely the su-

The established channels of international
trade and International banking would be

ery. That it would go the way of all

cheap money, the politically manipulable

paper unitas? None, of course.

ket. All these facilities will remain at its
disposal. (Proposals for an international

April 8, 1943, p. 11.)

especially, it scolds the O.P.A., C.C.C.,
A. A. A., and the other political alphabetical agencies for using their powers
to change the economy, for taking on

gold money? What earthly chance would

is the basis of its impregnable liquidity

clearing union, British Information Services,

ery which it has created and to

con its functions within the bounds
of the laws it has itself written. Now

in domestic economics? Would not the

temporary advances and to hold temporary

overseas balances, or to buy gold in the mar-

its time trying to restrain the political

the international field as it always has

gold have to remain in circulation internationally and compete with the

leading International standard unit of
value and settler of accounts and what
is left of the orthodox international gold
standard by substituting therefor a fictitious and political paper unit of account called unitas, in terms of which
international pecuniary contracts would
have to be made. It is sheer nonsense

Who in 1887 would have thought that
the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which was created at that time, would
develop to its present size, complexity,
and power, and that the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution would

"unitas" of account on the other. Would
not Gresham's law operate the same in

bad unitas money drive out the good

The scheme seeks to accomplish these

bureaucracy that has taken place in the
Federal Government in recent years.

trade balances, a definable weight of gold
on the one hand and an Indefinable paper

nance $5,000,000,000 or more of debts
Britain owes to a large number of coun-

tries; to restore London as the world's
banker and financial center; to finance
her world trade and pay for her Bever-

necesary. But look at the growth of

mt

impossible, namely, the existence simutaneously of two kinda of international
units of value and media for settling

Keynes-Morgenthau scheme, stripped of

its pretunse and window dressing. is,
perhars along with other highly important objectives, an attempt to inveigle
the United States into handing over to
Great Britain the control and use of the
United States stock pile of gold; to n-

2995

derlie it condemn It utterly. This is not

a proposal for international cooperation

If the word "cooperation" still means
what the dictionary up to now has always

said It heant-"collective action in the
pursuit of common well-being." On the
contrary. this is a proposal by Great
Britain, supported by other countries and

aided by our present administration not
only to bleed the United States white but
to destroy her very blood-making organs.

Table showing the countries which would have no free or unpledged gold and the countries which would have free or unpledged gold
for gold contributions to the Keynes-Morgenthau scheme, and other pertinent data relating thereto
POSITION OF 14 COUNTRIES HAVING NO FREE GOLD
11

3

TEAR

S

&

2

a

4

1

de

12

13

14

(

6

7

8

9

15

10

8

a

de

Country

<

Rept.

484.2

2,512,596

121.059

April 1940
August 1943

Canada

1948.
1943

8,000

-116,059

734,000

-131,411

13,000

<

Australia
Belgium

Bolivia

120,000
192
000 B
8,000
224,000

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUS

2996

MARC

Table showing the countries which would have no free or unpledged gold and tha\countries which would have free or unpledged gold
for gold contributions to the Keynes-Morgenthau scheme, and other pertinent data relating thereto-Continued
POSITION OF 14 COUNTRIES VING NO PARK GOLD -continued
10

11

12

13

14

a

.

9

4

a

82

2
an

Country

<

China

March 1939

Aug. 1943

Caechoslovakia
Egypt

863,441

21,000

320,000

142,798
484,840

France
Greece

India

2,272,964

Netherlands
New Zealand

68.000

United Kingdom

1943

Yugoslavia

713,840

(1)

Total

201,295

23.115.245

5,114,41

40,000
1,024,000

1.000

February 1941

83,000

7,306,263

3,801,000

24,000

-3,306,263

2,992,000

898,725

-891,725

POSITION OF 16 COUNTRIES HAVING FREE GOLD
BrazS

Apr.

107,229

473,209
30,306

63,748

66,915

816,643

(0)

Colembia
Costs
Cuba

1943

Rica

60,579

8,000

1.2

38,400

+6,579

+38.40

July 1943.
12,097

6,757

Mexico.

136,505
25,468

Norway
Peru.

20,628

21,681
Atrics.

181.1

Social

a

University

April 1943

+2.20

8,819

(1)

18,415

of Soviet

223,000
54,000

1943

7,239

12,005

Ecuador
Salvador

Poland
Houth

September 1943
August 1943

(8)

Oct.

600
000

+44,471

October

17,934

65,456

494,061

202,788

July 1939

78,808

102,534

1943

75,233

23,966

1,852

31,410
44,589

+42,000
+16,800

000

+18,644
+425,212

August 1943
September 1985

1943

Total

0,000

December 1942.
October 1943.
February 1940

+-72,000

839,000

June 1943
October 1943

101,000
84,000

1,424,729

+60,500
+39,365

2,455,000

616,000
16,000

184,800

+184,800

24,000

12,000

+12,000

1,234,800

427,400

+121,823

+4,000

GOLD POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

,

United States

40-35

Oct.

1943

15,550,000

14.

193,8

11,187.00

October 27, 1943

219,851.0

48,514,000

29.3

2,344,000

50 01,172,000

+1,172,000

its

The United
statute
Reserve
bankitsshall
maintain
reserves
in gold
certificates or lawful money of not less than 35 per centum against
deposits
andStates
reserves
goldthat:
lessEvery
than Federal
per centum
against
Federal
Reserve
notes
in actual
gold, that to extent to which goldheld
mayby
bethe
exported.
Federal Reserve banks They are truly representative of gold only to the extent to which they.are actually convertible into
AUSTRALIA

ing on the 30th day of June 1935; and not

Requires a 25-percent gold and gold

less than 25 percent of such notes on issue

Exchange included limited to English
sterling
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, July
1936. p. 542.)

of Congress, law library. November 15, 1943.)

The bank is obligated by law to maintain
a 25-percent gold reserve against notes in

considered as reserve against notes since

English sterling exchange owned by

Act of 1932 (emented to May 21, 1932) It

exchange.

exchange reserve against notes.

circulation By the Commonwealth Bank
was provided that the reserve may be held in

gold coin or in English starting or partly in
gold and partly in English sterling (Moody's
Manual of Investments 1943, P. 1652.)

The maintenance of reserved in the Com-

monwealth of Australia provided for in
the Commonwealth
follows:

Bank Act, 1911-32, is as

"SEC 60K (1) The Board shall hold in
gold or in English sterling or partly in gold
and partly in English sterling a reserve of
an amount not less than 15 percent of the
amount of Australian notes on Issue during
the 2 years ending on the 30th day of June
1933, not less than 18 percent of such notes

on Issue during the year ending on the 30th
day of June 1934; not less than 21 1/2 percent

of such notes on Issue during the year end.

after the 30th day of June 1935." (Library

Only gold held by Australia can be
Australia cannot be considered as gold
BELGIUM

BOLIVIA

Requires a 50 percent of gold and gold
exchange
reserve against notes and deposits.
May legally Include silver. Silver included
limited to one-fifth of required reserve. Ex.
change included limited to deposits payable

in gold on demand or on a days notice in

New York or London except that since Sep.
tember 6, 1932, domestic and foreign prime

Thirty percent gold or 40 percent of

commercial bills may. with the consent of

gold and gold exchange against demand

the superintendent of banks, be included up

liabilities-Federal Reserve Bulletin,

July 1936, page 542.

Prior to the occupation of the country

by the German Army in May 1940, the Na-

tional Bank of Belgium had the sole right

to issue bank notes: Its reserves, in gold or
gold foreign exchange had to equal 40 per-

cent of Its sight engagements and 75 per-

cent of the reserve had to be in gold.
(Moody's Manual of Investments, 1943, p.
1682.)

Moody's Manual of Investments data
used
for computing amount of gold reserve required.

to one-tenth of required reserve Bank in-

cludes drafts payable, dividends and other
obligations with deposits against which re-

serves are required. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, p. 542.)

Decree of June 1941, requires 45 percent
reserve in gold or foreign exchange
notes and deposits, all foreign exchan

be counted, but gold itself must equal 30
percent of notes and deposits. (Computation

of required reserves to chart based on this

30-percent requirement.) The bank however

follows its organic law of July 20, 1928, and
counts only gold, dollars and sterling (plus
a
amount
of small
June 30,
1943.)of siver) (Treasury data as

31

CONGRESSIONAL RECORDHOUSE

19

CANADA

Canada requires 25 percent gold reserve

against notes and deposits.
Government at bank's request may suspend

p. 108). Section 4 of the statute grants the

National Bank of Egypt the privilege of issuing bank notes Section 5 states that the

issue of bank notes is a separate service dis.

2997

held-$103,000 March 31, 1941, Federal

Reserve figure.

INDIA

A gold and gold-exchange reserve of 40

reserve requirement for maximum period of

year. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936,

tinet from the other operations of the bank
It states further:
The amount of bank notes in circulation

p. 542.)

payable either to bearer or on sight must be

stated reserve subject

order of May 1,1940 the bank's gold reserves

in gold; (2) one-half in such securities owned

sent

In connection with the Exchange Fund

were sold to the Foreign Exchange Control

Board and at the same time the bank's mini-

always represented by (1) at least one-half

by the bank and calculated at a rate not exceeding the daily quotations but with maxi-

percent is required against notes

Reserve may be permitted to fall below

to the payment of a tax. Government conis

necessary

in

India.

Gold

must not be less than 400,000,000 rupees; at

least 85 percent of gold included must be

mum gold reserve requirement was temporarily discontinued (Moody's Manual of In-

mum at par, the choice of which is by law

to deposits at Bank of England sterling bills,

Excludes gold held by Foreign Exchange
Control Board which on May 1. 1940, took

reserved to the government alone without
any responsibility whatsoever on the part of

plete or partial, of such securities the reserve

July 1936, p. 542.)

Canada amounting to $206,000,000. (Federal

bank notes, must be increased proportionately in such a way that the amount of the

vestments 1943, p. 1512.)

over all the gold reserves of the Bank of

Reserve data.)
CHINA

According to information supplied me
by the Federal Reserve Board. China held

in March 1939. only $21,000,000 in gold.
Yet. according to data furnished me by
the Treasury China's gold contribution is
set at $72,000,000.

No attempt has been made to show the

gold reserve requirements of China. The

Law Library of Congress furnished me
with almost seven pages of single-spaced

typewritten data relating to this subject,
which shows it to be impossible to determine much of value in respect to her
reserve requirements.

China has no gold to contribute to the

scheme. In this connection should be
he agreement made by the Treasury

tment with China relating to the

$500,000,000 of financial aid extended to

China Under that agreement the

United States has assumed a potential
gold liability to the full amount of $500.000,000. It is also necessary here to keep

in mind the great inflation which is now
raging m China. She needs all the gold
she can possibly acquire to meet that
situation, and for that reason alone would

have none to spare for the Keynes
scheme
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A 25-percent gold reserve is required
against domand liabilities
Reserve may be permitted to fall below
stated reserve requirements subject

to the payment of a tax (Federal Reserve

Bulletin, July 1936. p. 543.)

When Czechostovakia became divided into

a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and
the state of Slovakia, a separate Slovakian

bank-Slovenaks Narodna Banks was estab-

lished. (Library of Congress, Law Library.

November 10, 1943.)

The demand liabilities of Slovakia were

included with those of Bohemia and

Moravia, but they amount to only about
10 percent of those of the latter, and
would. for the purpose of this study. not
materially affect any of the figures shown
for Czechoslovakia.

in gold held by the special issue service of the

bank notes in circulation shall always be

covered completely.

This text is quoted from Pace, Repertaire

Requires a 50-percent gold and goldexchange reserve against notes.
d included must be held at home. Exincluded limited to British Treasury
bills. (Federal Reserve Bulletin. July 1936,
542.)

The statutes of the National Bank of Egypt,
approved by the decree of June 25, 1898, were

amended several times. the last amendments
being dated May 29, 1920, June 20, 1927, and

August 10. 1940. This last decree was promulgated August 12. 1940 (Journal Official,

or British Government securities maturing
within 5 years. (Federal Reserve Bulletin,
India held on August 27. 1943, $2,155.

071,000 of English Reserve data
Since English sterling exchange cannot

Permanent de Legislation Egyptienne, which
is a loose-leaf service of Egyptian legislation

be considered as gold exchange in the
true sense, India's English sterling can-

(Library of Congress. Law Library, November

notes.

in force brought up to date to August 1940.

not be applied as reserve against her
NETHERLANDS

18. 1943.)

Required gold reserve computed in ac-

cordance with Library of Congress, Law
Library, November 18, 1943, data. English exchange being not gold exchange,

the result would be the same If Federal

Reserve data had been used.
FRANCE

Requires a 35-percent gold reserve

against demand liabilities-Fe Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, page 542.

This 35-percent gold reserve require-

ment was suspended under the emergency decree of September 2. 1939Moody's Manual of Investments, 1943,
page-1777.

The amount of gold holding shown
does not include the gold transferred to
the Exchange Stabilization Fund-about
$700,000,000. See page 1003. September
1940 Federal Reserve Bulletin.
GENECE

A 40-percent gold and gold-exchange
reserve is required against "demand liabilities, minus holdings of national silver
coin up to 150,000,000 drachmas.
Reserve net, e., minus gold exchange 11a-

bilities. Reserve may include certain gold

bonds of the Greek state up to 650,000,000
drachmas Reserve requirement suspended
since April 26. 1932. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, p. 542.)
Under section 61 of the Statute of the Bank
of Greece of 1927, the bank had to maintain
"a reserve of not less than 40 percent of the

notes in circulation and other demand lia-

bilities. The reserve may have consisted
not only of gold bullion and coin, but also
of "net foreign gold exchange." However,

section 61. above quoted. was expressly sus-

pended by section 1 of the law. No. 5422 of
April 1932 (Ephemeria 1932. p. .917) This
law seems to be still in force down to 1939 as

it is stated in the monograph. Teamis
L'Evolution Monetaire on Grece, 1928-38,

EGYPT

p.

the government. In default, either com-

held at home Exchange included limited

Doctor's dissertation presented at the University of Nancy on October 19 1939. The
same work gives the following tabulation of
the amount of coverage actually held by the

bank (p. 96) (Library of Congress, Law LLbrary, November 17. 1943.)

No consideration was given to the sil.
ver allowed as reserve by Greece because

of the very small amount permitted to be
used, nor to her foreign exchange which
might be used by her as reserve because

of the comparatively small amount

A 40-percent gold reserve is required
against demand liabilities.
May legally include silver. Eighty percent
of required reserve must be held at home.
(Federal Reserve Bulletin July 1936. p. 543.)

The Netherlands Bank is required to

maintain against outstanding notes and

other demand liabilities a revenue of 40 percent in gold and silver coin and bullion, and

other legal tender coin. The law does not
specify a fixed proportion of gold or silver.
Foreign exchange is not permitted as reserve

(Moody's Manual of Investments, 1945, p.

1851.)

The latest comprehensive regulation con-

cerning the bank is contained in the law of

February 2. 1937 (Stantabled, 1987. No. 400).
and the royal decree of March 1, 1997 (Staste-

blad. 1937, No. 401). by which the provision

for issuing bank notes was prolonged for 5

years. beginning with March 31 is,

up to March 31, 1942 The last-named law

also contained the following provision:

"BEC. 23. The proportion of bank notes,

bank drafts, and balances of accounts current

which must be covered by coin or bullion

shall be established by royal decree and passed

on recommendation of the management of
the bank. This decree shall be promulgated

in Staatablad and changed as necessary from

time to time."
The only royal decree disclosed in this respect is that of January 4. 1939 (Stantabled,
1929, No. 3), which net the minimum proportion of the gold reserve in bullion and coin at
40 percent Stantabled from 1929 to 1940. inclusive, does not contain any laws changing

these provisions so it seems that It was still
in force by the end of 1940. (Library of Congress. LAW Library. November 1943.)

The amount of silver held in the Neth.
erlands Bank in June 1943 was $4,000,-

000-Federal Reserve Bulletin for October 1943, page 1040.
NEW ZEALAND

A 25-percent gold and gold exchange
reserve is required against demand liabilities.

Exchange may include sterling: liabilities

in exchange must be deducted from gold
exchange. Government at bank's request
may suspend reserve requirements Federal

Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, page 543.

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the

sole bank-note Issuing authority. In October 1939 it was announced that the minimum reserve of 25 percent of the Reserve

bank's note circulation and other demand

liabilities may be varied or suspended. and
authority was given to revalue the gold re-

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

2998

serve up to market value. As of September
1942, no action had been taken in either

respect-Moody's Manual of Investments,
1943, page 1664

As of February 1943, New Zealand
owned English sterling exchange to the
amount of £31,000,000-London Econo-

tribute to the fund. It has been suggested by one of the leading English
financial Journals that England might

sell goods for gold to meet her gold contribution, but that such action would be
objectionable. See London Economist,
August 28, 1943, pages 261-262

mist, April 7, 1943, page But Eng-

lish sterling exchange cannot be considered as gold exchange, since It is not
convertible into gold.
UNITED KINGDOM

A 100-percent gold reserve is required
against notes in excess of fiduciary issue
of £260,000,000.

At bank's request treasury may decrease

fductary Isaus or may for & period up to 2

years, increase fiduciary issue (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, p. 543.)

The principle of formula controlling the

Bank of England's reserve is to be found in

the Currency and Bank Note Act 1928 (18
and 19 George V. ch 13). section (1):
"Sac. 2 (1). Subject to the provisions of
this act the bank shall issue bank notes up

to the amount representing the gold coin
and gold bullion for the time being in the
issue department, and shall in addition issue

bank notes to the amount of $260,000,000
in excess of the amount first mentioned in

this section, and the issue of notes which the

bank is by or under this act required or

authorised to make in excess of the said first-

mentioned amount is in this act referred

YUGOBLAVIA

Requires a 25-percent gold reserve, or
36 percent of gold and gold-exchange re-

Section 3-(1) provides for the covering of

follows:

"Sec. 3 (1). In addition to the gold coin
and bullion for the time being in the issue

department, the bank shall from time to
time appropriate to and hold in the issue

department securities of an amount in value
sufficient to cover the fiduciary note issue for
the time being

"(2) The securities to be held as sforesaid may include silver coin to an amount

not exceeding five and one-half million

pounds.

((3) The bank shall from time to time

give to the treasury such information as the

treasury may require with respect to the

securities held in the Issue department but
shall not be required to include any of the

said securities in the account to be taken
pursuant to section 5 of the Bank of England Act. 1819. (Library of Congress Law

Library, No. 15. 1943.)

Gold held by England excludes gold held

by exchange equalization account which on

cent to and 25 percent, respectively, and
bank is authorized in computing these ra.

tion to value reserves at 28.5 percent above

legal rate (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July

1936, 543.)
The monetary law or May 1931 provided
with regard to the reserve as follows:
"Sac. 5. The bank must maintain a reserve

in gold or foreign values legally or actually
convertible into freely exportable gold. The
amount of the reserve to be not less than
35 percent of the bank's sight obligation. of
which at least 25 percent must be covered
by gold in the vaults of the bank.
By section 63 of the financial law (Budget)

July 1936, Federal Reserve Bulletin, page

543. It should be noted, however, that
this figure was not applied to the circulating notes, as will be seen in column 6
for the reason that the data here are

too uncertain to be of any value.
Unless it could be shown that England
considers that she no longer requires any

its deposits. This may be in gold bars or
coins deposited in the safes of the bank
or gold (bars or coins) deposited in the cus

tody of first-class foreign banks: or in deposits payable on demand, and in gold in
first-class banks in London and New York
The 50 percent guarantees also Treasury
notes and bonds in circulation which the
bank is obliged to exchange, cancel, or with

draw in accordance with law. (Library of
Congress Law Library, Nov. 15. 1943.)

situation in the country On the basis of
this authority, the Council of Ministers is

cally not subject to reserve requirements

force of law for the regulation of economic

ing printed in No. 15 Bluzhbene Novine of
"Decree concerning liquidation of the re-

volving credit of the national bank
"Section 1 The National Bank of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, may provisionally, in de-

flance of section 5 of the law on currency of
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and for the purpose of a complete liquidation of its revolving credits abroad, maintain reserve in gold
and foreign exchange which was accounted
at the legal rate plus a 'prim' of 28.5 percent

so that the total reserve must cover 25 per-

cent of the sight liabilities and at least 20

percent of sight liabilities of the bank must

be covered in gold in the vaults of the bank.'

No further change of this provision was

disclosed by perusal of the Collection of Yugo-

alavian Laws (Blushbene Novine) down to

the 2d of April 1941, the date of the last
number of Sluzhbene Novine. (Library of

Congress Law Library, November 18,1943.)
Computation of required gold reserves made

on the basis that at least 20 percent of eight

liabilities of the bank must be covered with

gold to the Taults of the bank. (Library of

Congress. LAW Library, data used for computing reserve requirements.)
BRAZIL

25-percent reserve of Government funds

against cruzeiro notes. No gold or foreign

The above being the only data avail.
able to me respecting the reserve requirements of Brazil, no effort has been
made to supply all of the figures here.
For the purpose of this study we shall
assume that Brazil would have enough
free gold to meet her gold contribution to
the fund.

CHILE

A 50-percent gold and gold exchange

reserve Is required against notes and de-

gold in the exchange equalization ac-

posits.

notes, she would have no free gold to con-

stated reserve requirements subject

count as well as any gold backing for her

maintain a gold reserve equal to so percent
of the total of its notes in circulation and of

change rates in its current trade, but at pres-

168. p. 330) the Council of Ministers was

exchange reserve is required against deposits
(Treasury data, as of June 30, 1943.)

by the United Kingdom against her
circulating notes was taken from the

dividends payable with deposits against
which reserved are required (Federal Re

granted the power to issue decrees with the

data.)

The figure of 100 in column 2 showing

reserve requirements are reduced to 25 per-

Reserve requirements are "in suspense.
(Treasury data, as of June 30, 1943.)

in gold or foreign exchange is required

the percentage of gold reserves required

of Jan 7. 1932 (No. 5028) and later consolidated in a long-term Government debt

for 1934-35 (Slushbene Novine, 1934, Item

September 1. 1941. the last date reported,
amounted to $151,000,000. (Federal Reserve

are excluded in computing ratio While

bank holds Treasury notes issued under law

serve Bulletin, July 1936, p. 542.)
Article 83: The Central Bank of Chile must

January 21. 1935, took effect on that date.
The decree reads:

the fiduciary note issue by securities as

garding official exchange control and an
equivalent amount of notes and deposits

cent Bank includes caihhers' checks and

being requested by the bank, direct that the

determined

5107) and February 13. 1935 (No. 5504), re-

Gold included must be held at home. Provisionally since January 21, 1935, reserve requirements are reduced from 25 and 35 per-

sued on January 15. 1935. a decree which be

amount of the fiduciary note issue shall for
such period as may be determined by the
treasury. after consultation with the bank
be reduced by such amount as may be so

in New York or London Exchange purchased under laws of April 19, 1932 (No.

serve against demand liabilities.

to as "the fiduciary note issue.

"(2) The treasury may at any time on

to the payment of a tax Exchange net:

limited to demand deposits payable in gold

Reserve may be permitted to fall below

Chile employs a system of multiple ex

ent the prevailing rate is P/31-01 P/817.

400,357 of the outstanding notes are techni(Treasury data as of June so, 1943.)

These factors were taken into
eration in determining the reserv
quired. Chile owned on August 31, 1943
$18,331,000 of foreign exchange-Federal

Reserve was added to her

gold holding in computing the amount

of reserve required against her notes and
deposits. However, no data are available

to show the distribution of Chile's for-

eign exchange holdings according to the

currency involved. To the extent Chile's
foreign exchange holdings may not consist of gold exchange the amount of free
gold shown in column 14 would be reduced.
COLOMBIA

A gold and gold exchange reserve of

40 percent is required against notes.
Reserve may be permitted to fall below
stated reserve requirements subject

to the payment of a tax. Exchange limited
to demand deposits but not to gold exchange

During present emergency reserve require
mental are reduced to 30 percent or so long

as gold content of peso is not reduced to

25 percent. An additional reserve of 25 percent of deposite plus outstanding Treasury

notes to required in gold or other cash (stiver

not to exceed one-half). (Federal Reserve
Bulletin, July 1936, 542.)
In January 1942 the minimum legal gold

reserve of the Bank of the Republic was fixed

at 30 percent (reduced from 40 percent) of

its Bills in circulation (Moody's Manual of

Investments, 1943, p. 1741.)

25 percent reserve is required against de-

posits, No more than one-half may be in

silver. A 50 percent reserve in gold or foreign
exchange is required against notes.
ury data, as of June 30, 1943.)

No attempt has been made to determine the amount of gold reserve that is
required against notes or notes and deposita. It is assumed Colombia would
have sufficient free gold to meet her gold
contrit ution.

32

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

1

COSTA RICA

No specific gold or exchange requirements
(Treasury data, as of June 30. 1943.)
CUBA

Since May 2. 1942. 98 percent gold or dol-

lar reserve has been required against new

note issues Earlier issued backed 1 to by

silver pescs United States currency eirculates freely (Treasury data, as of June 30,

to 40 percent of its notes in circulation. Not
less than one-third of the 40 percent reserve

2999

posits, and net foreign items in process

include Guatemalan silver coins in an

of collection.
May legally include silver. Blver included

1943, p. 1817.)

cluded may consist only of déposits payable
on demand in gold, or its equivalent, in New

notes: 25 percent against other sight liabili-

serve, bankers' payable in gold

must be kept in its own vaulta, but this may

amount not exceeding 8.33 percent of the
reserve. (Moody's Manual of Investments,

Forty percent reserve required against

ties. Reserves may consist of gold. deposite

must not exceed one-fifth Exchange in-

York or London, and up to one-half of re-

currencies (Federal Reserve Bulletin, Jan-

1943.)

abroad. United States currency. and silver

uary 1936, p. 543.)

serva metalica en los Bancos) Article 1 pro-

June 30, 1943.)

Central de Reserve del Peru) provided for
tax on the note circulation whenever the re-

Decree of August 2. 1938 (Norma de re-

vides that all banking institutions operating

within the territory of the Republic shall

have in metallic currency of national coinage
a reserve of at least 75 percent of the amount
to which article 180 of the Commercial Code

refers (infra) Article 180 of the Commercial
Code (as amended through 1941) provides
that banks shall conserve in metal at least

in a limited amount (Treasury data, as of

Amount of required gold reserve not
calculated Assumed Guatemala would
have sufficient gold to meet her gold
quota.
MEXICO

one-fourth of the total of their deposits, cur-

On December 23. 1938. the Chamber of
Deputies approved a new law providing for
the revaluation of the bank's gold. and for-

in circulation. (Library of Congress, Law

eign exchange reserves at market value. In

Library. November 15, 1943.)

the amount of paper currency which the

rent accounts in currency and of their bills
ECUADOR

Requires & 40-percent gold and goldexchange reserve against notes and deposits.

Exchange included limited to deposits payable in gold. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July
1936, p. 542.)

A 30-percent reserve is required against

notes and sight obligations This reserve may

consist of gold and (up to 20 percent of the

required reserve) of foreign exchange (Treasury data. as of June 30, 1943.)
minimum reserve of 30 percent (reduced

40 percent effective Jan. 1, 1938) in
against notes in circulation and sight

deposits is required. (Moody's Manual of

Investments 1943, p. 1765.)

Treasury data used in computing
amount of required gold reserve.
EL SALVADOR

A gold reserve of 25 percent is required

addition, the law removed the limitation on

bank may issue. Under the original or.

ganic law, the bank was required to back
its note issue with at least 50 percent of

metallic reserves. Early in 1938. however,

that restriction was removed by décree. and

The original statutes of the bank (Banco
below 50 percent, but this prosuspended by LAW 7760 of June 9.

1933. (Moody's Manual of Investments, 1943,

p. 1869.)

A 50-percent reserve is-required against

notes and deposits. Reserve may constat of
gold or exchange, bank acceptances or silver

coins (up to one-Rith). (Treasury data, as
of June so, 1943.)

No attempt has been made from the
above data to determine the amount of
gold reserve that is required for cover of
demand liabilities It is assumed Peru
would have sufficient free gold to meet
her gold quota.

a bill passed authorising the treasury to

issue interest-bearing treasury certificates

which are acceptable for tax payments
(Moody's Manual of Investments 1943, p.

1845.)

Ley organica del Banco de Mexico , Ests-

tutos- amended February 21. 1939:
"Article 99: The bank shall maintain at all
times a reserve to uphold the value of the

peso. The total of this reserve
shall not in any instance be lower than
100,000 pesos, nor less than 25 percent of the

total of notes issued on the bank and its
obligations to pay on. sight in national ourrency.

"Article 100: The reserve to which the ar-

ticle above refers will consist of gold and
silver. coined or in bars, of shares of foreign

exchange. etc." (Library of Congress Law

POLAND

Requires 30 percent gold reserve
against demand liabilities in excess of
100,000,000 zlotys. Reserve may be per-

mitted to fall below the stated reserve

requirements subject to the payment of a

tax. Gold net, after deduction of

pledged gold and of liabilities in exchange-Federal Reserve Bulletin, July

1936, page 543.

