The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.
259
Proposed Text of Cable to Sayre from
Secretary of the Treasury.
Re your telegram of December 19, 1941 on enemy property:
on December 16, 1941 the President approved the
first Mar Powers Act, 1041 (Public No. 354, 77th Congress).
Sections 301 and S02 of Title III of such Act read as
follows:
There take in text of Sections 301 and 302
of stinched Act7
You will note that these sections asend section
5(b) of the Trading with the enemy Act of October 6,
1017, as amended, pursuant to which freezing control
has been administered.
with the approval of the President, and for the
purpose of deeling with the philippine situation, all
of the powers and authority conferred upon the President
under the above-quoted provisions of law are hereby
delegated to you in so far as the Philippines are concerned.
In addition, I as allocating $100,000 from the
appropriation entitled "2020120, Salaries and Expenses,
Foreign Exchange Control, 1942" to cover your initial
expenses in carrying out this program. Please forward
to ae at once an estimate of the amount of funds (by
260
month) that you feel you will need during the next
three months.
It will of course be necessary for you, in
cooperation with the military and Commonwealth Government
authorities, to formulate a program for dealing with
this emergency situation. We will be glad to cooperate
with you and offer advice and suggestions on any points
you may care to raise but we do not want you to feel
that you must wait for instructions from Washington.
You will be advised from time to time as plans are
developed for dealing with enemy property.
The powers conferred by the statute are very
broad. Congress expects that complete records will be
established and maintained with respect to property
seised OF otherwise received in your oustody. Please
be guided accordingly.
You are authorised to take any steps you deem
appropriate to make public the authority herein conferred
on you.
BBinrd - 12/22/41.
261
December 22, 1941
Dear Jacks
A copy of Sayre's cable was furnished
to your office earlier today.
I am attaching a proposed memorandum to
the President and a proposed cable to Sayre
to which I would like to get your reaction
before it is submitted to the White House.
If you could telephone me in the morning after you have had a chance to go over
the papers, it will help materially.
Sincerely,
(Signad) B. E. Foley, Sr.
Non. John J. McCley,
Assistant Secretary of War,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
inclosures
EHFJr.:vls - 12/22/41
262
December 22, 1041
Dear E. K.:
A copy of Sayre's cable was furnished
to your office earlier today.
I am attaching a proposed memorandum to
the President and a proposed cable to Sayre
to which I would like to get your reaction
before it is submitted to the White House.
If you could telephone me in the morning after you have had a chance to go over
the papers, it will help materially.
Sincerely,
So.
Hon. Ebert K. Burlew,
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior,
Room 5116, Interior Building,
Washington, D. C.
Attachments
EHFJr.:vls - 12/22/41
263
December 22, 1941.
Dear Mr. Mays
The Secretary has signed the enclosed
copy of the new rules for the oustody of
Defense Progress Papers, and I - returning
it to you herevith.
You will note that Mr. Pitagerald has
also signed as the authorised agent to accept
material delivered at his desk for the Secretary.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed)
E. a. Klots,
Private Secretary.
Mr. Stocy May.
Chief, Juresa of Research
and Statistics,
Office of Production Management,
Social Security Building.
Washington, D. O.
Enclosure.
nmc
GEF/dbs
264
OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT
SOCIAL SECURITY BUILDING
WASHINGTON D.C.
December 17, 1941
The Honorable Henry Morganthau, Jr, Secretary
Treasury Department
Room 280, Treasury Building
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Beginning with Issue Number 63 of Defense Progress, the
confidential weekly report of the Bureau of Research and Statistics
of the Office of Production Management, we are adding your name to
our list or recipients. Up to the present we have regularly been
sending one copy of this report to Mr. George C. Haas, a recipient
in your agency.
More severe restrictions have recently been placed upon
our distribution. It is felt that Defense Progress can only continue
to serve its most useful purpose by analyzing and reporting data
which must be regarded as confidential. To safeguard properly the
confidential nature of this material, a rule has been adopted that
.istribution of the report should be made only to the responsible
heads of departments and independent offices. Hence, this report
is being sent to you in order that you may distribute it most usefully within your agency and may see that proper safeguards are
exercised to keep it filed in accordance with rules prescribed for
confidential data. We regret exceedingly the need for restrictions
which have been placed upon distribution and the resulting inconvenience for members of your staff. We trust however, that the arrangeent here proposed will prove satisfactory.
There is attached hereto 2 copies of the "Rules for the
Custody of Defense Progress", one of which we should like ou to keep.
will you sign the other and have your authorized agent who may sign
for receipt of Defense Progress also add his or her signature and
return it to us.
Sincerely yours,
StayMr.
Stacy May, Chief
Bureau of Research and Statistics
Enclosures 2
265
AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY RULES FOR CUSTODY OF 'DEFENSE PROGRESS'
As a recipient of Defense Progress, the undersigned
agrees to act as the custodian of all copies delivered to him
and to abide by the following rules which have been adopted
to aid in enforcing the Espionage Act:
(1) Not to permit information from any copy in his
custody to become available to anyone except
Government employees under his immediate super-
vision who will be bound by the restrictions
hereby agreed to and who require access to Defense Progress in connection with their official
duties.
A SECURELY LOCKED CONTAINER
(2) To keep all copies/ guarded when
IN
not actually in use.
(3) Not to incorporate information from Defense
Progress in any record unless the use of such
record is restricted as if the record were itself a copy of Defense Progress.
(4) To give prior written notice of any change of
address to the Bureau of Research and Statistics.
(5) On written request from the Bureau of Research
and Statistics, or before separation from the
Government position which entitles him to receive Defense Progress, to return all copies
charged to his account.
Signed
Date
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The undersigned authorized agent agrees so far as
lies in his/her power to aid his/her principal in abiding by
the rules for the proper custody of copies of Defense Progress
as set forth on the reverse side of this form.
Signed
Date
Mr.
Miss
Mrs.
whose signature is
.
given above is authorized in my absence to sign for and receive copies of Defense Progress addressed to me.
Signed
Date
AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY RULES FOR CUSTODY OF 'DEFENSE PROGRESS'
As a recipient of Defense Progress, the undersigned
agrees to act as the custodian of all copies delivered to him
and to abide by the following rules which have been adopted
to aid in enforcing the Espionage Act:
(1) Not to permit information from any copy in his
custody to become available to anyone except
Government employees under his immediate super-
vision who will be bound by the restrictions
hereby agreed to and who require access to De-
fense Progress in connection with their official
duties.
(2) To keep all when
IN A SECURELY LOCKED CONTAINER
not actually in use.
(3) Not to incorporate information from Defense
Progress in any record unless the use of such
record is restricted as if the record were itself a copy of Defense Progress.
(4) To give prior written notice of any change of
address to the Bureau of Research and Statistics.
(5) On written request from the Bureau of Research
and Statistics, or before separation from the
Government position which entitles him to receive Defense Progress, to return all copies
charged to his account.
Signed M.muthan
Date
AUTHORIZATION OF AGENT
The undersigned authorized agent agrees so far as
lies in his/her power to aid his/her principal in abiding by
the rules for the proper custody of copies of Defense Progress
as set forth on the reverse side of this form.
Signed Edward J
Date
Mr.
Miss
Mrs.
whose signature is
,
given above is authorized 11. my absence to sign for and receive copies of Defense Progress addressed to me.
Signed
Date
P
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST
28
267
The United
States
of
Europe
By WINSTON CHURCHILL
DEAS are born as the sparks fly upward They die from their own weak-
see they are whirled away by the
Former British the Exchanger
wind they are lost in the smoke: they vanish in the
darkness of the night. Someone throws on another log of
and effort, and fresh myriada of sparks stream
confectually into the air. Men have always tended these
firm. casting into them the fruits of their toll-indeed, all
they can spare after keeping body and soul together.
Sometimes at rare intervals something exciting results from
intelligence. White coal from mountain
torrents readjusta the disparity of min-
accumulation of muddle, waste particularism and prejudice
which had long lain piled up in the European garden, it be
came quite evident that new series of events had opened
To quit a metaphor before it becomes a burden, never
before have some four hundred millions of the strongest,
most educated and most civilized parent races of man-
eral deposits Electric cables transmit,
or offer to transmit, new sources of energy and wealth in
directions and to areas hitherto unconsidered Aircraft fly
in a day across half a dosen frontiers. Lastly there is the
economic and financial portent of the United States Here
is . region little larger than Europe and occupied by only
. fraction of its population. Here, too, are regions of vast
their activities Among innumerable sparks that flash and
away. there now and again gleams one that lights up
not only the immediate scene but the whole world. What
it that distinguishes the fortunes of one of these potent
kind done themselves so much harm by their quarrels and
resources and educated inhabitants, but they are progressing. and prosper at a speed and in . degree never before
disunion as have the great nations of Europe during the
present century. Never had they more reason to be dis
contented with the condition to which they have reduced
witnessed, and still increasing Their resources although
better distributed and disposed are not so much greater
than those of Europe; their population is far smaller
incendiary or explosive ideas from the endless procession of
themselves, and never could they see more clearly at once
its fellows? It is always something very simple and-once
the cause of their misfortunes and its remedy. They have
the surroundings are illuminated-painfully obvious. In
fact we may say that the power and vitality of an idea
only to look around to see the fair regions they inhabit
starved and impoverished by the greatest of all wars, dis.
result from . spontaneous recognition of the obvious
and hindering the old? The demand of the masses in all
countries is for higher economic well-being Science and
organization stand ready to supply it. Knowledge is not
turbed by hatreds and jealousies which the conflict has
only aggravated, and hampered and burdened at every
confined to one side of the Atlantic Ocean. Why, then, is
the contrast between American and European conditions
For instance, not far from the fire there is a rubbish
heap. and as the weather has been very dry for some time
and the night breeze is blowing in that direction, one single
spark out of all the millions has suddenly acquired enormous importance. It has fallen glowing upon the rubbish;
and there is the heap beginning to smolder, smoke and
break into flame; and already there is blaze and everyone
point by fetters and barriers they have themselves created
and must spend a large part of their income to maintain
Then comes science, gathering power every day. and
stimulated by the stress and fury of the great war. New
possibilities of profitable cooperation in industry, compulgive need for wider and
can see for himself the rubbish heap and that the spark has
more reasonable distri-
set it alight. No one knows how far the flames will go,
whose buildings will be threatened or what will happen
next There is no lack of excitement and bustling about
fort are apparent to
What are the causes which are favoring the New World
so cruel and their rates of material progress so unequal? To
find the answer. we have only to look at the rubbiah heap
upon which a brisk flame has already begun to crackle
We must regard this heap a little more closely in the
growing light. It has been the growth of centuries, and
(Continued on Page 48
bution of productive efthe humblest unbiased
and running around, and no one-not even the alowest
has any doubt but that something unusual has happened,
that it all arose from the spark and the rubbish heap
roming together in this way. But what to do about it is
quite different tale.
So when the idea of The United States of Europe drifted
of upon the wind and came in contact with the immense
ECTIONALISM
POLITICS
One
End
268
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST
48
February 15. 1930
THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE
Page 28)
vaunting their independence glory
passed, its hideous losses have
might
the
They
least
at
that
exalting
inhab
time
of
ground
defend the
Span-
with
pay
have and factories
them. They must
the catholicity Christendom
She
rested
her
Empire.
The
body
the structure of
The
make
to
Count
has
plight
Vienna
of
They
folly of the present
She
the aword uplifted
frontier
cavil
disci-
railways
and only mean,
revival under
solidarity.
living
of
the
but
Germany
are true
grouping
The Economic Sink
of
Why
have further manifeste issued by
in 1927, stating in effect that
body.
The Extreme in Nationalism
taina? the
and
about
slowly strangling herealt and that
economic policy is not reversed she
herself utterly impoverlabed and
Upon states, and
bankrupt. The report of the Consultative
of the League National pub-
each
and
last May, supports the bankers
The
away. The
Finally, M. Briand, the most
and certainly the eloquent
from
which medieval Christendom
anarchy must be torn The
of European with all the
vagueness of parlia-
human
of
proclaimed to the of
now
dealing
Nations his adherence to the
patience,
the
Europe.
nation:
loyalty
to
of Versailles
nationalism
The
slogan
do
most
that federal
nothing
into
has
barriers
would
states
loyalty the
the
He
The
barriers
fortu-
production
in-
divided
that
support
Doctor
they
The
Versailles
Trianon,
"Truth
States
Let
Barriers to Unity
Europe be
the House of Com-
has had the wit and
model of the tariff
of
purely
of He mounted
and
boun-
and
They
the
the
and imitation brickwork and
disputed
heights around the fronthe
better
In
border
the Treaties of Vermailles
tariff
Trianon represent the fullest expres
national and racial feeling which
resulta?
First
Necessity
of by Gerpractically
military organization is
of intensely thought
injured
knows about it. Battalions
of
of relief and
all,
United
the
lines
the
brigades gathered together
division, and division forms part
her.
grouped
Europe
flow
in chief, and finally the
in chief subordinate himself
generalisaimo.
the form
United States tariffs
higher, the
Wisdom Learned in War
declared
Imagine the ruin which would overtake
there were nothing but battal.
of United States
Therefore,
United States entitled
meet
bread
than
by
the
of
within
the
or
Nature
overcoming
the
free
Inter-
the
dominating factor rapid accretion
material wealth.
ished.
but
Balkanised.
Hapaburgs
unwieldy.
coherent entity
Poland has escaped
Why
little of
has
from
dungeon brietling
dassled by the light. The
whole Middle Europe, from the
Baltic Egean, is split into small
dearly
in
the
war?
Why divilian himself
of
French, German Spanish or Dutch and
simultaneously as European and, finally
citizen of the whole world. The flame
Sir Stamp perhaps
neat practical made
calculations which show that before the
(Continued .. Page
269
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST
world
Canada
United
The
King's
Not
British
The
and
neighborb
the
of
United
With Europe But Net
Great
them
Britain
from
Her
instance
Every
Europe
power.
her
increasing
the
that
truly
world
be
and
the
final
conclu-
these
deep
States
hatred
Europe,
to
lay
good
saide
in
it
for
Europe
internal
unity
growth
British
Empire
and
self-knowledge
the
English-
among
it.
and without
watch and aid the as
but
of the European tragedy and
without survey their sure and sound
wealth: being very constride towards European
which to the general
idealists may stand to
gether. the surest of all the
guaranties against the renewal of great
wars
partner in their good
fortune, and that any sinister tendencies
will be restrained or corrected by our united
strength.
270
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE December 22, 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
TO
Mr. Kamarck
FROM
Subject: Plane Shipments to British Forces
1.
2.
In the week ending December 16, a total of 62 planes
of
all types
(43 combat planes) were shipped to
British
forces.
Twenty-three Douglas and Boeing Boston bombers, or
moretothan
half of the total shipment of 43 combat planes,
went
Russia.
3. For the first time in the period that we have been re-
ceiving these statements (since February 1), there were
no deliveries of American airplanes to the United
Kingdom.
271
-2Table A -- Shipments by Area
(From February 1, 1941)
Week ending
November 25
To the United Kingdom
Light and medium bombers
98
0
Naval patrol bombers
82
0
Pursuit
Army cooperation
to Date
1,022
0
Heavy bombers
Total Reported
0
235
0
21
Total to the United Kingdom
1,458
0
To the Middle East
Light and medium bombers
299
3
Heavy bombers
0
5
Pursuit
Trainers
9
748
NO
142 1
Total to the Middle East
1,194
20
To the British Pacific Forces
Light and medium bombers
Naval patrol bombers
Pursuit
36
12
0
0
Trainers
0
119
0
93
Total to Pacific Forces
260
0
To the Forces in Russia
Light and medium bombers
23
Total to Russian Forces
To the Canadian Forces
Light and medium bombers
Naval patrol bombers
Pursuit
Trainers
44
44
23
38
0
0
13
8
42
1,097
11
Total to Canadian Forces
1,190
19
Totals
Light and medium bombers
Heavy bombers
Naval patrol bombers
Pursuit
Army cooperation
Trainers
Total
1,439
26
103
107
0
0
1,144
17
21
0
1,332 1
19
62
4,146
1 Shipment of trainers not previously reported to us are included 6,
in this week's cumulative total. Aug. 23, 18 planes; Sept.
24 planes; Sept. 13, 12 planes. (All shipments were to Southern
Rhodesia).
272
-3Table B -- Shipments by Types
(From February 1, 1941)
Week
ending
Dec. 16
Bell Airacobra
0
Boeing B-17
0
Boston III
Brewster Buffalo
Cessna T-50
15
0
11
Consolidated Catalina
Liberator I
Liberator II
Curtiss Kittyhawk
Tomahawk
Douglas Boston II
Boston III
Fairchild-24
0
0
Maryland II
Grumman Martlet II
Lockheed Hudson II
Hudson III
Hudson IV
Hudson V
North American Harvard II
Mustang
Pitcairn Autogiro
United Chesapeake
Vultee Stinson - 049
Grand Total - All Types
154
21
39
119
544
107
22
0
60
17
382
0
416
0
8
0
Glenn Martin Baltimore
Maryland I
Total
Reported
to Date
29
449
12
68
3
0
114
0
1
0
0
9
1
0
297
0
9
0
380
8
788
0
64
0
5
0
52
0
4
62
4,146
-4Table C -- Plane Shipments to the British by Weeks
(From February 1, 1941)
Week
Ended
35 Weeks (February 1October 7) TOTAL
Light and
medium
bombers
Naval
Heavy
bombers
1,241
47
35
1
Patrol
Bombers
95
Army
Pursuit
741
Coopera-
tion
6
Trainers
Total
916
3,046
35 Weeks (February 1October 7)
WEEKLY AVERAGE
October 14, 1941
October 21, 1941
October 28, 1941
November 4, 1941
November 11, 1941
November 18, 1941
November 25, 1941
December 2, 1941
December 9, 1941
December 16, 1941
February 1-December 16,
1941 - Total
1
45
21
9
9
10
12
19
2
13
1
7
21
0.2
26
87
1
68
o
44
1
50
0
57
167
138
3
3
38
4
86
19
31
100
3
45
0
2
34
2
42
94
1
67
0
38
118
5
0
6
19
NO
1
23
47
14
34
5
0
26
0
0
17
107
1,144
1,439
103
28
65
0
64
137
6
20
79
0
19
72
3
21
1,332
1
4,146
Shipments of trainers not previously reported to us are included in this week's cumulative
table.
Aug.Rhodesia.)
23, 18 planes; Sept. 6, 24 planes; Sept. 13, 12 planes. (All shipments were
to Southern
Since we do not have a breakdown by weeks of the deliveries to Canadian forces prior to
October, no statement of deliveries by weeks is given for this period.
Treasury Department
Division of Monetary Research
Date Dec. 22, 19419
To:
Miss Chauncey
I think the Secretary would
274
like to see this. Copies have been
Oht to Messrs. Bell, Sullivan, Paul,
Foley, and Blough.
MR. WHITE
Branch 2058 - Room 2141
275
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE
December 22, 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
TO
FROM Mr. White
Subject: British Excess Profits Tax.
Advice
in the appended
cables
indicates the following to
be the
viewsreceived
of Lord Beaverbrook
and Mr.
Bevin:
Lord Beaverbrook's views:
1. The excess profits tax affects production adversely through (a)
discouraging maximum efficiency, (b) encouraging wasteful
expenditures not needed at the present time, and (c) putting
a premium on evasive accounting practices which cannot be
effectively stopped.
2.
Although the 100 percent rate is a political necessity and
cannot be lowered, increasing the 20 percent post-war rebate
to
30 percent
or 40 percent would overcome most of the objections
to the tax.
3. He believes that in the United States a 60 percent excess profits
tax would be preferable to the English system.
Mr. Bevin's views differ from those of Lord Beaverbrook:
1. In his opinion, any tendency of the tax to cause managerial
inefficiency has been more than offeet by other wartime
measures which place a premium on efficiency. For example,
labor cannot be laid off and must be paid at the standard
rate. This has stimulated management to increase efficiency
and prevent interruptions and delays.
2.
In his opinion, criticism comes from financial rather than
industrial sources, because the tax is part of a general
stabilization scheme which leads to less buying and selling
of securities. He expresses the view that Secretary Morgenthau can safely ignore such criticism unless he is forced
to pay more attention to Wall Street than the British Govern-
ment does to financial groups.
3. Many large British business concerns consider the excess
profits tax 8.8 insurance against socialization, which might
be impelled by reaction against war profiteering.
4. He would not object to higher post-war rebates to give
larger reserves for post-war purposes, but believes this to
be politically not feasible.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
276
FROM: American Embassy, London, England
DATE: December 18, 1941, 9 pim.
NO.: 6125
THIS TELEGRAM IS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FROM MR. LAUREN
CASADAY FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Reference is made to telegram no. 5169, sent by the
Department on the 13th of November 1941.
The following view concerning the excess profit tax
was expressed by Lord Beaverbrook. Immediately and with
exphasis he made the statement that the present tax effects
production adversely. It encourages expenditures which are
wasteful or which are not needed at the present time and
discourages maximum efficiency. It puts a premium on devis-
ing doubtful practices in accounting to evade the tax
and at the government's expense to benefit business. It
seems as if the chartered accountants who serve industry,
whom Lord Beaverbrook sardonically referred to as the largest
single class of employees in England or some similar words,
can always move a little more rapidly than those who
serve the Inland Revenue Bureau, and the result is that no
effective stop can be ap lied to these evasive practices.
The
277
-2-
The statement was made by Lord Beaverbrook that
industry is being stripped naked really by the combined
effect of the income tax and the tax on excess profits.
The public, he said, has never really learned what a
real burden on business these combined taxes are and
the effects of them are not appreciated by the public.
It is Lord Beaverbrook's belief that most of the
difficulties referred to would be overcome by a tax
rate of 60 or 70 per cent in spite of the fact that
the other 30 or 40 per cent might be blooked or restricted
as to use until after the war in some way. The point was
clearly made that a lowering of the present tax rate is
not advocated by Lord Beaverbrook. It is his belief that
politically the tax is a necessity and that there is a
political advantage of having a tax rate of 100 per cent
in that it is easily understood and rather simple. He
even made the statement that were it possible to begin
all over again, and have the whole problem of war taxation
reconsidered, a 100 per dent tax on excess profits would
be advocated by him. He stated that it was his belief that
CAVE
was a necessity but for the United States he
YWEA91T
- advise it. For our picture he thought a tax
JEO
of 60 per cent would be better.
to
Holdivia
VISIONOM
WINANT
278
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM: American Embassy, London, England
DATE: December 18, 1941, 6 p.m.
NO.: 6119
THIS TELEGRAM IS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FROM MR. LAUREN
W. CASADAY FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Reference is made to telegram no. 5169, sent by the
Department on the 13th of November, 1941.
It has been denied by Mr. Bevin, with as much
emphasis as it was affirmed by Lord Beaverbrock, that
the present tax on excess profits leads to inefficient
management. He conceded that it might have tended to
result in this way if it were not that the operation of
other wartine measures have placed a premium on the
greatest efficiency. Among these measures most important
are the essential work orders which give a standard pay
and a standard work week to labor, restrict the right of
employers to hire, fire, or lay off men, and restrict
labor's free movements. Numerous examples were given by
Mr. Bevin which included mining, dooking, railroad, iron
and steel industries. In these most strenuous efforts
have been made by the managements to attain the highest
efficiency in spite of several wartime shifts, dispersals
and similar readjustments, because it was realized that
labor
279
-2-
labor could not be laid off, and whether used or not,
had to be paid at the standard rate.
He gave the explanation that managements were induced
by the incentive to use the labor force fully not only to
have the workers kept busy in a superficial sense but also
to devise within the industry and even on an inter-industrial
scale a system of timing and organization by which expensive delays and interruptions would be prevented. Mr. Bevin
made the statement that the production in mining is greater
now that it was before the war irrespective of the fact
that there are now employed over 100,000 fewer men.
Improvements within the mines were involved in this as
well as greater care in coordination of production with
the facilities of the railway and trucking industry.
He said that the turnaround period in shipping which was
greatly shortened was attained in like manner.
The statement was made by Mr. Bevin that although
he is constantly dealing with and meeting representatives
of management, no complaint against the present tax on
excess profits has been heard by him from such represen-
tatives. It is his opinion that from financial rather
than industrial sources come the criticism because this
tax is a part of a system which was designed to keep the
country's economy and profits stablized. This causes
less
280
-3-
less buying and selling of industrial securities which is
a development the financial community does not accept
cheerfully. He made a statement to the effect that
Mr. Morgenthau can ignore criticism of this sort safely
unless he is forced to attend to Wall Street more than
we do to the city.
He also stated that he was sure that the tax was
considered a form of insurance against the nationalization
of industry by many of the largest business concerns in
Britain who were not the least desirous of having it
either greatly lowered or removed. He said that it was
almost certain that the result of many signs of war
profiteering would be an immediate elamour for the
socialization of war industry which would be so strong
that the Government could not ignore it.
The only criticism Bevin had of this tax was that
some firms might be left with reserves which would not
be enough to meet readjustments of the post war period.
He stated that he would make no objection to a proposal
to have the post war tax rebate increased somewhat, but
it was his belief that owing to political considerations
there was little chance that such a proposal would actually
be introduced.
Emphasis
281
Emphasis was placed by Mr. Bevin on the fact that
the tax on excess profits must be considered as a factor
of a stabilization scheme which is general and includes
stabilization of wages and prices. Monetary deflation
and an economic slump will, otherwise, be brought by the
post war period. Such a situation after the last war
caused directly in 1926 the general strike. Noswithstanding
the recent increases in wages, labor is as anxious as
government and business to aviod events of this type,
he said,
WINANT
CEVEHOES
Insuring (108891T
laer OS 030
to a
EtatenoM
282
December 22, 1941
Mr. White
Mr. Southard
Subject: Reneval of $50,000,000 Stabilization Agreement of 1937 with the
Central Dank of China.
1. Paragraph 6 of this agreement provides for action thirty days prior to the
expiration date. The agreement, last. extended in July 1941. new expires
December 31. 1941.
2. On December 17 the Central Bask of China requested that the agreement be
extended for a further six months. Apparently the Central Bank usually is tarty
is requesting extension.
3. You have initialed the letter prepared for the Secretary's signature
instructing the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to extend the 1937 agreement to
June 30, 1948.
4. At the present time, under this agreement, the Stabilisation Fund is holding
65,000,000 year valued as $19,112,500 and collateralised by $29,379,000 is gold.
Prior to the we repayments, totaling 100,000,000 year. which occurred is February
1939. the purchases of year under this agreement totaled 165,000,000 valued at
$46,487,500.
283
C
0
P
Y
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 22, 1941
In reply refer to
FD 840.51 Frozen Credits/3960
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to
the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and encloses
a copy of confidential despatch No. 1025, dated October 8,
1941, from the American Consulate General, Hong Kong,
China, concerning the effect of Hong Kong's entry into
the sterling bloc and of the American and British Orders
"Freezing" Chinese assets.
Enclosure:
Despatch No. 1025,
from Consulate General,
Hong Kong, China,
October 8, 1941.
284
1025
Hong Kong, October 8, 1941
CONFIDENTIAL
Effect of Hong Kong's Entry Into the
Sterling Bloc and of the American and
British Orders "Freezing" Chinese
Assets
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
I have the honor to supplement this office's despatch No. 998
of August 23, 1941, et ante, regarding the recent American and
British orders freezing Chinese assets and the action of the British
authorities in placing Hong Kong in the Sterling bloc. The following
additional comment has been prepared by Consul Bruins.
While there is still a considerable amount of uncertainty and
confusion both among bankers and business men as to the details
under which these financial measures are being administered, the
Colony of Hong Kong is gradually getting down to a working basis.
The only subsequent official enactment has been the order of the
Hong Kong Exchange Control issued on September 23, 1941, restricting
the withdrawal and conversion of Chinese National dollar deposits.
For example, it was possible to withdraw National dollars from local
banks or exchange brokers and take them surreptitiously to Shanghai
at a profit of twenty percent. The order in question was aimed at
stopping this leakage. It apparently had the immediate effect of
taking it out of the hands of the more reputable banks and exchange
dealers, while Japanese agents and others continued the activity by
smuggling notes to Macao effecting telegraphic transfers from there.
However this activity is now understood to have declined materially.
The principal matter of interest to the local community is
whether the foregoing orders have actually resulted in a material
diminution of trade through Hong Kong into Free China, which trade
of necessity has to be "smuggled" through the Japanese lines which
surround the Colony. The last trade figures available are for August
1941 and do not show any diminution in value. The placing of Hong
Kong in the Sterling area is also likely to benefit its trade with
Singapore. Several prominent local businessmen and bankers have just
been interviewed on this subject. The general opinion is that the
increased trade with Singapore will only offset to a small extent the
285
-2possible loss in trade with Free China. The extent of the decline
in the latter is not readily determinable. Some decline in trade is
attributable to the shortage of shipping space rather than to the
foregoing financial measures. Thus far the administration of the
Sterling bloc restrictions by Mr. D. Kelvin-Stark, Hong Kong's Controller of Exchange, has been notably more liberal than the policy
followed in Singapore. Several shipments of trucks and gasoline have
received exchange permits and although this has not been admitted as
a long-term policy, it appears that the pressure of local business
interests (which in this instance coincides with the national policy
of granting all possible aid to China) have caused the Controller of
Exchange to adopt a definitely more liberal administrative attitude
for the time being than is the case in British Malaya. Consequently,
it seems unlikely that the actual value of import transactions will
undergo any material reduction in the near future. However, it is
understood that some restrictions are to be made on "luxury" items.
The important remittance business from United States to China by
way of Hong Kong encountered temporary difficulties. On the original
issuance of the freezing orders, arrangements were made under special
permission from the Hong Kong Government to transfer seventy-five
percent of the amounts formerly transmitted. The new instructions of
September 23 to local banks restricting the withdrawal and conversion
of Chinese National dollar deposits, interrupted such payments
temporarily. Foreign remittances to this area can still be paid out
in Hong Kong dollars. The Stabilization Board of China has just made
arrangements for the local banks to issue drafts in unlimited amounts
covering remittances, payable in Chinese National dollars to persons in
Free China. Some Hong Kong banks have continued to pay out small
amounts in Chinese currency, regardless of the regulations.
As previously reported, the Hong Kong Government recently broadened
the requirement under which British subjects had to report their
foreign holdings for later conversion into sterling at the official rate,
so that it included persons of all nationalities. No steps have been
taken to enforce this feature as regards holdings of Americans outside
the Colony although the local government immediately prohibited the
sending of messages regarding trading in such assets. This immediately
stopped the activities of the American brokerage concerns in Hong Kong
as reported September 30th. The Chase Bank subsequently applied for
special permission on behalf of one of its important clients to effect
a stock transfer but was refused. Reference is made to the Department's
telegram No. 255, of September 5, 1941, to Hong Kong on this subject,
indicating that the Hong Kong authorities will doubtless receive instructions
from London to treat American citizens in a manner similar to the practice established in Great Britain in this respect, namely, that Americans
residing in Hong Kong will not be required to report their foreign holdings
286
-3-
which were in their possession prior to the effective date of the
order. The substance of this telegram was brought to the attention
of the Hong Kong Controller of Exchange. He stated that no enforcement had yet been undertaken, that he had received instructions from
London of similar tone although not in sufficient detail for him to
take positive action. He expressed his appreciation for the information
and stated that in due course a corresponding order would probably be
issued. He expressed a desire to phrase such an order so that it would
not appear discriminatory in favor of Americans and stated that it
would probably be made to apply to all aliens not subject to freezing
control orders.
The recent enactments appear not to have had any adverse effect
on the exchange rate between Hong Kong dollars and American dollars.
The former continues to be equivalent to US$0.25.
The American banks are still critical of the action of the
Stabilization Board of China in offering sterling and American dollars
in Shanghai beginning August 18th at rates below the open market for
financing certain imports destined to Free China or to the Shanghai
International Settlement. The criticism is based mainly on their
assertions that the action was not fully enough considered and upon
the extreme difficulty of the banks in ascertaining exactly which
import orders were destined to the International Settlement. They
further assert that importers in Shanghai are in many cases under
Japanese influence and may even unknowingly sell to Japan-agents or to
Japanese controlled accounts. The point is that there is no sure way
to determine, for example, whether an importation of cotton will actually
be imported, spun, woven and sold in such a manner as not to accrue in some
indirect fashion to Japanese interests. American banks further assert
that their authority is not adequate for them to take the necessary
responsibility in this matter, that the British banks, at least the one
large British bank having headquarters here, can take such responsibility
and, therefore, the British banks are gaining great trade advantages
through the present arrangement. One prominent American banker also
expressed his opinion that a continuance of the present method of operation
will probably necessitate a far larger stabilization fund than is now
available in order to produce the desired effect both in import trade
and upon confidence in the Chungking currency.
The foregoing summarizes the situation upon the eve of the arrival
in Hong Kong of Mr. H. Merle Cochran and Sir Otto Niemeyer. Enclosed
is a copy of an editorial from the usually reliable "Hong Kong Telegraph"
of October 6, 1941, entitled "China's Currency" describing the popular
interest in the attempt now being made to "make the official Fund watertight."
SUMMARY: From the foregoing, the following conclusions may be drawn:
(1) Much confusion and uncertainty in the administration in Hong
Kong of the new financial regulations still exists;
287
-4-
(2) Steps have been taken to reduce the leakage of Chinese
National currency from Hong Kong at which large profits were being made;
(3) The expected reduction in the trade of the Colony as a
result of its inclusion in the Sterling bloc has not thus far materialized,
due to the relatively liberal administration of this order;
(4) It appears probable that the importance of the Colony as a
shipping point for supplies into Free China will continue to cause a
liberal administration of the Sterling bloc regulations, which would
otherwise materially curtail such trade;
(5) The main difficulties in effecting payment at Hong Kong of
remittances from the United States to Free China have been overcome;
(6) The Hong Kong Government is adopting a reasonable administrative
attitude on the recent requirement that all persons in the Colony must
report their foreign holdings for possible later conversion into Sterling
at the official rate;
(7) American bankers are still highly critical of the action of
the Stabilization Board initiated August 18, 1941, making Sterling and
dollar exchange available in Shenghai at adventageous rates for payment
of certain imports:
(8) The Hong Kong currency continues to be steady at approximately
US$0.25 per Hong Kong dollar;
(9) The operation of the Stabilization Fund appears to be resulting
in undue advantage to the British Banks, partly because of the fact that
the statutes under which they operate give then greater freedom of action
than is the case with American banks;
(LO) The American order freezing Chinese assets has caused no
adverse criticism in the Colony, nor any observable ill effects boyond
the inevitable delays and inconvenience;
(11) Many competent observers still believe that the disadvantages
of the inclusion of Hong Kong in the Sterling bloc far outweigh the
advantages.
Respectfully,
Addison E. Southard
American Consul General
800
JHB:bp
Enclosure
1/ Editorial from the
Hong Kong Telegraph.
-5-
Distribution
In quintuplicate to the
Department - by air mail;
Copy to the Embassy,
Chungking:
Copy to the Embassy,
Peiping:
Copy to the Consulate
General, Shanghai.
288
289
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1025
dated October 8, 1941, from Addison
E. Southard, American Consul General
at Hong Kong, on the subject of
"Effect of Hong Kong's Entry Into the
Sterling Bloc and of the American and
British Orders 'Freezing' Chinese
Assets."
HONG KONG TELEGRAPH
Oct. 6, 1941.
CHINA'S CURRENCY
FINANCIAL experts representing China, the United States and
Britain are to meet in Hong Kong this week for the purpose of discussing Anglo-American financial aid to China. The august group
will include Sir Otto Niemeyer, the prominent British monetary and
economic expert, Mr. H. Merle Cochrane, representing the United States,
and members of the China Currency Stabilisation Board, comprising
Messrs Manuel Fox, E. L. Hall-Patch, K. P. Chen, Tsu Yee-pei and Hsi
Teh-mou. Naturally enough. considerable secrecy surrounds the mooted
parleys, but it is generally conceded that they will cover not only
the general subject of British and American financial aid to China,
but the anny interrelated issues such as the effective operation of
the freezing orders, the official bolstering of Chuncking's currency
in the face of persistent attempts in Shanghai to undermine it, and
the development of Free China's economic potential, both as a means
of meeting the extensive credits advanced by Washington and London, and
as a postwar asset in the rebuilding of China.
The Stabilisation Board has already made quite considerable pro-
gress in the fulfilment of its task, notably towards elimination of the
Shenghai "black market", but the freezing orders imposed by the ABCD
Front have introduced new factors which make Shanghai's position vis-a-vis
the democracies extremely complex. To-day the ABCD Front is in a
position to confine the whole of its trade with Shanghai to operations
financed through its 14 banks, specially licensed for legitimate exchange
operations at the Fund's rates. All other trade between Shanghai and
the ABCD countries can be cut off entirely, apart from outright snuggling,
and this in time would leave Shenghai foreign traders no choice but
either to cooperate fully with the Fund, or withdraw from all business
with the democracies. The Fund, if it is to be at all effective, must
be in a position to set its exchange rates against U.S. Dollars and the
Found Storling and to see to it that all foreign trade overations are
carried out at those rates and not at rates below the official marks.
290
-2-
It has long been known that the Stabilisation Board has
experienced great difficulties in making its currency policy effective
in operation, due partly to differences of opinion in methods to be
applied, but chiefly because of lack of complete cooperation by
several of the banking institutions in Shanghai which has permitted
the "black market" considerable freedom in its manipulations. This
situation has now changed, but doubtless there are other ways and
means of making the official Fund watertight, and it is probably to
discuss these that the financial experts are meeting in Hong Kong
this week. The results of their deliberations will be watched with
unconcealed interest.
Copy:bj:12-#3-41
291
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 22, 1941
Dear Henry:
Thank you very much for your letter of December
eighteenth enclosing a memorandum of the same date for
the President concerning information furnished you by
Mr. Knoke of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
relating to a request of the Lisbao e Azores Bank at
Lisbon.
Sincerely yours,
The Honorable
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury.
0
0
292
P
Y
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington
In reply refer to
December 22, 1941
FD 894.515/98
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the
Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and encloses a copy
of despatch No. 2270, dated November 27, 1941, from the American
Enbassy, Lima, Peru, concerning shipments of gold bullion from
Japan to Peru.
Enclosure:
Despatch No. 2270
From Embassy, Lima,
November 27, 1941.
eh:copy
12-23-41
No. 2270
Lima, November 27, 1941.
293
Subject: Shipments of Gold Bullion
from Japan to Peru.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir:
I have the honor to refer to the Department's strictly confidential
instruction No. 737 of November 18, 1941, with reference to shipments of
gold bullion from Japan to Peru.
The statements that the shipments were effected through the Yokohama
Specie Bank and consigned to Mr. N. Kobayashi are confirmed by statements
of officers of the Central Reserve Bank. Those regarding the purposes
of the shipments are more ample than the explanations given at the Central
Reserve Bank, although we have no reason for questioning the statements
of the latter at the present time, since the value of the bullion received
is in line with the volume of recent and current exports to Japan. The
appropriation of a part of the shipments for paying the salaries of
Japanese officers in Peru would appear to be a natural method of procedure. So far the Embassy has obtained no concrete information nor heard
remarks by persons of responsibility to the effect that the funds are
destined for other uses. It is quite possible, however, that such is the
case and any details which may be obtained will be forwarded promptly.
The Embassy's telegram No. 616 of November 15. 1941, in reply to
the Department's circular telegram dated November 14, 1941, 6 p.m., re-
-2-
294
ferred to the Embassy's despatches, No. 1819 of September 26, 1941 and
No. 1892 of October 3. 1941, wherein details were given regarding two
shipments of gold bullion.
I wish to make particular reference to the first three paragraphs
at the top of page 2 of Despatch No. 1892, dated October 3. 1941, which
informed the Department that the Central Reserve Bank of Peru requested
the opinion of the American Government with reference to these shipments
of gold. One of the directors of the bank, under instructions from
President Gazzani, made a special point of consulting the Embassy on this
matter. He stated that such shipments might possibly conflict in some way
unknown to the Peruvian Government with the program or policy of the
American Government. He stated further that it is the desire of the Central
Reserve Bank to cooperate with the United States and that consequently it
would be desirable to know if the American Government would like to have
the second shipment of gold bullion rejected and returned to Japan.
He said that the Peruvian Government was entirely willing to do so if
the American authorities gave the least indication that such action would
be considered as a cooperative measure.
The Director has inquired on two occasions since our initial conversation as to whether any reply had been received from Washington. It was
necessary to inform him that so far none had been.
Judging from the facts in the case, it occurs to me that we have here
an example in which the Peruvian authorities have expressed a willingness
to cooperate with us without receiving any favorable reaction on our part.
However, 1 fully realize that Washington may be in possession of adequate
reasons unknown to the Embassy for leaving the matter in abeyance.
295
Nevertheless, if the failure to reply to that portion of Despatch
No. 1892 was due to an error or oversight I should be pleased to transmit
to the Central Reserve Bank whatever reply the Department considers
appropriate in the case.
Respectfully yours,
For the Ambassador,
Julian Greenup,
Commercial Attache.
A true copy of
the signed orig.
851
JG-mc
eh:copy 12-23-41
296
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION
Cheumoey
TO
DATE December 22, 1941
Secretary Morgenthau
FROM Mr. Dietrich
CONFIDENTIAL
Registered sterling transactions of the reporting banks were as follows:
Sold to commercial concerns
Purchased from commercial concerns
£85,000
£19,000
Open market sterling remained at 4.03-3/4, and there were no reported
transactions.
The Canadian dollar moved off to close at a new current low of 13-3/4%
discount, as against 11-3/4% a week ago. During the past few days. New York banks
have placed the daily turnover in this currency in the neighborhood of $50,000 to
$100,000.
In light trading, the Argentine free peso declined 10 points to close at
-
.2360.
In New York, closing quotations for the foreign currencies listed below were
as follows:
Brazilian milreis (free)
Colombian peso
Mexican peso
Uruguayan peso (free)
Venezuelan peso (free)
Cuban peso
.0516
.5775
.2065
.5310
.2690
Par
We sold $4,988,000 in gold to the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic,
which was added to its earmarked account.
The State Department forwarded a cable to us reporting that Samuel Montagu &
Company. London, shipped $22,000 and $14,000 in gold from England to the head
offices of the National City Bank and the Bankers Trust Company. respectively. for
sale to the New York Assay Office.
In London, spot and forward silver were unchanged at 23-1/2d and 23-9/16d,
respectively. The U. S. equivalents were 42.67 and 42.78
The Treasury's purchase price for foreign silver was unchanged at 35 Handy
and Herman's settlement price for foreign silver was also unchanged at 35-1/84.
We made no purchases of silver today.
D
297
12
2
SECRET
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
REPORT
SUPPLY ROUTES
FROM
THE UNITED STATES
TO THE
RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
December 22, 1941
298
SUPPLY ROUTES
SECRET
FROM THE UNITED STATES
TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
General Table of Contents
PART I
Page
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
PART II
THE NORTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES
A. Summary and Conclusions
1
B. The Route via Archangel
5
C. The Fort of Murmansk and its
67
Railway Connections
D. The Northern Sea Route
74
PART III
THE EASTERN SUPPLY ROUTE
D. The Trans-Siberian Railway
E. Supplementary Ports in Eastern Siberia and
Connections with the Trans Siberian
F. Supplementary Rail Routes in West Siberia, the
Urals and the Trans-Volga
5
C. The Port of Vladivostok
4
B. The Maritime Section
1
A. Summary and Conclusions
10
30
34
299
SECRET
PART IV
Page
THE SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES
Summary and Conclusions
1
A.
B. The Ocean Routes
8
C. Definition of the Land Routes
9
D. The Western Group of Southern
Supply Routes
10
E. The Eastern Group of Southern
Supply Routes
48
MAPS
Following Part IV
MAP I
SUPPLY RCUTES TO THE RUSSIAN FRONT
MAP II
ICE CONDITIONS IN THE WHITE SEA
MAP III SUPPLY ROUTES TO THE U.S.S.R. FROM THE SOUTH
SECR E
300
PART I
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In terms of practical action, Russia's allies cannot now provide
an adequate answer to the problem of Russian supply. Apparently the
need is extreme, while the only means available for satisfying it are
fractional and only half-satisfactory. A realization of the acute difficulty of this situation is the first essential step toward any practical attack upon the problem.
The two outstanding facts are these:
by depriving Russia of a considerable share of her productive
capacity, the war has created a critical and drastic need for foreign
supplies, and at the same time,
by closing all of Russia's best avenues of foreign communication,
the war has made it extremely difficult for friendly countries overseas
to act effectively to meet the Russian shortages.
