Full text of Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr. : Volume 3 : Part 1

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BOOK #3

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

May 16, 1940
thru

February 28, 1941

0542
May 16, 1940

6:15 p.m.

(After return from the White House)
Present:

Mr. Foley

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Bell
Mr. Young

HM,Jr: The President wants me to continue

doing this stuff for him. I told him, "Now you
have got to this point, I did not care personally.
He did not want to make any changes right now in
the Army or Navy. I put it up to him in a very

nice way 80 he could very easily say, "Now we have
come to a new point, and 80 forth and 80 on.

Well, he suggested bringing down a fellow by

the name of Jim Forrestal. In fact, he said he was
droping; might bring down a couple. Forrestal was
here Clarence Dillon. He said, "You could either have
Clarence Dillon or Jim Forrestal. If I have to have

either I would take Forrestal. But this is the point

and maybe I am all wrong. He wants to appoint him as
one of his silent six, but put him under me to report

to me. I told him I had an experience -- At 2:30 I

had in General Brett and Captain Kraus of the Navy and
in two hours they turned out the best memorandum on

how to get the engines in the Bill. I gave him the
program. Now, there is no civilian could do it in
two months. And I said to the President, "I don't

know but what I would just as lief have the regular

Army and Navy people to work with.

While I was there, Jimmie Byrnes talked to him

for half an hour trying to get him to take Barney
Baruch.
President
said, "Think up a nice honorary
title, butThe
I can't
use him.

0543
-2-

As I say, the way I feel tonight, everything
has gone all right, but physically I just don't know.
Awful fight. You have to fight Woodring, Edison,

Johnson, Compton, and all the rest of the stuff.
see on the ticker that Johnson says he's going to
call in all the aviation industry. Well, I give
the President a plan on engines which is good. O.K.
He likes it and says "That's it." And if he had a
Secretary of War and Navy, I would not have to do it.
I

Mr. Sullivan: I think that's quite so. The

little experience I have with the Navy on getting

results, slow beyond measure. They don't know. As
soon as itthey
wasfollowed
suggested
results,
it.how they could get better

HM,Jr: Well, you fellows think about it.
you?

Mr. Bell: You are thinking of a man to help
HM,Jr: Help the President.
Mr. Bell: On this National defense program?
HM,Jr: He really does not know Forrestal.

Forrestal came from Beacon, New York and he said that
he had made a speech, or something or other.

I had him down in September and I asked him if
there was a war would he come and he said yes, but I

have a family and I have a salary to think of, but he
said if you want me, call me. He would not be here.

He would be over with the President.

Mr. Foley: Would that be satisfactory to you?
HM,Jr: Yes. The President said he would report to me.
Mr. Bell: What does he know about this game?

(At this) point, HM,Jr spoke to Mr. Keller on
the telephone.

0544

HM,Jr: One of the two things I want you two

lawyers to think about -- this is the thing that the
Army and Navy have never been able to do and I told
them that I would do it -- and that is to make Pratt

Whitney and Curtiss license a couple of other fellows.
I don't know how to do it, but my God, the United
States Government ought to be able to know some way.

In other words, the thing I am asking you two
fellows to think about, how can I go to these so-andBOB and say, Pratt Whitney you license Lycoming and

Curtiss you license Continental. I don't expect an

answer tonight, but I want one tomorrow morning. There
must be a way. I want it loaded. I don't want any
blank cartridges.
Ed, you might ask some of these Left Wingers
whether they know Forrestal.

Mr,Foley: O. K.

Why don't you take McCollum?

HM,Jr: I am not sold on McCollum. Somebody
poured some poison in the President's ear about McCollum.
I mentioned him.
O. K.
000-000

Pres called 8,20 P.M
said he wanted us to do

5-16-40
0545

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to ourselves Told term it
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0546

IDENTIAL

May 16, 1940

To:

The Secretary

From:

Mr. Young

Colonel Jacquin called on me at 4:30 with a new idea
as to how the French could secure airplanes in a hurry.
He prefaced his remarks with the statement that he felt
the French had to have as many planes as they could get
in the next three or four weeks or they might not need
them at all.
At the present time the Swedish Government has on

order 144 Vanguard planes from the Vultee Aircraft, Incorporated, with delivery beginning in July and continuing
to December. These planes are to be equipped with Pratt
and Whitney 1830 engines.

Colonel Jacquin suggested that the French take over
the Swedish order and then turn over these pursuit planes
to the Army as fast as they were delivered in exchange for

a number of Army P-36's now in commission which could be
immediately shipped to France. Colonel Jacquin made the
statement that the Army nov has 210 P-36's and that the

Army would gain by this deal as he considers the Vultee
Vanguard superior to the P-36 as a pursuit plane, the ad-

vantage lying in the fact that the Vultee is evidently a

little faster.

In this way, according to Colonel Jacquin, the French
could secure planes at once, the Army would receive a better
plane, and the only drawback is the fact that the Army would

be without its present quota of pursuit planes for three or

four months provided, of course, that the new production was
not interrupted. Colonel Jacquin thought that that production schedule, as well as that of Pratt and Whitney, could

be speeded up.

Franklin BY ReoseveIt Library

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RHP 8-2-70

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0547
May 17, 1940

5:05 p.m.

(After return from Cabinet)
Present:

Mr. Bell
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Foley

Mr. McReynolds

Mrs. Klotz

fast.

HM,Jr:
Look, this thing is going to get awful
Where's Bell?
Mr. Bell: Here I a.m.

HM,Jr: Bell, I want this back for history.

The President wrote this thing out in connection with
your thing. "Can we, on present taxes and with proportional expenditure on Budget and war message, plus
$875,000,000 total for WPA, have, on February 1, a
Treasury balance of $500,000,000."
up to

Mr. Bell: He means expenditure of $875,000,000
HM,Jr:

February 1. You have it as clearly

9.8 I have and he may send for you Sunday.

Mr. Bell: That means recaptured.

HM,Jr: Again I want this back. I will let

you have it, but I want it back and you fellows get
together on this thing. Pat Harrison suggested to
the President we issue $2,000,000,000 of 5-year debentures outside of the debt limit. Now, how one
does that I don't know. The President's suggestion
is add 7% to every tax payment of every kind. If

the tax receipts for 1940 are $6,000,000,000 you add
$420,000,000 of bonds each year for 5 years and you
get your $2,100,000,000.

0548
-2-

All right?
Gentlemen, I am glad to have seen you. I

will be on the phone at Beacon 211.

The President at Cabinet got angry and said
he wasn't going to have four plane meetings on Monday.

All airplane meetings will take place here and Steve

Early is giving it out that all airplane meetings will
take place in the Treasury and he also had Harry Wood-

ring to tell Louis Johnson, which is marvelous! And
just crossing the street, I met a New York Times fellow
and he said it's in New York that I am trying to get
Keller to buy Continental Motors.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

705120

WASHINGTON

0555
May 18, 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

FOR REPORT ON MONDAY AT
LUNCH.

F. D. R.

recerved

5/20

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

0556

May 20, 1940.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

In accordance with your request of May 18th, I submit the

following report on the proposed legislation attached to the memorandum
to you from Assistant Secretary of War Johnson, dated May
17th:

Sec. 1 confers upon you power to suspend in whole or in

part any existing law insofar as it affects procurement of

military supplies. The three measures which would probably
be affected are the Walsh-Healy Act, the Wages and Hours Act,
and the Vinson-Trannell Act. The Treasury Department is
exceedingly apprehensive of the reaction in Congress and
among the people which will attend any attempt to relax the

profit limiting provisions of the Vinson-Tranmell Act. The
Treasury Department is even more fearful of legislation conferring a sweeping power to eliminate present legislation in
behalf of labor. The horrible experience in England, as presented in consular reports, causes us to be fearful of the
complete collapse of the entire rearmament program, if the

hostility of labor is aroused. We believe a sufficiently
serious threat of this condition is found in Section 1.
We submit that since the Walsh-Healy Act confers upon the

Secretary of Labor the power to suspend this Act in particular
cases, there is no necessity for such further authority.
Sec. 2. This section exempts emergency personnel from the

requirements of the Civil Service rules and regulations. This
exemption is wholly unnecessary and, in our opinion, is particularly objectionable and inconsistent with the Civil Service
program which you have promulgated and are gradually making
effective. Whatever exemptions may be required in the development of the emergency program, you have adequate authority to

grant and exemption by law is entirely superfluous and will
create troublesome patronage difficulties which can only result in friction and controversies.
Sec. 3. The Treasury Department does not object to this
section, conferring upon the Secretary of War the power to
advance payments to contractors not exceeding 30 percent.
The Treasury Department does not comment upon the necessity

of such legislation.

0557

-2Sec. 4. This section confers upon the President the power
to direct precedence of Government contracts for products and

materials over all other contracts and orders. While finding
no objection in this section, the Treasury Department recom-

mends that for the protection of the President such action
should be subject to certification of necessity by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. To the extent that
this gives precedence to orders of our own service over orders

of foreign belligerents, it may be inconsistent with the
President's message.

(Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr.

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON D.C.

May 17, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In view of existing world conditions and of the
necessity in the interest of the national defense of
facilitating the carrying out of an augmented procurement

program, it is considered essential that the provisions of
certain restrictive legislation be relaxed, or held in
abeyance, at the discretion of the President. It is urgently recommended, therefore, that legislation substantially
as attached be presented to the Congress with a view to its
enactment at an early date.

The legislation, in brief, permits procurement without
competition and, at the discretion of the President, relaxes
various statutes which tend to restrict procurement of military supplies. The authority granted thereby terminates on
July 1, 1942. Because of the possible political implications, particular attention is invited to Sections 1 and 4
of the proposed legislation.

name
Louis Johnson,

The Assistant Secretary of War.
Attached:

Draft of
Legislation.

0550

0359

A BILL

To facilitate the procurement of military supplies
for the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America, in Congress assembled:

C

Sec. 1. That whenever, prior to July 1, 1942, the President
determines such action to be necessary in the interest of the
national defense, he is authorized to suspend in whole or in part
the operation of any existing laws of the United States insofar as,
in his opinion, they restrict or impede the procurement of military
supplies, or the procurement or construction of military facilities,
to the detriment of the national defense.
Sec. 2. That whenever, prior to July 1, 1942, the Secretary of
War determines such action to be necessary in the interest of the
national defense, he is authorized to employ at the seat of Government, or elsewhere, such civilian personnel as he may deem necessary,

within available appropriations, without regard to civil service requirements or to any other restrictions of law relating thereto,
provided no eligible for the vacant position satisfactory to the
Secretary of War, or his authorized representative, is certified by
the Civil Service Commission within fourteen days after request for
such certification, and to continue the employment of such persons
so long as may be necessary, in his opinion, in the interest of

national defense. If, after the expiration of a probationary period

of six months from the date of employment, the Secretary of War

shall certify to the Civil Service Commission that the services of
any person employed under the authority of this Act are satisfactory,
the employee shall thereupon acquire civil service status with grade
and rating fixed by the Secretary of War, as though certified after
examination by the Civil Service Commission.
Sec. 3. That whenever, prior to July 1, 1942, the Secretary of
Mar shall determine it to be necessary in the interest of the national
defense, he is authorized, from appropriations available therefor,
to advance payments to contractors for supplies or construction for
the War Department in amounts not exceeding thirty per centum of

the contract price of such supplies: Provided, that such advances

0360

shall be made upon such terms as the Secretary of War shall prescribe

and he shall require adequate security for the protection of the

Government for the payments so made.

Sec. 4. That whenever, prior to July 1, 1942, the President
determines such action to be necessary in the interest of the
national defense, he may direct that compliance with any government
contract for products or materials required for national defense
shall take precedence over all other contracts and orders theretofore placed with the same contractor or supplier, and any individual,
firm, company, association, corporation, or organized manufacturing
industry, or the responsible heads thereof, who shall refuse or
fail to give such preference to the execution of any such contract
or order shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and
by a fine not exceeding $50,000.