The law of March 1939, Introduced some

amendments to the charter of the Bank

Polaki of 1936. In particular, the law
changed section 52 of the charter dealing with
the gold reserve (Dalennik Ustaw. 1939. Item

142. 417). Then the charter with all

the amendments was re-promulgated in toto

against demand liabilities.
After definitive stabilization of currency.

Library, November 15. 1948.)

exchange is not limited to gold exchange but

against both notes and deposits, of which at

1939, item 266) and the amended text to sec.

falls below 30 percent on 3 of the 24 report

exchange. As much as 20 percent may be in
silver. (Treasury data, as of June 30. 1943.)

reserve to the amount equivalent to 40 per-

shareholding banks (Federal Reserve Bul-

No attempt has been made from the
above data to calculate the amount of
required gold reserves. It is assumed
Mexico would have sufficient free gold to
meet her gold quota.

net exchange may count as reserve. Such

must be held in central banks If reserve

dates . year. no dividend shall be paid to

lette. July 1936, p. 542.)

Twenty-five percent reserve in gold or foreign exchange is required against notes and

other sight liabilities. If. however, the re-

serve ratio falls below 30 percent. no divi-

Twenty-five percent reserve required

least 80 percent must be in gold or foreign

dends can be paid. (Treasury data, as of

June 30, 1943.)

Amount of reserve not computed. Assumed El Salvador would have sufficient
free gold to meet her gold quota.
GUATEMALA

Thirteen and one-third percent gold is

required against notes. A gold reserve
of 81/3 percent is required against deposits, due in 30 days or less, including
unutilized credits.

Gold in required reserves must be in bank's

vaults. Silver may replace gold up to onetenth of requirement shown in gold column.

Reserve against deposits payable in a foreign currency may be held entirely in that
ency. Note issue may not exceed five
bank's paid-up capital and surplus or
12,500,000 quetzale, whichever is larger. Deposits due in 30 days or less may not exceed

five times bank's capital and surplus May

legally include silver in each category.
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, p. 542.)

The bank must maintain a reserve in gold

and silver in its vaults or in sight deposits

abroad payable in gold equivalent at least
No. 53

NORWAY

Requires a 100-percent gold reserve
against notes in excess of fiduciary issue
of 250,000,000 kroner. Gold included
must be held at home. Fiduciary issue
may be increased, subject to a tax, by
authority of King and Storting-Federal
Reserve Bulletin, July 1936, page 543.
legal minimum reserve of 100 percent gold

against notes in excess of a faduciary issue

of 425,000,000 kroner must be maintained
This issue may be increased subject to tax.

by authority of the King and Storting
(Moody's Manual of Investments 1943, p.

1860.)

Gold reserve requirements computed
from Moody's Manual of Investments,

that is, on the basis of 100 percent against

notes in excess of 425,000,000 kroner.
which qualifies the percentage figure as
shown in column 2 accordingly,

by the proclamation of the Minister of

Finance of May 2. 1939 (Driennik Ustaw,
tion 52 is given there as follows:

"Sec. 52 The bank must possess a gold

cent of the sum by which the total of the

banknotes in circulation plus sight Habillties exceeds the sum of 800,000,000 alotys.

Depending upon the situation on the gold

market, the council of the bank may, with

the consent of the Minister of Finance. raise
the limit of 800,000,000 ziotys established in

the first paragraph of this section to a sum

not exceeding 1,200,000,000 slotys however.

The liabilities based upon loans secured
by gold of the bank are deducted from the

gold reserve" (Dalennik Ustaw, 1939, p.
585)

These are the latest available provisions
for the period before the German occupation. (Library of Congress Law Library, November 19. 1943)

Gold-reserve requirement computed
from data supplied by Law Library of
Congress, second paragraph, under section 52.

If the figure 800,000,000 zlotys were
taken as representing the amount of
notes and sight liabilities to be exempted
from reserve requirements, as provided in

the first paragraph of section 52 above,

instead of the figure 1,200,000,000
zlotys-the figure used in the chart-

PERU

there would be a deficiency of gold to

A gold and gold exchange reserve of
50 percent is required against notes, de-

the amount of $13,455,000 for note and
sight liability coverage.

32

MARCH 2

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

3000
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Requires a gold reserve of 30 percent

against notes, deposits, and bills payable. May legally include silver.

Reserve may be permitted to fall below
stated reserve subject,
except in
to the payment of
South Africa
a tax. Government consent is necessary

in . South Afrida. One-half of gold

included must be held at home. Silver in-

cluded limited to 6 percent of deposits and
bills payable (Federal Reserve Bulletin, July
1936, p. 543)

She makes no report of her gold hold.

ings-Treasury data. There are indica-

tions that Russia does not intend to bind
herself to the United and Associated Nations stabilization fund scheme. See New

York World-Telegram, December 1943;

Lewis W. Haney in the Washington
Times-Herald December 11, 1943; Rus-

sia's Intentions About Gold, in the January 1944 Economic Conditions. Govern-

ment Finance, United States Securities,
page 6.

URUGUAY

Requires 45% percent of gold reserve
against major notes of 10 pesos or more

issued in excess of (a) bank's paid-up

capital less fiduciary issue of minor notes,

and (b) rediscounted bank documents
up to 10,000,000 pesos,

Fiduciary issue of minor notes is permitted

in place of major notes. against paid-up capi-

tal. Against minor notes in excess of fidu-

clary issue minimum reserve requirement is

45.6 percent in silver. Minor notes are limited to 20,000,000 pesos. Bank must hold
notes equivalent to 20 percent of deposits.
Gold coin may be held abroad only If 55,000.-

000 pescas of gold coin is held in Uruguay.

unless specifically authorized otherwise.
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1936. 543.)

Notes of the issue department of the Banco
de In Republica in excess of 60,000,000 pesca

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, the international stabilization fund project
which we have heard criticized so sharply

is not by any stretch of the Imagination
far enough along to warrant such detalled discussion Moreover, the criticlam is based chiefly upon a preliminary
draft, which, I understand, has been
worked over and changed materially by
the technical people of thirty-odd countries since its publication 4 months ago.
It seems to me, however, there is a
far larger issue at stake than whether
or not a stabilization plan which might
conceivably be adopted by this or any
other government looks good or bad at
this highly premature point.
The issue is whether or not the Government of this country should attempt
to be forehanded about problems which
are certain to arise in the future: whether
or not Government departments should

make preliminary investigations and
studies with the full knowledge and
consent of Congress, leading to possible

solutions for unavoidable difficulties
which lie ahead. I think they should

and I believe that we in Congress should

cooperate, not carp.

The alternative, of course, is to have

the Government operate as It did in late

Republican years, and spend its time
running around locking barn doors after
horses are stolen. My Republican colleague from Ohio may prefer this.

Now. before we go any farther, let us
set the record straight on some of the

more obvious accusations:

The gentleman from Ohio says that

the monetary proposal, drafted by Amer-

in gold. (Treasury data, of June 30, 1943.)

ican technicians, is nothing but a rewording of the text of the British proposal Nothing could be further from
the truth. In the first place the proposal
of the American technicians was drawn

The Bank of the Reputilic of Uruguay shall

up in the winter of 1941 fully 15 months

may be backed by silver up to 12,000,000 peace
(actually 9,000,000 pesos are so backed): addi.

tional notes require a backing of 100 percent
Ley No. 9496. August 14. 1935 Article 11.

always maintain a reserve of bank notes equal

before the British plan. and was pre-

matter of what type. (Library of Congress,

of foreign ministers in January 1942.
Anyone with the slightest understanding of International exchange and monetary questions would say that the plans

to 20 percent of the total of its deposits, no

Law Library. November 5,1943.)

Treasury data used for computing gold

reserve requirements. The percentage
figure shown in column 2 must therefore
be qualified accordingly.

Sixty million pesca, plus 12,000,000

pesos subtracted from 119,715,000 pesos-

Federal Reserve figure as of June 30.
1943, of outstanding peso notes times

65.83 cents to peso- source and
data as equals $31,410,000.

sented in principle to the Rio Conference

have only one thing in common and
that is they both attempt to deal with
the international monetary problems.
The two proposals are completely different in their approach and suggested solution.

The gentleman from Ohio says that

order of the House, the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. PATMAN) is recognized for
30 minutes.

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to revise and extend

my remarks and include therein certain
excerpts.

league's inferences, I understand it was
dropped because of the opposition of the

British experts.

The gentleman from Ohio says that
the control of our money would be given
over to an international money authority. Again I wonder whether he has read

the proposal. There is nothing in it
which reduces the authority of the
United States over its monetary system
or over the dollar. The fund can make
no change in the value of the dollar and
the proposal specifically reserves to each
country the complete control of its money
policies.

My esteemed colleague has placed before you a chart which purports to show
you the figures on the gold holdings and
gold contributions of some of the United
Nations. The figures shown are com-

pletely erroneous. They are based

largely upon data published years ago,
some going back as far as 1935, and
am surprised that anyone should assume

that data of this character can
represent the actual situation. I am
told, incidentally, that this table overlooks half the gold holdings of the other
United Nations. The true information,
I might point out. is secret and cannot
be given out by any country. The publication of a completely unfounded table
by the gentleman from Ohio serves no
purpose other than to confuse and mislead the interested public

I do not know what the gentleman

from Ohio means when he says that the
Keynes-Morgenthauschemes and by the
way. there is no such thing: the British
French, Canadians, and Americans all
had preliminary drafts, all published, all

different-h says the scheme could

involve the United States to the extent
of upward of $15,000,000,000. The
tentative proposal by the American tech-

nicians specifically states that our participation shall be limited in the neighborhood of $2,000,000,000. This Is small

error of 700 percent on the part of the
gentleman and involves some $13,000.000,000.

perhaps is the key to the understanding

nicians provides for defining the cur-

The SPEAKER Under a previous

fund to incur a loss. This provision, I
believe, has already been dropped.
Strangely enough. in view of my col-

rencies of all member countries in terms

A 50-percent reserve is required against
note and deposit liabilities. No more than

SPECIAL ORDER

which the fund finds it desirable to do
so, and only under terms and conditions
which make it actually impossible for the

that the proposal of the American tech-

with a fictitious standard. The fact is

June 30, 1943.)

the fund of very limited amounts of

blocked balances on those occasions on

Finally the gentleman from Ohio seems
to be disturbed by the fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission was differ-

the draft proposal seeks to replace gold

VENEZULA

10 percent of the reserve may be in the form
of foreign exchange. and at least 60 percent
must be gold on hand. (Treasury data, as of

more of British debts. This is complete
nonsense. An early draft of the fund
proposal provided for the purchase by

of gold and tieing their currencies to
gold. Instead of weakening the possibility of a return to the gold standard, it
would do the very opposite. It attempts
to strengthen the ties between all currencies and gold. To say that the plan

aims to destroy the supremacy which the

dollar holds in international trade and
finance is an obvious falsehood
The gentleman from Ohio says that the
scheme would involve the assumption by

the United States of $5,000,000,000 or

ent in 1887 from what it is now. This
of his entire speech This Republican
gentleman Is complaining because we
cannot meet the complex problems of the

1940's with the facilities of the y
when as a free, sun-kissed barefool

he first graced Shanesville, Ohio, in the
1880's. He was born there. I understand
in 1884, and like the Interstate Commerce Commission has altered his earlier
limits and become increasingly complex
in the intervening years.

33

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE

1

The preliminary work on stabiliza-

tion-and all the work that has been done

date is preliminary Is an effort by an
alert Government department to prepare a remedy beforehand for a difficulty

that seems certain to strike when the

war is over, or before.

When the economies of various countries began to shudder under the strain of
approaching war. Secretary Morgenthau

and his technical experts anticipated
that world reconstruction would be very
difficult indeed if all the moneys of the

world had no common denominator and

if there were no basis for international
cooperation. If we were to come out of
the war with a sound dollar and all other

nations were bankrupt and their exchange were fluctuating in a disruptive
manner, the Secretary recognized that
the soundness of our dollar would be a
virtue in a vacuum.
The war is likely to aggravate a situation which will make it extremely diffcult to avoid a break-down of international economic relations.
In an effort to find a solution to this
problem and unless a solution is found.
the reconstruction, restoration of a prosperous level of world trade and the estab-

lishment of sound monetary systems will

be delayed indefinitely- an effort to

find a solution, Secretary Morgenthau's
technicians began exploratory conversawith technical representatives of
nations.

Now, in spite of those who, through
lack of understanding or for political
purposes, choose to distort the facts in

the case, these early conversations were
not launched with the idea of letting the
United States rescue or support the other

nations of the world-a of them. Mr.

Morgenthau is no economic Santa Claus.

Anyone who has watched the handling
of Treasury matters over the past 10
years knows that. The present Secretary of the Treasury has worked hard
and long to make and keep Washington
the financial center of the world. He has
been diligent in keeping foreign debts in
hand, and he invented reverse lend-lease

to help keep dollar balances down. So
you may rest assured that our country's
economic wherewithal will not be dissipated across the oceans by the watchdog

of the Treasury Department

But let me repeat, the point at issue

is really whether or not. having seen the
necessity for stabilizing foreign exchange,

our Secretary of the Treasury would have
served the public interest better by pretending no problem exists, and accordingly done nothing about it. By inference, at least. the gentleman from Ohio
and others who criticize a plan which

still is in its formative stage are, ap-

parently, suggesting that we go back to
those good old do-nothing days -those
days that reached their pinnacle in 1929
when the administration in power realfull well that calamity lay just over
horizon, but chose to make no effort

I do not believe that we should return
to those unrealistic days of "let us pretend It is not so." Ibelieve that we should
continue to anticipate problems and try
to find solutions before they have an opportunity to send the International econ-

omy into a tailspin. And further I be-

lieve that this viewpoint is representa:
tive of a large majority of the American
people. Most Americans would rather
see us on the ball than behind it.
Some people have a tendency to view
with alarm anything going on that they
do not quite understand. Certainly there
is no crime in being alert, but it seems to
me aimless for anyone to take up time
to discuss, as though it were a fait accompli, a plan which in the first place
is in its preliminary stages and in the
second place he has confused with at

least one other plan. And especially
since he has not revealed the pertinent
fact that this thing which he views with

such alarm is nothing more than a logical,

conservative development which has
evolved out of proved practices of this
Government. It would appear that my
colleague is so concerned about motives

that he is losing sight completely of the

facts in the case.

I should like to take a few minutes to
tell you how this proposal for monetary
cooperation, aimed at the protection of
the American economy. came about. Its
evolution is as important as the project
itself. for it demonstrates its basic simplicity.

The story of this stabilization fund

really began back in the twenties, when a

surprisingly large and substantial group
of people suddenly awakened to the fact

that fortunes could be made by trading
in foreign exchange: and nations believed

that, by manipulating exchange rates,
they could avoid payment of war debts to
this country.
All this was going on during the Coolldge administration, and It continued

through the Hoover administration
There was no mystery about it. The

Republican administration which then
had the responsibility of safeguarding
the welfare of the American people knew

all about It.

In the record of the Hoover administration written by William Starr Myers
and Walter H. Newton, much is said
aboutThe deliberate credit Inflation policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve System and the

important central banking systems of Europe
in the year 1927.

with inevitable collapee which will bring the

greatest calamities upon our farmers, our

workers, and legitimate business

As Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Hoover

seems to have had some influence, for
this inflationary program was apparently

sidetracked for the time being

But in July 1927, Mr. Norman, of the

Bank of England, Dr. Schacht, president
of the Reichsbank and Prof. Charles Rist,

deputy governor of the Bank of France,
visited the United States, and to spite of

Mr Hoover, who was soon to become
President and certainly in a position to
protest if be wanted to. these redoubtable
gentlemen apparently got the plot started

all over again, and this time they went

through with it. Now. mind you, Mr.
Hoover made no move to stop it. though

he was on record as knowing what the
consequences would be Perhaps he had
been won over by those Republican leaders who seem so fond of inflationary poli-

cies that they have maintained a startling record of supporting inflation up to
the present day

In the final analysis, there could be

only one cure for this disease which had
been started so deliberately in the Cool-

ldge administration That cure was administered on March 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt closed the
banks for 4 days "because of unwarranted

withdrawals of gold and currency from
banking Institutions for the purpose of
hoarding. and undue speculative activity
abroad in foreign exchange.

That was a medicine swiftly and courageously administered Less than a year

later. concrete steps were planned to
make It impossible for such calamity as
we knew in 1929-30 and 31 to befall us
again These steps were planned under

the same Secretary of the Treasury.

Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who has just been

criticized for trying to get things done,
and consisted of setting up a stabilization fund in the United States to protect
the value of the dollar abroad, and to
make It difficult for foreign currencies
to be manipulated to the great detriment
of the American economy.

This stabilization fund. which has

been functioning for 9 years with complete success. was the real foundation
of the present International Stabilization Fund Idea

Through the use of this fund, the

I quote:

poses.

In late 1925 the Federal Reserve Bank of

New York through its governor, Benjamin
Strong. entered into the discussion of a pro-

gram of joint action with Montagu Norman
governor of the Bank of England. This was

joined in by the officials of various central
banks of continental Europe. The objectives

were the expansion of credit, "easy money

to keep people from starving. to keep
businesses from closing their doors, to

the situation in Europe.

ly grinding to a stop.

As to the effects of theee Reserve policies

upon the United States, It means Inflation

Then the authors review the growth
of that inflation policy. They say, and

policies" by "open market" operati and

keep the wheels of commerce from slow-

tested vigorously, and is reported to have
said:

American Government. on many occasions, has invested temporarily in foreign currencies for stabilization pur-

whatever to stop it. They felt that it
was none of the Government's business

3001

the manipulation of discount rates. The purpose of the arrangements was to strengthen

The book then points out that Mr. Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, pro-

In all of the 9 years that this fund

has been in operation. the United States
Government has not lost a cent
To those who say a stabilization fund

will not work, here is pretty strong evidence that It will work. Ours has been
working in this limited field for 9 years.
In 1936, Secretary Morgenthau took
another step to reinforce International

stabilization. He established the tripartite arrangement with the Governments of England and France. The
Governments of Belgium, the Nether-

33
3002

MARCI

CONGRESSIONAL RECORDHOUSE

lands, and Switzerland also held to this

and practical proposals must be formulated

suea a policy of exchange stability and 20-

policy-shaping officials of the various coun-

change practices Beyond that, there is only
the duty of consulting and agreeing before

and must be carefully considered by the

agreement. This, too, was successful
until the outbreak of war made it impos-

tries.

sible to continue for obvious reasons.

And then the Secretary said very

The present international stabilization plan which we have heard so bit-

clearly. so that we could not fall to un-

terly denounced as impractical, is a combination and extension of these two tried
and proved methods of stabilization

In each country acceptance of a definitive

plan can follow only upon legislative or executive action.

After explaining the nature of the preliminary proposal which was sent to the
other nations to start them thinking. the
Secretary said, upon leaving:
a

In January of 1942 the ministers of
foreign affairs of the American republics, meeting in Rio de Janeiro, recognized the need for a greater degree of
cooperation in the stabilization of currencies. Accordingly, they adopted

derstand:

resolution recommending

First, that the governments of the

American republics participate in a spe-

cial conference of ministers of finance
or their representatives to be called for
the purpose of considering the establishment of an international stabilization
fund:

Second, that the conference in considering the establishment of such a fund

shall formulate the plan of organization,
powers, and resources necessary to the

proper functioning of the fund, shall
determine the conditions requisite to

participation in the fund, and shall propose principles to guide the fund in its
operation.

Following this conference, an American technical committee was set up to
pursue the subject further. Represented on that committee were the Treasury

Department, the State Department the
Department of Commerce, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Bys-

tem, and the Board of Economic War-

fare. This group prepared a tentative
proposal which, in March 1943, the
Secretary of the Treasury sent to the

ministers of finance of the United

Nations for study by their technicians.
On April 5, Secretary Morgenthau reported to seven committees of the House
and Senate on the progress of this study,

even though it was then in its infancy,
so to speak. I think it is important that
the Secretary asked permission to keep
us advised, a program which he has
maintained consistently on this and
other projects falling within the scope
of the Treasury Department: On April
5 he said, in part:
For some time we in the Treasury have
been deeply concerned with the threat of
international monetary chaos at the end of

this war.

We feel that International currency etability is essential to reconstruction in the
post-war period and to the resumption of

private trade and finance. It is generally

held that this formidable task can be suc.
cessfully handled only through international
cooperation.

I think further that most of us would
agree that the establishment of a program
adequate to deal with the inevitable postwar monetary problems should not be post-

poned until the end of hostilities. It would
be Ill-advised, If not dangerous, to be un-

prepared for the difficult task of International monetary cooperation when the war
ends No one knows how long or how short

the war will be. We therefore believe It is

destrable to begin now to devise an Interna.

tional monetary agency adequate to cope

with the problems with which we shall be

confronted when the war does end.

The completion of such a task is certain
to take many months at the least. Specific

I have been anxious to discuss this matter
with you and to keep you informed of developments. Obviously, we are still in the early
stages of our thinking and discussions. How-

ever, I did want you to know what we are

doing and I do want to feel free to come back

from time to time and discuss the subject

with you and obtain your views and advice.

Here I should like to point out that

frains from resorting to discriminatory ex.

altering exchange rates, an extension of the
principle that we have embodied for years in

our own stabilization agreements

We have held technical conversations with

the experts of more than 30 countries and

we are continuing these discussions with the

experts of some of the countries. These ex-

ploratory conversations have been unofficial
and confined to the technical level. No gov-

ernment, including the United States, is

committed to any of the tentative proposals
for international monetary cooperation that

have been presented by the experts.

The Secretary then explained some of
the changes which had been made in
the proposal previously described to the
committees and presented a summary of
a tentative proposal for a United Na.
tions Bank for Reconstruction and De-

velopment, the principal function of
which would be to "guarantee loans

the gentleman from Ohio has taken advantage of this offer on numerous occasions. He has written many letters to the
Treasury and each has been answered,

made by private capital for sound and
constructive purposes, when such loans
are also guaranteed by a member gov-

seem for the most part to have been mis-

Secretary said:

although the answers to many of them

interpreted.

One of these letters I must comment

upon here: He wrote to the Secretary,
asking the Secretary for a direct answer
as to whether or not contributions to the
fund will be physically delivered to one
central point in one of the United Nations.

In answer. Mr Morgenthau told him
that it was generally assumed that at
least the major contributions to the fund
would simply be earmarked and kept in
the contributors central banks. In other
words, our gold would be kept right here

if that is what interests the gentleman
from Ohio.

Whereupon the esteemed gentleman

from Ohio, apparently interpreting

what "earmarked" means, throws his
hands in the air and says, "See what I
told you. How could there be any question about the manner in which the gold
should be delivered? How could it be

done except by shipping?'

But let me continue with the progress
of the stabilization fund.

Following the April 5 report, there
were many meetings of the technical ex-

perts of various countries. By fall the
technicians had made enough progress
so that a revised proposal could be prepared, and the Secretary again reported

to the committees in the House and the
Senate. He said at that time:
I want to emphasize that the International
Stabilization Fund, tentatively proposed by
the technical experts of this Government, is
fundamentally an adaptation of the methods
we have successfully used on a more limited

scale with our own Exchange Stabilization
Fund We have tried to adapt that expertence to the broader and more difficult currency problems confronting the world during the post-war years. The International

Stabilization Fund is an extension of the
principle of the tripartite agreement that

the responsibility for maintaining stability
of exchange rates is International and that
countries must cooperate to maintain etability of exchange.

The obligations a country assumes under

this proposal are no more than a country
voluntarily imposes on itself when It pur-

ernment."

Upon leaving the committees, the
I want to assure you again that I shall

always be available for discussion of both

the bank and fund proposals. I know that

some members of your committees are de-

sirous of cooperating with us in studying
these problems. Speaking for the Tree
would be very happy If an informal

mittee were formed which would CO.

with our technical men as frequently as

feasible.

That is the story of the international

stabilization fund to date. It is the
whole story.

On the basis of a rumor circulating in
a foreign capital, some sections of the
House of Representatives seem to have
become excited about possible infractions of the rights. of Congress by the
Treasury Department Statements have
been made that the executive depart-

ment of the Government is making

agreements with foreign nations, which
is wholly and absolutely absurd. There
have been inferences that the Treasury
Department, behind the backs of Congress, has been making arrangements to

give away our money and our credit.
This, of course, is even more absurd

than the first charge.

Secretary Morgenthau assured the
gentleman from New York, Represents
tive BLOOM. only last week that sufficient

progress had not yet been made to war-

rant taking the time of House and Senate committeemen to listen to a further
report.

The entire project is still at the level
of various Government technicians, A
group of technical men from Russia is
at present discussing the matter with
the American technicians at the Treasury. When progress has been made.

when a recommendation has

O

agreed upon by the technicians, a
mal meeting will be held by accredited
representatives of the various governments and following that. the various
legislative
bodies will decide upon what
action to take.

I think Congress should commend
Secretary Morgenthau for keeping us

34

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE
abreast of developments concerning the

stabilization fund project, rather than
criticize him for having made agreements which we all know very well he

has not and could not make, and which
he himself described on April 5 of last
year as being out of his province.
All this is a tempest in the teapot.
It is an effort to create a political issue
where no political issue could possibly
exist I suppose we can expect more
and more of this as we come closer to

election

But I sincerely hope that the admin-

istration will not find it necessary to
curtail its investigations and forehanded projects, because some groups want
to make it politically inexpedient to do
anything but sit.
LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent. leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. CANFIELD for Wednesday,

March 22. on account of official business.
To Mr. WEICHEL of Ohio, for March 23
and 24, on account of official business.
To Mr. WARD, for March 23, 24. and 27.

on account of official business

To Mr. BULWINKLE, for 9 legislative

days, on account of official business.
ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Mr. KLEIN. from the Committee on
Enrolled Bills, reported that that comtee had examined and found truly en-

1 bills of the House of the following

titles, which were thereupon signed by
the Speaker:

H.R.324. An act to place postmasters at

fourth-class post offices on an annual-salary
basis, and ftx their rate of pay. and provide

allowances for rent. fuel. light and equipment. and fix the rates thereof; and

H.R 4410. An act to extend for an additional 90 days the period during which certain grains and other products to be used
for livestock and poultry feed may be imported from foreign countries free of duty.

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled bills of the Senate of the
following titles:
1349 An act to authorize the Secretary

of the Navy to convey to the city of New
York certain lands within the Brooklyn Navy

Yard in the city of New York:
1410 An act to amend section 4 of the
act approved June 13, 1940:

S. 1428. An act to amend the provision of

the act authorizing payment of 6 months'

death gratuity to widow, child. or dependent
relative of officers. enlisted men or nurses of
the Navy or Marine Corps, and for other purpoees,

3.1635. An act to eliminate a pay discrim-

ination against the teacher of music at the

United States Military Academy; and
8. 1653. An act to provide title for heads of
staff departments of the United States Marine Corps, and for other purposes.
ADJOURNMENT

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I move that

the House do now adjourn.

he motion was agreed to: according-

at 5 o'clock and 33 minutes p. m.)
the House adjourned until tomorrow,
Thursday, March 23, 1944, at 12 o'clock
noon.

COMMITTEE HEARINGS
COMMITTEE or ROADS

(Thursday, March 23, 1944)

Hearings will be continued on H. R.
2426 in the Roads Consmittee room, 1011

New House Office Building at 10 a. m.,
Thursday, March 23, 1944.

COMMITTEE ON PATENTS

(Thursday, March 23. 1944)

The Committee on Patents will hold an

executive meeting on Thursday, March
23, 1944. at 10:30 a. m., to further con-

sider H. R. 2994.

COMMITTEE ON THE POST OFFICE AND POST
ROADS

(Thursday, March 23. 1944)

There will be a meeting of the Com-

mittee on the Post Office and Post Roads

on Thursday, March 23, 1944, at 10:30
a. m., to consider H. R. 1565, relating
to the appointment of postmasters; and
3688, to change the name of "watch-

man" in the Postal Service to that of
"post-office guard.' Hearings will be
had.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS ETO.

3003

1328 A letter from the Secretary of War,
letter from the Chief of Engl.
neers, United States Army. dated January 31,

1944. submitting a report, together with 40-

companying papera, on review of reports on

Detroit River, Mich requested by a resolu-

tion of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors,

House of Representatives, adopted on May
20, 1941; to the Committee on Rivers and
Harbora

1829. A letter from the becretary of War

transmitting a letter from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, dated December

11. 1943. submitting a report, together with
accompanying papers, on a review of reports

on Detroit River, Mich. with a view to Im-

provement along the easterly shore of Grosse
De requested by a resolution of the Commit
tee on Rivers and Harbore. House of Representatives, adopted on December 8. 1997; to
the Committee on Rivers and Harbora

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of
committees were delivered to the Clerk
for printing and reference to the proper

calendar. as follows:
Mr. PATTON: Committee on Accounts

House Resolution 480. Resolution authoris-

ing the expenses of conducting the investiga-

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive

tion authorized by House Resolution 166.
Seventy-eighth Congress: without amend-

1322. A communication from the Preal-

Calendar

communications were taken from the
Speaker's table and referred as follows:
dent of the United States, transmitting a

supplemental estimate of appropriation, in
the amount of $80,000,000, for the Navy

Department and naval service for the fiscal
year 1945. in the form of an amendment to
the Budget for said fiscal year (H. Doc. No.