The question of Russia's loss of productive capacity has been
treated in some detail in two reports previously prepared in the EastEuropean Section. 1 The industry of the country has been seriously
"Losses of Russian Industrial Production Resulting from the Eastward Movement of the War Front," 19 Sept. 1941: "Lines of Communication
between the United States and the Russo-German War Zone," 16 Oct. 1941
(Part II, "The War Losses of Russian Industry.").
--
301
SECRET
damaged, while Germany's superior productive power is reported to be
largely intact. Hence, in spite of the present successes of the Russian
armies, it is not improbable that their need for supplies will soon be
increasingly acute.
The task of the present report is to explore the routes still
available for the shipment of foreign material to Russia. When this
work was first undertaken, it was conceived of, mistakenly, as the task
of selecting the most satisfactory route from among a number to be
examined: in the end, it turned out to be the task of assessing the
possibilities of a number of rather unsatisfactory routes, all of which
will have to be utilized and developed if substantial deliveries are to
be made.
During the preparation of this report, it did not occur to anyone engaged in the work that the results to be presented, as to the
capacity of the several supply routes, might be used as a check upon
actual performance in the delivery of American goods to Russia. If
any attempt should be made to compare actual American (and British)
deliveries with the estimates of capacity here submitted, it ought
to be remembered, above all, that in most instances these estimates
show an extremely wide range of variation. Again, the estimates are
stated almost always in terms of tonnage, and the inclusion in current
shipments of large amounts of light but bulky cargo (for example,
crated airplanes) would tend to reduce very materially the value of
302
-3-
SECRET
any comparison, on the basis of tonnage, between estimated capacity and
actual deliveries. Finally, it must be said that in this report no
attempt whatever has been made to enter into the problems of planning,
procuring, assembling and loading the required cargo in America, and of
providing shipping space for its transportation overseas.
In normal times the main avenues of Russia's foreign trade run
by way of the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the land frontier between those
two seas. These avenues are now closed, of course, just as they were
during the First World War. But Vladivostok, wide open in 1914-18, is
now denied to the ships of countries that are at war with Japan.
Murmansk, opened late in the other war to break the blockade of the
European frontier, is not used currently for forwarding shipments to
the interior of Russia because of the great vulnerability of this route
to enemy attack. The Archangel route is threatened, as always, by Arc-
tic ice, but now it is also threatened by the enemy. The Northern Sea
Route to the Siberian river mouths is open for a brief season only, in
summer. The chief routes through the Middle East are probably occupied
very largely with the provisioning, not of the Russians, but of the
growing British forces in Iran and Iraq -- though the two roads from
India across Afghanistan may perhaps become new "Burma Roads" to Russia.
Such are the available transport lines to Russia and the Russian battle
front.
-4-
SECRET
303
THE NORTHERN ROUTES
The routes via Archangel and Murmansk are by all odds the short-
est between the Eastern industrial centers of the United States and the
Russo-German war zone; the distance from New York to Archangel is 4,673
nautical miles. In the ice-free season the port of Archangel can perhaps handle as much as 300,000 tons per month of imports - by far the
largest capacity of any Russian port still open to American ships. Unless the season is exceptionally severe, icebreakers and other aids to
ice navigation will in all probability serve to maintain a considerable
flow of goods to the small ports nearby, during the current winter,
when Archangel is closed by ice, though it is almost certain that the
tonnage just mentioned will not be equalled during the winter months.
Like the capacity of the port, that of the Archangel-Vologda railway
(partly single-track) is the subject of many varying estimates; the
line may be able to handle as such as 300,000 tons of southbound
freight per month -- or only 135,000 tons. The capacity of the railroad is almost completely available for imports, since it carries
scarcely any southbound freight of domestic origin. Archangel has
two southeastward connections, one via the Northern Dvina River, and
the other by way of a newly constructed railroad branching off from
the Archangel-Vologda line north of Vologda. The chief disadvantages of the Archangel route are the ice conditions in the White Sea,
and the danger of enemy attack by sea, land and air. Ships bound for
Archangel travel under naval convoy a part of the distance: but the
-5- -
304
BECRET
chief danger is that of air attack upon. the icebreakers. The number of
these indispensable escorts is limited, and without their help merchant
vessels cannot navigate the White Sea in winter.
The port of Murmansk is never closed by ice, and has a yearround capacity of perhaps as much as 100,000 tons per month of imports.
Its railway connection with Leningrad has been cut by enemy action, but
north of the area of enemy occupation there is a new railway connecting
the Murmansk line with the Archangel-Vologda railroad. In spite of the
obvious advantage offered by the ice-free port, the Murmansk route is
not now used for shipments to central Russia; for the present, at least,
the danger of attack is considered too serious.
If the transportation of goods to Russia were not beset with so
many difficulties, no one would think of mentioning the Northern Sea
Route and its river connections to the Trans-Siberian railway. The
mouth of the Ob is almost equally distant from New York and from Seattle-
about 5,500 nautical miles in either case. The northern seas are open
to navigation for a brief season only: and even then the assistance of
icebreakers is likely to be required at certain points - a fact that
might possibly have some bearing upon American construction programs.
Long in miles and short in season, the Northern Sea Route has the advantage of being comparatively safe from enemy attack.
THE EASTERN ROUTE
With Japan's declaration of war against the United States and
Great Britain, it became impossible for American and British ships to
reach Vladivostok (the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian railway)
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or the neighboring Pacific ports of Russia. Yet as long as Russia
remains neutral in this conflict, Boviet vessels and those of other
countries not at war with Japan will probably be able to carry cargo of
American origin to the Pacific ports of Russia. If Russia and Japan
become involved in hostilities, the whole fate of the trade route will
then hang on the outcome of the general Far Eastern war. If Japan should
be defeated while Germany and Russia are still at war, the Eastern route
would be of great significance once again.
Vladivostok is 4,570 nautical miles from San Francisco -- a hundred miles less than the distance from New York to Archangel. But this
comparison is deceptive, for the reason that the distance from Vladivostok to the war zone is several times the distance from Archangel to the
same region. Also industrial freight from the Eastern states of America,
destined for Vladivostok, would travel some additional thousands of miles
before it reached the American loading-port on the Pacific. The port of
Viadivostok, with a record of 168,000 tons per month in its best postRevolutionary year, apparently stands somewhere between Murmansk and
Archangel (summer average) in freight-handling capacity.
It is impossible to estimate the extent to which the demands of
the war have increased the tonnage of Siberian foodstuffs and industrial
products moving westward over the Siberian railways, and thus competing
with foreign imports for haulage capacity: yet the added burden of such
domestic freight is undoubtedly beaviest in Western Siberia, where
there are four roughly parallel trunk lines leading to European Russia.
Another factor of uncertainty, also undoubtedly affected by the war, is
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-
the amount of rolling stock available on the Trans-Siberian. Leaving
aside the indeterminable factor of rolling stock, it seems probable
that the Trans-Siberian railway can move westward as much as 250,000
tons of imports per month -- or considerably more than the estimated
capacity of the port of Vladivostok. Through four small ports on the
Pacific, with their connections by river or road-and-river, a limited
amount of freight can reach the Trans-Siberian railway, but hardly
enough to affect the supply situation very materially.
THE SOUTHERN ROUTES
From the United States to the Russo-German war zone, the North-
ern Route by way of Archangel (or Murmansk) is by all odds the shortest, the Eastern Route (via Vladivostok) comes next, while the Southern
Routes by way of the Middle East are very much the longest. From New
York to Archangel the distance is 4,673 nautical miles; from New
York via Cape Town to the head of the Persian Gulf is 12,010 nautical
miles; from San Francisco via Singapore to the same destination is
11,242 miles. But with hostilities actively under way in the area of
Singapore, it is probably necessary, for the time being, for ships out
of San Francisco bound for the Persian Gulf to sail by way of the
Torres Straits, or even to pass around Australia -- making the total
voyage 12,643 miles in one case, and 13,208 in the other. The passage
by way of Cape Town or Melbourne is probably comparatively safe, but
the sea distance in the latter case is nearly three times as great as
that to Archangel, and the subsequent trip from the port to central
Russia is also a much longer one.
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The Southern system of supply routes is very much more complex
than either of the other systems. The routes through Turkey, Iraq and
Iran, may be classed as the Western Group of Southern Routes. By the
spring of 1942, the routes through eastern Turkey might be expected to
forward about 21,000 tons per month (if the Turkish Government would
permit their use). From the Persian Gulf via the rivers, roads, and
railroads of Iraq and Iran, the deliveries to Trans-Caucasia and to the
Iranian Caspian ports may amount, by the same date, to about 100,000
tons per month.
The Eastern Group of Southern Routes is based on the modern port
of Karachi- in India. One road across eastern Iran, and two across
Afghanistan, connect the railways of India with those of Russian Cen-
tral Asia. After minor improvements -- which can best be undertaken,
in Afghanistan, by an American agency -- these roads should be capable
of delivering about 15,000 tons per month each, at the Russian railheads.
As a means of delivering supplies to the main Russian armies,
the routes of the Western Group have two conspicuous disadvantages:
first, there is probably a tendency to monopolize their capacity for
the benefit of the increasing British force in Iraq and Iran; and
second, this tendency would be increased, and at the same time the
communications of these roads with central Russia would be cut off,
if the Germans advanced to the Caucasus and Astrakhan (an event not
now so imminent as it appeared to be a short time ago). In other
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words, the roads of the Western Group appear well suited to the supply
of the British in this area, but not particularly well suited to the
supply of the main Russian armies.
The East Iranian Road, connecting with Karachi, may also be
required to serve chiefly British needs, but the two roads through
Afghanistan would seen to be free for development as supply lines to
Russia. The one qualification upon their usefulness is this: in the
event of a German advance to the Caspian, the Russian railway through
Central Asia would be obliged to transport a large tonnage of Caucasian
oil over the long, roundabout line from Krasnovodak through Tashkent to
Chkalov (Orenburg): and this would certainly limit the capacity of the
railroad to handle supplies delivered by way of the Afghan roads.
G. T. Robinson
Chief
East-European Section
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PART II
THE NORTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE UNITED STATES
TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
Table of Contents
Page
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1
THE ROUTE VIA ARCHANGEL
5
The Problem
2. The North Atlantic and the Barents Sea
3. Ice Conditions in the White Sea and its Western
Approach
5
1.
5
B.
6
4. The Past Performance of Icebreakers in Other
North Eurasian Waters
16
5. Past Experience in Winter Navigation in the
White Sea
27
6. Aids to the Winter Navigation of the White
Sea Route in 1941
45
7. Facilities and Capacity of Archangel and the
Neighboring Ports
8. The Rail and River Connections of Archangel
9. The Vulnerability of the Archangel Route
C.
THE PORT OF MURMANSK AND ITS RAILWAY CONNECTIONS
1.
General Considerations
2. The Port
51
58
65
67
67
67
70
3. The Murman Railway
4. The Connection between the Archangel and
Murman Railways
71
74
D. THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
74
1.
The problem
2. The Ocean Lanes of the Northern Sea Route
The River Routes from the Northern Sea Route to
3.
the Trans-Siberian Railway System
SEE MAPS I AND II
74
93
310
PART II
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THE NORTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE UNITED STATES
TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The northern routes to the Soviet Union run by way of Archangel
(on the White Sea), Murmansk (on the Barents Sea, at the extreme north-
west corner of Russian territory), and the Arctic mouths of the great
Siberian rivers.
The Route via Archangel
The chief factor in favor of the route via Archangel is its
large capacity in the ice-free season -- a capacity that can in all
probability be maintained in a substantial degree this winter. The
chief unfavorable factors affecting this route are the uncertainty as
to the effect of winter conditions, and the vulnerability of the sea
lanes, the port, and the inland connections to enemy attack.
To what extent can the navigation of the White Sea be main-
tained during the winter months? In an attempt to answer this question,
a number of different subjects have been examined: the complex ice con-
ditions of the White Sea, the past performance of icebreakers in other
north-Eurasian waters, the drive to bring ships through the ice to Archangel during the First World War, and the means available for the ice
campaign of the current winter. There is no common measure for all the
factors that must contribute to the solution of this problem: but the
tentative conclusion of this study is, that unless the present winter
is one of very exceptional severity, navigation on a considerable scale
can be maintained. The conditions are so variable and so difficult to
measure that the ice-campaign has much of the uncertainty of a naval war,
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but the chances seen to be rather definitely on the side of a limited
success.
Just how limited, it is quite impossible to say. Official
foreign and Soviet estimates of the capacity of the port vary greatly,
even for the summer months when the ice is out and this major factor
of uncertainty is eliminated; but the record of the past performance
of the port suggests that in the ice-free season it might perhaps
handle incoming freight totalling as much as the highest recent foreign
estimates of 300,000 tons per month. A British representative in Russia
believes that some 24 vessels per month can be discharged at two smaller
neighboring ports when Archangel is closed by ice; an American representa-
tive there puts the figure at 36 to 39 ships. The Soviet authorities expect
on their part, to maintain this winter a considerably larger inflow and
discharge of freight.
a
Archangel is connected with central Russia, via Vologda, by
railway that has for some distance south of the port only a single track.
An American railway of this type would handle something more than 300,000
tons per month in each direction -- that is, more than the highest estimate
for the monthly import capacity of Archangel in summer. However, nearly
all the current estimates of the capacity of the railway fall very much
below this figure, and a recent cable from an official American source in
Russia says that the line can carry, southbound, a total of only about
135,000 tons per month. Besides the Archangel-Vologda railway, there is
a good southeastward connection from Archangel by river (utilizable by
tractor-and-sled trains in winter) and then further on by rail; and there
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is also a new railway connection eastward from Konosha, a point north
of Vologda on the Archangel line.
The chief military danger to the route is probably the threat
of air attack upon those indispensable escorts of all cargo vessels --
the icebreakers. The freighters at sea, the port, and the railway are
likewise vulnerable. However, the capture of Vologda -- now less proba-
ble than it appeared to be a short time ago -- would not leave the
situation entirely hopeless, for there would still be two southeastward by-passes (the Northern Dvina River and the Konosha Railway) to
the Volga valley and central Russia.
The Murmansk Route
This route was developed to meet the needs of the First World
War, but in those days there was no German-Finnish front stretching
beyond the Arctic Circle and constantly threatening the sea approach,
the port, and the connecting railway. In favor of the use of Murmansk,
is its considerable year-round capacity (the port is never closed by ice
and it may be capable of handling as much as 100,000 tons per month of
imports). Also, a new railway leading from the Murman line to the Archangel railway provides a by-pass around the area occupied by the enemy.
But unless the local military situation is radically improved, the Murmansk route will, continue to be the extremely vulnerable to attack.
The Northern Sea Route
The one advantage of the Northern Sea Route, for American ship-
ments to the Soviet Union, is that it is much less exposed than are the
other northern routes to attack by the enemy: the chief unfavorable factors
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are the great length of this round-about way, the extreme brevity
of the navigation season, and the limitations on the total tonnage
than can be handled.
The river system of the Ob, up to the capacity of its sea-
ports, its channel, its river fleet, and its railheads, is the most
useful one in Siberia for the freighting of supplies from the United
States to central Russia and the war front; the Yenisei comes next,
and the Lena is a very poor third.
G. T. Robinson
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B. THE ROUTE VIA ARCHANGEL
1. The Problem
The first problem set for this division of the study was to
determine, under assumption of peace-time conditions, the extent
to which the port of Archangel (and the smaller neighboring ports)
could be utilized for the shipment of American supplies to the Soviet
Union. This required an examination of the sea approaches, the facili-
ties of the ports, and the inland connections by rail, by river, and
(potentially) by tractor-and-sled train. The factor that is hardest
to 'measure, here, is the influence of the Northern Winter -- most-particularly upon the navigation of the White Sea.
The second major problem involved is that of the vulnerability
of this route to attack by sea, by air, and by land. If it is difficult to determine, even within wide limits, the peace-time capacity
of the Archangel route (especially in winter), it is far more diffi-
cult to measure the military factors in the situation. Yet it is
obviously unrealistic to present a report that takes no account of
military conditions that impinge upon the subject at so many points
and with such a powerful influence. The best that can be done, under
the circumstances, is to mention some of the military problems as they
arise, without pretending to measure in any definite way their effect
upon the situation.
2. The North Atlantic and the Barents Sea
The sea route from the port of New York to Archangel is ap-
proximately 4,673 nautical miles in length, and ships are not likely
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SE FRET
to encounter difficulties from ice west of Sviatoi Nos Point, near
the mouth of the White Sea. The length of the voyage would be con-
siderably increased if a northerly course were chosen in order to
diminish the danger of attack by airplanes and submarines based on
the northern coast of Norway or of Finland. Another and more limited
hazard is the possibility of attack by surface raiders. Ships sailing
from the United States for Archangel are probably compelled to travel
in convoy, thus entailing demands on the Navy for escort vessels, and
involving delay through slow steaming.
3. Ice Conditions in the White Sea and its Western Approach
a. Types of Ice in this Area: Definitions
Many types of ice appear in the White Sea and its western
approach, and several different terminologies have been used in describing them. For purposes of convenience, the terminology used in
this report is that employed by the Hydrographic Administration of the
Soviet Union in its various publications.
The main types of ice which offer obstruction to navigation
in the White Sea and its western approach during the winter months are
the following:
1. land ice (or shore ice) - compact, stationary ice
attached to the shore and extending into the open sea or between two
points of land;
2. drift ice - unattached to the land, and consisting
of the following main types:
a. small-floe - small pieces of ice produced by
the break-up of, large sheets, and never attaining complete, continuous
316
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coverage of a given area;
b. large-floe - like small-floe ice, except
that the broken pieces are larger;
c. field ice - large compact sheets of ice
that have broken off from land ice or have been formed by. the freezing
together of small-floe ice, large-floe, or masses of water-soaked,
frozen snow;
d. floebergs - more or less isolated floating
heaps (not fields) of ice formed by the piling up of small-floe or
large-floe ice;
3. hummocks - heaps formed in land ice or field
ice by the crushing pressure of winds and currents, and consisting
of several floe masses (large and small) piled one upon another and
compressed and frozen into one mass.
4. pack ice - "an immense accumulation of ice
of all types, particularly of broken pieces of solid ice and icebergs, which have been forced together again and frozen once more
into a single mass. 1
b. Ice Conditions in the Western Approach
The Barents Sea extends from the North Cape and
Spitzbergen to Novaia Zemlia. Because of the influence of the Gulf
1Glavnoe Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Rukovodstvo dlia Plavanija
vo L'dakh Belogo Noria (Chief Hydrographic Administration, Guide to
Navigation in the Ice of the White Sea) (Leningrad, 1921) pp. 13-18.
V. Stefansson says, "We have pack ice often (in fact usually) without
icebergs.
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-
Stream, vessels eastbound from the Atlantic are not likely to meet
with any difficulty from ice west of Svyatoi Nos Bay, near the mouth
of the White Sea. It is planned that in the ice season, large convoys
shall anchor here in connecting Yukonga Bay, and that between this
point and Archangel the cargo ships shall proceed in small groups
under the escort of icebreakers.
Navigation in Svyatoi Nos Bay is very rarely ob-
structed by ice. 1 As Table I (below) indicates, in the average year
ice appears at Svyatoi Nos Lighthouse on February 5 and disappears
May 8: and in some years between 1891 and 1920 no ice appeared at
all. In 1927-1928, ice appeared in the Bay for only two days, and
in 1928-29, no ice appeared at all. 2 The density of the ice, observed
from Svyatoi Nos Lighthouse, as Table II (below) indicates, is relatively low, and the land ice that forms along the Bay does not extend
far out. Because of winds and shoals, however, the anchorage at Svyatoi
Nos is not as satisfactory as in the connecting Yukonga Bay (Roads) when
the latter is ice-free.
Ice conditions in Yukonga Bay (Roads) are highly un-
certain. Land ice may form at the end of December or in January: and
it may last, with intervals of interruption, until some time in the
period from March to May. 3 The thickness of the ice is not ascertainable
1Great Britain. Hydrographic Department, Arctic Pilot (London, 1933),
I, p. 177.
2Ibid., I, pp. 176-7.
Ibid., 173-75.
3
318
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from available sources. During the intervals of interruption, the
ice may be cleared completely, or there may appear large-floe ice
1The following comment was written 13 Dec. 1941 by Vilhjalmur
Stefansson:
"In the last paragraph under "b" is a reference to interruptions
when "the ice may be cleared completely or there may appear largefloe ice dangerous to navigation.
"These "interruptions" are referred to in English language terminology as the ice "going abroad." It results from a main cause, and
from one or more subsidiary causes.
"The main cause is that a strong wind, perhaps a gale, is blowing
over a large area that may be so distant that the wind itself is.not
felt locally. But this wind builds up a "tide" which, in places like
the eastern part of the north coast of Alaska, is 5 or 6 feet higher
than the maximum lunar tide. This rise of water tears the landfast
ice loose from its shore moorings.
"If the local wind happens to be such as to blow towards the land,
the shore ice so loosened will remain and will not be broken.up materially. But there may be (a) a current which has been created in con-
nection with the rise of water or (b) an offshore wind or one parallel
to the shore in either direction. The current or local wind may carry
the landfast ice out into a region that was previously open water or
moving ice, whereupon this drifting land ice will gradually break up
in floe and field ice.
"Surely there must be available somewhere for the White Sea informa-
tion on what kind of wind it is that creates the high tide which in turn
may bring about the loosening of the land ice, and its fracture into
cakes and floes -- the mentioned "interruption". It is of great inportance to get this information, if possible; for with it the captains
of incoming ships, and local people on the shore of the White Sea, can
forecast (by knowledge of what wind is blowing, and where) the probabil-
ities of stability or instability of the shore ice. This forecast might
be for anything between 6 and 18 hours -- ample time for removing sup-
plies and machinery from the land ice, preventing their loss by being
carried out to sea.
"On the western section of the north coast of Canada and on the north
coast of Alaska it is southwest and west gales in Bering Sea and over the
polar sea west of Barrow that create the "tides" that pry loose the land
ice, which begins to rise from 8 to 12 hours before the gale arrives. If
there is, locally, a wind that will take ice away, the land ice may actu-
ally move out before the strong wind arrives, so that a heavy sea can be
whipped up in the newly opened water, the area which has been vacated by
the land ice."
dangerous to navigation. These intervals usually last only
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a
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few days. Yukonga Bay is believed preferable to Svyatoi Nos
as a shelter for vessels waiting for ice breakers to appear,
or for ice conditions to improve farther south.1
C. Ice Conditions in the White Sea 2
On the average, the period in which ice is a
menace to navigation, to and from the port of Archangel, is
189 days in length- a figure arrived at by almost two centuries
of observation. 3 In the average year the ice stops navigation
1Great Britain, Hydrogr. Dept., Arctic Pilot, 1933, I p. 172-7;
Glavnoe Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie (Chief Hydrographic Office),
op. cit., p. 63
2The master of each American ship navigating these northern
waters might well be provided with a copy of Stefansson's Arctic
Manual. Washington, Government Printing Office.
3The data for ice conditions in the White Sea are taken from
Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Svedenis L'dov no Moriakh S.S.S.R.,
Zimo 1926-27, 1927-28. 1928-29. 1929-30, 1930-31, 1931-32 (Hydro-
graphic Administration, Information on Ice Conditions in the Seas
of the U.S.S.R., Winters of 1926-32) (Leningrad, 1928-36): Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Lotsiia Belogo Noria (Hydrographic Administration, The White Sea Pilot) (Leningrad, 1932) pp. 167-169;
Great Britain, Hydrographic Department, Arctic Pilot (London, 1933),
I. pp. 41-43, 173; Glavnoe Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Rukovodstvo
dlia Plavaniia vo L'dakh Belogo Moria (Chief Hydrographic Administration, Guide to Navigation in the Ice of the White Sea) (Leningrad,
1921), pp. 32-42, 51; Glavnoe Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Zapiski
PO Gidrografii (Chief Hydrographic Office, Annals of Hydrography)
(Leningrad, 1923), XLVII, PP. 24-31. Some information was also obtained from Danske Meteorologisk Institut, (Danish Meterorological
Institute), Isforholdene $ de Arktiske Have. Almindig Oversigt,
Gennemsnitsgraenser m.m., (The State of the Ice in the Arctic Seas.
Summary, Average Limits, etc.), (Kjobenhavn, 1917).
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(of vessels without the aid of icebreakers) during the last half of
November, and prevents navigation until the first half of May. Occasionally, navigation without the aid of icebreakers cannot be resumed until June. For the Bay of Archangel (Dvina Bay), upon which
the port of Archangel is located, the average date of freezing during
a forty-year period was November 9: the earliest date of freezing in
this period was October 22, and the latest date was December 5. The
average date of the break-up of the ice in the Bay of Archangel during
this forty-year period was May 6: the earliest date was April 24 and
the latest was May 22. The complete disappearance of the ice follows
the break-up by a few days. The following table gives the dates for the
ice conditions at various observation points in the White Sea.
The areas where the greatest difficulties for icebreakers are likely to be encountered are the Northern Zone at the
mouth of the White Sea, the Gorlo (throat) of the Sea, and the Gulf
of Archangel (Dvina Gulf). As Table I indicates, the Northern. Zone
and the Gorlo do not freeze over completely from shore to shore. 1
Hence, the serious obstacle to navigation in these areas is not
continuous land ice, but drift ice of various sizes, densities and
thicknesses.
1A publication of the Danish Meteorological Institute states:
"In some winters, however, the fixed ice may stretch all over the
sea and every winter the mouth of the White Sea freezes up as far
as can be seen from the Coast." Danske Meteorologisk Institute,
op.cit., p. 2. If this statement is meant to imply that the North-
ern Zone and the Gorlo freeze over completely, it conflicts with the
results of apparently much more complete observations.
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12
TABLE I
DATES FOR APPEARANCE OF ICE. COMPLETE FREEZING
OVER AND DISAPPEARANCE OF ICE IN THE WHITE SEA
(Glavnoe Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Rukovodstvo
Complete
Freez-
Location and
Period of
Appearance
Observation
111/17
Latest
Average
Earliest
Lighthouse
(1911-1920)
Intai Lighthouse
(1910-1920)
Sussovets Lighthouse,
(1888-1920)
Zimaegoraki
Lighthouse
(1888-1920)
Mudyugski Lighthouse
(1888-1920)
Mudyugski V Towers
Line
(1888-1920)
Average
Earliest
Latest
Average
Earliest
Latest
II/2
XII/19
VII/14
XI/29
V/28
TV/23
X/24
I/16
XI/6
X/18
Latest
XI/21
IV/24
VI/22
Average
XI/21
I/11
IV/6
XII/28
V/81
XI/21
IV/18
Earliest
Earliest
Latest
Average
Barliest
Latest
Average
X/15
X/18
I/10
Average
X/26
X/11
Earliest
Latest
Average
Earliest
Latent
X/27
Earliest
Lighthouse
(1888-1893,1911-19161 Latest
Average
Letai Orlovaki
(1910-1920)
Chesmenski
Lighthouse
(1908-1920)
Jujmuiski Lighthouse
(1890-1920)
Earliest
Latest
I/14
IV/16
III/1
V/14
II/9
V/6
I/28
I/10
II/20
I/24
XI/25
X/27
X/22
XII/5
I/14
XII/20
II/11
IV/24
V/17
IV/26
VI/29
V/12
IV/28
V/22
V/28
IV/28
IV/12
V/26
V/1
V/31
Does not freese
over completely
XII/24
VI/21
V/28
V/10
VI/15
V/20
XI/11
I/14
III/2
V/5
VI/16
Y/21
XI/23
II/2
Latest
XII/11
Average
XII/3
Latest
XII/24
Earliest
V/8
VI/9
11/19
Average
Barliest
V/20
11/20
Latest
Average
V1/9
XII/19
XII/22
Harliest
V/12
IV/5
I/15
Jijginski Lighthouse,
Latest
VII/B
XI/18
XII/1
Earliest
V/28
XI/23
Earliest
Latest
V/12
XII/81
Average
Lighthouse
VI/20
VI/1
Average
Average
Solovetski
IV/24
I/22
Archangel
(1881-1920)
(1889-1918)
VI/1
II/10
.
Abramovaki
Latest
V/17
III/31
VII/6
1/4
.
.
(1889-1920)
Earliest
.
Morjovski Lighthouse
Average
I/19
.
.
(1888-1920)
VI/80
Latest
.
Orlovski Lighthouse
V/8
I/11
.
2
(1909-1920)
II/5
.
2
Earliest
Gordetski Lighthouse
V/22
Latest
Average
Svyatoi Nos
Lighthouse
III/19
IV/23
111/17
III/2
.
Lighthouse
Disappearance
Does not freese
over completely
.
.
Semiostrovski
(1891-1920)
Average
Earliest
Breakup
.
(1919)
ing over
.
Sediovati Lighthouse
(1911-1916)
pp. 34-36. )
V/S
VI/18
XI/11
V/20
IV/17
VI/26
"Complete freezing over" means that ice covers the gives area from the poist of
observation to the horison.
1
During some years is the period under observation, so ice appeared at the Svyatoi
Nos and Semiostrovski Lighthouses.
The data for the complete freesing over and the breakup apply to the straits between
Jijginski Island and the mainland.
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Sometimes the drift ice attains a high degree of
density. The following table indicates this density at various points
and at various times of the year. 1
It may be noted in connection with the density
of ice that, according to one authority, sailing ships can navigate
when one-half of the visible area is covered with ice (5 points in
Table II); and steam ships can navigate wherr three quarters of the
visible area is covered (7é points in the Table). 2
In the Northern Zone (the location of the Morjovski
and Orlovski lighthouses), the drift ice occupies a large proportion
of the area, and makes navigation without the use of icebreakers a
very hazardous enterprise. The ice encountered is usually small-floe,
large-floe, and field. The field ice is composed of fused masses of
water-soaked frozen snow and of land ice which has broken off and has
drifted into the Northern Zone. These fields usually reach a thickness
of 1é to 2 feet; they rarely go beyond 2# feet, although a field from
5 to 6 feet thick was once observed.3 Ice hummocks and floebergs may
also be encountered. These usually attain a thickness of from 6 to 9
feet above water and from 18 to 27 feet below water; sometimes, however,
they may extend as much as 70 feet or more below the water line. Such
ice must, of course, be avoided rather than penetrated.
1Ibid., p. 51.
2Ibid., P. 53.
3Ibid., PP. 39-40.
C
a
to
10
The Highest
Degree of
Density
My
II
TABLE II
11
II
I
observation station tn the horizon):
visible area covered with ice.
The figures between 0 and 10 represent the number of tenths of the
0 represents the complete absence of ice within the visible area;
10 represents the complete coverage of the visible area (from the
DENSITY OF ICE BY SEMI-MONTHLY PERIODS. 1914-1920 (by points).
The point system for measuring ice density is based on the following plan:
Abramovski Lighthouse
Mudyugski V Towers Line
Orlovski Lighthouse
Svyatoi Nos Lighthouse
Morjovski
Sosaovets
Intai
Zimaegorski
Mudyugaki
Jijginski
Letne-Orlovaki Lighthouse
Chesmesski
Jajmaiski
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The Gorlo (the location of the Intsi and Sosnovets
lighthouses is filled with the various types of ice mentioned in
the above paragraph. The Gorlo, although narrow, is prevented from
freezing over completely by the presence of strong currents. Much
of the ice that is carried from the north can be cleared temporarily
by strong southwest winds; but a northwest or northeast wind may
bring a return of the ice. Occasionally, ice hummocks become so
extensive in the Gorlo that they halt icebreakers for several days:
that is, until they are removed by winds.
In the Basin (a small part of which, near the Zimnegorski Lighthouse, is crossed on the way to and from Archangel) the
formation of thick ice is prevented by the presence of tidal currents
that break up the ice soon after formation. In the White Sea, as a
whole, borders of land ice of varying width form along the shores, in
the narrows, and between the islands.
Since the problem of winter navigation in the Northern
Zone, the Gorlo and the Basin is caused by the drift ice, the direction
of winds and currents has a very great influence upon the ice conditions
at any given time and place. An intensive study of winds and currents,
coupled with land and aerial reconnaissance, can therefore facilitate
the passage of icebreakers and thin caravans through the ice. It may
be noted, in this connection, that ice fields in the White Sea have
been known to drift at the rate of from eight to twenty-five miles in
twenty-four hours. 1
1Ibid. p. 52
325
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d. Ice Conditions in the Gulf of Archangel
The head of the Gulf of Archangel becomes filled
with drift ice, as Table I indicates, about the end of October.
Later, usually about the middle of November, a large part of the
Gulf becomes filled with land ice, which at the head of the Gulf
attains a thickness of 21 feet. When the Northern Dvina and Mezen
Rivers begin to thaw, usually about the middle of May, the ice
emerging from the rivers completely stops navigation - even with
the aid of icebreakers -- for a few days. Over a period of 184
years, the average date for the break-up of the Dvina River was
May 12, six days later than the average date for the break-up of
the ice at the head of the Gulf of Archangel. 1
H. R. Weinstein
4. The Past Performance of Icebreakers in Other North
Eurasian Waters.
a. Types of Icebreaker Craft
By the time of the First World War, navigation in
ice had been revolutionized by the introduction of craft specially
built to deal with ice conditions of various types. Such craft
are indeed indispensable if navigation is to be maintained in any
area in which heavy freezing takes place. There are many types
of ships designed to deal with ice of different kinds. Since in
the remainder of this report there will be repeated references
to different types of icebreaking craft, it may be well at this
point to define these typer
1Ibid.. P. 35
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Port Icebreakers are ships of comparatively small
size, power, and tonnage. They are designed to maintain navi-
gation inside a port and to a certain extent to keep open the
approaches to the port. An example of such craft is- the Gor
used at Archangel in 1917-- vessel of 1300 H.P.
Icebreaking freighters are freighters of small size
and limited power with some capacity for cargo. They are es-
sentially very strongly built ships, especially reinforced at
points of strain. An example of this type is the famous Russian
ship Sedov of 1300 tons displacement and 2200 H.P.
Icebreakers (called ledokoly in Russian) are ships
generally of greater capacity and power than either port icebreakers of icebreaking freighters. They are equipped to deal with
severe ice conditions and to steam a long distance and a long
time through the ice. They crush the ice by pushing down on top of it
with their prow, which'action is sometimes assisted by a fore-propeller
which draws out the water from under the ice. An example of this type
is the Mussian Yermak of 10,000 tons displacement and 10,000 horsepower.
Icecutters are ships whose prow is designed to cut
the ice. They do not operate very effectively in stationary ice
although they are satisfactory in drift ice. An example of such
is the old Litke (ex-Ianada, ex-Lord Grey), still in use in Russia.
b. Factors Controlling the Performance of Icebreakers.
The speed that an icebreaker (or an icecutter) can
make is a function of many variables. The power and construction
327
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of the ship obviously are very important. Just as significant
are external, uncontrollable factors. In the first place, the
thickness of the ice naturally affects the speed of an icebreaking craft. More important, however, than the thickness
of the ice is its nature. The reaction of pack ice of a given
thickness to the pressure of an icebreaker is very different
from that of level land ice of the same thickness. The mode of
freezing influences greatly the structure and resistance of the
ice. Ice which breaks under an icebreaker into big pieces offers
less skin resistance to the forward progress of a ship than does
ice which breaks into many small pieces. Baltic hummocks one or
two feet high above water may be more troublesome to a heavy ship
like the Yermak than polar ice floes fourteen feet thick. Again,
it is one thing for a ship to navigate through ten-point ice (covering the entire surface of the water) and quite another, of course,
for it to push through ice of the same thickness with only a five
point density: the technique differs and the speed differs. Also
(and this factor is especially important in the White Sea) tides,
constant sea currents, and winds react with and against one another,
at one time to compress the ice fields or floe ice and at another
time to decompress them. In a period of compression it may be
almost impossible for an icebreaker to move either forward or
backwards. In a period of decompression, on the other hand, the
ship may be freed with no effort of its own. Also, of course,
it is one thing for an unencumbered icebreaker to snash its way
through ice fields, and quite another for the icebreaker to
have to make a path for other ships and also to
328
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have to be sheep dog for many weak-walled freighters that must be
kept out of trouble. Another factor in icebreaking is that icebreakers do not ordinarily follow a straight course. They go in
and out and roundabout to avoid ice, and when actually breaking
they more or less have to follow their own noses-that is, they
have to go down the crack they have opened regardless of whether
it takes them exactly along the course they wish to travel. The
weather also affects greatly the speed of an icebreaker Fog and
night (and the Arctic nights are very long)1 often force a convoy
to stop entirely; and storms may be exceedingly troublesome.
1The following comment was written 13 Dec. 1941 by V. Stefansson:
"While it is true that Arctic nights are very long it is equally
true that they are never very dark, if compared with tropic nights.
Bernacchi, astronomer for the Borchgrevink and the first Scott
Antarctic expeditions, and Poulter, chief scientist for the second
Byrd expedition, have endorsed the statement that all references to
pitch darkness in polar literature are unjustifiably inaccurate.
"If ships are in very thick ice during the period of nights which
have no daylight, then almost necessarily they are in snow-covered
ice. It is probably true that amid snow-covered ice, the very great-
est darkness produced by absence of moon and a thickly overcast sky
during a period of complete absence of daylight will still permit
one ship to see another at a quarter of a mile without night glasses,
and of course farther with them. If one ship cannot see another at
a quarter of a mile the reason must be fog or some other form of
precipitation.
"One of the things most necessary for inexperienced navigators
of the White Sea, or any similar region, is to have with them a
graph which they understand and from which they can read off the
probable light for any night of winter at any latitude."
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Aside from all these physical factors, there is also
the human factor in 1cebreaking--particularly the skill of the
pilot. In the past there have been instances of icebreakers having
been held up or turned back by ice, whereas small, frail sailing
vessels have passed around the troublesome point with ease because
they were guided by pilots who had ice sense and knew the White Sea
thoroughly.
Even if all the details of the construction and power
of an icebreaker and all the details of the ice conditions were known,
it would still be difficult to estimate the length of time it would
take to make any particular trip. Since the human factor, which is
at least as important as any other, is an imponderable, it is not
possible to predict the performance of a given icebreaker, say the
Stalin, in the White Sea.
C. Instances of Icebreaker Performance:
There are many factors that must be considered in any
attempt to estimate the probability of success of the attempt to
maintain a considerable sea traffic to Archangel throughout the
present winter; one of these is the past performance of icebreakers
under various conditions elsewhere. In the first place, it should
be said that the recorded instances of the performance of icebreakers
are widely scattered in time and place, and that the accounts of these
instances are nowhere systematically collected, so far as is known.
Moreover the case records are usually very incomplete: the thickness
of the ice is often reported, but temperature, the composition of the
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ice, and other important factors are usually not mentioned at all.
The omission of factors of such importance renders many of the
accounts of past performance almost useless. With this preface,
a few individual cases may be reported here.
The Sampo, a Finnish icebreaker of 3,000 H.P., was
able to steam through pack ice five to eight feet thick at the
rate of two knots. Runeberg, the authority describing this
feat, states that level land ice is never thick enough in the
Baltic (it is little thicker in the White Sea) to offer any
obstacle to an icebreaker of 2,500 H.P. or more. He states that
such an icebreaker ought to be able to go through Baltic ice 18
to 24 inches thick without stopping if the ice is clear of snow,
or by charging if there is snow on top of the ice. He states
that the real problem of icebreaking is that of making headway
through pack ice. 1
The Yermak, an old Russian Icebreaker of 10,000 tons
displacement and 10,000 H.P. with propellers fore and aft, was
the wonder of its time when it was launched, and it is still being
used regularly after 43 years of service. Admiral Makarov of the
Russian navy, on whose initiative the boat was built, wrote of its
early performance. He stated that in the Baltic compact ice with
hummocks no more than one to two feet in height (above the water,
presumably) offered great difficulty to the Yermak, obliging her
to move back and charge the ice repeatedly, with the result that
1Rune berg, On Steamers for Winter Navigation and Icebreaking,
London, 1900, p. 299.
330
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331
SECRET
she made very slow progress. The smallness of the pieces making
up the hummocks in the Baltic made for a very great skin resistance
to the ship. But in the polar regions the ice was not compact and
it was a simple matter, the Admiral says, to steer one's way between the ice floes, or in case of necessity, the breaker did not
hesitate, in this region, to charge floes of a thickness as great
as fourteen feet, provided there was room to nose aside the broken
pieces. The speed of the Yermak was greatly reduced whenever the
ice was in a period of compression. 1
The new ship, Stalin, pride of the Soviet icebreaker
fleet, is a vessel of 11,000 tons displacement. She is modern
and powerful, and is even equipped with facilities for airplane
reconnaissance from the ship. The following is a record of one
of her performances in the far north, under difficult ice conditions: "Moving forward to the 137th meridian, between latitudes
78° and 80°, the icebreaker cut across a broad field of ice. In
places there was encountered here heavy, hummocky, ten-point ice.
Turning to the East the icebreaker entered four-point ice and
moved forward at a speed of eight miles an hour. Between the
142nd and 144th meridians the ship climbed to longitude 82°, meet-
ing on the way four to eight-point ice. Amidst the old ice there
Hakarov, "The Yermak Icebreaker", Annual Report of the Board
of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, for the year ending
June 30, 1900, Washington, 1901; pp. 455-457. . The following
comment was written by V. Stefansson, 13 Dec. 1941: "The statements by Makarov about the performance of the Yermak which he made
in 1900 or before are perhaps more optimistic than others that he
made after his actual trial when he attempted to "steam to the North
Pole."
332
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was encountered newly-formed ice of a thickness of 10 to 20 cm.,
all of which was easily crushed by the body of the ship. Immense
fields of ten-point ice were encountered at 83° longitude. Their
thickness was two meters. Heavy ice was visible in northern and
eastern directions. The ship's speed fell to a mile an hour. No
other ship has attained so high a latitude so late in the year. 11
In a letter of the Commander of the United States Naval
forces in Northern Russia during the year 1918, the icebreaker Svia
togor (now the Krassin) was credited with the ability to steam at
six knots through four feet of ice not covered by snow (the type
of ice and other conditions are not specified), and also was said to
be able to make her way through eight to twelve feet of ice. It WAS
said that the Minin and the Pozharskii could break through four to
five feet of ice (type of ice and other conditions not specified in
the memorandum), and that the Vaigach and the Ivan Susanin could
break three feet of ice. 2
1 Nazarov, V., "O Ledovykh Usloviakh Navigatsli 1938 g.", ("On
the Ice Conditions for Navigation in 1938") in Sov. Arktika, June,
1939 p. 20. The following comment was written by V. Stefansson,
13 Dec. 1941: "This summary is apparently for the performance of
the Stalin during summer. This ship has a much better achievement
to her credit in the latter half of December 1939 and the first week
of January 1940 when she penetrated at about the coldest time of year
(only February is colder than January) to a point.northwest of the
northwestern corner of Spitsbergen -- see English-language account
in Moscow News, Russian language in Russian newspapers."
2Commander U. S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia, U.S.S. Olympia,
28 Nov., 1918, File 74-56.
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In April 1919 General Richardson, commanding the American
Expeditionary Force in North Russia, made the trip from Murmanak to
Archangel aboard the icecutter Kanada in three days. This is a distance of nearly 400 miles. He states that "at no time during the winter preceding had the ice been sufficiently heavy to prevent the Kanada
from making the journey within a reasonable limit of time. .1 During
the same winter, Commander Rils took two weeks to travel from Svystol
Nos to Archangel on an icebreaker. 2
As we have already said it is one thing for an icebreaker
to travel alone and quite another for it to escort a convoy. We shall
include some instances of icebreaker performance with convoys, largely
taken from ice campaigns of the early twenties in the Leningrad area.
These instances therefore took place in areas covered, for a distance
not exceeding 160 nautical miles from the port, with stationary land
ice not more than 28 inches thick--and beyond that partly covered with
floating ice (large and small-floe) extending a maximum of about 200
nautical miles beyond the land ice. Here for seven days (January 19-25,
1923) the icebreaker Yermak, escorting three ships, made a speed for the
whole period, including all stops, of .65 miles per hour. Between February 1st and 4th the icebreaker Lenin escorted three ships through 160
miles of ice at an average speed, including all stops, of 1.75 miles an
hour. Between February 27th and March 11th the Yermak, the Lenin and
the Sviatogor, escorting four steamers, made an average speed for the
General Richardson's "Notes on War", W.D. G-3, File.
Commander Riis (U. 8. Navy, Retired), interview, Nov. 24, 1941.
334
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entire period, including all stops, of 1.05 miles an hour. 1
In another source there is an account of a convoy of
twelve ordinary merchantmen that were escorted from Leningrad to
Reval in December and January of 1923 (this same year) by two ice-
breakers, and completed the last part of the journey in clear water.