2-

withdrawnfrom Presidents
deck and

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

re-written
0561

May 20, 1940.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

In accordance with your request of May 18th I submit the
following report on the proposed legislation attached to the

memorandum to you from Assistant Secretary of War Johnson,
dated May 17th:

Sec. 1 confers upon you power to suspend in whole or

in part any existing law insofar as it affects procure-

ment of military supplies. The three measures which
would probably be affected are the Walsh-Healy Act, the

Wages and Hours Act, and the Winson-Tranmell Act. The
Treasury Department is exceedingly apprehensive of the
reaction in Congress and among the people which will attend

any attempt to relax the profit limiting provisions of the
Vinson-Trammell Act. The Treasury Department is even more

Yearful of legislation conferring a sweeping power to
eliminate present legislation in behalf of labor. The
horrible experience in England as presented in consular
reports causes us to be fearful of the complete collapse
of the entire rearmament program, if the hostility of labor
is aroused. We believe a sufficiently serious threat of
this condition is found in Section 1.
Sec. 2. The Treasure Department interposes no objection

to this section relaxing the requirements of Civil Service.
Sec. 3. The Treasury Department does not object to this
section, conferring upon the Secretary of War the power to
advance payments to contractors not exceeding 30 percent.

The Treasury Department does not comment upon the necessity

of such legislation.

Sec. 4. This section confers upon the President the power
to direct precedence of Government contracts for products
and materials over all other contracts and orders. While
finding no objection to this section, the Treasury Department
recommends that for the protection of the President such

action should be subject to certification of necessity by
the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. To the
extent that this gives precedence to orders of our own
service over orders of foreign belligerents, it may be
inconsistent with the President's recent message.

Hand

0562
May 20, 1940
4:20 p.m.

I spoke to J. Edgar Hoover and asked him whether

he was able to listen in on Nazy spies by tapping the
wires and he said no; that the order given by Bob
Jackson stopping him had not been revoked. I said
I would go to work at once. He said he needed it
desperately.

He said that there were four Nazi spies working
in Buffalo across the Canadian border and the Royal
Mounted Police had asked for his assistance and he had
been unable to give it .
I called up General Watson and said this should

be done and he said, "I don't think it is legal. If I
said "What if it is illegal?" He called me back in

five minutes and said he told the President and the
President said, "Tell Bob Jackson to send for J. Edgar

Hoover and order him to do it and a written memorandum

will follow. "

(I spoke to Bob Jackson about this at Cabinet

last Friday, the 17th, and he said that he was not
going to do anything about it until after Congress

goes home. )

0563
May 20, 1940

The President said to me at lunch to-day,

"If I should die tomorrow, I want you to know
this. I am absolutely convinced that Lindbergh
is a Nazi".

0564

May 20, 1940
5 p.m.

At Mr. Hull's request, HM,Jr spoke on the
telephone to Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Wayne Taylor after
Mr. Bullitt had spoken to Mr. Hull.
HM, Jr dictated the following:
Bullitt said that between 3,000,000 and 5,000,000
people are on the roads to Paris and that they are
machine gunning children from 5 to 10 years of age

wilfully at the terminal. That they have no food.

The French are so busy fighting that they have no
opportunity to take care of these people. We have
got to get $20,000,000 from Congress and keep ships

going continuously to take care of this matter. Then
Wayne Taylor got on the phone and corroborated the
same thing. All it does is make me sick at my stomach.
What's a person going to do? Got hard enough times

here.

The Secretary then spoke to the President on

the phone and the following is HM,Jr's side of the

conversation:

"Bill Bullitt just talked simultaneously to

Cordell and me and Cordell asked me to call you, which

I am doing. He told a story which he may have told
to you about these 3 to 5 million people.
"Well, the other thing he mentioned was a
$20,000,000 appropriation and I just wanted to make
sure that

"There is no chance?

"Then there is nothing I can do at this end?
"Well, he's only asking for $10,000,000.
"Yes.

"Yes.

0565
-2-

"Well, the story was so terrible I did not
want to feel that I was muffing it. He also said
as far as the war was going, it was going a little
better tonight.

"Yes, he said it was a little better.
"Well
"No.

"Good Heavens!

"No, I did not know.
"Well, they say they don't know whether the
French are behind the German lines or vice versa.

"All right, Sir. I am here at your service."
HM,Jr dictated the following:
Says he ordered Norman Davis, who ,incidentally,

followed me at lunch, to send over 25,000,000 francs
at once and to have a ship sail with food within 5 days
and we cannot and will not ask Congress to do anything
because it would kill Norman Davis' drive and we could
not get it anyway.
HM,Jr then spoke to Cordell Hull on the phone
and the following is Secretary Morgenthau's side of
the conversation:

"Cordell, I spoke to the President. He said

he had already seen Norman Davis; that he had ordered
Norman Davis to send 25,000,000 france over at one by

cable and to have a ship sail within 5 days. The

President said he is not going to ask Congress for
$20,000,000 because he could not get it and it would

kill Norman Davis' drive anyway. I said 'Is there
anything else we can do?' and the President said at
this moment, nothing. So that at least absolves us
from any responsibility.

The President also said, Had I heard
that the French General Giroud had not been heard
P.S.

from in three days. I said I had not.

0566
May 21, 1940
12:50 p.m.

Just spoke to Miss Le Hand and told her that
I just talked with Frank and advised him that the
Treasury felt that we should not close the stock exchange. Please to tell the President and she said
the President will be glad to hear that because that's
the way he feels.

0567
June 3, 1940

At lunch with the President, he seemed very

angry at the way the newspapers had treated Hopkins
and myself and he said that tomorrow at his press
conference he would tell them so.

I asked him what he wanted me to do. He said
he wanted me to carry on with foreign purchases and
I told him that I wanted to give over my work to Knudsen
on airplanes and machine tools; that I had had a very
satisfactory talk with Knudsen for two hours and a quarter.

I said to the President, "I have a suggestion

which I am going to make and then run, namely: that

you swap Ickes and Woodring around" and the President

said, "I thought of that last week. I said "I think

it is good. He said, No, it's no good. 11 tell

you why. After the meeting we had with the Committee
of Seven, Ickes went into Miss Le Hand and belly-ached
(that's the word the President used) about the Committee -"why did I have Knudsen here? Why did I have Stettinius?
Just bringing General Motors and Wall Street and the
Morgans, and he thought it was terrible. And the
President said, "When I saw Ickes myself I said "What
do you think of this Committee of Seven?" and Ickes

said, "Let's change the subject. I would rather not
discuss it. And the President said, "That's Ickes'
attitude. While I thought of making him Secretary of
War last week, I have changed my mind because, he said,
"there won't be a day or two that he won't be fighting

with everybody and he's doing very well at his own job."

I said, "Well, you still have to have a Secretary
of War. He said, "Right!" He said, "What do you
think of Averill Harriman?" I said, "A very sweet,
nice person, but why make him Secretary of War?'
said, "I agree. He said, "What do you think of John
Carmody?" I said, "Why do you want to appoint an old
drunk for?" He said, "I didn't know he drinks. He
He

said, "What do you think of Jesse Jones?" I said, "He
would be pretty good, but ever since his airplane accident he has not been himself."

So then he said, "What do you think about Bob

La Follette?" and I said, "Wonderful!" So the Presi-

0568
-2-

dent said, "Well, he's voted against every Army appropriation. I said, "So much the better. I said,
"You will get him up before the country when it comes
to recruiting and he will do a swell job. I said,
"He and Senator Norris are the only two Senators that

I have any respect for on the Hill." He

said,

"Well,

La Follette will have a hard time to be re-elected and,"
he said, "I think he will take it. I said, "I am
very enthusiastic for La Follette.
I then dropped around to see Miss Le Hand and I

told her about these names. So she said, "Didn't he
mention Mr. Nelson?" I said, "What! My Mr. Nelson?"
She said, "Yes. He's got him in mind for that. I
said, "He can't have him. She said, "Did he mention

Frank Walker?" I said, "No." I said, "We did talk
about La Guardia, but he said that Herbert Lehman has
such a case of jitters as to what will happen if Italy

goes to war with all the Italians in New York that he
insists La Guardia must stay there and sit on the lid. If
I said, "I can understand that."
The President has in mind that he would like to
do something with Japan, sort of joint treaty to keep
peace in the Pacific.

I showed the President this note that he had
written me about Ernest Feiler and I said, "Franklin,

this is not the Franklin that I know. I said it very
quietly. I said, "After all, you don't want to put a
finger on anybody without giving him a chance.
said, "Of course not. Let me see it. He took it and
tore it up. He said, "You are quite right." I said,
I think this is Berle with his great jealousy between him
and Cairns. He said, "I don't think it is. I said,
"Can I talk to Berle?" and he said yes. But if I say
He

so myself, I had my nerve with me in saying that to him.
000-000

0569
June 4, 1940

HM,Jr called the President at about 10:30 and

the following is the Secretary's side of the conver-

nation:

'I have some of your friends here: Senator

Harrison, Congressman Doughton and Congressman Cooper

and some of our own people, and we have been going for
about an hour and a half.

"This is their thought. They feel that after

talking this over they want to increase this $3,000,000,000
special fund to $4,000,000,000. Then they would like to

lower the base -- get down to 3800 for single and $1800
for married.

"I will make that suggestion.
"They want to increase the tax in the middle
brackets, all of this money to go towards paying off
this additional $1, 000, , 000,000 in five years.

"They all feel that to put on a war profits tax

at this time would be just as unpopular as this request
on the National Guard. Some of them say that after
they come back they would be willing to put on a war

profits tax.'

(While the President held the phone HM,Jr said
to the group: "The President says that he does not
mind postponing the war profits tax as long as you make

it clear that you propose to do it.")
"Pat says that if we are going to get into a
war, of course we would have to do it, but the thing

he is afraid of at this time, is that it sounds as
though we are going to get into a war.

"Ways and Means were going to pass this thing

out favorably at one o'clock and it has got them unawares

0570
-2-

and they have Treadway's agreement. A week ago you

and I agreed to this. If

(While the President held the phone, HM,Jr asked
the group: "Would you be willing to have your Committee

study this thing and follow up what the President said --

that there will be no war profits?"

at that.

"They would be willing to do that.
"Just so long as the Republicans don't catch us

"Jerry Cooper wants to know whether this new proposal meets with your approval so he can go ahead and

help get it through.

(The President said "It's all right". )
"Pat Harrison's trouble is going to be with his
boys in the Senate, that they will want to go higher. "
(After the conclusion of his conversation with
the President, HM,Jr told the group: "He says that the
main thing is to get it out of the House and get it passed
and that he is in complete agreement with this program.
But the President wants you to follow up and say what

he said -- that there will be no war millionaires.")
000-000

0571
June 7, 1940

(After HM,Jr's return from Cabinet. )
Present:

Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Young

HM,Jr: At Cabinet got the President quite
worked up and almost to the point he was going to
write a letter to Harrison and Doughton on excess
profits tax and I tried my best to dissuade him. Now
you (Sullivan) have got to see Jerry Cooper and he has
got to make a statement, Monday or Tuesday, that they
will study this thing this summer and that they will
make a recommendation in the Fall on this year's income.
If they don't, by God! the President is going through
with one of those letters that upset Pat a couple of
years ago. You had better have a nice, quiet talk
with Jerry and say unless he comes through with a strong
statement -- when will they have a chance to make this
thing?

Mr. Sullivan: Tomorrow morning. The SubCommittee finished its work this afternoon; goes to
the full Committee tomorrow morning at 10:30.

HM,Jr: It's up to Jerry and I can't promise -this is what Cordell wrote to the President. "You might

consider having Senator Harrison et als re-state their
purpose to enact an excess profits tax in January for
1940 on, and make public announcement of it. Cordell
Hull writes this to the President and the President gives
it to me, 80 I don't want him doing it again and have all
of them sore at the President, but if they will make a
public announcement -- have I made myself plain?

Mr. Sullivan: You have, Sir.
HM,Jr: But Cabinet got him all worked up except Wallace. He thought business ought to get going
and once they got going as a break on inflation, that was

the time he was talking about my business. I said, "What
you are saying is the fat and the OX first." So the Vice

0572
-2-

President kept saying, "Jerry Cooper is for this."
Tuesday, in my office, he wasn't. He said it again.
I said, "I am sorry, Mr. Vice President. He told me
he wasn't." He said, "Well, may be it was two or
three weeks ago he said he was for it."
Put it in a way the President is not threatening them, but he is, as a matter of fact. The President
said, "Henry, I mean business. If But if Jerry will make
a forthright statement on this that they intend -- and
they can say something about letting industry get started,

but I will leave it to him.

Mr. Sullivan: Do you think this would be ade-

quate if Mr. Cooper were to announce that he had instructed
the Legislative Counsel of the House, Stam, and the Treasury officials to meet, address themselves to the problem
of preparing a b1:11 to be passed at a special session to
be held this Fall?