508): to the Committee on Appropriations

and ordered to be printed
1323. A letter from the Secretary of War.

rient (Rept. No. 1274). Referred to the House

Mr. DELANEY: Committee on Rules.

House Resolution 400. Resolution for the
consideration of H. R 4381. bill to authorize

he Secretary of the Navy to proceed with

the construction of certain public works, and
or other purposes; with amendmer. (Rept.
No. 1275). Referred to the House Calendar,

Mr. RANDOLPH: Committee on the Dis-

trict of Columbia H. R 2850. A bill to all-

transmitting a letter from the Chief of

thorize the rezoning of certain property In

Engineers, United States Army. dated February 14. 1944. submitting a report, together
with accompanying papers and Illustrations,

without amendment (Rept. No. 1276). Re-

on a review of the navigation provisions of

the project for the improvement of the Mla.
alssippi River adopted by the act of May 15.
1928. as amended, with a view to determin-

ing the advisability in the interest of navigation and flood control of increasing the

depth of the navigable channel from 9
to 12 feet between Cairo, III.. and Baton
Rouge, La This report was requested by

the District of Columbia as residential area:

forred to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union.
PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public

bills and resolutions were introduced and

severally referred as follows:
By Mr. CANNON of Florida
H. R 4455. A bill to provide duplicate posthumous awards; to the Committee on Mill-

resolutions of the Committee on Flood Control, House of Representatives, adopted on
March 8. 1943, and the Committee on Com.

tiry Affairs.
By Mr. MAY:

March 9. 1943 (H. Doc. No. 500). to the Com-

the act approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 697.

merce, United States Senate, adopted on

mittee on Flood Control and ordered to be

printed with two illustrations

1824 A letter from the Administrator,

Office of Price Administration transmitting
a copy of estimate of personnel requirements,

H R.4456. A bill to amend that portion of

750), authorising the settlement of accounts
of deceased officers and enlisted men of the

Army: to the Committee on Military Affairs.
By Mr. ELLIOTT:

H R. 4457. A bill to provide that, in dis-

for the quarter ending June 30, 1944: to the
Committee on the Civil Service

posing of lands which have been acquired by
the United States for national defense or war
purposes, a preference shall be given to the

report on the operations of the Chairman
of the War Production Board: to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

cissors in interest: to the Committee on Publie Buildings and Grounds

1325. A letter from the Chairman, War
Production Board, transmitting the tenth

1326. A letter from the Secretary of War.
transmitting a draft of a proposed bill, to remove the limitation on the right to command

of officers of the Dental Corps of the Army

which limits such officers to command in that
corps to the Committee on Military Affairs

1827. A letter from the Archvist of the

United States. transmitting report on records
proposed for disposal by various Government

agencies: to the Committee on the Disposition of Executive Papers.

Exmer owners of such lands or their sueBy Mr. BRYSON:

H R. 4458. A bill for the relief of J. G.

Power and L. D. Power: to the Committee on
Claims.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,
Mr. RODGERS of Pennsylvania introduced

bill (H. R. 4459) for the relief of Dominik

Tyeakowski, which was referred to the Com.
mittee on Invalid Pensions.

35
Congrebenan Wright Patman
Texas

For Release
Late Afternoon Papers
March 22, 1944

The International Stabilization Fund Project which we have heard
criticized so sharply is not by any stretch of the imagination far enough
along to warrant such detailed discussion. Horeover, the criticism is based
chiefly upon a preliminary draft which, I understand, has been worked over
and changed materially by the technical people of thirty-odd countries since
its publication four months ago.

It seems to me, however, there is a far larger issue at stake than
whether or not a stabilization plan which might conceivably be adopted by
this or any other Government looks good or bad at this highly premature

point.

The issue is whether or not the Government of this country should
attempt to be forehanded about problems wh ch are certain to arise in the
future; whether or not government departments should make preliminary
investigations and studies, with the full knowledge and consent of Congress,
leading to possible solutions for unavoidable difficulties which lie ahead.
I think they should, and I believe that we in Congress should cooperate,
not carp.

The alternative, of course, is to have the Government operate as it
did in late Republican years, and spend its time running around locking
barn doors after horses are stolen. My Republican colleague from Ohio may
prefer this.

Now, before we go any farther, let's set the record straight on some

of the more obvious accusations:

The Gentleman from Ohio says that the monetary proposal, drafted by

American technicians, is nothing but a rewording of the text of the

British proposal. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the first

place the proposal of the American technicians WILE drawn up in the winter
of 1941 fully 15 months before the British plan, and was presented in
principle to the Rio Conference of foreign Ministers in January 1942.
Anyone with the slightest understanding of international exchange and
monetary questions would say that the plans have only one thing in common
and that is they both attempt to deal with international monutary problems.
Two proposals are completely diffurent in their approach and suggested
solution.

The Gentleman from Ohio says that the draft proposal seeks to replace

gold with a fictitious standard. The fact is that the proposal of the

American technicians provides for defining the currencies of all member

countries in terms of gold and tying their air rencius to pold. Instead of
weakening the possibility of a return to the gold standard, it would do the
very opposite. It attempts to strugthen the tios butween all currencios
end gold. To sry that the plan nims to dustroy thu supromacy which the
dollar holds in tornational trade and finonou is an obvious felsehood.
The Guntleman from Ohio says that the scheme would involve the

assumption by the United Status of 65 billion or moru of British dobts.
This is complete nonsunsu. An early drift of the Fund proposal provided
for the purchr.su by the Fund of very limited amounts of blocked be nous
on those occasions on which the Fund finds it desirable to GO so, End only
under torms and conditions which moku it returlly impossible for thu Fund

to incur a loss. This provision, I bolity has alruidy boun dropped.

Strongely enough, in view of my collegue's inferences, I understand it was
dropped because of the opposition of the British experts.
The Gentleman from Ohio says that the control of our money would be
siven over to on international money authority. Again I wonder whether
he has read the proposal. There is nothing in it which reduces the
authority of the United States over its monetary system or over the dollar.
The Fund can make no change in the value of the dollar and the proposal
specifically reserves to each country the complete control of its money
policies.
My estoemed colleague has placed boford you a chart which purports
to show you the figures on the gold holdings and gold contributions of some
of the United Nations. The figures shown aru completely erronoous, They
Pro based larguly upon data publishud yours ago, somu going back as for
ES 1935, and I in surprised that anyone should assume that data of this

-

36

character can ats all represent the actual situation. I - told, in-

cidentally, that this table overlooks half the gold holdings of the other
United Nations. The true information, I might point out, is secret and
cannot be given out by any country. The publication of a completely

unfounded table by the Gentloman from Ohio served no purpose other than
to confuse and mislead the interested public

I do not know what the Gentleman from Ohio moans when he says the t the
Keynes-Morgonthau schumo (and by the way, there is no such thing. The

British, Frunch, Canadians and Americans all had preliminary drafts - all
publishud, all different) - he anys "the schemo" could involvo the
United Stntuo to the extent of upwards of #15 billion. The tontative
proposal by the American tuchnicians specifically states that our participation
shall be limited in the neighborhood of $2 billion. This is a small orror of
700 purcunt on the part of the gontleman and involves some $13 billion.
Finally the Gentluman from Ohio seoms to be disturbed by the fact that
the Interetate Commerce Commission was different in 1887 from what it is
now. This perhaps is the key to the understanding of his entire speech.
This Republican gentleman is complaining because we cannot meet the complex

problems of the 1940's with the facilities of the years when as a free,
sunkist barefoot boy he first graced Shanesville, Ohio in the 1880's. He
was born there, I understand in 1884, and like the Interstate Commerce
Commission, has altered his earlior limits and become increasingly complex
in the intervening years.

The preliminary work on stabilization - and all the work that has
been done to date is preliminary - is an effort by an alert Government
Department to prepare-a remedy beforehand for a difficulty that seems

certain to strike when the war is over, or before,

When the economies of various countries bugan to shudder under the
strain of approaching war, Secrotary Morgenthau and his technical experts

anticipated that world reconstruction would be very difficult indeed if all

the moneys of the world had no common dunominator and if there were no basis

for international cooperation. If we were to come out of the war with

a sound dollar and all other nations were bankrupt and their exchange were
fluctuating in a disruptivo mannor, the Secrotary recognized that the
soundness of our dollar would be a virtue in a vacuum.

The war is likely to aggravate a siturtion which will make it extremely
difficult to avoid a brunkdown of international economic relations.

In an effort to find a solution to this problom - and unless a solution
is found, the reconstruction, restoration of a prosperous level of world

trade and the establishment of sound monutary systems will be delayed
indefinitely - Secrutary Morgenthau's technicians bugan exploratory conversations with tuchnion1 representatives of other nations.

Now, in spite of those who, through lack of understanding or for political
purposes, choose to distort the foots in the caso, those onrly conversations
were not launched with the idea of letting the United States rescue or
support the other nations of the world - any of them. Mr. Morgenthau is no
economic Santa Claus. Anyone who has watched the handling of Treasury
matters over the post ton years knows that. The present Secretary of the
Treasury has worked hard and long to make and keep Washington the financial
center of the world. He hns buen diligent in kooping foreign debts in hand,
and he invented reverse lend-lonso to help koup dollar bolenous down. So
you may rest assured that our country's economic wherewithal will not be
dissippted across the ocuans by the watchdog of the Trunsury Department.

But let no report, the point nt issue is really whother or not, having
seen the necessity for stabilizing foreign exchange, our Secretary of the
Treasury would have surved the public interest bottur by pretending no
problem exists, and accordingly done nothing about it. By inference, at
least, the Gentlomen from Ohio and others who criticize n plan which still
is in its formativo stage are, apparently, suggesting that we go back to
those good old do-nothing days -- those days that runched their pinnacle in
1929 - when the Administration in power realized full well that calemity Iay
just over the horizon, but chose to make no offort whn tover to stop it. They
folt that it was none of the government's business to keep people from
starving, to keep businesses from closing their doors, to keep the whools

of commorce from slowly grinding to a stop.

37

I do not believe that we should return to those unrealistic days of

"let's pretend it isn't so," I believe that we should continue to anticipate

problems and try to find solutions before they have an opportunity to send

the international economy into a tail-spin. And further I believe that this

viewpoint is representative of a large majority of the American people,
Most Americans would rather see us on the ball than behind it.
Some people have a tendency to view with alarm anything going on that

they don't quite understand. Certainly there is no crime in being alert,
but it seems to me nimless for a Representative to take up the time of this
House for an hour to discuss, as though it were a fait accompli, a plan
which in the first place is in its preliminary stages and in the second
place he has confused with at least one other plan. And especially since
he has not revealed the pertinent fact that this thing which he views with

such alarm is nothing more than a logical, conservative development which
has evolved out of proved practices of this government. It would appear
that my colleague is 80 concerned about motivos that he is losing sight
completely of the facts in the case.

I should like to take a few minutes to tell you how this proposal for
monetary cooperation, aimed at the protection of the American economy, came

about. Its evolution is as important as the project itself, for it demonstrates

its basic simplicity.

The story of this Stabiliantion Fund really began back in the 20's, when
a surprisingly large and substantial group of people suddenly awakened to
the fact that fortunes could be mada by trading in foreign exchange and
nations believed that, by manipulating exchange ratus, they could avoid
payment of war debts to this country.
All this was going on during the Coolidge Administration, and it
continued through the Hoover Administration. There WAS no mystery about it.
The Republican Administration which then had the responsibility of safew
guarding the welfare of the American people know all about it.
In the record of THE HUOVER ADMINISTRATION written by William Starr Myers
and Walter H. Newton, much is said about

"the deliberate credit inflation policy undertaken by the
Federal Reserve System and the important central banking systems
of Europe in the year 1927."

Then the authors review the growth of that inflation policy. They any,

and I quotes

"In late 1925 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, through
its governor, Benjamin Strong, untered into the discussion of
n program of joint action with Montagu Norman, governor of the
Bank of England. This was joined in by the officials of various
central banks of continuntal Europu. The objectives were the
expension of credit, 'ensy money policies by 'open market
operations, and the manipulation of discount rates. The purpose
of the arrangements was to strengthun the situation in Europe."
The book then points out that Mr. Hoowr, then Secretary of Commerce,

protested vigorously, and is reported to have said: "AS to the effects
of thuse Reserve policies upon the United Status, it means inflation with
inevitable collapse which will bring the greatest calamities upon our
farmers, our workers and legitimate business.

As Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Hoover seems to have had some influence,

for this inflationary program was apparently side-tracked for the time

being.

But in July, 1927, Mr. Norman of the Bank of England, Dr. Schacht,
President of the Heichabank, and Professor Charles. Rist, deputy-governor
of the Bank of France, visited the United States: and in spite of Mr. Hoover
who was soon to become President and certainly in n position to protest if
he wanted to, these redoubtable gentlemen apparently got the plot started
all over again and this time they went through with it. Now, mind you,
Mr. Hoover made no move to stop it, though he was on record as knowing what
the consequences would be. Perhaps he had been won over by those Republican
lunders who seem so fond of inflationary policies that they have maintained

a startling record of supporting inflation up to the present dny.

38

In the final analysis, there could be only one cure for this disease
which had been started so deliberately, in the Coolidge Administration. That
cure was administered on March 6, 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt
closed the banks for four days "because of unwarranted withdrawals of gold
and currency from banking institutions for the purpose of hoarding, and undue
specule tive activity abroad in foreign exchange."
That was a medicine swiftly and courageously administered. Less than a
year later, concrete steps were planned to make it impossible for such
celamity AS we know in 1929-30 and 31 to befall us again. These steps were
planned under the some Sucretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgentheu, Jr., who
has just been criticized for trying to gots things done, and consisted of
setting up a Stabilization Fund in the United States to protect the value

of the dollar abroad, and to make it difficult for foreign curruncies to be

manipulated to the great detriment of the American economy.

This Stabilization Fund, which has been functioning for nine years
with complete success, was the real foundation of the present International
Stabilization Fund idea.
Through the use of this fund, the American Government, on many occasions,

has invested temporarily+in foreign currencies for Stabilization purposes.

In all of thu nine years that this fund has been in operation, the

United States Government has not lost a cont.

To those who say n Stabilization Fund won't work, here is pretty strong

evidence that it will work. Ours hns been working in this limited field
for nine yours.

In 1936, Secretary Morgenthau took another stup to reinforce International Stabilisation. He established the Tripartite arrangement with the
Governments of England and France. The Governments of Belgium, the

Notherlends and Switzerland also held to this agreement. This, too, was
successful until the outbreak of war made it impossible to continue for

obvious reasons.

The present International Stabilisation plnn which WO have heard so
bitterly denounced as impractical, is ID combination and extension of these
two tried and proved methods of stabilization.

In January of 1942 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics, meeting in Rio de Janeiro, recognized the need for a greater
\degree of cooperation in the stabilization of currencies. Accordingly,
they adopted a resolution recommendings

(1) That the Governments of the american hepublics

participate in a special conference of Ministers of Finance
or their representatives to be called for the purpose of considering the establishment of an international stabilization fund.
(2) That the conference in considering the establishment
of such a fund shall formulate the plan of organization, powers
and resources necessary to the proper functioning of the fund,

shall determine the conditions requisite to participation in
the fund, and shall propose principles to guide the fund in 'its

operation,

Following this conference, an American technical committee was set
up to pursue the subject further. Represented on that committee were the
Treasury Department, the State Department, the Department of Commerce, and
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Board of
Economic Warfare. This group prepared a tentative proposal which, in
March, 1943, the Secretary of the Treasury sent to the Ministers of Finance

of the United Nations for study by their technicians.

On April 5, Secretary Morgenthau reported to seven committees of the
House and Senate on the progress of this study, even though it was then in

its infancy, so to speak. I think it is important that the Secretary asked

permission to keep us advised, a program which he has maintained con-

sistently on this and other projects falling within the spope of the Treasury
Department. On April 5, he said, in part:

39

"For some time we in the Treasury have been deeply concerned

with the threat of international monetary chaos at the and of
this war.

"We feel that international currency stability is essential
to reconstruction in the post-war period and to the resumption of

private trade and finance. It is generally held that this formidable
task can be successfully handled only through international
cooperation.

"I think further that most of us would agree that the
establishment of a program adequate to deal with the inevitable
post-war monetary problems should not be postponed until the end

of hostilities. It would be ill-advised, if not dangerous, to
be unprepared for the difficult task of international monetary
cooperation when the war ends. No one knows how long or how

short the war will be. We therefore believe it is desirable
to begin now to devise an international monetary agency adequate
to cope with the problems with which we shall be confronted when
the war does end.

"The completion of such a task is certain to take many months

at the least. Specific and practical proposals must be formulated
and must be carefully considered by the policy-shaping officials
of the various countries.
And then the Secretary said very clearly, so that we could not fail to
understand:

"In each country accuptance of a definitive plan can follow only
upon lugislative or executive action."
After explaining the nature of the proliminary proposal which was sent
to the other nations to start them thinking, the Secretary said, upon leaving:
"I have been anxious to discuss this matter with you and to
keep you informed of developments. Obviously, we are still in the
early stages of our thinking and discussions. However, I did want
you to know what we are doing and I do want to feel free to come back
from time to time and discuss the subject with you and obtain your
views and advice."

Here I should like to point out that the Centleman from Ohio has taken
advantage of this offer on numerous occasions. Ho has written many letters
to the Treasury and each has been answered, altho The answers to many of
them seem for the most part to have been misinterpreted.
One of these letters, I must comment upon here. He wrote to the
Secretary, asking the Secretary for a direct answer as to whether or not
contributions to the Fund will be physically delivered to one central point
in one of the United Nations.
In answer, Mr. Morgenthau told him that it was generally assumed that
at least the major contributions to the Fund would simply be ear-marked
and kept in the contributors central banks. In other words, our gold would
be kept right here if that is what interests the Gentleman from Ohio.
lihereupon the esteened Gentleman from Ohio apparently not understanding
what "ear-marked" means, throws his hands in the air and says "See what
I told you! How could there be any question about the manner in which the
gold should be delivered? How could it be done except by shipping?"

Gentlenen, I propose this logic as the most elaborate non sequitur in
the history of the American House of Representatives.
But let me continue with the progress of the Stabilization Fund.
Following the April 5 report, there were many meetings of the technical
experts of various countries. By fall, the technicians had made enough
progress so that a revised proposal could be prepared, and the Secretary
again reported to the committees in the House and the Senate. He said at
that time:

-6"I want to emphasize that the International Stabilization
Fund, tentatively proposed by the technical experts of this

Government, is fundamentally an adaptation of the methods we
have successfully used on D more limited scale with our own
Exchange Stabilization Fund. We have tried to adapt that experience
to the broader and more difficult currency problems confronting the

world during the postwur years. The International Stabilization
Fund is an extension of the principle of the Tripartite Agreement
that the responsibility for maintaining stability of exchange rates
is international and that countries must cooperate to maintain
stability of exchange.
"The obligations a country assumes under this proposal are
more than a country voluntarily imposes on itself when it
pursues a policy of exchange stability and refrains from resorting
to discriminatory exchange practices. Beyond that, there is only
the duty of consulting and agreeing before altering exchange rates,
an extension of the principle that we have embodied for years in
our own stabilizztion agreements.

no

"No have held technical conversations with the experts of more
than thirty countries and we are continuing these discussions with
the experts of some of the countries. These exploratory conversations
have been unofficial and confined to the technical level. No Government, including the United States, is committed to any of the
tentative proposals for international monetary cooperation that have
been presented by the experts."

The Secretary then explained some of the changes which had been made in
the proposal previousl; described to the committees, and presented a summary
of a tentative proposal for a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the principle function of which would be to "guarantee loans
made by private capital for sound and constructive purposes, when such loans
are also guaranteed by a member government."

Upon leaving the committees, the Secretary said:

"I want to assure you again that I shall always be available
for discussion of both the Bank and Fund proposals. I know that
some members of your committees are desirous of cooperating with
us in studying thuse problems. Speaking for the Treasury, we
would be very happy if an informal committee were formed which
would consult with our technical men as frequently as feasible."

That is the story of the International Stabilization Fund to date. It

is the whole story.

On the basis of a rumor circulating in a foreign capital, some sections
of the House of Representatives soon to have become excited about possible
infractions of the rights of Congress by the Treasury Department. Statesents hav been made that the Executive Department of the Government is
making agreements with foreign nations, which is wholly and absolutely
absurd. There have boun informances that the Treasury Department, behind the
back of Congress, has been making arrangements to give away our money and

our credit. This, of courso, is avon more absurd than the first charge.

Secretary Morgenthau assured Representative Bloom only last wook that

sufficient progress had not yut been made to warrant taking the timu of
House and Sunate Committuemon to listen to a further ruport.

The entire projuct is still at the level of various government
technicians. A group of technical mun from Russia is at present discussing
the matter with the smuricon tuchnicians at the Treasury. When progress
has boun made, when a recommundation has boon agroud upon by the technicians,

a formal meeting will be hold by accrudited representatives of the various
governments and following that, the various lugislativo bodies will decide
upon what action to take.

I think Congress should commund Sucretary Morgenthau for keeping us
abreast 01 devolopments concerning the Stabilization Fund project, rather
than criticize him for having made agreements which we all know very well
he has not and could not make, and which he himself described on April 5
of last year as being out of his province.

All this is a tempest in the tea pot.

40

41

-7It is an effort to create a political issue where no political issue

could possibly exist. I suppose we can expect more and more of this as we
come closer to election.

But I sincerely hope that the Administration will not find it necessary

to curtail its investigations and forehanded projects because more groups

want to make it politically inexpedient. to do anything but sit.

42
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may be interested to know that the Russian representatives to the Monetary Committee have seen the United

States Army version of the film "Battle for Russia" and

were very much impressed with it.

Nikolai Chechulin, Head of the Russian Mission said
that he thought it would be a very good idea to exhibit

the film in Moscow.

You may wish to consider sending a copy of the film
to Premier Stalin for showing in Moscow.

PORVICTORY

BUY
WAR
BONDS
STAMPS

43

MAR 22 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is in response to the request of the

State Department for the views of the Treasury with regard to the appropriate financial terms of the proposed
extension of post-war credits to the U. S. S. R. under
the Lend Lease Agreement.

It is the view of this Department that the credits

should be amortized over a twenty-year period beginning
three years after the commencement of the credits and

that the interest rate charged should be set at the average rate of carrying costs on the U. S. public debt
plus 1/8 of 1%. Under the present circumstances, the interest rate would thus be set at 2.1% The Soviet Government should be notified in December of any given year

of the rate applicable to the ensuing year. This procedure would assure our public that the cost of the credit
advanced to the U. S. S. R. is fully paid and it would
assure the U. S. S. R. that it is getting the best terms
which this government can extend.

The Treasury believes that the question as to whether
a shorter amortization period should be used as a basis

for discussion can best be left to those responsible for

conducting the negotiations.

Very truly yours,
(Figned) H. Morganthes, Jr.

Secretary of the Treasury.
Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

WHT:SG:gp 3/22/44

44

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Inter-Office Communication
Date
To

Mr. Standish

From

Mr. McCornack

March 22, 1944.

Complementing, if you will, your Spanish plan of
March 17th, there are attached copies of a paper on the
Nansen Passport which represents a saga of that document
from 1922, when Dr. Nansen devised it, through 1939 when

it fell into the hands of the High Commissioner and the
Intergovernmental Committee.

Att.

45

THE NANSEN PASSPORT

An old Russian adage has it that a "man consists of body,
soul and a passport" and it could be that Dr. Nansen, faced with
the problem of protecting people without "state", had to regulate
their status and give them some sort of identity paper. For this
purpose he created in 1922 the "Nansen Certificate" or "Nansen
Passport" which Was adopted by fifty governments. The certificate was valid for one year only and issuance was discretionary
with individual governments.

Inasmuch as it was not valid for return to the country

of issue unless specifically inscribed to that effect, the
Nansen certificate was - at least a travel passport - inferior
to national passports, some countries being reluctant about
permitting people to enter who could not go back or be returned
60 where they came from. A convention in 1933, however, provided
that the Nansen passport should authorize the return of its holder
to the country of issue and that it could be extended for a
period of six months. Though only five nations - Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway and Italy - actually ratified
this convention, and three others - Belgium, France and Egypt -

signed it, the convention is practically in force. In an

emergency, moreover, the Nansen certificate proved its value:
namely, when in 1933 the Russian-Jewish refugees in Germany

were compelled to flee once more, they found that their Nansen

certificates still opened the frontiers for them.

While it might be a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity
of our times that for thousands and thousands of people a piece
of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between life and

death - detention and freedom - there is little doubt that, by
and large, the Nansen certificate is the greatest that has
happened for the individual refugee. It returned to him his
lost identity. And while the refugee could never be sure whether
he would get a labor permit by means of the Nansen certificate,
he could be sure that without the Nansen certificate he would
never get a labor permit.
The Nansen certificate gave the refugee moral support.
While the refugee without an identification paper was exposed

to petty police tyrannies, the holders of the Nansen passport
could turn to the representatives of the High Commission in
various capitals, who afforded them a kind of consular service.
These Commissioners took matters up with the Ministrees when

expulsion orders were issued, or labor permits refused, and
in a more general way saw to it that the governments kept the
arrangements they had entered into on behalf of refugees.

-2-

46

The Nansen Certificate, at the outset extended only to
the Russian and Armenian refugee, was then extended to the
Chaldean, Assyrian and Turkish refugees, and in 1935 to refugees
from the Saar, who were all under League protection; it never
reached the political "sans patries" from Hungary, Italy and
Spain who were not considered as coming within the League's
province.

Concerning these stateless persone outside of League
protection, the Connection and Transit Organization of the

League adopted at its third conference in 1927 a series of
recommendations to governments to employ a uniform document

of identity and travel, similar to the Nansen Certificate but

bearing the notation "good for return". These recommendations
were accepted in principle by most states, and the "international

passport came to life.

When refugees began "coming from Gernany" in 1933, the
Council of the League, to spare embarrassment to Germany then
a member of the League, set up the "High Commissioner for
Refugees coming from Germany" as an autonomous organization.

The Council appointed Jas. G. McDonald as High Commissioner,

and invited fifteen states to send representatives to the
governing body.

The organization of the High Commission was similar to

that of the Nansen Office. The seat of the office was initially

at Lausanne, but in October 1934, was removed to London. This
removal was significant of League detachment which was more

completely expressed in other ways. While the League bore the
administrative costs of the Nansen Office, the expenses of the
High Commissioner's office were borne by contributions from
philanthropic organizations, save for a Swedish Government
contribution. The High Commissioner's reports were not submitted to the League.
One of the High Commissioner's first tasks was to have
the "International Passport" of 1927 extended to refugees who
while still Germans, could not obtain renewals of their German
passports or a new German document. Although the governing
body, comprised of representatives of thirteen states, generally

agreed, it was here that McDonald ran into difficulty. The

High Commission, because of its autonomy, lacked the moral
authority which the Nansen Office in theory enjoyed by means of
invoking the resolutions of the League assembly, could only use
therefore persuasion and consultation to produce results.

-3-

In 1938 the Nansen Office was merged with the Office of
the High Commissioner and was commissioned to concern itself

with the legal and political destinies of refugees.

On July 14, 1938 at Evian the IGC adopted a resolution
for the formation of a permanent committee for refugees. Item

"e" of this resolution follows:

(e) "That, with regard to the documents required
by the countries of refuge and settlement,

the Governments represented on the IGC should

consider the adoption of the following provision:
'In those individual immigration cases
in which the usually required documents
emanating from foreign official sources

are found not to be available, there should
be accepted such other documents serving
the purpose of the requirements of law as

may be available to the immigrant, and that,
as regards the document which may be issued

to an involuntary emigrant by the country of
his foreign residence to serve the purpose of
a passport, note be taken of the several
international agreements providing for the
issue of a travel document serving the purpose of a passport and of the advantage of
their wide application. I II

PJMcC6rmacktia 3/23/44

47

48

Convention Relating to the International
Status of Refugees
Geneva, October 28, 1933

(c. 650. M. 311. 1933)
Chapter II - Administrative Measures
Article 2
(1) Each of the Contracting Parites under-

Reservations

takes to issue Nansen certificates, valid for
not less than one year, to refugees residing

regularly in its territory
(2) The text of the said certificates shall

include a formula authorizing exit and return. Bearers of Nansen certificates which
have not expired shall be free to leave the
country which has issued these documents

and return to it without requiring any
authorization on exit or visa from the consuls of that country on their return.
(3) The respective consuls of the Con-

tracting Parties shall be qualified to extend
these certificates for a period not exceeding
six months.