There is no statement as to what speed this convoy made
but at this period of the year the ice would be comparatively thin. 2
One Russian writer on the subject recommends that convoys
be made up of not less than three or more than twelve merchantmen,
3
plus icebreakers.
But another estimates that it takes two and one-
half times as long for an icebreaker to escort two ships as to escort
one, and four times as long to escort three ships as one. The strength
1 These instances of performance are extracted from Isuchenie
Ledokolnogo Dela V Norskikh Portakh U.S.S.R., Trudy Nauchno-Tekhnicheskago Komiteta Narodnogo Kommissariata Putes Soobshcheniia (A study
of Icebreaking in the Seaports of the U.S.S.R. Works of the Scientific
Technical Committee of the People's Commissariat of Ways of Communica-
tion). issue 5, 1925.
2Torgovyi Flot (Commercial Fleet). Oct.-Nov., 1923, p. 221
3Idem
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335
and condition (loaded or unloaded) of the freighters making up the
convoy also influence greatly the speed that can be maintained. 1
P. Whitney
1 Isuchenie Ledokolnogo Dela etc., p. 122
On 13 Dec., V. Stefansson wrote the following note on one form
of ice breaker attach -- "changing" or "bucking" the ice:
"This means that the vessel continues ahead until stopped, when
she backs up and charges again, the aim being to get a little farther
each time than the time before -- using momentum to supplement the
direct power of the engines. When this has to be done, it frequently
happens that vessels trying to follow the icebreaker are not successful. The very need for bucking usually indicates that the ice is in
a compression phase rather than in a spreading or scattering phase,
and that openings will close gradually.
"There are few icebreakers that can move backward with the same
effectiveness as forward. It is therefore in connection with icebucking that they are most often beset; the ice closes in behind
them so that they can no longer back up to secure momentum for a
charge.
336
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5. Past Experience in Winter Navigation in the White Sea
a. The Traffic Needs of the First World War
and the British-American Intervention
No winter navigation of significance for the purposes
of this investigation was carried on in the White Sea before the
years of the First World War. Inasmuch as other much easier trade
lanes to Russia were always open, there was never any incentive.
until the period of the war, to maintain navigation to and from
the port of Archangel in the winter season. And no real icebreakers were used on the White Sea till the First World War. 1
In 1914 Russia went to war with the Central Powers.
With the single exception of Archangel, all the great seaports of
European Russia were closed to Russia's western allies. Thus it
became necessary to increase the capacity of the port of Archangel
and to keep the port open in winter in order that the Russian armies
might receive desperately needed munitions.
In January, 1917, with the completion of the railway
to Murmansk, an ice-free port at the extreme northwestern corner
of the country, a new avenue of shipping was opened between Russia
and western Europe. However, the new railroad to Murmansk was only
a single-track line, and there would still have been a considerable
incentive to maintain the inflow of supplies through Archangel, as
well as Murmansk, if the Revolution had not reduced and then finally
terminated Russia's part in the War with the Central Powers. In
1 Morozov, N. Rukovodstvo dlia Plavanija vo L'dakh Belogo Noria
(Guide for Navigation in the Ice of the White Seal, Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, 1921. Introduction.
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337
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1917-18 there was no ice campaign in the White Sea, and in 1918-19
it was the British-American Expeditionary Force in Northern Russia
that kept the very limited traffic going.
The years 1914-19 witnessed the only serious attempts
ever made, before the current winter, to maintain active communication by sea to and from Archangel in the winter months, and an anal-
ysis of the effort expended and the results obtained must necessarily
be of use in connection with any attempt to measure the likelihood of
success in the ice campaign of 1941-42.
b. Measures to Naintain Winter Navigation, 1914-19.
For one thing, measures were taken to improve the port
facilities and to widen the gauge of the Archangel-Vologda Railway.
(The latter enterprise was completed in 1916.) These measures do
not concern us just here. 'In the second place, action was taken
so keep the port of Archangel open for the entire winter. This lat-
ter goal was to be attained by effort of three different kinds. First,
an advance-part was to be prepared farther out toward the Gulf of Arch-
angel, so that ships would not have to come up to the city itself
through the hasardous and heavily-fromen channels of the Northern Dvina
estuary. Second, an information service was to be organized for the
prompt reporting and communication of information on the state of the
ice in the approaches to the White Sea and the port. Third, a fleet
of icebreakers and other icebreaking craft of various sorts was to be
assembled to keep the lanes to the port open for cargo vessels.
338
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The following is an authoritative statement of 1918 regarding the advance-port set up near Archangel to handle winter
traffic:
"Due to the fact that Port of Archangel closes earlier
than Entrance to the Delta, the British in 1917 established a Winter
Port at Economia, on the Northern end of Povrakulski Island, at
Junction of Maimaksa and Kuzretchikha Channels, and about 20 miles
from City of Archangel. This port is usually accessible for a month
after Archangel is closed up.
"At Economia are one coal berth and five cargo berths
capable of discharging vessels of 26 to 28 feet draft. One of the
berths at present is not available, the icebreaker Semon Selushka,
being sunk there. There are 6 store houses and two movable cranes
of 10 and 15 tons, with one fixed crane of 6 tons. For approaching
winter it is intended to bring down to Economia one of the 50 ton
floating cranes from Archangel.
"In 1916 a section of railway was completed from Port
Economia to Archangel crossing Povrakulski River, and Kuzretchikha
Channel on permanent bridges. During Winter temporary tracks are
laid across the ice of the North Dvina, between Archangel and Archangel Station, so connecting Economia with railway system of Russia.
Throughout Winter of 1917-1918 channels were kept open from White
*Probably refers to the small icebreaking freighter, Semen
Cheliuskin.
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339
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Sea to Economia, but ice of the Entrance to White Sea or Gorlo was
impossible after March 1, 1918. 1
Another type of facility for handling winter traffic at
Archangel is represented by the two portable conveyors that were
used for unloading on the ice. These are described as follows.
"Martens' Co.
also have the two largest portable
conveyors ever made, and built especially for the Archangel trade.
They will convey weights of 15 cwt. are in 25 ft. sections and about
1,000 feet long. One is for coal. When ice breakers could no longer
reach Archangel, these conveyors could be set up on the shore ice and
on one or both tugs, and so reach steamer. As ice extends outward,
whole apparatus could be moved forward. Communication and transport
of material could thus be continued until spring jam of ice, probably
at least ten months out of twelve. .2
The cited memorandum does not state clearly whether the portable con-
veyors were located regularly in the winter at Ekonomiia or at Archangel
itself.
1 Memorandum from the Commander of U. S. Naval Forces in Northern
Russia to the Force Commander, from U.S.S. Olympia, Flagship, dated
November 28, 1918, on the subject of "The Port of Archangel, Russia.
This description varies slightly from that of a memorandum from the
"
files of O.N.I., undated (but apparently from the same period) and
entitled "The Port of Archangel. " In this the statement is made that
Economia (or Ekonomiia) was completed in 1916-17 instead of 1917 as
above and the further information is given that there were berths for
up to six ships of up to 10,000 tons each. Kuzretchikha Channel is
called in this latter report Kuznetchikha Channel. Correct spelling
is Kuznechikha; it is a small stream and not a channel.
2 Memorandum from the Director of Military Intelligence to the
Director of Naval Intelligence, dated Sept. 11, 1918, on the subject
of "The Offer of Martens and Co. of Their Conveyors, Tugs etc. at
Archangel for Prolonging Period of Navigation at That Port.
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On the subject of measures taken in these same years
to collect and distribute information on ice conditions in the
approaches to Archangel, another authority may be cited:
"In order to obtain information on ice, fourteen stations were established on the Gorlo of the White Sea. This net
was so dense that the horizons of neighboring points almost over-
lapped. To the observers special instructions were given, much
more detailed than those which had served up to this time. The
condition of the ice was described not only in terms of quantity
and type but also in terms of the proportion of the visible area
that it occupied as seen from a given point. All observations
were made at 10 A.M. This time appeared to be the most suitable
because of local conditions. On the one hand it was desirable to
conduct the observations as early as possible, in order to compile
the general summary of ice conditions in the Gorlo; and on the
other hand observations earlier than 10 A.M. in winter would have
been impossible because of darkness.
The results of observation from all points flowed into
the Hydro-Meteorological Service by 11 to 12 A.M. For convenience
this information was transmitted by means of a special cipher, which
at one and the same time greatly shortened the length of the telegram
and forced the observer to reply to a series of questions as to the
type, quantity and extent of the ice, the difficulty. of passage
through it, etc. On the basis of this information a general summary
was compiled by the Hydro-Meteorological Service in two forms: a map
of ice conditions and a radiogram for vessels at sea.
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"On the map, by means of symbols, there were pictured
the type and quantity of ice These maps were reproduced in
40 - 50 copies and distributed to different offices of the city of
Archangel. Customarily they were delivered about 4 - 6 in the afternoon. In war time when the movement of vessels was of great significance, these maps had great importance. But obviously the maps could
be useful only to offices located on land; and for punctual information
for navigators at sea, the Hydro-Meteorological Service issued summaries
giving detailed information on the ice conditions, winds, and weather
prospects for weather in the near future. These summaries customarily
were delivered by radio
Such in general outlines was the organiza-
tion for providing information on the condition of the ice in the Gorlo
of the White Sea. .1
C. Icebreaking Craft Employed, 1914-19
This ice information service was important in the maintenance
of navigation to and from Archangel in the winter, but of still greater
importance was the assembly at Archangel of a fleet of icebreakers, for
without the help of such craft, Archangel would have been closed to
ordinary freighters for over four months of the year.
Tables III and IV give specific information on the icebreaking craft that participated in the winter service at Archangel
during the years 1914-1919. Several facts emerge clearly from this
1 Berezkin, V. "Usloviia Zimnego Plavanila v Gorle Belogo Moria"
("Conditions of Winter Navigation in the Gorlo of the White Sea") in
Zapiski po Gidrografii (Notes on Hydrography) v. XLVII, pp. 34-35.
342
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compilation of data. In the first place it is obvious that during
the period 1914-18 the fleet of icebreaking craft expanded greatly.
From a quite negligible number of 2 vessels in the winter of 1914-15,
it had increased by 1917-18 to 9 vessels, according to a British
source, or 15, according to the Russians. Thus the maximum strength
was attained at the very time when Russia was making peace with Ger-
many. In the second place one may say 'that the fleet of icebreakers
(as distinct from icebreaking freighters and port icebreakers) was
quite modest in size until the winter of 1917-18. In the third place
it ought to be noted that not until 1917-18 or 1918-19 did any large
(10.000-ton) icebreakers go into service at Archangel, and then only
one such ship entered this service.
TABLE III
ICEBREAKING CRAFT USED AT ARCHANGEL 1914-1919
- 1917 Bristager Beliesteeries Beverit Engade State Peshurekit Baremate State Badbo Banasis Delinireries I
10000 171
as
as
1500
-
1000
5000
8400
#166
14
14
14
14.8
Freighter
#11
"
"
4000
.
-
10000
at
In
1999
Part
Icebreak
Ice-
Ice-
Ice-
Ice-
Ice-
breaking
breaking
breaking
breaking
Freight
breaking
Proighter
Freighter
Freighter
Freighter
Freighter
breaker
-
-
M
-
841
841
100
H
"
1400
as
"
10
-
####
14.5
1999
Ice-
as
1400
1999
etc
14
14
THE
"
..
19
18
1000
1000
1000
1994
...
1000
as
18
18
130
IT
19
18
Part
las
as
..
1300
1999
1994
is
LOTS
1914
breater
.
"
16-00
Freighter
see
or
Ice-
1994
as
.
or
14
14
1900
464
11-18
.
"
18
Incbreaker
1
-
⑉
###
Ice-
breaker
w.
1999
1911
1099
.
Ice-
cotter
.
Ice-
breaker
1996-18
.:
Ice-
breaker
.
Speed
ester
Ice-
breaker
1964-18
1914
1999
Halypia
1918
1914
.
(issa)
1999
Natural
.
Diaplace
SEST
care
.
Perer (kg)
Little
Ships I
Tolgach
Beobble
Instructions
care
.
Brought (feet)
1917
Lasts
Taber
:
1917
,
Date
I (feet)
Brece
,
Eresets
Length (feet)
Listress
Drop
later type this
Iceland
Lord
der
#
Barlier -
Seler
Beakmey
10-19
10-19
.
Service as
Archangel
Issues
10-19
18-19
14-14
19161919
18.18
14-14
14-11
14-11
18-19
14-19
18-19
18-18
18-19
10-19
16-19
Estams
possible
Other
1917-
19-18
Capable
Best to
Canada
1919
-
Net
salia-
factors
1918-19
14-18
16-11
1919
Sister skips
Media
stand
Beak
18-19
14-19
#:
States asign
1014-18
Pine ala-
-
inc.
343
344
35
SECRET
Table III
Icebreaking Craft Used at Archangel, 1914-19.9.
SOURCES
This chart was compiled with the assistance of various publications and memorands. In those few cases in which evidence conflicted,
the discrepancies were not serious and the figure for presentation was
drawn from the source that seemed the most reliable. The following
material was consulted:
Anufriev, "Ledokolnaia Praktika i Poliarnye Ledovye Plavanila
V Severnom Ledovitom Okeane" (Icebreaker Technique and Navigation in
Polar Ice in the Arctic Ocean"), in Zapiski po Gidrografii, v. L,
(1925), pp. 144 - 146.
Berezkin, "Usloviia Zimnego Plavanila V Gorle Belogo Moria"
(Conditions of Winter Navigation in the Gorlo of the White Sea"),
in Zapiski po Gidrografit. v. XLVII, p. 32.
Izuchenie Ledokolnogo Dela v Morskikh Portakh SSSR / A Study
of Icebreaking in the Seaports of the U.S.S.R.) in Trudy NauchnoTeknicheskago Komiteta Narodnogo Kommissariata Puter Soobshchenita.
(Works of the Scientific-Technical Committee of the People's Comissariat of Ways of Communication 1925, Vyp. 5.
Memorandum from the Commander of the U. S. Naval Forces in
Northern Russia, to the Force Commander, dated November 28, 1918,
on the subject of "The Port of Archangel, Russia.
Undated Memorandum from the files of O.N.I. entitled "The
Port of Archangel.
Jane's Fighting Ships 1940, issued January 1, 1941, Sampson
Low, Marston and Col, Ltd., London, MCMXL. The figures given in
this manual on the displacement of the Krassin and the Yermak are
lower than those uniformly given in Russian sources. The figures
which we have quoted are from the Russian sources. Jane's manual
states that the Krassin displaces 8700 tons and the Yermak 7875
tons; the Russian sources give 10,000 tons for each.
345
- 36 -
SECRET
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF ICEBREAKING CRAFT AT ARCHANGEL EACH WINTER
DURING THE PERIOD 1914-1919
Winter
British Sources
1914-15
2 Unclassified
1915-16
6 Unclassified
Russian Sources American Sources
3 Icebreakers
7 Icebreaking
freighters
1916-17 9 Unclassified
3 Icebreakers
7 Icebreaking
freighters
1917-18 9 Unclassified
1 Icecutter
7 Icebreakers
7 Icebreaking
freighters
1918-19
1 Icecutter
6 Icebreakers
5 Icebreaking
freighters
7 Port icebreakers
1 Icebreaking
gunboat
- 37 -
346
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Table IV
Number of Icebreaking Craft at Archangel Each Winter
During the Period 1914-1919
SOURCES
A. British Source: Letter from Wm. O. Hart of the British
Merchant Shipping Mission, dated November 17, 1941, in answer
to questions submitted to him by G. T. Robinson, O.C.I. Mr. Hart
does not state the source of his information.
B. Russian Sources: Izuchenie Ledokolnogo Dela v Morskikh
Portakh S.S.S.R., as previously cited, p. 22, data for 1915-16 an
and 1916-17. For 1917-18, Anufriev, op. cit., p. 145.
C. American Source: Memorandum from the Commander of the U. S.
Naval Forces in Northern Russia to the Force Commander, dated
November 28, 1918, on the subject of "The Port of Archangel,
Russia."
The figures cited from the American source for 1918-19
are taken from the memorandum mentioned just above, and repre-
sent anticipations as to the size of the icebreaking fleet for
the coming winter. Indications that there may have been some
difference between anticipations and reality were given, in a
recent interview by Commander Riis, U.S.N. Retired, who was
stationed at Archangel during the winter in question; according
to his recollection there were four "first-class" icebreakers
and one icecutter (Kanada) in service during this winter, instead of six icebreakers and one icecutter.
- 38 -
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To sum up, it may be said that during the winters when
icebreakers were most urgently needed at Archangel to open the way
for the transport of war materials into Russia, the icebreaker fleet
was small in size and possessed no icebreaker of the largest and
most effective type. During the winters when icebreakers were needed
much less urgently a fair sized flotilla of these craft was available
including one 10.000 ton ship, the Sviatogor.
d. The Extent of Winter Shipping. 1914-19
This then was the effort expended in 1914-19 to maintain
winter communications to and from the port of Archangel. What results
did this effort obtain? Table V presents figures on the number of
ships entering and leaving Archangel between October 15 and May 15 dur-
ing the winters of 1915-16 and 1916-17. Corresponding figures for the
winter of 1914-15 are not available. These figures on ship movements
reveal several notable facts. During the period between October 15 and
May 15 in the two years in question, 430 inbound or outbound voyages were
recorded. A very large portion of these vessels would not have been able
to make this trip without the various aids to ice-navigation which we
have described. Secondly, even with this assistance the movement of
ships was very limited indeed in February and March. In these two years
only six ships entered or left Archangel during February and March. The
movement of ships was very limited also in January of both years and in
April of 1917. The winter of 1915-16 is reported to have been the most
severe in 20 years; many ships were frozen in, several were damaged by
the ice, and one was sunk.
TABLE V
SHIPS ENTERING AND LEAVING ARCHANGEL DURING THE WINTER MONTHS OF 1915-16 AND 1916-17
Period
-
-
1
0
0
-
29
1-15
-
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
4
5
5
3
6
,
10
1
37
1
28
0
60
a
9
TOTAL
-
0
-
1
24
0
28
89
0
41
-
2
9
OUT
18
0
19
0
0
IN
0
9
10
2
20
-
2
39
0
56
0
59
-
0
TOTAL
-
0
11
0
25
0
26
9
25
0
OUT
10
0
14
0
20
2
24
2
IN
11-15,16-30
110
149
269
16
-
67
114
171
3
1-15,16-81
9
1-15,16-28
1
1-15.16-81
Whole
3
1-15,16-81
Nay
6
1-15,16-30
T
March
4
February
,
January
0
December
3
16-81
April
November
T
October
Source: Isuchenic Ledokolnogo Dela V Nors kikh Portah S.S.S.R., (Icebreaking
in the Seaports of the Soviet Union), Roscow, 1925. p. 12. The
source says, "This information was supplied to as by Professor B. N.
Kandiba on the basis of the accounts of the Chief of the Commercial
S
M
o
Port of Archangel. From the text it appears that icebreakers are
a
not included is the above figures.
as
H
Ships Entering and Leaving
Archangel - Winters of
1915-16, 1916-17
60
50
1915-16
1916-17 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40
30
20
10
o
31
16
Oct.
15
Nov.
30
15
Dec.
31
15
Jan.
31
15
Feb.
28
15
Mar
31
15
30
15
Apr.
May.
NO.23. GEOG DIV-CO.I
350
- 40 -
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Thus we may conclude that in the winters of 1915-16 and 1916-17, the
ice campaign at Archangel attained only a limited success. For although it greatly assisted the movement of ships, it did not succeed
in maintaining any large volume of traffic in the months of January,
February and March of 1916 and 1917, or in April of 1917.
During the winter of 1917-18 there was no ice campaign:
"No attempt was made to use the port
owing to the political
situation .1 For the winter of 1918-19, the testimony varies. On
the one hand, from the British source just cited there comes the
statement that "In the winter of 1918-19 the only ships to arrive
were the Wardown of 3500 tons deadweight, which arrived in March
assisted by several icebreakers, and a few special small Russian
ships." On the other hand we have the statement from Commander S. M.
Riis (Retired) of the U. S. Navy, who was stationed at Archangel in
1918 and 1919 that a number of cargo ships arrived every month dur-
ing this winter. Most of the ships entering, states Commander Rils,
were reinforced ships or icebreaking freighters, but at least two
were simple cargo ships without reinforcement or special power. All
went out again in winter, and none were icebound for more than a few
days. 2
Commander Rils also stated that during the winter of
1918-19 the need to bring in supplies for the British and American
forces was not particularly urgent, since most of the necessary stores
Letter from W. O. Hart of British Merchant Shipping Mission to
G. T. Robinson, O.C.I., dated November 17, 1941.
"Commander S. M. Riis, United States Navy (Retired), interviews
with G. T. Robinson, O.C.I., Nov. 24, 25, 28.
- 41 -
351
SECRET
had been accumulated before the ice season; If it had been necessary,
a considerably larger traffic could have been maintained.
It does not appear that ice conditions produced any unusual number of wrecks during the years 1914-19. One Russian writer
says: "During all the years of the war there was not one serious
wreck that might be attributed to carelessness or lack of foresight
in relation to the conditions of ice navigation. There were wrecks,
but their causes were not connected with the specific conditions of
winter navigation. .1 From a British source comes the following statement: "The number of ships lost through ice conditions is only known
for the winter of 1915-1916 when one was actually sunk and several
others were damaged. .2 Commander Riis has stated that during the winter
of 1918-19 only one ship was damaged, and that not badly enough to prevent her leaving Archangel under her own power.
Such, then, was the experience of the years from 1914 to
1919. For a considerable amount of effort expended, a moderate success was achieved, though normal commercial traffic was not maintained
during the months when the ice conditions were worst. Whether greater
success can be obtained in 1941 depends at least partly on how well the
lessons of 1914-1919 have been learned.
1Berezkin, op. cit., p. 33.
2Letter from British Shipping Mission, W. O. Hart to G. T. Robinson,
dated November 17, 1941
352
42 -
SECRET
e. Winter Navigation Between Two Wars.
With the end of the First World War and the subsequent
period of Allied intervention in Northern Russia, Archangel reverted
to its former status among Russian ports. That is, it was one among
numerous ports suitable for foreign trade. And there was little need
to keep it open during the winter months. Moreover there was now available in North Russia a good port that was never closed by ice, and had
a railway connection with the interior. This was Murmansk. In addi-
tion, the vicissitudes of war, civil war, and intervention had to a
certain extent depleted the Soviet icebreaker fleet, the chief means
for the maintenance of winter navigation.
Under these circumstances no all-out attempt was made
under Soviet guidance to keep Archangel open the entire winter.
A
plan was indeed considered by a committee of techincal experts that
met under the auspices of the Ministry of Ways of Communication to
consider the matter of icebreaking in general. These experts decided,
on the basis of the experience of the World War and their own general
knowledge of the subject, that the port of Archangel could be kept
open up to January 1 and reopened again on April 1 if the following
aids to ice navigation were provided:
1. An advance port (Ekonomiia) with workshops and
a floating dock,
2. A system of providing ice information,
3. A base for icebreakers near Svyatoi Nos, at
the entrance to the White Sea,
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353
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4. The use of reinforced or very strongly built
cargo ships only. (Ordinary vessels could be used if their bows
were reinforced with timber.)
5. The use of two icebreakers of the Posharskii
type (3150 tons displacement, 5500 h.p.) for escorting ships
through the Gorlo and the Northern Zone, of two icebreakers of
the Odessa $3 type (2000 h.p.) for further escorting purposes, and
of two port icebreakers' of the "No. 5" class (1800 h. p.) as port
icebreakers. (See Table III, above. 1
So far as is known, no attempt was made to put this
recommendation into effect. It is interesting, however, as indicating
the opinion of Russian experts in the middle 1920's respecting the
practicability of maintaining winter navigation of the White Sea to
a limited extent for strictly commercial purposes. In 1930 and 1931
the icebreaker Lenin was assigned to Archangel, where she kept the
the port open for several weeks beyond the ordinary closing time,
and opened it earlier than the ordinary opening date. Apparently
this was about all that was done along this line at Archangel for
some years.
On the other hand a great interest in the more renote regions of the Russian Arctic grew with official encouragement
during the Soviet period. The project of the Northern Sea Poute from
Russia via Arctic waters to the Far East, led to much exploration, a
great amount of scientific investigation, and the acquisition of much
1Isuchenie Ledokolnogo Dela v Norshikh Portakh S.S.S.R., as pre-
viously cited, M., 1925, pp. 56-58.
44 -
354
SECRET
.practical experience of navigation through ice, with and without icebreakers. Airplanes and radio were used to a large extent in guiding
ice navigation. In other words, although the Russiana were not
trying to keep the White Sea open in the winter, they were acquiring
just the sort of experience and equipment that would be necessary if
thes project should ever see the light of day again. Horeover, the
part of Archangel itself, being one of the main termini of the Northern Sea Route and a great center for the export of lumber, was developed in many ways that would be useful in the realization of such
a project. (The population of the city increased from 77,000 in 1926
to 281,000 in 1939). 1
Most important-of all, however, during the thirties the
Soviets devoted great attention to the modernization of their existing
icebreaker fleet and the construction of new icebreakers. Many of
these ships of the present fleet, including some of the largest, were
built before 1918, but some of the older vessels have been rebuilt or
otherwise drastically modernized. The new large icebreakers are all
equipped to carry with them airplanes fai ice reconnaissance. In gen-
eral, it seems fair to say that the fleet of icebreaking craft which the
Soviets could mobilize at Archangel in 1941 is definitely superior to
that which was used there during and shortly after the First World War
T. P. Whitney
Gidrograficheskos Upravienie, Svedenis L'dov na Norickh S.S.S.R.
Zima 1929-30. (Hydrografic Administration, Information on Ice Conditions in the Seas of the Soviet Union, Winter of 1929-30), Leningrad,
1932, p. 43: Zima 1930-31 (Winter 1930-31), Leningrad, 1934.
- 45 6.
355
SECRET
Aids to the Winter Navigation of the White Sea Route
in 1941
a. Air Reconnaissance, etc.
The beginning of hostilities between the United States,
Great Britain and Japan has greatly increased the necessity -- al-
ready extremely urgent -- that a large inflow of supplies shall be
maintained through Archangel during the current winter. In this
situation, it may be expected that the Soviet authorities will make
the fullest possible use in the White Sea of all the aids to ice navigation that they have developed so extensively (on the Northern Sea
Route in particular) in recent years: weather and ice reporting
from observation stations and reconnaissance planes, the preparation
and distribution to ships by radio of forecasts and sailing directions,
and the employment of the maximum number of icebreakers in the convoying
of cargo ships.
The Soviet authorities advised the recent American Mission in Noscow that ships that were to ply the White Sea between the
the middle of December and the end of April should be provided with
steel propellor blades, and should have their hulls braced and strengthened. 1 The British Ministry of War Transport has ordered that the bows
of all vessels engaged in the winter trade to Archangel shall be
strengthened and that barrels of cement, tarpaulins, and baulks must
2
be carried for the temporary repair of damage done by the ice.
1 Moscow Conference. Report on Proceedings of Transportation Com-
mittee of Moscow Conference, prepared by the British and American
Delegations.
2Hemorandum from W. O. Hart (British Merchant Shipping Mission) to
the
8.) Maritime Commission, Ralph Keating, 6 Nov. 1941. Regarding
strengthening (U. of ships for northern voyages, see also Arctic Pilot, 1933,
vol. I, P. 58 ff.
- 46 -
356
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b. Icebreakers
The two principal requisites for maintaining the flow of
goods to Archangel in winter are icebreakers to open a path for
the freighters, and adequate port facilities for the handling of
their cargo. In Jane's Fighting Ships, 1940. the Soviet icebreaker fleet is described as follows (Table VI):
TABLE VI
SOVIET ICEBREAKERS 1941
Name and Date
of
Construction
Kirov
Kaganovich 1987 Engels Sermorpat
1937 Jaures
1987
Mikitich
Davidov
Travor
Keibysher
Ihabarov
Molatov
1989
Krassis, Lesis, Makarov,
Sadko, Malygin, Litke,
Sibiriakov, Sedov,
Building
Schmidt
1940
Resanov, Break
Stalia
1916
1897
1896
1988-39
at Lesingrad.
Completed?
Length
357 ft.
351 ft.
211 ft.
34T_ft.
184 ft.
165 ft.
For these older ships
still is service, see
Table III above.
69 ft.
75 ft.
48 ft.
506 ft.
Draught
226 ft.
22 ft.
20 ft.
20 ft.
Displacement
(toss)
12,000
11,000
Horse Power
12,000
10,050
Boam
48 ft.
40 ft.
S
6,000 gross
1,800
Speed (Kaots)
none
#
2
Airplanes
11.5
2. 460
1,525
1,450
4,000
1,200
1,900
14
18
none
none
18
none
8
IN
SOURCE:
Jane's Fighting Ships 1940:
C
DO
London; January 1, 1941.
IN
H
358
- 48 -
SECRET
According to information supplied by Mr. W. A. Harriman,
of the Moscow Mission, there are several ships in the Northern service that
that are not mentioned in Jane's manual. The following are the icebreakers reported by Mr. Harriman to be available for service at Archangel:
SIBIRYAKOV
MUROMETS
--
DEZHNEV
6,500
completed
in
1938
-1908
1909
1938
.
TAIMIR
tons
.
ICE BREAKER #6
ICE BREAKER #8
11,000
1,200
1,200
1,290
1,140
-
STALIN
In addition, he reported that the following icebreakers were in the
service of the Northern Sea Route Administration (their exact location
is not given):
RUSANOV
1,140 tons
SADKO
1,616
1913
SEDOV
3,000
2,660
5,700
.
1909
"
1909
.
19131
.
-
.
LENIN
.
LITKE
completed
in
1909
Considering how urgent the desire is to keep traffic moving in the
White Sea, it seems probable that several of the vessels in the second group have already been put into service at Archangel. According
to a telegram from the British Ministry of War Transport, dated 30
October, Admiral Kharlamov had given "renewed assurance" that the
Russians guarantee to provide from eight to ten of these craft for the
White Sea ice campaign.
2
Letter from Rear Admiral R. R. Waesche, United States Coast Guard
to Captain James Roosevelt, O.C.I., 6 Nov. 1941. The letter says "This
information was supplied by Mr. W. A. Harriman after his recent visit
to the Soviet Union." Compare O.N.I. Intelligence Report, Serial 46-41,
22 Oct. 1941.
Information from British Merchant Shipping Mission, W. O. Hart.
- 49 -
359
SECRET
c. Can the Freighters be Kept Noving?
Papanin, the commander of the Northern Icebreaker Fleet,
believes that until the end of January the large icebreaker Stalin
can bring ten ships at a time, in a single convoy, through the ice
of the White Sea; after that date, the number of ships in each convoy must be reduced. Other ice experts believe that the estimate for
January is much too high, if ice conditions are severe. Two British
representatives at Archangel were reported a month ago as agreeing
that only two of the icebreakers at Archangel (the Stalin and the
Lenin) were suited to the task of convoying ships through the difficult Gorlo (Neck) of the White Sea; they considered the other breakers
serviceable only in waters nearer to the port; and they believed that
from the early days of January onward, the Stalin and the Lenin could
convoy only three freighters each, on each trip. 1 Rear Admiral R. R.
Waesche of the United States Coast Guard believes that "each large
icebreaker could handle not more than three cargo vessels in convoy
at a time, when heavy ice conditions prevail:" Admiral Waesche would
include the Dezhnev with the Lenin and the Stalin, as ships qualified
for this heavy duty. 2
During the ice season, incoming convoys from the Atlantic
will anchor at Yukonga Bay near the mouth of the White Sea to await
the arrival of icebreakers or the clearing of any congestion of ships
or cargos that may exist at the ports near Archangel. Yukonga Bay is
1 Memoranda from the British Merchant Shipping Mission, dated 17 and
18 November, 1941.
2Letter from Rear Admiral R. R. Waesche, United States Coast Guard,
to Captain James Roosevelt, O.C.I., 6 November, 1941.
50 -
360
SECRET
not always free from ice obstructions (see p. 6 above). and it can
offer anchorage to only a limited number of ships. 1 From Yukonga
Bay to Archangel, the distance is about 280 nautical miles. The
Soviet authorities told the American Mission to Moscow that an icebreaker coudd bring a small convoy from open water to the bar at
Archangel in from 12 to 36 hours, depending on ice conditions. 2
But inasmuch as these conditions vary so greatly, and have such a
powerful influence upon the progress of any convoy that attempts
to meet them, it hardly seems worth while to quote this or other
estimates of the time required to bring a convoy through the ice.
Finally, the Russians told members of the Moscow Mis-
sion that in a winter of extreme severity the whole ice campaign
in the White Sea would collapse -- a statement that one might
3
accept without reservation from witnesses naturally so unwilling
to admit the possibility of defeat, were it not for the fact that
in the winter of 1915-16, with the severest weather in twenty years
and with icebreakers and other ice aids very much inferior to those
now available, a few ships actually did bring their cargo into port.
Memorandum from British Merchant Shipping Mission, 18 November,
1941.
Moscow Conference. Report of Proceedings of Transportation
Committee of the Moscow Conference: Prepared by British and
American Delegations.
Interview with Captain Thomas and Captain Brame of the Moscow
Mission, 24 October 1941.
- 51 -
361
SECRET
7. Facilities and Capacity of Archangel and the
Neighboring Ports
If the degree of success to be expected in the ice campaign
is highly problematical, the capacity to handle cargo in port is
hardly less so. The capacity of the port of Archangel in the icefree season will first be discussed, for purposes of reference, and
the more immediate problem of winter port facilities will then be
presented.
a. The Port of Archangel in the Ice-free Season
It is only during the season of moderate ice, or of
none, that ships use the quays of Archangel proper and the main
dock at Bakaritsa on the west side of the Dvina about four miles
upstream from Archangel. At high tide at Archangel the channel is
23 ft. 6 in. deep at the pier, and at low tide the depth is 20 ft.
The quays here will accommodate simultaneously 8 or 9 ships not ex-
ceeding 500 ft. in length: 4 or 5 with a draft of 20-22 ft. 2 of
18 ft.: and 2 of 16-18 ft. There is also a dock at Archangel that
will accommodate 6 ships of 2,000 tons, while the anchorage space
is extensive and some cargo is taken from the ships' side by
barges. The cranes reported by O.N.I. to be at Archangel are:
One
Two
One
One
150 Ton rotating floating crane
25 Ton rotating floating cranes
15 Ton railway crane
7 Ton railway crane
The supply of ships' stores and fuel at Archangel is not considered
dependable. At Bakaritsa there is a dock 2,000 ft. long with accommodation for nine ships. 1
10.N.I. Intelligence Report, Serial 57-41, 28 Nov., 1941.
362
- 52 -
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Respecting the facilities of this port, there is hardly
one item that is not the subject of wide disagreement. To illustrate this fact, one may present certain data received about two
months ago by O.N.I. from the American Military Attache in London:
Port of Archangel
Source of Data 1
British Admiralty
Maximum number of ships
that can be berthed
simultaneously at
wharves
33 ships of
22 ft. draft
British Ministry
of War Transport
4-5 ships of
22 ft. draft
2 ships of
18 ft. draft
1 - 100 T. floating
1 - 150 T. Floating
6 - 30-50 T.
1 10-20 T. Gantry
2 - 71 T. rwy.
1 50 T.
-
4 8-20 T.
10 3-8 T.
1 25 T.
-
Cranes
When there are such variant reports as to simple, meas-
urable details, it is not surprising that there is wide disagreement
respecting that complex resultant of many factors -- the tonnage capa-
city of the port. According to the source just cited, the Admiralty
estimated the rate of discharge at 8-10,000 T. per day, while the
Ministry of War Transport set the figure at 2,500 - 3,000 T.
A British War Office report of 18 August, 1941 estimated
"that the port could handle 8,000 T. of military stores per day": but
subsequently the War Office fixed the figure for the port and the connecting railway at 3-4,000 T. of general stores, with an increase to
1Information received from O.N.I. by O.C.I. 22 Oct., 1941.
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6,000 T. per day in the spring. 1 After personal observation, two
American Assistant Military Attaches estimated the daily capacity
at 3,000 tons, 2 while the figure given by O.N.I. in a report
dated 28 November 1941, is 2,260 T. per day. 3
In October the Soviet authorities were reported as
asking for much larger deliveries than this at Archangel -- 300,000
T. per month (10,000 T. per day) according to one cable, 270,000 T.
per month (9,000 T. per day) according to another.4 On the same
day that the Soviet estimate of 270,000 T. per month (9,000 T. per
day) was telegraphed from London by the American Moscow Mission,
another Soviet figure of 120,000 T. per month (4,000 T. per day)
5
was wired from Kuibyshev by the American Assistant Military Attache.
In the presence of such a variety of current estimates,
from Russian, British and American sources, it may not be inappro-
priate to ask what has been the past performance of the port. The
most significant data on this subject are perhaps these:
Trade of Archangel in the Ice-Free Season
Average monthly tonnage
Exports Imports Total
1918 and 1937 (1935)
331,735 T. 19,360 T. 351,000 T.
for the best year between
Average monthly tonnage
for latest year avail-
able (1937)
294,000 T.
185 T. 294,000 T.
1Papers transmitted under cover of a letter from Intelligence Branch,
British Army Staff, Washington, to War Department G-2, dated 18 Nov.,
1941.
Radiogram from Kuibyshev, 1 November 1941.
30.N.I. Intelligence Report, Serial 57-41, 28 November 1941.
4Telegram from Steinhardt, Moscow, 6 October, 1941; telegram from
Harriman (Winant), London, 10 October 1941.
5Telegram from Michela, Kuibyshev, 10 October, 1941.
The port is normally open about 6₫ months per year, and the monthly
average
above was produced by dividing the total for the year in question
by 6.
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Thus the best monthly turnover recorded since the First World War
(of exports and imports combined) is considerably above the highest
Soviet estimate of current import capacity, and the turnover for
the latest year for which data are available is only a few tons short
of this Soviet estimate.
The trade turnover of Archangel consisted chiefly of
exports, and lumber and other forest products made up a very large
part of this export tonnage:
Freight Turnover of Archangel
1932
Total Exports
Forest Products
exported
Total Imports
1933
1934
1935
1,488,401 T.
1,651,353
1,876,422
2,156,274
1,396,444
1,476,191
1,396,444
1,958,695
65,270
71,118
125,849
T.
46,484 T.
It remains an open question, how much of this considerable capacity
to handle exports of lumber is realizable as capacity to handle imports
of military and general stores.
b. Winter Facilities and Winter Capacity
In winter the port of Archangel and the nearby wharf at
Bakaritsa are closed by ice, and ships must unload at Ekonomiia, about
ten miles down-river from Archangel in the delta of the Dvina, or at
Molotovsk, a few miles west of the delta on the shore of the Gulf of
Archangel. Ekonomiia was established as a winter port by the British
in 1917 and is connected with Archangel by rail. Archangel proper is
on the eastern side of the Dvina, and every winter a railraod is laid
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across the ice to connect with the Archangel-Vologda line on the
east bank. 1 A recent radiogram from the American Naval Attache in
Moscow states that there is no railway connection with Molotovsk;
however it is probable that track-tractors and sleds will be used
as a substitute during the winter season. 2
These winter ports are kept open by icebreakers, but
during recent months, estimates of the number of ships that can be
unloaded each month at Ekonomiia and Molotovsk have varied consider-
ably. The Soviet authorities informed the Moscow Mission that 12
vessels could be berthed simultaneously at Ekonomiia. 3 British representatives at Archangel believe that there will be accommodation
for a convoy of six ships every sixteen days at Ekonomiia and for
4
five dry-cargo ships and one tanker every sixteen days at Molotovsk.
An American representative now in Russia estimates the capacity of
Ekonomiia at eight ships for each convoy, and that of Molotovsk at
three or four non-tankers and one tanker, with a turn-around of ten
days for each convoy. British instructions are that all ships must
be able to discharge their cargo with their own gear -- thus indi-
cating that there is little or no lifting equipment at Ekonomiia or
Letter from Commander U. S. Naval Forces in Northern Russia, to
Force Commander, 28 November 1918; also other sources of later date.
2 Naval Intelligence Report of radiogram of 5 November 1941.
3Mos cow Conference. Report of Proceedings of Transportation Committee of Moscow Conference: Prepared by British and American Delegations.
Memorandum of 17 November 1941, accompanying letter from British
Merchant Shipping Mission, W. O. Hart, to O.C.I., G. T. Robinson,
dated 18 November 1941.
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Molotovsk. 1 The Soviet authorities believe that they can maintain a
large freight handling capacity by unloading some of the ships directly on the ice, and by putting into operation the large amount of
new port equipment ordered in the United States. 2
Respecting the possibility of unloading directly on the
ice, 3 Vilhjalmur Stefansson suggests that large platforms can be
1Cable from Ministry of. War Transport, London to British Merchant
Shipping Mission, Washington, 8 November 1941.
2Interview with Douglas Brown of the Moscow Mission, 1 December 1941.
3The following very interesting comment on the changing thickness of
the ice, in relation to the problem of unloading on the ice, was written
by V. Stefansson, 13 Deo. 1941:
"The thickness of ice in a given place veries directly with the cold
but inversely with the snowfall. It may occur, in any time of winter
that, following a heavy snowfall, the ice actually gets thinner during
a week or two of extreme cold. You may measure it at three feet on
January 15, and find it two feet or less February 1. Indeed, there are
cases where ice; more than two feet thick has completely disappeared from
beneath the snow without the cooperation of any incoming warn water current, the whole explanation being that the ice has been so effectively
insulated by the snow from the chill of the atmosphere that a very slight
above-freezing-point water temperature, which was being constantly defeated by the atmospheric chill before the snowfall, now becomes successful in producing melting.
This situation is seldom of material importance to an incoming ship;
but it is important to guard against the danger that when you are freighting supplies over the ice towards shore an area that carried heavy tractors safely before the snowfall may not support them two or three days
later, men and equipment falling into the water.
People who live in any given neighborhood will know whether these
things occur there. Accordingly, they should always be questioned. The
occurrence is likliest off a promontory, between an island and the mainland, or between islands. In this connection, remember that a shoal is
to be looked upon as if it rose above water and were a promontory or an
island."
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used on the ice to distribute the load of shore cranes and of heavy
articles of cargo. He also suggests that where the land-fast ice is
not heavy enough to serve as a temporary quay, it may be crushed at
the edge by icebreakers, and the broken pieces nosed back to form a
ridge of any desired height: in a short time the pieces will be
bonded by freezing. Mr. Stefansson says further:
"At any time when the wind is offshore or when there is
a calm, you can tie a ship to the ice broadside, and unload upon the
ice as if it were a dock. Cranes mounted on large sledges can be
brought to the ship. The motor power towards shore is often caterpillar, but could be teams of horses or even manpower.
"By studying the topography of the Bay carefully, you
could probably have a choice of unloading places so that there would
practically never be a wind that wasn't offshore from one of these
places.
"If a ship has not unloaded when the wind changes you
simply move it to another point and start unloading again. In a
really terrific gale the ship might have to go out into free water
and heave to for the duration.
"Since there are fewer rains in mid-winter, and since
dry snow is injurious to few commodities, you do not have as much
need for storage buildings abreast of the unloading places during winter as you would have in summer. .1
G. T. Robinson
1Note written 13 December 1941.
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8. The Rail and River Connections of Archangel
a. The Archangel Railway
The port of Archangel is connected with the Soviet rail
system by the line which runs due south to Vologda, and thence via
Danilov, Yaroslavl and Alexandrovsk to Moscow, a distance of 1134 km.
Vologda, where the Archangel line crosses the main line from Leningrad
to the Urals and Siberia, is 634 km. from Archangel. 1 From Moscow to
Filino, just north of Yaroslavl, the line is part of the Yaroslavl
Railway: from Filino to Archangel it is part of the Northern Railway.
The railway was opened in the early part of the present
century as a narrow-gauge line, but was converted to the Russian stand-
ard gauge during the last war. The line has been double-tracked from
Moscow to Danilov, 361 km., for some time and work on double-tracking
the rest of the line is now in progress. 2 A report recently received
from a reliable American source in Moscow states that double-tracking
has been completed. as' far as Konosha, a distance of 712 km. from Mos cow,
leaving 422 km. of single-track between Konosha and Archangel. 3 The
double-track section between Moscow and Alexandrovsk, 113 km., is
electrified.
Distances from Ofitsialinyi Ukazatel Passashirskikh Soobshchenii,
1937. Moscow, Transzheldorizdat, 1937.
2The cut-off to Bui, east of Vologda on the Leningrad-Urals line,
branches off from the Archangel line at Danilov. The Trans-Siberian
Express runs out of Moscow over the Archangel line as far as Danilov,
turning east here.