HM,Jr: No, don't say special session.

Mr. Sullivan: No special session. Then early

next session to apply to incomes for 1940.

HM,Jr: Yes. If you could get Pat to join you
in that, it would be wonderful. Talk it over with Cooper
and say this is what the President wants, but if you can
pull Pat into it and make it a joint statement
Mr. Sullivan: I think I could get Cooper and
Doughton and then I will submit it to Senator Harrison.
HM,Jr: The President wants togo on record and
if you could include something about war millionaires

Mr. Sullivan: I will see what I can do.
HM,Jr: I mentioned at Cabinet about Knudsen two
or three times wanting to do something about Wages and

Hours and Vinson-Trammell, etc. I said I was taking
the position that the President did not want any of his
social legislation changed and that I was having Knudsen
and Stettinius in Tuesday to talk the matter over with

0573

-3-

them.

The President said, "Fine. If I said, "Am
right
that
you don't want them changed?" He said,
"Yes.
I told them so yesterday.'
I

(Mr. Young came in at this point. )
HM,Jr: (To Mr. Young) Make some notes, will

you please. This is what I want to know Monday, if
possible. (1) When will there be another ship coming
over for more planes after this one? When will there
be another one in Halifax? (2) I want some kind of a

report on these Navy Thompson machine guns. Progress

report. (3) I would like a picture of what one of

these 50 Navy planes looks like. Photographs. Also

photographs of what the Army is proposing -- those 93
thatof
the
Army is proposing to give up. Short description
each.
Do you (Young) want to tell me anything?
Mr. Young: Jacquin called me up a few minutes
ago and said Purvis had talked him about the 93 and that
he wondered what you hadtold Purvis this morning because

Purvis evidently took it for a sure-fire thing.
HM,Jr: It is now.

Mr. Young: As I remember the conversation this
morning you told him it had not been approved.

HM,Jr: General Marshall told me they are already
being assembled.
Have you got a meeting this afternoon?

Mr. Young: The Irish Minister wants some guns,
armored cars and ammunition. Is Compton hangling motor

boats? What's stalling is there has not been an official

release issued by the Secretary of Navy to Admiral Spear.
Stark. )

(At this point, HM, Jr placed a call for Admiral
Mr. Young: It needs a push.

HM,Jr: I will give it a "putsch" right now.
000-000

Secretary Hull's note to the President
at Cabinet 6/7/40

THE WHITE HOUSE

-

WASHINGTON

you might Consider

having Senutor Harrism

it als. re-state Their
scans
$

purpose to enact
tat in January for 1940 on ,

and malle public

announcement of if 1

0574

June 9, 1940
(About 9:45 D. m. )

I talked to the President and told him what

we had accomplished on the bombs and fuses and he
is very much pleased.

I asked him if he had read the resolution we
had gotten through the Ways and Means. I read it
to him and he was delighted and said I could quote
him as being very happy over it.
news.

Paris.

Then the President told me he had very bad

The Germans were at Compiegne, 25 miles from

0575

576

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1940

Mr. Secretary:

Attached herewith are word-forword copies of your dispatch to the

President last night and his reply.
the original dispatch from the President will go directly to Mrs. Klotz

No other copies have been made and

at your office tomorrow morning, by

White House messenger.

Mr. Dale Whiteside of the White
House Secret Service will carry this
confidential cover to your home as
per
your telephone conversation from
Beacon.

Tel. & Tel. Office,
Cook.

SJ ANDARD FORM No. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT

FROM

MARCH 10. 1926

I

COPY OF ORIGINAL

The White House
Washington

TELEGRAM

-

OFFICIAL BUSINESS GOVERNMENT RATES

CONFIDENTIAL

(Via Naval Communications)

JUNE 8, 1940. 7:25PM.
10-6481

THE PRESIDENT
USS POTOMAC

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE NAVY HAS OFFERED X NUMBER OF BOMBS TO THE
WAR DEPARTMENT TO GO ALONG WITH FIFTY DIVE BOMBERS. SECRETARIES
WOODRING AND JOHNSON HAVE FILED A MEMORANDUM WITH GENERAL WATSON

AND UNTIL THEY HEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WISHES TO RELEASE
THESE BOMBS THEY REFUSE TO DO ANYTHING. SORRY TO BOTHER YOU AT

THIS TIME BUT WE OUGHT TO HAVE AN ANSWER TONIGHT. THE FRENCH SAY
THEY NEED SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY BOMBS WHICH WILL BE ENOUGH TO LAST
THEM FOR FIFTEEN DAYS.
HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL

COPY OF ORIGINAL
090345CR513
NAVAL DISPATCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

9 JUNE 40

The White House
Washington
FROM: PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES

ROUTINE

TOR CODE ROOM
0415

TO: THE SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY

RELEASE:
MW

IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT BOMBS ARE A NECESSARY PART OF PLANE
EQUIPMENT AND SHOULD GO ALONG WITH THE 50 NAVY BOMBERS. SHOW
THIS TO WOODRING AS AUTHORITY TO RELEASE.
*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0579
June 9, 1940
MEMO FOR

Mrs. Klotz:
Secretary Morgenthau requested

the attached dispatch be paraphrased and sent over first thing
Monday morning. It appears to be

in fairly good form as received

from Naval Communications. There-

fore we are sending it to. you just

as we received it.

Tel. & Tel. Office,
Cook.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0579
June 9, 1940
MEMO FOR

Mrs. Klotz:
Secretary Morgenthau requested

the attached dispatch be paraphr

ased and sent over first thing

Monday morning. It appears to be
in fairly good form as received
from Naval Communications. Therefore we are sending it to you just
as we received it.

Tel. & Tel. Office,

Cook.

090345CR513

NAVAL DISPATCH

NAVY DEPARTMENT

0580

FROM: PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DATE: 9 JUNE 40

TO: THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

INFO:

TOR CODE ROOM:

445

RELEASE:
MW

IT SEEMS OBVIOUS THAT BOMBS ARE A NECESSARY PART OF
PLANE EQUIPMENT AND SHOULD GO ALONG WITH THE 50 NAVY
BOMBERS. SHOW THIS TO WOODRING AS AUTHORITY TO RELEASE

to

Real been RW, w

the of

NOTE: ANY REPLY 10 THIS MESSACE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 56 OF THE "INSTRUCT ONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL
COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C. ,

0581
June 10, 1940

When HM,Jr got the attached message from Schwarz,

he called Miss Le Hand and told her that Baron de la
Grand had been up to the Bell Aircraft Company representing himself as a White House guest and asked for
license
necessary jigs and dies to build the P-39
in
Frenchand
Morocco.

HM,Jr said to Miss Le Hand, "I think you should
and Navy that word should get out that he should not
be permitted to go to any factories which have contracts with the Army and Navy."

get the authority to tell Pa Watson to tell the Army

-

6-10-40

TO:

The Secretary

Fred Neely of Bell Aircraft
called me from New York last
night to say that Baron de la

Grand had been at the Buffalo
plant Saturday asking for
license and necessary jigs

and dies to build the P-39
in French Morocco. Neely
said that Larry Bell was

completely flabbergasted by
the request and was eager to
get some indication whether
there has been any change of

policy here. He said the
dies would be of little value
without Bell engineers needed
here for construction supervision. The Baron asked for
an answer Comorrow (Tuesday).
Neely is calling me this
afternoon from New York. Can

we
shed any light on the
situation!
@

From: MR. SCHWARZ

0583
June 14, 1940

HM,Jr called the President at 10:45 a. m. and
the following is HM, Jr' 8 end of the conversation:
"Good morning, Sir.

"Mr. President, Mayor Maury Maverick just left
here and he 18 talking about this revolution in Mexico

on July 8th. He wants to offer his services to go
down there unofficially and he really knows his stuff.
I don't know how much confidence you have in him. He
is going to see Hull at noon. He has seen Berle and
has practically seen everyone. I wanted to give it

to you direct, because I knew you had the whole picture.
"Oh!

"But he is not the man?

"He talked rationally this morning.

"All right, Sir.
(The President said that Mayor Maverick went to

a convention and got into several fist fights. Nobody

really knows about Mexico. The President said there
may be four revolutions, there may be eight. He said
Mayor Maverick should see Welles, 80 I told him that he
was going to see Hull at noon. Under the circumstances

there is nothing I can do about it.)

(The Secretary's end of the conversation with
the President follows.)
"Our financing went very well, but not everybody
had a chance to turn in. We only gave them two days.
The percentage of turn in would have been greater if

they had had four days. It had nothing to do with the

price.

"Knudsen was here this morning. He now has a

formula not only on the Allies, but on the whole business.
'For 12 days, he said, 'I have been looking for a formula

and now I have one. He said he had to sell it now to

0584

-2-

Jesse Jones.

You know it 18 going to take a lot
of nerve to put up $3,000,000 or $5,000,000 with
the prospects of taking a loss. Jesse has always
wanted to make a profit. It may take $1, 000,000,000
and Jesse has got to be willing to take a loss. Be-

fore we are through with it we may have to come to you.

"All contracts, both Allied and others, would
have to be subject to the Vinson-Trammell and Wages
and Hours. The Allies were here this morning and
they have agreed to it.
000-000

0585
June 17, 1940

Saw the President of the United States for

10 or 15 minutes.

Told him that Arthur Purvis was coming for
supper and wanted to know whether I should continue
to give the English the same assistance that I have given

the English and French up to now.

He

said abso-

lutely! I said, for example, that they need four-

engine bombers. He said, "Haven't we got 8 or 9
obsolete one s that we could spare?" I said, "Well,
I think we ought to be able to spare about 10. " He
said, "That's fine." He said, "You have been doing

grand work and continue to give the English the same

help."

I said that it was my belief that next week
at the Republican Convention they will attack the
President on the President's Secretary of War and
Navy; that knowing him the way I did, that once
they began to attack him that he would get the old
Dutch up and would do nothing about it. He agreed
that, therefore, this was the week to do it. He
said that he had a thought that shifts in the Cabinet
would accomplish this within the next two days. I

said that I thought that I had seen enough of Knudsen
that I could recommend him for Secretary of War and
that the machinery was all in the War Department and

1f he really was to function he ought to have that
machinery at his disposal. He said, "Who would you

put in his place?" I said, "I really don't know.'
He said, "Who?" I said, "I don't know." He said,
"What about Forrestal?" I said, "He might do." I

said it would be unimportant who filled Knudsen's
place 1f Knudsen went in as Secretary of War. The

President said, "How would he be on profits?" I said,

"I think he would be all right." I said, "Anyway,
it's up to us in the Treasury to watch it."
000-000

0586

June 18, 1940

(1:30 p.m.)

I just spoke to Grace Tully and told her I
was sending over to the President a most secret docu-

ment in regard to the British destroyer situation,
and I wished she would inform the President that it is
my belief that unless we help out the British with
some destroyers it is hopeless to expect them to keep
going.

TRIPLE CONFIDENTIAL

Franklin D. Receevelt Library

DEAI ADDITION per T.D.160

RHO 8-2-71

ANGLO-FRENCH PURCHASING BOARD
NEW YORK:
15 BROAD STREET

0587

WASHINGTON
725 15th ST., N. W.

one 5 the

This letter from

Washington, D.C.

June 18, 1940.

8/6/10
H. S. Klotz
Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.
the with Laura some ostpres Mrs.

Dear Mrs. Klotz,

At the request of Mr. Purvis,
I am sending to you two copies of an important
telegram received from London with regard to
destroyer losses.

Yours sincerely,

C.T. Ballentyne
Charles T. Ballantyne,
Secretary-General.

0588

Viscount Halifax
Lord Lothian
June 17th, 1940
"

"

Following was handed to United States
Ambassador by former naval person late on June 15th.
Please inform Purvis.

Since beginning of the war Britain and
France lost thirty-two destroyers with displacement of 47,380 tons, which were complete losses.
Out of these twenty-five with displacement of 37,
637 tons were lost since February 1st.
There is (? always) a large number of
destroyers out of action for worst damages caused by
enemy action and (defence service ?). From the
outbreak of the war up to invasion approximately 30%
of British destroyers in home waters were in this
condition and since then percentage has greatly
increased and for instance out of 133 destroyers in
commission in home waters today only 68 are fit for
service, which is lowest level since the war started.
In 1918 some 433 were in service.

The critical situation which has arisen

in land operations has unfortunately made less
apparent the grave difficulties with which we are
faced on the sea.