(4) The cost of visas for Nansen certifi-

cates shall, subject to their issue free of

charge to indigent persons, be established

according to the lowest tariff applied to the

visas of foreign passports.

PJMcCormackiia

3/23/44

Pars. 2 & 3 - Bulgaria. The departure from the country of refugees
possessing Nansen certificates shall

be governed by the general regulations

in force in this respect. Bulgarian

consuls will be empowered in
case of 'force majeur' to extend Name

certificates issued in Bulgaria

for a period of three months.
Par. 3 - Belgium. Not accepted

Czechoslovakia, Not accepted
Norway. Reservation made

Par. 4 - Bulgaria, The coston Vieas
for Nansen certificates shall be fixed
in accordance with the tariff applicable to the nationals of the country
by which the certificate was issued,

49

Convention Concerning the Status of
Refugees Coming from Germany

Geneva, February 10, 1938

(c. 75. M. 30. 1938, XII)
Chapter III - Travel Document
Article 3
Issue and renewal

(1)(a) The High Contracting Parties
shall issue, to refugees coming from Germany and sojourning lawfully in their territory to which the present Convention applies, a travel document in the form of a
certificate similar to the attached specimen
(see annex), or some other document taking the place of a passport.
(b) AS a transition of measure, such
travel documents may be issued to refu-

gees not staying lawfully in these territories on the date of the coming into force
of the present Convention, provided such
refugees report themselves to the authori-

ties within the period prescribed by the

Government of the High Contracting
Party concerned.

(2) The issue of the travel document shall
be subject to the following conditions:

(a) It shall be in conformity with the

laws and regulations governing the super-

vision of foreigners in force in the territories of the High Contracting Party to
which the present Convention is applic-

able;

(b) It shall as a general rule be valid for

one year as from the date of issue;
(c) The renewal or extension of the
travel document shall be a matter for the

issuing authority, until such time as the

holder may be able to secure the issue of a
fresh travel document. Should a refugee
lawfully take up residence in another territory to which the Convention applies, the

authorities of that territory shall be requir-

ed to supply him with a new travel document;

(d) Consuls specially authorized for the
purpose by the country issuing the travel.
document shall be empowered to extend

Par. 2. Norway. Not applicable

-2Chapter III - Travel Document - Cont.

its validity for a period which, as a rule,
shall not exceed six months;
(e) The travel document shall be made

be
issued
to their
Theorfees issue of

out in the language of the issuing authority, and also in French;

Children years age shall

lowest
of
passports.
It isshould
case of
indigent
travel

entered (f) (g) documents scale parents persons, on the recommended charges under charged shall travel travel parent; not 16 for document for documents that, exceed national the of in the

be issued free of charge

Article 4. Effects
(1) (a) The travel document shall entitle
the holders to leave the territory where it
has been issued and to return thereto during the period of validity of the said travel
document.

(b) The High Contracting Parties reserve the right, in exceptional cases, to
limit the period during which the refugee
may return, such limitation being noted on
the travel document.

(2) The competent authorities of the territory to which the refugee desires to
proceed shall, if they are prepared to
admit him, affix a visa to the travel

document of which he is the holder.

(3) The authorities of the territories of
transit undertake to grant facilities for the
issue of transit visas to refugees who have
obtained visas for the territory of final
destination.

(4) The fees for the issue of entrance or
transit visas shall not exceed the lowest
scale of charges for visas on foreign passports. It is recommended that, in the case of
indigent persons, visas shall be issued
free of charge.

50

51

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Chungking, March 22, 1944.

No. 2345.

Subject: Protection of Victims of Enemy
Oppression.

The Ambassador has the honor to refer to the
Department's circular airgram of January 26, 7:00 p.m.,

in regard to relief measures for victims of enemy

oppression, and to enclose a copy of the Embassy's
circular instruction of February 28, 1944 addressed
to American diplomatic and consular officers in China

requesting reports on the matter for transmission to
the Department.

There is also enclosed a copy of the Embassy's

formal note of March 6, 1944 to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs which has orally informed the Embassy that the
matter has been referred to the Executive Yuan for
consideration.

Despatches to the Department received from the
officers stationed at Kunming, Sian and Chengtu in
accordance with the Embassy's circular are transmitted

herewith. Replies from other offices will be forwarded
when they are received.

52

2Enclosures:

1. Copy of circular instruction to American
diplomatic and consular officers in China;
2. Copy of Embassy's note to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs;
3. Despatch no. 50 of March 7, 1944 from the
American Consulate General, Kunming;
4:

Despatch no. 3 of March 9, 1944 from the

Secretary on detail at Sian:
5. Despatch no. 10 of March 12, 1944 from the
Secretary on detail at Chengtu.
Single copy to the Department.
320

HP/kky

53

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 2245 of March 22, 1944
from the American Embassy, Chungking.

Chungking, China, February 28, 1944
CIRCULAR NO. 30

Subject: Protection of Victims of Enemy Oppression.
To

American Diplomatic and Consular Officers in China.
Sirs:

There is enclosed a copy of an airgram dated
January 26, 1944, 7:00 p.m. received by the Embassy

from the Department in regard to relief of victims
of enemy oppression. It is desired that each office

render a report on its district as called for in the
fourth paragraph of the airgram. These reports,

addressed to the Department, should follow the form

specified in the Embassy's circular no. 27 of February

7, 1944 and be transmitted through the Embassy.

Other action required in the airgram will be
taken by the Embassy.

Very truly yours,

C. E. Gauss

Copies to:

Consulate General, Kunming.

Consulates, Kweilin, Tihwa.
Secretaries of Embassy on detail
at Chengtu, Lanchow, Sian.
HP/CCW

54

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch no. 2245
from the American Embassy, Chungking.
Chungking, March 6, 1944

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I
have received an instruction from my Government reading,

in part, as follows:
"The President has instructed the Secretaries

'It is all

immediate
Europe
and
other
an declared:
executive order
issued
measures rescue victims of
enemy
are of
death
and
otherwise
possible
of State, and War to take action for the

relief
successful
prosecution of the special
oppression and the within victims rescue Treasury assistance policy to its who and afford of of January power relief enemy this consistent such in Government 22, to persecution. imminent of victims the the with President Jews the danger all to the take of In

governmental
policy.
It
creates
the is
Secretaries
of
Board
charged with direct President

in seeing
thelook
out.
The
President
directly the Board for policy,
the Board Intergovernmental

Committee, and other international
to would that a UNRRA, War machinery indicated State, cooperate Refugee war'. announced responsibility Treasury for that Board The with the executing interested policy while order execution consisting and the War. he to establishes is this would the carried of The of this

organizations. The President stated that he expected
the cooperation of all members of the United Nations
and

His Excellency
Dr. T. V. Soong,

Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Chungking.

55

-2 and other governments in carrying out this difficult
but important task. He stated that the existing
facilities of the State, Treasury and Far Departments
would be employed to furnish aid to Axis victims to
the fullest extent possible. He stressed that it was
urgent that action be taken to forestall the plot of

the Nazis to exterminate the Jews and other persecuted
minorities in Europe".

I am directed by a later portion of this instruction
to ascertain the extent to which the Chinese Government is
prepared to cooperate in the policy expressed in the

President's Executive Order referred to above. I should
accordingly appreciate being informed as to the attitude
of the Chinese Government on this matter in order that I
may report accordingly to my Government.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my

highest consideration.

C. E. Gauss

56

No. 50
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Kunming, Yunnan, China, March 7, 1944.

SUBJECT: Protection of Victims of Enemy
Oppression.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's circular airgram of January 26, 1944, 7:00 p.m., addressed
to certain American missions, a copy of which was forwarded to this Consulate General under cover of Circular
Instruction no. 30 from the Embassy at Chungking, in
regard to relief of victims of enemy oppression, and to

submit a brief report as called for in the fourth peragraph of the airgram.

The legal position of the German Jew in Yunnan was
discussed in some length in this Consulate General's
despatch no. 42, dated February 12, 1944, addressed to
the Department, a copy of which was submitted to the Em=
bassy. It was stated that the Chinese Government had
failed to draw the obvious and necessary conclusion
that "stateless" Jews could not be regarded ds enemy
aliens and that the Chinese ordinances dealing with the
treatment of enemy aliens should not be applied to them.

One of the less admirable characteristics of the
Chinese is their lack of a sense of fair play and their
tendency to take advantage of those who are defenseless,
or, as the Chinese themselves would express it, to kick
). AB far as is known, nothing
a dead horse (

has been done to assist persecuted minorities. It is
often said that the Chinese is the only race capable of

57

-absorbing the Jew, and a Jewish racial problem cannot

be said to exist here in any form. Nevertheless, there
has been observed a growing, and an entirely baseless
and illogical tendency to heap scorn on the Jew and to

treat him with contempt. Chinese in authority have manifested in many ways their admiration for present day

Germany and the fascist, as opposed to the democratic
form of government. The only reasonable explanation of
the present-day Chinese attitude toward the Jew is that

it reflects the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda.

There are, in all probability, not more than twenty

German Jews in Yunnan Province. The last known German
Jens to come to Yunnan-were a Mr. and Mrs. Ludwig HEINRICH, who arrived in Kunming in September, 1940. Mr.

Heinrich was formerly a moderately prosperous traveler in
the wholesale moolen trade, and was admitted under the
guarantee of another German Jew, a certain Mr. BEAL, an
erstwhile employee of his in Germany. Mr. Beal himself,
along with three or four other German Jewish mechanics
from Shanghai, had previously been brought to Kunming
under the auspices of the International Red Cross to work
as chauffeurs on the Burns Road.

The Special Yunnan Delegate of the Ministry of For-

eign Affairs is without information in regard to requirements for immigration visas. German Jewish refugees,
like other prospective immigrants into China, are understood to be required to submit evidence (1) that they
are of good moral character, and (2) that they are suf-

ficiently responsible from a financial point of view to

warrant the belief that they are not liable to become a

public charge. It is said that in practice immigrants

into China from places in the Far East are for the most
part granted visas by the Chinese Consul General in Calcutta; doubtful cases are referred by him to the Chinese
Foreign Office.
Respectfully yours,
Arthur R. Ringwalt
American Consul

Approved for transmission:
C. E. Gauss

Original ozalid to Department
Copy to Embassy, Chungking.
840.1 - ARR:sam

58

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Second Secretary on detail at Sian, China,
March 9, 1944
No. 3
Subject: PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF ENEMY OPPRESSION

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Tashington.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's airgram of January 26, 1944, 7:00 p.m., in regard to
the rescue and relief of victims of enemy oppression and

persecution. I received with the airgram an instruction
from the Embassy at Chungking to submit a report to the
Department in accordance with the terms of the fourth

paragraph of the airgram. My report follows herewith.

Summary: While the plight of Jewish, Russian and
other refugees domiciled in the Jepanese-occupied areas

of China is reported to be serious, it would appear that

the Japanese have not deliberately maltreated or persecuted
them in a manner reminiscent of the atrocities perpetrated
by the German Nazis against the Jews of Europe. Very few
if any of the refugees in Japanese-occupied Chinese cities
appear to have made any effort to emigrate to unoccupied
China. The Chinese Government would appear to be without

the facilities to extend any substantial aid to such

refugees if they were to migrate to unoccupied China.

Removal from occupied to unoccupied China probably would

not in any event relieve the economic plight of such refugees; indeed it might add to their distress and diffi-

culties. In so far as is known, there are no official

regulations barring the entry of war refugees, but un-

identified refugees entering unoccupied China would almost

certainly be detained for examination. The Chinese official

59

2-

attitude toward the entry of war refugees would appear to
be negative and formless, it does not seem to have crystal-

lized. If faced with the concrete problem of the reception

and care of any substantial number of war refugees (Jewish,
Russian, et cetera), it seems doubtful whether the Chinese
reaction would be favorable for various reasons. No report
has been received of Chinese failure to admit to the
unoccupied areas war refugees seeking exit from the Japaneseoccupied areas. End of summary.

Introductory explanation. This report has reference
to conditions and developments in China, and more particularly to those relating to occupied China and to the northern

and central Provinces of Shensi, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh and
Anhwei. Moreover, it has reference primarily to European
refugees residing in the Chinese port cities who may have
been or may be subjected to Japanese oppression and persecution, the German Nazis apparently having been unable to

carry out their policy of racial persecution in the Far East.

Japanese attitude toward refugees. Accurate information
in regard to the Japanese attitude and actions toward the
Jews, "white" Russians and other minorities in Japaneseoccupied China is scanty and inconclusive. But on the basis
of available information it would appear that the Japanese
have not embarked on a deliberate campaign of persecution or

elimination of the Jews or other racial minorities that would
compare in any wise in barbarity or severity with the acts

reportedly perpetrated by the Germso Nazis against European
Jews, Russians, Poles, et cetera. According to Chinese
refugees arriving from Shanghai and other Japanese-occupied
cities of China, the economic plight of many Jews, Russians,

et cetera, is very serious, but no more so than that of

millions of Chinese. The bulk of the Jewish and Russian
refugee population has from the time of its arrival in Shanghai and other Chinese port cities lived in poverty and on a
low economic level; and it would appear that this group
has suffered increasingly as economic conditions have progressively deteriorated. This would appear to be true
especially of the Jewish population which is reported to have
been concentrated by the Japanese authorities in the narrow
limits of Hongkew at Shanghai. In so.far as is known, actual

60

-3physical concentration of Jewish, Russian and other European
refugees does not appear to have occurred on any marked

scale in Japanese-occupied China. It would appear that few,
if any, of these refugees in Japanese-occupied China have endeavored to come into unoccupied China. The precise reasons
why such migration of these refugees has not developed are
unknown: they may be subject to Japanese travel restrictions
or they may lack travel funds or they may feel that conditions
in unoccupied China would be no more favorable than those
obtaining in Japanese-occupied China.
Rescue of Jews and other minorities from Japanese-

occupied China. It would appear, in general, that the

Chinese Government, which seems hard-put to cope with the
problem of aiding the thousands of Chinese students who have
been and are now fleeing from Japanese-occupied China to un-

occupied China, not to mention its apparent inability to offer

any appreciable succor to millions of China's own famine and

war stricken population, is scarcely in a position to extend
active aid or relief to the suffering Jews, Russians and
other racial minorities of Shanghai, Tientsin and other

Japanese-occupied Chinese cities. And even if such refugees
evinced a desire to come to unoccupied China and if the
Chinese Government had the will and the resources to administer

relief to such refugees, it is doubtful whether the Chinese

Government has the machinery in the Japanese-occupied areas of

China to carry out such a program. !oreover, it would appear
that their removal, even if it were feasible, would not
ameliorate their lot or solve their pressing economic problems.
Having due regard to existing conditions and developments,
it seems the wiser course that such refugees should remain at
Shanghai, Tientsin and other enemy-occupied cities pending

conclusion of the war. If it is found that such refugees
are in need of urgent relief, it may be found possible to

afford them succer through the International Red Cross or the
agency of some neutral government.

The extent to which such war refugees are permitted to
enter unoccupied China. In so far as is known there is no
specific bar to the entry of Jews and other war refugees from
the Japanese-occupied areas to unoccupied China. No case is
known of the turning back at the border of such refugees.

61

4-

However, based on the experiences of citizens and subjects of
various European Powers proceeding from the Japanese-occupied

areas of China to this portion of China during the past year
or more, it would seem safe to predict that many such refugees
would be hindered, delayed and subjected to detainment. More

particularly would this be likely to occur in cases involving
refugees of former German or Austrian nationality. It is
more than likely that, unless well known and guaranteed,
such refugees would be regarded by the Chinese authorities
with suspicion and as possible. German or Japanese agents.

Unidentified Russian refugees would most certainly be the
objects of Chinese suspicion; it seems doubtful whether they
could travel far into unoccupied China without being detained

for investigation.

Even if war refugees were allowed to travel freely in
unoccupied China, they would find the cost and the diffi-

culties of transport to be very great. It may be stated

without qualification that should any appreciable number

of European war refugees endeavor to enter unoccupied China

by the generally traveled route--that is, via Kaishowtsi in

eastern Honan Province--they would tax relief and transport

facilities to the limit. Even if it were possible and

feasible to transport European war refugees from Shanghai,
Tientsin and other enemy-occupied cities to the border of
unoccupied China, it would seem that conditions in unoccupied
China are most unpropitious for their movement and residence.
The extent to which China encourages and cooperates in

the entry of war refugees. Owing to the very limited number
of war refugees (other than those of Chinese nationality)
coming into unoccupied China, it seems impossible from this
vantage point to define with any precision China's real
attitude in regard to the entry of European war refugees.
It would appear, however, that the Chinese authorities have,
in anything, taken a negative attitude in relation to encouraging the entry of war refugees (including those of Chinese
nationality) from the Japanese-occupied areas of China. If
the Chinese Government were faced with the concrete problem

of the admission and care of a substantial number of Jewish

or "white" Russian refugees, for instance, it is highly

doubtful whether the reception would be a welcome one. In
all probability the Chinese Government would take the attitude

62

-5that Jewish and Russian refugees could not be favored over
millions of distressed Chinese war refugees who must shift for
themselves. Moreover, as indicated above, the Chinese Govern-

ment would seem to lack the facilities to receive and absorb

any appreciable number of war refugees. Furthermore, as
suggested above, the Chinese Government would probably not
favor the infiscriminate admission of European refugees owing
to the possible danger of espionage.

The extent to which war refugees are not able to enter
unoccupied China. No information has been received of the
turning back by the Chinese authorities of European war
refugees. As has been pointed out above, very few European
war refugees appear to have tried to leave Japanese-occupied
China for unoccupied China. In the large sense, therefore,
this problem does not appear to have arisen. The few Europeans who have fled from Japanese-occupied China to this
portion of unoccupied China have found that difficulties with
the Chinese authorities are more apt to arise after they have
reached a city somewhat to the rear of the border; Sian is a
case in point. At least six Europeans have been detained here
for varying periods in the course of the past year or more
following their arrival from the Japanese-occupied areas.
Respectfully yours,

Fyerett F. Drumright
Second Secretary of Embassy

on detail at Sian

Approved for transmission:

C. E. Gauss

63

Enclosure no. 5 to despatch no. 2245 of March 22, 1944
from the American Embassy, Chungking.
DUPLICATE

No. 10.

Office of the Secretary on Detail at
Chengtu, Chengtu, Szechwan, March 12, 1944.

Subject: Protection of Victima of Enemy
Opression.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's airgram dated January 26, 1944, 7:00 p.m., to the Embassy

at Chungking, in regard to the relief of victims of enemy
oppression.

In compliance with the Chungking Embassy's circular

instruction no. 30 of February 28, 1944, the following

is this office's reply to the points raised in the fourth
paragraph of the Department's airgram under reference:

So far as this office is aware, nothing in particular is being done by the authorities of this district

(Szechwan north of 300 latitude and the whole of Sikang
Province) to rescue the Jews and other persecuted minorities

from Hitler. Although no actual case of arrival of enemy
persecuted minorities has come to the attention of this
office, it is believed that should such people, of German
or other enemy nationality, arrive here from abroad or

from other parts of China they would be regarded and
treated as enemy aliens in accordance with the provisions
of Chinese Regulations Governing the Treatment of Enemy
Aliens. Refugee Jews of non-enemy nationality would, it

is believed, be treated by the Chinese authorities of
this district with as much consideration as friendly gentiles.
Respectfully yours,

Approved for transmission:
C. E. Gauss
American Ambassador
HES.

Harry E. Stevens
Second Secretary of Embassy

on Detail at Chengtu

64

CMW-750

PLAIN

London

Dated March 22, 1944
Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

2324, 22nd

Sir Herbert Emerson 1s pleased at suggestion in

Department's 2043, March 17, midnight and plans to visit
Washington very soon. Please 80 inform Myron Taylor,
Secretary Morgenthau and Pehle.

Embassy requests immediate authority issue visa to
Emerson to proceed United States for discussions concerning
refugees with Secretary Morgenthau, Pehle and others.
References Taylor and Pehle.
WINANT

BB

ch:copy
3-25-44

65
3/22
CABLE TO MINISTER NORWEB, LISBON, PORTUGAL

Please refer to Department's No. 200 of January 25, 1944, in regard to
the establishment of the War Refugee Board. The Executive Director
of the Board, Hohn W. Pehle, has informed the Department that in conformity
with the President's Order of January 22, 1944, the Board proposes to appoint
Mr. Robert C. Dexter, European representative of the Unitarian Service Come
mittee and en route to Lisbon at the present time, as the special represents
tive of the Board with the designation by the Department as special attache to
the Legation on war refugee matters. The President's order provides that the
State Department shall appoint such special attaches upon recommendation of
the War Refugee Board, that they shall have diplomatic status, and that their

duties and responsibilities shell be defined by the Board, in consultation with
the State Department.

The Unitarian Service Committee has indicated that it has no objection
to Mr. Dexter's accepting this appointment.

If, after discussing the matter with Mr. Dexter, the appointment meets with
your approval, you should advise him that he is so désignated and that he is

to have diplomatic status. It is assumed there will be no objection on the

part of the Portuguese Government to this designation, although you may, in your
discretion, approach the Portuguese authorities if you consider it necessary or
advisable to do so. You are requested to confirm by telegram Dexter's designam
tion or to advise us promptly if there is any reason why it should not be
effective at once.
You should Advise Dexter that:

(a) He is charged with the duty and responsibility of carrying out

the Board's policies and programs in Portugal$

(b) He is responsible to t. Minister and should discuss his
activities and problems with him regularly and fully;
(c) The Legation will provide him with the necessary communication

facilities in carrying on his official dutiest

(d) He shall extend all possible assistance to the Minister in

carrying out the instructions contained in the Department's reference telegram;

(e) He shall work with and give all assistance to public and private

agenciesoperating in Portugal in this field regardless of whether such organ-

izations are Emerican, foreign or international

(f) He shall develop and assist in the development of programs and
implementation of measures for the rescue, transportation, maintenance and

relief of refugees;
(g) He shall forward to the Board recommendations and frequent reports
on progress of work and difficulties encountered;

66

-2(h) In so far as the Trading with the Enemy Act is concerned, the
Secretary of the Treasury has vested in the War Refugee Board and its representatives in the field full author ity to communicate with enemy territory to
carry out the purposes of the Order. The Secretary of the Treasury has also
delegated to the Bar Refugee Board and its representatives the power to authorize
any public or private agencies which may be subject to the provisions of our
Trading with the Enemy Act, to communicate with enemy territory for the purpose of carrying out the order. Dexter is authorized to act accordingly.

After receipt of confirmation of Dexter's designation further detailed
instructions will follow from time to time.

April 1, 1944
9:35 am.

JHMurphy:dh 3/22/44

JHM:JBF:WS:LSL:FH

67

1944

MAR 22 AM 8 36

WU6 13

TDB BELMONT MASS MAR 22 1944 823A
JOSEPH FRIEDMAN

WAR REFUGEE BOARD ROOM 192 TREASURY BLDG

UNITARIAN COMMITTEE ACCEPT PROPOSITION. I SUGGEST SPANISH
REPRESENTATIVE CONTACT ME LISBON BEFORE ENTRY
ROBERT DEXTER.

835A

68

AIRGRAM

From

LISBON

Date: March 22, 5:40 p.m., 1944
Rec'd: March 27 4 p
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

A-212 March 22, 5:40 p.m.

Please transmit urgently following telegram to
Rabbi Stefan Wise, Nahum Goldman, World Jewish Congress,
330 West 42nd Street, New York:

"Following suggestions in connection War Refugee
Board handed American Ambassador. Intervention with Portu-

guese authorities vising permission entry permanently till

war end ten thousand refugees, thus securing rescues
thousands. That Portuguese Red Cross be authorized large
scale expedition food parcels to concentration camps and
ghettos, preventing starvation thousands. Official intervention supported by Portuguese clergy with German authorities
for release and entry three thousand registered children from
France. Ambassador opines that successful intervention only
possible against guarantee that necessary food supplies be
delivered in Portugal for new arrivals and above mentioned
Red Cross expeditions. Suggest these guarantees best
obtained your end through intervention UNRRA or Intergovernmental Committee. Ambassador should be instructed by
State Department on these points. End item. Regarding our

suggestions creation reception centres in Portugal for
hidden children France via underground channels. American
Legation and British Embassy promise support and are intervening Portuguese authorities for respective permission.
American Friends and Unitarians already cooperating. Expect

Joint will follow suit when official authorization obtained.
Please cable." "

Signed ISAAC WEISSMAN

NORWEB

69
PARAPHRASE or TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM:

AMERICAN EMBASSY, MADRID.

TO:

Secretary of State, Washington

DATE:

March 22, 1944

NUMBER:

997

CONFIDENTIAL

I have not transmitted the substance of Department's
752, March 18, to Sequerra, JDC representative in Bareelona, by reason of the following considerations:
(a) David Blickenstaff is understood by me to be
the principal JDC representative in Spain, and not Sequerra;
all business with the JDC has been transacted by the
Embasay through Blickenstaff.

(b) Sequerra's loyalty to the Allied cause is not

considered to be beyond doubt although apparently this
fact has not been brought to the Department's attention.
Sequerra is a neutral subject (Portuguese) and although

he has apparently done effective work in the field of
relief of refugees, we have no basis for assuming that
he would not deal with our enemies, particularly if
pressure is applied. Until recently, Sequerra had a

personal representative in Madrid who was a disreputable
individual to whom a Palestine visa was refused by the
British on the grounds that he was suspected of having
given information to the Germans. It therefore appears
to me to invite obvious and unnecessary risks which could
have the most serious repercussions to entrust a person

of this type with the responsibility of carrying out the
operations described in the Department's telegram under

reference.

(o) For any American charitable organization or
its representatives to engage in elandestine operations
of the type contemplated by the license could well
jeepardize in Spain the entire position of these organizations. The work of these organizations has in the
past been centralized in Blickenstaff's office, and with

the Embassy's support, they have won respect and confidence
of the Spanish Government, which has enabled them to do

valuable work on behalf of unprotected and stateless
refugees.

-2-

70

refugees. This has frequently caused extreme discomfort

to the Germans who want the Spanish Government to supress

the activities of these organizations, and welcome every
pretext to bring force to bear to this end. We must

assume that the operations contemplated by license W-2155
would soon become known to the Germans and a pretext to
apply such force to the Spanish Government would be pro-

vided by the participation of the organizations in such

operations.

(d) On the other hand, if the Germans considered
that these operations could be turned to their own ad-

vantage, they might accomplish this purpose by using

these operations as an additional channel for getting
their agents into territory controlled by Spain and the
Allies.
(e) My most serious objection is the danger that
existing underground facilities within German occupied
territory for accomplishing the escape of American and
Allied airmen who have thereby been enabled to reach
the Spanish frontier without detection, may be compromised by these operations. I am firmly convinced and
determined that no steps should be taken which might
in the slightest measure jeepardize the chances of escape to safety of these airmen whose safety must be

given first priority by our Government (prior to that

of any other class of refugees) irrespective of humanitarian considerations, with which last I am, of course,
in complete sympathy.

(f) In view of the inevitable military significance

which must be attached at this crucial time with any
activities involving communication or the passage of
persons into or out of occupied France, and having in
mind the above considerations, I feel that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff should give prior approval to the operations envisaged by the license embedied in Department's
telegram under reference, and that my views in the matter
should be conveyed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their consideration of the matter.
Pending consideration by the Department of the points
mentioned above, I intend to take no action on Department's
telegram 752 under reference.

This telegram has been repeated to Lisbon and London.
HAYES

WT:WIR:AMN 3/25/44

71

DMH-53

Madrid

This telegram must be
paraphrased before being

Dated

March 22, 1944

communicated to anyone
other than 8 Governmental

Rec'd

1:30 p.m., 23rd

agency. (sc-00)
Secretary of State,
Washington.

997, March 22, 6 p.m.

In light of following considerations I am not (repeat

not) transmitting substance Department's 752, March 18, to
Sequerra, JDC representative, Barcelona:

One. It is my understanding that principal JDC representative in Spain is not (repeat not) Sequerra but is David
Blickenstaff and it is Embassy's practice to transact all
business with that organization through latter.
Two. Although it has apparently not been brought to
Department attention, Sequerra's loyalty to Allied cause
is not considered beyond question. He is a Portuguese and
therefore a neutral subject and, although he has apparently

done effective refugee relief work, there is little if any-

thing to indicate that he would be above dealing with our
enemies, particularly if subjected to pressure. Sequerra's

reputable individual who was refused Palestine visa by
British because of suspicion that he had been giving information to the Germans. To entrust such a person with carrying out of operations described in Department's telegram
would therefore appear to be inviting obvious and unnecessary risks which could have gravest consequences.

Three. Participation of any private American charitable
organization or its representatives in such clandestine op-

perations as those envisaged under authorization contained

in Department's telegram might well prejudice entire position of such organizations in Spain. With Embassy's sup-

port these organizations, centralized in Blickenstaff's

office, have won respect and confidence of Spanish Government and have been enabled thereby to do valuable work on

behalf of stateless and unprotected refugees often to acute
discomfort of Germans who would welcome pretext to force

Spanish Government to suppress their activities. Their
participation in operations authorized by license K-2155,
which we must assume would not long remain unknown to
Germans, would provide such a pretext.