3An unconfirmed report from a Soviet source states that double-
tracking is completed to Archangel. A representative of the British
Ministry of War Transport, at Archangel, has reported that the double
tracking has been completed to Plesetsk, 200 km. south of Archangel.
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There appear to be two bottle-necks limiting the capacity
of the Archangel Railway in addition to the shortage of rolling stock
and motive power which affects all Soviet railways: 1) in summer, the
lack of a bridge across the Northern Dvina at Archangel, and 2) the
single-track section from Archangel to Konosha. In winter a track is
laid across the river on the ice, and goods reaching Archangel by way
of the winter port of Ekonomiia are routed across this ice-bridge and
down the main railroad to the interior of the country. The lack of a
bridge means that in the ice-free season goods landed on the east shore
of the river, where the city is located, must be lightered over to the
west bank where the railway terminates. Since most of the dockage is
on the east bank (located there to handle the lumber export, in which
the railway is not significantly involved) the lack of a bridge is a
handicap particularly in the handling of imports. The Third Five Year
Plan provided for the needed bridge, but there have been no reports of
one under construction.
The single-track from Archangel to Konosha sets a definite
limit to the amount of supplies that can be moved south from the port.
Sidings on this stretch average 11.8 km. apart, judging from the stations shown in the Schematic Album. 1 According to information from a
generally reliable American source in Moscow, the maximum capacity of
this single-track line at present is 15 south-bound trains daily, with
a capacity of 300 tons each -- but this is probably too low an estimate.
Narodnyi Komissariat Putei Soobshcheniis SSSR, ''bom Skhem
Zhelesnykh Dorog SSSR, Moscow, Transkartografiin NKPS, 1937, pl.
6.
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Recently, according to the same source, only 9 trains were being dispatched southwards daily, and these trains were made up of only 15 cars
of 16 tons capacity, making a total per train of only 140 tons, a daily
total of 1,260 tons. Information is not available which would indicate
whether this low capacity, if it is actually a fact, is due to the condition of the track or to a shortage of rolling stock. In a recent
memorandum of the British Merchant Shipping Mission, the capacity of
the road is rated at 2-3,000 T. per day, while the British War Office
estimated last summer that the line could carry 15 south-bound trains of
with
a
500 T. each per day -- a total of 7,500 T. 1 An American railway
similar spacing of sidings should be able to handle 10,500 tons of
freight in each direction, daily.
In this region there is no year-round motor road capable
2
of carrying a heavy truck traffic from Archangel southward
Unless the locomotives operating on the line are equipped
to burn wood, the difficulty of obtaining coal may prove to be a con-
siderable handicap. It is believed that the Archangel line formerly
got much of its coal from the Soviet mines in Spitzbergen. These mines
were destroyed in the recent British raid, and in any case it is unlikely
that much coal was sent from there to Archangel after the outbreak of
hostilities between Germany and Russia.
In time of peace, a major southward connection in the icefree season is the large White Sea Canal, but this important system of
Memorandum from British Merchant Shipping Mission, W. O. Hart, to
U. S. Maritime Commission, D. E. Scholl, 6 November 1941. British War
Office Report on Allied-Soviet Communications, 13 August 1941.
2Telegram from Yeaton, American Military Attache, Kuibyshev,
23 October 1941.
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communication with Leningrad was cut some time ago by the enemy.
In view of the danger that Vologda may be captured
and the direct rail connection of Archangel with central Russia
thus cut off, special importance attaches to the more-or-less
hypothetical railway extending from Konosha, on the Archangel.
Vologda line, some 350 km. eastward to Kotlas, from which point
there is a railway connection with the Volga basin. The line from
Konosha to Kotlas is one of the many mysteries of the Soviet railway map; a Soviet chart of 1937 shows a part of this railroad under
construction, and a representative of the British Ministry of War
Transport at Archangel has recently reported that the line is com-
plete, though the report states that no details as to its capacity
are available. So far as is known, this British report remains
unconfirmed.
J. A. Morrison
b. Winter Roads for Tractor-Slec Trains
If Vologda or some other point on the Archangel rail-
way should be lost, it is not impossible that a motor by-pass for
winter use could be opened rather speedily. The surface of every
lake and every stream of any size offers a winter road, ready made,
and the comparatively flat terrain makes it possible to open tracks
through the forest with little or no labor except that required for
the felling of trees. 1
1v. Stefansson, interview with G. T. Robinson, O.C.I., 13 December
1941.
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River courses are particularly well adapted to winter freighting;
every northern river should be regarded, Stefansson says, as "a
liquid highway in summer and a concrete highway in winter."
A recent United States Army report indicated that trans-
portation over trails of this kind, by caterpillar tractors with sled
trains, may be practical under very severe winter conditions. For
some years food, oil, and machinery have been transported by this
method over tundra, through forests, and along river courses to a
large mining operation in Alaska, and the use of this form of transportation of military supplies, in Alaska, has recently been recommended
by a board of officers. 1 Tractor-sled trains have been used extensively
by the Russians in winter logging operations in the north, and the combined experience and equipment of Russia, Canada, and the United States
for this kind of haulage must very greatly exceed that of Germany and
her minor northern ally, Finland.
G. T. Robinson
C. The Northern Duina River
There is only one railway connection between Archangel
and the war zone; but winter or summer, the Northern Dvina River offers
the best of all substitutes for, or supplements to, this railway. A
tractor-drawn sled-train or a river boat bound inland from Archangel
by way of the Dvina would move from the port some 630 km. due southeast
1 Hq. Alaska Defense Command Office Experimental Board, Report on
Tractor-Drawn Freight Train, Reference Test Directive No. 33: letter of
transmittal dated 22 April 1941.
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to Kotlas, where. its load would be transferred to the railway connecting with the main transport net-work of Russia.
In an average year, a river boat drawing 115 cm. can navigate from Archangel to Kotlas during any month. In May and the first
half of June in an average year, boats drawing 250 cm. can navigate
between these two points successfully; but in the driest season recorded in a considerable number of years, only boats drawing 60 cm.
or less could cover this course. 1
The average period of ice-free navigation on the Northern
Dvina River is 174 days. At Archangel, the principal channels of the
river freeze in early November: and the spring breakup does not take
place until, on the average, May 13. "Steamship travel on the river
begins immediately after the breakup. River steamships from Vologda
follow after the ice and within a week freight barges appear in (Archangel) from up the river. .2
The river distance from Archangel to Kotlas is 630 kilo-
meters (390 statute miles. 13 At the river port of Kotlas there are
wharves, grain elevators, and boat-building facilities. Nearly half
a million tons of freight passed through this port in 1925; of this
amount, 42,000 tons were grain and 410,000 tons were wood and lumber.
1Spravochnaia Kniga po Vnutrennin Vodnym Putiam Severnogo Basseina
(Handbood on the River Routes of the Northern Basin). Archangel, 1929,
p. 168.
2Lotsiia Belogo Moria (White Sea Pilot), Leningrad, 1932, pp. 167-169.
3Spravochnaia Kniga PO Vnutrennim Vodnym Putiam Severnogo Basseina.
page 49.
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Most of the wood and lumber was towed from Kotlas down the river in
1
rafts.
A single-track railway connects Kotlas with the town of
Kirov (Viatra), from which there are single-track railway connections
both to the Ural region and to the central industrial region of Russia.
The distance from Kotlas to Sverdlovsk is 1,243 km.: from Kotlas to
the city of Gorkii (old Nizhnii Novgorod) it is 841 km. 2
In 1928, 90 per cent of the boats in the Northern Basin
operated on the Dvina. The Northern fleet as a whole included
275 steamboats and tugs with a total horsepower of 39,500.
550 barges with a total freight capacity of 273.000 tons.
70 motor vessels, mostly of a small size and capacity.
3
80 other craft of various sorts.
The Northern Dvina in the past has carried a very consider-
able traffic, though a very large proportion of it was in logs and lumber. Thus, in 1926 Archangel received and sent by this river a total
of 2,640,000 tons, of which 2,578,000 tons were logs and lumber. Most
of the lumber and logs were towed downstream by tugs, in rafts. 4
1Encyclopedia Britannica, 1941, Vol. 13, page 496; and Spravochnaia
Kniga PO Vnutrennim Vodnym Putiam Severnogo Basseina, p. 192.
20ffitsialnyi Ukazatel Zheleznodorozhnykh. Vodnykh 1 Drugikh
Passazhirskikh Soobshchenii, Letnee Duishenie 1937. (Official Guide
to Railway, Water and Other Passenger Communications, Summer Traffic,
1937). Moscow, 1937; tables 410, 325, 358.
3Spravochnaia Kniga po Vnutrennim Vodnym Putian Severnago Basseina,
P. 186. Lists of all ships, including barges, which operated on the
Northern Dvina in 1928, are available in this source.
Ibid. pp. 192-193.
4
375
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In 1918 it was said to be possible to send from Archangel
every month during the period of navigation 50,000 tons of freight upstream to the interior of Russia by the Northern Dvina River -- though
there is no evidence in the available figures of the movement. in recent
years of any such tonnage of general cargo. 1 Still, if the fleet on
the Dvina is as large today as it was in 1928, it should certainly be
capable of moving a considerable volume of freight upstream to Kotlas,
when the river opens next spring.
T. P. Whitney
9. The Vulnerability of the Archangel Route
In the Atlantic and the Barents Sea ships bound to and from
Archangel may be subject to attack by submarines and airplanes, and
to a limited extent by surface raiders. Presumably this entails the
employment of the convoy system, with its demands upon the Navy for
escort vessels, and with the delay due to slow steaming.
The White Sea traffic lanes, the port of Archangel (with those
of Ekonomiia and Molotovsk, nearby), and the long railway line (partly
single-track) to Vologda, are within range of medium and heavy bombers
from many airdromes in territory controlled by the Axis. 2 However, the
Germans have air bases slightly nearer to Liverpool than to Archangel,
and the reported ineffectiveness of the Germans in bombing Moscow may
1Memorandum of November 28, 1918, from the Commander of U. S. Naval
Forces in Northern Russia to the Force Commander, on the subject, The
Port of Archangel.
2 Military Intelligence, I.B. 150, Vulnerability of Archangel and
the White Sea to German Air Attack, 6 November 1941.
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possibly argue for some measure of success in any Russian attempt
to protect Archangel and its water and rail connections.
It has been argued that the slow movement of ships under con-
voy of an icebreaker makes them particularty vulnerable to attack:
but it has also been said, on the other hand, that at the best the
motion of a ship is so slow, by comparison with that of an airplane.
that a further slowing down has little relation to the accuracy of
bombing: though the longer a ship remains on its course, the longer
it is without the protection of shore batteries. It is said, sometimes that ice-lanes made by convoys will guide the bombers to their
target; but against this contention, it is said that no recognizable
ice-lane will remain for long behind the convoy: if the ice is in a
compression stage, it will close soon after the ships have passed;
if it is in a state of de-compression, there will be irregular areas
of open water everywhere and the course followed by the ships will
hardly be recognizable from the air. The length of the Arctic winter
nights should give some protection to ships, though the opposite condition will apparently operate in summer in favor of the bombers. The
one factor of greatest vulnerability in winter is perhaps this: that
the whole success of the ice campaign depends upon the continued opera-
tion of a few ships of a very special kind, the icebreakers. The sinking of a large breaker would be a blow of the first order to winter
shipping in the White Sea.
G. T. Robinson
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C. THE PORT OF NURNANSK AND ITS RAILWAY CONNECTIONS
1. General Considerations
Among ice-free Russian ports with inland rail connections,
Murmansk is now the only one not completely closed to American and
British ships. However the present usefulness of this port is complete-
ly controlled by two circumstances: first, the close proximity of the
port and its railway to the German-Finnish lines makes the sea approach,
the port, and the railway, particularly vulnerable to attack by sea, by
air and by land; and second, this vulnerability has already resulted in
the cutting of the Murman railway between the White Sea and Leningrad,
and has thus thrown the burden of any shipments inland from Mumansk
upon a new railway of unknown capacity that leaves the Murman line near
the southeastern corner of the White Sea (the Gulf of Onega) and connects
with the Archangel line at a point about 90 km. south of that city (See
Section 4, below). There is a possibility, of course, that this new
railway may be supplemented in winter by a tractor-and-sledge service,
following the same general route.
At present the Russians do not wish to route large inland shipments by way of Murmansk, but if an exceptionally severe winter should
make it impossible to maintain navigation to Archangel, the use of the
Murmansk system might be attempted.
2. The Port
Even in time of peace, Murmansk was the only comparatively icefree port of any consequence that the Soviet Union had on the open
ocean -- excepting far-away Vladivostok. "The port can always be
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kept open, although the assistance of an icebreaker is sometimes necessary. ..1 In November, 1939, the Russian journal, Water Transport, com-
plained that lack of equipment and inefficiency of labor had resulted
in an excessive idleness of ships and freight-cars at the port. 2
However, it seems that all the facilities of the port have
recently been improved. A generally reliable source of 1940 gives the
following account of these facilities: The approach to the quays is
26 ft. in depth. The depth alongside the piers is 18-26 ft., and these
piers will accomodate 11 ships. Wharves provide for a number of
additional vessels. The available cranes are:
Floating: 1 140 T.
3 50 T.
1 25 T.
Movable, on shore: 2 12 T.
4 10 T.
There are railroad tracks to all piers, and a drydock under construction that is capable of handling destroyers if not larger vessels.
A recent Intelligence Report of O.N.I. states that 12 ships of
16-25 ft. draft can be discharged simultaneously at the quays. It says,
"There are six railroad, caterpillar and motor cranes of lifting capacity
of 6 to 7 s tons: two floating cranes with a loading capacity of 30 and
50 tons respectively; and one bunkering ship. There are 30,000 square
meters of covered storage space and an open space of 25,000 to 50,000
square meters. 13
Arctic Pilot, V. I, 1933, p. 133.
2N. A., Berlin, M-781, December 1939.
30.N.I. Intelligence Report, Serial 57-41, 28 November 1941.
379
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69
A British War Office report of last August estimated that
Murmansk "could probably handle at least 3.000 tons of military stores
per day inwards, in addition to small quantities (say 500 tons) at the
neighboring ports of Kola and Polyarnoe. "1 The British Ministry of War
Transport believes that six ships can discharge simultaneously at
Murmansk in the winter season. 2
The record of the past performance of the port of Murmansk may
give some idea of what might be expected today, if peace-time conditions
existed.
Trade of Murmansk
Exports
Imports
Total
38,666 T.
74,833 T.
113,500 T.
63,016 T.
8,925 T.
71,916 T.
Average monthly tonnage
for best year between
1918 and 1937 (1935)
Average monthly tonnage
for latest year
3
available (1937)
The total turnover at Murmansk was much smaller than at Archangel: but
while the peacetime-trade of the latter port was largely in the form of
exports of forest products. Murmansk showed a much larger proportion of
imports of general cargo -- a fact that suggests that the port facilities of Murmansk may be better suited than those of Archangel to the
handling of incoming American supplies.
G. T. Robinson
British War Office, Report on Allied-Soviet Communications,
revised edition, 13 August 1941.
2 Cable from British Ministry of War Transport, 8 November 1941,
supplied by British Merchant Shipping Mission.
3 Department of Commerce, Eastern European Unit, E. C. Ropes.
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3. The Murman Railway
The 1,326 km. single-track Murman Railway, now part of the Kirovak
Railway, was built during the last war to connect the rest of Russia with
an ice-free port on the Kola fjord of the Murman Coast. Although not
completed in time to carry any significant quantities of munitions to the
Eastern Front, it played an important role during the occupation of North
Russia by the Allies in 1918-1919. Following the reestablishment of Soviet
authority, the line was almost completely re-built, and with the development of the port of Murmansk and the opening up of the mineral resource
of the Kola Peninsula, it came to be an important artery.
Although the Finnish-German forces have cut the Murman Railway at
a number of places south of the White Sea, it is possible that, under
certain conditions, described below, the northern part of the line may
still be of considerable use. Unfortunately, there are no data available as to the capacity of the Murman Railway. However, in view of the
fact that the northern 277 km. of the line - Kandalaksha to Murmansk --
are electrified, the capacity should be considerably greater than that
of the single-track portion of the Archangel line. 1 However, the Schematic
Album indicates that in 1937, at least, sidings were less frequent than on
the Archangel line; on the 667 km. between Murmansk and Belomorsk (Soroka),
they averaged only one every 17.6 km. 2 On the other hand, there would
1 The Kandalaksha-Murmansk section was electrified because this portion
of the line across the base of the Kola Peninsula has the heaviest grades
on the line and, due to the apatite movement to Murmansk for export and
to Kandalaksha for treatment, it has the heaviest traffic. Power is supplied by a hydro-electric plant on the Niva River, reported to have been
bombed during the present hostilities.
2 Al' bom Skhem, etc., pl. 1.
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seem to be a good chance that much of the rolling stock used in the
apatite traffic on the northern part of the line is still there, due
to the cutting of the railway south of the White Sea. This rolling
stock is therefore available for other purposes, since the apatite traffic must have declined with the cutting off of the export market and the
severing of the direct connection with the Russian interior.
In view of the nearness of the Murman line to the enemy, two
factors of vulnerability should be stressed. One is the use of electric
traction between.Murmansk and Kandalaksha. An electrified railway is
obviously more vulnerable than one on which self-contained units provide
the motive power 1 The other is the large number of bridges on the sec-
tion that parallels the west shore of the White Sea. Press reports suggest that the Finns have bombed a number of these bridges. The line is
also vulnerable, of course, to attack by land.
4. The Connection between the Archangel and Nurman Railways
Obviously, the northern part of the Murman railway can be of only
local utility (in serving local military forces) unless it has a connection with the Archangel railway and thus with central Russia.
Even during the last war there were plans for a "Great Northern
Railway" which would start at Kotlas, terminus of 383 km. branch from
Kirov on the Leningrad-Urals main line, and run northwesterly to
Belomorsk (Soroka) on the Murman railway, cutting the Archangel line
at or near Plesetsk. The principal argument for the line was the
1 The Murman railway formerly relied on Spitzbergen coal to fuel its
steam locomotives, at least those operating on the northern part of the
line. with the Spitzbergen mines destroyed and supplies from the interior of Russia cut off, the fuel problem is bound to be a very
serious one.
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necessity for providing a direct rail connection between the ice-free
port of Murmansk, and the Urals and West Siberia. The Soviet authorities
took over the scheme, and it was at one time on the list of concessions
offered to foreign capital. Actual construction was provided for by the
Second Five-Year Plan, but there have been no published statements as to
the
progress
of
the
line. 1 Recently, there have been several unpublished
reports in regard to the line. A Finnish source reported that the entire
line, Kotlas-Plesetsk-Soroka was operating before the war (the RussoFinnish Winter War or present Russo-German-Finnish war?). At a recent
conference, the Russians reported that the Kotlas-Plesetak section was
still under construction. A reliable American source in Moscow reports
that a railway connecting the Archangel and Murman lines has just been
laid along the shore of the Gulf of Onega. A map published in the
Stockholm Dagens Nyheter of 25 October 1941, indicates that this railway
runs from Belomorsk on the Murman railway through the town of Onega
(on the Gulf of Onega, an arm of the White Sea) to a point on the
Archangel line almost due east of Onega. Signals have not yet been
erected, and the new line is reported to have a limited capacity.
2
1 1An insert map showing lumber exploitation in the Archangel oblast
and the Komi ASSR on pl. 31 of Vol. II of the Bol'shoi Atlas Mira shows
a railway under construction between Obozerskaya on the Archangel Line
and the port of Onega.
2 The limited traffic capacity of the newly opened Pletsetsk-OnegaBelomorsk railway might be supplemented by the use of sled trains hauled
by caterpillar tractors over ice-roads. The Russians have made extensive
use of this technique in connection with lumbering operations in this
region. With lumbering operations presumably reduced, due to the difficulties of export, tractors and sleds should be available. Canadian lumber operators also familiar with this type of transport probably could
give estimates of the volume of freight which could be moved in this way.
In this connection, it is of interest to recall the reindeer-sled service
between the Archangel and Murmansk lines maintained by the American
forces in North Russia during the winter of 1918-19.
383
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Even if it should prove impossible to maintain navigation in
the White Sea during the current winter, a limited amount of freight
can perhaps be forwarded to central Russia via the port of Murmansk,
the Murman railway, and the new connecting line through Onega to the
Archangel-Vologda railway.
J. A. Morrison
384
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THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
1. The Problem
In the original plan for this study, there was no place for the
Northern Sea Route, but the need for its inclusion became apparent as
the work progressed. There is only one reason for investigating a line
of communications so remote and so difficult as this route through the
Arctic waters north of Eastern Europe and Siberia, and that is that the
other routes available for the shipment of American supplies to the
Soviet Union are so limited in capacity or so vulnerable to enemy attack
that the exploration of every possible alternative seems necessary. The
problem to be discussed here is whether the Arctic sea-lanes and their
Siberian river and rail connections can be employed, in the short summer season, for substantial American deliveries, and how best the capac-
ity of the route may be utilized.
Obviously no shipping whatever can pass this way for months to
come, but schedules for routing may be made long before they are to
become operative, and plans for the construction of icebreakers for
summer use in these waters might conceivably be put into effect at once.
2. The Ocean Lanes of the Northern Sea Route
a. General description
From the available data, it appears that there are four possible routed for supplies sent from the Western Hemisphere through
Arctic waters to those rivers of Siberia that connect with the TransSiberian railway system. These routes are:
1) Eastward to the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei
Rivers (through the Barents Sea and the western part of the Kara Sea):
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2) Eastward to the mouth of the Lena River (through the
Barents and Kara Seas, and the western part of the Laptev Sea):
3) Westward to the mouth of the Lena River (through the
Chukotsk and East Siberian Seas, and the eastern part of the Laptev Sea):
4) Westward to the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei
(through the Chukotsk, East Siberian and Laptev Seas, and the eastern
part of the Kara Sea).
The Northern Sea Route can be used only in summer and early autumn,
and its successful navigation even at this time is contingent upon the
use of icebreakers, aerial reconnaissance, and ice-prognosis. Because
ice conditions along the route vary from year to year, the tasks confronting icebreakers cannot be described explicitly. During the navigation season, the seas traversed by the Northern Sea Route are more sub-
ject to highly variable influences than is the White Sea in its ice season. Along the Northern Route, the variable influences that make it so
difficult to predict what the ice conditions will be in a given place at
a given time, are these: temperature, currents, winds, and the state of
the ice in the preceding winter. In many areas along the Northern Sea
Route, ice obstacles to navigation may be present during the entire
navigation season in a given year, and almost completely absent during
the same season in the following year. Conclusions as to the location
and nature of these obstacles must therefore be of a very general nature.
In a normal year, icebreakers are not required along the entire
length of the route during the navigation season, since large stretches
of ice-free water are encountered in many areas. These stretches are
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much more prevalent in the western section of the route (the Barents
and the western part of the Kara Sea) than in the eastern section (the
eastern part of the Kara Sea, and the Laptev, East Siberian and Chukotsk
Seas). In the second place, the ice of the previous winter tends to
remain longest and to provide the most serious difficulties for naviga-
tion in the vicinity of the straits along the route - the Kara, Iugorskii,
Matochkin, Boris Vilkitskii, Dmitri Laptev and De Long Straits. Some
straits, however, may be completely ice-free during a considerable part
of the navigation season, while others will remain clogged. It follows
from these observations that icebreakers may be required at certain points
along the route during the navigation season in one year, and at dif-
ferent points in another year: but in general icebreakers are required
along the eastern section of the route to a greater extent than in the
western section.
Because of the great variability in the position and character
of the ice from year to year, aerial reconnaissance and ice-prognosis
are necessary for locating the ice obstacles. The functions of these
aids to navigation are described below. Some concentration of planes
engaged in reconnaissance, as well as of icebreakers, may at times be
necessary: and this may limit the use of the Northern Sea Route to the
sections that are more favorably situated, geographically and economically.
From the available material, it appears that ordinary cargo vessels can be used for carrying freight eastward to the mouths of the Ob
and the Yenisei Rivers. On the other hand, the cargo vessels that have
made successful voyages westward to the Lena, the Ob and the Yenisei,
387
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SECREI
are evidently especially constructed freighters or ordinary freighters
with reinforced hulls. No information is available as to whether or not
especially constructed or reinforced cargo vessels are required to traverse
the route eastward to the mouth of the Lena.
In considering the Northern Sea Route, it must be remembered that
large stretches of the route are not yet well known and are still undergoing scientific investigation. While much has been done to develop the
route during the past ten or twelve years, many parts of the Arctic waters
north of Russia and Siberia are still being studied with a view to ascertaining ice conditions, winds, currents, temperature of water and air,
percipitation, and so forth. Some parts of the route, particularly the
western sections, have been more thoroughly studied than others.
The Navigation Season
in
North-Eurasian Waters
Most Favorable Months
Approx. Date
of Closing
July 1
Aug. Sept.
October 15
able year*
July 15
Average year
Aug. 1
Aug. Sept.
Aug. Sept.
October 1
Aug. Sept.
October 1
Approx. Date
of Opening
Barents Sea
Kara Sea
Esp. favor-
Laptev Sea
West. Section
October 15
East. Section
Aug. 1
Aug. 1
September
October 1
East Siberian Sea
Aug. 1
September
October 1
Chukotsk Sea
(in doubt)
Aug. early Sept.
October 1
*Probably this applies particularly to the western part of the Kara Sea.
388
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b. The Route Eastward to the Mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei
This route, the most difficult part of which is the crossing of
the Kara Sea, is the section of the Northern Sea Route that has been used
for the longest period of time. In the 1890's the route was already used
for commercial purposes, and in 1905, 22 ships carried 18,000 tons of
freight to the mouth of the Yenisei. In 1932, 28 vessels carried 96,000
tons to ports on the Kara Sea. 1 In 1933, 136,000 tons were carried over
the Northern Sea Route as a whole: and by 1936, this amount had increased
to 271,000 tons. 2 In 1940, the latest year for which statistics are available, 160,000 tons were carried along the Northern Sea Route. Over 100
freighters, assisted by 13 icebreakers, participated in the transport of
this tonnage. 3
The distance from Murmansk to Novyi Port, the point of transshipment from ocean-going vessels to steamers plying on the Ob River, is
1321 nautical miles: from New York to Novyi Port, the distance is about
5600 nautical miles. From New York to Port Dikson, a transfer point and
coaling station near the mouth of the Yenisei River, is about 5300 nautical miles (via Matochkin Straits) and ocean-going vessels may steam an
additional 500 miles up the Yenisei to another transfer point at Igarka.
As an avenue of communication with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the war
zone, the system of the Ob is much shorter and more direct than that of
the Yenisei.
1 Mason, K. "Notes on the North Sea Route," in The Geographic Journal.
July, 1940, p. 27.
2. 2Taracouzio, Soviets in the Arctic, (New York, 1938), p. 145.
Information supplied by the British Embassy, October 27, 1941.
389
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The Barents Sea extends from the North Cape on the Scandinavian
Peninsula to Novaia Zemlia and the Iugorskii, Kara and Matochkin Straits.
Because of the Gulf Stream, the western portion of the Barents Sea is
relatively ice-free: and it is completely clear of ice by June 1. 1 The
eastern portion of the sea, however, is not considered navigable until
the first part of July Even in July, ice may be encountered in the
vicinity of the straits, but such ice (areas of small and large drift
ice) is not a serious obstacle to icebreakers and their caravans. In
August and September, the Barents Sea section of the Northern Sea Route
is practically free of ice.
The western section of the Kara Sea, extending from the Iugorskii,
Kara and Matochkin Straits to Ob Bay and the Gulf of Yenisei, is considered
open for navigation in August and September. 2 In some very favorable years
the navigation season may extend from July 15 to October 15.
Ice conditions in the Kara Sea during the navigation period are
difficult to describe because of their great variability. Some of the
ice is of local origin, and some is brought in from the north by winds
and currents. Hence, the thickness, compactness, variety and location of
the ice depends on the nature of ice conditions in the previous winter,
and on winds, temperature and currents during the navigation season. 3
1Gidrograficheskil Otdel UMC RKKA, Lotsita Barentseva Moriia,
(Hydrographic Department of the Administration of Naval Forces of the
Worker-Peasant Red Army, Barents Sea Pilot) (Leningrad, 1935), II, pp.
50: Gidrograficheskii Otdel UMC RKKA 1 Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie
Glavsevmorput pri SNK SSSR, Lotsiia Karskogo Moriia (Hydrographic Depart-
40-
ment of the Administration of Naval Forces of the Worker-Peasant Red Army
and the Hydrographic Department of the Chief Administration of the Northern
Sea Route, Kara Sea Pilot) (Leningrad, 1935) II. PP. 58-60.
2 Lotsiia Karskogo Moriia. p. 44.
3Ibid P. 44 ff.
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390
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During the navigation period, ships pass through stretches of open water
that usually account for the greater part of the distance to the mouths
of the Ob and the Yenisei. In some years no ice is encountered between
the straits and the river mouths. In most years, however, ice will be
encountered in one part or another of the sea, during the period of
1
navigation. The ice, moreover, has a tendency to remain in the vicinity
of the straits and sometimes of the mouth of Ob Bay and the Gulf of
Yenisei until the latter part of August and the early part of September. 2
The ice encountered in proceeding from the western straits to Ob
Bay and the Gulf of Yenisei is, during the summer season, usually small
and large drift of varying density. Compact field ice is met only rarely.
Hence, icebreaking ships or ordinary cargo vessels accompanied by ice-
breakers can easily navigate the western part of the Kara Sea during
August and September. With the aid of reconnaissance by small icebreakers
and especially by airplanes (a subject to be discussed below), it should
be possible to determine in advance the areas which are most easily
navigable at any given time.
The Ob and Yenisei Rivers begin to thaw in April. Access to the
Ob is completely free after July 1, and to the Yenisei at an even
earlier date. 3 This indicates that the rivers are open to navigation
1Lotsiia Karskogo Moriia, P. 44.
2Ibid. pp. 44-52, and maps following p. 80. See also Danski
Meteorologisk Institute, Nautiske Afdeling, Isforholdene 1 de Arktiske
Have (Danish Meteorological Institute, Nautical Department, The State
of the Ice in the Arctic Seas) (Copenhagen, 1916), P. 2. A Guide Book
for Arctic Siberia, prepared under the Direction of the Air Corps, United
States Army (CONFIDENTIAL), pp. 256-57, 265, 30,-15, 414, 424-25, 435.
3Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 105-110.
391
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long before the first vessel. can arrive from the west. Freezing does
not begin at the mouth of the Ob until after the first week in October,
before which time ocean-going vessels should have returned westward.
The river itself gradually freezes during the second half of October
and November, the freezing dates being later as one travels southward,
up the river-course. The Yenisel freezes later than does the Ob.
Fog as well as ice presents a problem in the Kara Sea. In the
western part of the sea, at Matochkin Strait, fog appears during only
8 or 9 days a month: this increases as one goes eastward until one
reaches Cape Cheliuskin, where there is fog during 24 to 25 days a
month. At Port Dikson, near the mouth of the Yenisei, fog appears from
14 to 19 days a month during the period from June to August. In September, there are many more clear days.
C. The Route Eastward to the Mouth of the Lena River
Unless the ship passes north of Novaia Zemlia, this route is the
same as the route to the Ob and the Yenisei, plus the crossing of the
eastern half of the Kara Sea, from the Ob and the Yenisei to the Boris
Vilkitskii Straits, and a considerable portion of the Laptev Sea. The
distance from Murmansk to Tiksi, the point of trans-shipment at the
mouth of the Lena, is 2015 nautical miles; the distance from New York
to Tiksi is about 6300 nautical miles.
Navigation of this route has been much less extensive than of the
Ob and the Yenisei. The Lena was reached by four "fleets" in 1933 and
by 16 vessels in 1937. 2 Between 1932 and 1939 the route between the
1Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, p. 420.
2Ibid.. pp. 42-46.
392
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Barents Eea and the Lena was successfully covered 38 times by vessels
making voyage. over he entire Northern Sea Route, from east tc west or
from west to east.
The eastern half of the Kara Sea offers more formidable ice
obstacles than does the western half. Although the eastern part of the
sea has been the subject of much less investigation than has the western
part, it is certain that ice conditions are usually very difficult for
navigation without the aid of icebreakers, even during the favorable
months of August and September. Only in one year since the beginning
of navigation in this area--the extremely favorable year of 1932--Was
1
clear water encountered all the way to the Boris Vilkitskii Straits.
Some sections of the lane may be obstructed only by small and large
drift ice, but other sections in the path of convoys may be covered
with field ice, some of which is very hummocky; and occasionally icebergs may be met in and near the Shokalskii Straits and even the Boris
Vilkits 11 Straits. 2 Aerial reconnaissance is necessary in order to
guide ships around ice obstructions and thereby to insure that they
reach their destination in time to return westward the same year.
Before reaching the mouth of the Lena, ships must pass not
only through the Kara Sea but through the western portion of the
Laptev Sea, which extends from Severnaia Zemlia to the New Siberian
Islands--from the Boris Vilkitskii Straits to the Dmitri Laptev
1 Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 638-9: Lotsita Karskogo
Moriia, p. 53.
2Lotsiia Karskogo Moriia, PP. 52-58 and maps following P. 80.
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Straits. Of all the seas along the Northern Sea Route, the Laptev Sea
is the one most subject to fogs and storms. Ice conditions are also
difficult for navigation. As in the Kara Sea, these conditions depend
upon the severity of the preceding winter and upon the winds and the
currents. 1 The most favorable period for navigation, as in the Kara Sea,
is August and September, when the sea contains the smallest amount of ice.
Throughout the summer considerable quantity of ice may remain in the vicin-
ity of the Taimyr Peninsula, which is passed on the way to the Lena. The
varieties of ice and their approximate location have been studied even
less extensively here than in the Kara Sea, but it is known that on the
lanes traversed by ships, small and large drift, ice fields, and hummocks
may be encountered. 2
The average date for the opening of the mouth of the Lena, accord-
ing to data gathered during a period of 24 years, is June 2: the earliest
date was May 26 and the latest was June 9th. According to the same re-
cords, the average date for the freezing of the mouth of the river is
October 24: during the 24-year period of observation, the earliest date
for freezing was October 14, and the latest was November 1.3 This permits
1s. Lappo, "More Laptevykh" ("Laptev Sea") in Sovetskaia Arktika
Soviet Arctic), Nov. 1939, pp. 74-75: Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie RKKF
1 Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie Glavsevmorputi, Lotsiia Moria Laptevykh
(Hydrographic Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Fleet and Hydrographic Department of the Chief Administration of the North Sea Route,
Latter Sea Pilot) (Leningrad, 1938), pp. 39-44: Guide Book for Arctic
Siberia, pp. 638-639, 675, 677 689.
2Lotsiia More Laptevykh, maps following p. 57.
3Ibid.. P. 45.
394
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the transportation up the river, before it freezes, of freight from vessels that unload at the mouth of the Lena in August or in the early part
of September. In order to return westward the same year, cargo vessels
would probably have to reach the mouth of the Lena during the first half
of September, to allow time for crossing the western part of the Laptev
and the Kara Sea before freezing had made ice conditions too difficult
for navigation.
Fog is also an important factor in the navigation of the eastern
part of the Kara Sea: fog may appear for 25 days a month at Cape
Cheliuskin during July and August, and for 16 days during September. 1
The probability of fog appearing on a given day in the Laptev Sea is
estimated at 40 percent. 2
Because of the great length, the difficulty of its navigation,
and its poor river and rail connections with the war zone, the eastward
passage to the Lena is hardly worthy of consideration as a route for
American war shipments. It would seem that any vessel eastbound along
the Northern Sea Route with war supplies for Russia would do well to
discharge its cargo at the Ob, instead of proceeding to the mouth of the
Yenisei, still less to the Lena.
d. The Route Westward to the Lena
From the mouth of the Lena, the distance eastward to the Pacific
Coast of the United States is much shorter than it is westward to the
Atlantic Coast of this country: Tiksi Bay, at the mouth of the river,
Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, PP. 420.
2Ibid.' p. 661; Lappo, op. cit., PP. 74-75.
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SECRET
is about 3900 nautical miles from Seattle and 6300 from New York.
Between 1932 and 1938, 38 ships (icebreakers and cargo vessels) traversed the Northern Sea Route between the Kara Sea and Bering Straits,
thus passing near Tiksi Bay even if they did not always touch there. 1
The route between Tiksi Bay and Bering Straits may therefore be con-
sidered navigable, even though it is extremely difficult.
The Chukotsk Sea, extending from Uellen on the Bering Straits to
Cape Iakan, near the De Long Straits, is one of the most formidable
stretches on the Northern Sea Route. The navigation season is con-
sidered to extend through June, July, August, and the first part of
September, but June and July are difficult months. 2 The position of the
ice varies from year to year. In some years (of the period from 19281939) it did not disappear from De Long Straits during the entire sum-
mer: in other years, it remained in the region of Wrangel Island. Ice
reconnaissance, which has been expanding in the Chukotsk Sea, can
greatly facilitate shipping.
The East Siberian Sea, extending from Cape Billings to the Dmitri
Laptev Straits, is also difficult for navigation. While the western
part of the sea is free of ice during the summer months, the eastern
part--from the Chukotsk Sea to the mouth of the Kolyma River--is almost
never completely ice-free. 3 The break-up of the compact ice fields
1Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 42-46.
2s. G. Ratmanov, "Chukotskoe More" ("Chukotsk Sea") in Sovetskaia
Arktika (Soviet Arctic). August 1939, pp. 38-42; Guide Book for Arctic
Siberia. pp. 992, 998.
3K. Gomoiukov, "Vostochno-Sibirskoe More" ("East-Siberian Sea") in
Sovetskaia Arktika (Soviet Arctic). October 1939, pp. 47-53: Guide Book
for Arctic Siberia. DD. 908-910
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396
SECRET
which cover the eastern part of the sea in winter (sometimes extending
250-270 miles from the mainland) takes place during the last week in
July. After the break-up, the eastern part of the sea remains the most
difficult stretch on the whole Northern Sea Route. Freezing over of the
offshore zones begin around the middle of October, but in all probability
the ice barriers remaining throughout the summer become more serious early
in October. No details on ice conditions in the eastern part of the sea
are available, but navigation is possible, though difficult, with the
aid of ice-prognosis and icebreakers to help ships through ice-clogged
stretches. 1
After crossing the entire length of the Chukotsk and East-Siberian
Seas, ships on the way from the east to the mouth of the Lena must still
traverse the eastern part of the Laptev Sea. This section is frequently
clear of ice in September, but in August ships may encounter small and
large drift ice, as well as ice fields and hummocks. 2
Because the season for navigating the eastern section of the
Northern Sea Route is short and the obstacles formidable, it may be
advisable for ships sailing from the east to continue their course westward after having unloaded their cargoes. This practice has generally
been followed heretofore. Vessels that continue westward will encounter fewer natural obstacles than if they attempt to return eastward, and will be favored by the longer navigation season of the more
westerly waters. No information is at hand on the length of time required for crossing the various seas.
1 Gomolukov, op. cit., P. 53.
Lotsiia More Lattevykh. pp. 40-45, maps following P. 57.
87
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If a vessel loaded with American goods for Russia once negotiates
the difficult course from Pering Straits as far as the Lena, there seen
to be every reason why it should steam ahead to the mouth of the Ob and
discharge its cargo there, rather than at Tiksi.
e. The Route Westward to the Mouths of the 06 and the Yenisei
Rivers
The distance westward from Seattle to the mouths of the Yenisei
and the ob is approximately the same as the distance eastward from New
York to these rivers: Port Dikson, near the mouth of the Yenisel, is
roughly 5,000 nautical miles from Seattle and 5,300 miles from New York,
while Novyi Port, on the Ob, is about 5,500 nautical miles from Seattle
and some 5,600 miles from New York. Ships approaching these ports from
the east share with hose from the west the benefit of the best river and
rail connections that Siberia affords, to the war zone. Also the approach
from the Pacific has this distinct advantage over the approach from the
Atlantic: the former route is much less exposed to the potential attack
of Japan than is the latter to the actual attack of Germany.
On the other hand, the approach to the Yenisei and the Ob from
the Pacific is simply a prolongation of the Pacific route to the Lena,
and as such it presents a much greater problem in navigation than does
the Atlantic approach. A vessel that steams from Seattle to Port Dikson
or Novyl Port must pass through almost all of the really difficult sections of the Northern Sea Route: the Chukotsk, East Siberian and Laptev
Seas, and the eastern part of the Kara Sea (all of which have been des-
cribed in the earlier pages of this report). Since cargo vessels have
made successful through passages along the entire Northern Sea Route
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398
SEC R K T
from east to west. during a single season, the utilization of the Pacific
approach may be considered possible, except during extremely unfavorable
seasons, but the passage is undoubtedly a difficult one at best.
Vessels proceeding westward to the Ob and the Yenisei would pro-
bably have to continue westward after having discharged their cargo.
This would be even more true of these ships than of those unloading at
the mouth of the Lena. The latter might arrive at the Lena early enough
in the season to be allowed some choice as to whether to return eastward
of to sail on westward toward the Atlantic: but ships arriving from the
east at the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei would probably do so at
such a late date that their return via the Bering Straits would entail
grave danger of their being locked in the ice throughout the winter. If
icebreakers should be concentrated on the eastern section of the Northern
Sea Route and if the season should prove to be very favorable, there would
be a greater possibility of completing a round-trip between the Bering
Straits and the mouths of the Ob and the Yenisei during one season. It
may be noted, in this connection, that in 1939 the powerful icebreaker
Stalin made a round-trip between Murmansk and Vladivostok in a single
season.
A ship that approached a north-Siberian port from Seattle, unloaded its cargo, and then steamed on toward New York would have to
pass once, empty, through the zone of possible German attack north and
west of Norway.
f. By-Passes to the Northern Sea Route
It is not inconceivable that limited quantities of freight
might be landed at the growing port of Magadan (Nagaevo) on the sea of
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Ckhotsk, and transported by truck over the good motor road 450 km. to
Ust Utinaya -- thence by water down the Kolyma River to its mouth, where
the cargo could be transferred to ocean vessels for shipment westward
to the war zone via the Northern Sea Route, the Ch or the Yenisei, and
the'Trans-Siberlan Railway. The ports of Okhotsk and Ayan, also on the
Sea of Okhotsk, are similarly connected by wagon roads (220 km. and
450 km. long. respectively) with the Lena river system, and very small
quantities of supplies might possibly be forwarded thus to the Northern
Sea Route and then to the West Siberian rivers. The only reason for
mentioning these routes, with their small capacity and their many trans-
shipments, is that their use would relieve the Trans-Siberian railway
in some slight degree, and would also deliver freight to the Northern
Sea Route at points west of some of the most difficult areas of Arctic
Navigation. On the other hand, Japanese activity would be more threatening in the Sea of Okhotsk than along the North-Pacific approach to
the Northern Sea Route.
8. Aids to Ice Navigation
Because ice conditions vary so much from year to year along
the Northern Sea Route, special navigation aids are necessary. These
aids consist of permanent and temporary radio-meteorological stations,
air reconnaissance and ice-prognosis. - Seventy-two permanent or semipermanent stations, had been established by 1935, and over half of
these were located at points near the lanes for commercial shipping.
400
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The location of 69 of the stations was as follows: 1
East Siberian Sea
Chukotsk Sea
23
19
6
Kara Sea
Laptev Sea
14
7
Barents Sea
After 1935 a considerable number of stations were added, particularly in
in the East Siberian and Chukotsk Seas. 2 By 1940 there were over 100
stations of all kinds. 3 Some of these were temporary stations maintained
in the summer only for the express purpose of aiding ships. Stations of
all types maintain a meteorological service to determine hydrographic
and meteorological conditions, as well as a radio service to keep ships
and planes informed of these conditions. 4
Since 1935 there has been a gradual development of aerial recon-
naissance, the purpose of which is to direct ships to open water, and to
aid in the preparation of ice-prognoses. 5 Many of the radio-meteorological stations have sea-plane bases, while some of the larger stations -such as those at Dikson Island, Tiksi Bay and Cape Schmidt -- have air-
ports for land planes. 6 In 1936 there were 125 planes in the ice reconnaissance service, but this number has probably increased considerably,
especially as a result of the incentive given to Arctic aviation by the
Papanin Expedition and by the trans-Polar flights in 1937. No statistics
on the number of planes now available for Arctic service can be obtained
1Mason, op. cit., p. 32.
2Gomoriukov, op. cit., p. 47; Ratmanov, op. cit., p. 34.
3Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, p. 19.
4Ibid.. P. 20.
51bid.. P. 33.
6Mason, op. cit., p. 32; Guide Book for Arctic Siberia. p. 38.