The seizure of the Channel ports by the
and stepping-off ground for descents on the coast.
This means that our East Coast and I presume ports
will become much more open to attack and in consequence more (? shipping) will have to be concentrated
on the West Coast ports. This will enable the enemy
to concentrate their submarine attacks on this more
limited area, the shipping lanes of which will have
to carry a heavy concentration of shipping.
enemy has provided him both with convenient bases

DECLASSIVED

-2-

This alone is a serious enough problem at
a time when we know that enemy intend to carry out
bitter and concentrated attack on our trade routes

but added to our difficulties is the fact that
Italy's entry into the war has brought into the seas
another one hundred submarines many of which may be

added to those already in German U-Boat fleet which
at a conservative estimate numbers fifty-five.
The change of strategical situation

brought about by possession by the enemy of the
whole coast of Europe from Norway to Channel has
faced us with a prospective invasion which has
more hopes of success than we had ever conceived

possible. While we must concentrate our destroyers
on protecting vital trade, we must also dispose our
naval forces to meet this threat.

If this invasion does take place it will

almost certainly be in the form of dispersed landings
from a large number of small craft and only effective
counter to such a move is to maintain numerous and
effective destroyer patrols.
To meet this double threat we have only
the 68 destroyers mentioned above. Only 10 small
type new construction destroyers are due for completion in the next four months.
The position becomes still worse when
we have to contemplate diverting further destroyer
forces to the Mediterranean as we may be forced to

do when the sea war there is intensified.
We are faced with the imminent collapse
of French resistance and if this occurs successful
defence of this Island will be only hope of averting

collapse of civilisation as we define it.

We must ask therefore as a matter of life
or death, to be reinforced with these destroyers.
We will carry on the (? struggle) whatever the odds
but it may well be beyond our resources unless we
receive every reinforcement and particularly do we
need this reinforcement on the sea,

0589

0590
June 19, 1940
10:30 a.m.

(After return from conference with the President
at 9:30 a.m. )

HM, Jr asked for Miss Le Hand on the telephone and

the following is his end of the conversation.
"Missy.

"I just left the President and he gave me the
list of people he is thinking of appointing for War
and that was either Stimson or Bob Lovette and for
some reason or other he has gone a little sour on
Knudsen. I wanted to get this over: after all,
Stimson is 72 or 73; Lovette has never had a chance.
After all he may be the best of all. And Knudsen
gets things done and I have worked 1 th him long
enough to know the man is a doer and the other thing
is if you get a very strong man in the War Department
he' 8 not going to let Knudsen run the War Department
and Knudsen will go home sore. So altogether I wish
you would. He' 8 thinking of all three. I am strong
for Knudsen. The only criticism the President has is
he speaks broken English. It's like what Lincoln said,
"Give me the same kind of whiskey for the rest of my
soldiers.' I wish Frances would stop talking.

"So will you tell him I feel this quite strongly.
Ithe
had
a
talk with Harry, and Harry and I feel just
samelong
on this.
"I don't know when he's going to make up his

mind, but I gather the letter 1s going this morning,

so maybe I helped a little bit. I walked in this

morning and said, "The two days are up," and much to

my surprise he said, "That's right and I am going to
do something, today.

"Thanks. Thank you."
000-000

0591
June 19, 1940
10:30 a.m.

(After return from 9:30 conference
with the President.)

Saw the President.

Told him about the French and how they acted

in regard to leeting the English buy the gold and

take it to Canada and he was very much surprised.

Then told him about the seeming misunderstanding between Knudsen and Stettinius and his gang and
how Nelson and Foley were going to try to get them

straightened out this morning. The President said,
"Good!".

Then I said, "The two days are up. What are
you going to do about War and Navy?" He said, I
going to act today. He was thinking of Stimson or
Bob Lovette or Knudsen. (See HM,Jr's phone conversation with Miss Le Hand just previous to this transam

cript.)

I saw Harry out in the hall and he showed me

the letter which the President, he hoped, would write
longhand within the next hour and I went over it and
made four or five changes in the letter and Harry ac-

cepted them all. It's a letter to Woodring asking
him to resign tomorrow and offering him the position
of Governor of Porto Rico. (I think the President
means business this time about Woodring.)

Also talked to him about these 20 boats. The
President seemingly did not like the story and I said
something about I had no use for Compton and the President said, 'What have you got against Compton?" and
I said, "I don't think he's working in the interest
of the Government and I think he can be influenced by
the contractors and by the Admirals.
Then Steve Early came in and was very much

upset about the story. He said it had to be straightened

0592
-2-

out at once and I made the suggestion to let Stark
handle it. While I was there, Stark called up and
the President and he discussed it and agreed that
Stark would handle it. Then Steve Early was priming

himself, seemingly to handle it at his 10:30 press

conference, and General Watson, who was standing next

to me, poked me in the back and whispered in my ear

"I thought Stark was going to handle this". So I let

a few minutes pass and after the President was through
explaining the whole thing to Early, who was cross-

examining the President, I said, "I take it this is
what Stark is going to say. # Early said, "Yes. That's
right." Because Early saying how he was going to
describe it was going to throw a lot of it on me and
I am sure Stark won't.

Harry Hopkins told me that the President has
Colonel Knox in mind for the Navy, but he does not

think that Knox will take it.

The President seems to be in a very friendly

mood these days, very self-possessed.
000-000

0593
June 25, 1940.

I called Miss LeHand and told her that FBI wire-taps
all the Consular offices. They do not wire-tap the Embassy.
That is with Army. The Army never tells FBI what they hear.
I am interested in where this money goes and I only get half
the story because I get what FBI has and not what the Army has.

I am calling you instead of Pa Watson and I feel that
the President ought to issue an order that all of this wire
tapping should be done by FBI. If the President could get

word out to-day it would be very helpful. I think it is very
important.

0594
June 26, 1940

At 11:35 a.m., General Watson phoned the Secretary
and the following is HM,Jr' S end of the conversation:
"Yes.
On what?

Oh, yes!

Golly! You are going to protect me on this one,

aren' you? I don't want to have to appear in it, Pa.
I know. But you leave me out of it, except for
the President.
As I understand it, the Signal Corps taps the wires

of at least one embassy, the German embassy, and how many

more I don't know. See? And that information is not
given to F.B.I. Now
The Signal Corps.
F.B.I.

And the thought was that ought to be all given to
Well, that may be so, but you can't have divided

authority. Either the Army ought to do it all, or F.B.I.
And I am interested because I am trying to follow these
propaganda funds and I get full cooperation from F.B.I.

and when I say "How much money does the German Embassy

get?" I don't get anything out of the War Depart, emt.
Well, I know they do on the Germans and I think on
the Japanese.

And my own suggestion was that it all be given to
F.B.I. because they had it on the consular offices.
O. K.

Right.

0594
June 26, 1940

At 11:35 a.m., General Watson phoned the Secretary

and the following is HM,Jr's end of the conversation:
"Yes.
On what?

Oh, yea!

Golly! You are going to protect me on this one,

aren't you? I don't want to have to appear in it, Pa.
I know. But you leave me out of it, except for
the President.
As I understand it, the Signal Corps taps the wires

of at least one embassy, the German embassy, and how many

more I don't know. See? And that information is not
given to F.B.I. Now
The Signal Corps.

F.B.I.

And the thought was that ought to be all given to
Well, that may be so, but you can't have divided

authority. Either the Army ought to do it all, or F.B.I.
And I am interested because I am trying to follow these
propaganda funds and I get full cooperation from F.B.I.

and when I say "How much money does the German Embassy

get?* I don't get anything out of the War Depart, emt.
Well, I know they do on the Germans and I think on
the Japanese.

And my own suggestion was that it all be given to
F.B.I. because they had it on the consular offices.
O. K.

Right.

0595
-2-

together."Yes, but those two organizations ought to get
Right.
Thank you."

By way of explanation, the Secretary dictated
the following:
The President gave Pa Watson the task of checking

up on just what the Signal Corps was doing in connection
with tapping the wires of the German embassy and, I think,
the Japanese. He says the Army is doing great work on

that and it is for military purposes.
c0o-o0o

June 26, 1940.

The President read my suggestion in regard to having

a Cabinet officer be responsible for control of the export
of strategic materials but he wants to do it his own way
and wants to keep the authority under himself as he is very
much interested in it personally. Then Watson added that
the President told Hopkins to tell me this but Hopkins
wanted Watson to tell me and I added "What the -ell has
Hopkins got to do with it".

0596

June 28,1940
THE WHITE HOUSE

I

WASHINGTON

0597

Believe Pres. will not

get middle class or
upper class AN vote

therefore he will have

pto affeal to lower
third Watch him go to it,

an new social

legistation
I

June 28, 1940

THE WHITE HOUSE

0598

WASHINGTON

"Miney" asket me did
I think the Pres. was
going - to run . I laughed

and said why ask me.

the said again what did

Ithink I said I believed

that sometime during the
last thirty days behod made

of his mind to run.

Mussy sit's certainly hiped

he could wangle out of

running
she
said
she
not know. She said the
did hated to ask the Pres. and

she really did not know

hinselfintradict
whitterite
was
me when I

going to run But she did

30 days he had
made up his

mind to run.

IMJ
0599

:

said during The Got

0600
June 28, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In going through my files, I ran across a
letter which I wrote to you on October 17, 1938,
copy of which I am inclosing herewith.

I want to draw your particular attention
to page three, second paragraph, which starts

"Extension of credit to Latin American countries."
I thought that you also would be interested in
reading this paragraph in view of the discussion
which took place in your office yesterday afternoon.
Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House.
Encl.

0601
June 28, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In going through my files, I ran across a
letter which I wrote to you on October 17, 1938,
copy of which I am inclosing herewith.

I want to draw your particular attention
to page three, second paragraph, which starts

"Extension of credit to Latin American countries."
I thought that you also would be interested in
reading this paragraph in view of the discussion

which took place in your office yesterday afternoon.
Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House.
Encl.

0602
June 28, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

In going through my files, I ran across a
letter which I wrote to you on October 17, 1938,
copy of which I am inclosing herewith.

I want to draw your particular attention
to page three, second paragraph, which starts
"Extension of credit to Latin American countries."

I thought that you also would be interested in
reading this paragraph in view of the discussion
which took place in your office yesterday afternoon.
Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House.
Encl.

COPY
October 17, 1938

0603

Dear Mr. President:

The events of the past weeks have brought home to all

of us the increasing effectiveness of the forces of aggression.
and briefer intervals between, the fall of Manchuria and the
invasion of China, the conquest of Ethiopia, fomented unrest
in Latin America and in the Near East, armed intervention in

Since 1931 we have seen, succeeding each other with briefer

Spain, the annexation of Austria, and the dismemberment of
Czechoslovakia -- All in seven short years.

Nor can we expect aggression to end there. Japan at
first wanted only Manchuria; then North China; now she will
not be content with less than the whole of China. Italy wanted
only Ethiopia; now she wants control of North Africa. Germany
wanted only equality in armaments, then the remilitarization of
the Rhineland, then Austria, then Czechoslovakia, now colonies.
The current claim of an aggressor power is always its last -until the next one.
So well have the aggressor nations mastered the tactics

of aggression that a victory in one part of the world is follow-

ed by outbursts of aggression elsewhere. Germany's victory in
Czechoslovakia is followed with indecent haste by Polish and
Hungarian demands. Japan, watching her opportunity, loses no
time in attacking Canton, while in Palestine, Arab discontent
is fomented to fever pitch.

We should learn the lesson which the history of the
last seven years has to teach us. Let us not repeat the
short-sighted mistakes of Britain and France. The impact of
the aggressor nations upon American life and American interests
has so far, to be sure, been more insidious than overt but it

will be too late if we wait until the effects are obvious.

Who in France as late as 1930 would have dreamt that in less
than a decade that great democratic nation was to become a
second-rate power, shorn of influence in central Europe, dependent upon a grudging and demanding ally for security? Who
would have expected that Great Britain's might would be
challenged in the Mediterranean, that her economic interests
would be brushed aside in China, and that the Premier of England
would hurry to Hitler to plead that he be not too demanding or
impatient, and to plead, moreover in humble tones lest the
dictator take umbrage and demand more?

-

0604

Let us while we can peacefully do so try to check the
aggressors. Let us not be placed in the position of having to
compound with them. Let it not be necessary for the President
of the United States to fly to Tokyo and in humble manner plead
with the Kikado that he be content with half the Phillippines
rather than wage war for the whole. Such a possibility may seem
ridiculous now, but no more ridiculous than Chamberlain's flight
to Berlin would have seemed seven years ago.