**Omission of following:

personal representative in Madrid, until recently, was dis-

72

-2- 997, March 22, 6 p.m., from Madrid
Four. If on the other hand, Germans should consider

it more profitable to turn these operations to their own

ends they might by allowing them to continue provide them.
selves with an additional channel through which to send a

gents into Spain and Allied controlled territory..

Five. of even greater importance is danger that such
operations might compro mise existing underground facilities

within German occupied territory by means of which hundreds of American and Allied airmen have been enabled to

reach the Spanish frontier without detection. It is my

firm and determined conviction that, regardless of humanitarian considerations involved with which I am, of course,
entirely in sympathy, no (repeat no) steps should be taken
which might in even the slightest measure jeopardize the
chances of escape of these airmen whose safety must have

a prior claim on the efforts of our Government to that of
any other class of refugees.

Six. In view of above consideration and of the inevitable military significance which we must attach at
this crucial time to any activitiesinvolving passage of

communications and persons into or out of occupied France,

it is my feeling that any operation such as that envisaged
in Department's telegram under reference should be sub-

mitted for prior approval to Joint Chiefs of Staff who
shall be made acquainted with my views in the matter.

It is my intention to take no (repeat no) action on
Department's 752 pending consideration by Department of

points raised herein.

Repeated to London and Lisbon.
HAYES
WTD

73

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT
FROM:

Secretary of State, Washington

TO:

American Legation, Bern

DATED:

March 22, 1944

NUMBER: 950

SECRET

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

The following cable is for Isaac Sternbuch, 3 Teufener

Strasse, St. Gallen, froi Rabbie Abraham Kalmanio and
Aron Kotler of the Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee:

The interventions which you requested in
your communication via the Legation are being
made by us. Necessary funds are being raised

in order to do everything possible to expand
rescue work in France, Lithuania, Belgium, Holland
and wherever else possible. Regarding rescue work
for Jews who enter Hungaria and those in Rumania,

Advice whether it can be done by Jacob Grifill of
Istanbul and you.
HULL
(GLW)

74
COPY

KIN-756

Born

This telegram must be
paraphrased before being

Dated March 22, 1944

communicated to anyone
other than a Government

Rec'd 2:56 Pom.

agency.

(BR)

Secretary of State,
Washington.
US URGENT

1754, March 22, 6 p.m.

Federal Political Department informs me that it is
willing to include Roswell Dunlop NeClelland in Diplomatic
List as "Special Assistant" (thus according him Diplomatic
status) and that Swiss federal authorities will be pleased
to treat with his on questions concerned with the refugee
problem. Refer to my1387, March 8 and related telegrams.
Your confirmation NeOlelland's appointment awaited

with instructions as to salary, other expenses, appropriations to be used et cetera.
HARRISON

BB

75
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT
FROM:

SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

TO:

AMCONSUL, GENEVA

MARCH 22, 1944

DATED:

NUMBER: 126
CONFIDENTIAL

War Refugee Board sends the following message from
Leland Rex Robinson and Henry Lieper, The American Committee

for Christian Refugees for Adolph Freudenberg, 41 Champel,
Geneva:

During the six months beginning March 1 you are authorized

as our representative to use 21,200 Swiss france or dollar
equivalent monthly for work in France according to the outline
and assurances contained in your communications of November 18

and November 29. You should establish contact with the American
Legation at Bern regarding our license no. K-2150 which Treasury
issued March 8. You should kirep us informed through the Legation whenever possible.
HULL

DCR:IDB:JTM

3/28/44

76

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM:

The American Consul, Zurich

TO:

The Secretary of State, Washington

DATE:

March 22, 1944

NUMBER:

36

CONFIDENTIAL

With reference to immigration visas for refugee
children from France, the Consulate General has been provided by the
Legation with a copy of Department's message number 891 dated March 18,

1944. The necessary steps are being taken by this office to have all
consulates in Switserland issue such visas and further developments will
be reported.
WOODS

DCR:MPL

3/24/44

77

March 22, 1944
11:00 a.m.
CABLE TO AMBASSADOR STEINHARDT, ANKARA, TURKEY.
FOR HIRSCHMANN FROM PEHLE.

Your return to the United States to report to the
War Refugee Board has our full approval. We are taking
up with the War Department the matter of priority. The

swell job which Ambassador Steinhardt and you have done

has received the highest praise. We obviously desire the
continuance of your activities on behlf of the Board and
I will discuss this with you when I see you.

WRB Ankara Cable No. 9

JEDuBoistecr
3/22/44

78

CABLE TO STEINHARDT AND HIRSCHMANN, ANKARA, TURKEY,
FROM THE WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

WRB Cable Ankara No. 10

Refer your 455, 458, 471 and 472 concerning the matter

of obtaining shipping for the evacuation of refugees from the
Balkans.

We are requesting the Swiss Government to support the

efforts of the International Red Cross to obtain safe conduct
for the SS TARI which has been placed at your disposal for
a trip to Constanza to evacuate Jewish refugees.

The matter of this Government making available a substitute
vessel in order that the S. S. TARI may make repeated voyages to
evacuate refugees has been discussed with the War Shipping Administration. The War Shipping Administration is cabling Myron Black

requesting further information as to (1) the type of vessel desired
and where it is intended that the vessel trade: (2) if vessel is

to trade in enemy controlled areas, advice as to whether enemy will
treat vessel as Turkish vessel, including question as to whether
safe conduct is necessary. The War Shipping Administration has
made clear that any recommendation submitted by Black will be

sympathetically considered even if practical difficulties are

involved. They feel however that most practi cal way of handling
situation would be to treat it as problem of allocation and attempt

to work out arrangement whereby equivalent space on Allied vessel
proceeding to Eastern Mediterranean port would be made available
for Turkish requirements thereby conserving use of Turkish vessels.
The War Shipping Administration is also cabling Kalloch, their
representative in Algiers, requesting advice as to whether any

small frighter is available in the Mediterranean which could be
chartered to the Turks.

You should explore all possibilities in this situation with
Black. Since time is of the essence in view of military situation
whatever proposal is submitted must of course be one which will
involve least delays. The War Shipping Administration has pointed

out the practical difficulties in obtaining without delay a ship

now available in the Mediterranean which could be chartered to the
Turks for this purpose.
We will do whatever we can to carry out any recommendation

that you and Black may make after considering all of the difficulties
involved. However, you will bear in mind that an effort to actually

79

-2put a vessel into the hands of the Turks by the time that the
S.S. TARI completes the f irst voyage may be fraught with considerable difficulties if the voyage were completed in a short period
of time. On the other hand, if you could reach an understanding
with the Turks whereby the S.S. TARI would be made available any
for three months on the assurance that this Government would see
to it that an equivalent space on an Allied vessel was made
available for Turkish requirements for a three months period,
not necessarily concurrent with the period during which the
S. S. TARI will be used, such an arrangement would be much more

feasible from the standpoint of the shipping situation.

With respect to the purchase of the S. S. NECAT for donation
to the Turkish Red Crescent, it is noted that the Turkish Government
has indicated that to withdraw a second vessel from the ships
at the disposal of the Turkish Government would be impossible. Have
you explored the possibility of making the S. S. NECAT available to
the Turkish Red Crescent as soon as the S.S. TARI completes its
first voyage, in the event that arragements can not be made to
have the S.S. TARI make repeated voyages.

JEDuBoistecr
3/22/44

80
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT
FROM:

SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

TO:

AMEMBASSY, ANKARA

DATED:

MARCH 22, 1944

NUMBER: 230
SECRET

Following for Hirschmann from War Refugee Board.
War Refugee Board cable no. 7

It is stated in a letter dated February 25, from Intercross that the #Bellacitta", a Bulgarian vessel, is available
to transfer refugees at the rate of 150 per week to Istanbul
presumably from Mangalia. Red Cross also informed us that two

Bulgarian vessels, "Milka" and "Maritza", are also available
to Jewish organizations for this purpose but since Turkey is
not allowing more than 150 a week to go to Palestine by rail,
it is presumed that the last two mentioned boats will not be
usable since the "Bellacitta" can fill the limit imposed.
Red Cross as intermediary will give notification of sailings
you are requested to do everything possible without lea-

sening efforts concerning Swedish and Turkish boats. RedCross
has requested and the United States has granted safe conducts

for the "Bellacitta" and cable is being sent to the American

Embassy at Moscow requesting that the Soviet Government take
prompt action on the British Government's safe conduct requests.

HULL

81

GEM-703

This telegram must be
paraphrased before being
communicated to a nyone
other than a Governmental
agency. (BR)

Chungking

Dated March 22, 1944

Rec'd : p.m.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

MAR 9 3 1944

Washington.
MAN RECORDS

508, March 22, 2 p.m.

Department's circular February 22 and Embassy's
384, February 26, 10 a.m.
Central News Agency March 20 report official

statement issued by Finance Minister that Chinese

Government will not recognize transference of title
to looted gold which Axis powers at any time hold or
have disposed of in world market.
Embassy will expect to forward by pouch full text
of statement upon its receipt from Foreign office.
RR

GAUSS

NOT TO BE RE-TRANSMITTED

COPY NO

SECRET

11

OPTEL No. 94

Information received up to 10 A.M. 22nd March 1944
1. NAVAL

On 19th/20th heavily escorted ship believed German 5,000 ton tanker
proceeded up channel from BOULOGNE shelled by DOVER Coastal batteries and
possibly sunk.
2. MILITARY

Italy 21st. Intense fighting continues in and around CASSINO. Heavy
German artillery and mortar fire and ithin the town opposing
troops so close that neutralising enemy fire is dangerous to our forward
infantry. On heights to the West attack and counter-attack has left general
aituation unchanged. In Bridgehead situation relatively quiet.
Russia Russians have advanced further South West of DUBNO and Westward
between ZHMERINKA and MOGILEV-PODOLSKI. They have extended their
bridgehead on right bank of DNIESTER and have cut railygy between CERNAUTI and
BALTI. Further eastwards they have ro-taken VOZHESENSK.

Burma CHINDWIN. Japanese advancing West parallel to and south of

TAMU-PALEL road reported reached point 3 miles East ANGBRESHU

Four miles south of TAMU our tanks have destroyed four or five Japanese tanks for
the loss of one.
HOMALIN. Japanese forces which crossed CHINDWIN now thrusting

towards URKHUL North East of IMPHAL and are in

contact ith our troops.

HUKWANG VALLEY. U.S. and Chinese troops continue their advance.
North BURMA. Our troops have captured SUMPRABUM.
3. AIR OPERATIONS

21st. Liberators dropped 191 tons through cloud on
military constructions Northern FRANCE. 51 Mustangs
BORDEAUX area destroyed 12 enemy aircraft in the air end 9 on the ground

Western Front

7 sweeping Mustangs missing. Two Mosquitoes over STRASBOURG area shot down 3 enemy

aircraft and destroyed 4 and damaged 12 on the ground.

21st/22nd. Aircraft despatched: COLOGNE 27, AACHEN and OBERHAUSEN 9,

Intruders 21, Sea-mining 18, Leaflets 10, Anti-shipping 5. All returned

safely. About 95 German aircraft were over LONDON and Home counties of hich
70 came over SUFFOLK and 25 over South Coast. Enemy casualties by night

fighters 9:2:4.
Italy 19th/20th. 38 heavy and medium bombers attacked the submarine
base at MONFALCONE.

4. HOME SECURITY

21st/22nd. LONDON. Raid mainly incendiary, East end and docks chiefly

affected. 3 large fires reported but fire situation never serious and all under
control by 4:35 A.M. Killed, so far repostadvá

02 to Wd EZ HAW 9961

83

March 23, 1944
9:20 a.m.
GROUP

Present: Mr. Bell

Mr. Gaston
Mr. Smith

Mr. Sullivan

Mr. Thompson

Mr. O'Connell
Mr. Blough
Mr. Nunan

Mrs. Klotz

H.M.JR: There are two things that I need some

advice on, and that is the press. I mean, the press
is just forcing my hand. Can I get away, for instance,
by saying that during this simplifi cation bill there
will be people from the Treasury, Mr. Bell and Mr. Surrey,
and from the Bureau, Mr. Cann and Mr. Atkeson?

MR. NUNAN: Mr. Cann is away. He left on a trip, and
will be gone two or three weeks. In the meantime, Mr.
Atkeson will represent the Bureau.
MR. BELL: You meant Mr. Blough and Mr. Surrey

would represent you in this simplification. Have you

crossed the bridge yet as to who is to represent you on

taxes?

H.M.JR: I would like to be ready. I was thinking
about it last night. I don t like to be caught off base.
I don't know.

MR. BELL: I was wondering why you couldn't say that
you haven't decided yet who is to represent you on the

Hill in general tax matters for the time being. On simplification the technical people will handle it, those
who have been working with the Committee.

84

-2MR. SMITH: Why couldn't you say that whoever would

be most helpful to you would handle it for the time being?
MR. O'CONNELL: There isn't anything before the

Congress except simplification, and the work is practically
all done there except the technical work, as Iunderstand

it, completing the drafting. I more or less agree with
Dan that you don't need to make the decision.

MR. GASTON: Yes, I agree with that. I don't think
there is any serious problem yet. The same people who
have been working with the Committee will continue to
work with the Committee, I should say, under the general
direction of Mr. Blough.

MR. NUNAN: That is the way I feel about it, Mr.

Secretary; that will take care of it.

H.M.JR: Well, of course, there are two ways. If
I had a glib answer, it would look as though I had thought
the whole thing through, which I haven't.

On the other side of it, if I don't have an answer,

it looks as though they had caught me unawares. Is that

all right?
MR. BELL: It is probably all right.

H.M.JR: I am going all around the lot. What do you

think?

MR. BLOUGH: The Chairman of the Committee, I think,

would prefer to keep the Treasury's participation in this
bill on a technical level, because they consider it a
technical bill, primarily. There may be a point or two,
if the policy comes up, where you will want to send some-

body else down. But I think that is unlikely, and it can

be met when it comes. It seems to me for the time being,

in view of the fact that the Treasury has, in effect, been

represented by these technical people that it would be
entirely appropriate to say that for this purpose, and
when other problems arise they can be met as you desire
at that time.

85

-3H.M.JR: On the Treasury chart you are directly
responsible to me, aren't you?
MR. BLOUGH: Well, my responsibility has been a joint

responsibility. I have been responsible to the Under
Secretary, to the Assistant Secretary, to the General

Counsel, with sort of a side responsibility to you. I

don't know whom I am responsible to.

H.M.JR: It is between Bell and myself; it is the

same thing.

MR. BLOUGH: I have been responsible in part to Mr.

Paul, and in part to you.

MR. BELL: But on the chart, Norman, he is under the

Secretary.

MR. THOMPSON: No, he was under Mr. Sullivan, and

that responsibility on the chart is transferred to the

General Counsel.

MR. BLOUGH: It is transferred to the Tax Adviser to
the Secretary, not to the General Counsel. When Mr. Magill
was the Under Secretary the responsibility was to him, and

when Mr. Hanes was the Under Secretary the responsibility
was to him. Then when the tax work went to Mr. Sullivan,
the responsibility was to him. When the Tax Adviser was

brought in the responsibility was to him. There has

never been a responsibility to the General Counsel as
General Counsel.

MR. BELL: It has always been to the man who handled
tax policy.

H.M.JR: I thought there was a responsibility to the
Office of Secretary direct.
MR. BLOUGH: Well, I think practically everyone-MR. THOMPSON: Administratively he comes di rectly

under you, but for tax responsibility through Mr. Paul.
That is the way it is set up.

86

-4H.M.JR: How am I to be kept posted? Have you any

suggestions, John?

MR. SULLIVAN: The only thing I think you have to

avoid in this press conference is the idea that there
isn t going to be any more tax legislation this session.
H.M.JR: And, if I am not prepared to say anything?
MR. SULLIVAN: No, no, I think Dan is quite right;
there is no reason why you should be prepared this morn-

ing. I mean, the idea is that the only thing that is

pending is something being handled on the technical
level.

You might say that in a way that would be interpreted
as meaning we don't have to worry about this because there

isn't going to be any request for additional revenue this
year. That is the only thing I see that you have to
avoid in the Press Conference this morning.

H.M.JR: Does anybody else have anything to say?

MR. NUNAN: I think exactly as Mr. Bell does. I
would simply take the position that the only thing pend-

ing at this time is the working out of the simplification

plan, and the Treasury will be represented by Mr. Surrey
and Mr. Blough, who have been there since its inception
and know all about it.
In addition to that, you have your representatives
from the Bureau there. They will keep you advised as to
anything that is going on.
H.M.JR: Will you be kept advised by your man?

87

-5 MR. NUNAN: Yes, sir. I can always call Mr. Blough
if I want to. Mr. Atkeson keeps me advised.
H.M.JR: Doesn't somebody have to be boss up there?
MR. BLOUGH: It is a rare case where somebody has

to be boss. The occasion might arise where a decision

would have to be made. My guess is that if that situation
arose we would have to refer back to the group, anyway.

Mr. -Surrey and I work very well together. That is

not a problem.

H.M.JR: My inclination would be to make you sort of

senior.

MR. BLOUGH: That would be better than to make me
boss.

H.M.JR: If that were agreeable to the Commissioner--

MR. NUNAN: It is perfectly all right. As far as I

have seen, the Committee has worked in perfect harmony.
I have worked in a couple of sessions with the Ways and
Means.

First Mr. Blough and Mr. Surrey would state their
opinion. Then the Members would ask the members of the

Bureau for their opinion. Mr. Stam would give his, and
they would give theirs.
H.M.JR: If they say - who speaks for the Treasury
if they get into disagreement?

88

-6MR. NUNAN: For the time being, let it be Mr.Blough.

H.M.JR: Is that all right?
MR. BELL: Yes, sir.
H.M.JR: How about you, John?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, certainly.

H.M.JR: Let's leave it that way. Let me leave a
little leeway and see what happens. I think a little

bit depends on whether there is going to be another tax

bill.

MR. BLOUGH: That, of course, is the case. If a
tax bill comes up that requires a policy position on
the part of the Treasury, which may be different from
the policy position of the Congress, you should be

represented by someone above the technical level, be-

cause to put one of the technical people into that
position spoils the amateur standing for this particular-H.M.JR: You don't mean that.
MR. BLOUGH: I don't mean amateur standing--

H.M.JR: Professional standing.
MR. BLOUGH: Spoils the professional standing.

MR. BELL: Puts him into the policy level where
they can shoot at him.

MR. BLOUGH: I don't think it matters here, but I
do think if you have a bill where you have a policy

fight, or even policy positions to take, you will

probably want to be represented by somebody above the

technical level. But this time Surrey and I would be

the ones to suffer most from the situation which might
arise there.

-7I say at this time I do not think that is a consideration. I don't think there will be any problem
if we go on as we have been.

H.M.JR: What happens to Surrey? Where will his

time be spent?

MR. BLOUGH: He will go on working just like he

has been.

H.M.JR: For whom?

MR. BLOUGH: He and I have been in the same posi-

tion except that he has had, even in these last two

years, a full responsibility to Mr. Sullivan with

respect to certain matters coming up from the Bureau,

and Mr. Paul with respect to legislative policy and
legislative problems.

H.M.JR: Boys, talk up. Don't go out of here with

any gas on your brain, or anything.

MR. SULLIVAN: I think this is the way to handle it.
H.M.JR: So you can see I am groping. If anybody
isn't happy, please say so.
MR. O'CONNELL: It occurs to me it isn't a problem
that needs to be decided today, but the sort of problem
that would obviously come up if there is another tax
bill - may very probably be coming up from time to time

during the year even if there isn't a definitive tax
bill of the sort we have been working on in the last

year or two.

It raises in my mind the question of whether you

ought not to have, soon, someone who would be responsible

for tax legislation in the same way that Mr. Paul and
others prior to Mr. Paul have been. You always had a

man, it seems to me, at the top level in that sort of
position, even though he wasn't actually dealing with
the Committee all the time.

89

90

-8 I mean, in prior years we have had tax legislation
only a part of the year, and yet you have always had an
Under Secretary or someone at that level.
MR. GASTON: We didn't have before Magill came in

here, did we? We were represented on the Hill by a
Legislative Counsel. Arthur Khad something to do with the

tax matters, but he didn't go up on the Hill. We had
simply the Tax Counsel's representative.

MR. O'CONNELL: From Mr. Magill's time on you
always have had. There has been much more emphasis

on taxes since then, of course.

MR. SULLIVAN: Of course, you have a lot of correspondence, Joe, and people on the Hill-MR. O'CONNELL: Tax problems go on. Mr. Paul and
Mr. Blough were having meetings with people on things

like post-war taxation. Taxation doesn't stop being
a problem because the Congress isn't considering a bill.
H.M.JR: Who is Surrey's boss?
MR. BLOUGH: Surrey's boss is the Tax Adviser to
the Secretary.

MR. BELL: He is about in the same status as Roy.

We have no Tax Adviser, so what happens?

MR. THOMPSON: Put him directly under you.

H.M.JR: I tell you what you do, Norman; supposing

you take a fresh look at his status and Surrey's status
and the people under them in relation to the rest.
MR. THOMPSON: Yes.

MR. BLOUGH: Until 1940, Surrey's predecessor and I
stemmed directly from the Under Secretary. That was due,
however, to the fact that the Under Secretary was in charge

of taxes. But that was the organization chart at that

time.

91

-9H.M.JR: I think if Norman would have a fresh
look, consult the people involved, with the help of
Mr. Sullivan and Mr. O'Connell - I get my North and
South of Ireland mixed up!

MR. SULLIVAN: We never do!

MR. O'CONNELL: It is very different!
M.JR: While you are at it, make him Acting (O'Connell),

will you, please? This morning - if there is something
I have to sign - and consult Mr. Bell and Mr. Gaston.
I think you could maybe have several suggestions from

them. I think it is in kind of a nebulous state.
Then let's leave it this way for the time being, until
something hits me: Mr. Blough will be Senior Representative on the Hill; it is his job as well as Surrey's and
all of them, to see that we are all kept posted as to
what is being done. Those memos you have sent me, I
circulate to make sure-MR. BLOUGH: I checked with Miss Chauncey about

whether I should circulate them. She was a little
dubious on that point, so I did not.
H.M.JR: The people in the room here are all

interested.
them.

MR. BLOUGH: With your permission, I will circulate

H.M.JR: Will you? And until we get this thing

settled, be a little more communicative as to what goes

on, and consult a little bit more.

MR. BLOUGH: Of course, with my responsibility

to do it, I will do it. When it was somebody else's

responsibility, I didn't feel like inserting myself

between.

H.M.JR: I am asking without making any reflections

on anybody. Until we get settled, I think all of us

92

- 10 -

would like to know - I am talking for myself - would

like to be a little bit closer to the situation.

MR. SULLIVAN: Will he circulate directly, Mr.

Secretary?

H.M. JR: He will circulate personally, and his
writings, both, to save time.
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. The memoranda have been very

good, but a little late in getting in.

MR. BLOUGH: If I have your permission, I will at

the same time I send a memorandum to you, send a carbon

to the others. It was a question of whether you would
wish to have that done. Miss Chauncey didn't know.

H.M.JR: After giving careful consideration-MR. BLOUGH: Thank you.

H. .JR: Now, I have Mr. Gamble in the other room,

unless somebody wants to bring something up.

But until we get this thing settled and everything,
would like to work a little closer to the situation,
myself, to get the sense of it - and hope for the best.
I

93

March 23, 1944
10:30 a.m.

PRE PRESS CONFERENCE

Present: Mr. Bell

Mr. Shaeffer

Mr. Smith

Miss Chauncey

Mrs. Klotz

H.M.JR: We are going to kill that fourteen billion
dollar story.
MR. SMITH: You are?

H.M.JR: Yes, it is now sixteen billion.
MR. SMITH: Good, that is very good, because somebody must have leaked it out.

MR. BELL: One of the bankers.

MR. SMITH: It is nice to have them wrong.

MR. BELL: It is unfortunate to have to do that.
(The Secretary holds a telephone conversation with
Mr. Ronald Ransom, as follows:)

March 23, 1944
10:27 a.m.
HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Mr. Eccles hasn't arrived at the office yet but

HMJr:

I can't wait. Ronald Ransom, if he's there.

Operator:

All right.

HMJr:

I've got to talk to somebody right away.

Operator:

Right.

they expect him shortly.

10:28 a.m.
HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Mr. Ransom.

HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Go ahead.

HMJr:

Hello.

Ronald
Ransom:

Hello, Henry, how are you?

HMJr:

Fine. How are you?

R:

Fine, thank you.

HMJr:

I tried to get the Chairman but he's not
available so I'11 ask your help. I have a

press conference at 10:30
Yes.

R:

and yesterday some of the bankers must have

HMJr:

given out to the press that the quota was fourteen

billion. Hello?

R:

Yes.

HMJr:

On the Fifth War Loan. Well, we haven't made up
our minds. We were going to discuss this thing

with you

94

-2R:

Yes.

and so forth and so on.

HMJr:
R:

Yes.

HMJr:

Well, I've got a dozen of our State Chairmen in

R:

Yes.

HMJr:

and they all would like to have it at sixteen
billion

R:

I see.

HMJr:

of which either five and a half or six would
be for individuals.

R:

Yes.

HMJr:

Now, they are very enthusiastic and they'd like
me to say something this morning because they
say if they go home and it's fourteen and it' S

a let-down and we need the money and they' re in
a fighting mood and they'd like me to announce
sixteen.

R:

Yes.

HMJr:

So that I kill that other story.

R:

Yes.

HMJr:

Now, I don't want you to say your approval but
I did want to do the courtesy so you people
wouldn't a think, "Well, why go over and see the
Treasury? They make up their mind." Well, we
hadn't and I wasn't going to until next week,
but my hand has been forced.

R:

I see. You merely want us to know why your

hand was -- and how your hand was forced.
HMJr:

That's right. And I've felt that this would be
something that you'd like anyway. Hello?

R:

Henry, I am, at the moment, somewhat out of touch

95

96

-3HMJr:
R:

HMJr:

Oh.

somewhat out of touch with that and I am not,
this year, on the Executive
Oh.

Committee.

R:

HMJr:
R:

Well

I will see that your views are conveyed to the

Chairman and to the members who are on that
Committee.

HMJr:
R:

Will you, please? And explain that
And also to Sproul unless you're talking direct
to him.

HMJr:

No, I'm not talking to him.

R:

Well, I'll talk to him.

HMJr:

I'm only talking to you as Acting Chairman.

R:

Well, I'm not Acting Chairman

HMJr:

Well

R:

HMJr:

....of that damn Committee. You see, I'm Acting
Ohairman of the Board in the Chairman's absence,
but I will nevertheless convey your statement to
the right people for you.
Well, for my purpose, as I can't reach the Chairman,
SO you've got to act.

R:

HMJr:

All right, Henry.
I had not intended to make any announcement until

a week from tomorrow.

R:

I see.

HMJr:

But we all think it's a mistake to let this thing
drag for ten days.

R:

I see.

97

-4HMJr:
R:

HMJr:

So

I wouldn't know -- I don't happen to know what the
views of any of my associates who are working on
that immediate problem may be but I can certainly
pass on your statement to them and will do it.
And please tell them why I've done it this way.

R:

Yes, I will.

HMJr:

Thank you so much.

98

- -2 -

H.M.JR: I am not going to call Sproul. I think
we are all right. Don't you think so?
MR. BELL: Yes.

H.M.JR: Have you boys anything to suggest?

MR. BELL: Just going to say that the goal is

sixteen billion instead of the fourteen billion.

H.M.JR: What has "DeGaulle" got to do with this?

MR. BELL: The goal, the goal, the goal.
H.M.JR: Have we recognized him?

MR. BELL: We will at sixteen billion!

H.M.JR: We will set a quota of sixteen billion.
MR. BELL: Set a goal for the Fifth War Loan.
H.M.JR: Do you want me to say that instead of--

MR. BELL: Instead of quota. The quota is a
State thing and is a good-deal less. It is based on
individual-MR. SMITH: Better say it was an unauthorized
statement so they don't think you are changing your

mind.

H.M.JR: Why meet it unless they ask me? Why get
into an argument? Why not simply say that I have been
meeting this morning with--

MR. SMITH: All I am thinking about is up at the

other end people read the newspaper, and it said fourteen

billion. This was apparently an authorized statement by
the Treasury.

99

-3-

They are going to open their papers tomorrow and it

will say sixteen billion. It would be just as well if
they would say that the Secretary announced sixteen

billion and earlier stories were unauthorized.

MR. BELL: That it did not come from the Treasury.

MR. SMITH: I am just trying to keep you clear at
the other end of the line.
H.M.JR: Who is there?

MR. SMITH: One hundred and thirty-six million
Americans, with whom we must keep our relations straight.
MR. BELL: Including the Chicago Tribune.

