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Keep Bell 2021 Vor 7-11-10 down DOKUMENTE zun DEUTSCHEN HEISSBUCH Nr.6 399 Sensationelle Funde an der Lotre. Die politischen Geheimakten des franzosischen Generalstade erbeutet. Amtlich wird verlautbart: Unsere Truppen haben einen grossen Fang gemacht. In dem kleinen Stadtchen La Charite an der Leire erbeutete ein Nachrichtentrupp in einem halb zerstörten Zug die politischen Geheinakten des franzostschen Generalstabs. Dte hter gefundenen Dokumente sind uon solcher Bedeutung dass thre Veroffentlichung schlechthin als die groeste Sensation dieser Art bezeichnet werden muss. Sie enthullen mit einer geradezu beispiellosen Eindeutigkeit die zyntachen Kriegeausweitungs plane Englands und Frankreichs. Alles was man deutscherseits liber diese Plane geahnt, kombiniert und durch bisherige Aktenfunde bereits Destatiot gefunden hatt wird durch diese Dekumente in seinen grossen Zusammenhängen in geradesu erstaunlicher Weise klargelegt. Infolge der etgenen Schwache und aus Mangel an Einsatzbereit schaft Englands und Frankreichs sollten die kleinen Volker Europas systematisch zur Schlachtbank geführt werden. Deutschland wollte man out zwetfache Art niederzwingen. Erstens, durch Abschneiden von den schwedischen Erzgruben oder durch thre Vernichtung. Ferner durch Vernich tung sowohl des rumynischen Oels als auch der sowjetrussischen Oelquellen von Baku und Batum. Zweitens, durch Hineinziehen Skandinaviens in den Krieg gegen Deutschland wodurch man 10 Dtutstonen gegen Deutschland Dewinnen wollte und durch Hineinziehen von Rumanten Turket Ortechenland and Jugoslawien wodurch man etwa 100 Divisionen gegen Deutschland modil IU machen hoffte. Dies nannte man sinnreich die Strategie der . Front Dusure" (Abrutzungsfront) gegen die deutsche Armee. Bereits seit langem waren beide Aktionen beschlossens Sache Rur die Unfahigkeit und Entschlusslosigkeit der gegnerischen Fuhrung and das blitzschnelle Zuschlagen der deutschen Armee hat diese Plane vereitesit Mit Recht hat General Gamelin in einem aufgefundamen Schreiden von 12. Mat 1940 die strengsten Vorkehrungen fur die Geheinhaltung dieser Dokumente des Generalstades angeordnet denn "wenn eines dieser Dokumenoe in die Hand des Feindes fallen sollte" 80 würde das deutsche Oberkommando "allein schon hierdurch politische Handhaden trhalten die es gegen die Allierten auswerten würde." Ein wahrhaft klassisches Dokument schlechten Gewissens. Der Generalstad der Franzosen war sich in klaren uber die ratastrophalen Polgen die die Veroffentlichung dieser Dokumente fur die englische und tranzosische Politix haden musste. Das Auswartige Amt hat in seinem Weissbuch NT 6 eine dieser Exten vorgenomen. In Andetracht der ungeheuren 2 - 400 Bedeutung wird aber bereits heute vor Erscheinen des Wel/Bbuches damit begonnen der Offentlichkeit in einer fortlaufenden Folge diese Dokumente Irur Kennenis zu bringen. Ein Intrigenspiel wird htermit aufgedeckt wte es die felt bisher wohl kaum gesehen hat. Die D. kumente sprechen fir sich selbst. a kument Nr 1. Telegramm des General Weygand an General`Gameli vom 7. Mara 1940. England bereitet das Bombardement der Erdolfelder von Baku und Batu vor. - Englische und französische Offiziere erkunden in Zivil als Petroleuminteressanten getarnt die notwendigen Flugplatze. Oberkommando des Operationsgebietes Ost - Mittelmeer Streng vertraulich! 7. MOTE 1940, No 295 3/8. Der General. - Abschrift General Weygand an den Oberkommandierenders der Landstreit- krafte und Generalstabschef der Landesvertetdigung. Der Luftmarschall Mitchell, Kommandant der Luftwaffe des mittleren Ostens der Heute in Begleitung des Generals Jauneaud auf der Reise nach Ankara nach Beyrouth kam hat mir mitgeteilt dass er von London betreffend die Vorbereitungen. fur die etwaige Bombardierung bon Baku und Batum erhalten hade. Er hat mir seine Absicht eroffnet den Marschall Cakmalk um die Erlaudnis E bitten Flugplatze erkunden zu lassen die in den Raumen uon Dtabekir Erzerum Kars und des Yan - Sees als Zutschenlandeplatze fur Flugzeuge dienen könnten die Ihre Hauptbasis in Djezireh hatten. Der Luftmarschall Mitchell hat mich um die Erlaudnis Gebeten unsere Flugplatze in Djezireh auszukundschaften da die politische lage des Irak dessen Unabhangtgkeit anerkannt ist nicht gestatet die Plugplatze dieses Hoheitsebietes ohne die Gefahr uon Komplikationen zu benlitzen Ich beehre mich Ihnen zu berichten dass ich dem Hunsch des Suftmarschalls nachgekommen Din. Die Besichtigung wird demnachst uon Brittachez und franzosischen Offixieren die beiderseits in Zivil auftreten zerden durchgeführt werden. Es wird dabet der Eindruck erweckt werden loss es sich um Arbeiten betreffend die Ausbeutung der Erdölhaltigen Schichten dieses Raumes handele. Weysand. 3- 401 Dokument Nr 2. Aufzeichnung des Generals Gamelin vom 10. Mark 1940, Plane der Alliterten fur die Schaffung neuer Fronten in Skandinauten und auf dem Balkan. Dte kampfen. Divisionen der skandinavischen und Balkanlander sollen fur die Allierten No 104/1. Streng vertraulich! 10. Mark 1940. Aufzetchnung Uber die Teilnahme franzostach brittscher Strettkrafte an den Operationen in Finnland, Mit Beginn der Feindselt@keiten am 30. November 1939 zwischen Finnland und Sowjetrussland haben die franzosische und die britische Regierung thren Willen zum Ausdruck gebracht durch Lieferung uon Flugseugmaterial und Waffen Finnland wirksame und rasche Hilfe gu bringen. Die ersten Materialsendungen begannen am 20. Demember. Das franzosische Oberkommando hat sich seinerseits unuerzuglich damit befasst die Einsight des Marschalls Mannerheim dartiber in Erfahrung zu bringen invieweit adgesehen von freiwilligen Materialeendungen und der Entsendung die der Marschall schon gewonnen hatte franzostache Streitkrafte bet den Operationen eingesetzt warden könnten. Zu diesem Zweck wurde Kommandant Ganoval zu dem finnischen Generalissimus entsandt. Er reiste am 20. Demender zurlick. 1939 aus Frankreich nach Helsinki ad und kcam am 20. Januar 1940 Am 16. Januar arbeitete das franzosische Oberkommando an dem allgemeinen Plan einer bewaffneten Intervention in Pinnland. Dieser Plan sah Insbesondere die Landung allierter Truppenkontingente in Petsamo vor. Gleichzeitig sollten gegebenenfalls vorsichtshalber die Hafen und Flugplatze der norwegischen Westkuste in die Hand der Allierter gebrache werden. Der Plan sah ausserdem vor dass auf Grund der einmal Demonnement Ergebnisse die Operationen möglicherweise auf Schweden ausgedehnt und die Erzgruben von Gallivare der wichtigen Quelle fur die nach Deutschland besetzt warden sollten. Durch diese Operation sollte gleichzeitig eine neue Verbindung Uber Narutk - Lulor werden. Der Plan die bei Petsamo stimmte mit dem Deschaffen Uberein fur Operation den Marschall Mannerheim dem Kommandanten Ganoval dargelegt hatte. Bet den halbamtlichen Unterredungen mit dem britischen Oberkommando schten dises unsere Auffassung zu teilen. Bet den interalliteran Wilttarbesprechun.gen vom 31. Januar und 1. Februar die der Sitzung des Obersten Rates vom 5. Februar vorangingen verwiesen die Englander die Frage der unmittelbaren Hilfe fur Finnland an die zweite 402 Stelle. Sie zeigten sich als entschiedene Anhanger einer Unternehmung gegen die Erzgruden Nordachwedens dte wentgetens im Anjang den Ubertritt eines Teiles der beteiligten Streitkrafte nach Finnland zur NebenerscheiRUNG haben sollte. Man verzichtete somit praktisch out die Unternehmung pagen Petsamo. Diese hatte nur noch sekundaren bezo eventual - Charakter. Diese /natcht erlangte in Oberaten Rat die Mehrheit. Dte Yordereitung der skandinautschen Expedition wurde sofort in Angriff genommen und die franzostsch britischen Strettkrufte standen seit den ersten Marktagen rum Transport bereit. Die erste Gruppe der franzostschen Streitkrafte (eine Alpen jagerbrigade) stand am 26. Februar rum Verlassen der Garnison bereit und konnte vom 1. Mark an jederzeit eingeschifft werden. Fur den Fall eines plötzlichen Handstreichs auf Petsamo hatte eine Vorhut schon utel fruher entsandt werden konnen. Die Leitung der in Skandinauten beabston tigten Operationen war dem brittschen Oberkommando übertragen worden. Dies konnte anscheinend night anders geregelt werden. Dte Beforderung des Expeditionskorps einerseits und der Na chachud andererseits mussten tatauchlich auf Verkehrswegen vor sich gehen die durch die Zone des britischen Marine Oberkommandos fuhrten. Der Schutz dieser Transporte 1tegt seldstuerständltch den britischen Seestreitkraften od. Ausserdem kann die franzosische Marine nicht überall gleichzeitig anwesend sein. Das Mittelmeer, die Atlantikkuste Frankreichs und Afrikas bleiben thr uretgenstes Gebiet. Ganz abgesehen von der Aufgabe die thr durch den Schutz der aus Amerika eintreffenden Geleitzuge erwächst. Es bedarf auch der Brodhnung, daes die Teilnahme der franzosischen Landstrettkrafte an den norwegischen Operationen, gegenwartig nur eine begrenzte sein kann. Das franzosische Heer 1st gezwungen, sein Gros an der Nordostfront gu Delassen, we es dem Gros der deutschen Krafta gegenübersteht. Das franzosische Heer 1st ausserdem verpflichtet, on der Alpenfront und in Nordafrika die Wache genen Italten zu halten. Das franzostache Heer hat ferner eine Vorhut an der Levante. Es kann daher unter den gegenaartigen Umstanden nur beschrankte Kontingente fur ausserhald dieses Bereichs Itegende Krietsschauplatze zur Verfügung stellen. In der Luft kann Frankreich angesichts der gegenwartigen Lage der franzostschen Leftwaffe nur einen beachrankten Beitrag leisten. Die Broffruing eines nordischen Kriegsschauplatzes bietet UOM der Kriegaführung aus ein hervorragendes Interesse. Standpunkt Adgesehan gesehen von den moraltschen Vorteilen wird die Blockade unfassender, vor allem ader 1st es die Sperrung des Erstransportes nach Deutschland die es ankomat. In diesem Zusamenhang ware ein Vorgehen auf dem out Balkan, wenn es mit dem skandinguischen Unternehmen kombiniert würde, 403 Designet, die wirtschaftliche Abdrosselung des Retches zu verstarken. Deutschland verfligte dann nur noch liber einen einzigen Ausgang aus dem Blockadering, ndmlich uber seine Grenze mit Sowjetrussland, wodel zu berücksichtigen 1st, dass die Ausbeutung der russtschen Rohstoffquellen noch langer Fristen bedarf. Auf militarischen Gebiet ware eine Aktion out dem Balkan (diese Frage Dleibt naturlich mit der Haltung Italiens verknupft), fur Frankreich viel vorteilhafter als eine solche in Skandinavien: Der Kriegsschauplatz wurde in grossem Masstad erweitert, Jugoslawten, Rumanten Griechenland und die Turket würden uns eine Verstarkung uon ungefahr 100 Divisionen zuführen. Hierdel 1st die Frage des Erdols nicht einmal berücksichtigt. Es wire dabei noch an die Erd81quellen Rumantens, die man verteidigen oder zerstören konnte und an die Transkaukasiens zu denken. Schweden und Norwegen wurden uns nur eine schwache Unterstützung uon ungefahr 10 Divisionen verschaffen. Die Truppen, die die Deutschen von der Westfront wegztehen misston, um gegen unsere neuen Unternehmungen vorzugehen, würden zweifellos . sich in den gletchen Proportionen bewegen. Die Vorteile der Eroffnung eines skandinavischen Kriensschauplatzes bleiben nichtsdestoweniger unbestreitbar. Jedoch durften die technischen Schwiert@keiten, die ein solches Unternehmen mit sich bringt, nicht verkannt werden. Auf dem Gebiet der Seekriegsfihrung sind Operationen in der Ostsee fur uns praktiech ausgeschlossen. Unsere Verbindung geht über die Nordsee von Schottland nach Norwegen. Diese Verbindungslinte 1st wesentligh langer als die der Deutschen zwischen Stettin und der Stidküste Schwedens. Unsere Verbindungslinte muse gegen die deutschen Uboote and Bombenflugzeuge verteidigt werden. Es bedarf der Erwähnung, dass die Jahreszeit, in der der botnische Meerbusen eisfrei ist, den Beutschen fur die Landung in Finnland die grossten Vorteile bietet und zwar night nur an der Sudkliste, sondern auch an der Westkuste und an die Schwedens. Für die Landkriegsfuhrung 1st zu berücksichtigen, dass norwegischen Häfen Nordnorwegens und insbesondere Narutk nur einen geringen Umschlag besitzen. Sie sind fur die Ausladung von Truppen and fur Nachschub von grosserer Bedeutung schlecht ausgerüstet. Die Eisen- einen dahnen, die uon Narutk und Drontheim nach Lulea fihren konnen nur noch, geringen Verkehr dewditigen. Diese verkehrsxiffer verringert sich eine wenn man bis nach Finnland vorstösst, da man dann nur noch uber und den Bisenbahnlinie verfugt, die thren Ausgangspunkt in Lulea hat, dass die botnischen Meerbusen umfdhrt. Dies gilt unter dem Vordehalt Schweden uns thr Etsendahnmaterial lassen. 404 6 - Das Klima Finnlands und inabesondere Lapplands 1st ausser- ordentlich hart. Franzosisch - britische Strettkrafte können dort nur eingesetxt werden, wenn sie in geeigneter Weise ausgewählt sind. Bis Ende Mat 1st dazu noch eine Sonderausrüstung notig. Franzostache Zug- und Tragttere komen, von den Mauleseln abgesehen dort nicht akklimatistert werden. Schliesslich stellt der Nachschub von Lebensmitteln und insbesondere von Wein fur unsere Truppen ein ausserordentlich schwer su losendes Problem dar. Aus dem Vorhergehenden ergibt sich, dass - eine rasche wenn auch nicht gefahrlose Landung (m5glicher Einwirkung feindlicher U-Boote and Flugzeuge) in Norwegen vorausgesetzt - der Einsatz unserer Streitkrafte in Finnland nur sehr langsam erfolgen konnte. buf dem Gebiet der Luftkriegefuhrung erscheint eine Hilfe fuer Finnland durch Entsendung von Bombenflugreugen mit grosser Ret chweite als die am raschesten und am leichtesten zu verwirklichende Lösung, vorausgesetzt, dass man sich wie bet einer Landung in Petsamo, fur die Broffnung kriegerischer Operationen gegen Sowjetrussland entschlossen hatte. Eine derartige Unterstützung erscheint als das einzige Mittel, Pinnland bis zur Ankunft uon Landstreitkraften zu retten. Dieses Mittel konnte jedoch nur von den Englandern angewandt werden da unsere Luftwaffe noch nicht Bombenflugzeuge neuerer Art, die dieser Aufgabe gewachsen waren, in genügender Anzahl besitzt. Vor allem nicht Flugzeuge, die threr etwaiger Aufgade in Frankreich entzogen werden konnten Auf dem Gebiete der Jagdflugwaffe war die Hilfe fur Finnland, out dte in diesem Falle Desonders Wert gelegt wurde, notwendigerweise nochzögernder. Dte Jagdflugzeuge mussten auf dem Seewege befordert werden In Schweden mussten sie abmontiert und in Finnland wieder zusammengesetzt werden. Es bleibt zu berücksichtigen, dass die Landung in Petsamo unter den ge genwartigen Voraussetzungen ganz anders zu beurteilen 1st als vor twei Monoten. Die Russen haben in dieser Gegend bedeutende Verstärkungen erhalten. Sie sind in breiter Front nach Stiden tiber Petsamo hinaus vorgestossen. Pitegerhorste sind e tngerichtet worden. Moglicherweise 1st eine Landverbindung mit Murmansk hergestellt worden. Schliesslich haben die Russen die Kuste mit Verteidigungsmittelm gespickt und vor allen schwere Artillerie herangebracht. Andererseits stnd die Pinnen gegenwartig Destimmt ausserstands der Landung allierter Kontingente durch eine entsprechende Landoperation entgegenzukommen, wt e urspringlich deabsichtigt war. Im Nachhange zu den seit dem Monat Demember durchgeführ ten Materialtransporten karn die Hilfe fur Pinnland nunmehr im Wege einer militarischen Unternational durch die Enteencung allierter Truppen verwirklight werden, Augest dan franz&ischen und pelntschen Kontingenten 405 2 13 000 Mann , haden die Englander die Entsendung uon sechs bis steben Divisionen in Aussicht genommen .. hierru eine streng vertrauliche Auskunsc. die mir von General Ironside gegeben wurde Der Voranschlag fuer die Truppenstarke geht uon 1hm aus die Zustimanung des Kriegskabinetts 1 e e t nicht vor. Dte gesante Streitmacht umfasst somit mindestens 150 000 Marn. Dieser Vor.. anschlag der alle britischen Truppen der neuro Aushebung in sich einschliesst - von den gegenwärtig in Frankraich befindlichen Truppen misste eine aktive Division weggezogen werden - kann offenbar nicht erhoht werden wenn man die Schwierigkeiten da. Transports und die Umschlagsmög!tchkeiten der norwegischen Hafen berlickstchtigt. Dte Ausschiffung der Truppen erfordert schor. an sich Dedeutende Fristen. Es handelt sich um mehrere Monate Gegenwartig konnen daher keine Beschlüsse fiber dte Erhöhung dieser Truppenzahlen gefasat werden. In zwet oder dret Monaten wird die Lage an der franzõnischen Front zwetfellos besser geklart sein und wir werden daher in der Lage sein die Unterlagen fur eine erganzende Entscheidung EU liefern, Dte technischen Schwierigkeiten einer allierten Intervention durfen nicht ausser acht gelassen werden. Ste sind nt ht unilberwindlich und werden gegebenenfalls aus dem Wege gerdunt werden Eigenhandige Be merkung des Generals: Unsere skandinautschen Plane müssen mit Extschiedenheit weiter verfolct werden. Zur Rettung Finnlands oder doch mindesten. sur Wegnahme des schwedischen Erzes und der norweatschen Hafen. Air bringen jedoch zum Ausdruck dass vom Standpunkt der Kriegsjihrung aus der Balkan und der Kaukasus durch die man Deutschland auch des Petroleums berauben kann welt eintraglicher sind. Jedoch hult die Schlissel des Balkana Itolien in der Hand. gez. M Gamelin. Document Nr 3. Telegramm des General Gamelin an General Weygand vom 12. Marz 1940. Die von den Allierten geplanten Operationen sollen im mittleren Orient vom britischen Oberkommando im Kaukasus vom turkischen Oberkormando gelettet werden. Durchachlag - Projekt - Geheim - NT CAB / D N - 12. METE 1940. Berlios an Cesar Franck - Antwort out Telegramm 1 236 Die meinem Brief 293 - CAB / D.N. betgefügte Note vom 7. Marz unterbreite te Ihnen die allgemeine Auffassung die ich dem ilinisterprasidenten bezuplich der Operationen im mittleren Orient und im besonderen über die 406 mogitchen Operationen im Kaukasus vorgeschlagen habe. Ich bestatige Ihnen dass meines Erachtens die Operationen im mittleren Orient von dem brittschen Oberkommando und die Operationen im Kaukasus von dem turkischen Kommando gelettet werden miasten da letztere besonders durch turkische Streitkrafte unter Mitwirkung der Luftwaffs und eventueller alliterter Spezialkontingente durchgeführt werden. Ste konnen mit Marschall Tachakmak tiber diese Frage in Verbindung treten und an allen Vorbereitenden Untersuchungen uber den mittleren Orient teilnehmen. Ich übersende Ihnen durch Kurier eine zusammenfassende Abhandlung uber die Aktion im Kaukasus. General Gamelin. Dkument Nr 4. Telegramm des franzosischen Botschafters Massiglt in Ankara an das Aussenministerium in Paris, vom 14, Murz 1940. Unterhaltung des Botschafters mit dem turkischen Aussenminister über das Bombardement von Baku und Batum. - Der Botschafter erwartet von der turkischen Regierung keinerlei Schwtert@keiten. (Übersetzung) Ministerium des Aussern. NT 329 - Ankara, den 14. Mark 1940. Mit Kurler eingegangen um 22,13 Uhr. Streng geheim! Im Laufe des Resuchts den ich thm gestern gemacht habe hat der Minister des Ausseren mir aus eigener Initiative ein wahrend der Nacht eingegangenes Telegramu vorgelegt in dem der turRische Vertrater in Moskau uber eine Unterredung mit dem Botschafter der Vereinigten Staaten berichtete. Nach Ansicht dieses Letzteren sollen die Russen sich über die Gefahren einer Bombardierung und eines Brandes der Oel gegend von Baku solche Sorgen machen da9 die sowjetruseische Verwaltung amerikanische Ingenieurs gefragt hat od und wte ein Brand der durch eine Bombardterung hervorgerufen würde sich mit Erfolg Dekampfen liesse. Ingenteure sollen geantwortet haben infolge der Art und Weise wie die ölfelder Disher ausgebeutet worden seien set der Boden derartig mit Oel gesattigt dass eine Feuerbrunst sich unberzüglich auf das ganze benachbarte Gebiet ausbreiten wirde. Ks wirde Monate dauern bis man sie loschen konnte und Jahr devorder Betried wieder aufgenommen werden konne. Was den Schutz der Bevölkerung angehe 80 musse die Stadt zu diesem Zweck um 50 Km weitergerlickt werden. "Was halten Ste davon?" sagte Saracglu zu mir. Ich habe 407 -9- bean/bortet, moderne Bombenflugzeuge heetten metffellos einen ausreichenden Aktionsradium um Baku von Djeztreh oder von Nordirak aus erreichen ru kinnen Es mussten aber dazu turkische und tranische Gebiete überflogen verdin "Ste fürchten also einen Einspruch Irans" antwortets mir der Himister - Deutlicher hatte er mir nicht klarmachen konnen dass die Schwier:,kkitten nicht uon turkischer Sette kommen wiiden. Es ware ungeschicke pewesen wenn ich ihn genötigt hatte sich naher auszusprechen and ich bin deshalb nicht weiter auf die Ausserung eingegangen. Sie ist aber ntchtsdertoweniger sehr bedeuteam und ich gestatte mir Euer Excellent darauf aufmerksan zu machen Ich habe überdies auch meinem englischen Kollegen davor Hitteilung gemacht. gez. Masstalt. Dokument Nr 5. Aufseichnung des General Gamelin vom 16. Marz 1940. Die Pigene der Schaffung neuer Fronten werden vertieft. Deutschland und Sowjetrussland sollen durch Abschneiden der Erzzufuhr aus Schweder. und der Oelzufuhr aus Rumanien wirtschaftlich geschwdcht werden. Man will eine Strategie der "Abnutzung der deutschen Strettkrafte" Defolden- (Übersetzung) - Grosses Hauptquartier Biro des Chefs des Grossen Generalstades fur die Landesverteidlgung und Oberbefehlshader der Landstreitkrafte. den 16. Marz 1940 - No 325 CAB / D.N. - Streng geheim! Aufzeichnung über die Kriegsführung. (Endgultige Fassung unter Berlicksichtigung der Ausserungen der Oberbefehls haber and des Generals Buhrer). Da die Au/fassungen die von dem "Kriegsplan fur 1940" Mit Schreiden No 290 CAB / D.N. vom 26. Februar 1940 an Herrn Mtnisterprisidenten gesandt - dargelegt sind die Grundlage unseres Vorgehens bleiben empfiehlt es sich angesichts der Unterzeichnung des ruestsch-finnischen auf kurge Sicht unternommen Waffenstillstandes werden konnen festzulegen um fühlbare welche wenn Operationen nicht entschei- dende Schligge gegen Deutschland zu führen. Zu Lande erscheint es im Augenblick schwterto ausserhalb des undesetzten Gebietes wesentliche Resultate zu erztelen. Deshald muss Deutschland gezwungen werden aus eeiner Gegenwartigen abwarten.en Haltung herauszutreten. Das Erste was notig 1st ist eine Verschurfung der Blockade. Neben wirtscha ftlichen Ergebnissen die davon zu erwarten sind missen folgende Ziele angestrebt werden. 10 408 Erstens: Es kann in Deutschlands Interesse Hegen Holland und Belgien zu schonen denn diese ermöglichen es thm die Airkungen der Blockade weitgehend zu umgehen. Es 1teat also auf der Hand dars etna strenge Enti:gentierung der Einfuhr nach Holland und Belgien geeignet sein konnte Deutschland dahin zu bringen dass es kurzen Process macht und in dte Niederlande und Belgien einfallt da diese than dann in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht nur noch massigen Nutzen brachten. Zweitens: Bet den skandinautschen Lindern liegen d te Dinge anders. Belgten und Holland dienen Deutschland hauptsachlich als Zwischen handler nach Aussen, wahrend Schweden Deutschland einen unentbehrlichen Rohstoff Itefert namlich das Eisen. Es muss angestrebt werden eine solche Versorgung zu verbieten. Ein einfaches Verfahren würde darin Destehen zu erklgren die Lieferung gewisser wesentlicher Erzeugnisse wie zum Beispiel des Etsens durch neutrale Länder die an das Rei ch angrenzen bedeute einen Beistand in aller Form und Girde zu Repressolien filhren. Schweden wlirde also nur noch unter Blockadedrohung sein Erz an Deutschland ltefern konnen. Ebenso wiirde Norwegen nur noch unter dem gleichen Risiko die Durchfuhr bewirken können. Falls die belden Linder sich fügen so int das Ztel erreicht. Anderenfalls wäre thr Seehandel zu sperren. Angesichts einer solchen Lage konnte es sein dass Deutschland beschlosse darauf zu reagieran und in Schweden mit den Waffen einzugreifen. Es musste uns dann zur Abwehr bereit finden. Zu diesem Zweck muss in Frankreich und in England eine erste Staffel von Streitkraften bereitstehen um nach Skandinavien befordert zu werden set es als Gegenschlag oder auch als Prdventiumassnahme. Drittens: Die Abschneidung der deutschen Einfuhren an russischen Oel. - Dte Abschneidung der Lteferungen rumanischen Petroleums nach Deutschland lasst sich augenblicklich weder durch die Blockade noch durch militarische Operationen erreichen - Aus dem Kaukaaus wirft zundchst einmal die Frage einer Eröffnung von Feindseligkeiten gegen die UDSSR auf. Ferner ergibt sich dabet das Problem der Mitwirkung oder wenigstens der Lustimmung der Türkei. Wie alles was im Orient vorgeht kann drbet die italienische Haltung nicht unberiicksichti bleiben. Wie dem auch set die Bombardterung der Petroleumanlagen uon Baku und Batum aus der Luft konnte Deutschlands Versorgung mit Treid- stoffen ganz erheblich behindern. Nach den E. Zt. angestellten Ermittlungen würden dazu 9 Fitegergruppen gehören. Das Kommando der franzosi- schen Luftstreitkrafte nimmt in Aussight 4 Gruppen zu stellen der Rest ware uon der Royal Air Force zu stellen. Diese Gruppen die thre Basis in Djezireh hatten wo das Gelande dazu vorhanden oder in der Anles begriffen 1st (In nordlichem Teil der franzosischen Levante) missten wenn muglich auch in der asiatischen Turket -diese Gelande sind z.Zt. Gegenstand uon Erkundungen- Stützpunkte haben, 409 - 11 Das Kommando der franzosischen Luftstreitkrufte könnte schon jetzt nachdem es uterzehn Tage bis einen Monat vorher eine Warnung ausgesproch en hatte die Bomdardterungsoperationen in Transkaukasien in Angriff nehmen und zwar mit zwet Gruppen schwerer Bomber die durch zwet Gruppen mittelschwerer Bomber verstärkt werden könnten. Sie waren wenn dte Lage an der franzosischen Front es zuldast aus dem Mutterland zu entnehmen. Die Operationen in der Luft liessen sich auf folgende Weise wirksam unterstützen: Erstens Aktionen der Flotte die out die Stillegung des Verkehrs im Schwarzen Meer abzielten. Damit wären grundsätzlich franzosische und britische Unterseebacte zu betrauen. Ihre Durchfahrt durch die Meerengen würde die ausdrückliche oder stillschweigende Zustimmung der Turken voraussetzen und dte würden eine Basis an den Ufern des Schwarzen Meeres in Kleinasten brauchen. Zweitens, durch Aktionen zu Lande die nur durch die Turket ausgeführt werden können die Ubrigens durch gewisse Teile unserer Levantetruppen dabet unterstützt werden konnte. An der Operation konne sich auf Betreiben Grossbritanntens auch Iran beteiligen. Viertens, bet aller Berucksichtigung der Eimwande die in Laufe des letzten Kriegskomitees dagegen erhoben worden sind besteht Interesse daran das Minenwerfen auf den Flussen und mit den Mitteln der Luftwaffe sobald wie möglich in Angriff zu nehmen. Auf diese Weise würde sich eine teilweise Lahmlegung des Binnentransportes Deutschlands erreichen lassen. Es 1st wesentlich dass die Luftwaffe die Operationen sobald wie irgend möglich von der Last befreit mit der sie sie augenblicklich beschwert. Alles in allem braucht der russisch-finnische Waffenstillstand nichts an den wesentlichen Zielen zu andern die wir uns fur 1940 setzen konnen. ET muss uns aber dazu veranlassen schneller und tatkraftiger zu handeln. Durch eine Kombination von Blockademassnahmen und gewissen militarischen Operationen konnen wir nicht nur die wirtschaftliche Abschnurung inner enger gestalten sondern Deutschland auch dazu veranlassen aus seiner militarisch adwartenden Haltung herauszutreten. Die Erfahrungen von sechs Kriegsmonaten zeigen dass die Neutralen Deutschland furchten. Ohne ihnen auch unsererseits ebenso drohend gegenüberzutreten milssen wir sie unsere Kraft fuhlen lassen. Wohlverstanden muss das diplomatische und des militarische Vorgehen auf den gletchen energischen Ton abgestimmt werden. Gamelin. 