In March of this year Winston Churchill called upon

England to act, saying "If we do not stand up to the dictators

now, we shall only prepare the day when we shall have to stand up
to them under far more adverse conditions. Two years ago it was
safe, three years ago it was easy, and four years ago a mere dis-

patch might have rectified the position. Now the victors are

the vanquished, and those who threw down their arms in the field

and sued for an armistice are striding on to world mastery. The
basis for the present humiliation of England was laid in 1931,
when England failed to join the United States in disapproval of

Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The basis of either humiliation

or war for the United States is being laid today by a foreign

policy that shuts its eyes to aggression and withholds economic
support from those who resist.
I know you are firmly convinced as I am firmly convinced
that the forces of aggression must be stopped. By whom if not by

us? I believe that we are the only country in the world now in a
position to initiate effective steps to stop aggression by peaceful

means. Once the United States takes the lead in developing an
effective program, democratic forces in all countries -- even those
now submerged in the aggressor nations -- will take heart. In
England and in France groups within the government and without will
be stimulated and encouraged to press for parallel action.

To use our great financial strength to help safeguard

future peace for the United States, and to make your "Good Neighbor"

policy really effective, we should introduce at once a program of
peaceful action on two fronts -- in the Far East and in Latin
America. In these two areas we can move most effectively and with
the least complication.
Two opportunities are now before us:

1. The extension of credit to China. It is yet possible
for such aid to be of decisive help. Sanguine as I desire to be,
I am forced to the view that without substantial financial aid
given promptly the Chinese resistance may soon disintegrate. By

risking little more than the cost of one battleship we can give

0605

3-

renewed vitality and effectiveness to the Chinese. We can do more
than that. By our action we can further the struggle of democracy
against aggression everywhere.

I am pleading China's cause with a special urgency because
you have on numerous occasions told me to proceed with proposals

for assistance to China. All my efforts to secure immediate substantial aid for China have proved of no avail against the adamant
foreign policy of doing nothing which could possibly be objected
to by an aggressor nation. I need not tell you that I respect the
integrity and sincerity of those who hold the belief that a course
of inaction is the right one, but the issues at stake go beyond any
one of us and do not permit me to remain silent. What greater

force for peace could there be than the emergence of a unified China?

2. The extension of credit to Latin American countries.
Our neighbors to the South are sorely in need of capital and
commerce to enable them to develop their resources free from

foreign intervention. Unless we assist them they will become a

helpless field for political and economic exploitation by the

aggressor nations. Already some inroads have been made in that
direction. Now, after the Munich agreement, we may expect that
Germany, Italy and Japan will become bolder and more effective in

their attempts to establish areas of economic and political support to the south of us. We can stop that penetration by an
intelligent use of a small proportion of our enormous gold and
silver holdings.
The measures we may adopt can be developed as the specific

occasions requiring assistance may arise. We have several such
occasions before us right now: Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Peru. The
details of the assistance can be worked out in conjunction with

the representatives of those governments, but it is first necessary that we accept in principle the need for positive action of
this kind as a part of our "Good Neighbor" policy.
European events of the last month have made me feel more

certain than ever of the wisdom of initiating a positive program
of assistance along the lines indicated above. Reports from
China convince me that the need for quick action is urgent.
Sincerely,
The President,
Hyde Park, N. Y.

605
July 1, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

Mr. John Sullivan, Dr. Roswell Magill and
Mr. Randolph Paul are coming to my home at East

Fishkill, Saturday morning, at ten o'olook. We
propose to spend all day on the excess profits
tax.

If you would care to see us Saturday afternoon we would, of course, be delighted with the

opportunity of presenting our thoughts on this subjeet to you.
Yours sincerely,
(Signed) W. Morgenthan, Jr.

The President,
The White House.

Bv Messenger 435

0607
July 1, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

If you should decide to run

for President, I would like to again
recommend Bill Douglas as your running
mate.

Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House.

0608
July 2, 1940

Dear Missy:

I would appreciate if you
would personally put the inclosed

letter into the President's hand.
You will note that I have
not sealed it as I thought you
might be interested in reading it
yourself.

Yours sincerely,

Miss Marguerite Le Hand,

Secretary to the President,

The White House.

July 11, 1940
When HM,Jr returned from Cabinet he told

Mrs. Klotz to call up J. Edgar Hoover and ask him to
give the French Embassy the same kind of treatment
which he is giving the German Embassy.

0609

0610
Cabinet, July 11, 1940
The Vice President started an economic discussion
on President:
what is prosperity and I wrote the following
note
to the

I thought Ray
moley
all the
$ gave the U.P. answers
Dont Esk lowlell

Cabinet. July 11, 1940.

CatinetTHEJuly
11.19x0
1
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

011

French Enbessy
It James - $5,000.00

Told Pas about all

the boats we were
holding.
He told/tall to send
for S oil companies doing
business in South america

who are shitting

oil to Canary Issands
and shain and give

THE MHILE HONGE

ess

THE WHITE HOUSE
/

WASHINGTON

0512

I

them the wink to

stop shiffing oil.
I say gested to thank
Knox that he and

a ship to canay Islands
to have a look-see , He

said h would

0613
July 12, 1940

HM,Jr called Miss Le Hand at 10:15 and said:
"Missy. Good morning.

Here is something which I did not think would
be sensible to put in a letter. The Chairman of F.D.I.C.
Leo Crowley, is Acting Chairman or Chairman of F.D.I.C.
and is also Chairman of the Board of Standard Gas and
Electric, which is a terrible utility holding company.
I think we are very vulnerable to have him head of a
bad utility holding company and head of F.D.I.C. In
defense of Crowley, he only stayed on because the Pres-

ident asked him to. I think that situation ought to be
ident a favor by staying on. It is in your lap now.

cleaned up at once. Crowley thinks he is doing the Pres-

0614
July 12, 1940

The President called HM,Jr at 12:30 today, and
the following is HM, Jr' 8 end of the conversation:

"Hello, Sir.

Did you get the little note I sent you this
morning?

I wanted to let you know that if there is

anything that I can do

I am not going to the Convention. I am just
going to be home. I thought I would see Bob off on
Monday.

It is very nice of you to call me.
I am holding a lot of ships with oil. (Later,
HM,Jr said the President said that he had a brain storm
about these three particular cargoes of oil: that the

Navy could buy the oil and send it to various places like
Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and store it wherever the

Navy needed it.)

I find it is all owned by the Texas Company.
In case I am stuck with it, I can get the Navy
to buy the oil?
That would be marvelous.
me #

Have a good cruise and thank you again for calling
000-000

0615
July 12, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I hoped that you would be able to see me this
morning. My purpose was simply to let you know that
my services were at your complete disposal in connection with the Chicago Convention.

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I am
planning to leave this afternoon for the Farm. I am
sure that you will be as pleased as I am to learn
that Bob has enlisted in the Naval Reserve. He is
sailing on the Wyoming from New York on Monday, and

I was thinking of seeing him off.

All of my plans will be cheerfully laid aside
if I can be of the slightest use to you during the

next few days.

Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House.

0616
July 12, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I hoped that you would be able to see me this
morning. My purpose was simply to let you know that
my services were at your complete disposal in connection with the Chicago Convention.

Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I am
planning to leave this afternoon for the Farm. I am
sure that you will be as pleased as I am to learn
that Bob has enlisted in the Naval Reserve. He is
sailing on the Wyoming from New York on Monday, and

I was thinking of seeing him off.

All of my plans will be cheerfully laid aside
if I can be of the slightest use to you during the

next few days.

Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House.

0617
July 17, 1940

Took Sir Frederick Phillips to call on the

President. Gave him this memorandum which the Presi-

dent read very carefully.
The President was perfectly swell and went right
after Sir Frederick and said, "How about selling some of
these securities that you have in the Argentine, such as
Street Railway, and so forth?" Well, Sir Frederick Phillips
did not know whether he could or could not. The President
pressed him pretty hard and the President said, "Take the

Queen of the Netherlands. She owns an apartment house here.
She could borrow money on that and I am sure that you could

borrow money on securities in this country also."
The President took absolutely the right tone and
when I stayed behind I said, "If I had asked him to take a
certain line, he could not have done it better."

After Sir Frederick left, the President said,
"Sir Frederick is middle-class English, isn't he? He gave

me that impression. "

I then asked the President if I could talk with

the Russian Ambassador provided I had somebody from the
State Department present to discuss the Chinese-Russian-

United States deal. He said, "Go ahead. From what I have,
things are about right."
The President left a sort of vague impression with
Phillips that we might in some way help them borrow money

against their securities.

0618

DOLLAR REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM EXCHANGE CONTROL
Summary

A provisional forecast of the drain on the gold
exchange resources of the United Kingdom in the twelve

months from the let instant suggests a figure of say 81632
million as a minimum.

Details of this forecast are

given below.

As against these requirements the exchange

assets of the United Kingdom are set out in paragraph 4.
They include:

(a) Gold to a total of 1444 million, of which say $600
million is about the minimum gold balance with which
the fund could work;

(b) United States dollars: $108 million.
(c) Dollar securities at current prices, say, $700 million.
Other assets are of a much less liquid type such as some

direct investments in the U.S.A. and sterling investments
elsewhere.

The available assets would thus be very low at

the end of twelve months and some help in liquidating dollar
securities may be wanted long before then.
1.

The sterling area consists of the United Kingdom,
India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Eire and the
British Colonies and Dependencies.
It includes also Egypt

and Iraq. Purchases by the United Kingdom in any part of
the sterling area do not affect the foreign exchange
resources of the British Control as payment is made in
sterling.
On the other hand, transactions between any

part of the sterling area and countries outside it do affect
the British Control.
For example, if Australia buys
/motor-cars

0619

motor-cars in the U.S.A. it is the British Control which

finds the dollars and, similarly, if Malaya sells tea or
rubber to the U.S.A. the British Control receives the
dollar proceeds.

Canada is not included in the sterling area,

and for the present purpose is in a position similar to
that of a foreign country.
Conjectural balance of payments between the

2.

sterling area, including the United Kingdom, and the United
States of America.
July 1940 - June 1941
United Kingdom imports
from U.S.A.

United Kingdom exports,
1892

Rest of sterling area

visible and

invisible

180

Rest of sterling area

imports from U.S.A.,
visible and

invisible

& million

440

exports

280

Adverse balance

1552

2172

2172

The figures are, of course, estimates made in advance, and

to be treated with the greatest reserve. They are based
on the latest information available but it will be appreciated that the major buying programmes, which were vastly

altered as a result of the events of May and June, have

hardly yet reached a settled state.
The direct purchases by the United Kingdom in the

U.S.A. during the twelve months, totalling 81892 million,

include for aircraft and aircraft materials $716 millions,
for munitions 8340 millions, for iron and steel $400 millions,
for other raw materials $132 millions, for manufactures $100

millions, for food and tobacco $84 millions, for petroleum
868 millions, with some smaller items.
The adverse balance with the United States is
3.

/by

0320

by far the greatest drain on our exchange resources. There
is, however, in addition a large adverse balance with
Canada and a smaller adverse balance with foreign countries.
Against this must be set the receipts from the sale of
newly mined gold and the proceeds of any loans which we

obtain from Canada and other countries. A rough conjecture of the total drain in twelve months on the Exchange
Control would stand as follows:

$ million.
Proceeds of sale of

Adverse balance

between sterling

newly mined gold:

area and U.S.A.

as shown above

Adverse balance
with Canada.

1552

560

80

sent to United
400

Kingdom

Adverse balance

with foreign
countries.

sent direct to

U.S.A.

Loans and credits
220

from Canada and

other countries

220

Net drain on

exchange resources

2332

1632

2332

Having regard to the course of events in June

it 18 believed that the final figure of 81632 million is
much more likely to prove an under- than an over-estimate.
Assets:

4.

Gold.

1444 million

Note. This is the figure of the gold
still held in the United Kingdom
Exchange Equalization Fund: it does
not include the gold reserves held by
the Central Banks of India and South

Africa, since that gold is at the dis-

posal of the Governments of those
Dominions and not at the disposal of

the United Kingdom authorities. on
which is in the position of a bank and
like a bank must carry a substantial
cash reserve, cannot divest itself of
the other hand the Exchange Control,

/all

0621

all its gold and the necessary balance
could
million.hardly be put at less than 3600
Dollars.
Note.