100
March 23, 1944
10:56 a.m.

HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Mr. Crowley. Go ahead.

HMJr:

Hello.

Leo

Crowley:

Hello. How are you?

HMJr:

I'm all right. And you?

c:

Fine.

HMJr:

Leo, you may have seen by the papers that Paul
resigned.

C:

HMJr:

C:

Yeah.

Now, I'd like to take somebody from your
organization if I can for General Counsel.
Oh, my gosh, Henry, don't do that to me with

all the legislation we've got up there on the
Hill and everything else. It would just ruin
me. We're just right in the midst of Lend-lease.

We've got our appropriation on UNRRA. We've got our own

appropriation that we ve got to work out and we've
got to do something about funds for U.S. Commercial
and you'd just take the backbone right out from

under us entirely if you do that.

HMJr:
C:

HMJr:
C:

HMJr:

Does Oscar do all that?

Yeah, he handles all of that and it's necessary
that we have someone that can work with Harry in
things like that and he can do that, and if we
lost him I don't know what the devil I'd do, Henry.
Really?

Really, that's true and I don't know what I -where I'd turn. I'd be glad to talk to you about
that, but that's what I'm up against.
Well, I would like to talk to you about it because -you wouldn't want to let the President decide?

-2C:

Oh -- really, it's so darn serious.

HMJr:

Yes.

C:

HMJr:
C:

HMJr:
C:

101

It's SO serious to me that I -- I -- I don't
howhim.
I could physically stand the darn thing
ifsee
I lost
I see.

He -- for instance, on all this Lend-lease stuff,
now, he's carrying that load up on the Hill.
Yeah.

And he's been such a lot of help and he's got a
good organization, and you know what I inherited
in this thing here. And it would be so much
easier for you, an old established agency, to
find someone than it would be for me.

HMJr:

Yeah.

C:

Any time this afternoon or tomorrow that you have

some time, I'll be glad to talk to you but -- uh --

HMJr:

Well, I doubt whether

C:

It wouldn't do any good because, really, it would

just -- just bust me up entirely if I lost him.

HMJr:

Yeah. .

C:

And you know how well we've been able to work with

Harry and all the fellows with -- through him.

HMJr:

Yeah.

C:

And that's worth a lot to this whole picture.

HMJr:

Well, that -- that's right.

C:

See if you can't find someone else and then if you

can't, I'11 talk to you.
HMJr:

Well, let me think about it anyway.

C:

All right. Thank you.

HMJr:

Thank you.

102

March 23, 1944
11:10 a.m.
WAR FINANCE CHAIRMAN

Present: Mr. Haas
Mr. Gamble

Mr. Lindow

Mr. Tickton

Mr. Wood

Mr. Isbey

Mr. Rebmann

Mr. Pulilam
Mr. Sherer

Mr. Hall

Mr. Ford

Mr. Trounstine

Mr. Reilly

H.M.JR: I just thought you might like to see what
the Dow-Jones ticker said. (Reads from ticker release

of March 23, 1944.) "The Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau
announced today that the goal for the Fifth War Loan
Drive would be 16,000,000,000 dollars as compared with
14,000,000,000 dollars fixed for the Fourth War Loan Drive.

"The Treasury head stated main feature of forthcoming drive would be concentration on sale of E bonds.
Details of whole program, Mr. Morgenthau said, would be
announced at end of next week.

"So far the Treasury has conferred with a committee
of American Bankers Association and the State Drive
Committee Chairmen. Some of these participants had
indicated earlier in week that goal would be 14,000,000,000

dollars for the Fifth War Loan Drive, and this figure was
given widespread publication.

"Secretary Morgenthau said that since the 14,000,000,000
dollar figure had been made public he wanted to make the
announcement today that the figure was 16,000,000,000 dollars

103

-2SO that the American investing public would not be confused or misled. The Treasury Secretary said he had not
intended to make any official announcement on the Fifth
War Loan Drive until next week, but that publication of
the unofficial estimate made the announcement necessary

at this time."

That is it. We got some results, anyway. At least

we decided something.

Now, Gamble, what else?

MR. GAMBLE: When you left we were at the point of
having Mr. Wood review those one or two points for discussion.

We have settled, it seems to me, the matter of the
quota, so we can pass over that one. We can talk about
this bond, if you would like to have Mr. Bell and Mr.
Haas and others discuss this at that time.

H.M.JR: I am not ready to discuss that further.
As it is, I had to call up the Federal Reserve Board
and explain why we were doing this so hastily. They
are coming here Tuesday.

I want to talk it over more with our own people

first. It would be a waste of your time to discuss it

any further. Haas and his group know what your views
are, don't they?
MR. WOOD: That is right.

H.M.JR: It would be a waste of their time.
MR. FORD: We will have it in this memorandum for
you.

MR. BELL: You wanted a two percent bond, I take it,

whether it is a two percent restricted or unrestricted.

MR. WOOD: That is right, Mr. Bell. We wanted six

billion for individual sales if you did have a modification

of your basket to include a more salable piece of merchandise than we had before.

104

-3MR. BELL: If we decide, after hearing everybody, that
it is to be restricted, that really helps you a little,
doesn't it?
MR. WOOD: Yes, it does.

MR. BELL: So you wouldn't kick much if it were

unrestricted?

MR. WOOD: We will call that the Bell amendment to

the basket.

H.M.JR: The Bell amendment happens to be one on

soft drinks, which never went through. That is what it
is known as in the Treasury. Is that right, Dan?
MR. BELL: That is right, except I wanted to make
it a good deal more than a cent.
MR. WOOD: Then the next thing we had, Mr. Secretary--

you suggested item by item. The next is the matter of a

split offering, having a split drive, having for the first
period purely individuals, and then going on to broaden
to everyone else except commercial banks.

H.M.JR: I am sympathetic with that. I don't

know how Mr. Bell feels. That is contrary to the ABA.

MR. BELL: I thought the last time it worked very
well, but I haven't any strong feelings one way or another.
I think these fellows ought to have a great deal to say.
After all, they have to do the selling.
MR. WOOD: We were unanimous in that, Mr. Secretary.

H.M.JR: You will have no trouble with us on that.
MR. FORD: I think the ABA's point of view was somewhat polluted by Randolph Burgess, who hadn't sat in at

the discussion we had last week. Our point of view after
the drive was to revert to the Third War Loan technique.
After we had thrashed around on it all day long in the
State, they came up with this feeling. Randy wasn't
aware of that then.

105

-4-

H.M.JR:
rid himself of the pollution.
You had
betterHe
tellhadn't
him that.
MR. FORD: I have, and he agrees with me.
H.M.JR: Good.

Well, you will have no trouble on that one here.
MR. WOOD: The next one was the period of offering,

of having it not over four weeks, preferably nearer three
weeks,
that the periods that you had before were too long
and exhaustive.

H.M.JR: Again, I don't think there will be very
much trouble on that. I may have an opinion as to whether
I would like to start in May or June, but I don't want to

state the day. As to the length, I think it is up to

you salesmen.

MR. BELL: I think that is right.
MR. PULLIAM: There is one serious difficulty in

starting in May. I think we would all take the thing

on and go ahead provided you could give us materials,
but we do have to have materials actually in our hands

at least thirty days before this drive starts. You can-

not organize down to the county and township levels without

materials. I don't see how you could possibly get that
out and get started the last week in May. If you can, we
can go, but that is the first consideration on fixing the
date, how soon you can deliver. It balled us up in the

Third War Loan. This time it was fine. It is a very
important item. We had the materials in time.

H.M.JR: Well, Mr. Gamble will have to weigh that.
MR. WOOD: Our first choice was June 14 to July 8

on account of the tim Nevil's manpower problem of
getting enough coverag r New York State.

The second choice was May 23 to sometime in June,

a three or four-week period.

106

-5Then the next was the coming period would be two
calendar months in any event, either June and July, or

May 13--

H.M.JR: You won't have any trouble.
MR. WOOD: We have discussed the basket. It is the
same thing.

Then when it came to the sales approach, we liked

Mr. Gamble's suggestionsto you, Mr. Secretary, to go
further in this development of plant quotas through wires
from you to companies suggested by Dan.

H.M.JR: That is agreeable to me.
MR. GAMBLE: This was for thirty-five thousand. The
other was only for five hundred.
MR. WOOD: Next we recommended greater emphasis on

corporation subscriptions by the use of industry quotas
set at State levels and backed by intensified committee
solicitation, and the next, greater emphasis on house-to-

house solicitation. That was all.

MR. BELL: That is a good program.
MR. WOOD: Except the ABA thing of going after all
customer lists.
MR. GAMBLE: We talked over some of the details, Mr.

Secretary, about advertising and promotion, but I don't
think you want us to go into that.

H.M.JR: I would like to say what I feel about this.

My own feeling is that this time we have to begin to educate the people a little more on the basic economics of

this thing. I don't think during this Fifth War Loan it
will be so necessary for the War Finance Committee to sell
the war to the country. I think that that will be pretty
well done by the Army and Navy. I do think, though, that

we have to explain to them some of the very simple rudiments
of this thing and why it is necessary to buy and keep bonds.

107

-6-

I think that some of the publicity will be along that
line. I talked that way to the bankers, and they agreed.
I tried to get them to say they would do something, and
they said they couldn't get the space in the paper, but
that is no answer.

But, also, I personally think we have gone about as
far as we should in the direction of making a man feel
almost as patriotic as a soldier when he buys a twenty-

five dollar bond. I think it has all been good, but we
need a little bit more on inflation, a little bit more
on this whole question of why it is to his interest to
take this money out of circulation by lending it to the
Treasury. I hope there will be more of that, and less
of the other. I think the other was very important at
the time, particularly selling the war, especially when

we started the Third War Loan with Italy declaring peace.
We were not very far along. I don't know whether there is
any disagreement with that on the Committee.

MR. WOOD: I think you would be interested in this,
Mr. Secretary, that in all the farm areas--the same
thing is true in Iowa and Minnesota--any request we get
to go out and talk to farmers, any audience except in
the cities, they want nothing talked about except the
stabilized value of those securities at the end of the

war. They said the greatest resistance selling is
that eighty-two market in 1920. We have directed all

of our publicity at that thing.

MR. BELL: We are still answering those letters.

They come in every day.

H.M. JR: I think this is very good, and I think the

record of Gamble and his associates in previous drives

has been sufficiently high that I feel when you people
come in with this kind of recommendation you can back

it with action and fulfillment of the promise. But I

think you undoubtedly know how difficult the thing is.

However hard you worked last time, I think you have
to work that much harder, and everybody else, your indus-

tries, labor unions, pay-roll deduction--I just don't
think you can overlook anything.

108

-7You people know as well as I do which State went

over the top, and which didn't. Too many didn't, and

the last few days we had to do a little finagling with
across, with the result that our sales for this month
Army and Navy receipts to help put a few of the States

have been very meager. But, anyway, I am delighted,

Gamble, with the attitude of these people; and if they
can reflect that down to their subordinates and the

army of volunteers, I think we are all right.

MR. GAMBLE: I do, too, sir. They have spent fifteen
or sixteen hours arriving at these decisions.

H.M.JR: I will be on hand and will be glad to help

when and where it is necessary, personally.

MR. WOOD: I would like to say this as one of the
"sticks" States--and I know all the Chairmen feel the
same way--you haven't any idea of how efficient this
Washington office is as we telephone in and they service

us. It is simply perfect. Ted's one mistake was that
Oregon deal in the Third Drive. Outside of that, it is
perfect. (Laughter)

MR. BELL: They are riding you, Ted.

MR. FORD: I would like to concur in your statement.
H.M.JR: He was playing safe. He had been in
Washington so long he wasn't sure of Oregon. (Laughter)

Well, I will say good-bye to you all.

109
OFFICE OF

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

III

WASHINGTON
THE

March 23, 1944

SECRETARY

Memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury.

After a full discussion of the problems arising out of
our experience in the Fourth War Loan Drive and having the

successful prosecution of the Fifth War Loan Drive in mind,

and after careful study of the statistical information which
reveals convincingly the increased needs of the Treasury, and
recognizing the desirability of keeping to a minimum borrowinz from banks, we have come to the following general conclu-

sions later to be taken up in great detail. While our apbroach was primarily of sales, we attempted a detached point

of view on the over-all situation. We are convinced that the

general pattern of the Fifth Drive should follow that of the
Fourth, with however, an intensification of certain techniques.
There are four practical steps which we feel are of
primary importance that additional sales to individuals and
corporations may result, and as a consequence, more effectively
get at a far greater proportion of income accruels.
These are the four steps:

(1) Further development of plant quotas.
VICTORY

BUY
WAR
/BONDS
STAMPS

110
-2-

(2) As complete as possible coverage of bank customer

lists.
(3) In the corporate field, establishment of industry
quotas at state levels.
(4) Intensification of house to house, farm to farm and

face to face solicitation.
SIZE OF LOAN

In view of the increased needs of the Treasury we suggest

16 billion and regard it a stimulating challenge to workers
and buyers.
QUOTA

Over-all $16 billion of which $6 billion to individuals
provided (a) A.B.A. carries forward its stimulation program
among banks and bank depositors and (b) some slight changes
are made in Basket as suggested below.

In the event the above provisos are not possible we feel

the individual quota should be reduced to five billion five
hundred million dollars. In either case, we suggest the E Bond
portion of the individual quota be three billion dollars, the
quota to corporations and others to be either ten billion
dollars or ten billion five hundred million dollars depending
upon the amount determined for the individual quota.

111
-3-

LOAN PROCEDURE

We suggest a split offering similar to the procedure
followed in the Fourth War Loan the initial period of the
Drive to be devoted solely to individual solicitation
followed by a broadening of the offering to others except
commercial banks.
PERIOD OF OFFERING

We believe the Fourth War Loan Drive was a little too
long and suggest the Fifth War Loan be not over four weeks

of active offering and preferably nearer three weeks.
TIME OF OFFERING

Our first choice is June 14th to July 8th.
Our second choice is May 23 to approximately June 13th.

Our reasons for preferring the June 14th date are that

it gives us a longer period to recruit and train volunteers
which we consider essential, that it will give greater assurance of the timely receipt of selling material throughout the
states and lastly and less important, it may tend to obviate
any criticism of including E, F and G bond sales and C Notes

in the tabulation for the two month period. In the event
the May 23 date is selected, we suggest the counting period
commence May 15th and end July 15th; otherwise it be the
calender months June and July.

112
-4BASKET

To consist of E's, F's, G's and C's, one year 7/8's,
the usual long term 2-1/2's, and either a nine year 2 callable
in 7 years to be restricted for six months to 1 year, or an
eight-ten year 2 without restriction. We feel that the
introduction of a new element into the basket would be
stimulating to bond sales-people and buyers.
SALES

We approve heartily and recognize the necessity for
further development of employee plant quotas as suggested

by Mr. Gamble. We feel it would be extremely helpful if
these cuotas were determined by the Treasury and initiated

by wire from the Secretary to the plant executive as outlined
to us by Mr. Gamble.
We recommend greater emphasis on subscriptions from

corporations and that industry quotas be set at the state
level to be backed by intensified solicitation and recommend
greater emphasis on this type of selling.
In general we believe the answer to the many problems

facing all of us. is harder work by all and direct face to
face selling.

We feel that the program of intensified solicitation of
depositors by commercial banks would be extremely helpful and

113
-5-

hope that they will recognize, as well as we do, the

necessity for direct rather than indirect solicitation.
This memorandum makes no attempt for sake of brevity

to outline the many promotional and advertising suggestions
developed by those concurring in this memorandum.
Signed by:

John Reilly - District of Columbia
Frank Isbey - Michigan

Franklin D'Olier - New Jersey
Horace Corbin - New Jersey
Harold Wood - Minnesota
Randolph Burgess - New York

Nevil Ford - New York
G. R. Rebmann - Pennsylvania
a

Edward B. Hall - Illinois

R. P. Sherer - Illinois
F. Winchester Denio - Massachusetts

Eugene Pulliam - Indiana

Phil J. Trounstine - Ohio

114

March 23, 1944
11:40 a.m.

DEFERMENTS

Present:

Mr. Thompson

Mrs Klotz
Mr. White

MR. THOMPSON: Puryear is reconsidering these

cases but I don't think we will get many of them.
However, I think we will come out pretty well because

he approved fifty, and on the list there were thirtysix cases that went on the key list after you turned
them down. So we get those thirty-six. That is eighty-

six.

Then we had a lucky break in the Bureau of Engrav-

ing and Printing. Sixteen pressmen were on the list.
They were scarce. Suddenly the Government Printing

Office dismissed seventy-five pressmen. So we had all

we needed.

H.M.JR: Dismissed seventy-five?
MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir. So we went up over a

hundred out of the one hundred and fifty-seven. We go
direct to the Board and I haven't had a turn-down yet
from the local Board. As a matter of fact, Puryear gives
us sixty days and the Board gives us six months.
H.M.JR: The President was going to say something,

I gathered, on this whole question. I gather, on account
of his illness it has been postponed. I see now more
confusion than ever, under twenty-six. Every day it

is a different story.

MR. THOMPSON: I asked Puryear why he got so tough

on these pre-Pearl Harbor fathers over thirty when we
know the Army doesn't want men over thirty.

115

-2-

He said, "We can't consider age at all."
Then the next minute we were discussing Gunter
and Friedman. We argued back and forth on that. He
said he couldn't defer them because they weren't

thirty years old. They are twenty-nine. He agreed
to reconsider them and take them up and give us final
word, but that is where we were left there.
I gave him a very strong argument on both of them
and he left some papers with Harry.
MR. WHITE: We may get them, but his argument was

that he couldn't do it because of age. In the other
case he said he couldn't consider them. He is just

crazy. You can't argue with the man. His whole purpose
is a record before the Costello Committee. The merits

of the cases are secondary in every instance. It is

pathetic!

(The Secretary approves the attached list of

deferments)

DEFERMENTS

Name

Title

3-22-44

Age

No.

of

INTERNAL REVENUE:

Bratt, Bryce W.

Economic Analyst

35

Crenshaw, Stuart L.

Chief Adm. Officer

36

Davis, Dalmon

Special Agent

36

2

Liotta, Casimiro

Chemist

36

2

1

2

MINT BUREAU:

Frisch, Steve

Die, Gauge & Toolmaker

34

Benavides, Luis M.

Agent

35

Burger, Michael P.

Resident Agent

33

Cowles, Melvin A.

Agent

37

Lately, William Jr.

Agent

37

Johnson, George M.

Agent

35

Jukes, George W.

Agent

32

1

Keithahn, George Q.

Agent

36

4

MalkoweKI, Joseph F.

Agent

32

2

Exec. Manager for the

37

2

SECRET SERVICE DIVISION:
2

2

2

2

2

WAR FINANCE DIVISION,

Knecht, Joseph J.

State of Louisiana

Deferments for the above 14 employees are recommended by the Agency Committee.

APPROVED:

Secretary of the Treasury.

2

116

Children

117

March 23, 1944
2:16 p.m.
Smith
Webb:

Hello, Mr. Morgenthau.

HMJr:

Hello, Webb?

W:

Yes.

HMJr:

Morgenthau speaking.

Yes. How are you?
HMJr:

Can you hear me?
Yes.

HMJr:

The reason I'm calling you, Bailey tells me that
the Warrens are thinking of having an auction sale
and selling out.
Who is? Warren?

HMJr:

Ralph Warren.

W:

Yes.

Do you know anything about it?

No, I haven't heard about it. I didn't see anything
about it in the Courier.
HMJr:

Well, I don't think they've announced it yet. But
evidently they've made up their minds. There are
the two brothers and they can't, evidently, agree.

I see.
HMJr:

And also Bailey's been sort of talking to them and
they also can't agree on the place, but I gather
they ve been showing it to people.
I see.

But I -- I thought that I'd rather let you handle
it for me than -- rather than try to deal with them
direct.

W:

Well, I know them very well.

118

-2- DJr:

Well, supposing you look into it. It would have
to be very reasonable for me to be interested.

Yeah.
HMJr:

See?

All right. Well, I'll get the story on it for you.
It would have to be a bargain.
Yeah.

Let me ask you a question. What commission do you
charge when you sell a place?

Well, the County scale is 71%
HMJr:

Yes.

.... on anything outside of the City Limits.
MJr:

Yes.

And when it's in the City Limits, it's 5% for
Beacon.

HMJr:

No, but I mean a farm.

Well, on farm property, it's 71%
HMJr:

Is that what you get?
Yes.

Always?

Well, I won't say always, no, but that's the -that's the Board scale.

HMJr:

I see.

:

I'll admit that sometimes somebody takes some

little -- something less than that.
Well, the reason I'm asking is -- I thought you
ought to know -- that if I could get the Warren,
I might want to sell the Ben Hickman place.

119

-3-

W:

HMJr:

I see.
See?

All right.
I might want to sell it.
Well, we'll work with you on a basis that will
be satisfactory to you.
HMJr:

You will?

Now, on this Rushmore place, I've had a talk with
him and he's interested in doing business there on
a reasonable basis and I think that if you haven't
seen the place personally, the next time you're up

here, if it is good weather, if you'll give me a

HMJr:

ring, we can arrange to go up and look it over.
Well, we'll I be up the week-end of April 1.
I see. Well suppose you give me a call then,
whenever you've got some free time. I'd like to
go up with you.

HMJr:

All right.
And I'11 get the story on this other matter and
drop you a line at Washington.

HMJr:

Do that. Do that. Thank you.
All right. Good bye.

120

March 23, 1944
3:15 p.m.

ARGENTINA

Present:

Mr. Schmidt

Mr. Luxford
Mr. DuBois

Mrs. Klotz

I.M.JR: All right, come on! I still don't know

what this fellow (DuBois) is doing. He has an office

with the General Counsel, he works with Pehle, and he

is in on the Argentine.

MR. LUXFORD: You want to know what the story is?

You suggested I bring some men in, so I suggested

some men including Jim Mann and myself, and Schmidt

and myself, and John and DuBois. At the end, if you

were going into policy on the thing - the word I got
back was Schmidt and DuBois.

H.M.JR: That isn't the memo I got. I was given
the choice of two groups. (Secretary quotes memorandum)

"If merely a progress report, Luxford, Schmidt, and

DuBois.

MR. LUXFORD: It was Mann who should have been in
there.

MRS. KLOTZ: The Secretary is never wrong.

H.M. JR: Yes I am, but--

121

-2MR. LUXFORD: I believe you. I spoke first to
Fitzgerald and then to your other secretary. She
took it over the phone.
H.M.JR: If DuBois sounds like Mann - maybe "DuBois"
or "the boys"--

Well, should Mann be in on this?

Mr. LUXFORD: It is all right. I am quite confident

there will be no loss by DuBois being present. He keeps
generally familiar with what is going on.

H.M.JR: I was just kidding. But anyway-MR. LUXFORD: On Argentina, I didn't know whether

you noticed this morning's paper - two little items-H.M.JR: I admire his activity, the way he gets

around. I see him on rollerskates going up and down
the hall.
MR. DuBOIS: Good walker.

MR. LUXFORD: Did you notice this morning, Farrell

announces he is still loyal to Franco Spain, in"PM". I
will just read you the opening line on it. This is Ray
Josephs from Montevideo.
.

H.M.JR: Did you send a wire down there?
MR. LUXFORD: I could do better than this on the
basis of what you gave me the other day.

Here is just the headline on it: (Reading) "Farrell
still loyal to Franco Spain. Argentina looks and will
continue to look to Spain as its mother country and as
a source of guidance and inspiration, Colonel Farrell,
President of Argentina has pledged. This pledge of
loyalty to Fascist Franco Spain was made in an interview
granted by the President to the B.A. correspondent of
Franco's official newspaper."

122

-3-

It goes on with a news story, if you would like to

have it.

H.M.JR: Swell.
MR. LUXFORD: I don't know whether you noticed, in
Paraguay they have now ousted the Foreign Minister of
Paraguay who was the United Nations man, together with
his two men who were backing him, that is, the Minister

of Education and the Minister of Finance. And they
didn't oust the President, General Morinigo, because
he promised that he will collaborate more closely with
Argentina than with the United Nations. That was the
Colonel's scoop, according to the report.

H.M.JR: All right.
MR. LUXFORD: Now, the other day, at the time--

H.M.JR: This is the overture!
MR. LUXFORD: Yes. The other day, just at the time
you furnished me with this report from Acheson on Argentina--

H.M.JR: Yes, now I asked for that. I will tell

you why I want to have that. Would you fellows make a
note, and I would like to follow up, you see - Acheson

first said two days. First he said it would be a

Tuesday, then he said it would be a Thursday. Then
when we get this thing from Acheson which is a report

as of last January and I am still waiting for it, you
see - if you would write a little letter to Mr. Acheson,

go back over it.

First Mr. Stettinius said he could give it, when
Acheson was sitting here - two days - four days - then
this thing (refers to report on Food Board submitted
by Mr. Acheson).

MR. LUXFORD: All right.

123

-4H.M. JR: I want to make a record. Do you agree?

Think about it.

MR. LUXFORD: One other item I would want to inject

into it. We will come to that.

H.M.JR: If I don't do something like that - I mean,
here is the Acting Secretary of State saying he will give

it to me in two days, then Thursday, then the following
Monday, then I get a report as of last January and I am

still waiting for a plan.

MR. LUXFORD: The reason is quite obvious; that is,

on March 10 they sent letters again to each of the

Boards asking them if conditions hadn't changed enough.

H.M.JR: You draft that letter and then you fellows
talk about it. But let's make the record and take a

look at it.

MR. LUXFORD: I will be glad to. His answer will be
that he hasn't received the reports.
H.M.JR: But I want to make the record and let him

say, "You will get it in a month." Here they tell me

they will give me an answer in two days and it is now
about two weeks.

If you boys haven't read this morning's editorial
in the Post, I suggest you do.
MR. LUXFORD: We did.

As I was explaining, on the day I received this

we were ready to send to you a memorandum on Argentina

which would be from you to Hull. Now, in the light of

this document, you can't send this to Hull, but I still
believe that it is the best summary of Argentina on the

political, military, and so forth, that we have to date.
I would like to leave it with you just for your own back-

ground, Mr. Secretary.

124

-5H.M.JR: You say this is the best in town?
MR. LUXFORD: The best one to date, that is right.
It represents not only what we know about the matter,
but it was prepared in conjunction with Towson on the

military, and the questions that are raised there, in-

formally, are pretty sure to be answered our way; that is,
if we were to ask the Army those questions on the military
side, that that must inevitably be the result as borne
out by the report that the Army furnished us in January.
In other words, if we could have used the material

in this report, on the military side, we could have
answered most of those questions. It is very strong the report the Army gave us - but we felt we weren't in
a position--

H.M.JR: You mean on the Falangist thing?
MR. LUXFORD: No, I am talking about the report they
furnished us on the Argentine.
H.M.JR: On the smuggling and all?

MR. LUXFORD: That is right. The military said that
Argentina did foment the revolution in Bolivia, they are

trying to do it in Chile and in every other country in
that area. But we felt we couldn't put that into a

report to the Secretary of State because Towson felt
that since Strong had given this to you on his own, it
would be unwise for it to come out as a document that

might get into the record. But his answers to the

questions we have raised there will force response of
the same type.

H.M.JR: But you don't feel, in view of Acheson's

most recent letter, that I can send this to Hull.

MR. LUXFORD: I don't believe you can because we,

for instance, based our analysis of the food situation

upon the statements he made to us orally.

125

-6Those statements he made to us orally, I do
think are more favorable to our cause than the report

he transmitted to us in writing coupled with the fact
that as soon as we got that to Secretary Hull, by the

time he got it, he would have, probably, the new answers from the Food Board, so he could say our analysis
is obsolete in the light of these new analyses.
On the other hand, Mr. Secretary, there is one

thing we could do. It would require your help. The
key to this whole thing is the food situation. Now,
Stettinius told you informally that the food situation
was not as bad as it had been held out to be, that they

had discovered additional food, and I understood from
you that Marvin Jones, in speaking to you, had intimated
that same thing.

H.M.JR: No, what he said to me was this - to get
the thing straight - I asked him point-blank about the
food situation and everything else, and he told me that

weather being average, we would have more tonnage of

food raised In this country this year than last, and
last year was a bumper year.

I understand that since then, the thing they were
looking for, the snows where they need them for irri-

gation, had been quite heavy.

I asked him point-blank; I said, "Well, supposing

we had to blockade the Argentine, what could we do?"

He said, "It would be an awful burden - throw an

awful burden on me. It would be very difficult, but

we could handle it."

MR. LUXFORD: As I recall, you suggested an educa-

tional program and an appeal to the public.
H.M.JR: He said "We could handle it." The whole
thing gets down to this. We have waged war on the diplo-

matic front about twenty-five percent.

126

-7-

MR. LUXFORD: That much?

H.M.JR: Well! I don't know how to rate it, but

anyway, it is a question of getting tough and rough.
Nobody who has anything to do with it wants to. We

can't set up another Board like the War Refugee Board
outside of the State Department.
MR. LUXFORD: We are trying to, Mr. Secretary, on
foreign economic policy.
H.M.JR: Where?