410 - 12 Dokument Nr.6 Telegramm des franzosischen Botschafters Massigli in Ankara an das Aussenministerium in Parts vom 28. Marz 1940. Bet der Aktion gegen Baku und Batum soll durch geschickte Regie die Kompromittierung der Turket nach aussen hin bermieden werden. Auswartige Angelegenheiten Klartext Reserve-Nr.881 Telegrammankunft Ankara den 28, Marz 1940. Ankara den 28. york 1940. Durch Kurter am 3. April um 11.30 Uhr erhalten. Streng geheim! Ich beziehe mich auf das Telegramm E.Exz. Nr540-541. Bet dem Versuche, in metner fruheren Korrespondenz die Haltung der Turket der Sowjetunion gegentider klarzustellen (vergl. besonders meine Depesche Nr74 vom 24,Februar und timeTelegramme 433-439 und 461)betonte tch dass as meiner Ansight nach zwecklos set, zu versuchen, die Türken gegen die Sowjets aufzuhetzen, dass man ader andererseits hoffen könne, es werde uns unter gewissen Umstanden gelingen, sie dahin zu bringen, dass sie in unserem Fahrwasser gegen Russland Stellung ndhmen. An dieser Meinung die ich vor dem Zusammenbruch des finnischen Widerstandes ausgesprochen hade, glaube ich heute nichts undern zu missen. Der Moskauer Frieden wird gewiss die turkische Vorsicht nur noch steigern, gleichmeitic aber bleibt man hter bet der Uberzeugung, dass die rote Armee aus dem Krieg in Norden sehr geachwächt zurückgekommen 1st was wiederum ausgleichend wirkt. Jedenfalls stellteitch keinerlet Anndherungsversuche mit der Sowjetunion fest. Im Gegenteil, man gewöhnt sich allmdhlich an den Gedanken, mit Ihrer Feindschaft rechnen zu müssen, was aber nicht besagen will, dass die turkischen Staatsleiter gewillt sind, sich in ein Abenteuer mit ungewissem Erfold einzulassen. Wir missen uns in der Tat Rechenschaft darüber adlegen, dass wenn ate Regterung in Ankara uon jetzt as die !berzeugung hat dass Deutschland über dte Testmächte nicht den Step davontragen wird, doch utele Menschen in der Turket nicht nicht davon iberzeugt sind, dass diese our Zeit einen endgültigen Sieg devontragen Kinnen Viele glauben noch immer dass das Reich von den mide gewordenen Allttenten den Frieden erhalten wird, den es braucht. Viele glauben, und fie italieniache und die deutsche Propaganda bemiinen sich, sie davon EU überceupen - dass trotz der von den Regierungen in Paris und London Entschlossenheit der Krieg durch einen Kompromissfrieden sein Ende methon wird. darlder nachdenken UCS dem bet einem die bringen Dann konnte milaste in man deminhier Falle, naturlich kunftigen for die in dem Zustand der forhett und die Turket einem Russland Unzugr Friede: Volker Entrutigung Frankreichs lassen und würde, Englands fastinde das sich die Lektionen des Pinnenkrieges munutze Demack ben wurde, um seine militarische Yacht starken 13 411 Die Regierung kann diesen Getsteskustand nicht vollstandig ignorteren. Daher runrt auch zu einen grossen Tetle thre augenblickliche vorsicht. 00 wir uns morgen in einer wenn auch beschrankenden Aktion out der Westfront entschiedon durchsetzen, oder ob eine deutsche Offensive in grossem Stile gegen unsere Verteidigung RU Lande oder In der Luft zusammenbricht stets werden wir die Turken mutiger und unternehmungelustt. ger finden. Es muss aber leider hinsugefugt werden dass der Zustand unseres offentlichen Lebens unabhangig von jedem militariachen Gestchts- punkt hter einige Unruhe hervorgerufen hat. Die letzten Sttsungen im Parlament haben einen intederschlagenden Eindruck hinterlassen. Man hat sicherlich ru der Entschlossenheit Euer Excellent und der Regierung, die Lage EU bessern und die franzostsche Moral nicht sinken zu lassen, Vertrauen, aber es gibt Menachen, die dem Einfluss der deutschen und Italienischen Agenturen und Rundfunksendungen gegendiber nicht unempfind- lich sind und die noch nicht sicher stnd, od sie nicht in thren Hoffnungen die auch bet una die Gletchen sind, getduscht werden. Man muss den Mut haben es auszusprechen, dass die Turken in der gegenwartigen Stunde night das Gefunl uon unserer urutderstehltchen Uberlegenheit haben, wis gross auch thre Sympathien fur uns sein mögen, die Uberzeugung der meisten 1 duft darauf hinaus dass thr Schicksal mit dem Schicksal der Westmachte verbunden 1st, die Regierung 1st gewiss zur Finhaltung der mit una eingegangenen Verpflichtungen fest entschlossen, aber in der öffentlichen Meinung herrscht keine solche Geisteshaltung, die sie sur Ergretfung uon Initiativen ermutigt, die tiber das Rtstko hinwegfihren. Bevor ich der Aufforderung Euer Excellent nachkomme, deren grosse Richtlinien mir durch die Telegramme 540 - 41 angeneigt wurden erschien es mir notwendig diese wichtigen Gedankengange in Erinnerung zu bringen. Siz erklaren von vornherein einige der Vorbehalte die tch aussprechen muss, oder einige der Vorstchtsmassregeln, our die tch mit Nachdruck hinzuweisen hatte. Eine Luftaktion out Baku und eine Aktion zur See auf das Schwarze Meer erscheinen voin turkischen Gesichtspunkt aus technisch wie auch politisch in sehr verschiedenem Lichte. Erstens, Ein Luftangriff auf Baku uon Djezireh aus bringt eine Uberfliegung turkischen Gebietes von nicht einmal 200 Km mit etch, und furr handelts es sich wm die Uberfliegung des Bergmassives das sich zwischen dem Van - See und dem Ourmiah - See erstreckt, d.h. im Kurden- land das infolge der sehr strengen Polizeioperationen, die die türkische Arnee dort vor 2 oder 3 Jahren durchgefihrt hat, stark entuolkert 1st Eg wurde keinerlet wichtige Stedlungspruppe überflogen werden, und dte Flogenuge konnten sehr gut unbemerkt passieren. Sollten sie beobachtet werden dann höchstens uon vereinzelten Polizei- oder Gendarmerieposter Ausserdem konnte durch eine Wendung nach Westen und einen Querrium durch den nordlichen Tell des Iran die Uberfitegung des turktechen Gebiets ganzlich vermieden werden, (und noch mehr, wenn die 412 14 - Startbasis nicht in Djestreh sondern in Irak lage.) Wmn for diese tatsachliche Lage mit der Bemerkung Saracoglu's vergleiche, dte in metnes Telegramm Nr529 enthalten ist komme ich zu dem Schluss dass eine vorherige Benachrichtigung der turkischen Regierung und die Bitte um deren Genehmigung zur Uberfltegung three Gebietes sie unnuts in Verlegenhett bringer hiesse. Man sollte sie wenn night vor die vollendate Tatsache so doch wenigstens vor ein Ereignis stellen das gerade eintritt und den Leitrunts sur ihra Berachricntigung uber das was geschieht abwarten. (Ich meine damit thre offizielle Benachrichtigung, denn die vertraulicher Bertehungen, die wir mit thr wis mit dem Oberkommando unterhalten, würden es ja verbieten, dass ste ganz im Unklaren gelassen wurden). Die Operation muss bereits im Gange sein, Indem man sich im Voraus entschuldigt, wenn Flugzeuge wahrend thres Fluges genotige sind, turkischen Luftraum zu benutzen. Weit entfernt davon, die turkische Regterung zu verletzen, wird unsere Reserve gerade der Erleichterung Ihrer Aufgabe dienen. Sollte die Somjetregierung einen Protest erheben, dann 1st es wichtic, dass Ankara erkldren kann mit der Angelegenheit nichts zu tun gehabt gu haben. Benn eine Uberfltegung stattgefunden hat, dann ware es night einmal schlirm, wenn wir einen diskreten Protest erhielten, Sollte sich die Angelegenheit verschlimmern und sollten die Sowjets durch Kriegshandlungen darauf reagteren, so ware es tatsachlich notwendig, dass die turkische Regterung imstande ware, vor der grossen Versammlung zu erkldren, dass die Initiative sum Angriff Moskau zur Last fallt. In diesem Falle muss die Ubereinstimmung der offentlichen Meinung und des Landes mit der turkischen Regterung sichergestellt sein. Aber gerade well eine Reaktion der Sowjets borauszusehen 1st, müssen wir darauf bedacht sein, keinerlet Operation dieser Art vom Zaune mu brechen, ohne uns über thre möglichen Auswtrkungen auf die Turket Rechenschaft zu geben und infolgedessen uns auch über die Lage klar su werden der dieses Land gegenüberstehen misste. Mir personlich kommt es nicht zu, mich uber diese Frage quesusprechen. Ich muss jedoch bemerken dass auf der ostlichen Hochebene noch der Winter herrscht und dass das erforderliche Fluggelande noch nicht erkundet und hergerichtet werden konnte. Ausserdem muss ich bemerken dass Each meiner Kenntnts die Abwehr gegen Luftangriffe auf das Kohlenbecken Don Zongouldak und genen die Huttenwerke von Karabuk noch nichts sicher- Destellt fat da das flir sie bestimmte englische Material noch nicht deliefent warde. Meines Erachtens sehr zwei das turktsche ausschlaggebende ware eseinem unuorsichtig fur Firtschaftsleben so Punkte Luftangriff aus unter diesen Umstanden auszusetzen. E8 sollte mich sens Sebastonal die militarischen Frist von mehreren uon Experten nicht eine ochen wardern for He allerwichtigsten Vorbereitungen verlangten. 413 -15- Zweitens. Die Frage des Schwarzen Yeares und der Erleichterungen, die die Schiffahrt in setnen Gawdeseern bet dem verkappten !tiwerken der Sowjets fur die Versorgung Deutschlands bietet, halt weiterhin maine Aufmarksamkeit fest. Ich habe mir erlaubt, gletch an Morgen nach Abechluss des englisch-französtsch-turkischon Vertrages , Telegram 1969 vom 23. oktober 1939 , darauf anxuspielen. Mann muss leider anerkennen, dass eine Lisung des Problems night leight zu finden 1st. Nach den Bestimmungen der Meerengenkonuention stnd die alliterten Rohte ala Kriegaführende nur berechtigt Kriegaschiffe ins Schwarze year zu schicken, wenn ea sich um die Erfullung einer Entscheidung des Volkerbundes oder um die Anwendung eines im Rahmen des "%ikerbundspaktes abgeschlossenen in Genf registrierten und die Turket bindenden Beistands vertrages handelt oder wenn die Turket selbst ala kriegafuhrende .Macht oder sich uon einer Kriegagefahr bedroht fuhlende an die allierten Machte einen Hilferuf ergehen lasst. Zur Zeit 1st keine dieser Bedingungen erfullt. Unser Eintritt ins Schwarze Meer kann demash wite Euar Exellenz bemerken nur auf Grund einer wohlwollenden Entscheidung der Turket erfolgen, die daruber mlissen wir uns klar seinden von thr in Yontreux übernommenen Verpflichtungen widersprechen wilde und die daher einen Protest von einer Jacht, welche dte Konvention unterzeichnet hat oder wie dte Sowjetunion oder Italien, der Konvention beigetreten 1st, hervorrufen könnte. Die zuletzt genannten Machte könnten in diesem Falle sehr wohl das deutsche Spiel betreiben. Obendrein würde dte Sowjetunion selbst in dem Falle 100 keinerlet kriegertache Handlungen gegen thr Land oder thre Kriegs- und Handela- schiffe gertchtet sind, bet einer Offnung der Heerengen den allierten Kreuzern eine feindselige Manifestation ankündigen und selbst Gegenmassnahmen ergreifen. Dte N8glichkeit des Ausbruchs von Feindseligkeiten als eine Foloe unserer Initiative 1st also keineswegs ausgeschlossen and dieser Umstand würde une verpflichten une wite in dem bereita untersuchten Fall mit den Rückwirkungen zu befassen, die die geplante Intative vom Standpunkt der türkischen Verteidigung haben konnte. Es würden sich also dte gleichen Vorsichtsmassregeln und zwangsweise ergeben. die die Baku mit sich scheint. Wte librigens sollte die Kontrollaktion dem Schwarzen bringen Fristen Operation gegen out gu Neer aussehen? Dte Zahl der deutschen Handelsschiffe, die in den bulgerischen Hafen Zuflucht genommen haden ist ziemlich beschrankt len sind scheinbar acht). Das direkte Vorgehen einer alliterten Kreuzfahre gegen die würde also von kurzer Dower Schiffahrt unter deutscher Flagge sein. Es wird sich hauptsachlich darum handeln die rumanischen, bulgarischen oder italienischen Schiffe zu - 16 - 414 kontrollieren und Kontrollbesuchen zu unterziehen soute unter den gletchen Bedingungen die russischen und die italienischen Petroleum- schiffe anzuhalten und einer Schiffskontrolle zu unterziehen, die zwischen den kaukasischen Hafen und den Donaurundungen oder der bulgarischen Kuste hin und herfahren; - alles Operationen, die sich nicht gerade erfolgretch auf hoher See durchführen lassen. Die angehaltenen Schiffe milerten zu einem Flottenstützpunkt gebracht werden um dort kontrolliert zu werden und dte beschlagnahmten Taren aussuladen. No sollte dieser Stützpunkt sein, wenn night in einem turkischen Hafen? Diskrete Erleichterungen waren unzureichend. Das hiesse aber, dass die Turket direkt mit der Aktion der Alliterten verbunden wäre und dass Deutschland sie mit Recht als kriegafthrende Macht ansehen konnte. Dte turkische Regterung 1st nach meinem Dafurhalten zur Zeit aus den eingangs dargelegten Grunden nicht bereit, so weit zu gehen. Kann man sich Operationen von einer anderen Art vorstellen? Wenn es so gut wie unmöglich 1st, dass Kontrolloperationen plannassig auf dem Schwarzen Meer ohne attive Teilnahme der Turket durchgeführt werden können, 80 darf man sich andererseits nicht vorstellen dass Uboote - ohne dass man von dieser Macht mehr verlangt als die Augen su schliessen - des Nachts durch die Meerengen fahren, um fm Schwarzen Mear schnelle Streiffahrten durchauführen, die den Zweck haben, den Schiffsuerkehr zu storen und die deutsche Schiffstonnage, ja sogar dte angehaltenen Schiffe nach deutschem Muster zu aersenken, uon deren Ladungen man erkannt hatte dass sie fur Deutschland bestimat waren. Ich will die Frage nur anschneiden. Wenn die Operation technisch möglich 1st dann wirds ste politisch gesehen aufmeniger Schwterigkeiten stossen als eine Intervention alliterter Kreuzer da sich die Turket Dritten gegenüber darauf berufen konnte, dass sie Uber unsere Plane in Ungewissheit gehalten wurde. Dennoch müssen wir une unbedingt daruber klar sein, dass selbst eine solche beschrankte Operation die turkische Regierring in eine heikle Lage bringen wirds und wir infolgedessen die Operation nicht unternehmen konnten, ohne an die Rilckwirkungen zu denken, denen dieses Land ausgeliefert werden würde. Deshald milssen wir wieder auf die Überlegungen Uber den Stand der turkischen Rustungen xurlickkomen, die wir bereits oben angestellt haben. Ich komme zu dem Schluss, dass bet der gegenwart Agen Lage und nach einer von den Experten festzusetzenden Frist die Operationan gegen Baku am leichtesten zu organisteren stnd und near in dem Jasse in dem wir die turkischen Bedenken berücksichtigen konnten. Ausserdem wurde thr Erfolg derartige Konsequenzen haden und die russtsche Aktion derart Idhmen dass die turkische Regierung bet einem 415 - 17 outen Ausgang der Operation sich gerade durch unseren Erfold dazu ermutigt fuhlt, una die notwendigen Erleichterungen unbektimmerter rurugestehen, damit die Operationen der Schiffskontrolle auf dem Schwarzen Neer unter glinstigen Umständen vor sich gehen können. get. Massigli. Dokument Nr.7 Aufzeichnung des franzosischen Hintsterprasidenten Daladier vom 19.Januar 1940. General Gamelin soll Denkschrift Uber Zerstorung russischer Olfelder ausarbeiten. Ibschrift einer handschriftlichen Aufzeichnung des Ministerprasidenten Daladier vom 19. Januar 1940. General Gamelin und Admiral Darlan sind zu bitten, eine Denkschrift über eine evtl. Intervention zur Zerstörung der russischen lifelder auszuarbeiten. Fall eins: Abschneidung der flir Deutschland bestimmten Itransporte im Schwarzen Meer. Es handelt sich vor allem um deutsche chiffe. In diesem Fall wird Russland nicht in den Krieg hineingerogen. Fall zwei: Direkte Intervention im Kaukasus. Fall dret: Ohne direktes Vorgehen gegen Russland Massnahmen rgreifen um Selbststandigkettsdestrebungen der mohammedanischen eu61kerungsgruppen im Kaukasus zu fordern. - 18 - 416 Dokument Nr. 8 Niederschrift uber eine Abrede zwischen den franzosischen und englischen Generalstaben der Luftwaffe vom 5. April 1940. Britfsch-französischer Operationsplan fur den Luftangriff out Batum und Bakis. In sechs Tagen soll ein Drittel der Raffinerien und Hafenanlagen zerstort werden. Sehr Geheim! Luftangriff auf die Erdalfelder des Kaukasus. Verständigung erzielt im Grossen Hauptquartier der Luftwaffe 5.April 1960 Der französisch-britiache Luftangriff auf das KaukomusPetroleum richtet sich ausschliessltch gegen die Raffinerien und die Hafenanlagen von Batum - Ptot - Grozny - Baku. Es kann damit gerechnet werden, dass innerhalb der ersten sechs Tage dreissig bis 35 vom Hundert der Kaukasus-Raffinerten und der Hafenan lagen zerstort sein werden. Das verwendate Flugzeugmaterial unfasst 90 bis 100 Flugzeuge, die aus 6 franzustschen Fitegergruppen und 3 britischen Geschuadern xusammengestellt werden. Die franz5sischen Gruppen werden 80 ausgestattet dass sie Baku an den vorgesehenen Daten angreifen können. Sie setzen sich aus swet Gruppen Farman 221 und 4 Gruppen Glen Martin, die mit Ereatstanks ausgeristet stnd, zusammen. Sie konnen bet jedem Feindflug inagesant 70 Tonnen Bomben out etwa 100 erkundate Raffinerien abwerfen. Peindliche Oegenwirkung und die vermutliche Anwesenheit deutscher Jagdflieger werden dte Wirksamkeit dieser Operation in erheblichen Masse vermindern. Dokument Nr.9 Bericht des Generals Weygand an den Oberkommandierenden der franeBat Luftwaffe vom 17.April 1940. Die Luftaktion gegen die russischen Olfelder in Kaukasus wird fur Ende Juli 1940 vordereitet. Der Oberkommandierende des Oatlichen Mittelmeeres 17.April 1940 Geheim! General Heygand an den Oberkommandierenden Gamelin, Befehlehaber der Landstreitkrafte, an den Oberkommandierenden der Duftwaffe Mullemin. Die Vorberettungen fur die Bombardterung der Olfelder des Kaukasua sind so welt fortgeschritten, dass sich die Frist, Innerhald derer diese Operation durchgeführt werden kann, abschatnen lasst 19 417 Politische Voraussetzungen. Die Einhaltung einer Frist 1st hter nicht geboten die Unternehmung braucht nicht sum Gegenstant einer Vereinbarung mit den Turken gemacht gu werden, deren Abachluss sich im librigen als unmöglich erwtesen hat. Der franzos ische Botschafter in der Turket hat der Regterung liber diese Frage genau bertchtet. Gegenwartig kann von einer Genehmigung fur die Uberfltegung turkischen Staatsgebietes nicht die Rede sein, noch weniger uon der Bereitstellung von Flugplateen, die als Sprungbrett dienen konnten. Auch sonstige Hilfe 1st nicht zu erwarten. Der Materialtransport fur den gesamten Bedarf, geht liber die Etsenbahn Aleppo Nissibine. Eine vorherige Demarche fur die Benutzung dieser Strecke, soweit sie turkisches Staatsgebiet beruhrt fat nicht erforderlich, da unsere fruheren Vereinbarungen une in dieser Begtehung jede Freiheit lassen. Bet der Schätzung der Fristen sind au berücksichtigen: a.) die Herrichtung der Flugplatze. In dieser Jahresgeit 1st nur geringe Arbeit erforderlich, thre Dauer wird auf 14 Tage geschätzt. b.) Arbeiten auf der Eisenbahnstrecke und zur Auffullung der Depots (Wetchen, Schtenen, Drahtleitungen) Dauer: 14 - 20 Tage. c.) Transport von Betriebestoff. Munition, Truppen und Wagenpark nimmt fur die franzosischen Streitkrafte 56 Zuge in Anspruch. Dies bedeutet bet Annahme von 4 Zugen in 24 Stunden eine Frist von 14 Tagen. Ebenso lange Zeit 1st fur die englischen Truppen erforderlich. Insgesamt werden somit 30 Tage benötigt. Berücksichtigt man dass a.) und b.) gleichzeitig ausgeführt werden können, 80 stnd mindestens 45 bis 50 Tage notig. Vorausgesetzt dass das Etsenbahnmaterial und der britische und franzosische Nachachub unuerzüglich in Marsch gesetzt werden. Ausser diesen Fristen muss auch die Zeit berückstchtigt werden, die fur die Instandsetzung und die Anreise der Bombenflugzeuge erforderlich 1st. Bezuglich der franzosischen Geschwader 1st zu bemerken, dass gegenwartig keins einsatzbereit ist. Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach wird die Gruppe der Farman Nachtbomber, die seit langem in Dienet steht, rasch hier eintreffen können. Im Gegensatz hierzu erhalt die Gruppe der Bomber. die zur Levanteluftwatte gehort jetzt erst die ersten Flugzeuge des Typs Glen - Martin. Nach den Angaben der Oberkommandos der Luftwaffe selbst sind zweteinhalb bis dret Monate unerldsslich, um die Piloten auszubilden und sie instandzusetzen an einer Kriegsoperation teilzunehmen, der es darauf Wahrscheinlich die des Type auszuwerten. bet ankommt, das befinden vorhandene sich Material Ubrigen im höchsten Gruppen Grade Glen Martin, die aus Frankreich oder aus Nordafrika erwartet werden, in entsprechendem und Kommandeur ungefam der Luftwaffe britischen in Zustand. DerOrient Vice-Luftmarschall mittleren war als er dieUber. uon the fur erforderlich gehaltenen Fristen befragt wurde, um die Antwort sehr 418 - 20 verlegen, da er selbst seine Flugzeuge noch nicht erhalten hat. Es muss bemerkt werden, dass diese Schätzung die technische %orbereitung des Bombenangriffs underuckstchtigt lasst. Diese Yordereitung umfasst die Aumahme von Luftbildern, die Auswahl der Ziele sowte des geeignetsten Bombenmaterials, schltesslich die Herrichtung der Flugzeuge fur den besonderen Fall. Die Vorsicht gebietet, daher die Ausführung der Operation erst fur Ende Juni oder Anfang Jult in Aussicht zu nehmen besonders wenn man an die absolute Notwendigkeit denkt, das Unternehmen aret durchzuführen wenn alles bereit 1st. Nur 80 kann man entscheidende Ergebnisse mit dem groast- moglichen Machteinsatz und der grossten Schnelligkeit erzielen. Die Operation selbst darf nur einige Tage dauern und muss in massierter Bombardterung derjenigen Punkte bestehen, deren Zerstorung durch Sprengoder Brandbomben ala besonders wirksam anzusehen ist. Die bezeichnete Frist 1st Ubrigens auch fur die Turket notig wis Herr Massigli bereits hervorgehoben hat da die Turket atch im Laufo dieser Frist in einen Zustand versetzen muse der thr erlaubt, jeder feindlichen Gegenwirkung zu trotzen, die infolge der Bombardierung möglicherweise ausgelost wird. Der Oberkommandierende des Operationsgebietes Ost Mittelmeer. gez. Weygand. Stempel des Oberkommandierenden. - 21 - 419 Dokument Nr 10. Telegramm von General Gamelin an den britischen Luftmarschall Newall vom 15.5.1940. Sofortige Entsendung von 10 britischen Jagdgeschwadern erbeten. F.C. 15, Mat 1940. No 528 CAB / D.N. Der Oberbefehlshader General Gamelin an den Air Marshall Newall. (Bleistiftanmerkg. :Fur Gen. Lelong) Im Nachgang zu dem Ersuchen der franzostschen Regierung prazistere ich, dass die Zahl der Jagdgeschwader, deren unuerzigliche Entsendung auf die Flugplütze der brittschen Luftwaffe in der Champagne erforderlich 1st, 10 beträgt. Hterdel 1st zu Deachten, dass im Falle des Krtegseintritts Italtens Frankreich gezwungen wäre, einen Teil seiner Jagdgeschwader nach dem Stidosten Frankreichs und nach Tunis zu versetzen. Wir werden das erforderliche Bodenpersonal stellen. Einzelheiten konnen durch unmittelbare Vereinbarung moischen General Vuillemin und Marschall Barratt geregelt werden. General Gamelin. Dokument Nr 11. 16.5.1940. werden. Telegramm von General Gamelin an Winston Churchill vom Britische Luftwaffe muss in Kampfhandlungen eingesetxt Geheim - P.C. Den 16. Mat 1940 NC. 529 CAB / D.N. Der Oberbefehlshaber General Gamelin an General Lelong fur Mr. Winston Churchill. Ion erlaude mir erneut an Sie heranzutreten, um die sofortige Entsendung der 10 Jandgeschwader zu erbitten. Lage sehr ernst, natfrritch wurden diese 10 Jagdgeschwader an der unteren Seine stationtert werden, wo ste Schutz haben und wo Sie sie leight wieder zurlickholen konnen. General Gamelin. (Versiffert und adgesandt am 16. Mat 1940 UAR 10 Uhr 30) - 22 - 420 Dikument Nr 12, Telegramm von General Gamelin an Winston Churchill -16.5.40. Erneute Bitte um sofortige Entsendung von 10 brittschen Jagdgeschwadern. P.C. 16. Mat 1940 No 531 CAB / D.N. Der Oberbefehlshaber General Gamelin an General Lelong fur Mr. Winston Churchill. Ich erlaube mtr, erneut out die Tatsache hinzuweisen, dass x.z. die wesentlichate Aufgabe der britischen wie der franzostschen Luftwaffe darin 1tegt, auf die feindlichen Truppen einzwirken unter besonderer Beriickstchtigung derjenigen Punkte, die ste zwangalaufig Passteren milssen. General Gamelin. (Verziffert und adgesandt am 16g Mat 1940 um 14,20 Uhr) Dokument Nr 13 Telegramm von General Gamelin an Winston Churchill. 17. Mat 1940. No 533 CAB / D.N. Der Oberbefehlshaber General Gamelin an General Lelong fur Mr. Winston Churchill bet seiner Ankunft in London. Unsere Armee Gtraud wird seit heute vormittag stidlich Maudauge angesetzt. Die Kampfe sind sehr schwer. Die Folgen konnen schwerwlegend sein, und swar nicht nur fur Frankreich sondern auch fur England. Die Richtung bedroht namentlich die Verbindungswege der britischen Armee. Ich fordere erneut den Einsatz der brittschen Luftwaffe in jeder Weise als Beitrag zu der Schlacht. Inadesondere ware die Legung von magnetischen Minen in der Maas sehr wirksam, um Verstarkungen und Nachschud des Feindes zu storen. General Gamelin. (Verziffert und adgesandt am17. Mat 9,25 Uhr. Dekument Nr 14. Protokoll über die Sitzung des allierten Odersten Kriens- rates vom 22.5.1940. Im Hauptquartier des inzwischen zum Oberkommandierenden ernannten Generals Weygand unter Teilnahme von Winston Churchill und Ministerprasident Reynaud. Vollige Ratlosigkeit inmitten der Flandernschlacht. Desorganisation der Filhrung, vermwetfelte Plane, um die Umtlammerung zu durchbrechen. Churchill sagt zu, die Duftwaffe in Kampfhandlungen einzusetzen. Prasidium des Ministerrats. Abschrift. Streng vertraulich. Franzostach - britische Sitzung DOTA 22. Mat 1940. - 23 - 421 Gegen 12 Uhr kamen Winston Churchill im Grossen Hauptquar- tier ano In seiner Begleitung Defanden sich der britische Botschafter der General Sir John Dill, der Vice Marschall der Luftwaffe Pirs und General Ismay. Paul Reynaud wird von Hauptmann de Margerie begleitet. General Weygand empfing die beiden Premierminister im Kartenzimmer seines Generalstabs. Er ersuchte Oberst Simon den Schlachtplan der allierten Streitkrafte in grossem Zuge darzulegen. Oberst Simon erklarte; dass sich zwei französische Dtutstonen unter dem Befehl des Generals Fagalde in dussersten Norden an der Schelde und in Seeland befinden. Ihnen folgen die belgischen Truppen Dis ungefahr Audewards. Das britische Expeditionskorps steht weiter in Sliden mit 4 Divisionen, zu denen 3 Divisionen in der Gegend uon Arrus kommen. 