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from the sources at hand, but from the accounts of additional activities
and from the appearance of photographs of larger and more powerful planes
now being used in the service, one may judge that considerable improve-
ment has been made. This conclusion has been verified by the British
Embassy, which states that in 1941 ships were escorted by aircraft on
an increasing scale. 1 An example of the service rendered by aviation is
the work done by the base at Cape Schmidt. Beginning to operate in March
in 1939, a plane from this base was able to diagnose conditions in the
East Siberian and Chukotsk Seas before the navigation season started,
thus contributing much to the success of the season. 2 In 1939 conditions along the whole route in the East Siberian and Chukotsk Seas were
reported -- a service probably of considerable importance in the perform-
ance of the icebreaker Stalin, which in this year made the first roundtrip ever made over the whole length of the Northern Sea Route in a
single season. 3
Ice prognosis, which is aided by aerial reconnaissance, became a
regular feature of the Northern Sea Route Service only in 1937. The
prognoses are based on material relating to atmospheric pressure, winds,
1Information supplied by the British Embassy, Oct. 27, 1941.
2D. Karelin, "Ledovaia Sluzhba V Vostochnom Sektor Arktika V 1939 g."
("Ice Service in the Eastern Sector of the Arctic in 1939") in
Sovetskaia Arktika (Soviet Arctic), April, 1940, PP. 39-41.
3For the importance of aerial reconnaissance, see also V. Makhotkin,
"Ledovyi Razvedki" ("Ice Reconnaissance") in Sovetskaia Arktika (Soviet
Arctic), August, 1939, PP. 22-30: T. Karavaeva, "Poliarnyi Letchik
Makhotkin" ("Polar Aviator Makhotkin") in Sovetskaia Arktika, (Soviet
Arctic) Oct. 1940, p. 47.
402
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temperature of air and water, state of the ice, and the rate and direction
of
its
drift. 1 A Soviet source reports that the eight prognoses
issued at ten-day intervals in 1939 for the eastern section of the
Route proved to be 83% correct for the East Siberian Sea, and 88% cor-
rect for the Chukotsk Sea. 2 In general, the prognoses over a period
of years are said to have ranged from 40% to 100% in accuracy. One
may doubt the probability of such mathematically precise verification,
without at the same time questioning the great value of the prognoses
to navigation in these northern waters. 3 In the future, the development of these prognoses, together with an increase in the number of
temporary polar stations and the fuller development of aerial reconnaissance, should greatly facilitate the safe passage of cargo vessels
during the navigation season.
Too much care can hardly be lavished on aids to navigation on
the Northern Sea Route. While considerable success has been attained
in navigation, it must be remembered that in especially severe seasons,
like that of 1937, the dangers are considerable. In that year, twentyfive vessels were locked in the ice and forced to winter in its clutches.
Yet evidence of another kind, already cited, indicates a considerable
4
degree of success in the navigation of these difficult waters.
G. T. Robinson
H. R. Weinstein
Karelin, op. cit., p. 41; Makhotkin, op. cit., P. 22.
2Karelin, op. cit., P. 42.
3Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, p. 36.
4p. Liubarskaia, "Arkticheskomy Khozaistvy - Strogil Khozraschet"
("For the Arctic Economy -- a Strict Accounting") in Sovetskaia Arktika
(Soviet Arctic), July, 1939, p. 27.
403
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SECHET
THE RIVER ROUTES FROM THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE
TO THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY SYSTEM
a. General Description
In the Soviet Union there are three principal river systems
that connect the Arctic Ocean with the main transport route of
southern Siberia -- the Trans-Siberian railway system, these
rivers might therefore serve as routes for supplies shipped from
the United States to the Russo-German war zone. Each of these three
river systems is navigable, in varying degree, from the Artic Ocean
to railheads on the Trans-Siberian railway or its connections. Each
river system is closed to navigation for most of the year because of
ice, although in every case the navigation season of the river is
longer than that of the ocean approaches to its mouth. These three
rivers are, from west to east, the Ob, the Yenisei, and the Lena.
b. The 0b River
At its gulf the Ob River is frozen most of the year. At Novyi
Port, on the gulf, observations extending over a period of years show
that the ice forms October 12 and November 25, and breaks up
between June 10 and July 3.1
An ocean-going vessel entering the Gulf of Ob will encounter
shoals and shallow water throughout an area stretching for 80 to 100
miles north of the mouth of the Nadyn River. It is in this shallow
area that Novyi Port (with a population of only about 200 in 1933)
and Nakhodka Bay are located. Vessels drawing up to 9 feet will
find safe anchorage in these harbors, and ships with a draught up
to 16 feet may transfer their cargo to river boats off shore. Ships
1Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, PP. 104-107
404
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SECRET
may safely winter at Novyl Port since the bay freezes over and is free
of moving ice in winter, and the ice breaks up quietly in the spring. 1
In rough weather, the stretch of shoals and shallow water in the region
of these ports is troublesome both to the sea-going vessels arriving from
the north and to the river boats that meet them here, and is said to be
the chief obstacle to the use of the Ob system.2 2
Inland from the ports, the entrance to the Ob is further obstructed
by a bar where the water is usually only 8 feet deep. with favorable
winds, however, the water at this point may be somewhat deeper. Once
this obstacle is passed, it is said that vessels of 9 foot draught can
steam through the Khamanelskaia Ob (the principal channel from the gulf
through the delta) to the main course of the river.
From Novyi Port to Tiumen, the westernmost point for the transfer
of freight from the Ob river system to the northern branch of the TransSiberian railway, the distance by river is about 950 miles: and from
Tiumen by rail to Sverdlovsk, the center of the great Ural industrial
district, the distance is only 201 miles. The importance of Tiumen as
a river port is indicated by the fact that a major center for the building and repair of river boats is located here. 3
East of Tiumen is Ishim, another important point for the transfer
of freight from the Ob river system to the Trans-Siberian. Ishim is
381 miles from Sverdlovsk by rail, and something more than 1,000 miles
from Novyi Port by river, and vessels of 10 foot draught can bring
1Arctic Pilot, V. I, pp. 494-497, London, 1933.
2 Guide Book for Arctic Siberia,pp. 202-204.
Baranskii, Ekonomicheskassa Geograftia SSSR (Economic Georgraphy
of the U.S.S.R.I. M., 1938, p. 89.
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405
freight from the Arctic transfer point directly to the quays of this
river
port. 1 Farther east on the Trans-Siberian, and farther also
from Novyi Port, are the river ports of Omsk and Novosibiirsk, where
freight that comes up the Ob can also be transferred to the railway. 2
Detailed information on these river ports is not now available;
nor do we know anything of the size of the river fleet in the basin of
the Ob. The Arctic Pilot reported (1933) that 3500-ton steel barges
drawing about 9 feet of water and towed by powerful tugs were in common
use on this and other great Siberian rivers. 3
C. The Yenisei River
Port Dikson near the mouth of the Yenisei is a modern port. It
has an excellent, sheltered anchorage of from 4-7 fathoms depth. The
population in summer is 3-4000 and ships can be loaded and unloaded at
a speed of 250-800 tons a day (1939) There are tugs and lighters, a
200-ft. stationary conveyor, and 3 conveyors for the holds of ships. Ir
1940 it was planned to do the unloading in the harbor instead of the
roadstead and to provide new warehouse facilities. There is a narrow
gauge railway on the docks, as well as tractors and horses. Fort Dikson
is the important bunkering station of this sector of the Northern Sea
Route, and a ship repair yard was to be built there. 4
Sea-going vessels with a draught up to 23 feet can navigate the
1Arctic Pilot, V. I, p. 505.
2Bolshaiia Sovetskatia Entsiklopediia (Large Soviet Encyclopedia),
v. 42, pp. 648-652. River boats of 200-ton can pass over the numerous
sandbars near Novosibiirsk only in May and June.
3v. I, P. 505, 520
4Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, PP. 453-472.
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406
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Yenisei up to Igarka, 400 miles from the open ocean. Here the navigation
season lasts from mid-July to the beginning of October. Igarka has a
permanent population of 20,000, with a large additional number of tempo-
rary workers in the summer. The harbor is good and the river is forty
feet deep at that point. There are seven mooring basins and a quay 2,300
feet long. There are, besides, two floating wharfs. During the navigation season in 1938, 178,000 tons of freight were handled in the port,
and 46 ocean-going vessels called there, many of them of foreign registry. 1
At Igarka, goods are transferred to river vessels for the voyage
upstream to Krasnoyarsk (1,100 miles) or Irkutsk -- both on the Trans-
Siberian railway. At Krasnoyarsk the river is usually open from May to
November. The run between Igarka and Krasnoyarsk requires 10-12 days
upstream and 6-8 downstream. 2 The Guide Book for Arctic Siberia reports
47 river boats on the Yenisei system, including 12 with passenger accommodations. The Soviet Encyclopaedia gives a somewhat higher figure. 3
d. The Lena River
The town of Tiksi, outside the delta of the Lena, is the point of
transfer from ocean vessels to river craft. In 1940 this town had a
population of 350-400. A plan had been made for the installation of a
considerable mechanical equipment for the handling of freight.
At Yakutsk, about half way between the mouth of the Lena and its
southern railway connection, the river is navigable from about the middle
1Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 519-545.
2Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 510-545. Data on speed of river
trip from Gruber, I Went to the Soviet Arctic, N. Y., 1939, p. 56.
3Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 497-513. Bolshaia Sovietskaia
Entsiklopediia, V. 24, pp. 511-516.
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SECRE:
407
of June to the first of November. Up to Olekminsk, 1402 miles above
Tiksi, the Lena is navigable by boats drawing 6-7 feet of water. Petween
Olekminsk and Ust-Kut, about 2,200 miles from Tiksi, the minimum depth of
the river is 32 inches -- a condition that appears to limit the traffic
severely. Yet it is reported that a ship-yard was built at Ust-Kut in
1936.
Ust-Kut is situated at the point where the line of the new BaikalAmur railway crosses the Lena. It is believed, but not known with
certainty, that this new railway is in operation between Ust-Kut and
Talshet on the Trans-Siberian line. Other ports on the Lena can have
hardly more than a local significance, since they have no railway connections. 1
G. T. Robinson
T. P. Whitney
1Guide Book for Arctic Siberia, pp. 249-860.
408
SECRET
PART III
THE EASTERN SUPPLY ROUTE FROM THE UNITED STATES
TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
Table of Contents
Page
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1
B. THE MARITIME SECTION
4
C. THE PORT OF VLADIVOSTOK
5
1. Vulnerability
2. Natural Conditions
5
3. Port Facilities
6
7
4. Capacity
8
D. THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY
10
1. Definition
10
2. Double-Tracking
3. Passing Tracks and Sorting Yards
4. Roadbed, Raila, Bridges, Tunnels, etc
5. Round-houses, Repair shops, and Water-supply
6. Rolling Stock and Locomotives
7. personnel
8. Capacity
9. Conclusions
E. SUPPLEMENTARY PORTS IN EASTERN SIBERIA AND CONNECTIONS
WITH THE TRANS-SIBERIAN
1. Sovetskaya Gavan
12
13
13
15
17
18
19
27
30
30
2. Nikolayevsk |and the Amur River Route
3. Ayan and its Road-River Connection
4. Okhotsk
5. Magadan (Nogayeva)
31
32
33
33
6. Conclusions
33
F. SUPPLEMENTARY RAIL ROUTES IN WEST SIBERIA, THE URALS
34
AND THE TRANS-VOLGA
SEE MAP I
PART III
409
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THE EASTERN SUPPLY ROUTE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE
RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The Eastern supply route from the United States to the
Russo-German war zone consists of a maritime section across the
Pacific and through the Sea of Japan or the Sea of Okhotsk, the
Port of Vladivostok, the main line of the Trans-Siberian from
Vladivostok to the Volga, supplementary ports and road-river
connections in eastern Siberia, and supplementary rail routes
in western Siberia, the Urals and the Trans-Volga regions.
2. The outbreak of hostilities between the United States
and Japan greatly reduces the value of and probably eliminates, for
the time being, the Eastern Route as a route of supply from the
United States to the Russo-German war zone.
3. The Port of Vladivostok must handle the bulk of any
supplies sent over the Eastern supply route, since it alone has
the facilities for handling large quantities of freight and has
the necessary rail connection to the west. Operations at the
Port are maintained with the aid of icebreakers during the winter.
The Port has averaged as much as 168,000 tons a month in a single
year.
4. The double-track Trans-Siberian Railway must handle the
bulk of any supplies routed to the Russo-German war zone across
Siberia.
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SECRET
5. The shortage of rolling stock and motive power, chronic
in peace-time and much aggravated by war-time demands, is the
principal limiting factor in the capacity of the Trans-Siberian.
Rolling stock and motive power may be diverted to the Trans-Siberian,
but at the cost of other vital needs.
6. The trackage between Vladivostok and Novosibirsk had con-
siderable reserve capacity prior to the outbreak of Russo-German
hostilities - up to 4 million tons annually in each direction.
7. In 1937 the trackage between Novosibirsk and Chelyabinsk
was loaded nearly to capacity, due largely to the heavy coal and
iron ore traffic between the Urals and the Kuznetsk coal basin.
However, the rapid increase of coal production in the Karaganda coal
basin, the opening of a new direct railway from there to the southern
Urals, the development of local coal basins in the Urals, and the
increase of iron ore production in the Kuznetsk area should have
relieved the main line of the Trans-Siberian of about 4 million tons
of westbound coal traffic annually and a lesser amount of eastbound
ore traffic between 1937 and the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.
8. The loss of food-producing and industrial regions in the
west has presumably increased the dependence of the remaining parts
of European Russia on the Urals and West Siberia for foodstuffs, raw
materials and munitions, thus increasing the westbound traffic load
on all lines. However, for the section over which this traffic is
heaviest, namely the Urals - Volga, there are four trunk lines, one
of which is double-track, while in the West Siberia food surplus
region there are four lines west of a meridian running north and
411
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south through Kurgan, three west of the meridian of Petropavlovsk,
and two west of the meridian of Omsk, one railroad in each case being
the double-tracked Trans-Siberian.
9. Taking all factors into consideration, the trackage capacity availability of rolling stock and motive power not considered - westward
from Vladivostok to the Volga may possibly be sufficient to accomodate
a through westbound traffic of 3 million tons of imports a year, or
250,000 tons a month. This is considerably in excess of the estimated
capacity of the Port of Vladivostok.
10. Supplementary ports in the Soviet Far East north of Vladivostok
and road and river connections from them to the Trans-Siberian may handle
an unknown, but definitely small volume of supplies. However, these
ports and the sea approaches to them are not so vulnerable to Japanese
attack as is Vladivostok and its approaches.
(a) Sovetskaya Gavan, a small new port, will be of some importance when the railway connecting it with the Komsomolsk branch of the
Trans-Siberian and port installations are completed. It is believed that
the port can be kept open by icebreakers during the winter.
(b) Nikolayevsk near the mouth of the Amur is open 5-6 months
in the year. Access to the Trans-Siberian is by the Amur River which is
open to navigation 6-7 months in the year.
(c) Ayan and Okhotsk, small ports on the Sea of Okhotsk, and
their road-river connection to the Trans-Siberian can have only the most
limited utility for forwarding supplies due to the lack of port facilities,
the poor quality of the roads, and the uncertainties of river navigation.
J. A. Morrison
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B. THE MARITIME SECTION
The outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan
eliminates, for the time being, the Eastern Route as a route of supply
from the United States to the Russo-German war front. Although at this
moment it is still possible for vessels of Soviet or non-belligerent
registry to reach Vladivostok or Sovetskaya Gavan by the normal Japanese-
controlled commercial routes through La Perouse and Tsugaru Straits, it
seems unlikely that the Japanese will permit this for long. It may be
possible for supply ships to reach the Sea of Japan through the Tatar
Strait even in the event of Russian involvement in the war with Japan,
since Russia controls both shores of the strait in its narrower northern
reaches. But the passage of this strait would seem to be dependent on
Russian control of the air between the mainland and Sakhalin. Even
though vessels should succeed in passing through the Tatar Strait into
the Sea of Japan, there would still be a thousand-mile run through the
Sea of Japan to Vladivostok. It is, of course, possible that dispersion
of Japanese naval and air forces in the series of widespread attacks of
the first days of the war with the Allies may have lowered their strength
in the Sea of Japan to the point where the reduced Russian Far Eastern
air forces and the Russian submarines could protect shipping proceeding
along the coast of the Primorsk province to Vladivostok. But for the
present the route would seem to be a hazardous one at best.
While shipping in the Sea of Okhotsk will probably be less exposed
than in the Sea of Japan, and the entrance to that body of water through
the Kurile Strait could probably be safeguarded, the ports of the Sea of
Okhotsk, with the possible exception of Nikolayevsk at the mouth of the
--
S413
state E T
Amur, are of very limited capacity, and none of them are ice-free or have
reliable all-year connections of any considerable capacity with the TransSiberian Railway.
Thus, even a limited use of the Eastern Route during the winter
depends on Russian air control over the eastern part of the Sea of Japan -the approach to Vladivostok, the one large year-round Russian port on the
Pacific. Even next summer, the large-scale use of the Eastern Route will
still depend upon the effective protection of the approach to Vladivostok.
Although use of the Eastern supply route may be largely, if not
entirely eliminated for the present, it may be of limited value even while
Japan is at war, and it will again be of great significance if Japan should
be dePeated while Germany and Russia are still at war. For this reason,
the section of the Eastern Route first presented in the report of 16
October, 1941 is included in the present report.
J. A. Morrison
C. THE PORT OF VLADIVOSTON
Vladivostok, 4,570 nautical miles from San Francisco, is the only
Soviet port on the Pacific that is equipped both to receive and to forward
by rail substantial tonnages of supplies.
1. Vulnerability
Unfortunately, however, Vladivostok is the most vulnerable of the
Soviet Far Eastern ports, to Japanese attack. Not only are the sea ap-
proaches (with the possible exception of that via the Tatar Straits) controlled by Japan, as indicated in the preceding section, but the port is
very vulnerable to attack from the landward side because of its proximity
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414
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to Japanese-occupied Manchuria. The degree to which the land and air
defences of Vladivostok and of southeastern Asiatic Russia in general
may have been weakened by the dispatch of units of the Soviet Far
Eastern forces to the Russo-German front can only be guessed: but there
have been numerous reports of limited transfers of Soviet forces to
European Russia.
2. Natural Conditions
Vladivostok has one of the best natural harbors on the Pacific.
The city is located at the southern end of a peninsula that extends into
the Gulf of Peter the Great, and divides the Gulf into two spacious bays,
Amur Bay on the west and Ussuri Bay on the east; these bays in turn have
numerous smaller bays and inlets, one of which is the famed Zolotoi Rog
(Golden Horn), on the shores of which are most of the port facilities.
Although the port is admirably protected from storms, ice conditions are
heavy enough to interfere-with shipping from late December to late March.
1
However, even in the worst years, the ice does not extend farther out to
sea than Askold Island, about 25 miles from the port and at no time is it
heavy enough to prevent the maintenance of navigation to the port with the
.
aid of icebreakers. 2 Cargo vessels with reliable hulls can enter the
port without the aid of an ice-breaker until mid-January. 3 A report of
February 20, 1941 states that at that time there were 5 icebreakers at
Hydrographic office, No. 122, 1933, pp. 330-331. The O.N.I. report,
"Supply Routes to Russia" (Serial 57-41, from ONI-Op-16-F-5, Confidential)
states that the port is frozen over for about 80 days.
2 Moscow Conference. Report of the Proceedings of the Transportation
Annex I. Secret. An MID report of May 5, 1941 (G-2/2659-
Committee, D-1061 Confidential) states that during the ice season icebreakers make
navigation possible "to a limited extent."
SMID Report quoted in preceding footnote.
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8E
c415
the port, one of which "seemed very efficient in breaking 16 in. of ice at
the ship's berth." Thus, it seems that icebreakers maintain the operation
of the port in winter, but presumably not at full efficiency.
3. Port Facilities
The port facilities at Vladivostok received considerable development
in the 1920's and early 1930's in connection with the large transit trade
to and from North Manchuria, a natural hinterland of the port. According
to a reliable recent source, the commercial port can berth 55 ocean-going
vessels: 10 of them, drawing from 22 ft. to 28 ft., can discharge cargoes
simultaneously 2. The same report lists the cranes available as follows:
a) 2 electrically operated, movable cranes of 2 tons
capacity each
b) 3 railway, tractor and motor cranes of 3 to 18 tons
capacity each
c) 2 floating cranes of 40 and 120 tons capacity,
respectively
A total area of 30,000 so. meters of covered storage space can be alloted
to imported cargoes and there is an additional open area of 13,000 so.
meters that can be used for this purpose. 3
In view of the importance of oil and gasoline in the supplies sent
to Vladivostok, reports on the turn-around of tankers at the port are
pertinent. The U. S. Maritime Commission reports, as follows, the recent
experience of three American ships at Vladivostok:
1G-2/2659-D1061-May 5. 1941.
2Hoscow Conference, op. cit.
3Ibid.
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416
SECRET
Type of Ship
Date of Arrival
Date of Departure
Tanker
Sept. 3
Sept. 4
Tanker
Sept. 6
Sept. 9
Tanker
Sept. 11
Sept. 14
1
Allowing for delays in docking at an unfamiliar port of a country at war,
it is unlikely that actual discharge could have continued in any case for
more than 36 hours, suggesting a rate of discharge of somewhat over 2,000
barrels per hour.
4. Capacity
It was to be expected that American and British estimates of the
port capacity might vary considerably. A report of the British War office
of 13 August, 1941, gives a monthly capacity of 75,000 tons to 90,000 tons. 2
An annex to this report, of a later date, raises the figure, giving the port
a capacity of from 90,000 tons to 120,000 tons monthly. The recent American
ONI report referred to above estimates the capacity of 75,000 to 105,000 tons
per month and quotes a Russian claim that by Spring of 1942 the port will be
able to handle 110,000 tons a month. 3
However, it is somewhat surprising to find even more widely varying
estimates -- apparently provided by the Russians -- in the report of the
Transportation Committee of the Moscow Conference. Two estimates are given
in this report -- one of 140,000 tons and one of 224,000 tons per month -1. Maritime Commission, Division of Operations and Traffic,
Edw. P. Cotter.
2-Allied-Soviet Communications, - Revised edition, 13 August, 1941
(from British Army Staff, Intelligence Branch, British Embassy, Washington).
3 ONI "Supply Routes to Russia," etc.
417
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SECRET
the lower figure substantially higher than, and the higher figure more than
twice as great as, the highest British or American estimate. However, the
higher of the two Conference estimates is apparently the later of the two
from Soviet sources. 1
Comparison of these varying estimates with the past performance of
the port may provide a yard-stick for measuring very roughly their probable
validity:
Trade of Vladivostok
Exports
Imports
Total
Average monthly tonnage
for best year between
1918 and 1937 (1935)
66,000 T.
103,000 T.
168,000 T.
917 T.
34,000 T.
35,000 T.
Average monthly tonnage
for latest year
available (1937)
Assuming that the facilities used for handling exports can also be used for
imports, past performance would indicate that the port can handle somewhat
more than the lower, but very considerable less than the higher of the two
Soviet estimates given at the Moscow Conference. However, it is necessary
to take into account the lessened efficiency of the night operations of the
port during war-time as compared with the same port in peace-time, and also
the greater effort likely to be made during day-time operations. All things
considered, it may be concluded, very tentatively, that the capacity of the
port of Vladivostok is probably more than 140.000 tons and less than
224,000 tons per month.
J. A. Morrison
G. T. Robinson
1This is the figure given also in a cablegram from Mr. Harriman to
the President and Mr. Hopkins, transmitted by Ambassador Winant 10
October, 1941, on Mr. Harriman's return to London from Moscow.
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D. THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY
(Note: This section is reproduced with only slight changes from
Section III of Part IV of the Report of 16 October, 1941, "Lines of
Communication between the United States and the Russo-German War Zone")
At the present time and for several years, the Trans-Siberian railway must be depended on to carry the bulk of any freight sent over the
landward portion of the Eastern Route. The ability of the railway to
carry this traffic depends on the physical condition of the line itself,
on the servicing and repair facilities available, and the efficiency of
the personnel. The line is one of the best, if not the best railways in
the country in terms of physical equipment and facilities, in this respect
approaching if not equalling some of our Western trunk lines. On the
section between the Ural and Kuzbass (Kuznetsk Basin) mining and industrial
regions, the volume of traffic is high even for the USSR which has an
1
average traffic density higher than that of any country in the world.
In short, the Trans-Siberian railway is one of the major trunk lines of
the world, capable of carrying a sustained heavy traffic.
1. Definition
The term "Trans-Siberian Railway" is a popular one. Russians may
refer to the "Trans-Siberiar Express", but rarely to the "Trans-Siberian
Railway" which from an administrative and operating point of view does
not exist. As used in this report the term is understood to mean the
main line of the transcontinental railway extending from Vladivostok via
1 In 1937 the freight traffic per kilometer averaged 4,097,000 tons-km; and
this compares with 1,313,000 for the U.S.A., 1,030,000 for Germany,
822,000 for England.
419
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Khabarovsk, Chita, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Kurgan,
Chelyabinsk, and Ufa to the Volga just west of Kuibyshev (Samara). For
actual operation and administration, the line is divided into the eight
railway administrations listed below: 1
TABLE I
Railway Admini-
Distance on
Operation
main Line in
Divisions
on main line
kziometers
stration
Number
Av. Distance
between
of
Stations
-
Stations
Far Eastern
(Vladivostok-Arkhara)
1210
6
133
9.1
53
24.2
66
15.4
84
15.5
85
9.4
43
11.8
67
13.5
73
9.7
82
9.7
686
13.1
Amur
1283
6
(Arkhara-Ksenevskaya)
Molotov
(Ksenevskaya-Petrovskii
4
1015
Zavod)
East Siberian
1304
4
(Petrovskii Zavod-Taishet)
Krasnoyarsk
803
3
(Taishet-Mariinsk)
Tomsk
508
2
(Mariinsk-Chulymskaya)
Omsk
905
3
(Chulymskaya-Makushino)
South Urals
707
3
MMakushino-Kropachevo)
Kuibyshev
Totals
797
8532
3
(Kropachevo-Volga)8
34
The Kuibyshev Railway extends west of the Volga 155 Km. to Kuznetsk.
If Chelyabinsk be considered as the western end of the Trans-Siberian, the
total distance is 7415 km. In addition to the main line trackage, each railway administration also operates branch and connecting lines, in some cases
totaling more in mileage than the main line section.
1AL'bom Skhem Zheleznykh Dorog SSSR. (Schematic Album of the Railways of
the USSR). pub. by S.S.S.R. Narodnyi Komissariat Putei Soobshcheniia (USSR
People's Commissariat of Ways of Communication), Moscow, Trans-kartografiia
NKPS, 1937. Distances from ofitsial 'ny: Ukazatel' Passazhirskikh Soobshchenii,
1937.
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2. Double-Tracking
Double tracking of the Trans-Siberian began even before World
War I and was completed from Omsk to Ulan-Ude (Verkhneudinsk), east
of Lake Baikal, by 1914, although the larger bridges on this section
remained single-track. 1 In recent years the rest of the line has been
double-tracked, the last section to be completed being that from
Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. 2 In some sections, notably on the Amur and
Molotov Railways, the second track is often at some distance from the
first; this is due to the number of tunnels and rock cutting required
and the necessity of maintaining traffic on the existing line continuously. At the same time second bridges have been built on the
portion of the line which was double-tracked by the previous regime.
Except for the second bridge over the Irtysh at Omsk, reported to be
nearing completion3, the Trans-Siberian is now a double-track railway
from the Pacific to the Volga, the longest continuous section of doubletrack in the world. According to statements by two travellers recently
returned from Moscow over the Trans-Siberian, the section between
Vladivostok and Khabarovsk (Far Eastern Railway Administration) is
triple-tracked, presumably in preparation for military eventualities. 4
1Bol'shoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira, I, p1. 164.
2December, 1938
Statement by Mr. John Scott who travelled over the Trans-Siberian
eastbound at the end of June, 1941.
4Reported by Mr. Scott and Mr. W. C. Armstrong of the American
Embassy in Moscow who travelled over the railway a week after Mr. Scott.
421
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- 13 3. Passing Tracks and Sorting Yards
In addition to being double-tracked throughout, the Trans-Siberian
is also well supplied with passing tracks and sorting yards. Table I
above shows that there were 686 stations in 1937, an average of a station
every 13.1 km. Assuming that each station has one or more sidings, this
figure may be taken as the average distance between sidings for the entire
line; the distance varying from only 9.1 km. on the Far Eastern to 24.2 km.
on the Amur section of the route. In the Soviet Far East strategic considerations are responsible for the fact that at a number of stations
there are several sidings. One report of a trip from Moscow to Vladivostok
and return lists 38 stations where there were more than 1 siding, the number
varying from 4-12. The same report states that these sidings are 1000 yards
in length, as a rule. 1 In the matter of passing tracks, the Trans-Siberian
would seem to compare favorably with our Western trunk lines.
There are practically no recent data on sorting yards. Gradjdanzev
gives a list of "principal yards" at the following: 2
Chelyabinsk
Yurga
Taishet
Svobodnyi
Kurgan
Achinsk
Innokentyevskaya
Khabarovsk
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Krasnoyarsk
Kansk
Ulan-Ude
Chita
Voroshilov
Vladivostok
4. Roadbed, Rails, Bridges, Tunnels, etc.
No up-to-date data on the gradients and radii of curves for the
Trans-Siberian have been discovered by the Section. Grajdanzev, citing the
1M/A. Moscow, No. 607. Sept. 14, 1936.
2Grajdanzev, A. J., "The Trans-Siberian Railway", unpublished admits Ms dated that
September 9, 1941, 26. The source is not given and the author
the list is not up-to-date.
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Admiralty Handbook on Siberia and Arctic Russia, published in 1920, states
that on the part of the line crossing the great West Siberian lowland, the
gradient was less than 0.007 in 1914, while in the mountainous sections
(presumably east of Lake Baikal) it rose to 0.0174; minimum radius of
curves was 1050-1750 feet. 1 Since that time grades and curves have been
reduced. However, the several mountain ranges east of Lake Baikal, chief
of which is the Yablonovyi, and the Great Khinghan system which the railway
crosses where it rounds the great northern bend of the Amur, will always
reduce the efficiency of the line. The most difficult section of the entire
line to construct was that around the south end of Lake Baikal. Here the
Eastern Sayan drops precipitately down to the shore of the lake, necessitating much tunnelling, rock-cutting, bridging and other heavy construction.
However, since the line keeps close to the shore of the lake, the gradients
are slight.
There is also a lack of precise data concerning the quality of the
ballast on the line. On the section carrying the heaviest traffic,
Novosibirsk-Chelyabinsk -- especially Novosibirsk-Omsk -- the line seemed
well-ballasted in 1937, gravel being the usual ballast. Between Novosibirsk
and Krasnoyarsk the ballast seemed lighter.
Although there has been much replacement of rails, they would seem to
be still too light for heavy traffic -- at least by American standards -- if
as Grajdanzev states, they weigh only 76-87 lbs. per yard. 2 The frequency of
accidents may be due to this inadequacy in the rails.
1Grajdanzev, A. J., "The Trans-Siberian Railway", unpublished Ms dated
September 9, 1941, 21. The source is not given and the author admits that
the list is not up-to-date.
2Ibid, 24, (from Planovoe Khosiaistvo, No. 10, 1940, 43
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Grajdanzev is also authority for the number of ties; he states
that the number per kilometer has recently been raised to 1600-1840. 1
Wood preservation treatment is not yet general.
In the summer of 1937 it was noted that automatic block signals
were installed on the entire section Chelyabinsk-Novosibirsk Since
that time the system has been extended eastward, how far cannot be said
definitely. 2
The Trans-Siberian has a number of long bridges, the longest being
the twin bridges over the Amur at Khabarovsk, between six and seven thou-
sand feet long. The Yenisei, Ob, and Irtysh are crossed on bridges over
2000 feet in length, while there are several others in excess of 1000
feet. All large bridges are of steel with concrete or masonry piers.
Many of the smaller bridges are of masonry. Double-tracking has made
necessary the construction of second bridges which are often at some dis-
tance from the original structures. All the second bridges are completed
except that over the Irtysh at Omsk. 3
5. Round-houses, repair shops, and water-supply
Here again we lack reliable up-to-date data. If one assumes one
roundhouse at the end of each operating division, then it can be seen
from Table I that there should be thirty-five. However, Grajdanzev, not
citing his source of the year for which it was applicable, gives a total
of forty-six between Chelyabinsk and Vladivostok. 4 Grajdanzev also states
1Grajdanzev, A. J.,OP. cit., 24.
2Mr. John Scott who travelled over the line in June, 1941, reports
that east of Novosibirsk, automatic block-signalling seemed to be limited
to the vicinity of the larger stations.
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424
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that over twenty per cent of the 216 car repair shops, 64 car depots and 12
wheel repair shops built in the USSR during the Second Five-Year Plan period,
were constructed in Siberia. 1 The Trans-Siberian either is or should shortly
be independent of the older industrial centers of European Russia for loco.
motive and car replacements. The Nizhni Tagil car works (Uralwagonstrol)
with an ultimate capacity of 50,000 four-axle cars a year, the largest car
plant in the USSR, is already producing. Another new car plant is the one at
Irkutsk on which construction started in 1936 and which was due to start
operations during the Third Five-Year Plan. Locomotives are either now or
will shortly be turned out at the Ulan-Ude locomotive works (in operation in
1937), the Kuznetsk locomotive works (construction started in 1936, scheduled
for operation in 1939 or 1940), and the Orsk locomotive plant in the southern
Urals (under construction?).
Water supply presents problems on two sections of the line; the Omsk
Railway in the west, where semi-arid conditions result in water shortage and
possibly alkalinity, and along the Molotov and Amur Railways in the east,
where extreme winter temperatures and perpetually frozen sub-soil create
especial difficulties. On the Omsk Railway great hopes were placed in the
Soviet-designed condenser-locomotive. However, judging from the twenty-five
or thirty of these locomotives seen on sidings at petropavlovsk in 1937, the
type was not entirely successful at first. At that time it was noted that
excavation for and the laying of pipe was proceeding at a number of places
between Kurgan and Omsk. Russians on the train said that this was for the
1Grajdanzev, op. cit., 18-19.
425
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railway water supply. In the east it is necessary to heat water pipes
during the winter which involves the building of galleries, or surrounding the water conduit with a warm water jacket, since pipes cannot be
buried below the frost level.
6. Rolling Stock and Locomotives
The Section has been unable to find any references giving the
number of locomotives and cars operated by the different railway adminis-
trations making up the Trans-Siberian The lack of such data is not, however, of much importance, since the entire country can be drawn upon at
need for motive power and rolling stock. In this connection, it might be
pointed out that undoubtedly some of the rolling stock which normally
operates in the regions now occupied by the enemy has been evacuated and is
operating on the Trans-Siberian. Grajdanzev estimates that in 1940-41 the
number of freight cars on the Siberian railways was 120,000 (in terms of
two-axle freight-cars), locomotives about 4,200 and passenger cars about
6,000. 1 However, these estimates should be treated with great reserve,
since they are derived from the ton-Kilometer distances run on Siberian
railways, apparently in 1935. In recent years with the increasing output
of four-axle 50 m. tons-capacity cars, the proportion of large capacity
cars in the total park has been steadily increasing. In long distance
transit traffic, such as much of that over the Trans-Siberian, so-called
"marshrutnyi" trains, completely made up of the four-axle cars, are used.
The average capacity of a Soviet freight car in 1936 was 20.87 m. tons --
it is probably nearer 22 m. tons today. 2 More intensive use of the
1Grajdanzev, op. cit., 17.
2Grajdanzev, op. cit., 20. These figures include many two-axle 15
ton cars.
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existing rolling stock will be possible as more and more are equipped with
automatic couplers and brakes. Grajdanzev estimates that about 70% of all
cars are now equipped with both automatic brakes and automatic couplers, a
figure which is probably too high.
The standard freight locomotive for main line haulage of mass freight
is the FD type. It has a 1-5-1 wheel arrangement, a rated horsepower of
2,630, a tractive power of 1,800 m. tons gross, or 1,200 tons net on a grade
of 9/1000, or 2,200 tons gross on a grade of 7/1000. The most efficient
speed is 65 Km./p/h and the machine is equipped with an automatic stoker.
The standard passenger locomotive is the type IS (Josef Stalin; Russian lacks
the letter "J"), which has the 1-4-2 wheel arrangement, a rated horsepower of
3.030, is equipped with automatic stoker and operates most efficiently at a
speed of 85-105 km. per hour. 1 These locomotives closely resemble American
types of similar capacity. In 1935, 1,495 locomotives were delivered to the
railways; 1,123 of these were of the FD type. The Third Five-Year Plan (1937-
1942) calls for the delivery of 7,370 new locomotives to the railways: 1,870
of these to be of the FD type, and 1,500 the IS passenger type, and 3,200
condenser-type locomotives. The latter type is expected to be the chief
freight locomotive in the next few years. 2 The decision to build so many of
this type suggests that the earlier "bugs" have been eliminated.
7. Personnel
Grajdanzev, citing an article in the Gosplan publication Trud v SSSR.
gives statistical material on number of workers in various categories on the
Grajdanzev, op. cit., 18-19.
2Gosplan, Tretii Piatiletnis Plan Razvitiia.Narodnogo Khosiaistva Soiusa
SSR (1938-1942), Moscow, Gosplanizdat, 1939.
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Siberian railways and those of the USSR. 1 On January 1, 1936 some 259,191
engineers, technicians, clerks, workers, attendants, and apprentices were
employed on the Omsk, Tomsk, East Siberian, Molotov, and Ussuri Railways. 2
Giving figures for the entire country, Grajdanzev comes to the conclusion
that in 1935 the Soviet railways did only one-fifth the work of the American
railway system with 74% more. workers, leading to the conclusion that the pro-
ductivity of Soviet railway workers is very low. This he attributes to the
3
low wages.
8. Capacity
In making any estimate, however tentative, of the capacity of the
Trans-Siberian for forwarding supplies to the Russo-German war zone, it is
necessary to bear in mind that operating conditions and traffic requirements
vary considerably on different sections of the line. For the purposes of
our analysis, the Trans-Siberian may be divided into three parts: Vladivostok
Novosibirsk, Novosibirsk-Chelyabinsk, and Chelyabinsk-Volga.
The Vladivostok-Novosibirsk portion has the most severe operating con-
ditions. As pointed out previously in this discussion (p. 14 ), there are two
mountainous sections on this stretch and considerable hilly country through
which operating conditions are by no means ideal. Furthermore, the severe
climate, more severe in Eastern than Western Siberia, makes for difficulty in
winter operations. On the other hand normal traffic is not heavy. A dispatch
from the M/A in Moscow in February of this year (1941) giving a spot count of
train movements on the Trans-Siberian, shows 16-20 pairs of trains operating
1Grajdanzev, op. cit., 28-29.
2Grajdanzev, op. cit., 29. In 1936 the present Amur Railway was divided
between the Trans-Baikal (Molotov) and Ussuri (Far Eastern) Railway administrations.
428
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SEcRET
daily on the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk section, 15-30 on the Khabarovsk-Chita
section, and 30-35 on the Chita-Novosibirsk section. 1 Assuming that onethird of these were passenger trains, and that the average load per freight
train was 1,000 tons, the tonnage movement figures out as follows: 2
TABLE II
Daily tonnage in each
direction
Section of Main Line
Khabarovsk-Chita
Chita-Novosibirsk
both directions
-- 13,300 3,900,000 -- 4,800,000
10,700
10,000
20,000
Vladivostok-Khabarovsk
Total Yearly Tonnage
--
--
20.000 3,650,000 -- 7,300,000
24,000 7,300,000 -- 8,760,000
However, in view, of the more difficult operating conditions east of
Novosibirsk, this figure is probably too high: 700-800 tons is probably more
nearly correct. A correction factor should therefore be applied to the above
figures.
The only statistics which give actual freight movement are for 1935,
and are contained in a table appearing in Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo
1936. 3 The table follows:
TABLE III
Name of Railway
Freight Carried in Thousand Metric
Tons
Transit
Total
Imports
(a)
Ussuri
Molotov
East Siberian
11,464
7,937
8,655
Exports
(b)
(c)
398
1,840
2,200
393
886
2,123
1,996
2,732
Local
(d)
9,226
3,348
2. 914
(a) Presumably freight originating on other railways destined for
stations on the railway indicated.
1M/A Moscow, Report No. 1857, Feb. 12, 1941. I.G. No. 4540. Secret.
2Grajdanzev, op. cit., p.9, gives 1.000 tons as the average for all
Siberian railways. This figure is also given in a dispatch from Moscow:
(M/A Moscow, Report No. 1857. Secret).
Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo 1936, 423, Cited by Grajdanzev, op.
cit., 7
429
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- 21 -
(b) Presumably freight originating on railway indicated and
destined for stations on other railways.
(c) Presumably freight in transit over the railway shown. No
transit freight is shown for the Ussuri Railway, since from the railway
point of view, freight imported through the port of Vladivostok and
loaded onto the railway there originates there and if destined for
points west of Ussuri Railway appears as "export" freight.
(d) The heavy local freight traffic on the Ussuri Railway is
attributable to the coal traffic from the Suchan mines to Vladivostok
and other points on the railway.
Comparison of the data in Tables II and III suggests that there
had been little increase in traffic over the part of the line east of
Novosibirsk from 1935 until the train count above referred to was taken.
It seems unlikely that this represents capacity traffic when it
is recalled that completion of double-tracking on the line from UlanUde to Vladivostok has taken place since 1935. If single-track sections
were able to carry upwards of 8 million tons in 1935, it seems likely
that the double-tracked railway of today could carry a total 'of twice
that amount, or 16 million tons. 1 Since the train count early this
year suggests a volume of traffic approximately the same as that in
1935, it seems safe to assume that so far as the line itself is concerned, the reserve capacity of the Trans-Siberian east of Novosibirsk
is at least 8 million tons annually -- 4 million in either direction -2
or approximately 11,000 tons daily in each direction.
The reserve capacity of 4 million tons available for westbound
traffic should be largely free for through traffic, since Eastern
1 In general, the capacity of a railway can be doubled by adding a
second track.
2Grajdanzev, using another method, calculates that the freight
capacity of the entire Trans-Siberian for military purposes is between
3 and 7 million tons. Op. cit., 8-10
430
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Siberia and the Soviet Far East do not produce in quantity the raw
materials, foodstuffs and manufactures needed in European Russia at
the present. As a matter of fact this part of Siberia normally imports
from West Siberia and European Russia considerably more than it exports.
This estimate of reserve capacity obviously does not take into
consideration the availability of rolling stock, which is discussed
below.
The Novosibirsk-Chelyabinsk portion of the Trans-Siberian is
the best part of the entire line from an operating point of view.
Grades are slight, there is a high percentage of tangents, the line is
well-ballasted and is equipped with automatic block signals. It is thus
capable of carrying near the maximum which a double-track railway can
carry. According to an American authority, a comparable stretch of
track in this country should be able to maintain a traffic density of a
train in either direction every half-hour, or forty-eight per day 1
The train count contained in the M/A dispatch above referred to gives
45-50 as the number of pairs on the Novosibirsk-Omsk stretch. This
suggests that this portion of the Trans-Siberian is operating very
nearly at capacity, and that there is thus little if any reserve capacity.
The Soviet statistics referred to above show the following freight movement on the Omsk and Tomsk Railways (which roughly coincide with the
Novosibirsk-Chalyabinsk stretch). 2
Statement by Col. Ross, G4
2Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo 1936, 423
431
SECRET
23
TABLE IV
Name of Railway
Omsk
Tomak
Total
20,280
29,329
Freight carried in thousand metric tons
Imports
Exports
2,879
5,448
3,310
9.987
Transit
12,048
3.061
Local
2.043
11,334
Even allowing for the great proportion of branch and connecting line
mileage to main line mileage as compared with the railways of Eastern
Siberia and the Soviet Far East, the traffic shown in Table IV was
much heavier than that carried by the East Siberian, Molotov, and
Ussuri Railways. It is due in large measure to the heavy coal and iron
ore traffic between the Kuznetsk Basin and the Urals. In 1935 some
3-6 million tons of coal moved from the Kuznetsk Basin to the Urals
and 14-3 million tons of iron ore from the Urals to the Kuznetsk Basin
over the Trans-Siberian main line. 1 This coal and iron ore traffic
explain the high "import" and "export" figures for the Tomsk Railway
and the high transit figures for the Omsk Railway. Since the Kuznetsk
Basin is served by branch lines of the Tomak Railway, coal shipped
westwards is "exported" from the railway and the iron ore brought to
the Kuznetsk Basin from the Urals is "imported." Since neither the
coal or iron ore originates on the Omsk Railway, but merely passes
over it from one end to the other, it is transit freight. The large
local traffic on the Tomsk Railway is presumably accounted for in the
main by the movement of coal from the mines to the nearby smelters and
blast furnaces within the Kuznetsk Basin or to the industrial plants
of Novosibirsk.