$108 million.

These are dollars held by the

United Kingdom Exchange Equalization

Fund. There were fairly substantial
private dollar deposits in the United
States at the outbreak of war but
these have been in large part requisitioned. Under the exchange control

arrangements in force in the United
Kingdom remaining private dollar
deposits are kept to the minimum amounts
required for carrying on business and
these deposite can therefore properly
be regarded as nothing more than
necessary working capital.

Dollar securities.

$700 million.

Note. In addition to these dollar
securities there are fairly substantial
direct investments in the United States,
but it is impossible to give at the

present stage any figure on which

reliance could be placed for the liquidation value of such direct investments.
In
The matter is being looked into.
addition there are of course large
British investments in the rest of the
world in sterling. It is impossible to
give any reliable figure for such investments in present circumstances and
their value for the purpose under consideration would depend on finding a
willing purchaser or lender in the
United States.

It will be seen that at the and of the twelve
months the available assets will be very low, whereas it

is certain that there will still be very substantial
commitments in respect of long-term contracts still out-

standing. No figure can be given for this, but it might
be anywhere in the neighbourhood of $1,000 million, and if

the war continues the net drain in the following year
could not be such less than $1600 million.
Long before twelve months are out the
question of finding some more rapid method than market

sales for converting dollar securities into cash may become
acute.

0622
July 23, 1940
3:30 p.m.

I spoke to Miss LeHand in regard to the telegram which I sent to the President on strategic materials
and outstanding permits which were licensed prior to
July 5.

The President sent me a message by Miss

LeHand that I should take it up with Sumner Welles.

I said, "I am sorry, that I wouldn't, that I have been
trying to get this thing through for three weeks, and
it was up to the President as Commander in Chief as
to whether he did or did not want it, and then issue

an order. "

0623

July 22, 1940

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT

HYDE PARK NEW YORK (VIA WHITE HOUSE
TELEGRAPH)

VALUABLE STRATEGIC MATERIEL SLIPPING THROUGH

OUR FINGERS EVERY DAY. LICENSES ISSUED BY
JOE GREEN OF STATE DEPARTMENT PRIOR TO JULY

FIFTH. PLEASE INSTRUCT COLONEL MAXWELL TO
CANCEL ALL OUTSTANDING LICENSES ISSUED PRIOR

TO JULY FIFTH BY STATE DEPARTMENT.
HENRY MORGENTHAU JR.

Declassified
per T. 0. 160

7.30

-

July 24.1940
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

dent 0624

and The Presi Leo both

:

the Limald hold
locative positions
in private Business

Inecnument that
effective any 1st
they be hermitted

rest
from
/ Jobs

andtimeto
to their

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0625

July 24, 1940
THE PRESIDENT:

Lee Growley and Stewart McDonald

both hold lucrative positions in prirate business. I recommend that effective
August first, they be permitted to resign
from their respective Government Jobs and
devote their entire time to their personal

businesses.

HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.

(Original sent to Hyde Park over private
wire at 8:19 a. m.)

( Copy to Mrs. Klotz, by direction of the
Secretary. )

0626
July 24, 1940

Pa Watson said that the President had told him

not to send up Judge Patterson's name on Monday

and that Barnie Baruch is raising hell about letting
talk to the President before he talked to Stimson.
It seems that Johnson, I gather, is insisting that
the President give out a statement before he will
get out, but Watson said he would talk to the President about it at 8:30 Thursday morning and the pro-

Johnson go and he, Watson, for some reason wanted to

gram is to send Judge Patterson's name up on Thursday.

Watson said that I had gummed it up by calling

the President and getting him excited and I said, "I

don't see how I gummed it up, because Stimson was in
doubt as to whether the President would keep his word

to him
andtoas
friend of the
me
to talk
thea President.
If President it was up to

I don' t give a damn if Watson is excited, because
Iefficient.
think it is more important to keep Stimson happy and

July 25, 1940

0627

At the White House.

I stayed behind and talked to the President
alone and urged him to see Corcoran, Cohen, Foley
and me to get a new corporation set up under the

R.F.C. to finance small factories. The President,
for reasons I don't know, did not want to see Cor
coran and Cohen. I tried my best, but he definitely did not want to see them, so I dropped it.

To make my point, I said, "Curtise-Wright and Packard are held up by Jesse and from hearsay I learn

also Chrysler on an order of tanks. Then and there
he called Jesse and asked him when he was going to
do it and Jesse told him he was going to do both

Packard and Curtiss-Wright today, that he knew noth-

ing about Chrysler. Subsequently I learned that in
the case of Chrysler it's a question of direct Gov-

ernment construction SO Jesse does not come in on it.
The President said, "You know, Jesse's ambition

all his life has been to be a Cabinet member. I
said I did not know that. He said, "Within a month

Hopkins is going to resign as Secretary of Commerce
and they are going to pay him $5,000 a year to look
after the Hyde Park Library, the way he had planned

it for months." I showed surprise and the President
said, "Well, you know, Hopkins is not well enough to
go to the office." I felt like saying I had known
that for two years. He said, "What would you think
of my making Jesse Secretary of Commerce as a sop to
the so-called older Democrats. I said, frankly,

"Well, I would have to think it over. I did not

know.

I said Jesse had been doing some funny things

recently. I cited how he was both father, mother
and nurse to Giannini. The President said, "That's
right, but we may have to do something like that.'
He said, "In my talk with Wallace today we agreed
we would follow the Wilsonian practice and that he
would resign from the Cabinet." Wallace was thinking of his successor in terms of either Marvin Jones
or Milo Perkins. So I said I was a little bit afraid
of Milo Perkins because I thought he was a little wild
in some of his ideas and the President agreed, and I
thought Marvin Jones would be a much safer person.

a

0628
-2-

He said, "Well, if I put Marvin Jones in from

Texas then I can't take care of Jesse Jones."
said, "What about Jesse Jones for Chairman of the
National Democratic Committee?" He said, "Well,
I

I think it's going to be James Aloysius Farley.
I said, "Really? He said, "Yes, I have a good
chance of getting him to stay." I said, "Well,
that would certainly be great news." He said,
"If I don't get Farley, it has to be a Catholic."
I said, "Well, then, your best bet would be Frank
If

Walker," and he said, "Or Eddie Flynn. "
The President then outlined to me what he was
going to do over the week-end, how he was going
down the river, inspect the Navy Yards at Norfolk,
etc., and that was going to be his method of cam-

paigning. "What did I think of it?' I said, "Excellent.' He wanted other suggestions for other
trips and I did not have any on the spur of the moment.

The President seemed a little tired.

Just before I left I got him to tell Watson to
tell Colonel Maxwell to issue the order cancelling
all outstanding licenses issued prior to July 5th.
The President's whole attitude towards me seems
to have changed again and he seems to want my advice
and, what is more important, he follows the recommendations that I make to him.

I gathered from General Watson that the State Department was terribly upset on these two orders the
President issued including oil and oil products, etc.,
without consultation with the State Department.

Watson told me in strictest confidence that when
he talked with Louie Johnson and asked for his resignation last Friday that Johnson broke down and cried
like a baby.
000-000

July26/40
THE WHITE HOUSE
I

WASHINGTON

0629

after sleeping on
your suggestion

I would prefer to
see

the Cabinet nather

than Jean Jones.
(Please
destroy.)
I gave this to the President and the
President wrote Agriculture over

Marvin Jones' name.

0630
August 6, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am inclosing herewith a

clipping from the Wall Street Journal
and a cartoon from the Washington Post

which I thought might interest you.
Yours sincerely,

Henry
The President,
The White House.

2 Encla.

By Messenger / 10

Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1940.

0631

Congress plans to enact revenue
measure within three weeks. Would

include excess profits levies, amorti-

zation, earnings limit repeal. Joint

hearings are proposed, etc.

Cartoon. Washington Post. August 6. 1940.
Preparedness?
I

1.

0632
August 6, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am inclosing herewith a

clipping from the Wall Street Journal
and a cartoon from the Washington Post

which I thought might interest you.
Yours sincerely,

Henry
The President,
The White House.

2 Encla.

By Messenger

0633
August 6, 1940

I talked to the President last night at nine

'clock and told him what we had done on the tax bill.
He was very much pleased.

The President then said, "I was going to call
you in the morning to ask you to do something for me."
He said, "I have received word, never mind from whom,

that Barney Baruch's nose is out of joint and if you

could speak to Arthur Purvis and ask him to consult with
him occasionally, it would be very helpful because I
am afraid otherwise Barney might get off the reservation."
He said, "Be sure to explain the full circumstances to
Purvis because I do not want to leave him under any

misunderstanding."

I gave this message to Purvis and he said he
would be very glad to do what the President suggested.
He had already had one conference with Barney.
The President first asked me whether we could
use Barney Baruch and I told him definitely no.

0634
August 14, 1940

At the meeting yesterday (August 13th) with the

President, I showed him my answer to Jesse Jones which

the President read very carefully and asked whether I

had shown it to Jones. I said I had not but that I

intended to. The President said that he wanted to keep
Jones sweet, and had I noticed Jones' brother called on
Willkie yesterday? The President said he thought he
would appoint Jones Secretary of Commerce and let him

rattle around in that job for the next couple of months,

but that Jones expected to keep his hold on RFC. While
I was there, the President called up Jones and asked him
to come over to see him at 3:00. The President said to
me sarcastically, "You know Jones is having a great deal

of difficulty in getting legislation through on the ExportImport Bank. I again brought the President's attention

to our suggestion for a national defense finance corporation,

and it was at that time that he told me he was a little
worried about Jones politically.

The President asked me how we were getting along on

the tax bill, and I told him it was 8 lousy bill and that

I had in no way- committed myself to it. This seemed to
please him very much. He said he wanted us to prepare a
veto message for him. He said he thought at his press
conference on Friday, on the chance that on the following
day Willkie might say something and tie up the draft and

the tax bill, that he, the President might take the wind

out of his sails and say something himself on Friday and

come out for $30 a month for the soldiers. I told the
President I was not in favor of the draft and was in
favor of the volunteer system. He said he was too.

He then sketched a system which he would have liked to have
had where the boys through selective draft would have come

into the CCC. He had the thing worked out very carefully
in his mind and it sounded awfully good.

0635
-2I asked the President what he was going to do about

destroyers, and he said he was going to discuss it after
lunch with War, State and Navy. I asked if I might stay
and he said, "Yes."

I told him the troubles of the Allison engine were

heavy and it was my recommendation from now on to let England

have everyother engine until further notice. I also let

him read the memorandum on planes on order for Sweden.

When the other gentlemen came in he said, "I asked
the Secretary to stay because he has some ideas on Allison
engines and planes to Sweden," and he gave me an opportunity
to expound on the same. As the meeting progressed, they

drafted a cable on the destroyers which was to go directly
to Churchill, and he, the President, would give a copy of it
to Lothian, which I understood from Purvis he did last night

at 9:15. The plan on the destroyers is that England is to

give us land in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Trinidad, and some-

other places in exchange for the 50 destroyers. The Presi-

dent also mentioned giving them these 20 speed boats which
we once had contracted and revoked, also 5 long distance
4-engine bombers and 5 long distance Navy bombers. I
mentioned letting the bombsight go with them, but they

didn't seem to think well of that.

The President asked whether he should conclude the

deal with the English first and tell Congress afterward or

tell Congress first. I said I thought he ought to tell

Congress first, but the undercurrent of those present
seemed to be he should do it first and tell Congress afterward.

From the first time that I discussed destroyers with

the President, he seemed to have made up his mind. He read
us a telegram from William Allen White from Colorado which

was non-committal, the implication being Willkie wouldn't
give
much
on this matter but would in no way guarantee that
hetrouble
wouldn't.

-3Some one mentioned 250,000 Enfield rifles for the
English, and Stimson spoke up and said he thought they

ought to go to the Philippines.

0636

0637

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have your memorandum of August 12 and Mr. Jones'

letter of August 5 in regard to the expension of the Packard
plant for the production of Rolls-Royce-Merlin engines for
British and United States order. I have the following comments:

(1) Mr. Jones states in his letter
and there would have been no delay in
this situation if Henry Morgenthau had not

It

told Mr. Purvis, of the British Purchasing
Commission, and Mr. Knudsen that the RFC

would finance the plants and that it would
not be necessary for the British to furnish
any money for this purpose."