2 britische Ersatzdivistonen befinden sich im Raume von Lille. An sie schltesst sich die erste franzosische Armee an, an deren Flanke sich das Kavalleriekorps befindet. General Billotte, der Oberbefehlshaber der französisch - englisch - belgischen Armee im Norden 1tegt wegen eines ernsten Autounfalls im Lazarett. Er hat den Oberbefehl an General Blanchard adtreten müssen, der seinerseits von General Prioux ersetzt worden ist. Dieser hat sich an der Spitze des Kavalleriekorps hervorragend geschlagen. Winston Churchill erklarte, dass eine deutsche Panzerkolonne die am Morgen des Vortages von Abbeville aufgeDrochen set, den Ort Etaples in Richtung auf Boulogne passiert hade. Ein verwundeter englischer Officier, der diese deutschen Streitkrafte vordetfahren sah, habe sie ouf 4 bis 5000 Mann geschätzt. Ungefahr die Halfte dieser Truppeneinheit, die im Vordringen nach Norden begriffen set, set gegen 16.30 Uhr uon britischen Luftstreitkruften, dte in Grossbritannien gestartet seten, angegriffen und sind in Etaples aufgehalten worden. Zwei Gardebataillone die betden letzten noch in England verbliebenen Einheiten der attiven britischen Armee seien mit 48 Pake in Boulogne gelandet. Ihre Aufgade set die Verteidigung dieser Stadt gegen etwaige deutsche Angriffe. Zur Verteidigung von Calais und Dinkirchen seten gletchfalls Massnahmen getroffen worden. Man konne somit annehmen, dass diese dret Hafen gegen einen Uberfall, wie er sich in Abbeville ereignet hade, gesichertselen. General Weygand bestätigt die Angaden des Prenterministers. Er just hinzu, dass sich in Calais dret franzostsche Infanteriebatatllone befanden, und dass der Kommandant von Dankirchen ein Desondere tuchtiger Admiral set, der über die erforderlichen Krafte fur die erfolgreiche Verteidigung der Stadt verflige. Hierauf fuhr Oberst Simon mit der allgemeinen Darlegung der Lage fort. Die Somme 1st offendar jensetts Ram nicht überschritten worden, die Deutschen besitzen einige Bruckenkopfe, einen davon in - 24 - 422 Persone und einen anderen sudlich uon Amtens. Eine franzosteche Armee unter 'em Befehl des Generals Frere nimmt den Raum zwischen der Otse and her Somme ein und zieht sich fortschreitend in der Richtung gegen fester susammen. Sie umfasst 8 Dtutstonen von denen 4 vollstandig stnd, entrend dte 4 ubrigen noch verladen werden. Diese Armee hat den Befehl erhalten, einen Angriff nach Norden auszufthhen, um das Sommetal freizumachen Weiter im Osten befinden sich die Armeen Touchon und Huntzi- ger. Was dte deutschen Armeen andelangt, 30 haben sie in der ersten Linte an den kritischen Punkten Panzerdivtsionen aufgestellt. Hinter diesen Einhetten folgen motoristerte Divisionen, hinter diesen wieder die normalen Divistonen, die auf Pferdekraft angewiesen stnd. Es hat den Anschein, als OD eine Anzahl von Infantertedtvtstonen im Begriffe set, sich im Raume uon St Quentin zur Vertetdigung einzurichfor Auf eine Frage Winston Churchills erklarte General Weygand, dass bereits grosse Massen feindlicher Infaterie in Berührung mit der Armee Huntziger standen. Er fligte hinzu: Vor unseren Augen spielts sich und spielt sich noch jetzt ein erster deutscher Angriff ab, der noch einer bisher unbekannten Formel mit neuen Kampfmitteln vor sich gehe. Der General 1st der Ansicht, dass diesem ersten Angriff eine offensive klassischen Stils mit starker Artillerteunterstutzung folgen werde. Nach Lösung der ersten Frage werden wir uns sonach mit einem zweiten Problem zu befasse n haben, dessen Losung nicht minder schwterig set, umsomehr als heftige Vorstösse des Feindes gegen Suden, namlich gegen die in der Maginotlinte stehenden Heeresgruppen zu erwarten seten. General Weygand berichtete anschliessend in grossen Zilgen über die Ergebnisse seiner Reise an die Front. Der Oberkommandierende erklart, es fur ausgeschlossen, uon der englisch franzosisch belgischen Hauptgruppe, dte sich noch im Norden befindet und mehr als 40 Divisionen umfarst, zu verlangen, sich einfach nach Stiden durchzuschlagen und den Anschluss an die französische Hauptarmee ou finden. Ein derartiges Manover set zum Schettern verurteilt und die beteiligten Truppen hatten mit ihrem sicheren "erlust zu rechnen. Die Lage verlangt im Gegenteil, dass die verfugbaren franzosischen und englischen Streitkrafte unter dem Schutz des belgischen Heeres, das fur sie die Deckung gegen Osten und gegebenenfalls gegen Norden übernshme im Raume von Cambrai und Arras und in der allgemeinen Richtung St Quentin einen Angriff nach Stiden vortragen und auf diese Weise den deutschen Panzerdtvisionen, die eich derzett im Sack von St Quentin befinden, in die Flanke fallen. Gleicheettig hat die franzosische Armee des Generals Frere die sudlich der Somme in der Gegend von Beauvais steht, nach Norden vorzustossen und so den Druck auf die feindlichen Panzertruppen im Raume von Amtens, Abbeville und Arras zu verstärken. Das Wesentliche besteht 25 - 423 darin, dese Truppen eineu standigen Druck auszusetzen, ihnen nie die Initiative zu überlassen, sondern sie standig in Bewegung zu halten, the Verluste beizubringen und thre Rückwartigen Stellungen zu gefahrden Nur in dieser Weise kann der Rickzug der in Belgien stehenden Heeresteile mit Erfold durchgeführt werden. Am Vortage konnte General Weygand diese Frage letder mit General Gort nicht besprechen, da sich dieser ausser befand. Jedoch hatte General Weygand eine lange Besprechung mit dem Konto der Belgier und dessen Generalstad. Uder die Aufgabe der belgtschen Armee bestehen nash dem Oberkommandterenden 2 Auffassungen. Bisher hat sich der Konig fur keine dieser Au 'fassungen entschieden. Dte eine Auffassung die General Weygand teilt, betsteht darin, der belgischen Armee aufzugeben, sich von der Schelde auf die Yser zurlickzurtehen und dabet die Deckung der franzosisch-britischen Streitkrafte, die auf St Quentin vorgehen, zu übernehmen. Tatsachlich befindet sich die belgische Armee zwischen der Scheldem'induno, Gent und Audenwarde in einer gefahrdeten Lage. Dte Unterstützung, die sie den übrigen Heeresteilen der Westfront leiht, kam ebenso gut von der Yser aus mit Hilfe von Überschwemmungen durchgeführt weren. - General Weygand hat librigens das sofortige Freilassen des Wassers angeordnet. Die andere Auffassung wurde von General van Overstreaten dem Adjutanten des Konig Leopold vertreten. Nach dieser Auffassung hat die belgische Armee in ihrer Disherigen Stellung zu verbleiben und sich wenn notig von den übrigen allierten Streitkraften zu trennen. Ihre Aufgade 1st, die Kliste in eimem weiten Haldkreis zu schützen. Der Nashschub kann in diesem Fall über Ostende und Dunkirchen gesichert werden. Zur Begrundung dieses Plans wies General van Overstraaten auf die Ermildung der belgischen Truppen hin. Diese haben von Maastricht her ununterbrochene Marsche zurückgelegt. Der belgische General wies auch out die Moral dieser Truppen hin, die unter diesem langen Rickzug natur lich gelitten hat. Seit der Ankunft der belgischen Armee an der Schelde haben die Truppen nach einer 24 stundigen Ruhe wieder Fassung gewonnen und dies am 21. Mat dadurch bewtesen, da. a ste 2 deutsche Versuche, den Ubergang über die Schelde zu erzwingen, glanzend abgeschlagen haben. Von diesen Truppen zu verlangen, erneut zurückzuwe ichen und das nationale Gebiet fast in seiner Gesamtheit preiszugeden, hiesse die Truppe nach der Ansight des Generals van Overstraaten den Gefahren einer neuen Welle der Demoraltsterung aussetzen. General Weygand hat sich dieser Auffassung mit grosser Entschiedenheit widersetzt. Er hat zu bedenken gegeben, dass die Streit- krafte der Alliterten eine Einheit darstellten, dars die Franzosen und Englander den Belgiern zu Hilfe gekommen seten und dass jetzt die Belgier wetter anEnglander der Seite der und Franzosen den Kampf fortsuhren müssten. Er hat hinzugefügt, dass der Wachschub fur die - 26 - 424 Armee des Kunigs unter den UOM General van Overstraaten vorausgeschenen Umstanden unmöglich durchgeführt werden konnen und dass in diesem Pull sich die belgischen Streitkrafte sehr bald gezwungen sehen würden, zu kapitulteren. Der Konig hat in die Diskussion nicht eingegriffen, erst bet seiner Rückkehr zum Grossen Hauptquartter, eine Stunde fruher erfuhr General Weygand, dass das belgische Oberkommando sich seiner Meinung angeschlossen habe und sich entschlossen hade, Richtung out die Yeer in gwel Etappen zu machen, uon denen die erstere einen Ruckzug bis zur Lus vorsah. Unter diesen Umstanden fahrt der General fort wird die belgische Armee die Rolle als Deckung sptelen, die ich thr zugedacht habe, während die französisch-englischen Strettkrafte sich nach Stiden entfolten werden, wobet ste zu threr Richten durch das franzosische Kavalleriekorps verstärkt we rden durch das belgische Kavalleriekorps, von denen letzteres zum Teil motoristert ist. Der Konig hat vorgeschen, dieses dem franzosischen Oberbefehl zur Verfugung zu stellen. Wahrend der Dauer des Vortrages von General Weygand ltessen Mr Winston Churchill und General Str John Dill vielfach thre Zustimming erkennen und zeigten durch Fragen und Unterbrechungen, data thre eigene Auffassung uber die Schlacht genauestens mit der des Generalissimus übereinstimmte, insbesondere wo as sich um dte der belgischen Armee zugeteilte Rolle handelte. Der brittsche Premierminister wiederholte mehrfach, dass die Wiederherstellung der Verdindung der Nord Stidarmeen liber Arras unerlasslich set. Dass die englischen Streitkrafte unter General Gort nunmehr fur 4 Tage Lebensmittel hatten, dass der gesamte Nechachub und alles Kriegsmaterial des britischen Expeditionskorps ab Calais langs der Kuste in Richtung auf St Nazaire konzentriert set. Und dass der Hauptgedanke des General Gort daringegangen set, diese fur thn lebenswichtigen Verbindungswege offen zu halten. Daher hat er sich selt vorgestern in Bewegung gesetzt, indem er auf seiner rechten Flanke eine Anzahl Einhetten hinter diese Linten verlegt hat, un in Richtung auf Arras und Bapaume worrlicken zu konnen. Es handelt sich hter um eine fur die Zukunft des Krieges entscheidende Schlacht, denn die Versorgung der englischen Streitkrafte über die Kanalhafen ist sehr stark in Frage gestellt, sodass unter diesen Umstanden das Gebiet um Cambrat und St Quentin eine entscheidende Bedeutung gewinnt. Mr Winston Churchill teilte etwas spater in einer Privatdesprechung dem franzosischen Ministerprastdenten und dem General Weygan mit, dass die Bertehungen des Generals Billott zu dem Oberatkonmandieren den des britischen Expeditionskorps nicht vollauf sufriedenstellend seten. Insbesondere set General Gort durch uter Tage hindurch ohne Weisung geblieben. Hierzu teilte General Weygand mit, dass der General Billott durch einen schweren Automobilunfall leidend set und durch General Blanchard ersetet wird. - 27 - 425 General Weygand stellt die volle Billigung fest, die die britische Regi rung und der britische Generalstad seinen Planen entgegenbrachten und brachte dann ebenso entschieden und klar wte hoflich suel in seinen Augen entscheidende Forderungen vor. Erstens, es 1st uon ausschlaggebender Wichtigkeit fur den Erfolg der beginnenden Schlacht, dass die britische Luftwaffe und swar Jtiger wie Bomber sich vollauf im Kampfgebiet einsetzen. Sie hat der franzosischen Armee wdhrend der vergangenen Tage sehr grosse Dienste erwiesen und hat so schon einen dusserst gunstigen Einfluss out den Getst der Infanterie ausgelibt, wdhrend sie zugletch utele deutsche Marschkolonnen auf dem Wege zur Front empfindlich gestort hade, Daneben hat sie umfangreiche Aktionen in bestimmten Teilen Deutschlands durah geführt und zwar namentlich im Ruhrgebiet und in Hamburg, Bremen und an anderen Orten, wo sie gute Erfolge in der Bombardierung uon feindlichen Tankanlagen und Raffinerien erstelt habe. In Abetracht der Wichtigkeit unserer Zusammenarbeit halt der Generalissimus es jedoch in Augenblick fur erforderlich, dass die englische Luftwaffe vorlduftg nur fur einige Tage thre Fernfluge einstellt, um dauernd und unmittelbar an der Front selbst oder in der ndchsten Umgebung zu wirken. Br fordert also, dass die Dritische Luftwaffe den Befehl bekomme, thre Anstrengungen in der Gegend der vorgesehenen Operationen zu vervielfachen. Der Viceluftmarschall Phira teilt hierauf seine Ansioht dem Thema mit. Er gibt zu bedenken, dass ein Teil der britischen Bomber geschwader namentlich die Wellingtons kaum bet Tage eingesetst werden, kann, da die Flugzeuge zu exponterte Ziele darstellen. Es scheint the dusserst wichtig, dass andererseits z.B. die Maasbrucken oder die Etsendahnknotenpunkte in einiger Entfernung von der eigentlichen Operationslinte bombardiert werden, da ale deutscherseits fur den Nachschub wdhrend der Schlacht von Bedeutung seten. Nach einem Gedankenaustausch zwischen the und General Wewgand, an dem auch Mr Winston Churchill teilnimmt, komat man liberein, dass den Wunschen des Generalissimus entsprochen wird und die britische Luftstreitkrafte des Mutterlandes ausachliesslich in der Schlacht eingesetzt werden. Die Bomber , die nicht immer (wie dies in den vorhergehenden Tagen der Fall war) in der Kampflinie selbst genaue Ztele ausmachen können, werden die Verdindungen swischen der Front und der Maas zu stören versuchen, wahrend die jager (die aus England kammend, kaum langer als 20 Minuten im Kampfgebiet sich aufhalten Konnen) sich in aufetnanderfolgenden Wellen ablosen werden. Zweitens, General Weygand weist sodann nachdrucklich out die Gefahr fur die nationale Verteidigung, die sich z. Zt. aus dem Fluchtlingsstrom aus den Ntederlanden Belgien und Nordfrankreich ergebe, him die out den Strassen sich vorwdrtsbewegenden Massen behindern die Bewegungsfreiheit der Truppen, gestatten deutschen Elementen, sich - 28 - 426 unter are zu mengen und Uben liberdies eine ungunstige Wirkung auf den Getst der Truppe aus. Ks 1st unbedingt erforderlich, dass diesem Zustrom Einhalt geboten wird, dass ntemand mehr out francostaches Gebiet ubertreten durfe dass dte in Bewegung befindlichen Fluchtlingskolonnen von den grossen Verkehrsstrassen wahrend gewisser Tagesxeiten ferngehalten werden. Sie sollen auf den Feldern lagern und nur mit gewissen Einschrankungen wetterziehen aurfen. General Weygand zeigte sich in dtesem Punkte dem Konig der Belgter ausserat firm, und er hofft, dass die allierten Regierungen die gletche Haltung einnehmen werden. Mr Winston Churchill und M Paul Reynaud dussern thre volle Billigung zu den vom General vorgetragenen Gestchtspunkten. Der Generalissimus teilte dann kurz mit, dass er sich wahrend des Abends und in der Nacht mit dret Offixteren des Generalstabs der Armee Giraud habe unterhalten können, die the ausserordentlich wertvolle Einzelheiten user die von der deutschen Armee in der Schlacht angewendeten Methoden hatten geben konnen und dte auf seine Wetsung hin eine kurze Aufzeichnung vorgelegt haben, die verlesen wird. Mr Winston Churchill schlteest daraus, dass unter Anwendung geeigneter Methoden und mit der notwendigen Kaltblitigkeit die Angriffe der deutschen Panzerkrafte, selbet wenn sie uon Bombern unterstützt werden, adgeweirrt werden koonten, und dass es sich jetzt darum handele, sich überall, wo man sich befinde, bis zum letzten in den Stellungen zu bleiben. General Weygand fugt hinzu, dass man auch handeln musse und dass wo man angreige, man auch jemanden store. Die Sitzung wurde um 13.15 Uhr geschlossen. 17.00 Uhr - General Neygand sucht den Ministerprdstdenten out und zeigt thm an Hand einer mitgebrachten Karte die naheren Umstande, unter denen sich morgen die vorgeschene Offensive abspielen wird. M. Paul Reynaud macht thn bet dieser Gelegenheit von den Gerüchten Mitteilung, dte hierliber in politischen Kreisen umlaufen und bittet thn, allenthalben erneut Wetsung zu geben, damit das Geheimnis Uber dte Operationen gewahrt bleibe, Der Oberstkommandierende stellt fest, dass die Tatsachen, die er in Laufe des Vormittags Mr Winston Churchill und M Paul Reynaud mitgeteilt habe, durch eine günstigere Entwicklung erganzt werde . Die Armee des Generals Frere werde morgen zur Stützung der im Norden vorgesehenen Operationen zahlreichere und bedeutendere Einheiten aufweisen, als man es vor einigen Stunden annehmen konnte. Streng vertraulich! Schluesfolgerungen der am 22. Marz 1940 im Hauptquartier des Generals Weygand ab:gehaltenen Konferenz zwischen dem Mintsterprdstdenten, Paul Reynaud und General Weygand und dem britischen Premterminister Winston Churchill, General Gill, Luftmarachall Pierce. Es wurde folgendes vereinbart: - 29 - 427 1.) Dte belgische Armee stient steh out die Year - Linte zurtick und halt diese Limite. Die Sohleusen stnd geoffnet. 2.) Die britische und die franzustache Armee gretfen in Sudwesten in Richtung Bapaume und Cambrat an und near sobald wte moelial - bestimmt morgen mit ungefahr 8 Divisionen. 3.) Angesichts der vitalen Bedeutung dieser Schlacht fur die belden Heere und der Tatsache, dass die britischen Verdindungen uon der Befreiung Amtens adhangen, leistet die britische Duftwaffe wahrend der Dauer der Schlacht Tag und Nacht jede mögliche Hilfe. 4.) Die neue franzostsche Armeegruppe, die auf Amtens worstöest und die langs der Somme eine Front bildet, stoest nach Norden vor, um die Verbindung mit den in Richtung Stiden Richtung Bapaume angreifenden britischen Divisionen aufsunchmen. Dokument Nr 15. Telegramm von Winston Churchill an Ministerprasident Reynaud fur General Weygand vom 24. Mat 1940. Heftige Beschwerde Uber mangelnde Führung und Verdindung. Landesverteidigungs und Kriegsministerium - Ministerburo. Franzosische Republik. Streng geheim! Parts, den 24. Mait 1940. Abschrift des Telegramms von Churchill an Reynaud fur General Weysand. (Dechiffriert am 24, Mat 1940 0500 Uhr frun). General Gort telegrafiert, dass die Koordinierung mit den Armeen der dret verschiedenen Nationen an der Nordfront wesentlich set. Er Konne diese Koordinterung nicht bewirken, da er bereits im Norden und Stiden kampfe und seine Verbindungsstrassen bedroht seten. Gleichmeittg hore ich von Str Roger Keyes, das belgische Hauptquartier and der Konig hatten bis heute, 23. Mat 0300 Uhr nachmittags keine Direktiven erhalten. Wie passt das zu Ihrer Erklarung, Blanchard und Gort gingen Hand in Hand? Ich unterschätze durch aus nicht die Schwterigketten fur die Aufrechterhaltung der Verbindung, habe aber nicht das Gefunl, dass die Operationen im nordlichen Gebiet, gegen das sich der Feind konzentriert, wirksam miteinander in'Zinkling gebracht werden. Verlasse mich darauf, dass Sie darin Abhilfe schaffen konnen. Gort sapt ferner, jodes Vorrucken seinerseits konne nur die Form eines Durchbruchsversuchs annehmen, und er musse Entsatz von Sliden her erhalten, da er zu einem ernsthaften Angriff die erforderliche Munition nicht habe. Ntchtsdestoweniger wiesen wir thn an, an der Durchfthrung Ihres Planes festzuhalten. Wir haden hier nicht einmal Ihre eigenen Richtlinien erhalten und wissen nichts liber die Einzelhet ten Ihrer Operationen im Norden. Wollen Sie uns diese bitte sobald wie irgend möglich durch die franzosische Botschaft senden. Dte besten Winsche. - 30 428 Dokument Nr 16. Telegramm von Paul Reynaud an Winston Churchill vom 24.5.40. Heftige Beschwerde wegen Raumung von Arras und Le Haure durch die britischen Truppen. Forderung, sich den Befehlen des Generals Hey and untermoonden. Ubersetzung - Durchachlag. Streng geheim! 24. Mat 1940. Telegramm uon Paul Reynaud an Winston Churchill. 1.) General Weygand hat Ihnen vorgestern in metner Gegenwart in Vincennes einen Plan auseinandergesetzt, dem ste wis auch Ihre Begleitoffixtere voll und ganz zugestimmt haben. 2.) Diesen Plan hatten Sie schriftlich zusammengefasst. General Weygand setzte Sie davon in Kenntnis, dass er dieser Zusammenfassung gustimmte. 3.) General Weygand kennt alle Schwterigkeiten der Lage, aber er 1st der Ansicht, dass es keine andere mögliche Lösung gidt, als die Durchführung dieses Planes, selbst auf die Gefahr hin, dass man (hn den Schmiert@keiten des Augenblicks anpasat, indem man x.B. den Marsch nach Sudwesten addiegt und der rechte Flügel unterhald von Amiens auf die Somme hinsteuert. Er hat daher heute morgen den Befehl zur Durchfuhrung dieses Planes wiederholt. Die eingeschlossenen Armeen mussen also den verzweifelten Versuch unternehmen, sich mit den von Suden nach Norden marschierenden franzosischen Truppen zu vereinigen, indem sie von der Some aus und zwar Desonders von Amtens aus, losbrechen. 4.) Es 1st dringend erforderlich, die Armee Gort liber Dunkirchen zu verproviantieren, das von den beiden Divisionen Fagalde gedeckt wird. 5.) Es 1st sehr winschenswert, dass Sie in die Hafen Truppen entsenden, sowie Ste es gestern fur Calais getan haben. 6.) General Weygand hat zu seiner Uberraschung festgestellt, dass im Widerspruch xu diesem Plan die Stadt Arras gestern uon den englischen Truppen gerdumt worden ist. 7.) Dte Verbindung des Generals Weygand mit der belgischen Armee 1st sichergestellt. Er hat gestern abend erfahren, dass die Belgier kleine Stretfzuge zuruckgewiesen haben und thre Moral ausgexetchnet set. 8.) Dte Unmoglichkeit, mit Blanchard, dem Oberbefehlshaber der dret Armeen, ndmlich der belgischen Armee und der Armeen Gort und Blanchard, direkt in Verbindung zu treten, gestattet dem General Weygand nicht, Ihnen liber die fehlende Verbindung zwischen Blanchard und Gort eine Antwort zu geden. Da er aber mit der belgischen Armee direkt in Verbindung steht, hat er die Uberzeugung, dass seine Befehle Blanchard und Uber thn, Gort erreicht haben. Der Bewets fur die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Blanchard und Gort scheint daraus hervorzugehen, dass in der vergangenen Nacht eine franzosische Division eine englische Division adgelost hat. 429 - 31 - 9.) General Weysand erfahrt soeben von dem Abschud der achweren Einheiten der englischen Armeen aus Le Haure, was in der hinteren Front eine grosse moralische Verwirrung hervorruft. Wie ich selbst, 1st auch er davon überrascht, dass er night worher davon in Kenntnis gesetzt wurde. 10.) Ste werden, wte auch ich, die Metnung vertreten, dass sich in diesen schicksalsohweren Stunden die einheitliche Fuhrung mehr denn je suvor durchsetzen musa und die Befehle des Generals Weygand ausgefuhrt werden mussen. 11.) General Weygand 1st davon überzeigt, dass sein Plan nur dann von Erfold gekront werden kann, wenn die belgische Armee und die Armeen Blanchard und Gort von dem fanatischen Willen erfullt stnd, einen Ausfall zu unternehmen, der allein sie retten kann. Document Nr 17. Telegramm von General Heygand an den franzosischen Militar attaché in London UOM 28. Mat 1940. Notwendigkeit des Einsatzes der brittschen Luftwaffe in Dunkirchen. P.C. 28. Mat 1940. No 565 CAB / D.N. Der Oberbefehlshaber General Weygand an General Lelong franzosischer Militdrattaché in London. Der Kommandterende Admiral in Dunkirchen Detont die Notwen- digkeit eines nachdrucklichen Schutzes durch Luft und Seestrettkrafte zur Sicherung des Nachschuds und der teilweisen Evakuterung der in der Verteidigung des Bruckenropfee Dunktrohen kdmpfenden Truppe. Ich tweifle nicht, dass diese Notwendigkeit von den britischen Behorden verstanden wird. Ion bitte jedoch, erneut bet Ihnen vorstellig zu werden, damit alles unternommen wird, um diese Gedanken zu verwirklichen. General Weygand. (Verziffert und adgesandt den 28. Mat 1940 um 18.10 Uhr unter Nr 29) Dokument Nr 18. Telegrann von General Weygand an das britische Oberkommando Vom 30. Mat 1940. Instandige Bitte, dte britische Luftwaffe, die nach England xuruckgekehrt 1st, wieder in Frankreich zu stationieren, damit ste in die new entstehende Sohlacht eingretfen kann. Das ganze Gewicht der Schlacht fallt sonst out Frankretch. 30. Nat 1940. Arcole an Brumaire: Geheim. No 1272/3 - P.T. 430 - 32 Bitte dem brittschen Oberkommando sofort folgendes mitsuteilen: Der Letter der britischen Militdrmission hat am 29. Mat dem General Georges mitgeteilt, dass die britische Regierung beads tortige, den Kampf in Frankreich an der Seite der franzosischen Arace fort zusetzen. Die Paneerdivtsion und die 51. Division verbleiben in Frankreich unter dem Befehl des franzostschen Oberkommandos und werden sobald wte möglich eine Verstarkung erfahren. Die britische Duftwaffe verbleibt in Frankreich. Der Oberkommandierende Weygand dankt den britischen Oberkommando fur dieses Beweis der Solidaritat, er glaudt jedoch, die Aufmerksamkeit der Generalstabschefs out die Lage der in Frankreich verbliebenen brittschen Luftwaffeneinheiten lanken su mileson. Gegenwartig verbleiben auf unserem Staatsgediet mur dret Jagdgeschwader Alle anderen sind nach England zurückgekehrt. Nach der Beendigung der Schlocht in Flandern sind die suletat genannten Geschuader ausserstands, in die neus Schlacht einzugreifen, die möglicherweise an der Some Front, in der Champagne oder an der Maas beginnt. Das ganze Gewight der Schlacht fallt somit auf das franzosische Heer, das enormes aushalten muss. Der franzostache Oberkommandierende bittet das britische Oberkommando instandig, die Schwere dieser Lage begreifen zu wollen and alle Masanahmen zu ergreifen, damit sofort ein erheblicher Teil der britischen Luftwaffe inabesondere Jager als Bereitschaft fur die Devorstehende Schlacht in Frankreich stationtert werden körmen. Weygand. Dokument Nr 19. Telegram von General Weygand an das britische Oberko vom 2. Junt 1940. Dringendate Bitte, Flotte und Luftwaffe in Dankirchen einsusetken, damit franzosische Nachhut nicht geopfert wird. Nr.1328/3 F.T. 2.Junt 1940 Arcole an Brumaire. Bitte sofort bein britischen Oberkomando sweaks nachfolgender Mitteilung vorstellig werden: Admiral Nord hat heute Morgen telegraphiert, dose ausaer den 25 000 Franzosen die Bruckenkopf Dunkirohen verteidigen, ROOT ungefills 22 000 weitere Frankosen verbleiben. Adle Englander werden houte Abend abtransportiert. Da su hoffen 1st, dass in der folgenden Nacht diese 22 000 Mann abtransportiert werden konnen, verbletben morgen free noch 25 000 Verteidiger. Aus diesen Granden hat Admiral Word erklart 431 - 33 - dpss er in Dunkirchen bleide und die Sperrung der Hafeneinjahrt aufschiede. Er verlangt, dass thm morgen -Vontag Abend admtliche brittschen Wasser- und Luftfahrxeuge sur Verfugung gestellt werden, um die 25 000 Hann adrutransportieren, die durch thr Ausharren die Einschiffung der letsten britischen Kontingente ermöglicht haben. Bitte in der dringendsten Form namens des Oberkommandierenden fur die Erfullung der Bitte des Admirals Nord einsutreten. Weiset darauf hin, dass die Solidaritat der beiden Armeen erfordert, dass die franzostache Nachhut nicht geopfert werden darf. Dokument Nr.20. Schreiden des Generals Weysand an Paul Reynaud vom 3. Juni 1940. Dringende Bitte, nooh einmal auf Winston Churchill einzwirken, damit britische Luftwaffe den franzostschen Truppen zur Hilfe kommt. Anlage zu diesem Schreiben: Bericht des Oberbefehlshabers der franzosischen Luftwaffe an General Weygand vom 3. Junt 1940, Uber die Notwendigkeit der sofortigen Entsendung von 10 britischen Jagdgeschwadern. Erfullung dieser Forderung 1st eine Frage von Laben oder Tod. Grosses Hauptquartier der Oberbefehlshaber No.582 - CAB / D. N. 3. Juni 1940 Durchschlag. Streng geheim! Herr President. Ich erlaude mir, Ihner heute noch einen Brief zuzuleiten, den mir General Vuillemin geschrieben hat und den er als dusserst dringlich bezeichnet. Dieser Brief unterstützt den dringlichen Appell, den Sie Herrn Winston Churchill zugehen liessen. Seine Schlussfolgerung 1st keineswegs ubertrieden;sollen unsere Truppen nicht mit zu ungleichen Waffen morgen in die Schlacht gehen, 80 brauchen sie die Unterstützung einer starken Jagdfliegerei. Keiner, der an den letsten Schlachten teilgenommen hat, wird dies bestreiten. Unsere eigene Luftwaffe 1st nicht in der Lage, uneeren Truppen diese unerlassliche Unterstützung zu gewähren. In Andetracht des Ernstes der Lage bitte ich Sie, nooh einmal auf den britischen Premierminister einwirken zu wollen. Der Brief des Generals Vuillemin 1st dereits dem Oberbefehlshaber der britischen Luftwaffe in Frankreich und dem Chef der franzosischen Mission beim britischen Luftjahrtministerium our Kenntnis gebracht worden. Genehmigen Ste, Herr Prdsident, usw. gez. Keygand - 34 - 432 Der Oberberehlaher der Luftwaffe Generalstad D. Buro NN.3987-3/0. S. 3. Jun t 1940. Eiligat! Strong geheim! Herr General Vuillemin als Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe an den oberbefehlshaber und Chef des Generalstabes der Nationalen Verteidigung, oberbefehlshaber