1Bolshoi Atlas Mira, II, pl. 79
Grajdanzev (op. cit., P. 11) states that in 1937 7à million tons not of
coal were moved from the Kusnetsk Basin to the Urals. He does
give his source for this figure.
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Since 1935 the traffic over the Novosibirsk-Chelyabinsk section
has undoubtedly increased -- the increased production of iron and steel
in the Kuznetsk Basin and the Urals alone would account for a signifi-
cant increase in the coal and iron ore traffic. 1
The loss of food-producing and iron and steel-producing capacity
in the Ukraine as a result of the German invasion has presumably placed
an additional load on this portion of the Trans-Siberian. If it were
not for the completion of the Akmolinsk-Kartaly line providing a means
for getting coal from the Karaganda Basin to the Urals without using
the main line of the Trans-Siberian, there would be no reserve capacity
to handle additional transit freight from Vladivostok. Here again we
are considering only the line itself, not rolling stock and motive
power. The new line, opened only at the end of 1939, should be able by
now to carry several million tons of Karaganda coal to the Urals annually,
thus relieving the main line of an equivalent amount of Kuznetsk coal.
Nevertheless, even with the aid of the new line, the reserve capacity
of the Trans-Siberian between Novosibirsk and Chelyabinsk must be con-
siderably less than that of the line east of Novosibirsk -- an outside
maximum of 3 million tons a year at most, probably considerably less.
Even less data are available for the Chelyabinsk-Volga portion
of the Trans-Siberian than for the Vladivostok-Novosibirsk and
sections. The total capacity of the line is
presumably less than for the Novosibirsk-Chelyabinak stretch, since it
Between 1932 and 1937 traffic on all Siberian railways increased
2.8 times (Galitskii, A., "Gruzooborot Zheleznykh dorog v. tret'en
platiletii, "Planovoe Khosiaistvo, No. 6, 1939, 109). For the period
1938-1942, freight traffic on the railways of Western Siberia is to
increase 50-55% according to the Third Five-Year Plan (ibid., 117).
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passes through the Urals and in addition involves some long grades
between the Urals and the Volga. However, its capacity is probably
greater than that of the Vladivostok-Novosibirsk section. Normally
its reserve capacity should be greater than that of the section between Novosibirsk and Chelyabinsk, since it does not normally have any
considerable coal and iron ore traffic. However, the loss of the
Krivoi Rog iron ore mines, may well have led to an attempt to supply
the Donets Basin blast furnaces with iron ore from the Urals, in which
case this section of the Trans-Siberian has presumably had to carry a
large increase in westbound freight. In addition to the iron ore,
there has probably also been a considerable increase in the shipment
to the west of pig iron, steel ingots and forms, and heavy manufactures
of various kinds from the Ural industrial region such as tractors and
tanks from the Chelyabinsk tractor plant. Presumably also there is a
larger than normal shipment of grain westward from the West Siberian
and Trans-Volga grain belts; much of this traffic would move over the
Chelyabinsk-Volga line. While there are other lines connecting the
Urals with the west, this is the only double-track line, and therefore
presumably is carrying near its capacity as a result of the war situstion. Unfortunately, there are no figures available on which to
base an estimate of the remaining reserve capacity of this part of the
Trans-Siberian. It is probably somewhat under that of the NovosibirskChelyabinsk section.
In the foregoing discussion of the capacity of three parts of
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the Trans-Siberian, no account was taken of the availability of rolling
stock, obviously equally important with the line itself in determining
the capacity of the route. It was pointed out in an earlier section
that even if figures on the number of locomotives and freight cars
operated by each of the nine railway administrations which share the
Trans-Siberian were available, they would not be of much significance,
since rolling stock can be and is drawn from all the railways of the
country at need. The degree to which this is done depends on how im-
portant the authorities consider the requirements of any one rail route.
For the country as a whole the rolling stock and motive power situation
must be extremely serious. Even in peace times, there is a chronic
shortage of cars and locomotives, in spite of large increases in the
production of each. Add to this the purely military requirements - which
must be enormous in view of the forces involved - and the added requirements due to dislocation of industries and raw material sources and the
need for hauling food-stuffs from greater distances, and it will be seen
that the shortage of rolling stock and locomotives must be acute. However, some proportion of the rolling stock and locomotives which normally
operated in the territories now occupied by the Germans, must have been
evacuated and should be available to help meet the emergency situation
on the railways still under Soviet control. On the other hand, in view
of the destruction of rolling-stock on Soviet-controlled railways by
bombing attacks, it is possible that the evacuated material just about
makes up for the destruction of rolling stock and locomotives on lines
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still under Soviet control. In any case, there can be little doubt
that the diversion of cars and engines to hauling supplies from
Vladivostok over the Trans-Siberian can only be at the expense of
other vital traffic.
While statistical data on the volume of transit freight carried
over the entire route of the Trans-Siberian is lacking, five reports
on the volume of transit goods shipped over the Trans-Siberian from
the Far East to Germany prior to the latter's attack on the USSR, pro-
vide some indication of the through traffic which the line could
accomodate in addition to the normal peace-time traffic load. The
highest figure for this German transit traffic is 2,143 tons daily and
is given in two reports. 1 The lowest figure cited is 1000 tons. 2
One may assume that if the Soviet authorities managed to move over
1000 tons daily for the Germans, an effort there is some evidence to
a
show was less than wholehearted, they would find a way of moving
higher quantity of supplies which they urgently need themselves.
9. Conclusions
From the analysis of the rail connections west from Vladivostok,
it appears on the basis of the available data that, so far as trackage
alone is concerned, the bottle-neck for westbound traffic on the main
line of the Trans-Siberian was, up to 1937, the section between
1Reliable British source and memorandum from W. E. Shipp, Lt. Col.
G.S.C. to Chief, Intelligence Branch, dated May 9. 1940.
Dispatch from American Consul General, Harbin, to American
Ambassador, Peiping, Nov. 4, 1940.
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Novosibirsk and Chelyabinsk, and especially the section between
Novosibirsk and Omsk, where there are no alternative routes. This was
due primarily to the heavy westward movement of coal from the Kuznetsk
Basin required by the metallurgical plants of the Urals.
The relief of this bottle-neck is, therefore, in large measure
dependent on the degree to which this long-haul Kuzbas-Urals coal
traffic may have been, or may still be, reduced. In recent years since 1937 - efforts have been made to reduce this long distance coal
traffic by greater utilization of the low grade coals of the Urals and
by establishing a direct rail connection between the Urals and the
Karaganda coal basin, 678 km. nearer to the south Urals than the Kuzbas.
No data are available which would indicate fully the quantitative
success of these efforts. However, the increased production of Karaganda
coal (4 million tons in 1938, 8 million called for by 1942) and the opening of the Akmolinsk-Kartaly railway providing direct connection between
the Karaganda and the South Orals should have relieved the Trans-Siberian
of upwards of 3 million tons of Kuznetsk coal which formerly went to the
South Urals. In addition, the Sverdlovsk metallurgical area can be
relieved from dependence on Kuznetsk coal by obtaining Karaganda coal via
petropavlovsk and Kurgan. This coal - 1 million tons annually, at least
would move over the Trans-Siberian over a section for which there is an
alternative route.
Thus, if coal production at Karaganda has increased according to
plan, and the new railways are sufficiently well equipped to handle the
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traffic, the main line of the Trans-Siberian should by this time have
been relieved of a coal traffic of some 4 million tons annually,
possibly more This capacity would be available for other traffic.
The loss of food-producing and industrial regions in the west
will obviously increase the dependence of the remaining parts of
European Russia on the Urals and West Siberia for food-stuff, raw
materials and munitions, thus increasing the westbound traffic load
on all the railways. Lacking any data on this traffic, it is impossible
to say how much of the westbound trackage capacity it will require. How-
ever, it should be emphasized that for the section over which this
traffic is or will presumably be, heaviest, namely, the Urals - Volga,
there are four trunk lines, one of which is double track, and that in
the West Siberia food surplus region there are four lines west of a
meridian running north and south through Kurgan, three west of a
meridian north and south thru Petropavlovsk, and two west of a meridian
north and south through Omsk, one railroad line in each case being the
double-tracked Trans-Siberian.
Taking all factors into consideration, the trackage capacity -availability of rolling stock and motive power not considered -- westward from Vladivostok may possibly be sufficient to accomodate a
through westbound traffic of 3 million tons a year, possibly even more.
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E. SUPPLEMENTARY
TRANS-SIBERIAN PORTS IN EASTERN SIBERIA AND CONNECTIONS WITH THE
(Note: This section is reproduced with only slight changes
from Section IV, Part IV of the Report of 16 October, 1941, "Lines
of Communication between the United States and the Russo-German War
Zone. ")
1. Sovetskaya Gavan
This is a new port 1000 km. north of Vladivostok on the Sea of
Japan, which is mentioned in a number of articles and reports as the
ultimate terminus of the Baikal-Amur Railway. The port has only a
small sheltered anchorage, and this freezes in winter, but it is
believed that it can be kept open by icebreakers as easily as the
harbor of Vladivostok. 1
Although there seems scant possibility that the entire BaikalAmur Railway will be completed for several years, there is a possibility that the eastern end, connecting the port of Sovetskaya Gavan
with Komsomolsk on the Amur River (the terminus of a branch railroad
line from Volochayevka on the Trans-Siberian) may be completed in time
to enable Sovetskaya Gavan to supplement Vladivostok during the present
crisis. The Dailway between Sovetskaya Gavan and Komsomolsk is reported
to be under construction, although not yet completed. 2
Although there are no reports on the route of the new railway
or the distance involved, examination of the largest scale relief map
available indicates that there is a practical route across the northern
end of the Sikhota Alin which does not involve elevations greater than
+G-2/2657-D-1061-May 5, 1941
2H/A. Hoscow, No. IB. 10/1/41. S.
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meters. 1 The distance by this route would be approximately 375 km.
The chief engineering problem on this line would appear to be a bridge
over the Amur at or near Komsomolak. Until the bridge is completed,
trains will have to be ferried over the river, since the Komsomolsk
branch lies on the west side of the Amur.
This railway might also be of use in connection with the Amur
River route, discussed below, in view of the fact that the river at
Komsomolsk is open longer than the port of Nikolayevsk near the mouth
of the river. Vessels which reached the neighboring waters before the
ice went out of the Amur in the spring or after freezing in the fall
could drop down to Sovetskaya Gavan and unload there, cargoes moving
over the new railway to the river open which is somewhat longer at
Komsomolsk.
Until more is known about the port and the railway, it is impossible to make any estimate as to the capacity of this supplementary
route.
2. Nikolayevsk and the Amur River Route
Nikolayevsk, near the mouth of the Amur, is an old Russian Far
Eastern port and was at one time Russia's chief naval base on the
Pacific. Here the sea communications and the port are somewhat less
exposed to attack than at Vladivostok or Sovetskaya Gavan. The port
of Nikolayevsk is ice-bound six to seven months per year. 2
The port's only practicable connection with the interior is the
Amur River.
1 Bolshoi Atlas Mira, II
2G-2/2657-D-1061-May 5, 1941.
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The Amur is navigable for small ocean vessels up to Khabarovsk,
and for river steamers as far as Sretenak. Ice limits the usefulness
of the river to six to seven months per year in its lower reaches, but
as suggested above, the railway under construction from Sovetskava
Gavan to Komsomolsk might make the river useable before the ice has
gone out at the mouth or after it has frozen over in the lower river.
Since there are no data on the amount of river shipping available,
no estimates on the capacity of the river route can be given at this
time. However, maximum use should be made of this route since not only
will it reduce pressure on the limited port facilities of Vladivostok,
but also on the rolling stock of the railway.
Obviously, use of the Amur above Khabarovsk, at least, depends
on continued Japanese neutrality.
3. Ayan and its Road-River Connection
The small port of Ayan on the sea of Okhotsk, 450 km. by sea
from the mouth of the Amur, can have only the most limited utility as
a means of forwarding supplies.
Ayan is connected by a 220 km. wagon road with the village of
Nelkan at the head of navigation on the Maya, a right bank tributary of
the Aldan, which in turn is a tributary of the Lena. Supplies unloaded
at Ayan and freighted over the wagon road, can proceed by river craft
down the Maya to the Aldan, down the Aldan to the Lena, and up the Lena
to Ust-Kut, to which point it is believed the Baikal-Amur Railway is completed from Taishet on the Trans-Siberian. While the use of this route
would afford some relief to Vladivostok and to the Trans-Siberian
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all the way to Taishet, the limitations of the Ayan-Nelkan wagon road
and river shipping, suggest that the relief would be insignificant.
4. Okhotsk
The small port of Okhotsk, 450 km. north of Ayan, is connected
with the Aldan by a wagon road which terminates at Aldanskii Perevoz.
Since the road is nearly twice as long as that from Ayan to Nelkan,
this route can handle even less traffic than the Ayan route, and thus
need not be further considered,
5. Magadan (Nogayeva)
This rapidly developing port on a fine natural harbor with a
good automobile road 450 km. long connecting it with the Kolyma at
Ust Utinaya, is referred to in several reports. Although it can be
used only for forwarding supplies to the west in conjunction with the
Northern Sea Route -- the Kolyma flows directly into the Arctic -- the
port and the connecting highway have significance in connection with
the plane-ferry route from Alaska.
If any considerable number of planes are to be flown to the
front via Alaska and Siberia, a fuel base somewhere in northeastern
Siberia is essential. The port and the auto-truck highway to the
interior provide an adequate route for fuel transport.
6. Conclusions
(a) Only the port of Sovetskaya Gavan can supplement Vladivostok
the year 'round, and this port is of no utility until the railway to
Komsomolsk is completed.
(b) The other routes can be used in summer only, since they are
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river routes. The Amur, either alone, or in conjunction with the railway -- as yet unfinished -- from Sovetskaya Gavan to Komsomolsk, offers
the best hopes, since it does not involve the use of wagon roads, is
more direct, and remains open longer. It is, however, peculiarly
vulnerable in the event of war with Japan. In that eventuality, only
the Ayan and Okhotsk routes, with their very limited capacities, could
be used to forward supplies from the east.
F. SUPPLEMENTARY RAIL ROUTES IN WEST SIBERIA, THE URALS AND THE TRANSVOLGA
(Note: This section is reproduced with only slight changes from
Section V, Part IV of the report of 16 October, 1941, "Lines of Communication between the United States and the Russo-German War Zone.")
The heavier traffic on the Trans-Siberian west of Novosibirsk as
compared to that to the east of that point is to some degree compensated
for by the existence, west of Novosibirsk, of branch and connecting railways which to some extent form supplementary routes. These are shown on
the accompanying map.
Proceeding from east to west, the first alternative rail route is
reached at Omsk. 1 This is the single-track line from Omsk via Ishim and
Tyumen to Sverdlovsk, from which two single-track lines lead westward,
1The by-pass routes around Novosibirsk--Anzhero--Sudzhensk--Kemerovo-
Topki--Proektnaya- Eikhe--0 Yurga Proektnaya--Eikhe--Ob, and Sokur-Eikhe--Ob--do not supplement the main line since any traffic diverted
over them is returned to the main line at Ob. Their value, insofar as
operations on the main line are concerned, lies in diverting through
traffic around the Novosibirsk Junction.
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one via Perm and Kirov (Vyatka) to Leningrad and Moscow (via Bui and
Danilov), the other via Kazan to Moscow. 1 Although the Omsk-Sverdlovsk
line is single-track, it is a trunk line which carries a heavy traffic.
Sidings are frequent -- judging from the stations shown in the schematic
album referred to earlier -- averaging one to every 10.1 km. 2 The
quality of the roadbed is equal to that on the main line, judging from
observation in 1937 and from the fact that the schedule of the TransSiberian Express calls for the same speed over the stretch SverdlovskOmsk as over the Omsk-Novosibirsk portion of the main line. Unfortunately,
we have no spot counts for this line.
The next alternative route is reached at Petropavlovsk, 273 km.
west of Omsk. Here the new railway branches off to the Karaganda coal
basin and Lake Balkash, 1208 km. to the south. At Akmolinsk on this
line, 491 km. south of Petropevlovsk, connection is made with the South
Siberian Railway. This railway, planned even before the last war, will,
when completed, form a second Frans-Siberian south of and roughly
parallel to the older line from Magnitogorsk via Akmolinsk, Pavlodar,
Barnaul, Stalinsk, and Minusinsk to Taishet on the Trans-Siberian, where
the main line turns southcast to round Lake Baikal. At Taishet the
South Siberian will connect with the Baikal-Amur Railway, also under
construction, and together with the latter form a new transcontinental
line from the Urals to the Pacific. To date only the western section of
1The Trans-Siberian Express operates over this line.
'bom Skhem, etc., pl. 31 and 33 Distances from Ofitsial'ny:
Ukazatel'
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the South Siberian line has been opened, from Magnitogorsk to Akmolinsk. 1
Construction is reported to be under way on the Barnaul-Stalinsk section.
While the completed South Siberian Line could take over much of the traffic
which has hitherto moved over the Trans-Siberian, the section already
operating should have given a considerable measure of relief. This
Akmolinsk-Kartaly section reduces the rail distance from the Karaganda
coal basin to Magnitogorsk by about 550 km., thus removing all the
Karaganda-Magnitogorsk coal traffic from the main line. Furthermore,
since the Karaganda coal basin is now 678 km. closer to Magnitogorsk and
Orsk than the Kuznetsk Basin, it seems likely that the movement of coal
from the Kuznetsk Basin to the iron and steel plants of the south Urals,
at least, should be much less than before the new line was completed,
thus relieving the congested section of the Trans-Siberian still further,
particularly that east of Petropavlovsk. The new line also offers an
alternative rail route to the Urals, and, via Orsk and Chkalov, to the
Volga at Kuibyshev or to Saratov (via the new Iletsk-Uralsk link).
There are no data on the capacity of the Karaganda-Akmolinsk-
Kartaly line, but one may suppose that since the line was built primarily
to carry coal from Karaganda to the south Urals metallurgical plants, it
1The Magnitogorsk-Kartaly section is double-track, and has been in
operation for a number of years: from Kartaly there is a double-track
line north to Chelyabinsk on the Trans-Siberian; the 804 km. singletrack line from Kartaly to Akmolinsk was opened at the end of 1939.
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was planned to make it a high capacity line. On the other hand, the
recency of its opening might suggest that the installation of siding,
signals, water tanks and the like may not be complete. However,
assuming only 12 trains daily each way with an average of 1000 tons
per train, the line could carry a maximum of 4,380,000 tons of Karaganda
coal to the Urals annually. Even though this figure be reduced to 3
million tons to allow for the movement of grain, it represents a considerable unburdening of the Trans-Siberian main line.
The next alternative route west of Petropavlovsk branches off
at Kurgan. Here a single-track line completed by the Soviets runs
northwest 363 km. to Sverdlovsk. Sidings average one every 11 km.,
suggesting a capacity of 15 pairs of trains daily. The writer travelled
over this line in 1937 and was not particularly impressed with its
quality. However, in 1935 it carried over 3,000,000 and less than
1,500,000 tons of coal to the Sverdlovsk area. 1 Its value in long distance haulage is that it brings the Karaganda coal basin 475 km. nearer
to the iron and steel plants of the Sverdlovsk area than the Kuznetsk
coal basin. Thus, if the capacity of the Karaganda basin can be increased sufficiently to meet the import coal requirements of the middle
Urals as well as the south Urals, there will be no necessity for the
movement of Kuznetsk coal to the Urals, thus relieving the main line
1Bol'shoi Atlas Mira II, pl. 79.
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38 -
of the Trans-Siberian of the largest item in its westbound traffic. 1
Between the Urals and the Volga, there are, in addition to the
main double-track line of the Trans-Siberian from Chelyabinsk through
Ufa to Kuibyshev, three other single track trunk routes: the SverdlovskPerm-Kirov (Vyatka) line and the Sverdlovsk-Kazan line north of the
Trans-Siberian, and the Orsk-Chkalov (Orenburg) - Kuibyshev line to the
south. In addition to these four railways extending from the Urals to
the Volga, there are two additional lines branching off from two of the
four trunk routes and extending to the Volga: a single-track line which
leaves the main line of the Trans-Siberian just west of Ufa and runs
due west to Ulianovsk on the Volga, and the newly completed IletskUralsk line connecting with Saratov on the Volga.
J. A. Morrison
1TO be sure, Karaganda coal destined for the middle Urals, if shipped
via Kurgan, has to pass over the petropavlovsk-Kurgan section of the
Trans-Siberian. However, on this portion of the Trans-Siberian there is
an alternative line, that from Omsk to Sverdlovsk via Tyumen, so there
is not the same danger of a bottle-neck as exists on the line between
Omsk and Novosibirsk.
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PART IV
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THE SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE UNITED STATES
TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
Table of Contents
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Page
:
B. THE OCEAN ROUTES
8
C. DEFINITION OF THE LAND ROUTES
9
D. THE WESTERN GROUP OF SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES
10
1. Routes from the Mediterranean
10
2. Routes from the Persian Gulf
22
3. The Iranian Caspian Ports
37
4. Soviet Transport Northward from Iranian
Caspian Ports and from Tabriz
41
5. Effect of Further German Advance on the
Western Group of Southern Routes
E.
THE EASTERN GROUP OF SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES
45
48
1. The Port of Karachi
49
2. The Indian Railway Connections
50
3. Soviet Rail Connections
51
4.
The East Iranian Road
55
60
5. The West Afghan Road
6. The North Afghan Road
7. Necessity for Afghan-American Cooperation
61
64
65
8. Conclusions
SEE MAPS I AND III
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PART IV
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THE SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE UNITED STATES
TO THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR ZONE
A.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. Supplies may be sent from the United States to the Russo-German war
zone by way of several ports in the Middle East and various land routes leading
from them to the southern frontier of the Soviet Union.
2. The distances by sea from either west or east coast ports of the United
States to these ports of the Middle East are more than twice the distances involved in the maritime sections of the Eastern and Northern supply routes.
3. The outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan,
while not closing the route across the Pacific, has made it hazardous and will
presumably increase the distance involved.
4. The ports of the Middle East and the land routes from them over
which it is possible to send supplies to the southern frontier of the Soviet
Union may be divided into two groups, a Western Group and an Eastern Group, on
the basis of their location, orientation, and the present or possible future
military situation.
5. The Western Group comprises ports on the Levant Coast of the Mediterranean and near the head of the Persian Gulf together with land routes lead-
ing from them through Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Iran to
Tabriz, terminus of the Russian gauge railway in northwestern Iran, and to the
Iranian ports on the south coast of the Caspian. A total of 4.000 tons daily
may be forwarded to Russia by these routes by next spring if transit through
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Turkey is possible; 3,300 tons if Turkey is excluded. The following are the
different routes of the Western Group and their capacities:
a.
From the Turkish ports of Mersin and Iskenderun (Alexandretta)
by standard-gauge railway to Samsun on the Black Sea coast of Turkey and thence
by boat to the Soviet ports at the eastern end of the Black Sea and by standardgauge railway to Erzurum, thence by narrow-gauge railway or motor transport to
Sarikamis (beginning of the Russian-gauge railway) or by motor transport to
the port of Trabzon and thence by boat to Russian ports. These routes are not
now available due to Turkish neutrality.
Daily capacities are as follows:
Port of Mersin
400 tons
Port of Iskenderun
300 tons (approx. )
Standard-gauge railway
to Samsun
1.000 tons ?
Port of Samsun
1.100-1.200 tons
Standard-gauge railway
to Erzurum
1.000 tons ?
Narrow-gauge railway,
Erzurum to Sarikamis
100 tons
Road, Erzurum-Sarikamis
300 tons
Road, Erzurum-Trabzon
500 tons
The capacities of the ports of Mersin and Iskenderun, 700 tons
daily, set the limit to the volume of freight which can be forwarded through
Turkey.
b. From the port of Tripoli by standard-gauge railway to Turkey
or to Iraq. No information as to the capacity of the port. Capacity of the
railway to Mosul and Baghdad -- 60C-900 tons daily.
-
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450
CR T
C. From the port of Belrut by narrow-gauge railway to Rayak
where connection is made with the standard-gauge railway to Iraq. or by motor
transport direct to Baghdad.
Daily capacities:
Port of Beirut
2.000 tons
Narrow-gauge railway less than 37 tons
Road to Baghdad
300-400 tons
d. From the port of Haifa by 3 ft. 5-4 in. gauge railway to Rayak
where connection is made with the standard-gauge line to Iraq. or by motor
transport to Baghdad.
Daily capacities:
Fort of Haifa
over 2.000 tons
Railway to Rayak
no data
Road to Baghdad
1.000 tons
e. From the port of Basra to Baghdad and Mosul by meter-gauge
railway (standard-gauge Baghdad-Mosul , transport on the Tigris river. and dry
season road.
Daily capacities:
Port of Basra
3,600 tons
Meter-gauge railway
1.000 tons, rising to
Basra-Baghdad
3.000 tons
River transport on
the Tigris
1.500 tons
Dry season road
Basra-Baghdad
600 tons rising to
150 tons
f. The Kermanshah Road from Khanigin or Baghdad to Kazvin and the
Iranian Caspian port of Pahlevi.
Daily capacity - 500 tons
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8. The Rowanduz Road from Mosul or Kirkuk to Tabria:
Daily capacity - 500 tons :with improvements)
h. From the port of Khorramshahr by river transport and dry
season road to Dizful, thence by all-weather road to the Iranian Caspian port
of Noshahr:
Daily capacities:
Port of Khorramshanr not definite
River transport
Khorramshahr to Dizful no data
Dry season road
Khorramshahr to Dizful no data
All-weather road
Dizful to Noshahr
300 tons
1. From the port of Bandar Shahpur to Tabriz and the Iranian
Caspian ports by the Trans-Iranian Railway and connecting roads:
Daily capacities:
Port of Bandar Shahpur
Trans-Iranian Railway
All-weather road from
Zenjan to Tabriz
1,000 tons, rising to
2,500 tons by March, 1942
400 tons, rising to
2.000 tons
1,000 tons
6. The Iranian Caspian Ports have capacities as follows:
Daily Capacity
Tonnage of freight to arrive
by different routes
Pahlevi
600 tons
500 tons over Kermanshah Road
Noshahr
600 tons
300 tons over Dizful Road and
Babul-Sar
300 tons
By rail to Shahi and truck to
Port
and 100 by rail to Kazva and
thence by truck to port.
300 tons by rail to Shahi and
thence by truck to port.
port.
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-
Bandar -1 Gaz
200 tons
By rail to nearest point on
railway thence by truck to
port.
Bandar Shah
150-250 tons
rising to 700
tcns in May, 1942
By rail all the way to the
port.
7. Information as to the capacity of the Soviet mercantile marine for
removing consignments from Iranian Caspian ports and the capacities of the
Soviet Caspian ports is incomplete.
a. The Caspian merchant fleet consists of 106 vessels totaling
173,257 tons, one-half of which represents oil tankers.
b. The ports of Astrakhan and Guriev are icebound 32 months.
C. The ports of Baku and Makhach Kala are ice-free and are
probably able to handle as much tonnage as can be sent them from Iranian Casplan ports.
d. Krasnovodsk is available, but its rail connection to the
Russo-German war zone through central Asia is excessively long.
8. The railway from Tabriz to Djulfa on the Soviet Iranian frontier
should have a capacity of 1.800 tons daily when new ties and ballast are laid.
From Djulfa there are two rail connections to Baku.
9. A renewed German advance to the southeast would have the following
possibilities:
a. If it reached Rostov again, it would cut the main rail
connection (here double-track) between Caucasia and the main war zone to
the north;
b. If it reached Salsk, 116 miles southeast of Rostov, it would
cut the single-track railway connecting Caucasia with the Volga;
C. If it reached Astrakhan it would cut the remaining direct
routes from Caucasia and the Caspian, thus rendering the whole Western Group
of supply routes useless for supplying the main Russian forces.
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10. The Eastern Group of supply routes from the south comprise the port
of Karachi, Indian railways leading from it to rail-heads on the Afghan and
Iranian frontiers, the branch lines extending from the Trans-Caspian railway
in Soviet Central Asia to rail-heads on the Afghan and Iranian frontiers, and
three roads connecting the Indian and Russian rail-heads, as follows:
a.
The Eastern Iranian Road, extending from Zahidan, the Iranian
terminus of the British Baluchistan railway, almost due north for 583 miles to
Meshed from which there are connections to Ashkhabad on the Russian Trans-
Caspian railway (160 miles), and to Sarakha (120 miles) terminus of the branch
line reported to have been built south from Tedzhen on the Trans-Caspian;
b. The West Afghan Road, 506 miles long, from Chaman on the
Indian-Afghan frontier, terminus of the Quetta branch of the Baluchistan railway, via Kandahar and Herat to Kushka on the Soviet-Afghan frontier, terminus
of a branch line from Merv on the Trans-Caspban railway:
c.
The North Afghan Road, 563 miles long, from Landi Khotal,
terminus of the British military railway through the Khyber Pass, via Jalalabad, Kabul, Charikar, and Mazar-1-Sharif to the Amu-Darya (Oxus) opposite
Termez on the Kagan-Stalinabad branch of the Trans-Caspian.
11. With relatively minor improvements and with sufficient motor transport, each of the three roads of the Eastern Group probably could carry at
least as much tonnage as that planned for the Burma Road, namely 16,000 tons
monthly, or a total of possibly 48,000 tons for all three routes.
12. The disadvantages of the Eastern Group of supply routes are:
a. The very considerable length of the land routes involved.
For example, it is 629 miles from Karachi to Chaman by rail, then 506 miles by
road to Kushka, and finally 2,115 miles by rail from Kushka to the Volga.
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b. In case the Germans advance to the lower Volga, oil from the
Caucasian area to the rest of Russia will have to be routed via Central Asia,
placing a heavy load on the Trans-Caspian and Tashkent-Chkalov railways.
13. These Eastern roads merit serious consideration as routes for forwarding supplies to Russia for the following reasons:
a. Their Soviet railway connections are in no present danger of
being cut by a German advance;
b. At present the two Afghan roads, at least, carry only light
local traffic; hence most of their capacity is available for the transport of
supplies to Russia;
C. They provide a direct connection between the Soviet Union and
India, itself an important source of supplies.
14. The East Iranian Road, due to British control and the need for using
it to some extent to supply British forces in Iran, will presumably be of less
value for forwarding supplies to the Soviet Union than the two roads through
Afghanistan.
15. In view of the traditional Afghan hostility to the British and
Russians, proposals regarding the development of the two Afghan roads into major
supply routes would probably be received more favorably by the Afghan Govern-
ment if they were presented directly by American representatives.
16. If these Afghan roads are to be developed by American agency, it
appears that the detailed technical information necessary for the formulation
of transport plans could best be supplied by an American technical mission.
J. A. Morrison
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
B. THE OCEAN ROUTES
There are several ports in the Middle East and a number of land routes
leading from them by which supplies may reach the Russo-German war zone from the
south.
The distances by sea from either west or east coast ports of the United
States to these ports of the Middle East are more than twice as great as the
distances involved in the maritime sections of the Eastern and Northern (Archangel) routes. From San Franciso to the head of the Persian Gulf via Singapore
it is 11,242 nautical miles. From New York via Cape Town the direct route
through the Mediterranean is not available for obvious reasons to the same
place the distance is 12,010 miles. Until the Japanese attack on the United
States, both these routes were comparatively safe; and this was especially true
of the route via Singapore. While the route via the Pacific to the ports of the
Middle East is presumably less affected by the Japanese attack than is the sea
route to Vladivostok, present indications are that it will be necessary for the
time being for ships steaming to the Middle East to follow the route via the
Torres Straits, 1,401 miles longer than that by way of Singapore route, or even
to pass around Australia, a voyage 1,966 miles longer than the Singapore route.
The new situation respecting Japan would not appear to change the status of the
New York-Cape Town route. In contrast to the maritime portions of the Northern
and Eastern supply routes, which are most vulnerable in the sections nearest to
the Soviet Union, the Pacific sea routes to the Middle East are at present most
vulnerable in their middle sections.
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C. DEFINITION OF THE LAND ROUTES
The Middle Eastern ports and the land routes leading from them to the
southern frontiers of the Soviet Union may be divided into two groups in
accordance with their location, orientation and present and possible future
functions:
1) A Western Group, based on ports on the Levant coast of the Mediterranean and near the head of the Persian Gulf which are oriented primarily toward Trans-Caucasia and the Caspian Sea, and
2) An Eastern Group, based on the port of Karachi in India and oriented
primarily toward Soviet Central Asia.
The Western Group has or may have two functions:
(1) To supply the British forces in Iran and the Russian (and
possibly British) forces which may be required to hold the line of the Caucasus.
(2) To forward supplies destined for the main Soviet forces in
European Russia - either by rail from Trans-Caucasia, or by the Caspian Sea to
Russian Caspian-ports, and thence by rail or river.
It would appear that a German advance from the Crimea and the lower Don
to the southeast and east would limit the second function and then perhaps elim-
inate it entirely, while at the same time it greatly increased the importance of
the first function. Such an advance might stop the northward movement of traffic
via the Cis-Caucasian railways and the north-Caspian ports, while at the same
time it threw upon 'the Western Group of Southern Routes the burden of moving up
from the south all the supplies required by the armies holding the line of the
Caucasus.
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The Eastern Group of Southern Routes is of importance primarily for send-
ing supplies to the main Russian forces, and only partly, and to a minor extent,
for supplying the Allied forces in northwest Iran and Caucasia.
D. THE WESTERN GROUP OF SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES
Examination of the accompanying map shows a number of routes -- rail,
road, and river -- leading from ports on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf
to the Caspian or to Trans-Caucasia. Since these routes connect with one another
at one or more points, there are several alternative traffic lines. In most cases
two or more methods of transportation are required to carry supplies from the
original port to the Caspian or Trans-Caucasia. An attempt will be made in this
section to indicate the segments in this complex of routes which limit the amount
of supplies which can be forwarded from the south.
1. Routes from the Mediterranean
At the present time the routing of American supplies to the Russo-German
war zone via the ports of the eastern Mediterranean meets with the following
objections:
1) So long as it is not possible to send shipping through the Mediterranean from the west, the several ports on the Levant coast of the Mediterranean
from which supplies can at present be shipped to Trans-Caucasia and the Caspian
are at least 1,000 miles farther from both coasts of the United States, in terms
of distances that must be travelled, than are the ports at the head of the
Persian Gulf;
2) The distances from the Mediterranean ports to the points in Iraq from
which roads lead to Trans-Caucasia and the Caspian are considerably greater than
from ports on the Persian Gulf to the same points:
458
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3) The combined capacity of the two roads over which all supplies from
the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Russia must at present leave
that country is considerable less than can be delivered to them from Persian Gulf
ports alone:
4) The limited-capacity rail route through Turkey to Trans-Caucasia is not
now available.
However, in view of the possibility (1) that the sea route through the
Mediterranean from the west may become available, thus making the ports of the
eastern Mediterranean the nearest of the southern supply ports to the United
States, and (2) that the rail route through Turkey to Trans-Caucasia under certain
circumstances may become available, it seems advisable to include in the present
study some consideration of the Mediterranean ports and the land routes leading
from them.
a. Via Turkey
The two Turkish ports are presumably not now available for receiving
and forwarding supplies for Russia, since Turkey is maintaining a "correct"
attitude vis-a-vis Germany. However, in the event that Turkey is involved in
the war on the side of the Allies, these ports might be of some use, since they
are connected by rail with both Iraq and Trans-Caucasia. However, neither is
equipped to handle any large volume of freight. Mersin is a partially protected
roadstead with dockage facilities for lighters only. There are 4 lighter piers
with depths of 6-10 ft. at the outer ends. The largest of these is the Railway
Pier which has 2 lines of railway track, two travelling cranes of 3 and 44 ons
capacity and an electric overhead trolley system on both sides for conveying
loads of approximately 1 ton to the compound at the shore end of the pier. The
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Customs Pier has a trammay and 1 -ton travelling crane and 1 1-ton fixed crane.
The port has 6 small tugs and 57 15-100-ton lighters. 1 The capacity of the port
is estimated at some 400 tons daily. 2 Mersin is connected by a 29 mile branch
with the Taurus line of the Turkish rail system.
Iskenderun (Alexandretta) has one of the best natural harbors in the
Levant, but like Mersin, has dockage facilities for lighters only. There are
travelling cranes of up to 10 tons capacity on the west wall of the enclosed
lighter harbor onto which the railway runs. The port has 46 lighters with
capacities of from 10 to 60 tons, some of them with motors, and 6 tugs. During
the last ten years the port has handled about 100.000 tons of cargo annually, a
daily average of 278 tons. 3 In view of the fact that during most of that period
the port was under French jurisdiction and trade from its natural hinterland was
diverted to ports further south, it is not believed that this figure represents
the maximum capacity of the port; a daily capacity of 300 tons may be safely
assumed. Iskenderun is connected with the main line at Toprakkale by a branch
railroad reported to be in a bad state of disrepair. 4
Mersin and Iskenderun are connected with Erzurum in eastern Turkey by a
standard-gauge line via Osmaniye, Fevaipasa, Malatya, Cetinkaya and Ersincan
(the last section, Cetinkaya-Erzurum was opened only in 1939), and by the more
roundabout route via the Taurus tunnels, Ulukisla, Kayseri, Sivas and Cetinkaya.
1Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, February, 1941, C. B. 1754A
(2/41). Confidential
2 Information from Dr. C. W. McEwan, office of Program Preparations,
Economic Defence Board.
3 Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, op. cit.
4 Ibid.
460
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From Ersurum there is a 75 cm. line to Sarikamis -- 144 miles long -- built by
the Russians during the First World War. Sarikamis is the terminus of the
Russian broad-gauge line which connects with the Soviet Trans-Caucasian railways at the frontier near Leninakan in the Armenian Soviet Republic. The amount
of freight which might be shipped over this route would be determined by the
capacity of the Ersurum-Sarikamis narrow-gauge line and the transfer facilities
available at either end of this bottle-neck. In the year 1938 the line carried
a total of only 94,000 tons in both directions, or an average of some 257 tons
daily. 1 A recent British report gives this narrow-gauge line a present daily
capacity of 120 tons (presumably in each direction) and adds that with "much
additional" rolling stock and motive power, 600 tons per day could be handled. 2
The figure for present capacity does not appear to take into consideration
Turkish military and civil needs. Any significant addition to the rolling stock
and motive power of this line appears very unlikely in view of the fact that
there are only two other lines in Turkey of this gauge, and both less than 25
miles in length. If the rail route from Erzurum to Trans-Caucasia is to be a
major supply route to Russia it will be necessary to extend the standard-gauge
to Sarikamis, an undertaking of some magnitude since it requires the building
of an entirely new line involving extensive heavy construction. 3 Pending com-
1statistik YY11IgT, 1938, 463
"Allied-Soviet Communications," Revised edition, 13 August, 1941, (from
British Army Staff, Intelligence Branch, British Embassy, Washington).
3 According to Mr. J. Aggiman, a contractor of Ankara, work on this
extension began last spring, but due to the fact that construction has to
be suspended during the severe winters of eastern Turkey, at least two
more seasons will be required to complete the new line.
461
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pletion of this extension, the capacity of the narrow-gauge might be supplemented
to some extent by the use of motor trucks from Erzurum to Sarikamis, and from
Ersurun to the Black Sea port of Trabzon. According to the British source
referred to above, the Erzurum-Sarikamis road has been surfaced and is reported
suitable for light and heavy motor trucks between May and October with a capacity
of 300 tons daily during those months if the necessary motor to insport is available. The road from Erzurum to Trabzon -- and for that matter, also the
Erzurun--Sarikamis road as far as Horasan -- is the western half of the socalled Iran Transit Road, a surfaced, all-weather road from Trabzon to the
Iranian frontier with bridges capable of supporting up to 7 tons and provisions
for removing snow blocks in the winter. The British map "Turkey Wheel Routes"
has a marginal notation to the effect that the Trabzon-Erzurum section of this
road can "stand up to 2,000 tons per day, one way, limited time". It does not
seem unreasonable to suppose that this road might maintain a regular traffic
of 500 tons daily from Erzurum to the port of Trabzon provided sufficient motor
transport vehicles were available. It seems questionable, however, whether that
volume of freight could be loaded on ship at Trabzon, in view of the limited
facilities of the port. All freight must be transferred from shore to ship in
lighters of 15-20 tons capacity and there are only two cranes on the lighter
jetty. 1
In view of the shortness of the water distance from Trabzon to Batum -- only 90
nautical miles -- it should be possible to secure sufficient shipping to
l'evaluation of British paper (August 13. 1941) "Allied-Soviet Communications"
by Lt. Col. W. W. Cox, G.S.C., Chief Southern European Section, for the Chief of
the Intelligence Branch, War Dept., Washington, November 25. 1941.
462
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freight 50C tcns. from the Turkish to the Runsian port every 24 hours. If suf-
ficient motor transport vehicles were available and if the facilities of the
port of Trabzon were used to the utmost, it should thus be possible to route
approximately 900 tons daily to Trans-Caucasia via Erzurum, as follows: 100
LODS by the narrow gauge from Erzurum to Sarikamis, 300 tons by truck from
Erzurum to Sarikamis, 5CC tons by truck to Trabzon and thence by ship to Batum.
In addition to the route via Erzurum, there is also the railway
to the Black Sea port of Samsun, 230 nautical miles from Batum. The capacity
of this route is given as 500 tons daily by the British report referred to
earlier. 1 However, if the supplies sent via Erzurum were concentrated on the
Osmaniye-Fevsipasa-Cetinkaya line, the western line via Ulukisla, Kayseri, and
Amasya should be able to carry upwards of a thousand tons a day, if the rolling stock and motive power from other lines were brought to it.2 Samsun is the
principal Black Sea port of Turkey, but as at Mersin and Iskenderun, all cargoes
must be lightered. There are B lighter jetties, two of which have 8-ton cranes
and one a 20-ton crane. Transfer from the railway to lighters must be made by
cart or truck since there are no tracks on the jetties. There are 67 lighters
and some tugs. During strong northerly blows, there may be periods of several
days during which cargoes cannot be trans-shipped. It is estimated that 1100-
1200 tons can be loaded daily in favorable weather if there is sufficient
labor. a Whether sufficient shipping is available on the Black Sea to dispatch
this volume of freight daily from Samsun to Batum or Poti) is a question in
view of the losses suffered by the Soviet mercantile marine in the Black Sea.
1"Allled-Soviet Communications."
2It should be borne in mind that all of the railways built by the Turkish
Republic were designed with military loads in mind. The rolling stock and
locomotives are generally modern.
Estimate provided by Lt. George Milee ONT
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If the several assumptions in the foregoing are accepted, it would
appear that some 1,900 tons daily might be forwarded through Turkey from Mersin
and Iskenderun to Trans-Caucasia. This is almost three times the 700 tons which
is given above as the total daily capacity of both ports. It is doubtful whether
the remaining 1,200 tons could be forwarded from ports further south. Izmir,
Turkey's second port, could easily handle the additional tonnage, but the enemy
forces in the Dodecanese and the Greek islands off the coast bar the use of this
port at the present.
However, the question of the capacities of the routes through
Turkey to Trans-Caucasia is of theoretic interest only, since Turkey is unlikely
to risk a German attack by permitting the transit of military supplies to Russia.
And in the event of a German attack on Turkey, it may be assumed that there will
be little rolling stock and motive power available for sending supplies to Russia.
If political conditions would permit, supplies unloaded at the two
Turkish ports might also be sent by rail, without trans-shipment, to Mosul and
Baghdad via Fevsipasa, Aleppo, and the Baghdad line. The special status of the
latter line is discussed below.
b. Va Syrian and Palestine Ports to Iraq
The port of Tripoli in Syria is also limited in capacity by its
lack of dockage facilities. Freight must be lightered ashore and the facilities are described as "primitive". 1 No information regarding the capacity of
the port is available.
1Himadeh, Sa'id B., ed., Economic Organization of Syria, Beirut, 1936,
P. 190. In 1930, busiest year for which data are available, 447 steamships
with a net tonnage of 837,818 visited the port.