After RFC secured enlargement of its powers last June to finance
the national defense program, I took the position that RFC should

provide funds to expand plant facilities of a capital nature for
the production of materials and supplies necessary for national

defense, and that the funds remaining available to the British
should not be dissipated on additional plant expansion which

would be available for our own defense needs. Prior to my statement to Purvis and Knudsen, I discussed this policy with you and
you indicated your approval.

(2) Mr. Jones states in his letter

-2-

0638

If we built a plant for the manufacture
of airplane engines, two-thirds for Great Britain
and one-third for the United States Government,

we eight be violating international law

At a meeting with Ed Foley on July 12 Mr. Jones took the position that
his powers were not broad enough under the new legislation to pormit
him to loan money to a manufacturer for the purpose of expanding his

plant facilities when the RFC knew that part of such additional facilities
were to be employed for the manufacture of airplane engines for the
British Government. Mr. Folay took issue with Mr. Jones and has given

me the attached opinion which holds that "there is adequate authority
in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make the proposed loan either
under the 1940 National Defense amendmont, supre, or under the 1938 Glass-

Steagall amendment, aupra". This opinion has the informal approval of
Attorney General Jackson.

Now it appears that Mr. Jones is placing his legal inability
to make the loan not on lack of RFC power but on grounds of international

law. Mr. Foley informs me that there is no legal morit in this position.
The question of the applicability of international law was considered at
the time the opinion was prepared and was not mentioned since it was
inconsequential.

(3) Because of Mr. Jonea' legal objection to advancing all of
the money for the expension of the Packard plant, the British Government

has agreed to put up a large sum of money for capital as well as noncapital items. As yet, the contracts between Packard, RFC and the British
have not been executed.

0639
c

P
Y

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

August 12, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

original returned to

White House m 8/14 -

FEDERAL LOAN AGENCY

0

0640

0

WASHINGTON

P

Y

August 5, 1940

Dear Mr. President:

In reply to your note of the 3rd, asking how we
were getting along with commitments to finance plants that
are working for both the United States and the British, beg
to advise that the Packard plant is the only one which seems
to fall in this category, and there would have been no delay
in this situation if Henry Morgenthau had not told Mr. Purvis

of the British Purchasing Commission and Mr. Knudsen that the
RFC would finance the plant, and that it would not be neces-

sary for the British to furnish any money for this purpose.
When Mr. Knudsen told me of this I advised him

that I was afraid that, if we built a plant for the manufaoture of airplane engines, two-thirds for Great Britain and

one-third for the United States Government, we night be
violating International Law, but that if the Packard Company
wanted a loan from the RFC, they should make application to
the RFC for it.

We have agreed with the Packard Company to install

equipment in their plant to a cost of $8,000,000 under condi-

tions which we are satisfied will not conflict with International Law. This, with other funds available to the Packard

Company, is all they say they will need.

I might add that I wrote Mr. Knudsen on July 12th,
suggesting a solution for the Packard problem and one in
which the RFC could participate.

Trusting that you are getting some relief from the

Washington weather and strain,

Sincerely yours,
/a/ Jesse H. Jones
Administrator
The President
Hyde Park, New York

Gave to Secretary 12:50 P.M., 8/13/40
Re: Swedish Export License

0641
The following is . complete analysis of undelivered balances
of export licenses now in effect for shipment to Sweden:
Airplanee
22

Republic 2 PA pursuit ships are covered by

license out of a total of 115 still to be

delivered on an old order. 34 of these

shipe were on hand complete with enginee

ready for delivery on August 9.

No export license exists for 156 Vultee
pursuit planes on which delivery will begin

in September. The Swedes have asked Vultee

to offer these planes to the U. S. Army.
Enginee
211

Pratt and Whitney aircraft engines suitable
for pursuit ships are covered by existing

export licenses.
Propellers
106

Hamilton Standard Hydronatic propellers

36

Hamilton Standard propeller blades

60

Namilton propeller hub forgings

65

Hamilton propeller blade forgings
All the above are covered by existing export
licenses.

Spare Airplane Parts
$193,602.00

worth of spare parts for the Republic

2 PA pursuit shipe are covered by an

existing export license.
& 29,091.67

worth of spare parts for Donglas DC-3
commercial planes are covered by existing

export licenses.

0642

-2Cartridges
23,150,000

10,000

rounds of 9 MR. parabellum assusition
suitable for Swedish, British, Canadian
and German pistols are covered by existing
export licenses.

rounds of rifle bullets are covered by
existing export licenses.

muskloty- Diary aug 17,1980

Confidential

1.

0643

Friday aug16, called in F.N.R at White

Hause by appointment Found

B. Jacken and H. Holkins already there
Pres . hadjust started reading cable

fund Churchill which he said was
Unitedly
satiswas
factory.
his mission
than on to hour

R. should Randle it. Every me agreed

it should bedine that day It was

finally R. idea to do it at his frees
conference and and handle what

we
were
to
namely
air
bases
etc.) He also got the idea on the stot
that he would see me Kencil King
Jackson and 9 persuaded not to include
the 20 stud toats 170 footers) at
this
time
as
congress
had
turned
it drun mee
I found the hrs. much more decising

again but not unfleastly so.

intinuted next to nothing
but seemed very excited and eagh

0644

2.

to all get idea over and Jackson not
too scene of himself
I stayed behind after others

left
Brought
up
oil
and
sorah
um much to may surfrise Pres.

talked in same vein as S.velles.
namely
we
must
not
fush
Japan
too much at this time as we

might
hush
her
to
take
which
East Indies I will tackle Pres.
again
in
this
after
Later
Day.
I asked him about L I them

said he was going to make
him under sec of commerce

Itold Pres we were cancelling
Swearing lincerds and giving

plane to Canada and stare enjines
the 4.1 any
Pres is very disdaiful of Willkie

0645

3

saw an Sec of Was Patkism
called Evansit g. m. while he was
there . 9 made there Auy sistins
/.
They
continue
mode
of
allism
ful the antis P. YO until

allions next Engine is 100 %
forever

2. They hincense mant to make
fewer house forever Custes Wright
and Pratt it Whitney
3. They seriously consider a flastic

flane for that basic trainer.

Evans told us over belopone that
amy is considerin g adding
another
150
"C
allisons
In
their another 100 Curtis P. 40

9 said to Pattersm after all
what are we going tv us these

ships
for
during
coming
year
It
Jernands came they would send
heavy
medium
slow
bomban's
and
curtis P. 40 could well take carero these

4,

I

0646

at cabinet Pres asked
what anyme knew about allism
as know me new any thing
I gave him the facts then
restated my idea that we should
but
m
making
P
X
O
with
midel "C " until a better dugine
had been frour and thinson

said he would see that it
would he carried out
at hunch with Kunsken I
made same recemendation
about Curtis P. - yo and he
said he had the idea
under
and would
consideration
take
it
up
with
g.m.
official
at Detroit the funday

10mg

sept 6. 1940.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

:

0647

Pres said all
contracts given
publicity in the future.

Steel krap
if ve enhango how can
we let go into England

Copy of out
refect to
state, war
Interior
many -

THE MHLLE HOOSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0648

Hall said same

are should
han dle oil Pres said I

should handle it.
Before Hanes are

shipped to whitch
East Indies check

with Hull said

the Pres

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Does English

0649

want planes
go
to
Dutch
East Indies

0650
September 6, 1940

I said to the President, "I don't know after
your election (his eyes came up with a flash) whether
you want me to stay on. If He said, "I told you that you

came with me from Dutchess County and that you stay with

me as long as I do and when we leave Washington we leave
together.
"

0651
September 10, 1940
11:45 a.m.

The following is HM,Jr's end of a conversation over the telephone with the President:
"Good morning, Sir.

LaFollette was in this morning and I had a

very good heart-to-heart talk with him. I was very
frank because on a legislative matter you can trust him.
I said that you were interested in his bill. "Here is
the situation. Tomorrow will be the last chance for

the Treasury to say something. By that he means every
night Pat Harrison has the newspaper men in after the day
is over and has led them to believe that these compromises have been approved by us. He said that Sullivan
tomorrow morning ought to say something pointing out

that this is a very bad bill because it is only going
to raise $100,000,000 This will lay the groundwork
for him to introduce his bill from the floor of the
Senate. Sullivan does not want to do that unless he
has your approval. Briefly, as I understand the La
Follette Bill, the amortization is in just the same as
it was in the House, but what he does is this: he takes
this year's capitalization for 1940, the actual money in
the business, and says to a man, "You can earn 8% on that"
and then he applies the excess profits on a steeply rising
basis on everything over and above that. The next year
it applies the same way on the amount of actual capital
in the business, but the same rule applies.
His bill is about 12 pages as against 100

pages on the other bill. It will raise a gross of
$475,000,000. If it does that, I take it that before

it gets
Byrnes.

on the floor you will have a talk with Jimmie
Tomorrow morning.

Suppose I get to you in the morning a one-

page analysis of the La Follette bill with the bill
attached. Does that sound all right?

-2-

0652

"I told La Follette the only chance of
success is that he keep absolute secrecy. That you

would talk to the Democratic side.

Do you think tomorrow you could talk to me

on

the needs of the English? Do I have to remind any-

body?

him. If

Fair enough.

I will call La Follette right away and tell

0653
September 12, 1940

At 10:10, HM,Jr spoke to the President. The
following is the Secretary's end of the conversation.
"Hello, Sir.
"That was a grand speech.

"I am fine.

"You certainly know how to give a political talk.
(The President said: "That wasn't political. ")
"I talked to Eleanor this morning and she said
that she begged the President not to give an historical
speech.

"All that speech cost me was about $5,000,000,000.
I figured that what you promised them was $5,000,000,000.
(The President said, "Nothing." ")

"I hope Wilkie raises you.

"They certainly were enthusiastic. You certainly

have not lost your touch. If
"John Sullivan and I went up on the Hill and we
did our Boy Scout deed and they tore us limb from limb.
Your name never appeared in the show and not in the papers.

You are in the clear so far. The point is that La Follette
does not know .how much support he is going to get tomorrow.
"Jimmie Byrnes and Barkley were excited, but they

told us as they were leaving that they did talk to you.
"I think we handled a difficult situation well and
if you want La Follette to do something tomorrow you will

have to get word to him somehow. You think over how you
want to get word to him.

"His bill is based on this year's capitalization
for 1940, the actual money in the business, and letting
the man earn 8% on that end then he applies the excess
profits on a steeply rising basis on everything over and
above that, and this will raise a lot of money.

0654
-2-

"La Follette is waiting for a word from you.
"Are you going to make any more political speeches?

(The President said, "Historical from now on.")
"You certainly handed it out."

a " ***
After the conversation was concluded, HM,Jr

said to Mrs. Klotz: "The President said it was a good
party last night and he made an historical speech. He
said that he would get word sometime today to La Fol-

lette, but of course La Follette could not say that the
President was for it, but that he did want La Follette
to introduce his bill in order to make a record. When
I described the bill to him he said, 'Oh, that 18 my

bill'.

/Cabinet sht 13.1940
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0655

Send Hull +
thin sun coty of
my letter from Lithican

of Seft 7th

Mucifull will
see
if
get
us
planes in

martinique as a

suof for mmay
fn
difformatic
enfs in Central

america and South america

1.

THE WHITE HOUSE
,

0656

WASHINGTON

you might keep
handy Leon Henderson

I basis (scrap Iron)
for any further Consider ation
(Hull gave me This at Cabinet
I

Seft (3.194)
1hm.g.

0657
September 19, 1940
10:20 a.m.

I saw the President and showed him first, how

the English were getting, Sept. 1 to Sept. 14, exclusive
of training planes, and exclusive of the P-40's which
have no engines, about 17 planes.
I then let him read the memorandum of what we

have done on the Curtiss P-40 and I said I wanted to
work out a similar arrangement with each company, particularly those where the Army or Navy were getting
more planes from now to the end of July than the English
were. First one I showed him was Consolidated and particularly the four-engine bombers and, much to my surprise, he said he was working on it himself. (I think
he's got this twisted with PBY-5s.)
So I said, "The English have got to have more planes"
and again he said, "They can have everything they want. If
He said, "But you had better work this out with the Army
Navy and Knudsen," and I said, "I am working it out and I
will go to it, but you are going to hear plenty about this."
I said, "I may have to bring them to see Papa.

Of course, this is going to be very hard work for
me, but if the President will give me his continuous back-

ing on this I will have no trouble.