out allen Kriegaschauplatzen. (Kabinett - Generalatab 3. Buro) Nit Schreiben No.3906-3/0 E.L.G. vom 31. Yat 1940 hade ich Sie gebeten, out das dringlichate bet den oberaten britischen Behorden vorstellig zu werden, um von Ihnen einen massterten Jagdfilegereinsatz in Frankreich zu erreichen. Die Entwicklung der Ereignisse, die x.Zt. in Richtung auf ein Eingreifen starker deutscher Bomberverbande im Sudosten und die Möglichkeit des unmittelbar beuorstehenden Kriegsein- tritts Italians geht, verstarkt nach den kritischen Charakter der Situation, die ich Ihnen beschrieben habe. Ich beehre mich, meinen Gedankengang zu diesem Thema wie folgt darsulegen: Wenn der Feind, wie su erwarten steht, binnen kurzem einen neuen massierten Panzer- und Luftwaffeneinsatz gegen die x.Zt. in Aufdan befindliche neue Defensivfront durchfuhrt, 80 steht durchaus zu erwarten, dass er uon neuem unsere Stellung eindruckt und einen schnellen und tiefen Einbruch durchfuhrt, den wir nicht mehr aufhalten konnen, wenn wir nicht in der Lage sind, schon au Beginn des Angriffs die feindlichen Bomberkrafte durch einen massierten Eineatz der allierten Jagdfliegerverbande ausauschalten. Ein derartiger massterter Einsatz setst die Unterstützung mindestens der Halfte der out englischen Flughafen stationierten Luftwaffe voraus. Dies 1st umao notwendiger, als die deutsche Aktion in Stidosten und der mögliche Kriegaeintritt Italians mich in Andetracht der ausserordentlich schwachen Mittel in Sudosten und in Nordafrika bereits erkwingen haben, Teile der Luftwaffe nach dem Sudosten abaukommandieren. Diese im Verhaltnis zu der möglichen Gefahr lacherlich geringen Kommandos würden nach dem Kriegaeintritt Italiens verstarkt werden missen, Awenn nicht unser ganzer Sudosten ohne Verteidigung einer italientachen Aktion ausgeliefert werden soll. Eine sol che Aktion konnte ebenfalls Angriffe mit Panzerwagen und Luftwaffe zugleich unfassen und konnte gut denselben Erfolg haben wie der deutsche Angriff in Nordosten. Ion brauche den Ernet der oben geschilderten Gesamtlage nicht zu unterstreichen, wenn wir nicht von den obersten britischen Beharden die geforderte Unterstützung vollstandig und unuerziglich erhalten, so erscheint es wahrscheinlich, dass die transosischen Krafte geachlagen warden und der Krieg fur Grossbritannien und fur Frankreich verloren geht. Da der Feind sich den Zeitpunkt des Angriffs aussuchen kann, 80 kann die geforderte Unterstützung nur dann 433 - 35 - als unmittelbar bezeichnet werden, wenn die britischen Jdgerverbande is Voraus in Frankreich stationiert werden. Ion habe daher die Ehre Sie zu bitten, bet den obersten britischen Behorden vorstellig su werden, damit die Unterstutzung naoh folgenden Gesichtspunkten erfolgt: Erstens. Augenblickliche Entsendung von 10 britischen Jagdgeschwadern, die in der Gegend von Eureux Dreux stationiert werden sollen und zur Unterstützung der Landkrafte westlich des franzosischen Aufmarsches zwischen der Linie Pontoise Peronne und dem Meere eingesetst werden konnen. Dies würde mich in die Lage versetzen, Starkere Krafte fur die Ubrige Front bereitzuhalten, wobet auch die nach dem Stidosten zu kommandterenden Einheiten zu berücksichtigen sind. Zweitens. Vordereitungen fur die stark beschleunigte Entsendung nach Frankreich von weiteren 10 Jagdgeschwadern, die UOM ersten Schlachttage ab auf dem sohon uon den Briten besetsten Gebiet stationteren waren. mu Drittens. Da diese Geschwader out bereits von den Briten und Frankosen besetzten Stutzpunkten zu stationieren waren, brauchte thr NachschuD keine Bewegungen vorzunshmen. Wenn tatadhhich der Paind den strategischen Fehler machen sollte, ohne vorherige erneuts offensive handlungen gegen Frankfall England "anzugreifen, so konnten diese Geschuader noch am gleichen Tage ouf thre englischen Stutzpunkte murlickkehren. Ausserdem würden sie ouf diese Weise vermutlich der planmdesigen Bombardterung der Jagdfliegerstutzpunkte in England entgangen setn, mit denen der Feind sicherlich seine Operationen gegen England einlette wird. Ich möchte noch einnal betonen, dass es fur Grossbritannien wie auch fur Frankreich eine Frage von Leben oder Tod 1st, ob diene: Forderungen unuerzuglior erfullt warden. Der Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe Puillemin . 11 . 434 DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF TRANSLATION 1 - President 1 - British Ambassador 1 - Dr. White 2 - Mr. Irey 1 - Diary 1 - Extra 435 This translation has not been finally corrected. 436 DOCUMENT mm - - - I no. s 437 Sensational Discoveries on the Loire The Secret Political Dominants of the French General Staff are Captured IS is officially amounted Our treeps have made a great discovery. In the small town of La Charite on the Leire, a small recommiteemes group captured the secret political documents of the French General Staff in a half destroyed airplane. The doon meats found here are of such importance that their publication must be regarded as the greatest sensation of this kind. They disclose with as almost upprecedented clarity the cynical alms for spreading the was of England and France. Everything which me enspected OF inferred, on the German side, with regard to these plane and which has been supported by the documents found - until now, becomes astenishingly clarified, in its large outlines, through these documents. On account of their - weakness and because of the lack of preparation on the part of England and France, the small peoples of Europe were to be 10d systematically to the chambles. IS was Haired to subjegate Germany is two ways. First, through outting off Germany free the Swedish iron mines OF through their w struction. Further, through the destruction both of Rumanian oil and of the Seviet Reseian oil fields of Bake and Batum. Second, through bringing Scandinavia into the war against Germany, whereby 18 was desired to gain 10 divisions against 438 Germany and through bringing in Recents, Turkey, Greese and Togeclavia, shereby 18 me hoped to mobilise 100 divisions against Germany. This was called, eleverly, the strategy of the agrees Secure* (Astrision Front) against the German army. For a long time both of those actions were decided things. only the incompetence and the lack of desision of the enery leadership and the lightning quick blow of the German army have frustrated these plans. Rightly aid General Camelin, in a discovered note of May 12, 1940, order the greatest procestions for keeping these documents of the General Staff secret for off one of these documents should fall into the hands of the energy the German High Command will "thereby receive polisseal instruments which it would employ against the Allion." A truly classic document of The General staff of the French was clear with regard to the estastrophie results which the publication of these documents meet have upon English and French policy. The Foreign office has undertaken an assemblage of these documents in its White Beek No. 6. In consideration of the momentous importance, however, today before the publication of the White Book, there so hereby begin an attempt so put before the public a preliminary series of these documents. A game of intrigue 10 hereby disclosed, such as the world has hardly heretefore seen. The documents speak for themselves. 439 Document No. 2 Telegram of General Vergend to General Genetin, March 7. 1940. England prepares for the bembardment of the oil fields of Bake and Satum. - English and French officers - plare the necessary air fields, in civilian dress, as persons interested in petrolem. General Headquarters of the Eastern Modiforreness Operation Area. The General No. 295 3/8 March 7. 1940 strictly Confidential (Copy) General Woygand to the Commader of the Military Forces and Chief of the General Staff of Defense. Air Marahal Hitchell, Commander of the Air Force of the H1441. East, the today - to Beyrouth, is the company of General - the my to Ankara, has informed me that he has received information from London regarding the preparations for the eventual bonhardment of Sales and Satum. No explained to no that he intended to eak Marahal dahmalk for the permission to explore air fields in the area of Diabokir, Broarm, Kare and the Yan see, which eas serve as internation landing places for airplanes with have their principal base is Mesireh Air Marshal Mitchell asked me for permission to explore - air fields in Djesirch because the political condition of Inck 440 4 - whose integentence 10 recognised, is not such as nakes possible the use of the air fields of that severeign territory without danger of complications. I am honored to inform you that I consented to the request of the Air Marshal. The surveys will shortly be undertaken by British and French officers, both in civilian dress. Thereby the impression will be given that the affair is one of work relating to the exploitation of the oil boaring strate of this area. Weypond -5- 441 Document No. 2 Note of General Gamelia of March 10, 1940 Plane of the Allies for the creation of new fronts is the Scandinavians and is the Balkans. - The Divisions of the Scandinavians and Balkan countries shall fight for the Allies No. 104/1 - Strietly confidential - March 10, 1940 Note concerning the participation of French and British forces in the operations in Finland. with the beginning of the heatilities between Finland and Seviet Russia on the 30th of November, 1939. the French and British Governments have expressed their wills to give practical and quick help in Finland through the delivery of airplanes and musitions. The first shipments of the material begas on the 20th of December. The French High Command, for its part, without delay has concerned itself to realise the desire of Marshal Mannorhein, insefar as - apart from the volunteer shipments of materials and the shipments that the Marchal has already received French forces can be placed in the operations. For this purpose, Commander Geneval was sent to the Finnish General. No left France on December 20, 1949 for Helsinki and came back on the 20th of January in 1940. On January 16, the French High Command worked on a general plan for armed intervention in Finland. This plan particularly 442 looked formard to the landing of Allied troops in Peterms. AS the - time, the harbers and air fields of the Norvegian west coast were, should the occasion arice, to be taken over as a precautionary measure by the Allies. The plan me, furthermore, that on the basis of the results once achieved, the operations should if possible be extended toward Sweden and that the irea mines of Callivare, which are valuable courees for iron shipment to Germany, should be occupied. Through this operation, there should at the same time, be a new connection made between Harvik and Laler. The plan for the operation at Peteame coinsided with the one that Marahal Mannerhois placed before Commender Ganoval. AS the seal-official conversations the British High Command seened to share our views. AS the inter-Allied military vereations of January 32 and February 1, which preseded the meeting of the Supreme Council of February 5. the English pushed the question of direct help for Finland back to a secondary position. They aboved themselves to be convinced supporters of as expedition against the northern Swedish irea since, which, at least in the beginning, would have made the transference of a part of the engaged forces to Finland morely a side show. Thereby, the expedition against Petermo was sheatened for practical purposes. It had only a secondary and subsequent character. This view achieved a majority in the Supreme Council. The preparation of the Beandinavian expedition - immediately taken in hand, and the French and British forces were ready to be transported from the first days in March. -7- 443 The first group of French forces (an Alpine Rifle Brigate) was ready to leave its garrison on the 26th of February and could have been embarked anytime from the first of March. Per the ease of a adden blow on Petermo, 18 would have been possible to send as advanced guard such earlier. The leadership of the operations envisaged in Scandinavia was given ever to the British High Command. This could apparently not be decided any other way. The equipment for the expeditionary force on the one hand, and its reinferesments, - the other hand, nooded to depend on communications which passed through the some of the British see command. The protection of these transports w pended, of course, on British sea foress. Furtherwore, the French Havy cannot be everywhere at the same time. The Meditor- reason, the Atlantic conet of France and Africa renain its natural sphere. Quite apart from the task which devolves upon it for the protection of the coaveys from America. It must also be recalled that the participation of the French military foress in the Hervegian operations can at prosent be only a limited one. The French aray is foreed to keep its mass on the northeasters front where 11 stands against the mass of German forces. The French army is furtherwore obligated to keep the watch against Italy on the Alpine front and in North Africa. The French army has furtherwore a vanguard in the Near East. IS can, therefore, enter present circumstances, make available only limited contingents for areas of operation lying outside these spheres. 444 In the air, France can make only a limited contribution on account of the present condition of the French air force. The opening of a northern battle field has a primary interest from the standpoint of the conduct of the war. Apart from the moral consequences the blockade becomes more compre- honsive and above all, the blocking of the transport of iron are to Germany, which is of consequence. In this connection, an operation in the Balkana, if is could be combined with the Scandinavian undertaking, would be calculated to increase the economic pressure on Germany. Germany would then have only one my out from the blockade, namely ever her frentier with Seviet Russia, and in this connection 18 must be noted that 18 will take a long time to exploit the Massian sourees of raw materials. On the military plane, an action in the Balkans (this question remains naturally tied up with the position of Italy), would be much more profitable to France than a similar one in Scandinavia: the battle field would be enlarged on a great scale; Yagoalavia, Remania, Greese and Turkey would bring us reenfereements of almost 100 divisions. so far the question of petrolean has not been considered. It is necessary to consider the potroleum resources of Rumania and offirencemensia which ean be defended or destroyed. Sweden and Norway would give us only a weak support of about 10 divisions. The troops which the Germane would have to withdraw from the western front to counter our undertaking would desite less be of about the same proportions. 445 The advantages of opening a Seantimevian battle front remain monotheless unquestionable. Nevertheless, the technical difficulties which come with such as undertaking must not be overlooked. In the sphere of sea fighting, operations in the Baltis are practically excluded for us. our communications w over the North Sea from Seetland to Horray. This line of eation is substantially longer than the German - butween Stettis and the south coast of Suches. our line of communication must be protected against the German submires and bombore. IS must be recalled that the time of year in which the Gulf of Bethatan 10 free of see gives the Germane the greatest advantages for landing in Finland and not only on the south coast, but also on the west coast and on the east coast of Suchen. For the can- dust of land warfare, 18 is to be noted that the Norvegian hap bore and especially Nervik have only very limited cover. They are badly equipped for the disembarkation of Sroope and soenforcements. The reilreads which run from Barvik and Breatheta to Lales can carry only limited traffic. This traffic figure sarrows further if one pushes forward to Finland, for then there is only one reilroad line available, of which Lales 10 the starting point and which reas around the Bethaian coast. This is true under the assumption that the Sucdes leave us their reilread material. The climate of Finland and especially Lapland is oztreerdinarily severe. France-British forces can be stationed - 10 - 446 there only if they are chosen very carefully. Until the end of May 18 is necessary that they have special equipment. French pack and draft animals, aside from sules, cannot because acclimated there. Furthermore, the supply of provisions and especially of wine, for our troope presents as extraordinarily difficult problem to selve. From the foregoing, 18 is apparent that - taking for granted a rapid if not dangerless landing (possible action of enery U-beats and bembers) in Horway - the entry into action of our forces in Finland can follow only very slowly. In the sphere of air force, 18 appears that help for Finland is most quickly and easily possible through the dispatch of bembers with long range, assuming - as also with respect to a landing is Peteano - that 18 has been decided in favor of an opening of military operations against Soviet Russia. Such support seems the only way of helping Fialand before the appearance of land foress. This assistance can, however, be sent only by the English because our air force does not yet have bembers of the never type in large enough mmers to undertake this work. Before all else, no airplanes which eas be withiness from their eventual work in France. In the sphere of fighters, planes, help for Fialand, upon which in Shis case particular value is placed, is necessarily even more afficials. Fighter planos must be supplied by sea. They must be dismounted in Sucden and assembled again in Finland. It must be noted also that - 22 - 447 a landing in Petsamo under present conditions must be judged quite differently than two months age. The Russians have received notable reasforements in this region. They have pushed forward in a broad front townte the south from Petermo. Mangore have been prepared. Possibly a land connection with Marmank has been established. Finally, the Russions have spotted the const with defensee and above all, have bought up heavy artillery. on the other hand, the Pians are now entirely out of condition to assist a Landing of Allied singents through a comprehensive land operation as we originally expected. Following - the chipments of material which have been carried - since the month of number, help for Fialand can new be developed through a military when taking involving the sending of Allied troops. Aside from the French and Polich centingents (13,000 mm) the English have sidered senting from 6 to 7 divisions - with regard to this I have had thoroughly reliable information which we given me by General The estimate of the troops' strength conce from hims the agreement of the War Cabinet has not yet been received. The total conbet force, therefore, whee w as the very least, 190,000 mm. The estimate, which includes all the Brasses troops of the new levy - one active division - be taken away from the troops new is France - no increase so possible whose ene considere the difficulties of transport and the cover possibilities of the Berogian markers. - 12 - 448 The transport of the trosps involves in itself already notable delays. IS is a matter of several months. Therefore, 18 is now impossible to make any conclusions with regard to the increase of these treep members. In 2 or 3 months, no doubt, the condition on the French front will be clearer, and we will then be is condition to supply the means for a more comprehensive decision. The technical difficulties of as Allied intervention must not be left out of account. They are not inorporable and will, should the occasion arise, be removed from the my. Handwritten note of the Generales Our Scandinevian plane meet be carried forth with desision. For the saving of Finland or for the very least to take ever the Swetish iron are and the Norwegian barbore. we, noverthelees, express that from the standpoint of the conduct of military operations, the Balkane and the Cameranon, from which 18 is possible also to deprive Germany of petrolous is much more important. However, Italy holds the key of the Balkana in her hand. (Signed) M. Ganelin 449 - 13 - Document No. 3 Telegram of General Gamelia to General Weygand of March 12, 1940 The operations planned by the Allies shall be directed by the British High Consoned in the niddle east and by the Turkish High Commond in the Commons. Carbon Copy . Project - Secret . No. CAB / ⑉ March 12, 1940. Borties to Good Francit - Answer so telegram 1 236 The note of March 7th appended to my letter 293 . CAB / ⑉ informed you of the general Judgment which I have placed before the President of the Council of Ministers with regard to the operations in the Maddle East and particularly with regard to possible operations is the Gameaous. In my opinion the operations in the middle East must be directed by the Brittah High Command and the operations in the Gaucasus by the Turkish High Commont, the latter to be contrated with Tarkish foress assisted by aircraft and later special centingente of the Allies. You may enter into relations with Marahal Teahalmak with regard to this question and participate is all proporatory investigations with regard to the middle East. I - sending you by messenger a recented discussion with w card to the action in the Caucasus. General CameLia - 14 - 450 Document No. 4 Telegran of the French Ambasendor Massigis in Ankare to the Foreign office in Paris, March 14, 1940. Conversation of the Ambussador with the Turkish Foreign Minister with regard to the bombing of Sales and Satum. - The Ambassador expects me difficulties from the Turkish Government - (translation) Foreign Ministry No. 389 - Ankara, March 14, 1940. Dispatched by messenger as 22:23 o'clock. Strictly secret. In the course of the interview which I had yesterday with him, the Foreign Minister lold before me, at his initiative, a telegran which came in during the night in which the Tarkish representative in Neeses reported with regard to a discussion with the Ambassador of the United States. so- cording to the opinions of the latter, the Russiane are so distanced with regard to the danger of a bombing and burning of the oil area of Bake that the Seviet Russian Administration asked American engineers abother and how a fire resulting from a bombardment could be successfully combuted. The engineers are reported to have replied that on account of the manner in which the all fields have heretefore been exploited, the grored - 15 - 451 is se saturated with oil that a fire would undoubtedly spread over the whole neighboring area. It would take months before it would be possible to put it out and a year before operations could be undertaken again. with regard to the safety of the population, the city should be moved for that purpose about 50 kilometers further amy. "What do you think about 1870 said Saraogin to me. I assvored that addre bombore no doubt had an effective radine of action to reach Bake from Djesireh or from a Irek. It would be accessary, however, for that to fly over Turkish and Iranian territory. "You are afraid then of an objection from Treats the Minister assured me. - He could not have made is sere clear to me that the difficulties will not come from the Turkish side. IS would have been snopt and I compelled his to press himself more definitely and therefore I and not " further into his statement. It 10, severtheless, very important and I permit myself to bring 18 to the attention of Your Excellency. I have also informed my English celleague with regard to this matter. (Signed) Massigis 452 - 16 - Document No. 5. Note of General Camelia of March 16, 1940. The plans for the creation of new fronts become deeper. Germany and Seviet Russia are to be wakened economically through the outting off of irea are importe from Sweden and oil imports from Rumania. A strategy of 'attrition of the Gerean fighting power is to be followed. (translation) - General Headquarters Bureau of the Chief of the General Staff for National Defense and of the Military Forese, March 16, 1940, . No. 325 CAB ID. N. - Strictly Secret. Note with regard to the conduct of the MAF. (Final draft with consideration to the statements of the and of General Since the views which were explained in the "War Plan for 1940 - sent to the President of the Council of Ministers by the message No. 290 GAB / D. N. of February 26, 1940 - remain the foundation of our contact, as because necessary is view of the signing of the Armistice to w termine which operations eas be undertaken immediately to load to important if not desisive Mone against Gereray. - 27 - 453 on lame, st appears at present very difficult to achieve results outside of the unpopulated areas. Therefore Germany must be forced to leave its present waiting position. The first thing which is necessary is a chargesing of the blookade. Along with the economic results which must be expected from 28, an attempt must be made to realise the following objectives. First: It can be in Germany's interest to spare Holland and Belgium because these nations make 18 possible for Germany to considerably circument the action of the blookade. It is also possible that a severe establishment of quotas for imports into Helland and Belgium may bring Germany to the position of making a quick and of the matter and attacking the Netherlands and Belgim for these countries ean still bring Germany great advantages in an economic my. Seconds with regard to the Scandinevian countries, things are quite different. Belgium and Holland serve Germany principally as intermediary traders whereas Seeden applies Germany with as indispensible saw material, namely iron. Efforts must be made to prevent such supply. A simple action would be to explain that the supply of certain important prodasts, for instance iron, by neutral countries which border Germany amounts to support for Germany and would lead to repricals. Seeden then would be able to supply its irea to Germany only under threat of blockade. Similarly Normay would be able to engage in the transit trade only under the same risk. If both countries cooperate, the goal 10 attained - 18 - 154 otherwise their occanic trade should be Mechaded. On the face of such a state of affairs, Germany may deside to react and my attack sweden is a military my. That meet find us ready for defense. For this purpose there must stand ready in France and England a first wait of military power ready to send to Scandinavia, whether as a counter blow or as a preventive measure. Thirds The outsing off of German imports of Russian oil. - The outting off of deliveries of Rumanian petroleum to Germany ean at present be attained neither through the Mostade nor through military operations. with regard to the Cancasus, the first question which arises is the opening of heatilities against the U. s. s. R. Further there 10 the problem of the cooperation of at least the agreement of Turkey. As in everything that happens is the East, the assitude of Italy ean not be disregarded. Also the bombing of the oil supplies of Bake and Bates from the air can materially