MR. LUXFORD: You signed the letters yesterday.
The Budget or the Foreign Economic Policy Committee.

Do you recall it now?

H.M.JR: Oh, yes, sure. Well, that will be under

the chairmanship of Hull.

MR LUXFORD: Yes, but it would be reporting to the

President.

H.M.JR: True, but lacking something like that,
you wouldn't get anywhere. And you are not going to
change this man at the eleventh hour.
MR. LUXFORD: Surely.

MR. DuBOIS: All the more reason why it seems to

me it is hopeless if you are going to wait until you

convince everybody that we should go ahead with a hundred
percent program, which comes back again to the question
which we may want to weigh from time to time as to

whether or not taking a small part may not force the

whole thing, the public reaction and the like. In other
words, whether or not we shouldn't consider at some

stage of the game, seeing this other is hopeless, the
freezing.

H.M.JR: You may be right, Joe, but unfortunately,
I am beginning to talk like the old man that I am, I

127

-8 mean in experience here - things don't happen in Wash-

ington on this front until they get so stinking bad
that it is either too late, or there is an investigation,

or Congress appoints a Committee.

Don't forget, Congress had a parallel committee
to the War Refugee Board all ready, you know. That is

what assisted this thing. But suddenly it gets to the
point where somebody says, "We have to do it before
Congress does."

But we are sort of going around. Let me read this

report. Let me digest it, and then let me see if I can
get any hunch.

MR. LUXFORD: May I just lay one on the table?

H.M.JR: Let me see how I react after reading the

thing. Maybe I will get all excited and want to do
something tonight, I don't know.

MR. LUXFORD: May I lay one on the table?

H.M.JR: I don't know. Lay!
MR. LUXFORD: If Marvin Jones were to read this

report unofficially, so that the boys writing the Food
Report would write it in the perspective of the realities,
that is, how critical it is that we meet the problem on
the food side, the same that I know if you were to read
the thing, the instructions we would get would be such

that they would really begin to deal with this food

problem in a real sense.

H.M.JR: You have laid it! I don't know - let me

read it. I mean, it is a little bit remote. Here you

have Sumner Welles coming out not to do anything to the
Argentine.

MR. LUXFORD: That was terrible.

128

-9-

H.M.JR: The President saying something about how
he misses Sumner these days - his advice on South

America. Did I tell you that?

MR. LUXFORD: No. Is that true?

H.M.JR: Sure, everything I say is true.
MR. LUXFORD: I just can't believe he would make
that kind of remark.

H.M.JR: Well, he did. Where is Nelson Rockefeller
on these things?
MR. LUXFORD: I don't know.

H.M.JR: Somebody said he was leaving the country.
Ever called him up and found out?

MR. LUXFORD: Never. I don't see how he could help

us. I don't think he can change State if you can't. You

have had more luck than anyone else.
H.M.JR: Now. don't begin to hand me soft soap.
MRS. KLOTZ: They have.

MR. LUXFORD: Let's look at the record, then.
MRS. KLOTZ: Let's knock wood.

H.M.JR: As between handing a thing like that to
Marvin Jones - the thing is different. How much does
Nelson know, you see - what is he doing about it?
MR.SCHMIDT: The questions that State has given are

all loaded to get exactly the kind of answers they want,
and the idea is if you can influence them a little from
the other side-H.M.JR: You mean the whole thing hangs on Marvin
Jones.

129

- 10 -

MR. LUXFORD: I think so; I think it does. In other

words, here the worst thing that that food report came
out with was that if we were to try to meet the British
food requirements, it would require a ten percent cut
in the meat supply of the United States. The true answer
would be, "So what?" But now I am sure that if Jones
were confronted with that as being the true issue in the
light of this memorandum, that is, how serious the situation is in the light of what is happening today in Paraguay
and what Farrell is saying about Spain, that to ask us
to give up ten percent of our meat for three months is
certainly of inconsequential standing.

H.M.JR: I am thinking--i it just doesn't click with

me, this Marvin Jones thing, because it is too much

trying to influence the jury. He is a judge, and he
might resent it, you see. He could say, "I ain asking
for a factual report. What makes you think you could
influence me on that factual report?" He is a very
decent fellow, Marvin Jones.

I am not saying I wouldn't, but he is a very decent
fellow, and he is doing a good job. I am just wondering

if we could get the Vice President excited a little bit

about this thing, because he told me, you see-what did
he tell me about Collado telling him everything was all

right? I don't know. At least he got information from
Pete Collado which I had to tell him was just a lie.
MR. LUXFORD: It wouldn't be the first time.

H.M.JR: You know, he is going off quite a lot on
his own. What would you boys think of asking to see

Wallace and show him this stuff from me?

MR. LUXFORD: I think it would be very much worth

while, but I still come back that somebody has to get
to the Food people, because the facts there are not as
black and white as they say.

H.M.JR: All right, wait a minute. If Wallace

wants to go to Marvin Jones, see, and have a talk with him
as Vice President of the United States and former Secretary

of Agriculture, see--

130

- 11 MR. LUXFORD: That sounds all right.

H.M.JR:
It won't look as though I were a suppliant
before
the court.
MR. LUXFORD: You are doing all right.

H.M.JR: Is that all right?
MR. LUXFORD: That is very good, only we think you

have a position as a matter of right.

H.M.JR: I know, but I am thinking out loud. If the

Vice President would say--he swears-- "This is the damnedest

thing. Now, what can I do to help?", I would say, "Will

you talk to Marvin Jones?"

MR. LUXFORD: Give him that memorandum and this file
and say, "What do you think?"

H.M.JR: Well, let me read it tonight; and then if
I get it out of this thing, I think we might move in on
the Vice President.

MR. LUXFORD: Good.

H.M.JR: I don't think it would be difficult to
get him excited. Then if he says, "What can I do?",

all right, I will say, "Will you send for Marvin Jones?"
MR. LUXFORD: Fine.

H.M.JR: How does that sound to you boys?
MR. LUXFORD: It sounds very good, very good.

H.M.JR: In the whole town, who is there that might
get excited about this thing?
MR. LUXFORD: You would obviously give the Vice

President, too, that thing you have from the Army on the

Falangists?

131

- 12 H.M.JR: Yes, I can show him that.
MR. LUXFORD: Also, we can get him some choice

excerpts out of the military report. I should think
the Vice President could have it, which would answer
some of the questions that otherwise we couldn't.

H.M.JR: The trouble with the Vice President is-I have given him stuff like this before--you have to be
prepared for the fact that when he gets in a corner and
they ask him where he gets that he will say, "I got it
from Henry Morgenthau, because he has done that before.

He has done that at Cabinet. He will get excited and
say, "I got it from Henry Morgenthau.

I mean, I could call up Marshall and ask him if I

could show that.

MR. LUXFORD: Marshall doesn't even know General

Strong gave you this. That is what Towson is worried
about.

H.M. JR: What is Strong doing?
MR. LUXFORD: Towson spoke to me about that yesterday;

he said he was retired and then recalled to active duty.

But they have been kicking him around without giving him
an assignment to the point where he is about ready to ask
for retirement again. Towson thought it was a shame, that
he was an able man and was being wasted.

H.M.JR: Somebody told me that he stood up too much

to Stimson, and Stimson didn't like it.

MR. LUXFORD: That is exactly what Towson told me,

that he didn't "aye" the brass hats. That is why Towson
inquired whether there was any place in our organization
where he might be used, because this is the only place
in town where you could disagree with your boss.

H.M.JR: Thank you, but I like that.

132

- 13 MR. LUXFORD: I told him I would mention it to you.
He would be most interested. Towson has been telling me
that the Treasury ought to set up an economic intelligence
organization, world-wide, and that he felt that the General
would be the right man to do that.
H.M.JR: The place to do it would be to put the man
on the Stabilization Fund.
MR. LUXFORD: Let him set up a staff.
tion.

H.M.JR: Yes. There is a place for that on StabilizaMRS. KLOTZ: It is a very good idea.
MR. LUXFORD: The General would love it.

H.M.JR: I had that idea four or five years ago.
MR. LUXFORD: Towson told me, and I don't know whether

it is true or not, that the General has strong political
backing and can get along with State.

H.M.JR: Strong political backing of which party?
MR. LUXFORD: I don't know.

H.M.JR: It is important.
MR. LUXFORD: I would assume there is only one that

is important today. What is the use of having a strong
Republican backing today? Maybe I am wrong.

H.M.JR: I don't agree with you.
MRS. KLOTZ: What?

H.M.JR: I think it is important to have a Democratic
background.

MRS. KLOTZ: You didn't hear him.

133

- 14 MR. LUXFORD: I assume Towson must be talking about

Democratic backing if he has strong backing.

H.M.JR: Oh, I thought you said the only important
thing--

MR. LUXFORD: Can we take one minute more of your
time?

H.M.JR: Can I read this thing tonight? Then if
I think it is good enough, I will get hold of the Vice

President and ask him whether he wouldn't do this soon.
MR. LUXFORD: Give him these two while you are at it.

H.M.JR: I won't give him anything.
MR. LUXFORD: All right.

Now, you have a cable from Tito, which we want to
deliver to you.
H.M.JR: Oh, somebody was asking me this morning
about whom we gave the money to in Jugoslavia.
MR. LUXFORD: You got a cable by--

MR. SMITH: Straight from Tito himself.
H.M.JR: Boy!

MR. LUXFORD: This is most interesting. Let's
give Mrs. Klotz a copy.
You are in it now.
(The Secretary reads aloud cablegram from Director
of Central Telegraph of USSR, dated March 23, 1944, attached.)
H.M.JR: Where is old man Bicanic?

MR. SMITH: I gather he is probably over in Jugoslavia.

134

- 15 MR. LUXFORD: We will send to the War Refugee Board
to get him.

H.M.JR: I. B. Tito--are those his initials?
MR. LUXFORD: I guess so.

H.M.JR: Or does that mean, I be Tito?
MR. LUXFORD: It was sent through the Central Telegraph.

H.M.JR: You can acknowledge receipt of it, anyway,
as to the time.
MR. LUXFORD: Now, we have sent informally a copy of

this to State. It came through our channels, not even
through State.

H.M.JR: Ask them to advise us. I was asked in Press
this morning who decides--

MR. SMITH: Did you see this? (Hands the Secretary

clipping entitled "King Peter's Secret Source of Funds,
It

from PM, March 23, 1944.)

H.M., JR: How much have you withdrawn?

MR. SMITH: Originally ten million was made available,

was certified over. We are checking to get all the details
and bring them to your attention.

H.M.JR: My hunch is that the stuff should be frozen.
this?

MR. LUXFORD: Can I give you a little background on

H.M.JR: It always helps.
MR. LUXFORD: You will recall at the time Jugoslavia
was beginning to fall we were beginning to get signing
power, and we worked out a certification scheme so that
Fotich might sign on the Jugoslavian funds.

135

- 16 Now, right at the same time the Jugoslav Government

got a request to send ten million dollars down to Brazil.
We were not anxious to do it, but the President decided
we should, because Jugoslavia was going our way and we

didn't want to quarrel with them about small matters of
this character. Thereafter, once the Jugoslav Government
sided up with us we were anxious to get that money back

from Brazil, and the Central Bank of Brazil said they
were perfectly willing to send it back to the United States,
provided we would hold them free and harmless in the event

later on there was litigation about the authority of this
group to take the ten million. Well, that has been kicking

around between State and the Fed for two years now. Recently

they got very excited about it.
H.M.JR: Who are they?
MR. LUXFORD: State, because the Jugoslav Refugee

Government has used up all of the dollar assets in the
United States except the gold.

Now, they wanted to borrow against the gold, and
the State Department didn't want to have to make an
arrangement of that character; and to avoid having to do

that, they wanted to get the ten million back from Brazil.
The thing got very critical the other day, and we couldn't
quite understand why it was they were going to put the
whole certification through on an hour's notice basis.
There was going to be a whole series of transactions
occur so it would go right into the Central Bank account

and right out again. We couldn't quite figure it out

until the headlines the next day showed that Tito wanted
to attach the Jugoslav funds and to freeze them.
So the whole thing is a play, apparently, between
Tito and the Refugee Government, and this is just part.

We are getting the other side of it.

H.M.JR: Well, anyway, who over there can advise us?
MR. LUXFORD: In State? Who have we been dealing

with over there? We notified Hiss this morning.

136

- 17 MR. SCHMIDT: We told Hiss about it this morning, and

I think it is in Collado's lap at this point.

H.M.JR: Should I call up Mr. Hull and tell him I

would like to get an answer?

MR. SCHMIDT: As I see it, the question is basically
the political one of whether or not this Government is

recognizing the government-in-exile.

H.M.JR: How long will it kick around?
MR. LUXFORD: Supposing we do this? Supposing we

try to pursue it through channels and see what will
happen on it. If they kick it around, we will come back
to you.

H.M.JR: I don't think you will get anywhere in
any time, will you? I will give you a chance.
MR. LUXFORD: I don't think we are going to get
them to recognize the Tito Government.

H.M.JR: No, but the freezing of the funds is

something else again.

MR. SCHMIDT: The funds are presently frozen. There
is no question about that.
H.M.JR: Are they?
MR. SCHMIDT: Oh, yes. The funds that have been
made available were made available to support the
government-in-exile, which was the recognized government,
as far as this Government is concerned.

H.M.JR: Yes, but supposing King Peter wanted to

give his wife a million dollars as a present?

MR. LUXFORD: He couldn't do it without a further

certification against this gold. We have it stopped as

far as anything further is concerned.
H.M.JR:

O.K. All right. I will read that stuff

tonight and get some kind of a hunch, I hope.

137
Received
FOREIGN FUNDS CONTROL

Treasury
1944 Mar 23 AM 9 15
K1 RADIO VIA MACKAY RADIO
MOSCOU 22
BOARD OF TREASURY
WASHINGTON

WE ARE FORWARDING TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY CENTRAL TELEGRAPH IN MOSCOW
FROM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ADDRESSED
TO YOU COLON QUOTE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA
INFORMS BOARD OF TREASURY THAT IT AUTHORIZED MR DOCTOR RUDOLPH
BICANIC VICEGOVERNOR OF NATIONAL BANK OF KINGDOM
OF YUGOSLAVIA TO REPRESENT INTERESTS OF NATIONAL BANK OF KINGDOM
OF YUGOSLAVIA AND TO PREVENT WITHDRAWAL OF ITS DEPOSITS WITH
YOUR TREASURY BY ANYONE AND IN ANY AMOUNT WITHOUT CONSENT OF
NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA STOP NATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AUTHORIZED DOCTOR RUDOLPH

BICANIC TO REPRESENT IN THIS MATTER INTERESTS OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AS LAWFUL REPRESENTATIVE OF PEOPLES
OF YUGOSLAVIA STOP SIGNED PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA I B TITO COMMA ACTING COMMISSIONER FOR
FINANCE I MILUTINOVIC STOP MARCH EIGHTEENTH NINETEEN FORTY FOUR
STOP YUGOSLAVIA STOP SEAL OF PRESIDIUM OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA UNQUOTE STOP CENTRAL TELEGRAPH OF SOVIET
UNION REQUESTS YOU INFORM IT OF TIME OF DELIVERY THIS TELEGRAM TO
ADDRESSEE STOP

DIRECTOR CENTRAL TELEGRAP H OF USSR.
914A MAR 23

King Peter's
Secret Source

"

Of Funds
Yugoslavs Charge 20 Millions of 'People's

Money Withdrawn From U.S.; Britain Keeps Lid On

Page

7

PM. THURSDAY MARCH as,

Yugoslavs Say King Peter Gets

Funds Here But Not in Britain
Charge 20 Million
Of People's Money Has

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

All

139

DATEMarch 23, 1944

TO Secretary Morgenthau

FROM o*Connell

Narvin Jones testified yesterday before the Senate

Danking and Currency Committee recommending the extension

of the rice stabilization laws. He read the attached brief
statement which describes in broad terms the benefits the
Copners and others have derived from price stabilization.

Mr. Jones was questioned by Senators Danaher and Taft
to whether he had any amendments to propose or suggest to

rice stabilization laws, the questions being designed
elicit from him a recommendation that requisitioning,
tioning and other powers relating to food be centered in

to

the Tar Food Administrator. Mr. Jones said he had no amendcents to suggest.

Several Senators asked the Administrator whether, as

corn and other feed grains, an increase in ceiling prices
10 encourage production. Mr. Jones stated strongly that

ice increases would not bring more production. He added

List grains are not in short supply except in relation to
the

tremendously increased number of poultry, hogs ant cattle

ich require feed. He also mentioned the use of grains in
Industrial alcohol.

Jones explained that the grain situation is still
critical, particularly in wheat. The carry-over from 1943
Mr.

is less than that from 1942, despite the fact that the 1942
corn crop exceeded the all-time record. The 1943 total supply
HBS less than anticipated because of the failure of about half

of the Argentine crop. Notwithstanding the fact that, if
afficient shipping is available, it may be possible to bring
in more grains from Argentina during 1944, the estimated

production for 1944 is not sufficient to cover all of the

needs. On the whole there was nothing in Mr. Jones' testimony
ich offers any hope that grains for beverage production

rposes will be available in the near future.

Attachment

goe's

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

140

War Food Administration
Washington 25, D.C.
For Release on Delivery

Statement by Judge Marvin Jones, War Food Administrator,
before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
Wednesday, March 22, 1944, at 10:30 a.m., E.W.T.

I welcome this opportunity to state my views with respect to S. 1764, which
would extend the life of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Stabiliza-

tion Act approved October 2, 1942, through June 30, 1945. I will of course limit
my observations to the field in which my primary interest and responsil bility lie,
the field of the production and distribution of food and farm products.
The necessity for continuing a stabilization program seems apparent. No
Nation can long afford to engage in total war without instituting some safeguarding
controls to see that food and the other necessities are produced in abundance and

equitably distributed, and this means at prices which the masses can afford. This
is a fundenental wartime objective.

The present controls, under the current stabilization program, have proven
successful. It is apparent that both farmers and consumers have benefited. One
of the tests is that of production, a sound and a very practical measurement.
Food Production in 1943 was 32 percent greater than the five-year prewar

average. It WAS 5 percent greater than in 1942. As a result of this production,
our consumers have had somewhat more food per capital than prewar, even though about

one-fourth of that production is being used for the armed services and for export.

Support price for farm products are an integral part of the war food progran and have played their large part in inducing this large production. Generally
announced in advance of planting time they not only encourage the necessary total

production, but the relative prices for the various products encourage the most
desirable pattern of production. A successful production program is to some extent
an automatic stabilization program. The two are closely linked.
8585

(over)

USDA 1887-44

Farmers are interested not only in price control as related to their products

but are also interested in a general stabilization program which will protect the
prices of the things they need as producers and which thus induces and protects
production.

Although farm prices have been stable since April 1943, production has helped

to increase farm income to a record level. The net realized income of farm operators (income after deducting operating expenses including wages, taxes, and
interest) is estimated at about $12,500,000,000 for 1943, compared with
$9,500,000,000 for the year before and $4,700,000,000 for the five prewar years

1935-39. While the farmer was receiving this benefit. food costs to consumers
have been maintained at reasonable levels.

It is true that the average per capita income of farmers in 1943 was still
well below that of non-farmers but it was at a record level.
I am sure there is no question but that farners would rather have stable
prices and a fair break than uncontrolled high prices all along the line, the dons
quent inflation and the deflation which inevitably follows.
Farmers tell me they want the stabilization program continued. They know
from experience that excessive prices, speculative advances and short-time rises in
land
values
their sons
to load
pay. finally to an ever-increasing burden of debt for themselves and

I should also mention that farners are likely to become increasingly
interested in wage stabilization during 1944. Although farm wages were at a
relatively low level when the war started, they have increased substantially. There
have been sone areas, especially during the harvest season of certain perishable
commodities, when the immediate. pressing demands caused wages to reach prohibitive

levels. Faced with the danger of loss of vital war crops, the producers themselves
found it necessary to ask that a limit be placed. on farm wages in such areas. We
have put into effect several wage ceilings in such areas and there may be need for
extending such measures this year, in the interest of production.
It seems apparent that a program which has proven itself in the past by the
practical test of production should be continued. A direct increase in price which
night result from one or two breaks in the line would produce pressure for further

breaks. Too many such breaks would prevent achievement of the objective I mentioned

at the outset--which is to see to it that food and other necessities are equitably
distributed at prices which the masses of the Nation can afford.

Any substantial
break
in the
stabilization can work only to the disadvantage)
of all groups
and to the
nation
itself.
N

USDA 1887-44-2

141

March 23, 1944
3:16 p.m.

HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Mr. Crowley.

HMJr:

Hello.

Leo

Crowley Hello.

HMJr: Leo.
C:

Yeah.

HMJr:

This is Henry talking.

C:

Yeah.

HMJr:

Now, Leo, I've been thinking over the conversation
I had with you.

C:

Yeah.

HMJr:

And in the interest of team-play I've decided to
drop this idea about Oscar.

C:

HMJr:

Well, I appreciate it, Henry, because it would be a
very, very sad thing from my point.
Well, I don't want to do anything that's going to
crimp you.

C:

HMJr:

C:

HMJr:

And I think it does make it possible for us to
work together very well and it certainly would
hurt me terribly.
Well, I don't want to hurt you and -- uh -- I mean
I don't want to benefit by hurting you.
I know that. I know that.

And so we'll forget it and I think the less said
about it, the better.

C:

Thank you a thousand times.

HMJr:

All right. Bye.

C:

Bye

March 23, 1944

142

Dear Secretary Morgeathan:

I can't resut telling you
how heartening it is to deal with you.
not only are you one of the best administs ators I have ever seen, but you
human
qualities
unique. with
You have
handled
the lastare
situation
such
understanding, kindness and integrity
that my respect and appreciat con are overflowing.
This kind of experience-and your

example-gives me an urge to try to do

a good job in a way that I can't put
into words. And that's one of the greated
kicks m life.
Hon Heavy Margenthan Jr Oscar Cox

143

MAR 23 1944

Mr. Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr.,
Assistant General Counsel.

Effective this date and while the present
vacancy exists in the Office of the General
Counsel for the Department of the Treasury,
you are hereby designated to act as General
Counsel for the Department of the Treasury with

the operating title of Acting General Counsel.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) H. Mergeathan, Jr.

Secretary of the Treasury.

ANTIaja

Bythma

144

Fred Smith

March 23, 1944

Secretary Morgenthau

In today's New York Tribune, W.P.B. announces

the addition of two industrial alcohol plants and say

that indirectly that will help portable alcohol. If
W.P.B., within a week, doesn't announce that Union

Carbide five-million-gallon plant, I suggest that you
call up Dr. Whitman and follow up on it. Please watch
for the announcement and when it comes, let me see it.

Thank you. F inished

145
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

March 23, 1944.
Memorandum
TO:

Secretary Morgenthau

FROM: Mr. Gaston

I have discussed with Harry
White and Dan Bell your proposed letter

to Secretary Hull. We all agree that
no letter should be sent.

Mr. Hull's paragraph on international finance in his general state-

ment covers projects that we have discussed with the State Department and

is entirely consistent with statements

we have made as to Treasury objectives

in the international field. It would

have been the courteous thing for the
State Department to show us this portion
of the general statement before it was
issued, but since it covers matters on
which there is complete agreement, it
does not seem necessary that they should
do so. We can't complain about the
substance of the statement but only that

they didn't show it to us.

wis

146

DRAFT

My dear Cordell:

I read in yesterday's newspaper for the first time
the story accredited to you about the seventeen points on

foreign policy. I note that Point No. X refers to finance.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact
that the Treasury was not consulted in advance in regard
to Point No. X.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State.

147

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE March 23, 1944
TO

Secretary Morgenthau

FROM

M. White

This is in reply to your note of March 23.
we were not consulted about the paragraph on finance
that appeared in Hull's speech. However, about a week ago,

Collado, in a conversation about other matters, referred
to the fact that Hull was going to make a speech and that
it was going to contain some remarks on international
monetary matters which he thought we would like.

The paragraph in Hull's speech (quoted in full below)
contains nothing that we could take objection to in any
way. The statement is quite in accord with our own objectives. Ne would have liked to have had the statement
phrased in less general terms but that same criticism goes
for the whole speech.

I do not think we should bring this to Mr. Hull's

attention.

'International Finance -- Equally plain is

the need for making national currencies once more
freely exchangeable for each other at stable
rates of exchange; for a system of financial relations so devised that materials can be produced
and ways may be found of moving them where there
are markets created by human need; for machinery

through which capital may -- for the development

of the world's resources and for the stabilization

of economic activity -- move on equitable terms

from financially stronger to financially weaker

countries."

148

Harry White

March 23, 1944

Secretary Morgenthau

In Hull's seventeen points I see he has a
paragraph on finance. Were we consulted about this?
If not, please let me know in the form of a memorandum

not later than two o'olook today. Also, whether you

think I should bring it to Hull's attention if we
were not consulted. File

149

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE

March 23, 1944
TO

Secretary Morgenthau

FROM Fred Smith

As you know, Congressman Smith bowed out on making his

speech at the last minute, so Patman did likewise. However,

they are both in the record. This put a crimp in our pub-

licity, but the very fact that we were on the ball also put
a very serious crimp in Smith's publicity, except in the
early editions.

We slipped up by not releasing a very early story on

the Patman speech to nullify Smith's early story. We didn't
do it because we thought we would get a better play in this
morning's papers if we waited, and we probably would have if
the speeches had been made. But next time we will plug the
holes as we go along. We learned something.

However, we are not letting the project drop here. Not
only for the sake of the Stabilization Fund, but more importantly for the sake of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., this speech

should get wide circulation. Accordingly, we are planning
to do the following things:
(1) Have copies of the speech slipped to various
columnists by people who know them -- Gaston, Irey, etc.

150

-2-

(2) If Patman will reprint the speech, we will take
care of the mechanics of sending out, under his frank, and

from his office, about a thousand copies to editorial writers
and other interested parties.
(3) We are working on a Treasury release which will
recap the story as contained in Patman's speech, and if it

works out, I will send it in to you for clearance.

151

Fred Smith

March 23, 1944

Secretary Morgenthau

Please write two letters for me today and I'd
like to have them by two o'clock; one, to the Speaker
thanking him for arranging to have Congressman Wright
Patman come to our defense; two, a letter to Congressman

Wright Patman thanking him for doing it. Please see that
they are both in Mrs. Klots' hand not later than two

o'olook today. Thank you. time

152

March 23, 1944

Personal
Dear Sam:

I want to thank you for arranging to have
Congressman Wright Patman reply to Congressman

Smith's attack on the Stabilization Fund. I

think we upset a pretty well planned Republican

project. It also gave us an opportunity to
tell the full story of the Stabilisation Fund,

for the first time.

If Patman's speech could be circulated, it
is my belief that It would not only help the
Stabilization Fund, but would help set the record
of the Democratic Administration straight on the
matter of being forehanded about post-war problems.
Sincerely,
(Signed) Henry

Honorable Sam Rayburn

Speaker of the House

of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

FS:gr

153

March 23, 1944

My dear Mr. Patman:

I want to thank you for agreeing to come

to the defense of the Stabilization Fund - and,
for that matter, to the defense of the Administration's record. I am sorry you didn't get an
opportunity to deliver the speech, because I
think it would have made good publicity for our

side, and rather bad publicity for the other
side. However, I am convinced that having this
statement on the record will pay dividends for

a long time to come.

Your help was greatly appreciated, and I
hope we will have the opportunity of working
with you again.

If there is any way that we can be of
assistance to you, please do not hesitate to
let us know.

Sincerely,
(Signed) H. Morgenthen, J,

Honorable Wright Patman
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

FS:gr

154

MAR 23 1944

Dear Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of March 15,

1944 enclosing copies of a memorandum dated February 21,

a letter of February 24, 1944 from the Acting Secretary of
State, and a proposed Executive Order "establishing the
Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy".

I as gratified that consideration is being given at

theeconomic
of
I can

this time to the establishment of an interdepartmental

our committee post-war for foreign purpose formulating policy. recommendations think of few, on

If any, pos t-war problems of more challenging proportions and
with greater potential implications on the economy of this
country than the problem of post-mar foreign economic policy.
The type of interdepartmental machinery needed to cope with
this problem therefore should be the subject of most careful
study at the highest levels in the Government.
I have several comments to make with respect to the

draft of Executive Order transmitted with your letter of
arch 15, 1944:

1. From a purely political point of view the Order

does not establian machinery of adequate stature for dealing

with a problem of of political and economic magnitude.

In the first place the Order attempts to resurrect an

old interdepartmental committee, give it a new face and name,
and launch It on a now course. This might be understandable
if the committee to be revived was one of nationally known
importance in the past and had a public record of outstanding
&C Mever and prestige. However, the committee singled out
for resurrection, whatever its real merits any have been in
the past, was never well known to the publier has no public

155

-2record of achievement; and certainly can lend no prestige to
the new committee.