While I was there, Watson gave me this memorandum

in regard to Maryland and the President said he would like

me to do it if I could and I said I thought I could.

0658
September 23, 1940

Saturday noon (Sept. 21) I called up the President
and told him about Welles calling me after Cabinet, Hull
calling me at 11 o'clock on Friday, and what Jones and I
had done with the Russian Ambassador.
Sunday (Sept. 22) at Hyde Park at the picnic, after
he was in his car and with several people standing around,
the President said that Welles had phoned him (undoubtedly
after I had spoken to the President) and that he had told

Welles to see me. I said to the President, "Well, after
all, I only did what you told me to," and he said, "That
1s what Welles says and I suppose that I, the President,
am therefore at fault. If I said nothing.

0659

September 24, 1940

I talked to the President at five minutes past five
this evening, and told him that I had called on Cordell
Hull this morning at his apartment, and had given the
old boy a half hour to get everything off his chest.
said that I left Hull with the understanding that we
would start anew.
I

The President asked, "Has Sumner come to see you?"

and I said, "Yes." "Well what happened?" he asked. So
I said, "Well, he came over here and offered his services
as a peacemaker between Hull and myself;" whereupon
the President laughed showing that he was as much surprised

as I was. Then the President said, "Did you tell Sumner
that you saw Hull this morning and everything was all right?"
and I said, "Yes." "Well," the President said, "What did
you talk about?" And I said, "We discussed politics in the
State of Maryland." I also told the President that Welles
said there couldn't be any lag between myself and Welles.

After my conversation with the President, I am sure
that the President told Sumner Welles to come over here

and make peace with me himself.

0680
September 26, 1940
10:05 am

In discussing the 12:30 meeting with Steve Early
they said they had better keep it off the record because
Steve Early thought they would say it was a meeting for
the 25 bombers. So I said, "Why not leave me off the
record
call
it National
agreed and
to do
it that
way. Defense meeting" and they

I then told the President what I was going to ask
now and the first of July; half of the Consolidated
for was half of the 112 Boeing Flying Fortresses between

B-24 4-engine bombers; half of the PBY5 2-engine Navy
bombers, and the Sperry bomb sight. He seemed to be

agreeable to all of it. I showed him figures on the

Canadian
training
program,
which interested him very much,
and he said,
"Bring
that along".

I also told him that much to my surprise I learned
that the Russians and Summer Welles had broken off relations. The President made no comment. I then showed
him the map of how the Russians proposed to get the manganese out and they were ready to sell it and I said,
"It seems to me, where we have no particular friends today,

that it would be distinctly useful within the next day or

two to conclude an arrangement by which we bought some man-

ganese from the Russians. " But, I said, he would have to
make
the but
next
move.
left me with the impression that
he
would,
I have
myHe
doubts.

1. Russia

0661

-

2. should Brass lats

be present
3 Mangan
Henry
Bunsiglet
Canada wants

plans
for
maitin B-26
Lock heed P. 38

7.0R

9.30

Wright # 1820 = 1200 H.P.

givin 10 to the any

0662

for Boeing
Had to send 5 Luch need Huden

to England without Engines

any askin

unitit march 31.1940
Pratt & What What ney

181

1830# 181

1340th ?
Wright
crush

R-2600 236

R- -1820# 68(?)

Captain Ballan

0663

arts for 6 Considerated

land Combers LB-30

to
hease
use
for
femining
across allaulic

need 6m October

120 on order starting

in april very with
first six opened
any British onewere anways

corp.
need release on Vulter
dive tomber

664
0664

Hankel 113 = over 400

Antis R40 mader

allison

C-

Delivery starting oct

$ Lichead - -P.38 = soo 2000

C- = Bell P.39 450
E4 start clevery selt

Captain Balfan

0663

asks for 6 Considered
land combers LB - 30

to
be
use
fn
femining
across allantic
need 6 in October

120 on order starting
in april . vehay with

first six . operated

by British oversee airways

corp.
need release on Vulter
dive homer

0665
October 3, 1940

After HM Jr returned from the White House this morning,

he dictated the following in the presence of Mr. White:

I saw the President and told him that I talked to Jones
about the Russian situation, and that T. V. Soong told Jones
that Oumansky had told him everything that had gone on in my
office plus his difficulties with Sumner Welles.

The President said, "Well, that's only part of the story,"

and then he went ahead and said, "You know Oumansky doesn't

stand so well with his government, and we have decided to do

half of our negotiations with the Russians through Steinhardt,
and Steinhardt has just had a long talk with Molotov.' So

I said, "Well, was it satisfactory?" He said, "Not entirely."

Then I said, 'Well, have the Russians come to any definite
agreement with Japan and Germany?" He said, "No. I think
they will continue their mugwump policy of sitting on the

fence." I said, "Well, is there still a chance of keeping
them from getting any closer with Germany and Japan?" and
he said, "Yes. I think there is a chance." Then I asked

"Well, would you say there is a silver lining to the cloud?"
and he said, "Yes, I would." I said, "What has happened in
Spain?" and he replied, "Well, the trouble with Spain is
there is no food there for an Army to live off and, therefore,
they decided they couldn't go ahead using Spain as a base."

In the list of the five things that T. V. Soong said

Oumansky complained about, nothing was said about a limita-

tion on Russians traveling in this country (see attached

news clipping).

I started the conversation with the President by saying,
"I gather that Hull doesn't want to do anything with Russia.
The President said, "Oh, no. You absolutely got that wrong.
It is much deeper than that."
(Mr. White was excused at this point and HM Jr con-

tinued as follows:)

0566
-2I then told the President how at our 9:00 meeting
yesterday we arranged with Knox and the English to divvy
up on the PBY-5s, and how I suggested that they all go
out to Consolidated at San Diego and try to duplicate
what we have done in Buffalo. And then I.said, "After
that Mr. Knox pulled a Beaverbrook on me and spilled

the whole thing to the papers. The President said, "You

could have knocked me over with a feather when I saw that
because I know who is responsible for the work and I knew
Knox had nothing to do with it.' "

Russia

0667

THE U. S. IS TRYING TO DISCOURAGE SOVIET RUSSIA FROM JOINING THE NEW
JAPANESE-GERMAN-ITALIAN MILITARY ALLIANCE, ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAY.
INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN RESUMED.

THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE A CONTINUATION OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE SUMNER WELLES AND RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR CONSTANTINE

OUMANSKY WHO SOUGHT RECENTLY TO REACH A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION OF

POSSIBLE "POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION* IN THE FAR EAST.
THE WELLES-OUMANSKY TALKS COLLAPSED BECAUSE OF RUSSIAN DEMANDS FOR

MORE LIBERAL TRAVEL PRIVILEGES IN THE U. S. FOR RUSSIAN TOURISTS.
WELLES OBJECTED, IT WAS SAID, BECAUSE RUSSIAN TOURISTS TOO OFTEN HAD
TURNED OUT TO BE COMMUNIST AGITATORS.
THE PRESENT CONVERSATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE IN MOSCOW.

10/3--RS845A

-

0668
October 21, 1940

I called up Flynn this morning and offered to

have a lunch here Tuesday or Wednesday of Cabinet
members and heads of Departments if he would send
Johnson, chairman of the Finance Committee, to talk

about raising money. I also suggested that they take

an ad in a Washington paper which would let government

workers know that they could contribute, and he said

no, it was a bad idea. I also offered to speak any-

where that they wanted me to, and his reaction to that
was negative. The President, when I suggested that I

might talk in Illinois, thought it was a good sug-

gestion and wants me to. But my own bet is that
Flynn will not send me out and I will not go on my
knees and beg to speak. I convinced the President

and he agreed to it that he would call Governor Lehman

and ask him to take charge of New York State, first
conferring with Farley.

Eleanor Roosevelt said she did not see any reason
why everybody should have the jitters.

Hopkins said that he left Flynn last night at

midnight, and Flynn was convinced he could carry New York
City by 800,000 and, therefore, New York City was safe
for Roosevelt.

0669
October 24, 1940

HM,Jr called the President on the telephone

at 9 o' clock this morning. The following is the
Secretary' end of the conversation:
"Hello.

This is Henry talking.

What a man!

It was marvelous! (President's speech at
Philadelphia last evening.)

It was an all-time high. I never heard anything like it. It was magnificent. You just went
to town! Your delivery was simply superb. Elinor
and I were thrilled down to our toes. I never heard
you do it any better.
This fellow didn't know he was up against a

buzz saw.

I am expecting to answer him at 10:30 at my
press conference on this business of money and gold.

I have a 300-word statement. I talk about his
friends in Wall Street.
I am at your service.
I expect to see Bill Douglas this morning. I
gave him everything we had.
My heartiest. If

HM,Jr said that the President said the crowds
were almost as good as in 1936 and he said that from

now on he has his bit in his teeth and he is going to
let him have it.

m
1a

QUERY:

A.A. GUNNERY

0670

Supply of 40 mm. Bofors Anti-aircraft guns and complete set of fire
control instruments including the Kerison predictor and 2000 rounds
of ammunition.

SOURCE:

Letter from Chief of Staff to Sir Henry Tizard dated Oc. 2, 1940.

ANSWER:

4 Oct., 1940

Reply to Chief of Staff from Sir Henry Tizard stating that he is returning to England immediately and
will try to facilitate dispatch of equipment by expressing doubt whether more than one will be sent.

fote Oct., 1940
foli Oct., 1940

Cable received from England stating that equipment

(one set, with crew) is being shipped.

U.S. authorities informed.

Mr.
AIRCRAFT ARMAMENTS

QUERY:

0671

Detailed information concerning belt servo feed for a .303, .50 and

20 - calibre installation.

SOURCE: Letter from Bureau of Aeronautics dated Sept. 27, 1940.
ANSWER:

11 Oct., 1940

Request referred to Air Commodore Baker.

14 Oct., 1940

Air Commodore Baker states information being sought

from London. He considers unlikely that drawings
exist.

17 Oct., 1940

U.S. authorities informed of position.

AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

QUERY:

0672

Reports of tests to determine effect of various types and calibres
of ammunition on aircraft components.

SOURCE:

Verbal at a meeting Sept. 18, 1940.
Letter from G2 dated Sept. 24, 1940.

ANSWER: 24 Sept., 1940 Request cabled to England by Air Commodore Baker.

1940 Information supplied to U.S. authorities before Oct. 19.
(10 report )

AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

0673

QUERY:

Information concerning the manufacture and use of machine gun tracer

ammunition incorporating delayed ignition and early shut-off of the
trace.

SOURCE:

Letter from Bureau of Aeronautics dated Sept. 27, 1940.

ANSWER:

11 Oct., 1940

Request referred to Air Commodore Baker.

14 Oct., 1940

Air Commodore Baker states information being sought

17 Oct., 1940

U.S. authorities informed of position.

from London. He considers unlikely that drawings exist.

NOTE: Instructional films on the use of tracer ammunition with early
shut-off were lent to the U.S. authorities, early in October,
and they made copies of these.

I

AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

QUERY:

0674

Drawings of a wing gun installation showing the provision for cooling the gun barrel and heating the gun receiver.

SOURCE:

Letter from Bureau of Aeronautics dated Sept. 27, 1940.

ANSWER:

11 Oct., 1940

Request referred to Air Commodore Baker.

12 Oct., 1940

Air Commodore Baker states information being sought
from London. He considers unlikely that drawings
exist.

17 Oct., 1940

U.S. authorities informed of position.

AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

0675
QUERY:

Ballistic data for beam (side) firing aircraft weapon.

SOURCE:

Verbal at a meeting Sept. 18, 1940.
Letter from G2 dated Sept. 24, 1940.

ANSWER:

Understand Air Commodore Baker taking action on notes of meeting of
Sept. 18, 1940.
28 Oct., 1940

Letter to Air Commodore Baker asking whether this

action is in train.

Note: Some data supplied in discussions between Professor Fowler
and representatives of Ordnance Department.

AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

0676

QUERY:

Description and reports of tests of British incendiary ammunition.

SOURCE:

Verbal ,at a meeting Sept. 18, 1940.
Letter from 02 dated Sept. 24, 1940.

ANSWER:

Understand Air Commodore Baker taking action on notes of meeting of
Sept. 18, 1940.
28 Oct., 1940

Letter to Air Commodore Baker asking whetherthis

action is in train.

Note: Some relevant information contained in answer to query on
effect of various types of ammunition on aircraft components.

1