injure Germany's supply of gaseline. recording to the inquiries made 9 air squadrens will be necessary for this task. The Command of the French Air Force is prepared to make available 5 squadrone and the rest must come from the Reyal Air Force. These groups, which have their base in Djesirch, where the landing fields for this purpose either are ready or are being undertaken (in the northern part of the French Middle East) must also if possible have support points is Astatic Turkey where fields are new Jeet of exploration. - 19 - 455 The command of the French Air Force eas already undertake a bombing operation in transcamensis after receiving notice of 14 days to a month and can undertake this operation with two squadrens of heavy bembers which can be supported with two squadrone of medium heavy bombore. These bombers should be withdraw from the mother country If the condition of the French front permits. The operations in the air can be practically supported in the following my: First, action of the floots directed towards breaking communications in the Black Sea. French and British submarines should be extrusted this task. Their passage through the Straits will require the express OF tasit approval of Turkey and they will need a base is the harbors of the Black Sea in Asia Miner. Second, through action on land which can be earried out only by Turkey, which however can be supported through certain units of our middle eastern troups. Iran can also take part is these operations at the instance of Great Britain. Fourth, with all consideration of the objections which were made to this policy is the course of the last meeting of the was comeil, there is an advantage in mining the rivers and undertaking this task with the medium of the air force as seen as possible. In this manner 18 will be possible to partially damage the interior transportation of Geresay. It is necessary that the operations free the air force as seen - 20 - to 456 as possible from the burden with which as is at present leaded. Altogether, the Incue-Finnish Armistics should make no difference in the basic objectives which we set for 1940. IS must cause us however to act more quickly and more energetically. through a completion of blookado measures and certain military operations we can not only draw the economic lasse more tightly but also make 18 necessary for Germany to step out of her present passive military position. The experiences of six months of war show that the noutrals fear Germany. without confronting them as threateningly from our side, we must also let them know our power. or course diplomatic and military conduct met be determined by the same energetie tone. 457 n Document No. 6. Telegram of the French Ambassador Massigit in Ankare so the Foreign Ministry in Paris, March 28, 1940. In the action against Sake and Satum, the outward compre- aising of Turkey shall be avoided through skillful management. Foreign Affairs, Plain Text, Reserve No. 881. Telegram received in Ankare 28 March 1940. Askare March 26. Received by messenger April 3 at 11:30 O'clook. strietly Secret. I refer to the telegram to your Excellency No. 540-541. In ay efforts is my earlier correspondence to explain the pesttion of Turkey with regard to the Boviet Union (compare espeetally my dispatches No. 74 of February # and my telegrans 433 - 439 and 461) I emphasised that, in my opinion, as is w less to attempt to heat - Turkey against the Seviete, that on the other hand however 18 is possible to hope that we will be successful under certain circumstances in bringing Turkey to take a position against is our wake. I see today no accessity of changing anything in the opinion which I expressed before the breakup of Finnish resistance. The Newson pease will of course further increase Turkey's cention. Revever, people 458 22 - are convinced here that the red army came out of this - in the north very such weakened - which tends to cancel out. None the less, I saw no efforts to come eleser to the Seviet Union. on the contrary, people are gotting used to the idea of having to count on have easity, which does not mean however, that the Tarkish statesmen are prepared to get themselves into as adventure with as uncertain outcome. We must in fast take account of the circumstances that if the government in Askare from now on has the conviction that Germany will not conquer the vesters powers, still many people in Turkey are not viseed that we will eventually sis a elean out vistory. Many still believe that the Reich will receive from the tired out Allies the pease which as noods. Many believe - and the Italian and the German propogandists exert themselves to servines than of this - this, in spite of the strengthened determination of the governments in Paris and Lenton, the war will end through a compremising peace. Then people must naturally consider here what the future may bring in the case that a pease which will leave the peoples of France and England disentisfied and as solutioned, Turkey should have to stand against a Buseia which had taken advantage of the lessons of the Finnish - to strongthan its military power. The government ean not entirely 1g- are this state of the opinion. 459 - 23 Thence also are the sourees of a large part of its present causion. should we tomorrow clearly succeed on the western front even is a limited action, or should a German offensive in the grand manner break against our defense on the last OF is the air, - would find the Tarks more energette and more ready for now undertakings. It must however unfortunately be added that the condition of our public life, quite independent of any military outlook, causes certain unreat here. The last sessions of Parliament left a bad impression. People were certainly impressed by the determination of your Excellency and your government to improve the state of affairs and not to allow French morale to sink, but there are people who are not unisfluenced by German and Italian agents and breakcasts and are not yet sure whether they will not be disappointed in their hopes, which are identical with ours. One must have the courage to say that the Turks at the present 40 not have the feeling of OUR irresistible superiority, no matter how great their sympathy for us may be. The majority believe that their fate is bound up with the fate of the western powers; the governsent is certainly firmly determined to maintain its obligations to us, but in the public mind there is no such opinion which would strengthen them to undertake initiatives which involve risks. 460 Before I comply with the requests of your of which the general lines - show me strength Selegrans sto. gu, as eeemed accessary to - to bring these important conside ornitions to stad. They explain beforehand certain reservations which I meet express - certain of the procestions which 8 and to emphasise. As air action against Sales and a - action - the Mack See have very different aspects from the point of vice, both technically and politically. First, an air attack on Date from Bjostrole accessitates fiying over Twitter servitory for - w attempters, and furtherwore as is necessary to ny - the montale reage w trees the Van See and the Carrish sm, that is in Bardistan, which is very populated as a result of very covere police operations that were carried out there two or three years age. No important population centers will be from across, and the airplanes may very well pass market. should they be seen, then at meet they will be noticed by a few posts of police gondarnes. Forthermore, through a surning some the west and a cross flight through the northern part of Iran, as so possible entirely w avoid fiying over Turkiah territory (and, expectally If the point of departure should 120 not is but is Irak). When I contront this factual situation with the remote of Sarasogia which are contained in my sologram No. 529. I 461 - 25 come to the conclusion that a prior information of the Surkich government and a request for permission to ny over its terri- tory would bring them - exhurranement. It is assessafy to place them as not before the completed fast them before a situation which will arise immediately and to delay the time for informing them about what is going on (I mosa Shareby in ferming them officially, for the confidential relations which we have with her as with the High Command would forbid that they be leftseentirely in the dark). The operation must actually be in course/that we can excuse owreelves when planse in the course of their flight have so cress through Turkish air. Far from insulting the Turkish regine, - recerve will actually lighten their work. should the Seviet government make a pro- test, then is is desirable that Ankara be in a position to plain that 18 had nothing to 4 with these faste. When flying over her territory had actually taken place, then 18 would not be bad were we to receive a discrete protest. Should the air constances become weree, and should the Seviet Union react through military measures, then 18 would be accessary that the Turkish regine be in a position to explain to the General Assembly that the institutive for the attack was the responsibility of Meeson. Is this ease the agreement of public opinion 4 of the country with the Turkich government would be made certain. But precisely because a reaction from the Series Union is to be 462 - 26 - expected, - must be circumspost not to undertake any such action without taking into account its. possible effects on Turkey, and on account of this we must also become clear with regards to the situation which this country must entrent. It 10 not my affair to express ayself ever this question. I must novertheless note that on the eastern tableland there is still wister and that the accessary landing fields ean not yet be explored and prepared. Furthermore, I must note that according to my knowledge protection against air attacks on the eeal fields as Songoulder and the steel works in Karabak are not yet ready because certain English materials have not yet been delivered. In my opinion is would show a great lack of foresight to expese two each important points of the Turkish economy to air attack from Sebastopol. I should be very such surprised If the military exporte asd not need a delay for several weeks to make all the accessary preparations. Second. The question of the Black sea, and of the feet- litation which shipping in its waters receives as a result of the close cooperation of the Seviete for the supplying of Germany, has engaged my attention. I permitted ayself on the morning after the conclusion of the treaty (Sologram 1969 of october 23. 1939) to allude to 18. IS must unfortunately be recognised that a solution of the problem is not easy to find. recording 463 27 to the - is the of stations, cluded in - binding Turkey assistance conditions is basis of one signature the the convention stope are the ships, the by all undertake - montilizees I well convention. play the as a excluded, Descibility 464 - 26 The Turkish Government is in my epision not ready at this time, as a result of the reasons explained above, to 8 .. far as this. Is as possible to foresee operations of another kind? If 18 is almost impossible to conduct control operations systemstienlly on the Black Sea without question participation of Turkey, then it is also not possible to expect - unless one expects more from this power than to close 180 eyes - that w marines would go b night through the Streits to carry ea quiek combat Journies in the Black Sea which would have the objective of disturbing sea traffie and German shipping, and to sink shipe which free their earge are clearly destined for Germany. I only touch on the question. If the operation were technically possible, then it would from a political point or view encounter fever obstacles than an intervention of allied cruisers because Turkey could then say that she was kept main- formed with regard to our plans. However, we must be quite clear about the matter that even such a limited operation would SEED place the Turkish regime in a delicate position and we cannot undertake such operations without taking into Amount their consequences upon this country. Therefore we must return to the fasts about the condition of Tarkish armanents which we have set forth above. I come to the conclusion that under present conditions, and after a period to be established by the experts, operations 465 previously considered ease to concern ourselves with the sequences which the planned initiative night have from the standpoint of Turkish defense. Therefore as will be meeseary to have the same procestions and delays which the operation against Bake seems to bring with 18. What furtherfure is the outlook for central action in the Black Sea? The number of German merchant shipe which have taken refage in Bulgarian marbers is evidently limited (apparently a). the direct action of as allied raid against shipping under the German Sing would therefore be of very short duration. IS will therefore be principally a matter of controlling Russian, Palgarian or Italian shipe, and to sake control examinations se as to hold up Reseise and Italian tankure and to establish a trel over the shipe which ply between Gausasian harbers and the nouths of the Benube or the Bulgarian Coast. All of those are operations which cannot be commuted particularly moopesfully on the high sea. The alosed shipe must be brought to a base to be examined there and to disembark the confiscated goods. where can this base be if not is a Turkish harbert Discrete assistance will not be successful. This means therefore that Turkey will be directly bound up with the action of the Allies and that Germany will be able rightly to regard her as a belligerent power. 466 - 30 without taking sate account their consequences upon this country. Therefore w must return to the facts about the condition of Tarkish assessents which we have set forth above. I come to the conclusion that under present conditions, and after a period to be established by the exports, operations against Dake are the ensiest to organise and especially to the extent that - take into account Turkish conditions. Furthersore, its muccess will have such consequences and will se weaken Baselan action that the Surhich regine, as a result of the successful consequence of the operation, will feel itself by our oureese and will give us the necessary assistance more willingly so that operations of shipping control - the Blest sea can take place under more favorable circumstances. (Signed) Massigis n- 467 December No. 7 note of the French Prime Minister Baladier of January 19. 1940. General Camelia is to prepare a memorantes - the do- struction of the Succian oil fields. Copy of the handwritten note of Prime Maister Deletion of January 19. 1940. General famolis and Metrol Darlan are asked to work out a with regard to an eventual intervention for the destruction of the master oil fields. Case No. 1: Breaking off of the oil Bankore bound for Germany in the Black Sea. IS is a matter principally of German shipping. In this case mesia would not be brought into the war. Case No. 2: Direct interrention in the Ganeaous. Case No. 3: without direct action against Smeeta, measures Saken to assist the self-detersination efforte of the Mehannodan population groupe in the Cameasus. -2. 468 Document No. . Note - a conversation between the French and English Air General Staffe of the 5th of April, 1940. France-British plan of operation for an air attack - Datum and Bake. A third of the refineries and of the marber storage teaks to be destroyed in six days. Very secrets Air attack on the oil fields of the Cacasus. Agreement reached in the ohiof headquarters of the AIR Force, 5th of April, 1940. The Presso-British air attack - the Cassess potrolem is aimed exclusively as the refineries and Merber storage tanks of Nature - Ptel - Grossy . Bake. It can be estimated that within the first six days, 30 to 35 of the 100 refineries and barber storage Sanite of the Cassons will be destroyed. The airplane material to be applied includes 90 to 100 airplanes which will be companed of s Treach flying groups and 3 British equadrone. the French groupe will be se equipped that they will be able to attack Balta on the -- in 469 fore-appointed date. They are composed of two Farmes m groups and n doe Martin groupe, provided with reserve tanks. on each night against the enery, they can drop a total of 70 tone of bonbo on about 100 know refineries. Energy counter-astion and the probable presence of German persuit planes will dintmish the effectiveness of this operation to a considerable extent. 470 -34 Document No. 9. Report of General Weygand to the High Coasand of the French Air Force of the 17th of April, 1940. Air action against the Ruesian oil fields in the Cacaous is prepared for the end of July, 1940. The High Command of the Eastern Mediterranean, 17th of April 1940. Secrets General Weygand to Gommander-is-Chief Gamelin, Commander in-Chief of the Land Force, and to of the Air Force Waillenin. The preparations for the bombardment of the Cancasus oil fields are se far advanced that the time in which this operation can be carried through can be estimated. Rigid adherence to a time-schedule is not offered here. The undertaking does not need for this purpose the making of as agreement with the conclusion of which has acreever been show to be impossible. The French Ambassador to Turkey has accurately informed the Government on this question. At present, there can be no talk of assent for flight ever Turkish territory, still less of a preparation of air bases which could serve as . springboard. Further, other help is not to be expected. The transport of material for joint requirement goes by the Aleppe-Nissibine railroad. Aa advance demarche for the use of it 471 -35. - this track insofar as 18 concerns Turkish territory is not required, as our previous agreements give us every freedom in this connection. In the estimate of the period of time, the following are to be considered: (a) The preparation of air bases. At this time of the year only light work is required, its duration is estimated at 14 days. (b) Work on the railread and on the filling up of the depots (sidings, rails, telegraph lines). Duration: 14 to 20 days. (o) Transport of relling stock, minitions, troops, and wagon parks for the French combatant forces requires 56 trains. This means a period of 14 days on the ascumption of 4 trains a day. The same time is required for the English soldiers. Consequently 30 days are needed altogether. It must be noted that (a) and (b) can be simultaneously carried out se that at least 45 to 50 days are necessary. IS is assumed that the railroad material and that the British and French n enforcements can be placed on the march immediately. In addition to this period of time, the time required for the assemblage and arrival of the bembers must also be considered. with respect to the French squadrons, 18 is to be noted that at present none are ready for setting out. According to all the probabilities, the groupe of Farmen-night bembers which have been in long service can arrive here quickly. On the other hand, -36- 472 the group of bombers which belongs to the Middle Eastern air force now at last has the first airplanes of the Glen-Martin type. According to the statements of the Air High Command itself, 2-1/2 to 3 months are essential in order to train the pilots to put then in a position to take part in a military operation se that the available material is used to the highest degree. Probably the remaining groups of the Glen-Martin type which are expected from France and from North Africa are in approximately a corresponding state. The Vice-Air Marshal and Commander of the British Air Force in the Middle East was very confused when he was asked about the answer as he himself had not yet received the airplanes. It must be noted that this estimate does not include the technical preparations for bombing attacks. This preparation includes the obtaining of air photographs, the selection of objectives, as well as of the most appropriate bombing materials, and finally the preparation of the airplanes for each particular attack. Caution requires that the carrying out of the operation be considered only for the end of June or for the beginning of July, particularly when the absolute meessity of carrying through the undertaking when everything is ready is realised. Only thus can decisive results be attained with the greatest possible mobilisations of power and the greatest speed. The operation itself need only last a few days and must consist is -- 473 - hombardments of these points, the destruction of which through explesive or incondiary boube is regarded as particularly effective. Hereover the period of time indicated 10 also necessary for Turkey, as m. mosigns has already brought one, as Surkey is the course of this period of time must put steelf in a position which allows as to duty every - counter move which will possibly be wiceous as the result of the benhartment. The of the Best Mediterrences Operations. (Signed) Stamp of the -x- 474 Document No. 10 Telegram from General Gamelin to British Air Marshal Newall of 15.5.1940. Immediate dispatch of ten British pursuit squadrens asked for. F. c. 15 of May 1940. No. 528 CAB / D. N. From Commander General Gamelin to Air Marshal Newall. (Note in pencil: for General Lelong) Consequent on the efforts of the French Government I make it clear that the number of pursuit squadrons immediate dispatch of which to Champagne is required amounts to ten. Here it is to be noted that in the case of Italy's entry into the war, France will be compelled to rebove a part of its pursuit squadrone to south-east France and to Tunis. We will supply the requisite ground personnel. The details can be arranged through immediate agreement between General Vuillenta and Marshal Barratt. General Gamelia 475 - 39 - Document No. 11 Telegram from General Gamelin to Winston Churchill of 15.5.1940 The British Air Force must be put into military action. Secret - P. c. the 16 May 1940 - NO. 529 CAB / D.M. Consander-in-Chief General Camelin to General Lelong for Mr. Winston Churchill. I permit myself again to approach you in order to ask for the immediate dispatch of ten pursuit squadrons. The situation is very serious, naturally these ten pursuit squadrons will be stationed on the lower Seine where they have protection and whenes they can be easily withdrawn again. General Gamelia (Deciphered and dispatched on the 16 May 1940 at 10:30) 476 -40- Document No. 12 Telegram from General Gamelin to Winston Churchill - 16/5/40 Renewed request for inmediate dispatch of ten British pursuit equadrons. P. G. 16 May 1940, No. 531 GAR/D.S. Commander-in-Smief General Gamelin to General Lelong for Mr. Winston Charchill. I permit myself again to refer to the facts that -- the essential test of the British as of the French air forces now consists in operating on enery troops with particular reference to these points which they must necessarily erose. General Gamelia (Deciphered and dispatched on the 16th of May, 1940, at 2:20 P.M.) kr 41 Document No. 13 Telegram from General Camelia to Mr. Winston Churchill. 17 May 1940. No. 533 GAB/D.N. Commander-in-thief Camelia to General Lelong for Mr. Winston Churchill on his arrival is Lenter. Our Girand army will be placed south of Manbouge before seen today. The fight 10 very hard. The consequences can be grave, not only for France but also for England. The course of battle threatens the communication limes of the British army. I again ask for the entry of the British Air Force in every way as a contribution to the battle. In particular, the placing of mgmotic mines in the Neas would be very effective in order to disturb the strengthening and reinforcement of the enemy. General Gamelia (Deetphered and on the 17th of May as 9:25 A.M.) 477 - 42 8 Document No. 14 Protoool on the Session of the Allied High War Council of 22/5/40. In the headquarters of General Weygand, who was appointed in the interis as Comsander-in-Chief with the participation of Winston Churchill and Premier Reynoud. Complete perplexity in the middle of the Battle of Flanders. Disorganization of the leadership, desperate plans in order to break through the pincers. Churchill agrees to put the air force into military action. Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Copy. Very confidential. Franco-British session of the 22nd of May 1940. Winston Churchill arrived at the chief headquarters about 12 o'elook. He was accompanied by the British Ambassador, General Sir John Dill, Vice-Marshall of the Air Force Pire and General Ismay. Paul Reynaud was accompanied by Captain de Margerie. General weygand received both Prime Ministers in the Map Room of his General Staff. Colonel Simon explained: Two French divisions under the command of General Fagalde were at the extreme north OR the Schelde. The Belgian troops were following then roughly up to Audewards. The British Expeditionary Corps was further to the South with four divisions, to which three divisions were -13- kr 479 Document No. 14 (Cost.) arriving in the neighborhood of Arras. Two British reserve divisions were around Lille. Linked with them was the first French army on whose flank the Cavalry Corps was stationed. General Billess, the Commander-in-Chief of the France-British- Belgian Aray of the North, was in the hospital as a result of a serious moter accident. No had to give the command to General Blanchard, who in turn has been replaced by General Prioux. The latter had fought with distinction at the head of the Cavalry Corps. Winston Charchill explained that a German amored division which broke through on the previous morning fres Abbebille has passed Etaples in the direction of Boulegue. A wounded English officer who saw these German combatant forces travel by had estimated then as from 4,000 to 5,000 mon. Approximately half of this unit which attacked from the North had since 4:30 P.M. been attacked by British air forces taking off from Great Britain and had been halted at Etaples. Two battalions of guards, both of then from the remaining units of the active British Again in England, had landed in Boulogne with 48 tanks (9) Their task was to defend this town against eventual German attacks. Measures had also been undertaken for the defense of Calais and Dunkisk. It could therefore be assumed that these three harbers were accured against a surprise attack such as happened in Abbeville. -44- 480 Document No. 14 (Gent.) General Weygend confirmed the Prime Minister's statements. No added that there were three Fyench infantry battalione is Calais and that the Commander of Dunkisk was a particularly capable Admiral who had the requisite foress for a subcessful defense of the town. AS this point, Colonel Simon continued with the general exposition of the it station. The Souno had clearly not been crossed on the other side of Ran (Syanslater's note, Rheins would appear to be indicated) the Germans occupied several bridgeheads, one of them in Perease and another south of Amines. A French Aray under the command of General Frore occupies the space between the Oise and the Somme and was consen- trating progressively is a westerly direction. It included eight divisions, of which four were complete while the remain- ing four were still being forwarded. This army received the order to carry through an attack to the North in order to liberate the Sense Valley. Further to the east were the armice of Touchon and Huntsiger. As far as the German areies were concerned, they had drawn up armored divisions in the front line at the critical points. Behind these units followed motorised divisions, behind these again the normal divisions which had been brought up by horse. It appeared as though the idea was to organise a number of infantry divisions around St. Quentin for defense. .15. in 481 Document No. 24 (Cont.) In reply to a question from Winston Charchill, General Weygend explained that already great masses of emony infantry were in contact with the Mantsiger Army. No added that the first German attack had been and was taking place before their eyes and that 18 was proceeding according to a hitherto known formula with new waspens of war. The General was of the opinion that an offensive of the classical style with strong artillery support would follow this attack. After the solution of the first question, they would have to deal with a second problem, the solution of which would not be less difficult especially as a violent advance against the worth, 1.0., against the armice stationed in the Maginet Line, was to be expected. General Weygend finally reported in bread outline on the results of his trip to the Front. The explained that 11 was impossible so expect the sagle-Treach- Belgian sain groupe, which were still is the north and included more than 40 divisions, simply to break through w the south and to make connections with the main Pyonah area. Such a maneuver was fore-seemed to failure and the treeps taking part had to recksa with certain less. The situation demented, on the centuary, that the available Pyench and British foress under the coveref the Belgian Army. which undertook to cover an 482 - 4Document No. 14 (Gent.) them from the best and, should the escasion present 11self, from the north, carry forward an attack is the Genbral Arrae area and in the general direction of St. Quentia, to the south, and in this way fall on the flank of the German arnored divisions, which were actually to be found is the ss. Quentia seek. AS the same time, the French Agay of General There, south of the sease in the Beauvais area, was to - push forward to the north and thus strengthen the pressure on the enemy armored troope in the Asions, Abbeville, and Apras area. The essential task consisted in subjecting these troope to permanent pressure, Never allowing then the initiative, but always keeping then in action, inflieting lesses on them and endangering their rear positions. Only in this way could the withdrawal of the part of the army stationed in Belgium be carried through with success. Unfortunately General Weygand could not discuss this question with General Sert on the previous day as the latter was out of the country. However, General Woygand had a long discussion with the King of Belgium and his General staff. There were two episions on the task of the Belgian Agency according to the The King had not yet decided for either of these opinions. 483 - 47 Document No. 14 (Cont.) The first opinion, which General Weygand supported, can- sisted in commissioning the Belgian Army to withdraw fres the Schelds to the Year and thereby take over covering the France British forces which were advancing on st. Quentia. Actually the Belgian Army was in a dangerous position between the mouth of the Schelde, Gent and Anderwards. The support which it lent the remaining parts of the Army of the Western Front could likewise be well carried out from the Year envards by means of flooding. General Weygand norsover arranged the immediate release of the waters. The other opinion was represented by General van Overstructon, King Leopold's adjutant. According to this opinion, the Belgian Army had to remain in its previous position and to separate itself, if necessary, from the other Allied forces. Its problem was to defend the coast in a broad semicirole. Reinforcements could in this case be accured from Ostend and Dunkisk, In support of this plan, General van Overstreaten referred to the fatigue of the Belgian troops. They had traveled fres Keastright in an unbroken a.reh. The Belgian General also referred to their morals which had naturally suffered in this long retreat. Since the arrival of the Belgian Army on the Schelde, the treepe after a 24-hour rest had regained their calm, as they demonstrated on the 21st of May by brilliantly repelling two German efforts to - obtain passage over the Schelds. To demand of these troops to retreat again and to abandon their country almost in its entirety seant in the 484 - 48 Document No. 14 (Cont.) opinion of General van Overstreaten to face these troops with the danger a new wave of demoralization. General Weygand opposed this opinion with great deter mination. He presented for consideration the fasts that the Allied forces represented a single entity, that the French and British had come to the aid of the Belgians and that now the Belgiana must continue the struggle further on the British and French side. He added that reinforcements for the Belgium army under the circumstances foreseen by General an Overstreates could not possibly be carried through and that in this case the Belgian forces would be compelled to capitulate very soon. The King did not participate in the discussion. Only on his return to chief headquarters an hour earlier did General Weygand learn that the Belgian High Coomand had arrived at its decision and that its decision was to move in the direction of the Year in two stages, of which the first provided for a retreat to Lys. The General continued that under these circumstances the Belgian army would play the role of & covering army which he had intended, while the Pranoo-British forces would be deployed toward the south as a result of which they would be strengthened to their right by the French cavalry corps, and by the Belgian cavalry corps, the latter being partly motorized. The King had provided to put these at the disposal of the French High Cousand. 485 - 49 During General Waygand's talk Ny Vinetes Charchill and General Sir John Dill repeatedly demonstrated their agree ment and indicated by questions and interuptions that their own opinion of the battle esincided most procisely with that of the Generalissimo especially where the role alletted to the Belgian army was concerned. The British Prime Minister repeated several times that the restoration of the northern and southern armices communications around Apras was essen- tial, That the British battle forces under General Gort had now subsistence for four days, that the total reinforements and all the war material of the British expeditionary corps was compentrated from Calais along the coast in the direction of st. Hasaire. That the chief thought of General Gort was to keep open this line of communication so vital for him. Hense since the day before yesterday he had started moving while he had removed a number of units on his right flank behind his lines in order to be able so advance is the direction of Arras and Bapaume. The question vas here of a battle decisive for the future of the war, for the provisioning of the English battle forces by means of the canal harbers was very seriously endangered so that in these siressstances the area around Gambres and St. Quentia acquired decisive signifiance. In the course of a private conversation Mr. Winston Churchill informed the French Prime Minister and General Veygand a little later that the relations of General Billess to the Commander-in-Chief of the British expeditionary Corp were not very satisfactory. In particular General Gort had 486 - 50 . Document No. 24 (dent.) reasined without directions for four days. AS this point General Wergand announced that General Billett was suffering from a severe automobile accident and that he would be replaced by General Blanchard. General Veggand confirmed the full approval with which the British Government and the British General Staff had not his plans and then firmly, clearly and politely advanced two requests, which in his opinion were decisive. First, 18 was of crucial importance for the result of the battle which was starting that the Britishair force and indeed pursuit planee as well as bombare, be freely put in the field of battle. It had performed very great services for the French Army in the provision days and had thus already exercised a very favorable influence on the spirit of the in fantry, while at the same time 18 had perceptibly disturbed many German marching columns on their way to the front. Besides, is had carried through extensive actions in certain parts of Germany, particularly in the rural area and in Hanburg, Brenon and other places where 18 had obtained good results is the bembardment of enemy storage tanks and refineries. However, in considering the importance of 487 51 Document No. 24 (Cont.) of our cooperation, the General held at necessary at the moneat that the English AIR Force make long distance flights only for a few days for the time being . as w WAR operate permanently and imotiately on the front staelf or in its immediate environment, He thus demanded that the British air force receive the commond that 18 multiply its efforts in the area of operations arranged upon, Vice Air Marshall Pare horouper gave his opinion on the subject. No offered for consideration the fast that a part of the British bember equitrens, vis the Vellingtone, could hardly be obtained for a few days as the airplanes appeared as expened objectives. It appeared of most impor tance to his that - the other hand the House bridges or the Failway Junetions be bombod at some distance from the actual line of operations as they were of significance the Geruan side for reinforements during the battle. 52 488 53 Document No. 14 (Cont.) After as exchange of thoughts between his and General Weygand, is which Mr. asia Winston Churchill also took part, the conclusion was arrived at that the wishes of the Generalissimo be man and that the British air force of the neatherland be sent entirely into the battle. The bombore which could not always make out clear objectivesia the battle line of the battle as was the ease in the previous days were to attempt to disturb the lines of communication between the front and the MEUSE. While the pursuit planes (eesing fres England as they did) could hardly keep themselves in the line of battle for more than 20 simes, and were to take off in consedutive waves. Second, General Woygand then referred emphatically to the danger for national defensence resulting from the stream of refugees from the Netherlands, Belgium and northern France; the masses of people moving forward on the streets himdered the freedom of movement of the troops, permitted German elements to single among then and thereby exercised an unfavorable effect on the spirit of the troops. It was unconditionally necessary that halt be called to this flight, that nobody should pass ever into French territory any longer, so that the columns of refugees now in flight be kept at a distance from the great high reads during certain periods of the day. They should encamp in the fields and should only continue further under certain limitations. General Weygand expressed himself 489 - 53 Documents 14 (Cont.) very firmly on this point to the King of Belgium and hoped that the Allied Governments would take the same position. Mr. Winston Charchill and M. Paul Reynout expressed their full approval of the point of view reported by the General. The Generalissimo then briefly announced that he had been able to converse during the evening and night bith 3 General Staff officers of the Giroud Again who had been able to give his extraordinarily valuable details of the methods applied by the German Agay in battle and that at his request they had produced a short note which would be read. From this Mr Winston Churchill concluded that with the application of appropriate methods and with the necessary coldbloodedness the attacks of the German armored forces could be warded off even when they were supported by bombers, and that it was above all a matter of remaining to the last is the positions the forces occupied. General Weygand addite that they also had to be active and that were they attacked they had to upset the enemy. The session was concluded at 1:15 p.a. General Weygand called on the Prime Minister at 5 p.a. and showed his by mane of a map he had bought with his the approximate circumstances under which the arranged offensvie would develop. 490 53a Document 24 (Cont.) At this opportunity M. Paul Reynond informed his of the remore which circulated in political etseles about 18 and asked his to give renoved instructions so that seeresy concerning the operations be saintained. the Goomander-in-shief stated that the fasts of which he had informed Mr. Winston Churchill and M. Feel Reynond in the we of the warning were supplemented by a very favorable development. In support of the arranged operations in the north the army of General Prore would give larger and are important units than would be expected a few hours earlier. Very confidential : Conclusions of the conference of the 22nd of March (franclator's note: May is obviously mont) 1940 held at General Waygual's headquarters between Pyenier Paul Reynoud, General Woygand, the British Prime Minister Winstes Charchill, General Gill (Systems note: Previously referred to as milk) and Air Marshall Pierce (Syane- later's note: Previously referred to as Piss). The following was agreed upon: (2) The Belgia Agency is to withdrew to the Year lime and to hold this line. The looks are to be opened. * 491 - 53b Document No. 14 (Cont.) (2) The British and French Armies to attack to the southwest in the direction of Bapaume and Cambrai as early as possible -- definitely tomorrow with approximately 8 divisions. (3) with respect to the vital significance of this battle for both armies and the fact that the British lines of consunication depend on the freeing of Amiens, the British air force, was to give every possible help day and night for the duration of the battle. (4) The new French army group, which advances towards Amiens and which forms a front along the Somme, to advance to the north so as to establish communications with the British divisions attacking to the south in the direction of Bapaume. - 56 - R. 492 Document No. 15 Telegram from Winston Charchill to Premier Reynand for General Weygand on the 24th of May 1940. Stronger complaints on inadequate leadership and communi- cation. The Ministry of Defense and of Var-Bureau of the Minister. French Republic. Very secret! Paris 24th of May 1940. Copy of a telegram from Churchill to Reynoud for General Weygand. (Deciphered on the 24th of May, 1940, 5100 A.M.) General Gort telegraphed that the coordination of the armies of the three nations on the Northern front was essen tial. He could not ask this coordination as he was already fighting in the north and south and his consumication reads were threatened. AS the same time, I hear from Sir Reger Keyes that the Belgian headquarters and the King had not yet at 3:00 P.M. this afternoon today, the 23rd of May, received directions. How do you explain that Blanchard and Gort were together? I de not at all underestimate the difficulties in the way of the maintenance of connections but I do not feel that the operations in the northern area against which the enemy is concentrating are being efficiently harmonized. I rely on your ability to produce relief for then. Gort says further that any advance on his part can only take the form of an attempt to break through and that he must receive relief from the south, as he does not have the munitions required for a serious attack. Nevertheless, we told his to stick to the 55 493 carrying through of your plan. Ve have not yet received your own plan of action and are not acquainted with the details of your operations in the north. Please sent them as com as possible through the French Rebessy. Best vishes, - +1 494 Document No. 16 Telegram from Paul Reynoud to Winston Charchill 24.4.40 strong complaints on the evacuation of Arras and Le Have by British troups. Request that General Weygand's orders be aboyed. Translation - Garbon Copy - Very Secret - 24 May 1940. Telegram from Paul Raynand to Winston Churchill. 1. General Veygand explained to you the day before yester day in my presence at Vineennes a plan to which you and the officers accompanying you agreed completely and fully. 2. You summarised this plan in writing. General Weygand thereupon informed you that he agreed to this 3. General Weygand known of the difficulties of the situs tion, but he 10 of the opinion that there 10 no other solution but the carrying through of this plan, even at the risk that it must be adapted to the difficulties of the moment while for example the march to the southeast can be broken off and the right wing at the lever old of Amiens and bound for the Somme. He therefore repeated the command for the execution of this plan this morning. The surrounded armice must thus under take the desperate enterprise of writing with the Fyench troups marching from the south to the north while they break through from the Some and particularly from spiens. -57. 495 4. x is urgently necessary to provision Gort's army from Dunkisk which is covered by the two Fagaldo divisions. 5. It is very desirable that you dispatch treeps to the harbers, as you did for Galate yesterday. 6. General Weygand has established to his surprise that in contradiction to his plan the town of Arras was evacuated by English troops yesterday. 7. General Weygand's communications with the Belgian army are assured. No learned yesterday evening that the Belgians repulsed small raids and that their merale is excellent, 6. The impossibility of establishing direct connection with Blanchard the Conmander-ia-hief of the three armies, 1.0., the Belgian army, Gort's army and Blanchard's army, does not permit General Weygand to give you an answer on the absence of can munication Blanchard and Gort. But since he is is direct communication with the Belgian army he is convinced that Blanchard, and through him, Govt, had received his instructions. Proof of the cooperation between Blanchard and Gort appears from the fast that on the previous night a French division had relieved an English division. 9 General Weygand just new learned of the departure of large units of the British any from Le Navre, which had produced great moral confusion behind the front, Like myself he is very mudh surprised as he was not previously informed of this matter. n. 496 10. You will be of the optation, as X on, that in these sates sub hours the mified comment - new were the ever be successfully asserted and that General Vergend's comments must be carried out, 11. General Vergand so convinced that his plan - only be evered with success ss the Dolginn - and the and cort soulce are filled wth that fanations will w take as attack which alone - save M 497 Document No. 17. Telegram from General Weygand to the Fyench Military Attache in London. May 28, 1940. Necessity for action by the British air force at Dankisk. P.C. 28 May 1940 No. 565 GAB / D.N. Commander in Ohiof General Weygand to General Lelong, French Military Attache, is London. The Admiral in Command at Dunkisk asserts the necessity of an energetic defense by air and naval forces to assure reenforcement and partial evacuation of the troops fighting in the defense of Dankisk bridgehead. I do not doubt that this necessity 10 understood b the British authorities. However, I ask you to memorialise them again so that every thing is undertaken to realise these ideas. General Weygand. (Deciphered and dispatched 28 May 1940 at 6:10 P.M.) ow. 498 Document No. 18 Telegras from General Weygand to the British High Commond of May 30, 1940. Urgent request to re-station the British air force, which has returned to England, in France se that 18 ean participate in the new developing battle the whole weight of the battle otherwise falls on France. Secret - 30th May 1940 Number 1272/3 - P.S. Arcele, Breasives Please inform the British High Gammand immediately of the followings The head of the British military mission informed General Georges on May the 29th that the British Government intended to continue the struggle in France side by side with the French Army. The arnered division and 51 divisions remain in France ender the can-and of the French High Consand and will be strengthened as seen as possible. The British air foree remains in France. Counselforcia Chief Weygand thanks the Byt 1ish High Consant for this domonstraw tion of solidarity; however he believes he - airlet the belief of General Staff's attentions to the position of the British air unite remaining in Frence. AS present only three pursuit squadrens renais - Preach seil. All the others have returned to England. After the and of the Battle of Flanders, the last-mentioned equadrone are not Y ou. 499 is a position to take part in the now battle beginning possibly - the Same front, in Chargegue, - - the House, The whole weight of the battle these falls on the French have, which must suffer operaously. the French wrently asits the mum High Commond to understand the situation's gravity and w adopt all masures in order that a considerable section of the British air fores, particularly persett planes, - be stationed in Frence in proparation for the Motest battle. Vergant. -62- 500 Document No. 19 Telegram from General Weygand to the British High Compand of June 2nd 1940. Most urgent request to set the British fleet and air force in operation at Dunkisk so that the French rear guard will not be sacrificed. Number 1328/3 F.T. 2nd June 1940 Areele, Brumaire Please give the British High Command the following information immediately: Admiral Hard telegraphed today that besides the 25,000 Frenchmen defending the Dunkirk bridgehead another roughly 22,000 additional Frenchmen remain. All Englishmen are to be moved this evening. As it is to be hoped that these 22,000 Frenchmen can be transported on the following evening, there will still remain 25,000 defenders early on the next day. OR these grounds Admiral Nord explaine that he will renain in Dunkirk and delay the blooking of the harber entrance. He asks that all British naval and air transports be placed at his disposal tomorrow Monday evening in order to move the 25,000 men who by their persoverance made possible the embarks ation of the last British contingents. Please stand up most urgently in the Connander-in-Chief's name for the fulfillment of Admiral Nord's request. Indicate that the solidarity of both armies demands that the French rearguard should not be sacrificed. 501 - -63- Document Member 20 Manuscript of General Weymand to Paul Reynond of June 3. 1940. Urgent request case again to influence Winston Charchill so that the British air force should come to the French treeps' help. Appendix to this masseript. Report of the of the French air foree to General Soygand of June 3 1940 on the necessity for the innodiate dispatch of Sea British pursuit equadreas. Fulfillmont of this request is a matter of life and death. The chief headquartere. Number 582 GAB/D.B. 3rd June 1940 Garbon copy. Very secret Mr. Premier, Today I allow myself to transmit to you another letter he which General Fruillents has written me and which/described as extremely urgent. The letter supports the pressing appeal which you have to Mr. Winston Charchill. His * inclusion 10 in no wise exaggerated; 18 our troops are not to enter the battle tomorrow with unequal weapons, they need the support of a strong pursuit plane force. Nobody who has taken part is the last battle will dony this. Our on air force is is no position to give our troops this indispensable aid. 502 - 64 Document No. 29 (Cont.) I need net underline the science of the above-described general situation; unless we immediately receive the entire required support from the British authorities, it appears probable that the French forces will be defeated and the war will be lost for Great Britain and France. As the enemy can choose the time for his offensive, the required support can only be described as immodiate when the British pursuit planes are stationed in Fyanco in advance. I have therefore the honor to ask that you position the British authorities ************ you so that support can ensue according to the following: First. Immediate dispatching of 10 British pursuit squadrone, which will be stationed in the Euroux DrouX vieinity and which can be mobilised for the land forces' support west of the Fyench deployment between the line PONTOXNE-PERCHNE and the sea. This would put me in a position to keep stronger forces ready for the rest of the front and consequently to pay regard to the units to be ordered to the south-east. Second. Preparations for the such-hastened dispatch to France of 10 additional pursuit equadrons, which would be stationed from the first day of battle envards in Britishoccupied areas. Third. Since these equadrons would be stationed at bases already occupied by the British and French, their re- informents would not call for any movement. If, is fact, the enemy should make the strategic blunter of attaching France >1 503 - 65 Document No. 20 (Gont.) the critical character of the situation I have described to you. I am to present my reflections on this subject as follows: If, as 18 10 to be expected, the enemy carried through within a abort time a fresh massed concentration of the arnered ear and air area against the new defensive front now being constructed, 18 must absolutely be expected that 18 will again crush through our position and accomplish a quick and deep penetration, which we ear no longer continue If we are not in a position to eliminate the enemy boobing planes at the beginning of the attack by a massed force of allied pursuit plane equadrons. Such a massed force would assume the support of at least half the air force stationed as the English airports. This is all the more mecessary as German action in the south-east and Italy's possible entry into the war have already compelled me is view of the extraordinary weak material in the with-east and in North Agrica to detach parts of the air force to the south-east. These detachments, which are Indicrously emallin relation to the possible danger, will have to be strengthened after Italy's entry into the war, unless the whole of our south-east is to be delivered w without defease against an Italian operation. Such an operation sight likewise incinic simultaneous assaults by arnored care and by air and sight well have the same success as the German offensive is the north-east. 504 -" Document No. 20 (Cont.) In consideration of the gravity of the studion, I ask you to influence the British Prime Minister. General Vallonia's letter has already been brought to the attention of the Communder-in-Shief of the British - air force in Pyence and of the Chief of the Fyench air mission to the British Air Ministry. I am, Mr. Prenter, etc. signat Worgand Commander-in-thief of the Air General staff, D. Bureau MM. 3987 - 3/0.8. 