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However, like the two Turkish ports, it is connected with the
interior by a standard-gauge railway which runs north to Aleppo where
connection is made with the old Baghdad line, either northwest to a junction with the Turkish State Railways and so to Erzurum, or northeast and
east to Mosul and Baghdad. It is reported that the Tripoli-Aleppo line
can carry only 250 tons daily. 1 Although goods landed at Tripoli cannot
now be forwarded to Russia via Turkey for the reasons given above, the
situation in regard to eastward shipments to Mosul and Baghdad over the
Baghdad line is somewhat different even though this line lies in Turkish
territory from Corbanbey to Nusaybin (Nisibin). 2
Because the line runs practically on the frontier, with several
stations actually on Syrian territory, and because both ends lie outside
Turkey, this section of the Baghdad line has in a certain degree an international status. Under various agreements between the Syrian mandate and
Turkey, transit freight -- including munitions -- may be shipped over the
line without customs inspection. If the Turkish authorities did not
choose to consider the new Free French-British regime in Syria as the
legatee of the mandate, there is a more practical reason for their permitting the passage of war supplies over the line. Excepting for the Erzurum
information from C. W. McEwan. This low figure is presumably due to
the shortage of rolling stock; even a poorly built and inadequately maintained standard-gauge-line should be able to carry several times this
amount. In 1934, according to Himadeh (op. cit., 185) the entire Damas,
Homs et Prolongements system, including the 102 km. line from Tripoli to
Homs and the 331 km. line from Rayak through Homs to Aleppo, carried
610,346 tons, a daily average for the system of 1,672 tons.
This portion of the Baghdad line runs just inside the Turkish border,
the Turko-Syrian boundary here having been drawn one meter south of the
track.
465
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line to Soviet Russia, this part of the Baghdad railway is the sole present
rail connection of Turkey with the non-Axis world. If the Turks refused
permission to ship munitions over their part of this railway, the British
could stop the movement of any goods into or out of Turkey over this line,
by reason of their control of both ends of the railroad. If the Germans
should complain, the Turks could point out that during the recent revolt
in Iraq the Turks permitted the Germans to ship munitions over the line
from Syria. Thus, if sufficient rolling stock can be made available, this
much-discussed railway can perhaps become a significant link in the for-
warding of supplies to Russia, not only from Tripoli, but, as will be
shown below, also from ports further south. 1
Beirut is a more modern port than any of the three discussed so far,
but its connections with the interior are not so good. The new harbor has
a well-developed sea-wall and new quays with a depth alongside of 26 ft.
In addition to two floating cranes -- capacities 3 and 30 tons -- there
are several on the new quays whose capacities and exact numbers are not
known. However, most cargo is still discharged into lighters, of which
there are several, ranging from 15 to 30 tons in capacity. Lighters use
the old harbor, where the docks are equipped with 2-ton cranes. Lightertugs are available if they were not destroyed or removed during the recent
1 The Baghdad line was opened by the Germans as far as Nusaybin during
the last war. For years the rail-head remained there. In 1935 the French
opened the short extension across the Syrian "pan-handle" to Tel Kotchek on
the Iraq frontier. The Iraq authorities then undertook the extension on
their territory, opening the line to Mosul in 1939, and to Baghdad in 1940.
- 19 1
2,000 tons.
The daily capacity of the port is reported to be approximately
2
fighting
466
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Beirut is connected with the interior by both a railway and a highway over the Lebanon Mountains. A 3 ft. 54 in. gauge railway connects the
port with Damascus via Rayak, where connection is made with the standard-
gauge line north to Homs and Aleppo. The capacity of the narrow-gauge line
is small, largely because of the excessive grades over the Lebanon: so
steep is the grade in one section that rack-and-pinion traction is necessary.3
The highway in normal times is an excellent surfaced road and carries most
of the traffic between Beirut, Rayak and Damascus. The highway and the
railway together could probably deliver to Rayak (for trans-shipment to the
standard-gauge line) and to Damascus (for `truck transport across the desert
to Baghdad) from 300 to 400 tons per day. 4
Haifa is by far the best port on the Levant coast. It is wellprotected by two new breakwaters. Vessels drawing up to 26 ft. can be
accommodated at the docks. The main wharf is 1312 ft. long and there is an
intermediate ward, 361 ft. long, a cargo jetty 640 ft. long, and an oil
dock 1000 ft. long. In addition, twenty vessels can discharge simultaneously
Data supplied by the American Export Lines to the Office of Program
Preparations, Economic Defense Board.
Data provided by Squadron Leader Murray Harris, British Embassy, and
C. W. McEwan.
3In 1929, a year of heavy traffic on this railway, the entire line,
Beirut-Damascus-Trans-Jordan frontier, maintained an average daily traffic
of only 9041 ton - km. (Himadeb, op. cit., 182). This amounts to an average
of only 37 tons over each of the 245 kilometers of the line. Most of the
traffic was presumably over the section south of Damascus.
4gstimates of Squadron Leader Harris and C. W. McEwan.
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S E C.R E T
into lighters inside the breakwaters. Both large tugs and lighter-tugs
are available. The port facilities include one 30-ton floating crane, one
25-ton railway crane, two five-ton gantry cranes, one 15-ton fixed derrick,
and one 3-ton mobile crane. The port is well equipped with suitable warehouses and customs sheds. In 1938 the port handled 793,000 tons of cargo,
or a daily average of well over 2,000 tons. 1
Haifa is connected with the interior by rail and railway. The railway is a branch of the 3 ft. 5 in. gauge Hejaz Railway which runs south
from Damascus. By it freight can be shipped via Damascus to Rayak where
transfer to standard-gauge is necessary for forwarding to Aleppo and Iraq.
No data are available as to the capacity of this line. If it is converted
to standard-gauge, as it is reported the British are contemplating, the
utility of the line will be greatly increased, since it will then be possible to route freight cars from the Halfa docks directly through to Mosul
and Baghdad.
At the present time, however, the new highway across the desert to
Baghdad is of more practical significance than the railway. A road, surfaced with tarmac, has been completed along the pipe-line from Haifs east
as far as Rutbah and from Ramadi on the Euphrates a similar road has been
extended west for approximately 50 miles. The intervening stretch of
desert track is regarded as a good all-weather road, but the road from
Data from report on Port Handling Facilities in Palestine, prepared
by Albert W. Scott, American Consul, Jerusalem under date of Aug. 26, 1939.
(State Dept. File No. 800.1561/38).
468
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Randi to Baghdad is subject to inundation during high water on the Euphrates.
If one bears in mind that all the pipe and the pumping-station equipment for
the pipe-line were hauled by heavy motor trucks across the desert, it will
be seen that the highway is capable of carrying a considerable traffic. Its
capacity depends on the number and tonnage of the motor trucks available.
Over most of the route, trailers can be used, thus reducing the number of
drivers required for the transport of a given tonnage. A thousand tons daily
over this road is probably a conservative estimate of its possibilities. 1
Shipping by truck has the added advantage that no trans-shipments are neces-
sary - once loaded at Halfa, trucks can go directly through to the Russian
rail-head at Tabriz or to the Iranian Caspian ports.
The port of Jaffa and Tel-Aviv does not compare with Haifa as a
landing place for heavy imports. The 458,000 tons which the twin-port
handled in 1938 consisted chiefly of citrus fruit exports. All ships must
anchor in the unprotected roadstead and lighter their incoming cargoes to
shore. The lighter wharves have cranes of only 7 and 3 tons capacity. 2
There are connections by standard-guage railway and by highway south
to Egypt and north to Haifa.
Since the standard-gauge railways of Palestine and Egypt can be con-
nected by car ferries across the Suez canal, Alexandria and Port Said on the
Mediterranean, and Suez at the head of the gulf of that name, might also be
used as ports of entry. However, if these ports were used, supplies forward-
ed from them by rail would require trans-shipment to the 3 ft. 5 in. gauge
railway at Halfa or to trucks. Furthermore, more freight can be unloaded at
the ports further north than the railway and highway to Iraq can handle.
Finally, it is likely that the full capacity of the Egyptian ports is
required to supply the British forces in Egypt.
1 According to Squadron Leader Harris, this road can handle 285 - 10-ton
trucks daily between Haifs and Baghdad.
2 "Handling Facilities in Palestine," State Department No. 800.1561/38.
469
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2. Routes from the Persian Gulf
The ports at the head of the Persian Gulf are preferable to those of
the Levant coast of the Mediterranean for shipping supplies to Russia for
two reasons:
1) They are closer to both the east and west coasts of the United
States by present routes; and
2) They are closer to Trans-Caucasia and the Caspian.
Two sets of routes lead from the head of the Gulf to the Caspian and
Trans-Caucasia: One set leads northwest into Iraq, where junction is made
with the routes coming from the Mediterranean; and from these merged routes
two routes lead northwest into Iran. The other set leads directly north
through Iran toward the Caspian and Trans-Caucasia.
Three ports at the head of the Persian Gulf may be used for transshipping supplies bound for the Russian war zone; two of these, (Basra and
Khorramshahr, ) are on the Shat al Arab (the mouth of the Tigris and the
Euphrates), and one, Bandar Shahpur, is at the head of the Khor Musa, a
shallow finger-like lagoon a few miles east of the mouth of the Shat al Arab.
a. Basra and Its Landward Connections
Basra, the principal port of Iraq, is located on the right bank of
the Shat al Arab, some 85 miles from its mouth. The bar at the mouth of the
Shat is kept dredged to allow the passage of ships drawing 21 ft. 6 in. at
low tide, 30 ft. at high tide. 1 The port has 12 wharves. Six of these can
accommodate large vessels, having depths of 25 ft. alongside, and are
equipped with a total of 15 electric gantry cranes of 3-8 tons capacity and
1The Persian Gulf Pilot, 1932, London, Hydrographic Dept., Admiralty 254.
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SECRET
- 23
several large warehouses. Five of the wharves are suitable for smaller
vessels only, since they have only 10 to 15 ft. of water alongside. The
port also has 4 temporary berths and special wharves for gasoline, kerosine,
and fuel oil. In addition to the gantry cranes, the port is equipped with
4 floating cranes of 8, 15, 30, and 80 tons capacity. 1 According to one
account, the port has a capacity of 3600 tons daily.2 A less reliable source
According to the first account, the
gives the daily capacity as 5000 tons.
3
port of Basra and the adjoining port of Umgaar are to be developed to handle
a total of 8,000 tons per day. For best working results the draft of vessels should not exceed 25 ft. and the length should be between 400 and 500 ft.
To move this considerable tonnage inland, there are available:
1) The meter-gauge railway, Basra-Baghdad, 353 miles
2) The Tigris River
3) The Basra-Baghdad Road, 340 miles
4) The Euphrates River
The present capacity of the railway is given as 1.000 tons daily. 5
The same source states that the existing single-track line is to be developed
1Ibid., 269; Also, Great Britain, Air Ministry, Military Report on Iraq,
Vol. I, 119-120. British Confidential.
2M.A., London, Report No. 44446, Sept. 10, 1941 (I.G. No. 4500; Subject:
Road, Rail and River Communications in Iran and Persia. Source: British
War Office). According to the Military Report on Iraq cited above, 1,500-
2,000 tons of military stores could be handled daily with a single shift.
3Ireland, P. W., "The Baghdad Railway: Its New Role in the Middle East,'
Royal Central Asian Journal, July, 1941, P. 333.
4Great Britain, Air Ministry, op. cit., 122.
5M. A., London, op. cit. The Military Report on Iraq. Vol. I, estimates maximum
the capacity of the line for military traffic at 5 trains of 600 M.E.I.C. tons Col-
gross load in each direction daily (p. 191). According to the meterlation Map of the Russo-Iranian Frontier. August, 1941, there are 53 1500
gauge locomotives in Iraq, 84 meter-gauge passenger coaches and over
freight cars, mostly of 10.4 tons capacity.
471
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to take 3.000 tons daily and that an additional line is to be laid to give
a maximum capacity of up to 10,000 tons daily. However, if this upper
figure is to be attained, additional rolling stock will have to be imported. 1
At the present time there are the following alternatives for forwarding
freight reaching Baghdad over the meter-gauge line from Basra:
1) The meter-gauge cars may be ferried across the Tigris to the
Baghdad-Khaniqin-Kirkuk meter-gauge line. At Khanigin goods may be trans-
ferred to trucks for forwarding over the Kermanshah Road into Iran and
beyond. At Kirkuk goods may be transferred to trucks for forwarding through
Iran over the Kirkuk-Erbil-Rowanduz-Tabriz road. The capacity of the Baghdad-
Khaniqin railway is reported to be 250 tons daily 2
1 According to Squadron Leader Harris, the additional line will be laid
with ties of sufficient length to provide for future conversion to standard
gauge. This suggests the possibility of laying immediately a third rail to
accommodate standard-gauge rolling stock without waiting for conversion.
If this were done, the existing meter-gauge rolling stock could still be
used, while the standard-gauge rolling stock of the Baghdad-Mosul-TripoliRayak line could be operated from Basra, thus saving a trans-shipment at
Baghdad for freight destined for Mosul and beyond. If Turkey subsequently
came into the war on the side of the Allies, Turkish rolling stock would
also be available for shipments from Basra. If in addition, the Rayak-Haifa
line were converted to standard gauge -- or a third rail laid on that line
and a new standard-gauge line built to connect Basra with the southern end
of the Trans-Iranian, through movement without the necessity of transshipment would be possible from the Western Desert of Egypt to the Caspian
and to the Trans-Caucasian frontier. It would also be possible to pool the
standard-gauge rolling-stock and motive power of the entire Middle East,
and to shift forces rapidly to any threatened point between the Western
Desert. of Egypt and the Caucasus - Caspian area. Mixed-gauge railway
operations of the sort envisaged above have long been common on the Denver
and Rio Grande Railway system in the United States.
M. A. London, op. cit.
472
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2) Goods may be transferred to trucks at Baghdad West and sent on by
road from there via Khaniqin into Iran. The Baghdad-Khaniqin road is reported
to have a daily capacity of 150 tons. 1 This figure undoubtedly could be
raised by using more trucks.
3) Goods may be transferred at Baghdad West to standard-gauge cars and
forwarded to Mosul, and there be transferred to trucks for further transport
over the Mosul-Erbil-Rowanduz-Tabriz road. The normal capacity of the Baghdad
West-Mosul railway is reported to be 600 tons daily. 2
At the present time the first and second alternatives are to be preferred to
the third, since they involve one less trans-shipment. However, this would
no longer be true if the third rail were laid on the Basra-Baghdad line, as
suggested above (Footnote 1, page
).
Freight unloaded at Basra may also be forwarded to Baghdad by barge
up the Tigris River. The tugs which operate on the river can tow two 160-ton
barges upstream, and a total daily upstream movement of 600 tons is reported
possible with present equipment. The time required varies from 4 days during
high water to 15 days during low water (June-October). According to a source
3
previously quoted the daily tonnage is to be increased to 1500 tons.
If a meter-gauge branch were built from Baquba on the Baghdad-Khaniqin
line southward to Kut-al Imara on the Tigris, the daily figure might be raised
to 2,500 tons by concentrating barges on the shorter water haul. 4 Goods
arriving at Baghdad by barge can be transferred to the meter-gauge for forwarding to Khaniqin where transfer to truck would be necessary, or to the
standard-gauge for forwarding to Mosul where transfer to truck would also be
necessary; or the barge cargoes can be loaded into trucks directly at Baghdad.
thus saving one trans-shipment.
1Ibid.
2Ibid. For military traffic the capacity is given as 900 tons daily, with
more rolling stock, this figure could be raised appreciably.
3Ibid.
4Ibid. It is understood that this line was refused first priority by the
authorities in London.
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473
S ECHET
The Basra-Baghdad road may be used to forward goods from the port
during the dry season (May-October), but the capacity of the road is reported to be only 150 tons daily. 1
The Euphrates may also be used to carry a limited amount of freight
with a transfer to truck near Baghdad. No data are available on the capac-
ity of this river route, but it is believed to be insignificant.
b. The Kermanshah and Rowandus Roads
All supplies in transit through Iraq to Iran and beyond, whether
they come through Basra or the ports on the Mediterranean, must,leave the
country over two roads which climb over the parallel ranges of the Zagros
to the Iranian Plateau. The capacity of these two roads determines the
total volume of Russia-bound supplies that can be routed through the ports
and over the routes thus far described.
The first of these is the (Baghdad)-Khaniqin-Kermanshah-Hamadan.
Kasvin road, which for convenience we shall call the Kermanshah Road, This
is a surfaced all-weather road which was the chief avenue of communication
between Iran and the outside world before the completion of the Trans-
Iranian Railway. In peace-time it carried 40-50 trucks and cars daily,
including tank trucks of as high as 10 tons capacity. Although it is rated
an all-weather road, snow in the 7,200 feet high Asadabad Pass between
Kermanshah and Hamadan may block the road for two or three days at a time
during
January and February. 2 From Khaniqin to Tehran the distance is 490
miles, from Baghdad, 596 miles. Driving time for a passenger car is given
as about 19 hours from Khanigin, and about 24 hours from Baghdad. Estimates
1.Ibid.
2General Staff, India, N.T. Routes in Iran, Vol. I, (Main Routes), Route I.
474
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as to the capacity of the road vary from 150 to 500 tons daily. 1
The lower
figure is presumably based on the capacity of the road if locally available
motor transport alone is used, the higher figure on its capacity if additional transport vehicles are brought in from the outside. In view of the
numerous heavy grades over the Zagros ranges, 500 tons is probably close to
the maximum that can be delivered over this road to Kazvin daily 2 More
detailed information regarding the road and its capacity should shortly be
available from the American mission at Basra.
At Kazvin there are the following alternatives:
1) The trucks may turn west over the Kazvin-Tabriz road (311 miles) an
and transfer their loads to the Russian-gauge railway at Tabriz for forwarding via Trans-Caucasia. This alternative is inadvisable since the deliveries
at Tabriz can be more easily maintained by truck transport from the rail-head
of the western branch of the Trans-Iranian (pending its completion to Tabriz),
and by truck over the Rowanduz road.
2) They may turn east over the Kazvin-Tehran road and north by the new
Karaj-Chalus road over the Elburz Mountains to the port of Noshahr, 172 miles.
This alternative is inadvisable also since this road over the mountains will
not accommodate more traffic than can reach it over the Dizful road, of which
it is the logical extension to the Caspian.
3) They can transfer their loads to the railway for forwarding to the
rail-head of the western branch of the Trans-Iranian. This would mean one
more transfer of goods than by any other route, and hence is to be avoided.
1 Lower figure from Squadron Leader Harris: higher figure from report of
Military Attache, London, above referred to.
The Russians have agreed to accept 11.000 tons a month at Kazvin, an
average of 367 tons a day.
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475
SECRET
4) They can transfer their loads to the railway for transport eastward to the port of Bandar Shah. This alternative is objectionable since
the limited capacity of this port can more easily be utilized by supplies
brought to it by rail from the Persian Gulf.
5) They can continue on down to the port of Pahlevi over the 151
mile road built down the gorge of the Safid Rud by Russian military engineers before World War I. Although the road has steep gradients (up to
1:15) and blind curves, it is metalled throughout and carries a heavy motor
truck traffic the year 'round. 1 This would seem to be the preferred route
for forwarding supplies from Kazvin, since Pahlevi is the nearest port.
The other road leading from Iraq up onto the Iranian Plateau leaves
the railway at Mosul or Kirkuk and proceeds via Erbil up through the Rowanduz
Gorge to Rayat on the Iranian frontier, thence through Miyanduab and Maragheh
to Tabriz, 377 miles. For convenience this road will be called the Rowanduz
Road, after the famous gorge up through which the road climbs. This road is
in constant use by motor transport and under normal conditions is considered
an all-weather road. However, on the Iraq section the road between Mosul and
Erbil may be impassable for heavy motor trucks for two or three days following
heavy rains, and on the Iranian side where the road crosses the Urmiah Plain
it becomes deep in mud after a heavy rain. Application of additional gravel
easily obtainable - should take care of this difficulty. Snow during January
and February on the higher elevations of the Iranian port of the road may
close it for a week at a time, but with sufficient labor the road could be
1For a detailed description of this road see General Staff, India,
M. T. Routes in Iran, Vol. I (Main Routes), Route No. VII.
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476
SECRET
open. 1 Bridges on the Iranian side are reported to be poor. The
present capacity of the road is apparently 300 tons a day. 2 With relatively
minor repairs, it should be possible to raise this figure to 500 tons,
always assuming that the necessary motor trucks are available. The Rowanduz
Road is to be preferred to the Kermanshain Road for forwarding supplies to
Tabriz, since it is considerably shorter, and for supplies coming from the
Mediterranean ports, it offers a more direct route to Trans-Caucasia than
does the Kermanshah Road.
If we may assume that the daily capacity of the Rowanduz and Kerman-
shah Roads can be readily raised to 500 tons each, we thus fix 1,000 tons
as the amount of supplies which may be forwarded daily from the Mediter-
ranean ports and Basra through Iraq to northern Iran. This figure is considerably below the capacity of the ports and the several routes leading from
them to the two roads which thus limit the amount of freight that can be
forwarded through Iraq to Iran.
C. The Khorramshahr-Dizful-Caspian Route
The Iranian port of Khorramshahr (formerly Mohammerah) is located
some 20 miles below Basra at the junction of the Karun River and the Shat-
al Arab just above the great Abadan oil refinery. There are five jetties on
the south side of the Karun River, capable of accommodating ocean-going
ships. 3 The available figures on the capacity of the port are conflicting.
Great Britain, Air Ministry, Military Report on Iraq. Vol. II (Routes),
Route Reports, Nos. 9, 32; General Staff, India, M. T. Routes in Iran,
Vol. I, Route X, Vol. II, Routes 43, 65, 66. Information in these reports
checks with that provided by E. M. Wright, Near East Section, O.C.I., who
knows northwestern Iran intimately.
This is the figure given in the report of the Military Attache, London,
referred to earlier, by Squadron Leader Harris, and by Lt. Col. Tompkins.
Military Handbook on Iran, M.I.2. (a), November, 1940 (Stamp: Joint
Staff Mission, Army "I" Branch, Nov. 6, 1941). Secret.
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477
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According to Squadron Leader Harris, the port handled a million tons of
cargo last year, an average of 2,740 tons daily. On the other hand, the
report of the Military Attache, London, referred to earlier in this report,
gives the daily capacity for both Khorramshahr and Abadan together as only
600 tons. In any case, the port can probably handle more cargo than can
be taken away from it to the interior.
The principal problem on this route is getting supplies to the
beginning of the all-weather road at Dizful, 173 miles north of Khorramshahru
During the dry season it is possible for heavy trucks to drive almost any-
where over the flat clay plain of Arabistan. But half an hour's heavy rain
will render any road in the plain impassable to motor traffic for from four
to six hours and a heavy and continuous downpour of 12 hours will put a road
out of action for at least three days. 1 Thus during the rainy season (December to April) it is quite impossible to move supplies out of (horranshahr
by truck to Disful. During this season, the only way for supplies to reach
the end of the all-weather road at Dizful is by shallow-draft steamer or
barge up the Karun river to Ahwaz and thence by the railway to Disful, or
from Ahwaz to Disful up the Ab i Diz, a tributary of the Karun. In view of
the fact that the capacity of the railway is less than that of its terminal
port, Bandar Shahpur, it is unlikely that the railway can be used for forwarding supplies from Ahwaz to Disful. During high water (December to May
or June), however, vessels drawing 5 ft. can ascend the Karun and Ab 1 Diz
to Disful. 2 Thus, by using motor transport during the dry season the river
1. T. Routes in Iran Vol. I, Route IV, Section IV-a.
2persian Gulf Pilot 1932. 276-278, and Squadron Leader Harris.
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478
SECRET
steamers and barges on the Karun and Ab 1 Dis during the rainy season,
supplies landed at Khorranshahr can be delivered to Disful.
From Dizful north the road is metalled and is used by heavy motor
trucks at
all seasons. 1 At Malayir the road forks, one branch leading
northwest to a junction with the Kermanshah Road at Hanadan, while the other
other turns east to Iraq (Sultanabad), thence northeasterly to Qua and
Tehran. There is thus a choice of routes for further transport. However,
better utilization of roads would be secured by sending all Disful trucks
over the eastern road, leaving the Kermanshah Road free for traffic from
Khaniqin and Baghdad. At Tehran trucks coming from Disful could transfer
their loads to the railway. But as at Kazvin, it would be preferable to
continue on to the nearest Caspian port, Noshahr, 106 miles from Tehran by
the new road over the Elburz Mountains to Chalus. 2 The length of the entire
route is 912 miles. With little improvement it could carry up to 300 tons
a day.
1N. T. Routes in Iran, Vol. I, Route IV: and information from M. Leon
Brasseur of Tehran to Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr., OCI. According to
M. Brasseur, 10-ton tank trucks operate regularly over this road.
2This road is the most remarkable in Iran, if not in the entire Near
East. It was built by the recent Shah in order to provide quick access
from Tehran to his large estates along the Caspian, north of the capital.
The road is well built, with steel and masonry bridges, and stone embankments and coping. The outstanding engineering feature is a tunnel, 2*
miles long, under the summit ridge. However, in spite of the tunnel,
the grades are so steep that trucks have avoided the road, and it has
been used chiefly by passenger cars during the summer. It could be kept
open in the winter, however. (Information from E. M. Wright, Near East
Section, OCI).
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d. Bandar Shahpur and the Trans-Iranian Railway
In Part V of the "Report on Supply Routes to the Soviet Union" sub-
mitted by this section on October 16, 1941, a brief description of the
Trans-Iranian railway was given, together with various estimates of the
capacity of the railway and its two terminal ports. Since that time
additional information has become available which throws a somewhat more
favorable light on the railway as a supply route to the Russo-German war
zone. However, since a detailed report on the railway and the two ports
by competent American engineers should shortly be available, no attempt
will be made here to attempt a definitive statement.
In the memorandum above referred to, the only estimate on the
capacity of this route was based on the capacity of the northern port,
Bandar Shah, it being assumed at that time that all supplies entering
Bandar Shahpur and moving over the railway to the Russo-German war zone
would have to go through this Caspian port. However, it now appears that
supplies moving over the railway may also reach the war zone over other
routes.
In the earlier report it was stated that completion of the western
branch of the railway to Tabriz in the near future was unlikely, in view
of the difficult nature of the terrain between Zenjan and Tabriz. When
this statement was made it was assumed that the line. would follow a more
or less direct route from Zenjan to Tabriz, necessitating a long tunnel
under the Shibli Pass between Mianeh and Tabriz. However, it has since
been learned that the line will follow a less difficult although longer,
route westward from Mianeh to Lake Urmiah and thence north to Tabriz.
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It has recently been stated by an apparently well-informed witness that
about one-fifth of the route from Zenjan toward Tabriz has been graded
and that contracts for the completion of grading on the entire line within
two years were let before the British-Russian occupation. 1 A copy of a
Tehran newspaper which has come to hand since the preparation of the
earlier report, states that a 600-meter-long tunnel near Mianeh station,
approximately 80 miles northwest of Zenjan, was opened on December 30,
1940, and that completion of two other tunnels, 1,550 meters and 1,700
meters in length respectively, is being pushed. 2 It would thus appear
that there is a possibility that the western branch of the Trans-Iranian
may be completed to a junction with the Russian broad-gauge line at
Tabriz in the relatively near future. Connection of the two lines would
make possible the shipment of supplies` to the Russo-German war zone with
but one transfer -- that from standard-gauge cars to Russian-gauge cars
at Tabris. Every other southern route requires at least two transfers.
While a German advance to the Caucasus, by cutting the Russian railway
lines north of that range, would make it impossible to send supplies to
the main Russian armies by this route, the necessity of supplying
from the south the forces holding the Caucasus against the Germans would
increase rather than decrease the importance of a through rail connection
from the Persian Gulf to the Caucasus. The completion of the western
Statement by M. Leon Brasseur of Tehran to Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr.,
Near East Section, OCI, October 30, 1941. M. Brasseur did not know
whether any grading had been done from Tabriz southward. M. Brasseur was
of the opinion that European contractors could do the job in considerably
less time than two years.
2 Journal de Teheran, January 5. 1941.
481
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branch of the Trans-Iranian to Tabriz would thus seen to be worthy of a
high priority rating. 1
Until the closing of the gap, supplies routed over the western
branch of the Trans-Iranian will have to be transferred to trucks at the
rail-head for forwarding to the end of the Russian-gauge line at Tabris.
Fortunately, the road from Zenjan (to which point the railway now operates)
to Tabriz, a distance of 201 miles, is one of the best in Iran. It is
metalled over most of its distance and carries heavy motor transport in
all seasons. The only difficult section is the Shibili Pass (alt. circa.
8,500 ft.). However, the steeper and longer grade is on the western side
of the pass, thus favoring traffic toward Tabriz. Normal traffic has
frequently been held up for 10 days at a time by snow on the pass, but
special measures would keep the pass open without great difficulty. 2 Most
of the bridges are of wooden construction and it is reported that several
have broken down under Russian military loads. 3 In addition to strengthen-
ing the existing bridges or building new ones, it will be necessary to
1A telegram received while this report was in process of final typing
gives late information on the status of the western branch of the Trans-
Iranian. According to this information, the rails are actually laid as
far as Saremsaghlou beyond Zenjan and 115 miles from Kazvin, the section
of 174 miles from Saremsaghlou to Maragheh is partially constructed, while
preparatory work only has been done on the final section of 82 miles from
Maragheh to Tabris. In general, structures are further advanced than grading. (Telegram from Dreyfus, Tebran, December 11, 1941, No. 254.)
2For a detailed description of the road see N. T. Routes in Iran, Vol.
I (Main Routes), Route VIII -- Section B.
SNote by Lt. Col. Tompkins in Evaluation of British Paper (August 13.
1941), "Allied-Soviet Communications," submitted by Lt. Col. L. J. Compton,
Chief, British Empire Section, Military intelligence Division G-2. Accord-
ing to the Journal de Teheran of May 31, 1941, 91 new bridges were authorized
for this road last May.
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482
1
widen the road in certain places.
The tonnage of supplies which can be delivered at Tabriz depends
on the capacity of the port of Bandar Shahpur, the capacity of the Trans.
Iranian, and, pending the completion of the railway to Tabriz, on the
capacity of the road from the rail-head to Tabriz. The capacity of the
2
port of Bandar Shahpur is reported to be 1.000 tons daily. The capacity
of the railway for north-bound freight is 400 tons daily at present and
could be raised to 800-1,000 tons in from nine months to a year according
However, the London source above cited states that
to one authority.
3
"by development of the Port of Bandar Shahpur and considerable addition
of locomotives and rolling stock, the capacity of the Trans-Iranian railway could be increased to 2,000 tons per day. . 4
On the other hand, the Russian agreement to accept delivery of 1,000 tons
daily at Tabriz "via Zenjan" suggests that in their opinion the railway
According to the British "Allied-Soviet Communications, . the width
of the road does not exceed 18 ft. anywhere and in several sections is only
15 ft. wide.
1
2 Telegram from Dreyfus, Tehran, Oct. 11, 1941, No 183. S. According
to Lt. Col. Tompkins, the port should handle 2,500 tons daily by the end
of March, 1942.
3wiiliam B. Poland, office of Program Preparations, Economic Defense
Board. The report of the Military Attache, London, above referred to,
also gives 400 tons as the present daily capacity of the railway.
4 M.A., London, op. cit. The MID report "Future aid to Russia" (18
October 1941, OCI Accession No. 2115) indicates that by the spring of
1941 the railway may have a capacity of 1,900 tons. However, as indicated
earlier, final estimates of the capacity of the Trans-Iranian railway must
await the report of the American mission at Basra.
483
- 36 -
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cannot in the immediate future deliver more than that amount to Zenjan. 1
If we may assume that the railway can shortly carry 1,000 tons daily
to the rail-head on the western branch, there is the problem of moving that
amount from the rail-head to Tabriz. It is estimated that to move that
tonnage the 200 miles from Zenjan to Tabriz would require 600 5-ton trucks.
However, as the rail-head advances and the length of road Haulage is reduced,
the number of trucks required will be less.
The completion of the eastern branch, now operating as far as Shahrud,
to Meshed and its extension to a connection with the Soviet Central Asian
railways at Sarakhs, while presenting fewer physical obstacles, would not
appear to have the same urgency as completion of the western branch, es-
pecially in view of the fact that the entire capacity of the main line
is needed to deliver the tonnage expected at Tabriz and at Bandar Shah. 2
1Apparently the Russians estimate the northbound capacity of the main line
of the Trans-Iranian as at least 1,250 tons daily at present, since in addition to the 1,000 tons to be delivered over the western branch, they expect
250 tons to be delivered at Bandar Shah. And by May they expect 700 tons
daily to reach that terminus, or a total of 1,700 tons daily over the main
line. These figures obviously do not include other traffic over the railway.
According to the British report "Allied-Soviet Communications" of August 13,
1941, "with much additional rolling stock and motive power this (the capacity
of the railway) could be increased to 800 tons to Bandar Shah (or vicinity)
and 960 tons to Zenjan." The MID report referred to in the preceeding footnote estimates that 900 tons daily can be delivered at Tabriz over the TransIranian and the connecting highway by next spring.
2 However, if the western branch were completed to Tabriz and the
eastern branch extended to Sarakhs there would be a through rail connection, albeit with a change of gauge, between Trans-Caucasia and Soviet
Central Asia (and thus with the rest of unoccupied Russia) through northern
Iran. Such a connection presumably would be an advantage in the event
that it becomes necessary to establish a new front along the Caucasus
cut off from the main Russian front, since it would permit the rapid
reinforcing and supply of the Russian forces holding the Caucasus front
from Central Asia and the Ural-West Siberian region over a protected rail
route.
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484
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3. The Iranian Castian Ports
Pahlevi, located at the mouth of the Murdab river, is the oldest
and best of the Iranian Caspian ports, and for many years has been the
principal Caspian entrance to Iran. An undated plan of the port shows
five quaya on the east bank of the estuary, one of 225 ft. frontage, one
of 190 ft., one of 276 ft., one of 375 ft., and one of 150 ft. 1 This
would indicate that five vessels of varying sizes can be docked simultaneously. 2 According to Lt. Col. F. D. Tompkins who visited Pahlevi
last summer, the port can be entered by vessels drawing up to 12 ft. 6 in.
and he was assured by the Belgian engineer in charge of the port that the
two dredges at the port (a large suction dredge and a smaller chain bucket
dredge) could maintain a depth of 15 ft. without difficulty. Col. Tompkins
also reports that the port equipment includes 3 floating cranes -- one of
30-ton capacity, one of 8-ton capacity and one of 4à ton capacity -- and
two portable type cranes of 41 ton capacity each. The capacity of the port
1plan provided by ONI (office of Origin: Op-16-F-5). Frontage figures
approximate. The Military Handbook on Iran referred to above mentions a
quay 120 yards long which is being extended to 300 yards.
2According to the M.E.I.C. Collation Map of the Russo-Iranian Frontier,
August, 1941. two or three vessels of 1,000 tons burden can be handled at
one time. E. M. Wright, Near East Section, OCI, states that four vessels
can be taken care of at once. M. Leon Brasseur states that the port can
accomodate the largest ships on the Caspian.
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485
SECRET
estimated at 600 tons daily. 1 This is 100 tons more than the 500 tons
is
which it is assumed could be delivered to the port daily over the Kerman
shah Road. If the Kazvin-Pahlevi road has the capacity to carry 100 tons
in addition, the full capacity of the port might be utilized by transferring the extra 100 tons from the railway at Kazvin.
The new port of Noshahr, almost due north of Tehran, is one of the
developments of the Shah, who recently abdicated. It is an unprotected
port with a single pier which can accommodate two vessels drawing up to
12 ft. It has four cranes of 7 ton capacity, two of 10 tons, one of 12
2
tons, one of 15 tons and also a floating crane of 15 ton capacity.
The port is reported to be able to handle upwards of 600 tons daily. 3
A narrow-gauge railway that extends from the pier to a quarry in the hills
would facilitate extension of the pier. Although the port is not protected, severe storms are infrequent. 4 If the capacity of the port
M.E.I.C. Collation Map. The report of the Military Attache, London,
above referred to, gives 500 tons as the daily capacity of the port. Lt.
1
Col. Tompkins gives the capacity of the port as 1,500 tons daily (Evaluation of British paper "Allied-Soviet Communications, by Lt. Col. Compton),
but this figure seems too high for the facilities at present available.
2 Telegram from Dreyfus, Tehran, September 10, 1941, No. 114. S.
3 Ibid. The report of the Military Attache, London, gives the same
figure for capacity. That Noshahr, although able to berth only two
vessels at a time, can handle approximately the same tonnage at Pahlevi
is presumably due to the large number of cranes at Noshahr.
Information from E. M. Wright.
4
486
32
SECRET
is reported correctly, it has double the capacity of the road from Tehran.
If the full capacity of the port is to he utilized, it will be necessary
to bring 300 tons a day over the excellent coastal highway from Shahi,
105 miles away, where the railwa; to Bandar Sha comes down out of the
mountains.
The remaining Caspian ports have smaller capacities. Babul Sar
(Meshed-1-Sar), with a daily capacity of 300 tons, is about 22 miles from
Shahi. It is also the point where the road-over the Elburz from Firuzkuh
joins the coastal highway. Bandar-1-Gaz is a small port on the Asterabad
lagoon about 15 miles from .Bandar Shah. A narrow-gauge railway connects
the port with the nearby station on the Trans-Iranian Railway. It has a
small pier and a daily capacity of 200 tons. 1
Bandar Shah, near the entrance to the Asterabad lagoon and
farthest east of the Iranian ports on the Caspian, is the Caspian
terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway. However, it had proved to be a
great disappointment. For several years the level of the Caspian has been
dropping, with the result that the depth of water in the channel is now
only 4 & ft. Hence, all goods have to be handled by lighter and the capa-
city of the port is only 150-250 tons daily 2 The Russians state that a
1port capacity figures for Babul Sar and Bandar-i-Gaz from report of
Military Attache, London, above referred to. According to the telegram
from Dreyfus above referred to (No. 144, Sept. 10, 1941), freight cannot
be handled in any large quantities at Babul Sar and Bandar-1-Gaz.
2The higher figure is the tonnage which the Russians have agreed to
to accept here. According to the M.E.I.C. Collation Map of the RussoIranian Frontier, August, 1941, the capacity is 150-200 tons daily. This
figure is also given in the report of the Military Attache, London, above
referred to. Lt. Col. Tompkins states that the present capacity of Bandar
Shah is 150 tons daily.
487
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40
2 ft. channel can be dredged SC that the capacity of the port can be
increased to 700 tons daily by nex: May. Data are not available to
prove or disprove this claim. i
Summing up. the total daily capacity of all five of Iran's
Caspian ports appears to be approximately 1,900 tons at present -2,400 tons by next May if a 12 ft. channel can be dredged at Bandar
Shah by that time. To utilize this capacity, approximately 900 tons
daily would come over the Kermanshah and Dizful roads without recourse
to the Trans-Iranian, perhaps 250 more would be delivered direct by
the Trans-Iranian, and the remainder brought to Kazvin and Shahi by
rail and transferred to truck for delivery at Pahlevi, Noshahr, Babul
Sar, and Bandar-i-Gaz.
The capacities of the several ports and the means by which they
might be supplied are shown in the following table:
Tonnage of freight to
Daily Capacity
Port
arrive by different routes
pahlevi
600 tons
500 tons over Kermanshah
Road and 100 by rail to
Kazvin and thence by truck
to port.
Noshahr
600 tons
300 tons over Dizful Road
and 300 tons by rail to
Shahi and thence by truck
to port:
Babul-Sar
300 tons
By rail to Shahi and truck
Bandar-i-Gaz
200 tons
By rail to nearest point on
to port.
railway thence by narrow-
gauge railway to port.
Bandar Shah
150-250 tons
rising to 700
By rail all the way to the
port.
tons in'May
1A German-built dredge was delivered to the port just before the German
attack on Russia.
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SECRE 488
4. Soviet
Transport Northward From Iranian Castian Ports
and From Tabriz
All supplies destined for the Russian front which are delivered
at Iran's Caspian ports or at Tabriz must be transported across the
Caspian to Soviet ports and then forwarded by rail or river, or else
be transported by rail through the Caucasian isthmus to the war zone.
Obviously if transport is blocked for any reason on the Soviet side, the
entire Western group of southern supply routes are useless for sending
supplies to the main Russian armies.
a. Transport on the Caspian; the Soviet Caspian Ports
and Their Landward Connections
The most obvious physical fact about the Caspian is that it is
land-locked. For the problem under consideration this means that the
only shipping available for forwarding Soviet supplies across this body
of water is that which is already on it or such Volga shipping as can be
used on it. According to one source, the Caspian merchant fleet consists of 106 vessels totaling 173,257 tons, of these vessels about one-
half are tankers. 1 This office has seen no information from the Soviet
authorities as to the maximum amount which their shipping could load
monthly at the Iranian Caspian ports.
A second physical fact about the Caspian that has a direct effect
on the supply problem has already been touched on -- the lowering of its
level during recent years. Constant dredging is necessary in most Caspian
1.N.E.I.C. Collation Map of the Russo-Iranian Frontier, August, 1941.
According to M. Leon Brasseur, there are not over 100 vessels on the
Caspian of "useful" size. According to this source, these vessels run
from 600 to 2,000 tons, with the smaller sizes predominating.
489
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ports to keep them open to shipping. A third fact is that the northern
part of the sea is frozen for an average of three months (January-March)
every year, the thickness of the ice varying from 50 to 70 cm. 1 This'is
due to the large amount of fresh water poured into the shallow northern
end of the sea by the Volga. The thickness of the ice would not appear
to be too great for icebreakers to overcome; but no data regarding the
use of these vessels on the Caspian are available.
The cheapest and easiest route by which large volumes of goods
can be moved into the interior of Russia from the Caspian is the Volga
river. But the Volga is closed by ice even longer than the northern end
of the Caspian. At Astrakhan, the river is frozen for an average of 100
days, from December 6 to March 24: at Stalingrad for 150 days, from
November 21 to April 20: at Saratov for 166 days, from November 13 to
April 28: at Kuibyshev for 171 days, from November 9 to April 29: and at
Gorky for 172 days, from November 6 to April 27. 2 Not only does the
freezing of the Volga prevent its use for over five months in the year,
but it also prevents the use of the railway which connects Astrakhan with
the main rail system of the country for forwarding goods from the Caspian
during most of that time. The railway can take the place of the river
for only about a month in the spring when the port of Astrakhan is
accessible while the river above is still ice-bound.
For this reason the port of Makhach Kala, 235 miles north of Baku
on the western shore of the Caspian, takes the place of Astrakhan during
1Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedisa, Kaspiiskoe More
20p. cit., Volga
490
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the period when the Volga is frozen. Here navigation is seldon closed by
ice for more than a week or two in January. The harbor, which has a depth
of 12 to 14 ft., is enclosed by a wooden pier and a curved stone mole about
500 yards long with railway connection from each to the railway station.
In addition to the pier and mole, there are several quays and berths with
sufficient space to allow about 10 steamers to load or unload at once, 1
Makhach Kala is on the main railway line from Baku to Rostov which is now
double tracked from here north. The distance to Rostov is 586 miles.
Freight may also be routed over this line to Stalingrad, leaving the main
line at Tikhoretakaya, thus avoiding Rostov. When the Kizlyar-Astrakhan
line, parallel with the shore of the Caspian, is completed, a still more
easterly connection with the main railway net will be available.
Baku, one of the major Soviet ports, although primarily an oilshipping port, is also equipped to handle dry cargoes. A new pier for
handling such cargoes was recently completed. It is equipped with several
2-ton cranes and can accomodate deep draft steamers alongside. 2 The railway connections northward which serve Makhach Kala are also available for
cargoes unloaded at Baku.
The only other Russian Caspian ports which have rail connections with
the rest of Russia are the small port of Guriev east of Astrakhan and the
desert port of Krasnovodsk on the east coast of the Caspian. Guriev is
connected with the main rail net by the recently completed line to Kandagach
on the Chakalov -- Tashkent railway, but, like Astrakhan, it is closed by
1Admiralty C. B. 1753 c (11/40)
2Ibid.
491
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ice during the winter. No information on its port facilities is available.
Krasnovodsk is the best harbor on the east coast of the Caspian and
is accessible to vessels drawing up to 14 ft. There are 9 wharves, 5 of
which can accommodate large steamers. The longest is a stone pier 500 ft.
long and 42-56 ft. wide with a double set of railway tracks along its whole
length. 1 Although the wharves are not equipped with cranes, the port is
reported able to handle 2,000 tons daily. 2 Any supplies landed here would
have an excessive rail haul before reaching the central front -- 2,647
miles to the Volga and 3,221 miles to Moscow.
b. Transport from Tabria
Tabriz is the terminus of the Russian-gauge railway which was built
into Iran from Djulfa on the Russian side of the Araxes river just before
the First World War. Until recently only two trains each way per week were
operated, and little attention was paid to maintenance. However, with new
ties and ballast, the line should have a capacity of 1,800 tons daily, if
is
the Russians can provide sufficient rolling stock. 3 From Djulfa there
now a choice of two rail routes, thanks to the completion of the Djulfa -Baku line which has been spasmodically under construction since before the
last war. This new line follows down the Araxes river and provides a direct
IIbid.