Secondly, the membership on the proposed committee is

confined to "representatives" of the various interested

agencies with a chairman to be appointed by the Secretary of
State. The announcement of a committee at this level may very

well loose an attack upon the administration charging that it

fails to recognize the magnitude and importance of formulating
a sound post-war foreign economic policy since it is sending a
boy to do a man's task. Certainly, there can be no argument
but that a committee comprised of the heads of the interested
departments and agencies, under the chairmanship of the

Secretary of State, and reporting directly to the President,

would lend the committee public prestige and lessen the scope

of critical attacks.

Finally, it should not be ignored that there are at

least three resolutions presently pending in Congress (S.J.
Res. 120, H.J. Res. 247 and H.J. Res. 249) calling for an
elaborate "foreign economic commission" comprised of the
leaders of Congress, interested cabinet officers and agency

hands, and important public leaders. It is most doubtful that

a committee at the level contemplated by the proposed Order

will be regarded in any way as an effective substitute for the

proposals now before Congress.

2. From an administrative point of view the machinery
contemplated by the Order is inadequate to cope with the
problems with which it will be confronted.
Responsible participation in the formulation of a sound
post-war foreign economic policy should be fixed on the head
of each of the interested departments and agencies rather than
on one of their subordinates. Placing the responsibility

squarely on the agency heads means that each agency will accord

to this problem the time and staff necessary to discharge the
task. Placing it on the shoulders of a subordinate tends to
relieve the agency head of a responsibility that should be his
and prejudices the chances of full agency participation as
distinguished from individual participation. This means that

156

.3as a purely administrative atter the committee should be
comprised of department and agency heads with the Secretary of

State as chairman.

The more fact that department and agency heads may
designate alternate members does not mean that the committee

will be relegated to the same level as that proposed in the
draft Executive Order. On the contrary, the alternate nots

and speaks for his agency head and on major issues the agency

head can personally intervene as a matter of right to insure
the discharge of his personal responsibility.
The proposed Executive Order is deficient also in the
type of machinery it provides for dealing with the complex
problems that will be raised in the field of foreign economic

policy in the post-mar period. With the position of world wide

dominance abi oh the United States will be called upon to occupy

in both the political and economic field in the post-ner period
it is unreal to attempt to guide our economic action by aschinery

that was designed to deal with pre-war problems and was no
startling success in even that atmosphere.

Either we should now concede that we propose to get along
with make-shift anchinery and deal with the fundamental problems
on an ad hoe basis or we should establish a new mechanism for
formulating past-war economic policy which will be geared to

the magnitude and complexity of the problem. If the latter be
our choice, it is submitted that no one committee at any level
can intelligently review the post-war foreign economic problems

of commercial policy, shipping, aviation, labor, commodity ty

agreements, money and credit, communications, patents and

cartols, etc. and formulate sound policies. Rather it will have
accomplished a Hereulian task if it merely success in coordinating
the work and over-all policies of other committees assigned the

specific task of developing policy in each of these fields.

If this be true, then the proposed Executive Order should

recognize these premises and provide machinery adapted to the

task. Thus the Executive Order should specifically provide for

sub-consuittoes to examine the problems and developments relating

157

.4.
to each field; it should stipulate that representation on each
sub-committee would be confined to those departments and

agencies having a direct interest in the subject and each subcommittee would be under the chairmanship of the head of the
department or agency most directly concerneds it should accord
each sub-committee the widest degree of autonomy consistent

with the committee's responsibility for the formulation of overall foreign economic polley; and it should clearly recognize

that the magnitude and complexity of this government's foreign
economic relations requires a large measure of decentralization
and & high degree of departmental and agency responsibility.

3. From a policy point of view the proposed Order is
so vague in its premises as to portend Its Tailure as an
effective mechanism.

Little will be gained by the establishment of adequate

machinery to cope with the problems of our post-war foreign
economic policy unless the Order establishing such machinery
establishes certain fundamental premises. Everyone concedes

the important interrelationship between our foreign political
policy and our foreign economic policy. It also Is hoped that
everyone recognises the fundamental Interrelationship between
our domestic economic policy and our foreign economic policy.

A the other hand, it is not nearly as clear that everyone

concedes that the fundamental interrelationship between our
foreign economic policy and our domestic economic policy
requires that the formulation of our post-war foreign economic

policy be the joint responsibility of those agencies in the
Government sharing primary responsibility for our economic
policy--both domestic and foreign.

Certainly the proposed Executive Order does not reflect
the foregoing premises. In fact its context would tend to
negate these assumptions. If I am wrong, and the foregoing
premises are acceptable there is much to be said for their
express inclusion in the Executive Order or at least that there
be informal agreement, with the approval of the President, on
the premises before an Order is issued. On the other hand, if
the foregoing premises are not acceptable and we are to proosed

on 8038 different premises, I think there is all the more

158

.5reason for the Executive Order to be explicit on the subject

OF for the members of the Committee to be otherwise so advised.

Clarity on this score will do much to facilitate the working

relationship of the Committee membership and to lift the work
of the Committee above the jurisdictional level.
The Treasury Department has prepared an alternative

draft of Executive Order, a copy of which is enclosed herewith,
which embodies the principles above stated. It is the opinion
of this Department that an Executive Order along the lines of
the enclosed draft would produce far more effective coordination
of policy on foreign economic matters than would be produced by
the proposed Executive Order transmitted with your letter of
arch 15.

Copies of this letter and enclosure are being transmitted

to the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor,
and to the Chairman of the United States Tariff Commission, and
the Foreign Economic Administrator.

Very truly yours,

(Mignet) E Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury.

Honorable Harold Smith,
Director,
Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

Enc.

AFLinrd - 3/21/44

159
9:35 a .
March 21, 1944

XECUTIVE ORDER
-

stablishing the Foreign Economic Policy Committee
and Defining Its Functions and Membership
HOREAS the problem of post-ner foreign economic policy is
becoming increasingly important; and
#BERKAS the formulation of a sound post-war foreign economic
.

policy requires a clear recognition of the fundamental interrelation=
e

(

ship between our domestic economic policy and our foreign economic

.

policy; and

HEREAS our post-ner foreign economic policy will affect the

operations and responsibilities of several of the executive departments and agencies of the Government

NON, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in no as

resident of the United States, it is hereby ordered that:
1. There is hereby established the Foreign Economic
Policy Co mittoo (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). The
Committee shall be concesed of the Secretary of state, who shall
be Chairman of the Committee; the Secretary of the Treasury the

Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture the Secretary of
Commerce; the Secretary of Labor; the Chairman of the United States
Tariff Commissions and the Foreign Economic Administrator. Each
member of the Committee shall designate an alternate member authorised

to act in his stead on the Committee. The Committee may from time
to time invite the heads of other executive departments and agencies

to participate in its activities for such periods and purposes as

160

-2to the Committee seen desirable.

2. The Committee shall consider the over-all problems
and developments affecting the long range economic policy of the

United states, both domestic and foreign, and shall formulate general

rinciples of foreign economic policy subject to the approval of
the president.

3. The Committee shall establish sub-committees to
examine problems and developments relating to commercial policy,

monetary and credits problems, patents and cartels, and other

as ects of our foreign economic policy as are necessary or desirable
in the opinion of the Committee. The chairman of each sub-consittee
shall be the head of the executive department or agency which is
most directly concerned in the subject assigned to the sub-committee.
Any executive department or agency having a direct interest

in the subject assigned to any sub-consittee shall be represented
on such sub-committee regardless of whether such department or agency
is represented on the Committee) and representation on the sub-committee

shall be confined to the departments and agencies having a direct

interest in the respective subjects.
Each sub-committee shall make such reports to the Committee
as the Committee may from time to time require.

4. Each of the sub-consittees established pursuant to
aragraph 3 above shall be accorded the widest degree of autonosy

consistent with the Committee's responsibility for the formulation of
over-all foreign economic policy. The Committee also shall recognise
that the magnitude and complexity of this government's foreign economic

relations requires a large measure of decontralisation and a high degree
of departmental and agency responsibility.

161

5. Nothing contained in this Order shall be deemed to recove
the responsibility or authority of each executive department or agency
for carrying out its own functions and operations but such functions
and operations shall be carried out in accordance with the over-all
foreign economic policy formulated by the Committee with the approval

of the resident.
6. The Executive Committee on Commercial Foliey established

by the letter of November 11, 1933, from the President to the Secretary
of State, and continued by Executive rders No. 6656 of March 27, 1934
and No. 7260 of secenter 31, 1935, is hereby abolished.

LCAsAFL:RBjemj 3/21/44

EXECUTIVE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON. D.C. 25

MAR 15 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:
Enclosed herewith are copies of a memorandum

dated February 21, and a letter of February 24, 1944
from the Acting Secretary of State, and of a proposed
Executive Order "Establishing the Executive Committee
on Economic Foreign Policy and Defining Its Functions
and Membership".

The proposed order is intended to revise the

functions of the Executive Committee on Commercial

Policy as presently constituted under Executive Order
7260 of December 31, 1935, and to provide for member-

ship thereon of representatives of the Departments of
State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor,
and the United States Tariff Commission and the Foreign Economic Administration.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget will
appreciate receiving, not later than Saturday, March
18, any comments which you may care to make with respect to the proposed Executive Order.

Very truly yours,

Assistant Director
Legislative Reference
The Honorable;

The Secretary of the Treasury.
Enclosures.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1944

MEMORANDUL FOR TIE PRESIDENT

Feed for m Executive Committee on Economic

Poralm Policy

1. The Department of state, in its efforts to for-

mulate policy recommendations in the post-war international economic field, has established a number of working
comittees on subjects of commercial policy, shipping,
aviation, labor, commodity agreements, et cetera. Most
of
these committees are reasonably advanced in their
work.

2. An executive interdepartmental committee is
needed at a level capable of reviewing this work and
formulating policy recommendations in the name of the
departments and agencies most intimately affected. This
could be most readily effected by reviving the Executive
Committee
on Commercial Policy and revising and expanding its functions.
3. The recommended Executive Committee on Economic

Foreign Poliey would have as its function the examination
of problems and developments affecting the long-range
foreign economic policy of the United States and the formulation of recommendations in regard thereto for the
comsideration
of the Secretary of State and, in appropriate
cases,
of the President.

OK

4. The suggested membership would be the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor,
the United States Tariff Commission and the Foreign
Economic Administration. Other agencies should be drawn
in as matters of particular interest to then are under
consideration.

5. The chairman should be appointed by the Secretary
of State.

/a/ E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

163

sincerely yours,

(Signed) Tr.
noting

the
Progidant
Braft Expertive Order

Letters to heads of
parious agencies
Immerable

Harold D. mish,
Director,
Bareau of the Budget,

COPY
EXECUTIVE ORDER

"STABLISHING THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
ON ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY

WHEREAS the Executive Committee on Commercial Policy

was established by the letter of November 11, 1933, from

the President to the Secretary of State and continued by
Executive Orders No. 6656 of March 27, 1934 and No. 7260
of December 31, 1935, and

WHEREAS it is desired to revise the functions of the
said Committee to correspond more closely to current and

prospective problems of economic foreign policy with which
this Government is, and will be concerned:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in

no as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered

N

that

1. The name of the said Executive Committee on
Commercial Policy is changed to the Executive Committee
on Economic Foreign Policy.

2. It shall be the function and duty of the
Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy to

examine problems and developments affecting the long-

range economic foreign policy of the United States and
to formulate recommendations in regard thereto for the

consideration of the Secretary of State and, in
appropriate cases, of the President.

COPY
3. The membership of the said Committee shall be

composed of representatives of each of the following
departments and agencies: The Department of State, The
Treasury Department, The Department of Agriculture, The
Department of Commerce, The Department of Labor, The

United States Tariff Commission, The Foreign Economic

Administration. The Committee may, with the approval of
the President, from time to time add representatives of
other governmental departments and agencies to its
membership for such periods and purposes and with such

rights and privileges as to the Committee seem desirable.
4. The representative of each member department
or agency on the said Committee shall be designated by
the head of such department or agency. The Chairman

shall be appointed by the Secretary of State.

5. The provisions of the aforesaid letter of
November 11, 1933, and the said Executive Orders Nos.
6656 and 7260, are revoked.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

March P 1944.

166

MAR 23 1944

is dear Mr. Secretary:

on March 15, 1944 Mr. F. J. Bailey of the Bureau of
the Badget sent a letter to you enclosing copies of a MOROrendum dated February 21, and a letter dated February 24,
1944 from the Acting Secretary of State, and of a proposed
Executive order "Establishing the Executive Committee on

Economic Foreign Policy." It is understood that similar
letters were sent to the heads of all departments and
agencies who may be represented on the proposed Committee.

Secretary Morgenthau has written a repky to the
Director of the Saress of the Budget and has suggested an

alternative draft of Executive Order. He asked no to bring
this letter of reply and proposed alternative Order personally
to the attention of the heads of the departments and agencies
concerned. Accordingly, copies of thase papers are enclosed
herewith for your information.
Very truly yours,
SIGNED W.N. THOMPSON

Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary

The Renorable

The Secretary of State.
inclosures.

LOAT
5/22/26

This same letter also went to:
The Secretary of Agriculture

Mr. Crowley, Adm., FEA
The Secretary of Commerce

The Secretary of Labor
Hon. Oscar B. Ryder, Chairman,
U.S.Tariff Commission.

167

MAR 23 1944

Wy dosr Mr. Attorney General,

On March 15, 19th, Mr. F. J. Bailey of the Bureau
of the Budget sent to this Department a letter enclosing
copies of a menorandus dated February 21, and a letter
dated February 24, 1944 from the Acting Secretary of
tate, and of a proposed Executive Order "Establishing
the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy."

it is understood that similar letters were sent to the

heads of all departments and agencies who may be represented on the proposed Committee.

Copies of the foregoing correspondence are enclosed
for your information. Secretary Morgenthau also asked me

to bring to your personal attention copies of his reply to
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the alternative
draft of Executive Order transmitted therewith. Accordingly,
copies of the latter papers are also enclosed for your
information.

A copy of this letter is being sent to Mr. F. J. Bailey.
Very truly yours,
(SIGNED) W.N. THOMPSON

Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary

The Honorable

The Attorney General.
Enclosures.

3/22/hls

168

MAR 23 1944

Dear Mr. Bailey:

There is enclosed for year information a
copy of a letter dated today, sent by this Department
to the Attorney General with reference to the proposed
Executive Order "Establishing the Executive Committee
on Economic Foreign Folicy."

Very truly yours,
(SIGNED) W.N. THOMPSON

Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary

NT. F. J. Bailey,
Assistant Director,
Legislative Reference,
Hureru of the Budget,

Washington, D. C.

LCA mou

3/22/14

169

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Secret

FORM DO

Office Memorandum .

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 23,MYY
TO

:
:

FROM

Hm Heavy Morgenthan g

Oscar tox

SURJECT: Petroleum Inventories m the UK

Here is Some of the material
you wanted.

In order to get it to you

quickly I have not digested and

briefed for you.
If convenient, would
appreciate t if you attached offer

could make a copy and send it
to me. This is my only set
Action will be taken as
quickly as possible on the print
brnot makes.

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FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SECRET
it. Oscar S. Cox
John B. Howard

Date: March 23, 1944

Petroleum Inventories in the United Kingdom

1. I am attaching a table which Al Ernst has prepared showing
the lend-lease percentage of U.K. supplies of petroleum products
during the fiscal year 1945.
2. I am also attaching Al's memorandum to me on the subject.
I have marked in red pencil his suggested method for determining
the lend-lease percentage of stocks on hand at any given moment.
This method strikes me as being both sound in principle and

simple. It can be applied to other products, and for the purpose
of recapture at the end of the war as well as for the purpose
of diverting lend-lease supplies during the war.
3. The Army-Navy Petroleum Board has informed us that during

the fiscal year 1945, it is anticipated that the U.S. will

receive from our allies on reverse lend-lease a quantity of
petroleum products totalling slightly less than half the total
quantity of lend-lease exports during that period. Inasmuch as
the bulk of lend-lease and reverse lend-lgase petroleum transactions
take place with the U.K., it is probably/Tair assumption that
the two-to-one ratio also applies in the U.K. The actual
figures for reverse lend-lease of petroleum products in the
U.K. is highly secret and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board would

be very reluctant to supply them to us.

Attachments

Johnthewound

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

r

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

John Howard

E. Ernst

SECRET
Date: March 22, 1944

rol of Stocks of Petroleum Products on hand in the United Kingdom

Attached is a statement which will give an idea of the approximate
distribution of the origin of petroleum stocks on hand in the U.K. at an
average moment during the period of the Fifth Lend-Lease Appropriation.
In this connection, I summarize briefly below the net outcome of our
various conversations including that with Captain Shaffer in my office last
Saturday, on the general subject to which the attached statement pertains.

As you will recall, the Army particularly, but various others as well,

are concerned with the ownership, control and disposition of the large petroleus stocks which are being built up in the U.K. through Lend-Lease shipments.
Our Army is especially concerned that at any given moment it might, for
operational reasons, find it desirable to make an emergency shipment of petro-

Ista products from stocks on hand in the U.K., and find itself obstructed
from doing BO because the petroleum has been transferred to the possession

of the British or through some other technical objection by British functionaries.

To romedy this situation, it is proposed that an agreement be made with
the British to clear up such technical obstacles immediately. Such agreement
should provide (1) That our armed forces - or others that may be specified - may

assume possession of and dispose of stocks of petroleum products
on hand in the U.K., and

That this action can be taken under conditions and by a mechanism
to be stated specifically in the agreement. The mechanism might,
for example, be put in motion by a directive from General Eisenhower.

tion has arisen as to how the amount which U. S. representatives could
under such conditions, could be determined. One suggestion for acAng this, consistent with lend-lease general policies, might be to agree
such withdrawals to the portion of stocks on hand that are of lend-

igin. This limitation could be accepted for the solution of the im-

urgent problem at hand, without prejudice to the solution of any over

Loma on which this question may impinge.

computing the portion of stocks on hand that are of lend-lease origin,
Even moment, the following suggestions might be followed:
(Continued)

rd - Page 2 - March 22, 1944

Mr.

stocks of the product involved, on hand in the country as a whole erely at a particular locality from which our representatives proto 11ft products - would be considered.

(1)

(2)

basic statistics of the 011 Control Board would be used. The figures
the total stocks on hand at any moment are regularly available from
the British 011 Control Board records and could be supplied currently to
U.S. representatives in the country concerned. Information on arrivals
of principal petroleum products, vessel by vessel, could also be supplied
currently to our representatives designated for the purpose.
on

(3) At any moment at which liftings by U.S. authorities might be desirable,
these figures could be used to determine the latest inventory and the

ships by which that inventory arrived. For simplicity this calculation
should be based on the assumption that the stocks on hand were received

by the most recently arrived ships which, in the aggregate, carried
quantities equal to the inventory. This presupposes that products arriving by earlier vessels have been completely consumed.

(4) From this information the origin of the stocks on hand could be readily
U.S.
determined and the percentage of lend-lease origin calculated. The

representatives could be given the right to lift up to such ouanti-

ties. To avoid creating an emergency situation, it might be desirable
to provide that in no case should the total stock available in a given
locality be permitted to be drawn below 8 point - to be fixed in numbers
of tons in advance - which might be considered to jeopardize the public
welfare. This would be a very small quantity, however.

ALL of the foregoing is, of course, merely a tentative suggestion which I outline above as perhaps a useful basis of discussion. This is a question with many
aspects, and all the factors of importance will naturally have to be considered.
However, resolution of this problem is a matter of extreme urgency. Our military
authorities are greatly concerned over the problem and I know we would be rendering
a service which they consider a "must" if we could consummate an arrangement which

will complish the purposes outlined above in the near future.

Att

STATEMENT SHOWING THE EXPECTED ORIGIN OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

DURING THE FIFTH APPROPRIATION PERIOD, JULY 1, 1944 TO JUNE 30, 1945, BY PRINCIPAL CLASSES OF PRODUCTS,
TOGETHER WITH THE HERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL AVATIABILITY WHICH WILL BE OF LEND-LEASE ORIGIN

(In 1000's of Barrels)
Produced by Refining
Produced by Refining of U.K. Crude Production
and Substitutes
of Imported Crudes *
in U.K. Refineries
in U.K. Refineries

Motor Gasoline
Kerosene

Grand Total
of U.K.

Products

Refined Products

New Supply

Sterling Refined

from Sterling
Sources

Percentage
Land-Lease

to Total

1,329

8,371

12,287

38,762

51,049

75.93

2,587

22,870

24,753

47,676

65.82

1,840

72,429

43

2,601

2,632

6,938

9,570

72.50

15,009

21,981

29,592

51,573

57.38

1,414

8,027

9,441

85.02

23

8

Aviation Gasoline

Total
Land-Lease

Total

Imports

Gas/Diesel/Fuel Oils

1,477

5,495

Lube Oils, Greases and Waxes

1,267

147

3,362

60

2,572

790

1,335

1,177

23.48

Other Petrolean Products

50,028

65,639

131,785

197,424

66.75

8,879

6,732

-

TOTALS

9

45.12% from Land-Lease and 56.88% from Sterling origin.

SECRET

Petroleum Division
Foreign Eco nomic Administration
March 22, 1944

AGUDAS ISRAEL WORLD CORGANIZATIO

175

226 West 97th Street
New York 25, N. Y.
March 23rd, 1944

Mr. John Pehle, Director
flar Refugee Board

U. S. Treasury Building
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
Sir:

in are respectfully presenting for your consideration and action this
brief memorandum pertaining to Jewish internees in French-German camps,
who possess South American and Latin American passports:
I.

A number of Polish, Belgian and Dutch Jews possess documents from various
South American states, which were issued to them by their respective
Consuls. A part of the above mentioned have passports and some have only
letters from the Consuls, stating that their governments have recognized

then as citizens of their respective countries. Several hundreds of these
people are 1 terned in the following camps:

Vittel
Liebenau

Tittmoning all in Germany
and Compiegne

in France.

However, the major part are interned in Belsen-Bergen near Hanover.
In November 1943, the German authorities at camps Vittel, Liebenau,
Tittmoning and Compiegne, took away all the documents of the interned
Jens, and until February 29th, 1944, they had not been returned to them.
In December 1943, these internees were in grave danger of being deported
to Poland, which would have meant instant death. However, through the
efforts of the State Department which intervened with the Paraguay Governsent (which had issued most of these passports) and the other South
American countries, the passports and documents in cuestion were acknow-

ledged as valid. It is evident, however, that the German camp authorities are aware of the nature of these passports and documents, and accordine to the remarks and actions of the various camp commanders, it seems
that these people are saved merely for the purpose of future exchange-

possibilities.

These internees are a part of the last remnants of Polish, Belgian and
Ditch Jewry, and many of them are outstanding Rabbis, spiritual and cultoral leaders.

-2-

176

It is very urgent to begin with the exchange of at least some of these
internees so that the German government may become aware of the con-

cert of the United Nations in behalf of the people who possess the South
Ame team documents. It is through this method alone, that the people
in these various camps can actually be saved. They may otherwise be contimelly threatened with being suddenly deported to the death-camps of
Polani.

A Lire number of these internees are in possession of immigration certificates to Palestine, and the South American countries may therefore
be resured that these people will not become a burden to their countries,
but will actually go to Palestine. Even pending protracted negotiations,
these negotiations would thus themselves mean a certain kind of protection
against the danger of being deported. We are prepared to submit on request
list of approx. 150 names of internees in the camps mentioned, who could
be taken in view for such an exchange.

II.
1th reference to the internees in Belsen-Bergen, we are informed that it
is impossible to establish any contact with them. Even the American and

International Red Cross have not succeeded. Since the South American
countries, especially Paraguay, have recognized these internees as their

officers, it is urgent that the strongest pressure be exterted on the

German authorities, to permit the Red Cross to contact this camp, so that
the Internees in Belsen-Bergen could be treated in the same manner as

it South American internees in all other camps.

III.
have recently been informed from Switzerland, that an intervention on
behalf of the War Refugee Board at the Government of HONDURAS would be

highly desirable and very urgent, in order to obtain also from that Governwent the acknowledgment of citizenship documents, rightly or wrongly
!smied, to save threatened human life from certain annihilation.
Respectfully submitted
AGUDAS ISRAEL WORLD ORGANIZATION

President

Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'ty) Abrahamson, Akzin, Bernstein,
Cohn, Dubois, Friedman, Gaston, Hodel, Laughlin, Lesser,
Luxford, Mann, Marks, McCormack, Murphy, Paul, Pollak, Rains,

Sargoy, Smith, Standish, Stewart, H. D. White, Pehle, Files

177

American Embassy near the
Government of Greece.

Cairo, March 23, 1944
No. 81

Subject: Measures for the rescue and relief
of the refugees of Europe.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Sir:

With reference to the Department's circular
airgram of February 29, 7:30 p.m., concerning measures

for the rescue and relief of the refugees of Europe,
I have the honor to report that this Embassy failed to
receive the Department's previous circular airgram of
January 26, 7:00 D.m. on this subject, mentioned therein.

However, when the matter was brought to the Embassy's

attention by the receipt on March 14th of the later message,
copies of the earlier one were obtained from the Legation
and, as instructed, the Royal Hellenic Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was approached, by an aide memoire dated March 16,

1944, with a view to explaining the policy of the United
States Government in respect to this question and to
ascertaining the extent to which the Royal Hellenic Government is prepared to cooperate. So far, no reply has been
received.

As regards the report requested concerning the
situation at present, the Greek Government is, of course,
itself in a refugee status and consequently controls no

CC: Miss Chauncey (For the Sec'y), Mr. Abrahamson, Mr. Akzin,
Mr. Bernstein, Mrs. Cohn, Mr. DuBois, Mr. Friedman,
Mr. Gaston, Miss Hodel, Miss Laughlin, Mr. Lesser,
Mr. Luxford, Mr. Mann, Mrs. Mannon, Mr. Marks, Mr. McCormack,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Paul, Mr. Pehle, Mr. Pollak, Mr. Rains,
Mr. Sargoy, Mr. Smith, Mr. Standish, Mr. Stewart,
Mr. Weinstein, Mr. H. D. White, Files

178

territory on which refugees might find haven. However,
as the Department is aware, that Government is actively
concerned with measures for the rescue of its own nationals
from occupied Europe and for their reception and maintenance
in various countries of the Middle East and Africa.
Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

Harold Shantz
Counselor of Embassy

File no. 848
Sent in hectograph to Department
WB/ad

179
FG-185

Cairo

This telegram must be
,araphrased before being

Dated

March 23, 1944

other than a Governmental

Rec'd

6:29 p.m.

communicated to anyone
agency (BR)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

680, March 23, 4 p.m.
The Legation has received a note dated March 20 from

the Agyptian Foreign Office stating that the Egyptian

Government has received reports of persecution,

pillage and atrocities committed by certain (unspecified)
Iugoslav military elements against Moslems in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including massacre of women and children.

Note observed difficult to confirm accuracy of these

reports but that Egyptian Government as a Moslem Govern-

cont deemed it its duty to invite attention thereto
since such acts, if actually committed, would constitute
serious infraction of most elementary human principles

as well as of ideals for which the United Nations are
fighting. Note concluded that Egyptian Government
would be happy to learn that such events have not taken
place but in contrary case would appreciate receiving
Legation's assurance that effective immediate steps would
be taken with view to preventing their recurrence.

I have replied to Foreign Office that the Legation
has no information to enable it to cast any light on
this matter, but that it was being brought to the
attention of the Department for appropriate consideration.
Copies of Foreign Office note and of this telegram

have been furnished the American Ambassador to

Iugoslavia here for his information and possible comment
to the Department.
KIRK

JT

180

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

FROM:

AMEMBASSY, LONDON

TO:

MARCH 23, 1944

DATED:

NUMBER:

2224

CONFIDENTIAL

Given below is the substance of a cable for Joseph
Schwartz. Central Council for Jewish Refugees, Upper Woburn

Place, London, from Leavitt, Joint Distribution Committeet

Please contact the Financial Officer of the British
Foreign Office regarding the return of $20,000 which we sent
on behalf of the Jewish Community in Rome. It is requested
that you arrange to open an account in the name of the Joint
Distribution Committee at Barclays Bank London. Signatures

of officers authorized to draw on accounts will be filed with
Barclays Bank New York. It is probable that the funds will
stay in London until it is possible to repay individuals in
Rome who are now advancing funds against this account.
HULL

181

N-296

PLAIN

London

Dated

March 23, 1944

Rec'd

10:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2331, 23rd.

Malin has suggested by telegram to Emerson from
North Africa that the IGC appointee to MERRA contemplated
in Embassy's 1762, 3rd by Keeny. Emerson whole recognising that arrangements must depend upon still pending
decisions concerning UNRRA relations with MERRA accepts

Malin's estimate of Keeny's suitability and says he
would be greatful if Department could ascertain whether
UNIGRA will be prepared to release Keeny (said to be now
with UNRRA) for employment under IGC to Cairo if decision

is in favor of IGC having a representative there. Please
instruct.

WINANT