3rd June 1940 Meat urgent 8 Very secret General Vuillents as of the air force to the Consender-is-Chief and head of the missional defence General staff, of all the theaters of War. (CabinotGeneral Staff - 3rd Sareau) I bogged you is Manuscript Number 3906 - 3/0 E.L.G. of the 31st May 1940 most urgons to petition the highest British authorisies to obtain from then a massed concentration of pursuit planes in France. The unfolding of events, which new moves in the direction of as assault by strong German bomber groups in the south-east and of the possibility of Italy's immediate and instant entry into the war, further strengthens 505 - 67 Document No. 20 (Coast) and England without previously renewed offensive operations, these equadrone could return to their English bases on the very same day. In addition they would in this way probably avoid the planned beebing of pursuit plane air bases in England with which the enemy will start his operations against England. I sight again state that 11 is a matter of life and death for Frame as well of England that those requests be not immediately The of the Air Force Vuillesia 506 JUL 15 1940 By dear Mr. Secretarys Attached herewith is a copy of a letter dated July 2nd, which I received from Mr. Morris v. Vilsen, Representative in Canada and the United States of the Ministry of Aircraft Production of the United Kinglem, concerning the disposition of certain Bolls Royoe plans and drawings now in the onstedy of the Year Department. Although Mr. Wilson requests that some of these plans and travings be sent to his by express at Montroal, Canada, I have been advised that, if the Var Department should wish to retain any or all of those plans for inspection purposes, Mr. Vilees will be delighted to forward the request to Lord Boaverbrook. As a copy of the inventory of these plans is in your possession, my I suggest that it be studied carefully by the Chief of the Air Corps in accordance with the foregoing. I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Rr. Wilson for his information. Sincerely, (Signed) H. Morgenthau, Jr. The Monorable, The Secretary of War. Enclosure PY:bj 7/12/40 pl. By Messenger 12 45 507 JUL 15 1940 My dear Mr. Secretary: Attached herewith is a copy of a letter dated July 2nd, which I received from Mr. Horris W. Wilson, Representative in Canada and the United States of the Ministry of Aircraft Production of the United Kingdom, concerning the disposition of certain Rolls Royce plans and drawings now in the custody of the Var Department. Although Mr. Wilson requests that some of these plans and drawings be sent to him by express at Montreal, Canada, I have been advised that, if the Var Department should wish to retain any or all of these plans for inspection purposes, Mr. Wilson will be delighted to forward the request to Lord Beaverbrook. As a copy of the inventory of these plans is in your possession, may I suggest that it be studied carefully by the Chief of the Air Corps in accordance with the foregoing. I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Mr. Wilson for his information. Sincerely, (Signed) H. Morgenthau, The Honorable, The Secretary of War. PY:bj 7/12/40 By Messenger 508 July 15, 1940 12:07 p.m. H.M.Jr: General Watson: H.MJr: Pa, the Under the British Treasury is here on my Secretary invitation.ofHello? Yeah. He' S just arrived. He has most valuable information not only on finances but on the British airplane situation. Hello? W: H.M.Jr: W: H.M.Jr: W: H.M.Jr: W: H.M.Jr: W: H.M.Jr: W: Yeah. And I think it's well worth the President's time in the next day or two to let me bring him over. All right. He'e got the real dope and I have great confidence in him. What is his position? What is he? He's Under Secretary of the British Treasury. I see. Under Secretary of British Treasury. Sir Frederick Phillips. Sir Frederick Phillips. All right. And he's got the latest dope on the airplanes, airplane engines and their financial situation. Uh-huh. I'm sure the President will want to see him. H.M.Jr: What's that? W: I'm sure he'll want to see him. H.M.Jr: W: Yeah, I'd like to bring him over. All right. 509 -2H.M.Jr: You let me know, please. W: All right. H.M.Jr: Thank you. W: Yeah. 510 7/15 Opening Statement in Conference with Sir Frederick Phillips From time to time we have received from the British Govern- ment requests or suggestions as to courses of action, etc., which the Treasury should take. Very likely this practice will continue. We are desirous of giving careful and understanding consideration to such requests and suggestions, and we are also desirous of cooperating with the British consistent with this Administration's foreign policy. However, for us to deal with these matters intelligently, it is necessary for us to have full understanding of all the relevant facts and policies. We thought that you might be in a position to be of help to us in this connection. Accordingly, and if this is agreeable to you, there are a number of questions which we would like to ask you and a number of problems we would like to discuss with you. 511 Suggested Agenda for Discussion with Sir Frederick Phillips I. Gold and Foreign Exchange Assets of Great Britain 1. How much gold does England have and where is it located? 2. Is the British Treasury planning to remove the gold now in England to Canada or to other places where it will be beyond the reach of a possible German invasion? 3. Does the Treasury anticipate increasing the rate of liquidation of British held American securities? 4. What 1s the British Treasury's estimate of the total value of United Kingdom's foreign exchange assets classified by kind and location? What is the value and character of the foreign exchange assets of each of the Empire countries? 5. To what extent are the dominions and colonies making their foreign exchange assets available for the financing of the war? 6. At what rate is the United Kingdom at present depleting its foreign exchange resources? Could an estimate for the Secretary of the balances of payments for the next three months of the British Treasury prepare (a) The British Empire with the rest of the world? (b) The United Kingdom with her Empire? (c) The United Kingdom with non-Empire countries? 7. Under what circumstances would the British Government desire the United States to impose licensing restrictions on the use of British assets in this country? 512 -2II. Gold and Foreign Exchange Assets of France 1. What steps is the British government taking or contemplating taking with respect to the French gold and other French assets in Great Britain and other parts of the Empire? 2. What are the views of the British Treasury with respect to the status of French gold earmarked in the United States, and to the liberation of other French assets blocked in the United States? III. Gold and Foreign Exchange Assets of Other European countries 1. The British government has requested us to block German and Italian assets here. How important do they feel such action to be? 2. Does the British Treasury contemplate any special action with respect to assets belonging to Switzerland and Sweden now held in British countries? 3. How much gold does the British Treasury believe to have fallen into German hands in occupied countries? 4. Does the British Treasury have any knowledge of the confiscation of foreign exchange yielding securities by Germany in the invaded countries? 5. How much gold, balances and other assets do the invaded countries have in the United Kingdom and the rest of the British Empire? 513 -3IV. Far East 1. Is the British Treasury considering extending additional aid to the Chinese government for the purpose of strengthening the yuan? Would it consider doing so in collaboration with the United States? 2. Does the Indian government intend to acquire more silver, or permit increased imports of silver into Indiat 514 TREASURY DEPARTMENT INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION DATE July 15. 1940 Secretary Morgenthau FROM Mr. Cochran STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL At 11 'clock Saturday evening, July 13. Mr. Pinsent, Financial Counselor of the British Embassy, telephoned me at my home that Sir Frederick Phillips, British Under Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Kenneth Bewley, also of the British Treasury, would arrive in Washington at 5:30 p.m. on Sunday. I telephoned this information to Secretary Morgenthau at the farm at 9:30 Sunday morning. Later in the day I was instructed by the Secretary, through Lieutenant McKay, that he would be pleased to receive Sir Frederick Phillips at the Treasury at 11 a.m. on Monday. I passed this information on to Mr. Pinsent on Sunday afternoon, and also telephoned Under Secretary Bell to let him know the schedule. When Sir Frederick Phillips, accompanied by Messrs. Bewley and Pinsent, arrived at 11 o'clock this morning, the Secretary first received Sir Frederick Phillips alone. Messrs. Bewley and Pinsent waited with Mr. Cochran in his office. At 11:15, the Secretary had Messrs. Bell, Bewley, Pinsent, Stewart, Viner, White and Cochran oin him and Sir Frederick Phillips. The Secretary expressed his desire to let the visitors know how we are operat- ing, particularly through our control of foreign funds of certain countries. He called upon Under Secretary Bell to explain the basis of our control, and the practice involved. Mr. Bell cited the legislation which was the basis of our authority for the control of funds. This subject was of particular interest to Sir Frederick Phillips, and it was arranged that he should be provided with the text of pertinent legislation. Mr. Bell made the point that the prime purpose of our control was to prevent funds of other countries falling into German hands. Among the provisions of our control which were explained was that permitting nationals of the blocked countries resident in the United States to draw up to $500 per month for living expenses. In answer to Sir Frederick's question, it was explained that we had experienced no particular difficulties in operating the control of French funds. There had been a few French payments to South America principally for food supplies purchased in that area. In answer to a further question on the part of Phillips, it was explained that there was no specific date limit fixed on our control authority, this being valid for the extent of our "emergency". In connection with our control of foreign funds, the Secretary gave the visitors an idea of the control recently instituted with respect to ships leaving the as United States. The Secretary cited a few problems which confronted the Treasury, the department administering this control, in passing upon the propriety of a Greek vessel clearing with sugar for Casablanca, a United States vessel sailing for Spain with oil, etc. 515 -2In the American control regulations it was explained that French colonies are accorded the same treatment as metropolitan France. Phillips explained that England has blocked French assets under the British Trading With The Enemy Act. French banks in London are no longer permitted to receive instructions from their head offices and are under strict control, although permitted to carry out certain contracts previously entered into within the sterling area. In answer to the Secretary's inquiry, Sir Frederick Phillips stated that he was prepared to give us certain information in regard to prospective British purchases in the United States for the next twelve months. He stressed the point that this schedule must necessarily be accepted as tentative, subject to changes in policy, errors and omission, particularly as concerns the individual items contemplated for purchase. When he was asked for data as to Empire needs, he said that his figures would include dollar requirements for all parts of the Empire, since, for example, when Australia requires dollars for purchases on the American market, the British Treasury provides them. He added, however, that Mr. Purvis is in a position to give more precise information in regard to the Empire purchasing program. Sir Frederick had seen Mr. Purvis in New York on Sunday. The Secretary invited Sir Frederick to lunch with him on Wednesday, when it is planned that Mr. Purvis shall also be present. While discussing the purchasing program, Secretary Morgenthau explained the yorking of the arrangement whereby 9,000 Rolls Royce motors will be made in the United tates, 6,000 for the British and 3,000 for the United States. The Secretary spoke very highly of the work that Mr. Purvis has done in the United States as head of the Anglo French Purchasing Commission. The Secretary stressed the improvement in the purchasing system that had resulted from eliminating the complex control which had at one time been exercised over Mr. Purvis from Ottawa, and he expressed the hope that Mr. Purvis might have even more direct authority from Lord Beaverbrook in the future. Phillips explained that, with the capitulation of France, the joint committee which Jean Monnet had headed has now collapsed, and that a new "Salter committee" has now been set up to coordinate purchases by the various British ministries. The Secretary invited the British visitors to return to the Treasury at 4:15 this afternoon if they might be interested in observing the manner in which our committee on foreign funds control operates. It was also arranged that they should come to the Treasury on Tuesday morning at 10:30 for a further conference. At 4:15 Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Pinsent came to Under Secretary Bell's office and sat for two hours with the control group, consisting of Messrs. Bell, Stewart, Viner, Upham, White, Bernstein, Pehle and Cochran. A few typical cases were discussed and decided upon at this session. Mr. Bell explained in some detail various phases of the control including a brief description of the setup. in New York and its relation of to the Treasury. We let the visitors know that we consult the Missions in Washington blocked countries on certain cases, but do not undertake to be guided exclusively by those Missions. The action which was being taken yesterday with respect to blocking the assets in the countries of Latvia, was explained. a further step under There States was discussion of the Baltic of contemplation Estonia invaded and Lithuania which terri- involved ar stamping United of securities traded on this market which have come from ories. There was also a study made of documents drawn up in regard to examination of 516 -3consular mail with the view to detecting shipments of looted securities. It was ascertained in this connection that the British Embassy in Washington looked favorably upon our examination of consular mail, and had even issued a circular to British consuls in American territory advising them not to protest against such practice. This circular had been inspired by a protest made by the British Consul in Manila against the action in that city of our postal authorities. Sir Frederick Phillips was quite interested in our system. He gave us certain general information in regard to British censorship and control of alien enemy funds. 517 - Early in the first conference with the British visitors their interest in French balances in this country was made quite clear. The Secretary had them provided orally with a statement of French balances in this country. The figures given were the dollar balances of the Bank of France with the Federal Reserve Bank of $255,585,000 and earmarked gold of the Bank of France with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, amount- in this as of 1940. to $506,950,000, both figures as of July 10, 1940. It was added that private French ing funds market estimatedgold amounted French toLondon approximately $242,000,000 July 3, Sir Frederick Phillips holdings atin$350,000,000. He stated such gold is still in London. He said the French had some sterling securities, particularly gold mining shares, but he did not attempt to estimate the value thereof. Dr. White thought that French holdings of American dollar securities totaled around $100,000,000. He explained, however, that the inventory which we are now making may reveal a higher figure. While in Mr. Cochran's office, Mr. Bewley reported that it was his understanding that the Belgian and Polish central bank gold which had been in France was shipped out on one vessel, of which there has been no further word. It was rumored to have gone to Africa. IMM. July 15, 1940 518 2.khillian securities ogold dead certain rate of loss gold + securities whole steating area $1,600. los England Canad s. africa India new yeland australia In six months Alient of gold may have to troup against securities not readily socable a year furn now 518-A down to 4600. airplane June 22 week ending byine 888 of which to 200 reconstructed 688 new airplane 570 new 422 in 148 recrostucted 1/3 of Haves training Bamberst fighters 285 519 July 15, 1940 3:31 p.m. H.M.Jr: Hello. Wm. H. McReynolds: Yes, sir. H.M.Jr: Mac? How are you? McR: Pretty good, thank you. H.M.Jr: How's your golf? McR: Why, not 80 bad. I made $1.50 over the weekend H.M.Jr: You could make that and shoot over a hundred McR: Well, I made $1.50 on Saturday and I made playing golf. if you played with $1. 50 yesterday. H.M.Jr: Good for you. McR: But my golf wasn't so hot. The other fellows were worse, that's all. H.M.Jr: Now don't go modest on me. McR: (Laughs). H.M.Jr: Mac. McR: Yeah. H.M.Jr: I've got an invitation to come to the White House at two o'clock tomorrow with the National Defense Council. McR: Yes, sir. H.M.Jr: What's it mean? McR: Well, I mean, the Boss said Thursday when we were over there that he wanted us Tuesday of this week instead of Thursday and that he was going to invite the same group that he had at 520 -2- the first meeting just as a sort of review H.M.Jr: and get-together. That was all. Well, what's back of it? McR: I don't know that there's a thing. H.M.Jr: Who was the first group? McR: Well, you were there -- it was the Cabinet H.M.Jr: Oh, my God! McR: The Cabinet and the Commission. H.M.Jr: Oh, the whole Cabinet is going to be there. McR: Yeah. H.M.Jr: I see. McR: That is, all that are here. H.M.Jr: I see. McR: The Boss said that they -- he was going to have the Cabinet, the Assistant Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary of Navy and the Commission. H.M.Jr: I see. McR: And that was the basis of the invitation. He told me to see that Pa Watson got the invitations out. H.M.Jr: O. K. McR: So I've been on his neck ever since to see that he got them out. H.M.Jr: Well, I was invited but I wondered what it was. Now I know. McR: That's the whole story. H.M.Jr: O. K. 521 -3McR: I just called you while you were in press conference. Mrs. Spangler asked me whether she could do anything and I told her what I wanted. I think she's going ahead and do it. H.M.Jr: What's that? McR: This Rolls Royce boy was trying to get hold of the Chief Engineer in Darby without any success at all and they'd asked Phil Young how they did it and he didn't know, 80 they called me and Mrs. Spangler said she had done that two or three times before for them and that she would go ahead if I thought it was all right. I said you'd better check it, but I was going to ask the Secretary before I gave anybody any request. H.M.Jr: They'd better do that through the British Embassy from now on. McR: Do it through the British Embassy from now on. I think she 8 on the way to do it now, if you want it cancelled out over there. H.M.Jr: They'd better do that -- I don't want any more of those calls going through the -I don't know what they are. McR: Well, what they're trying to do is to get some information from their chief engineer in Darby as to technical assistance they can H.M.Jr: get in building up this plant in Packard. They'd better do it through the British Embassy. McR: I'11 tell them so. H.M.Jr: Yeah. McR: O. K. H.M.Jr: Thank you. McR: Thank you. 522 July 15, 1940 3:40 p.m. Operator: Operator. H.M.Jr: Why do you put a call through to London Operator: I didn't put any call through. H.M.Jr: Well, McReynolds said he asked you to put that I've already refused? a call through for the Rolls Royce. Operator: Yes, he asked me to but I haven't worked H.M.Jr: Were you going to ask me? Operator: Well, Mr. McReynolds and I talked it over on it yet. and he said he thought it was all right to go ahead without asking you. H.M.Jr: Well, you'd better never do that again. Operator: All right. H.M.Jr: I've turned it down once today. Operator: H.M.Jr: oh, I didn't know that. Never, never do a thing like that again. Operator: All right. H.M.Jr: No calls now, please, Mrs. Spangler. I understand. Operator: H.M.Jr: I mean, I turned them down once and they go to McReynolds. Operator: H.M.Jr: oh, I didn't know that. Well, you'd better ask. I mean, I turned it down once today and when I want a call to go through to Europe, unless I personally tell you or unless it's something that I tell you or Mr. Cochran or somebody here, please never do it again. I don't know what all of this Rolls Royce business is. 523 -2Operator: I see. It was that same call that you had H.M.Jr: That was when they were here. I see. Operator: H.M.Jr: told me about several times before. But since then a lot of things have happened which I don't understand and I don't know who this Rolls Royce man is or whether he's a German sympathizer or what he is, and I'm not going to have my Treasury used for that purpose. Operator: I see. Yee, sir. H.M.Jr: I'm quite upset over that and McReynolds called me and he said he'd talked to you. Please be more careful. You know, these people are at war, Mrs. Spangler, and you just don't know who's spy and who's fifth columnist. You've got to be terribly careful. Operator: I know. H.M.Jr: And I've got you down there because I have confidence in you. Operator: Well, it was this same man that you had H.M.Jr: Operator: How long ago, Mrs. Spangler. It' S been about a month ago now. H.M.Jr: Exactly, and a lot of things have happened Operator: I understand. H.M.Jr: All right. All right. Operator: passed a call for him. It was for Mr. Olley. since then. 524 July 15, 1940 4:43 p.m. Operator: Hello. H.M.Jr: Mrs. Spangler, just to keep my records straight. McReynolds said he tried to get me while I was at press conference and then when he couldn't he spoke to you? Operator: That's right. H.M.Jr: Operator: Is that right? That's right. H.M.Jr: O. K. Operator: All right. Thank you. with The compliments of KWANG PU CHEN Hn 8hil 525 Foreign Trade Commission, Changking, China. July 15, 1940. Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Embassy, Washington, D.C., U. S. A. Dear Shih Chih: The purpose of this letter is to confirm the two cables which were sent on the 8th and 10th to the Universal Trading Corporation to be forwarded to you and to give you a rather detailed account of information I have gathered since my arrival here which may be of interest to you. One of the important decisions of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Kuomintang which is now in session is the formation of a Ministry of Economic Warfare in which will be embodied the Foreign Trade Commission of the Ministry of Finance, and several minor sub-divisions of the Ministry of Economics which will be changed into a Ministry of Industry and Trade. In addition, the heads of Ministrics of War, Finance, Co munication, Industry and Trade and Economic Warfare will meet regularly as the National Economic Conference under the chairmanShip of the Generalissimo. The Government will also set up a Central Planning Board for purposes of planning as well as supervision of the nations political as well as economic affairs. The nature of Economic Warfare in China differs considerably from the nature of economic warfare in Great Britain. In the latter, economic warfare consists of blockading its enemy. In China, economic warfare consists of mitigating the effect of enemy blockade, increasing production in order to supply home consumption and develop export trade, and carrying on disruptive activities so as to make it impossible for the enemy to exploit the occupied areas and use the resources of such areas for the continued prosecution of the war. Warfare on the economic front, of course, has been going on since the beginning of the war. But 80 far the extent of the warfare has been limited. The formation of the new ministry indicates that the Government is going to pay greater attention to this vital problem and emphasizes the fact that, despite persistent rumors of a compromise, the Government is not only determined to carry on but will greatly intensify warfare on the vitally important economic front. Rising prices and high living cost constitute perhaps the most talked about problem in Free China. It is, however, not the general rise in the price level, but the spectacular rise in 526 2 the price of commodities of every day consumption that is worrying many people. Detailed figures are not available, but information gathered at random from various sources indicate that in Chungking, the price of rice must have risen five or six times or more in one year while price of rice in Kunming has arisen eleven or twelve times during the same period. In Chengtu, recently, the price of rice went up ten dollars in a single day. There are many well-recognized reasons for this phenomenon, such as commodity shortage, high cost of transport, high labor cost resulting from labor shortage, hoarding of commedities and currency inflation, but opinions differ as to the relative importance of these reasons. There is, however, an interesting phenomenon in Szechuan which pointsto the great importance of hoarding as a factor in boost- ing up prices. Contrary to general expectation, the price of grain is highest not in the great cities where large quantities are con- sumed but in the localities such as Chiangehing, Chichiang and other places which are the centers of rice production. The explanation, according to a reliable source, is that speculators are buying up rice right at the source of production. Police measures against speculators are reported to be strict in hungking. Once, at the direct order of the Generalissimo, warehouses of several large banks were searched for hoarded commodities, but nothing was found. In the small towns and the countryside, however, the control authorities were not so vigilant and it is reported that commodity hoarding still presents a serious problem. Regarding currency inflation. its existence is a generally admitted fact but there is a special feature in the currency situa- tion which mitigates considerably the undesirable consequences of inflation. The degree of development of money economy in China's interior is so small that barter or near-barter trade prevails to a considerable extent and there has generally been a shortage of our- rency in the villages. The result of inflation, therefore, has so far been the injection of a sisable amount of paper currency into the villages with the result that peasants who never handled much currency before now readily pull out of their pockets