2M.E.I.C. Collation Nap
SN.A. Report, London, op. cit.
492
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route to Baku, from which the lines discussed previously can be used.
Baku can also be reached by the older, more round about line via Tiflis
(Djulfa-Tiflis-Baku, 700 miles). The completion of the Black Sea railway, also many years under construction, provides an alternative and
somewhat shorter route to North Caucasia via Tiflis, Sukhum, Tuapse and
Armavir.
5. Effect of Further German Advance on the Western Group
of Southern Routes
The reported German Capture of Rostov throws into sharp relief
the fundamental disadvantage of the Western Group of routes from the
south: namely, the vulnerability of their extensions of Soviet territory.
As these are cut by a continued German advance to the east, the value of
the Western Group of southern supply routes for forwarding supplies to
the Russo-German war zone becomes progressively less. The capture of
Rostov means that the principal rail connection between Caucasia and the
rest of Russia is no longer available. While it may still be possible to
route supplies to the central front over the Tikhoretskaya-Stalingrad line,
the capacity of this line -- a single-track railway -- is probably less
than half that of the double-track line through Rostov. Furthermore,
since this line is less than 100 miles east of Rostov, it may be assumed
that it has already been severely damaged by bombing and its capacity much
reduced. The Kizlyar-Astrakhan railway, which may have been completed, is
less vulnerable to air attack -- for the present -- since it is well over
300 miles east of Rostov: however even this distance does not make an
objective immune from crippling air bombing. Even Astrakhan and its railway
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493
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connection to the north is now well within bombing range.
If the Germans arrive at Astrakhan, it will be very difficult to
move supplies by way of Caucasia and the Caspian to Central Russia. Such
a move by the Germans would not only cut the Tikhoretskaya-Stalingrad and
Kizlyar-Astrakhan lines, connecting Caucasia with the Volga; the occupation
of the mouth of the Volga would stop any movement of supplies to Astrakhan
from the Iranian Caspian ports. Any supplies forwarded by these ports
would then have to go either to Guriev at the northeastern corner of the
Caspian or to Krasnovodsk on its eastern shore. Guriev will be closed by
ice for at least three months, and its port facilities are probably limited
in any case. Furthermore, ships en route to Guriev would be within bombing
range from Astrakhan for the last part of their journey. While Krasnovodsk
is safer from air attack, its capacity and the capacity of the Trans-Caspian
railway east to Tashkent and thence northwest to the Urals would probably
be severely taxed by the necessity to send over this route all Baku oil
destined for the main Russian armies and the remaining Soviet industry. In
any case, supplies from the south could more easily reach the Trans-Caspian
railway by way of Afghanistan than by way of Krasnovodsk.
In the measure in which the routes making up the Western Group become of decreasing value for forwarding supplies to the Russo-German war
zone, they become of increasing importance for supplying the Russian forces
in the Caucasus (which will be cut off from their sources of supply in
Russia if the German advance continues) and for supplying the British
forces in northwest Iran. In the event that the Germans advance to the
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494
S E CRE
Caucasus and an active front develops there, the full capacity of all
the Western Group of supply routes will be needed to supply the Russian
and British forces holding that front. It seems more than likely that
even at the present time the threat of a German advance to the southeast
is such as to require almost the full capacity of these routes for the
supply of the Allied forces being assembled in Trans-Caucasia and ad-
jacent northwest Iran to meet this advance. It thus appears that even
now the Western Group of supply routes from the south is of very limited
value for forwarding supplies to the Russo-German war zone, and that
these routes are likely to be of even less value for this purpose in the
future. 1
The preceding section was typed in final form before the German
retreat from Rostov. At this moment the forces of General von Kleist
appear unable to mount a new offensive toward Rostov and the mouth of
the Volga. Thus, for the time being all the Soviet connections northward
from the Caucasus and Astrakhan are available for the transport of
supplies coming over the Western group of southern supply routes. However
until the final defeat of the German armies in the Russo-German war zone,
there is always the possibility of a renewed German thrust to the southwest
with the aim of cutting the supply routes from the south and at the same
time securing the oil resources of north Caucasia. The reported withdrawal
of German forces from the Moscow front may indicate a regrouping of German
forces as a prelude to such a move.
495
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E. THE EASTERN GROUP OF SOUTHERN SUPPLY ROUTES
In view of the limited capacity of the Western Group of Southern
Supply routes for forwarding supplies to Russia, and the possibility
that whatever capacity they have may be rendered ineffective or diverted
to other uses by a German advance to the lower Volga and the Caucasus,
serious consideration may well be given to the possibility of forwarding
American supplies to Russia via Indian ports and railways and motor-
truck transport across Afghanistan and eastern Iran to the Soviet railheads in Central Asia.
There are three practicable roads for motor-truck traffic from
India to Soviet Central Asia--one across eastern Iran, and two across
Afghanistan:
1. The East Iranian Road, which extends from Zahidan, the Iranian
terminus of the British Baluchistano railway, almost due north for 583
miles to Meshed from which there are connections to Ashkhabad on the
Russian Trans-Caspian railway, 160 miles, or to Sarakhs, terminus of the
branch line reported to have been built south from Tedzhen on the TransCaspian, 120 miles;
2. The West Afghan Road, 506 miles long, from Chaman on the
Afghan-Indian frontier (terminus of a branch line from the Baluchistan
railway), west through Kandahar and Girishk to Farah, thence north through
Herat to Kushka on the Afghan-Soviet frontier. terminus of a branch line
from Merv on the Trans-Caspian;
3. The North Afghan Road, 563 miles long, from Landi Khotal (end
of the British military railway through the Khyber Pass) or from Peshawar,
496
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west to Kabul, thence north and east through Mazar-1-Sharif to the
Amu Darya (Oxus) opposite Termez on the Kagan (Bukhara) Stalinabad
branch of the Trans-Caspian railway.
As compared with the Western group of Southern routes, these
three eastern roads have the following advantages:
1. Their Soviet railway connections are in no present danger
of being cut off by a German advance;
2. The two Afghan roads, at least, are now carrying only light
local traffic; hence most of their capacity is available for transit
traffic;
3. They provide direct connection between Russia and India,
itself an important source of supplies.
The major disadvantage is the very considerable length of the
land routes involved. For example, from Karachi it is 628 miles to
Chaman by rail, then 506 miles by road to Kushka, and finally 2,115
miles by rail from Kushka to the Volga at Kuibyshev a total land
1
distance of approximately 3,250 miles.
1. The Port of Karachi
Karachi is the nearest port for all three routes. It is a
modern, large-capacity port that has handled up to 2,869,000 tons
a year. Twenty-two ships drawing up to 26 ft. can be accommodated at
the docks simultaneously.
Calcutta and Bombay might also be used, but this would involve
a much longer rail haul: from Calcutta to Landi Khotal the distance
1This is via the Tashkent-- Chkalov (Orenburg) railway; if goods
were routed by the Turksib and Trans-Siberian railways, the distance
would be over 4000 miles.
497
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is 1,528 miles, as compared with 1082 miles from Karachi. However,
for urgent cargoes shipped from the west coast of the United States,
there would be a saving in time if they were routed via Calcutia.
2. The Indian Railway Connections
Supplies landed at Karachi can be forwarded toward all three
Indian rail-heads over the 5 ft. 6 in. gauge Northwestern Railway
as far as Sukkur. The line to Baluchistan turns west here; it is
a well-built military line, double-tracked in the Bolan Pass, to
Quetta and Chaman. The long branch to Zahidan, which leaves the
Quetta line just south of Quetta, is more lightly built. It was extended into Iran during the last war to supply British forces operating
in that country. In view of the conflicting reports on the status of
the line west of Nok Kundi, the following passage from a letter by an
American who travelled from Meahed over this route as recently as last
spring is worth quoting: "So far as could be observed from the road,
all rails are in on the Nok Kundi Zahidan railroad; they say that the
yard trackage in Zahidan was removed and used in buildings, but I was
not near that spot. of course the grade is washed out from under the
track where it crosses the washes: while there is a lot of work to be
done, it ought not to take much time. .1 Another American who travelled
this way in August 1940 has this to say as to the status of this railway:
"Whenever we crossed the railroad or could see it between Zahidan and
Mir Jawah (frontier station), the rails were still in position (we crossed
Letter dated November 11, 1941 from J. D. Payne, on leave from the
American Mission, Zeheran, to E. M. Wright, Near Eastern Section, OCI.
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it several times), but the bed has suffered from erosion and a good
deal of work would be necessary to straighten out the line and resur-
face it. of course, it is possible that some rails are gone, but
certainly not where the line was visible from the road in 1940--and that
is a large part of the whole distance. .1 The British authorities in
India would doubtless provide information as to the present status of
the line and as to their plans for its future. 2 However, utilization
of the East Iranian Road does not depend on operation of trains to
Zahidan, since a road used by motor trucks parallels the track to
Nok Kundi and beyond to Quetta.
North of Sukkur the railways fan out into the Punjab, so there
is a choice of several routes to Peshawar. However, the main line via
Lahore is considered the best, although longer than the direct line up
the Indus which is used primarily for local traffic. Although Peshawar
is the terminus for commercial traffic, the military authorities have
built a heavy-duty line up through the Khyber to Landi Khotal.
3. Soviet Rail Connections
For many years Ashkhabad was the most accessible station on the
Trans-Caspian for Meshed, northern end of the East Iranian Road proper.
However, recent non-Soviet maps show a new branch railway from Tedzhen,
135 miles east of Ashkhabad on the Trans-Caspian, south to Sarakhs, a
distance of approximately 80 miles. If this line is actually in operation or nearing completion, it will provide a rail-head 40 miles nearer
Meshed than is Ashkhabad. 3
1 Letter from Mr. Walter Hauser to Dr. Myron B. Smith, November 3, 1940
According to the British periodical Modern Transport for October, 1941,
the line west of Nok Kundi is to be rehabilitated immediately.
3A description of the roads from Meshed to Ashkhabad and Sarakhs will
be found at the end of the section on the East Iranian Road.
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SECRE T 499
Kushka, the Soviet railhead for the West Afghan Road is the
terminus of the 196 miles-long branch line south from Merv on the
Trans-Caspian. Stations on this line average 16.2 miles apart,
suggesting a rather low capacity. 1 However, it may safely be as-
sumed that this line can carry all the freight likely to be delivered
to it over the West Afghan Road. The Soviet authorities have agreed
to accept supplies at Kushka in such quantities as can be delivered
there.
The nearest railway station to Mazar-1-Sharif on the North
Afghan Road is Termez, 303 miles from Kagan on the Kagan-Stalinabad
branch of the Trans-Caspian. However, neither Termez or any other
place on the Stalinabad-Kagan line has been designated by the Soviet
authorities as a receiving station for supplies coming over the North
Afghan Road. This may have been due to lack of information on their
part as to the suitability of the North Afghan Road for transit traffic to the Soviet Union. It would seem doubtful that it could have
been due to the condition of the branch railway, since this line is
the only rail connection between Tadzhikistan and the rest of the coun-
try, and, in addition, serves the only Egyptian cotton-growing region
of the country. Whatever the explanation, it would do no harm to ask
the Soviet authorities to designate a station for reception of goods
coming over the North Afghan Road.
The capacity of the Kagan-Stalinabad branch line is not great,
1This and subsequent figures for station spacings on the Soviet railways are derived from the 1937 edition of the Ofitsial 'my: Passashirskikh
Soobshchenii and the Albom Skhem Zheleznykh Dorog SSSR, both published
by N.K.P.S.
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judging from the spacing of the stations, which average 15.1 miles
apart from Termez to Kagan. However, since cotton is the only com-
modity normally moving over this line in any quantity, the railway
should be able to handle whatever is delivered to it by the North
Afghan Road.
The Trans-Caspian railway normally has a rather light traffic,
at least as far east as Samarkand, since most of the cotton, the chief
commodity exported from Central Asia, is raised east of Samarkand, primarily in the great Fergana Valley, and moves to European Russia over
the Tashkent-Chkalov line. If the Germans should reach the lower Volga,
it will be necessary for the Trans-Caspian railway to carry a substantial part of the crude and refined petroleum from Baku required by the
Russian armies and by the industry, agriculture and transport of unoc-
cupied Russia. That this would tax the capacity of the line severely
is clear when it is reflected that this single track line whose stations
average 10.7 miles apart, would have to carry much of the oil normally
carried by the Caspian and Volga tankers and the railway from Baku to
Rostov. This would be true until large additional producing and refining capacity had been developed in east-central Russia.
The most direct rail connection between the Trans-Caspian and
the railways of European Russia is the Tashkent Chkalov (Orenburg)- --
Kuibyshev line, one of the country's main single-track railways. This
line normally carries the bulk of the cotton crop produced in Central
Asia. In case of a German intersection of the direct routes from Baku
to European Russia, this line would also be called on to carry a large
SECRET501
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part of the oil traffic. Station spacings on this line between Arys,
where the Turksib branches off, and Iletsk, from which there is an
alternative route to the Volga, average 9.4 miles.
The Turksib railway from Arys on the Tashkent-Chkalov line
to Novosibirsk on the Trans-Siberian provides a roundabout connection
to the Urals and the Volga. This line was opened to through traffic
in 1931 and since then has been considerably improved. Its chief
traffic is wheat, lumber, and coal from Siberia to Central Asia; hence
there should be considerable reserve capacity for north-bound freight.
Stations on this line average 11.1 miles apart. Aside from the much
greater distance to east-central Russia via this route, its chief drawback is the fact that traffic moving over the Turksib to the Volga would
have to move through the bottle-neck of the Trans-Siberian--the Novo-
sibirsk--Omsk section of the main line. 1
Distances from the Soviet rail-heads in Central Asia to Kuibyshev on the Volga are shown in the following table:
Via Tashkent-Rail-head
Chkalov
Ashkhabad
Sarakhs
Kushka
Termez
2134 miles
2054 miles
2114 miles
1999 miles
Via the Turksib and
the Trans-Siberian
3898 miles
3819 miles
3879 miles
3764 miles
1The necessity for passing through this bottle-neck will be eliminated with the extension of the Petropavlovsk-- Balkash line from Mointy
around the western end of Lake Balkash to Chu on the Turksib line, 199
miles west of Alma-Ata. Completion of this line, believed to be under
construction, will also provide a third rail-connection between Central
Asia and the Urals (via the recently completed Akmolinsk--Kartaly line)
which will be longer than that via the Tashkent-Chkalov railway, but
shorter than that via Novosibirsk.
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Unless and until the Germans reach the Volga, there is the
possibility of supplies coming over the three eastern roads being
routed through the port of Krasnovodsk, and thence either to Baku
or Astrakhan for further forwarding. As stated earlier, Krasnovodsk
is reported to have a capacity of 2000 tons daily. Should the Germans reach the Volga, some shipments might still be made from Kras-
novodsk to the port of Guriev and thence by the newly-opened railway
to Kandagach on the Tashkent-Chkalov line.
4. The East Iranian Road
This road, called the East Persian Gordon by the British who
developed it as a motor supply route for their forces operating in
northeast Persia and Trans-Caspia in 1918-1919, is, according to
most reports, an all-weather truck route. The Iranians have used it
ever since the last war as their principal overland connection with
India. A number of Europeans and Americans have driven over this
road to and from India and the Iranians have used it for tea transport from India in 5--7 ton trucks. An American who drove over the
road last July states that "we must have met or passed 20 trucks every
night. .1 The British are currently believed to be improving the road.
The most authoritative description of the East Iranian Road is
that in M. T. Routes in Iran (Vol. I -- Main Routes, Route No. II).
According to this description, compiled in 1934, the surface of the
road is "either metalled or sufficiently hard to be regarded generally
1 Letter from Prof. Robert L. Fox, Robert College, to Dr. Walter L.
Wright, Jr., Near East Section OCI, Nov. 15, 1941.
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SECRET 503
as the equivalent of metalled. It suffers from deterioration in the
spring from rain and spates. Metalling is sprinkled on but Lot rolled.
Pot holes are filled in on an average once a year. The surface of the
road across the Amrani desert gets cut up badly in wet weather and
would require maintenance.
Statements concerning the road have been obtained from four
Americans who have driven over this road within recent months. Mr.
Walter Hauser in August of 1940, Mr. Andrew J. Lynch of the American
Consular Service in November, 1940, Mr. J. D. Payne of the American
Mission, Tehran, in the spring of this year, and most recently, Prof.
Robert L. Fox of Robert College, in July of this year. Their views as
to the quality of the road differ rather markedly. Mr. Lynch reports
as follows: "From Meshed to Zahidan, the going is for the most part
exceedingly rough. To people who are used to concrete highways or even
to the country dirt roads still occasionally found in the United States
it would seem unbelievably bad. To those of us who are used to Persian
travel it would seem somewhat worse than usual, nothing more. .1 Mr.
Payne, however, has this to say about the road: "The road all the way
is as good or better than the Tabris-Kazvin road and the bridges are
better. It is a very fast road, comparable to the Isfahan-Shiraz stretch.
The road can take as much heavy traffic as either of these roads right
now; none of it is desert track, as we understand that term. .2 Dr.
Hauser is somewhat more specific: "The Meshed-Zahidan road is all right
1 Letter to Dr. Hyron Bement Smith, Consultant in Islamic Archaeology,
Library of Congress, October 29, 1941.
2Letter to Mr. E. M. Wright, Near Eastern Section, OCI, Nov. 10, 1941.
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504
for heavy trucks. Some of it south from Sefid Abeh, 175 kilometers
north of Zahidan, runs through open salt desert and can get sticky
in wet winter and spring weather. In this region it has not been
banked up or properly drained. I do not remember hearing that it
is impassable. Zahidan to Mir Jawah is also likely to be bad in wet
weather as it runs in low land near foothills and gets washed out by
heavy rains rushing down onto it. Trucking is seldom held up for
more than a day or two. .1 In view of the fact that Mr. Payne came
over the road in the spring when it is supposed to be at its worst,
and the other two came over it during the dry season, his praise of
the road is the more remarkable. However, last spring was an unusu-
ally dry one for the Near East. Professor Fox has this to say about
the road: "The roads were never so bad, at least from Meshed to
Zahidan, but what one could make 25 miles an hour quite comfortably
The road (from Birjand to Zahidan) was fairly smooth
scarcely wide enough for two cars, for there were piles of gravel at
rather frequent intervals. .2
In spite of the seeming disagreements between the four reports
quoted, it would seen safe to conclude that the road is practicable
for heavy motor trucks throughout most of the year, and that with some
grading, the wet season would impose no handicap.
According to N. T. Routes in Iran the distance from Zahidan to
Meshed is 583 miles. 3 It took Dr. Hauser 28 hours to cover the distance
Letter to Dr. Myron B. Smith, November 1, 1941.
Letter to Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr., Near Eastern Section, OCI,
November 15, 1941-
General Staff, India, N. T. Routes in Iran, Vol. I (Main Routes),
Route II.
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505
SECRET
in a "seven-passenger heavily laden Dodge car." Trucks cover the
road in two to three days, depending on their loads. Slight road
improvement could probably cut down the driving time.
From Meshed, northern end of the East Iranian Road proper,
there are roads used by motor trucks to both Ashkhabad and Sarakhs.
The road to Ashkhabad runs northwest to Kuchan and thence north
over the Kopet Dagh to the Trans-Caspian railway, a distance of
approximately 160 miles. It has been for long the most travelled
route from Meshed to the railway; mail and goods from and to Russia
and Europe having used this road. The road is characterized as
"good" by Hauser, who also states that it has been thoroughly repaired recently. 1
During the winter heavy snow may close the road over the Kopet
Dagh for a few days at a time. The road to Sarakhs is about 40 miles
shorter and according to Hauser was formerly bad in wet weather, but
was extensively repaired in 1939. According to a British source quoted
previously, the road was apparently widened to a minimum width of 6
meters, but is not metalled and hence, although it has a firm surface,
it is impassable from December to mid-April. The report states, how-
ever, that it is the best and shortest connection from Meshed to the
Russian Railway system. 2 In addition to being shorter than the Ashkhabad road, it goes around the end of the Kopet Dagh, thus avoiding
the steep grades of the other road.
Letter from Dr. Hauser.
2=Allied-Soviet Communications", Revised edition, 13 August, 1941
(From British Army Staff, Intelligence Branch, British Embassy,
Washington.)
- 59 -
SECRE 506
Fortunately, the question as to which of the two roads from
Meshed is the better one for supplies does not require an answer,
since the Soviet authorities have designated Meshed as the delivery
point. The fact that they have agreed to accept as much as can be
delivered at this point strongly suggests that the roads from Meshed
to the Russian railway are as good as those south and west of Meshed.
If one compares the relatively level terrain traversed by the
East Iranian Road with the mountainous country which the Burma Road
crosses, and if one bears in mind further that the prolonged season
of heavy rains which impedes traffic on the Burma Road is fortunately
much shorter on the Iranian road, it seems reasonable to assume that,
provided sufficient motor transport vehicles are made available, the
East Iranian Road can carry at least as much, and probably more, than
the 16,000 tons monthly planned for the Burma Road.
However, in view of the fact that the East Iranian Road, in
addition to providing a route from India to Russia, also provides a
land connection between the Indian base of supplies and the British
forces in northwest Iran, it is unlikely that the full capacity of
this road can be used for forwarding supplies to Russia. It seems
more than likely that the British who are now in control of the East
Iranian Road will wish to use a substantial portion of its capacity
for forwarding reinforcements and supplies to their forces in northwest Iran if they are not already so doing. Consultation between the
members of the American Mission and the British authorities on the spot
might establish a suitable apportionment of the capacity of the road
60 -
507
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between British and Russian needs. In any case, in view of the importance of the road, it would seem that its maximum capacity should
be developed-with American aid, if necessary.
5. The West Afghan Road
This is the shortest of the three roads connecting the Indian
and Soviet railways. It is 197 miles shorter than the East Iranian
Road (to Sarakhs) and 57 miles shorter than the North Afghan Road.
In addition, the distance by rail from Karachi to the Indian end of
the road is considerably less than to either of the two road terminals. It is the chief trade route between Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union and one of the two major trade routes between Afghanistan and
India. The second and third cities of the country, Herat and Kandahar, lie on this road and all traffic between Herat and Kabul passes
over this route. 1 There is considerable trucking over the road by
natives and a regular postal bus service is maintained.
From Chaman to Kandahar (70 miles) the road is surfaced, but
for lack of proper maintenance, it has become very rough. From
Kandahar west to Girishk (75 miles), the road, partly surfaced, runs
over the steppe to the Helmand river across which a steel bridge has
recently been built.2 Between Girishk and Farah (140 miles), the
1The direct road between Kabul and Herat over the Unai Pass and
down the valley of the Hari Rud which was made into a motor truck road
in Amanullah's reign has been neglected and is no longer passable for
motor vehicles at least not over its entire length.
2Two photographs of this bridge appear in the Afghan publication
The Igtesad Journal (vol. 218, April-May 1941, p. 139).
- 61 -
S E C R E T 508
road crosses plains of outwash which are liable to sheet flooding
during the spring and early summer due to run-off from the nearby
mountains. However, it is reported that the Afghan government has
recently had as many as 9,000 men at work on this section of the
road, and it is possible that measures have been taken to overcome this problem. 1 From Farah, where the road turns north to
Herat, it is 145 miles over rolling steppe country: here the road
is reported to be fair and passable the year round. The only part
of the route which involves any climbing, or a snow problem is the
last section of 66 miles between Herat and the rail-head at Kushka.
Here the highway has to cross the western end of the Parapamisus
range via the Ardewan Pass (el. 4,650 ft.), the ascent to which
from Herat is rather abrupt. The Pir Sang Pass (el. 4,670 ft.)
is
also used. Both passes are reported to be difficult, but not impassable, in winter.
It appears that with little improvement this road can be made
into a heavy truck route capable of carrying at least as much as the
16,000 tons daily planned for the Burma Road. The present capacity
is between 100-300 tons daily using 1+-ton trucks. 2
6. The North Afghan Road
Very few Europeans have passed over this road through the
heart of Afghanistan, and there is very little published or unpublished material available. Consequently, the Section was very
Supdor Leader Harris. The above-mentioned British report
states that with chains the road is now passable for trucks in wet
weather.
"Allied-Soviet Communications"
- 62 -
509
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fortunate to contact Mr. Wilbur V. Harland, who recently returned
to Washington from Kabul where he served as a teacher from December
1938 to December 1940. During his residence in Afghanistan, Mr. Har-
land travelled over this road several times, and now has very kindly
prepared extensive notes on it and on matters pertaining to motor
transport in Afghanistan in general. 1 All material in this memorandum bearing on the North Afghan Road is based on his notes and on
conversations with him.
The Landi Khotal--Kabul section of this road has been used
for auto transport for a number of years and provides the principal
means of communication between the capital city and the outside world.
Numbers of foreigners have driven over this section of the road. But
the motor road from Kabul through the Hindu Kush Mountains to Afghan
Turkestan is a development of recent years. One of the reasons for
building the road was to provide a cheap means of bringing cotton
and wheat from Afghan Turkestan to the capital. There is a lively
truck traffic on the road, cotton and wheat being the chief freights.
There are two high passes on this North Afghan Road, the
Lataband (el. 10.086 ft.) between Nimla and Kabul, and the Shibar,
(el. 9,800 ft.) between Charikar and the Kunduz river. Snow on the
Lataband generally closes the road for up to a month each winter.
However, the government is building an entirely new road down the
valley of the Kabul river from Kabul, which will eliminate the Lata-
band entirely. This road should be nearing completion if it is not
1A detailed report and map based on these notes will be available
shortly.
- 63 -
SECRET
510
already finished. The Shibar, although further north and almost as
high as the Lataband, has less snow; it is not closed more than a week
or two and could easily be kept open. The descent on the western side
is very sharp, so sharp that Kabul-bound trucks are generally partly
unloaded in order to climb one particularly steep pitch. A little
blasting and grading here would greatly improve this road. 1
The only other section of this road which presents difficulty
is the 30-mile stretch between Mazar-1-Sharif and the Amu Darya op-
posite Termez. The Afghans have not improved this part of the road,
and there are reported to be some difficult sandy stretches. However,
motor trucks have been over this section, and it would appear to be
a relatively simple matter to improve the road for heavy traffic.
The bridges over the larger streams are generally of steel
construction, smaller streams and gullies being crossed by stone
bridges or by culverts of one type or another. The road is supposed
to be a two-way highway throughout, but this is narrowly interpreted
in some sections. While motor trucks carrying loads of 3-4 tons now
operate over the road, relatively little work with American roadbuilding machinery would bring it up to the standards of the Kermanshah Road. Even without improvements, trucks driven by relays of
drivers, and not overloaded, could make the transit from rail-head
to rail-head in 36 to 48 hours. With relatively little road improvement (such as gravel-spreading to fill in chuck-holes, straightening out some of the needlessly sharp curves, realigning the road
The Shibar is not a pass over the Hindu Kush, but rather a saddle
between that range and the Paghman range to the south. The road passes
through the Hindu Kush on a water-level grade down the valley of the
Kunduz.
511
64 -
SECRET
for easier grades), the transit time could be materially reduced and
the loads increased. With such minor improvements, the North Afghan
Road should be able to at least equal the performance of the Burma
Road. 1
7. Necessity for Afghan-American Cooperation
The development of the two Afghan roads into major supply
routes obviously depends on the attitude of the Afghan government.
In view of the traditional hostility of the Afghans toward the British and the Russians, it would seem highly unlikely that the Afghan
government would give favorable consideration to proposals for the
improvement of the two roads and for the organization of regular
transit traffic over them, if such proposals came from British or
Russian sources, or if American proposals were transmitted by the
British or the Russians. On the other hand, in view of the high
esteem in which Americans are reported to be held in Afghanistan,
and the desire of the government for modern highways, it is possible
that proposals from official or semi-official American sources would
be welcomed. 2 While subsequent cooperation would be essential from
the British for the transit of supplies through India, and from the
Russians with respect to delivery at their rail-heads, it would seem
essential that any proposals be made first directly to Kabul by Americans
1The British report "Allied-Soviet Communications" referred to above,
gives a capacity after improvements of only 100 tons daily. From the
evidence available, this figure appears closer to the present capacity
of the road.
2There is at present no full-time American diplomatic representative
in Afghanistan. The American Minister to Iran is also accredited to
Afghanistan, but visits Kabul at infrequent intervals only.
- 65 -
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While the two Afghan roads can be used at once for forwarding
limited amounts of supplies (perhaps 100-200 tons daily), improvements
of the sort mentioned above and large numbers of imported trucks of
suitable sizes will be required if each of the two roads is to reach
the capacity planned for the Burma Road. 1 To secure estimates of the
amount of and kind of improvements necessary, the types of road con-
struction equipment needed, and the length of time required for such
improvements, and to establish the necessary technical cooperation with
the Afghan authorities, it would seem advisable to send at least two
American road-engineers - preferably with foreign experience - to
Afghanistan to make preliminary surveys of both roads. If these road
engineers were accompanied by motor transport experts, a simultaneous
survey could be made as to the best use of local transport equipment,
the types of trucks best adapted to the roads, locations for repair
and supply depots, quarters for the American staff, the availability
of local drivers, and similar technical matters. On the basis of the
reports of the road engineers and the transport experts, a comprehen-
sive plan for the development of the two roads into major supply routes
could be drawn up.
8. Conclusions
Assuming that cooperation can' be secured from the Afghan government
for the development of the two Afghan roads, that motor transport vehicles
1It is estimated that there are at present 2,590 General Motors trucks
(mostly Chevrolets) in Afghanistan. in 1941, 800 General Motors trucks
were exported to Afghanistan. ( Information from General Motors Overstas
Operations.) According to the Iqtesad Journal (vol. 227, January-February,
1941, p. 49 of the English section), there are now 5,000 privately owned
motor trucks engaged in transport.
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513
SECRET
in sufficient numbers can be delivered, that drivers can be obtained,
and that the requisite improvements on the roads themselves can be
made expeditiously, it should be possible to develop the three roads
forming the Eastern Group™ of southern supply routes into the equiva-
lent of three Burma roads, with a total capacity of approximately
50,000 tons monthly. However, since a considerable portion of the
capacity of the East Iranian Road is or will be required for the supply of the British forces in Iran, the volume of supplies which might
be delivered to the Russian rail-heads in Central Asia would be between 32,000 and 50,000 tons monthly.
John A. Morrison
514
SECRET
MAP II
ICE CONDITIONS IN THE WHITE SEA
Explanatory Note
A. Thickness of Ice
The measurements (in inches) are taken from British
Admiralty, Hydrographic Department, Arctic Pilot, Volume I,
London, 1933, page 44: these measurements are 5- to 21-year
averages of thickness, as recorded by Russian observation sta-
tions. The least satisfactory data, from the point of view of
the number of measurements, are those for Onega and Popov Island
(5 years), and Intsi, Letni Orlovski and Chesmenski (7 years).
It was impossible to make any extensive use of the tables in
Gidrograficheski Otdel, Svedenisa 0 Sostoianii L'dov na Moriakh
S.S.S.R., 1926-1932, (Hydrographic Division, (Information on the
State of Ice in the Seas of U.S.S.R.) because only one or two
records (of maximum thickness) are given for any one observation
point, and the readings are dated only as to year, and not as to
month and day. However, some use of these measurements was made
as a check on the figures which appear on the map. Finally, the
measurements for the average thickness at certain points (for example, Archangel-Solombala) could be checked approximately against
similar measurements given in general accounts of ice conditions
in the White Sea.
B. Character and Distribution of Ice
The sources for this information are the Arctic Pilot,
pp. 42-3 and passim; Gidrograficheskoe Upravlenie, Lotsiia Belogo
-2 -
515
SECRE T
Moria (Hydrographical Institute. White Sea Pilot), 5th ed., Leningrad, 1932, pp. 167 ff.: and most important, the series of maps in
each number of the Svedeniia (1926-32), which show the distribution
of the principal categories of ice: grease, small and large-floe,
field, and land, for the months of December through May. In the
present map the first category has been disregarded. In some
cases these maps incorporate material from land, vessel, and plane
observations. In addition, each number of the Svedenija includes
descriptions based on individual observation flights by airplanes
and also running accounts of the season's observations from each
recording station. For Yukonga Bay, information for the map was
obtained from the general account of ice conditions there in the
Arctic Pilot, p. 173.
C. Cautions respecting the Use of the Map
No attempt is made to show the thickness of the ice at
points other than those for which there are averages for at least
four years. For the character and distribution of ice, a considerable amount of interpolation and generalization, based in part on
general descriptions and on indications of probability in the maps
in the Svedeniia, seemed necessary in order to give a representation
of the probable average conditions which might be faced during the
months of maximum ice - January, February, March, and April. However,
the precise situation at any given time -- the location of ice floes,
for example -- depend on variables such as the degree of severity of
516
- -3 -
SECRET
the winter and the direction of winds and currents. Furthermore,
for the same reasons, ice conditions attain their maximum severity
at different points at different seasons. Hence, the map is not
an absolute but a general average representation.
517
MURMANSK
MAP II
ICE
CONDITIONS
IN THE
WHITE
SEA
Svyatoi Nos Lt.(44)
APPROXIMATE AVERAGE
CONDITIONS DURING
MAXIMUM ICE - JANUARY
OF
FEBRUARY,
MARCH,
AND
Yukongo
Boy
O
THE MONTHS
APRIL
Gordetski
LAND
XXXXXX
ICE
Known
Probable
ICE
O
DRIFT
Known Field Ice
Probable Field Ice
Oriovsk
Field Ice Likely To Be
oO
Encountered Occasionally
Large-Floe And Small-Floe Ice
Also Likely To Be Encountered
The Figures Represent Ice Thickness In Inches
Morjovski Lt
Sosnovets
o
Intsi Lt.(81)
O
o
O
O
O
O
o
o
O
O
Zimnegorski Lt.(20)
O
O
[i(35)
60
Mudyugski Lt.(24)
Letni Oriovski
oChesmenskiLt
Archangel-Solombolor (30)
ARCHANGEL
Drown In The Cartographic
Section, Geoo. Div., In Cooperation
With The East European Section, C.O.I.
Miles
50
(Approximate)
Onega(69)
MAP NO 118
00
517
MURMANSK
MAP II
ICE
O
CONDITIONS
IN THE
O
WHITE
SEA
Svyatoi Nos Lt.(44)
THE MONTHS
OF
CONDITIONS DURING
MAXIMUM ICE - JANUARY
Yukongo
O
APPROXIMATE AVERAGE
Boy
FEBRUARY, MARCH, AND APRIL
Gordetski
LAND ICE
XXXXXX
Known
Probable
DRIFT
ICE
Known Field Ice
Orlovsk
Probable Field Ice
Field Ice Likely To Be
Encountered Occasionally
Lorge-Floe And Small-Floe Ice
Also Likely To Be Encountered
b
The Figures
Represent Ice Thickness In Inches
Morjovski
Sosnovets
Intsi Lt.(81)
o
O
O
Zimnegorski Lt.(20)
udyugski Lt.(24)
150
Letni Oriovski Lt.
Chesmenski Lt.
(<<22)
X83)
JArchangel-Solombola(30)
ARCHANGEL
ulmuisk
Miles
Drown In The Cartographic
50
o
Section,
Geog.
Div.,
In
Cooperation
With The East European Section, C.O.I.
(Approximate)
Onega(69)
MAP NO 118
00
518
MAP III
SUPPLY ROUTES
TO THE
USSR FROM THE SOUTH
RAILROAD GAUGES
U.
S.
S.
N
R
57
R.
519
CONFIDENTIAL
AIR INFORMATION BULLETIN
No. 1
MID 461
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, December 22, 1941
NOTICE
The information contained in this series of bulletins
will be restricted to items from official sources which are
reasonably confirmed,
This document is being given an approved distribution,
and no additional copies are aveilable in the Military Intelligence Division. For provisions governing its reproduction,
see Letter TAG 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M.
NOTES ON
JAPANESE AIR TACTICS
SOURCE
These notes are based on A report, dated December 16, 1941,
from a highly reliable source.
CONTENTS
1. ATTACKS ON BRITISH CAPITAL SHIPS
2. ATTACKS ON PEARL HARBOR
3. POINTS OF SIMILARITY IN THE ATTACKS
4. ADDITIONAL NOTES
CONFIDENTIAL
520
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTES ON
JAPANESE AIR TACTICS
1. ATTACKS ON BRITISH CAPITAL SHIPS
On the morning of December 10, 1941, H.M.S. Prince of Wales
and H.M.S. Repulse were in position about lat. 4° N.-long. 103°30' E.
close in to the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula in open column,
the Wales leading at the distance of about 1000 yards. The shipe had
no air protection.
At 11:13 local time nine (9) Japanese high-level bombers approached in line from deed ahead at an altitude of about 12,000 feet.
All of the planes dropped bombs simultaneously in line across the
Repulse, one being a near miss on the port side, Fire broke out and
casualties were incurred from fragments. During the approach the
ships turned 90° right, placing the Repulse on the starboard quarter
of the Wales.
At 11:39 nine (9) torpedo planes attacked the Wales, which
changed course too late to a parallel track. At least one and perhaps
two direct hits caused severe damage, the ship appearing to rise out
of the water. Speed was promptly reduced to 15 knots and continued to
drop. Generators were reported out of action and steering control was
lost. The ship began to list about 15° to port.
At 11:56 the third attack was launched, again by torpedo
planes, eight (8) or nine (9) in number. This time, the attack was
directed on the Repulse, which turned to parallel the torpedo tracks
and remained unhit.
At 12:18 the fourth attack was made, once again by torpedo
planes, three (3) being directed on the Repulse and two waves of
three (3) each on the starboard side of the Wales, which now listed
heavily to port and was unable to maneuver. The Repulse again was un-
hit, but the Wales suffered two hits under her forecastle, one near
her "Y" turret.
At 12:26 came the fifth attack, with nine (9) or ten (10) torpedo planes launching torpedoes on the Repulse, which maneuvered to
avoid them, but received two hits on her port side and one on her starboard side, all well aft. The Resulse sank at about 12:33.
At 12:35 nine (9) bombers returned to make the sixth attack,
dropping full-load bombs about 6 miles away for no apparent reason.
The bombers then flew over the Wales from port to starboard without
dropping any bombs. The speed of the Wales was now reduced to about
CONFIDENTIAL
-1-
521
CONFIDENTIAL
8 knote. At 12:42 the same number of bombers attacked the Wales from
ahead, scoring one direct hit on her "S3" turret and several near
misses. The Wales lost all propulsion and sank at about 13:15.
The details of the attack which should be stressed are:
a, Bombers approached from ahead in close line abeam and dropped
bombs together by signal. They made an excellent pattern, using what
were believed to be 1000-1b. bombs.
b. When the torpedo planes were first sighted, they were in close
formation at a high altitude. While still out of range, they lost
height and were strung out in loose column, expanding into an approximate diamond as the target was closed. Their maneuvers showed com-
plete disregard for gunfire. Their tactical unit is usually nine (9)
planes. Eighteen-inch torpedoes were dropped from heights as great
as 300 feet and distances as close as 1000 yards, the average distance
being 1500 yards. No glider attachment was seen on the torpedoes,
which fell at an angle of about 40° to the horizontal. Each plano
seemed to take individual aim, there appearing to be no coordinated
attack or zones of attack. After dropping bombs, the planes took no
evident precaution to avoid action. They rose heavily, departed slowly,
and passed close to the ship under attack, thus drawing a large volume
of gunfire on the planes which had completed their attack.
c. The approach of the enemy planes was not detected by radio detection equipment.
d. The lack of air support for the British ships was occasioned
by British aircraft proceeding to Singora on the eastern coast of the
Malay Peninsula in order to launch a surprise dawn attack there on
mass enemy transports on December 10. Unfortunately these planes were
sighted by three Japanese reconnaissance planes between 17:00 and
18:30 the previous evening, and the Singora attack was abandoned, the
planes turning south for Singapore. En route, about midnight, they
received a report of enemy transports near Kuantan, lat. 3°50'N. and
decided to sweep them up at dawn. The transports were not found, however, and the search for them was still underway when the attack on
the Wales and the Repulse began.
2. ATTACKS ON PEARL HARBOR
In the attack on U. S. naval vessels at Pearl Harbor, which
started shortly before 08:00, Sunday, December 7, Japanese horizontal
bombers were reported attacking in a nine (9) plane formation line
abreast at about 12,000 feet. Bombs were dropped on a signal, and
formed an excellent pattern. Both instantaneous and delayed-action
fuzes were used in 500 and 1000-1b. bombs. The use of AP bombs was
CONFIDENTIAL
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522
CONFIDENTIAL
also reported.
Torpedo planes in nine (9) plane formations lost altitude
while they were still outside gun range. They approached in loose
column and deployed into a wedge or loose diamond formation before
making individual drops. In spite of heavy AA fire, they dropped
torpedoes at varying altitudes up to 300 feet and from distances as
close as 1000 yards.
The torpedoes were reported as being 18-inch and 21-inch
Whiteheads, They ran very well in 40 feet of water. One such torpedo which was recovered had a tail-fitting which acted as a drag to
prevent the torpedo from seeking too great a depth. There was no evidence of any magnetic pistols.
3. POINTS OF SIMILARITY IN THE ATTACKS
In comparing the two engagements the following points of
similarity are noted:
a. The tactical unit for both horizontal bombers and torpedo
planes was nine (9) planes.
b. The horizontal bombers in both cases were at en altitudo of
about 12,000 feet and attacked in a close line abreast, thus making
an excellent pattern. During both engagements they dropped bombs simultaneously on signal. Many of the bombs weighed 1000 pounds.
c. On both occasions the horizontal bombers preceded the torpedo
bombers.
d. In all attacks by torpedo bombers the tactics were apparently
identical. The torpedo bombers lost altitude out of gun range, ap-
proached in loose column, and deployed for attack into a wedge or
loose diamond formation. They dropped torpedoes at an average distance
of 1500 yards, some closing to 1000 yards. Altitudes at the drop
varied up to 300 feet. Only individual attacks were made, always with
a complete disregard for AA fire.
e. In the attack on the Wales and the Revulso only 18-inch torpedoes were reported, whereas at Pearl Harbor both 18-inch and 21-inch
Whiteheads were noted.
4. ADDITIONAL NOTES
a. In the bombing of land objectives heavy AP bombs, which were
converted 15-inch AP projectiles, were used.
CONFIDENTIAL
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523
CONFIDENTIAL
b. Dive-bombing release altitudes were reported only as being
very low, and for future guidance strafing by dive bombers may be ex-
pected,
c. Gun armaments of enemy planes consisted of 20-mm. cannon and
7.7-mm. guns. No armor was installed in any of the planes shot down.
CONFIDENTIAL
--
524
RESTRICTED
0-2/2657-220; No. 577 MID., W.D.
11:00 A.M., December 22, 1941
SITUATION REPORT
I. Pacific Theater.
Philippines: Situation at Davao is obscure. Fighting is in
progress. Japanese landing attempts are under way slightly north of
Lingayen from the 70 to 80 enemy transports concentrated in Lingayen Gulf.
A major drive at the Philippines is indicated. Hawaii No further re-
ports of hostile activity have been received. Malaya: Japanese major
attack expected momentarily in the western sector. In the east, the
British are withdrawing to more favorable positions. British North Borneo
and Sarawak: Dutch air and submarine action continues. Hong Kongt No
further reports received. West Coast: No further reports have been
received.
IX. Eastern Theater.
There is no change in the general situation on the Russian
front. The Russians are maintaining pressure against the Volkhov River
west of Tikhvin and have made gains southwest of Tula.
III. Western Theater.
Air: No R.A.F. offensive because of weather conditions. There
were some limited reconnaissance and anti-shipping patrols by German air
units over the eastern coast of Great Britain.
The German communique this morning states that two British
bombers were shot down during raids last night by single planes over
Helgoland Bight and German-occupied regions along the Channel. The
German bombers attacked port installations on the southwest coast of Great
Britain.
IV.
Middle Eastern Theater.
Ground: Axis retreat continues toward Bengasi from North
Cyrenaica. Heavy troop movements reported south from Bengasi, and large
concentrations of German troops are reported 50 miles south of that
place. Italian troops massed in disorganized state north of Bengasi.
Air: British light bombers attacked motor transports near
Derna and Mechili yesterday, and other planes bombed railroads around
Zuara. R.A.F. continues bombing and strafing of Axis troops. Yesterday's
Cairo communique stated that R.A.F. is leading the assault in Libyn,
harassing air bases, railroads, and supply centers of Tripolitania.
The German high command claims that German aircraft
attacked heavily the British naval base at Malta last night.
RESPRICTED