one dollar and five dollar bills without much hesitancy. This fact means that on the one hand, peasants are acquiring the habit of using notes which implies a step forward in the development of money economy. while the effect of inflation are somewhat mitigated because the area for note ciroulation has become extended. Although both rising price and inflation are symptoms rather than the basic causes of our economic difficulties, there are many people who believe that effective measures to control prices and to mobilise idle capital in Shanghai and Hongkong can be and should be devised. The recent Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Kuomintang is reported to have worked out many conorete measures to meet the present situation. These measures have not yet been published and their effectiveness remains to be seen. As to fundamental measures to remedy the situation, increase of production and the improvement of transport stand naturally at the 527 3 top of the list. In my interviews with the Generalissimo on July 2nd, I emphasized the importance of these two measures, not only as the basic means in solving the internal economic problem but also as the basic steps that China should take in opening up more possi- bilities for securing foreign economic assistance. The saying that God only helps those who help themselves applies to nations as well as to individuals. Only when we have done our best in making internal improvements, in increasing the production of goods with which we can exchange for things we need and in developing our transport system so that it ceases to be a bottleneck in our economy - only when we have done all these and more can we be justified in feeling that we have not only prepared the road to victory but also laid the basis for post-war reconstruction. Although anxious to be of service to our country and people, I have, as you know, a strong disinclination to take any government position and, except under unavoidable circumstances, always prefer to do my part as a private citizen. I have, therefore, in a letter to Dr. Kung last week tendered my resignation as Chairman of the Foreign Trade Commission. I would have liked to free myself of all official duties, but somehow I feel that I cannot and should not attempt to escape from the responsibilities arising from the commercial activities created by the two Export-Import Bank Loans. Consequently I am retaining the post of Chairman of Board of Directors of Foo Shing Corporation and continuing to serve as a director of the Universal Trading Corporation. In these capacities I will be in a position to do all I can to insure the proper carrying out of the activities entrusted to these corporations so that the two loans are properly serviced and repaid, so that China will secure the greatest benefit from the purchases made from the loan proceeds and so that a sound basis for the further development of Chinese-Ametican trade will be laid. Perhaps the most noticeable physical conditions of work in Chungking are the extremely warm weather, the inconvenience in communication and transport and repeated interruptions resulting from air bombing raids. The room temperature in Chungking reaches 108° in the last few days. The heat is as oppressive as most tropical countries. if not more so. Humidity rivals that in Manila and Hongkong and people live in sweat twenty-four hours a makes the thanpractically Manila and is the day.absence What place worse of any breeze or wind. DayHongkong, after day thehowever, leaves of trees stand absolutely still and the only brease that brings a little relief comes from the fan which has indeed become man's best friend. a much The been air work has not Heat, however, is not the worst enemy to efficiency in Chungking. The inconvenience of communication and transport constitutes partly finished. destroyed by greater raids handicap. have and repair system been has totelephone be made byyetmessengers around on seldom covera more who or three move foot orof therefore, chairs and than scattered two miles anAppointments, hour. With most government officers over a large area in the countryside, it takes at least a couple of hours before a messenger san get to his destination and come back 528 4 with the return message. Once an appointment is made. the party invited must arrive early in the morning. If he arrives after 10 A.M. he is likely to be greeted with an air raid alarm and will have to go to the cave for two. three and sometimes four hours. so when the actual discussion starts, it's already mid-afternoom. If one lives across the river, one cannot stay for dinner unless one is prepared to stay over-night. An appointment is, therefore, usually a whole day affair. The tempo of movement here is consequently very slow, and even the most efficient man can accomplish little under the circumstances. To one who is accustomed to the pace in New York and Washington, the life here makes one feel like in a dream, when one sees clearly the necessity to move but feels paralysed and helpless. Despite all these inconveniences, however, the life of the city and the affairs of the Government are being carried on as usual. Air raids are perhaps the most important contributing factor in this inconvenience and the effects of air raids and the attempts for their prevention strike the eye as most characteristic features in Changking today. Chungking is a city of sears and air-raid-shelters or caves. Many streets, including some which were the meet prosperous sections a year age. are completely destroyed and there is seareely a single street without damaged houses and buildings. The air raids during last summer and the past two months have been se intense that had Chungking been a city built on an alluvial plain like Chengta it would have been rendered uninhabitable. Fortunately, Chungking is situated on limestone hills and air-raid shelters can be dug on the side of most streets or near most buildings. The result is that Changking has become a city of caves, and almost ence every day, in the last two months the people of Chungking are compelled to spend a few hours in the caves. I was spared this ordeal for two days after my arrival because of rain. Then in five days we experienced four raids, the first one on July 4th completed the wreck of the campus of Chungking university, the second and third raids on the 5th and 7th wrecked many buildings near the Government building where the Central Committee Meeting of the Enomintang was in session, and the fourth raid did not drop any bombs in Changing but passed here and raided Chengtu. and Changking It may be interesting to describe two of these air raids and cave life which may give you a concrete idea of one of at the most common characteristics of life ared at ball present. On Julyoutstanding 4th, at 10:30 the first alarm, hanging on a rask at the top of hill, appeared. The sound of automobiles and of the were soon heard. to saves. Hotel porters started trucks to rushing take guest out baggages city the People carrying bundles, were walking about the street, for the go all all heading women saves carrying they were babies, supposed to to. People were I walking to some place, but there was no panic, no rushing. haven't seen a single person running or shouting. Then, about half 529 5 an the caves. or red hour later, two red balls appeared. This is the sign that the have crossed the provincial border. People began enemy go into planes Another 20 minutes so, the two balls to which means that the enemy planes are approaching the We city. disappeared, The street becameCommercial of the all quiet and all sitting in the cave Shanghai andmotionless. Savingsare Bank waiting and talking in low tones. But the enemy were slow in coming. The save is high enough for the tallest person to walk through and it's wide enough to seat two rows of people and still leave enough space for one person to walk back and forth. The cave is a long tunnel out into a limestone hill. In order to prevent stones from falling on people when bomba drop on top of it or near by. the inside of the cave was lined with wooden boards and supported by a very solid wooden framework. It was lighted with vegetable oil lamps and although the lights are too dim for reading, they are sufficient to make the cave look lively and make it possible for people to be sociable. The people inside, mostly employees of the Bank, and some of their families, were mostly cheerful. They joked with each other, discussed reports in the days newspapers, and showed not the slightest sign of fear or worry. Suddenly, the few people who were near one of the doors of the cave rushed in and reported they heard the enemy planes. Soon there was a rumbling noise, like a thunder in a distance. Later on we were informed that the enemy dropped over 200 bombs on the campus of the Chungking university and that of the Central University, destroying most of the buildings and killing 2 servants and wounding 3. At 3:20 P.M. the all clear sign, a large green lantern, appeared and we all emerged from the cave. We have been sitting in that cave for 4 solid hours. On the morning of July 7th when a few friends and myself were out visiting, the air alarm sounded. We were out in the hills, travelling by chairs each of which were being carried by two bearers. It was a most inconvenient place to face an air raid. Had the raid come sooner than it did then we would have to go to the nearest public cave which is usually crowded and suffocating. Fortunately the enemy planes were slow in coming. So we rushed back to the Foreign Trade Commission where I was staying and where there is a good cave. We reached the Commission premises at about 11 A.M. and found Mr. Hou the vice-minister of Finance, Mr. ma, a tea expert, and Dr. Chi just finishing a hearty lunch. They knew the raid would last until 3 or and were therefore eating their lunch ahead of time. We all went together to the cave of the Commission which is situated about quarter of a mile up hill. We noticed young and old, women carrying babies and men with bundles in their hands, were coming from all directions leading toward one of the four entrances of the cave. Some guests 4 and leading members of the Commission were being borne up hill by chairs. My friends prepared a chair for me. I did not like the idea of riding while most 01 the people were on foot. So I joined the crowd and 530 6 climbed. But after going about half way, the effect of are began to tell, and at the urging of my friends, I reluctantly finished the climb by chair. The cave is known as one of the best in Chungking because it it as as of the is situated on the side of a hill and the best part of the cave roof of about 100 feet of solid stone. Costing $50,000 for its has construction a is ten times large that Shanghai Bank shelter over 1,000 people. The inside of the cave is cool and can damp. Water occasionally dripe from ceiling. rather one uts on extra clothing, he is most likely to come out of the cave with a cold. Despite the discomfort, the people inside obviously felt safe and were cheerful. Under the flickering light of the vegetable but very the Unless oil lamp. one could see people's animated faces and hear a continuous stream of pleasant conversion. There were tired faces, fatigued by the boredom of having to sit four hours as if in confinement, but therevis no sign of fear. It was particularly hard on the children who naturally felt the strain of enforced sitting and semi-darkness more keenly than the grown-ups. Many children, nevertheless, were cheerful and sometimes even helped to cheer up the adults. Then amidst the noises oreated by crying babies, complaining children and coaxing mothers one often hears groups of children singing patriotic songs or popular airs. There were, however, moments of gloom when the droning of enemy planes Was followed by a string of thunderous booming noises. Everybody know that enemy bombs had found their mark althoughnobody know where. When we emerged from the save, we could see smoke and flames somewhere in the heart of the city across the river. Later, we learned that the enemy were trying to bomb the place here the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Kuomintang was in eession. Fate, however has its tricks. The bomts destroyed most of the buildings in the neighbourhood and two soldiers guarding the gate of the Government building were blown to smithereens. But, the reassembled meeting surrounding hall ruins, of the unseathed Kuomintang and Conference untouched. stands The delegates proudly amidst the one hour after each raid and carried on their deliberations. There were no casualties and not even any absences. Thus, despite almost daily raid, the conference concluded its sessions on the 8th as sche- duled. The enemy obviously aimed to intimidate the delegates into submission, but the decision of the conference, as the whole world knows by now, is continued resistance. In view of the fact that the Japanese have failed either to intimidate our people or their leaders, it is difficult to understand illusion wishfulhow are realities, although in facing realities lies mon's only read to why they continue to carry out such raids which must be very costly to thinking. them. The explanation It is, indeed, is, a perhaps, pity unwilling resulting people from to face ealvation. There are many other things that I wish to tell you but the letter is already too long and, like all things good or bad, there must 531 be an end. I am staying in Chungking until July 26 when I will leave for Kunming, and then Rangoon. When circumstances permit I'11 write you again. In the meantime, permit me to close with my best wishes for your good health. Sincerely yours, (signed) K. F. Chen Treasury Department 532 Division of Monetary Research Date Sept. 19, 1940. 0 To: Secretary Morgenthau From: Appended is a copy such as you sent, I think, to Secretary Knox the other day. There are a few suggestions of things you might want to consider offering as possible inducements to Russia. MR. WHITE Branch 2058 - Room 210 533 July 15, 1940 COPY MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY: Proposal for a possible three-way arrangement between the United States, Jussia and China to Five assistance to China The following tentative plan is put forward as a possible feasible method of carrying out the President's suggestion of giving aid to China through an arrangement which would include Russia. A. We would purchase from $100 to $200 million of strategic and critical commodities from Russia for delivery as rapidly as possible but probably extending over several years. We would make advance payments for part of the purchase, preferably in proportion as Russia extends effective equivalent credits to China. According to an estimate based on the available data, which are neither comprehensive nor up to date, Russia can supply us with about 825 million per annua of manganese ore, asbestos, platinum, chromite, etc. (In addition to her normal exports to the United States). (See Exhibits A and B.) Further information from the Soviet Government would be needed to assertain the volume of such exports that could be made. Russia on her part would agree to extend to the Government of China credits equivalent to our advance payments for Russian strategie materials. Russia's equivalent credits to China would be in B. addition to the 850 million or se of Russian credits reported by Mr Soong is the middle of July to be still outstanding which China is using up as rapidly as Rassis will permit. Bussia's equivalent credite to China would become effective simultaneously with our advance payments to Russia. c. To eliminate the risk of Russian non-delivery of goods for which we have made advance payment, Russia could be requested to agree to leave gold on earmark with the United States to an amount equivalent to the sume we pay in advance. The gold would be unblocked, and if desired withdrawn, concomitantly with our receipt of Russian goods already paid for. 9/12/40 534 -2As a possible quid pro que to the Russians we sight allow them to use our advance payments to them for the purchase of such American goods as can be exported without detriment to our national defense. D. Advantages of plan: 1. It would make possible increased aid to China at a time when no other means -- except perhaps a our- roney stabilisation loan -- is open, and thus by strengthening Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression improves the United States' defensive position in the Pacific. 2. The aid to China would be made without our ineurring any risk and only at the cost of payment in advance for strategic and critical materials which we need anyhow. 3. We would increase our foreign trade by making possible larger exports to Russia. 4. If the international situation develops in such a way as to make 11 to our advantage to improve our relations with Russia, this three-way agreement would constitute a convenient opening wedge for this purpose. HDW:WLU:SA:1rs 9/12/40 535 EXHIBIT A September 12, 1940 The U.S.S.B. As a Source of Strategie and Critical Material The United States may be able to purchase strategie and critical materials from the U.S.S.R. to the extent of from $100 million to $200 million for delivery over a four-year period. (This - is in addition to our normal trade with the Seviet Union, which accounted to 824.5 million in 1939.) According to this estimate, the following materials might be annually obtainable in the following quantities and values Material Manganese (ore) Quantity Hensury 450,000 long time 100,000 long tens 7,000 flasks Asbestes (mmanufactured 100,000 tens Chronite (ore) Platious (ingete) Flooroper (are) Tin (are or netal) (76 lbs.) 60,000 trey cusses 301000 tens 2,000 tens (notal - Value $10,000,000 2,000,000 1,400,000 5,000,800 3,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000 test) Mies (strategic - manufactured) 10,000 tens Graphite (natural) 10,000 tems Total 900,000 290.000 $25,150,000 The above estimates are based - published data available to us, but the date is not - to date, ner is 18 comprohensive. There are many strategie materials which are known to be produced in the U.S.S.R., but for which no adequate statistical information is readily accountable. Before any definite emalusion - be reached as to the extent of possible purchases, 18 would be desirable to obtain the measury information from the Series Government as a basis for a more detailed survey. V Prepared by Mr. Ellesson Bur Division of Benetary Research I - 536 Management is a strategie material. used in the manufacture of steal. It is considered of *first priority Matted States Committees 2017 Prefesed in the United States 986,000 Imported - from U.S.S.R. Imported - from other combries 73,000 long tens are Total importe 932,000 long teas are Apparent complete 965,000 long tess are Importe from "other - primitally from the cold Cosat, Cabe, Breath. Sussion are has a higher - content than Wasters Benisphere are. states Statement Instruction 12 - (Amer exitiate) Denoutic Production Importe 185,000 long time are 202.000 long tens are Total requirements 600,000 long team are (Deficiency to be make - from Inventories) This appears to be - minrestimate of import tamage requirements. Estimated cost of Supertes 16,000,000. Section I Pretaction 1938 U.S.S.R. production I U.S.S.R. - 2,273,000 more tess are 785,000,000 motric - Canalasia The United States - probably obtata a Jarge your of ste import requirements from the U.S.S.R. The Year Department estimates of - requirements - 30m, especially is view of the 2997 vilum. If, however, the States States were to Super half the total 2997 quality, the cost of imported - would - to about (30 million your your (wing the Anny ortinates of energency prices.) 537 Advertes Year Ashootes is a critical material, used in the extensitive intestries for brake Manage and grabate. IS is also important for best insolation in verious types of construction and equipment. letted states 2932 The United States has been largely dependent on importe for with Canada the principal supplier (omplying about 90 parent). The Service Union was second with , persons. United States consumption in 1937 was as follows Beneritie production Importe from S.S.S.R. 10,000 12,800 teas Importe free other Total importe Less exports Apparent commution 397.000 tens see tens 336,000 time Review Ashadas Production The U.S.S.R., in 1936, produced 123,117 motric time of - achestes, which was a rise of 30 parent from 1934. If Series production continued to increase as the - rate, 18 probably will reach over 200,000 tens this year. The Service Union, in 1997, exported 27,000 astric tess. Sensimilar The United States, food with - - signs have to import - Robestes from the U.S.S.R. If that country were able and milling, is sign be able to sell the United States 100,000 tens of you exhastes a perhaps, 90 per tea (The 1938 value of - Separte from the U.S.S.E.) or 85,000,000. 1/12/45 538 Mas liseas Mica is a strategic material used in the electric and redie indu trice. A large part of the world's sies production is of - strategie mien, ground and pulverised for many purposes, including roofing. United States Decreaser Residencial 12 months (U.S. Aray estimate) The War Department has estimated that the United States would need 2,600 short tens of strategic sies animally during - - (this appears low in view of pesso-time - It estimated that our production plus normal steake could - Shan supply this desend. New over, this conclusion was based on "enterplated explaitation of all dowestic resources as unrestricted costs". In the past, the United States has imported chiefly from British Indian. If anything should out off the Indian supply, the United States sight find is prestical to import mies from the U.S.S.R. in order to tail too sharp a price rise. Soviet Mes Production In 1935, the U.S.S.R. produced over 8,000 tens of sice, twice the 1934 output and exceeding British India's output. If the U.S.S.R. preductica expanded as rapidly as India's, Sevior production in 1938 would amount to over 14,000 tone. The United States has imported no Seviet nice, nor is 11 known that the Series Union has exported any. The United States might find 18 practical to import 1,000 tens of manufactured sise from the Service Union, which might east 8500 per ten or $500,000. 539 Max Bag: Merowy for is a strategie material, used in also deterating in droge (calenol, high explosives and fixed - IS falminate is bottom, in corrective sublimate, etc.) in points need ship thereoutions, etc.) electrical apporation, and instruments for Jallet States commutations The United States has in the past imported . substantial its in other with approximately half is years of high parties less of Imports have years, democitis - remining relatively from Mexico. - 1937 principally commution from - as Spata follows and Italy, with leaser stealy. momite Democrite production Importe from U.S.S.R. Importe from other committee Less sports Apparent - 36,900 Name Class (76 provide) 28.93 Cleake (% points) 456 fleaks (% provide) 35,000 flacks (% printe) United States I Residental 12 - (Area estimates) rise. The The The Department has estimated that requirements in would - requirements Suress would of Mass - has to recently (1939) extinated - - that the would - democrite United States production prices, outgut to has ship might follows reach - be prices, 30,000 16,000 a Claste has flashe been under ordinated conditions annually. that Since of high the plied leave only by a imports. deficit of appreciately added 14,000 2,800 finals Claste which from Mexico. could be This - American Since worker, Speedab and Italian money might be est off 006.55 is - the wise might reality reach 8300 per flask from a rising - $1,400,000. 1997). The cost of importing 24,000 Cleaks would (11 be laries I Pretention Boliable Yearbook information (gooking the about Service protection is not available. The as - 8,700 Cleake is 1995, Superial 1936, and Institute) 1937 (the places latest Seviet year production reported), 540 (Continued) which appears to be inconcle in view of the rapid expension of Soviet production in all other fields. This figure, benever, would place the U.S.S.R. fourth in the world's a countries. IS is probable that Series production has expended repidly in recent years. As far as - be determined, the U.S.S.R. has experted se money. Constantes The United States is fased with a deficiency in many, since require- mente are rising and since She - most important foreign - of copply my be our off. The U.S.S.R. my be able end willing so supply - with purhape 7,000 Clasks animally, which would eest appreciately $100,000. 541 Christmas Iss Chromism is a strategie material (of "first priority"), used in alley steels, in refrestories, in signate, and is chronium plating (e.g., machine gm barrels). Paited states corrections 1937 The United States depends almost entirely - importe for its supply of chromite, importing chiefly from British Africa, from the Phillippine Islands, Cuba, and Turkey. The Cubes are is of low grade, and is therefore used is refresteries. It is understood that Turkey has agreed to sell chromite to Germany, a faster which (together with shipping usercultion) sakes Turkey a desidiful source of supply. 1937 consumption wee as follows Demostic Production Importe from U.S.S.B. 2,000 long tens are None Imports from other countries Apparent - 996,000 long tens are United States - 32 anoths (Area extimate) The War Department has orbinated that is as - the United States would need 285,600 tess of chrosite per year, using all possible substitutes. It estimated that democrite mines could produce 64,000 time annually, which appears high in view of actual production (812 tens is 1936). Assuming its estimates to be carreet, the United States would need to import appreximately 200,000 tens per year. Seviet Chessite Protection Sevies production data are not evallable for years since 1936, when their output was 227,000 metric teas. Production is probably appreciably higher as present, since is is Income to have rises charger through 1936, 1934 1935 1936 127,480 tess 177,900 tens - 217,000 test Farthermore, Service publications claimed as includency of chromite is 1936, while they claimed requirements to be 200 parent solisfied is 1938, then Series industry had expended appreciably from 1936 Sociale. 542 Chromine Seviet production now, it is falt, is probably well over 300,000 tone per year, a part of which the U.S.S.R. might be willing to expert, especially since sales of the are would in no way tax her refining facilities. The United States has imported no chronite from the U.S.S.R. since 1936. As far as can be determined, the Seviet Union has exported name since that time. Conclusions If the United States, under an emergency and using substitutes, were to import half its 1937 importations, is would need to purchase abread 277,000 tess of chromite per year, which would involve an appreximate cost of $7,000,000 (using Aray estimates of exergency prices). If the Series Union more willing to sell we 100,000 tone annually, the cost involved would amount to, roughly, $2,000,000. 543 Plating Iss Pistinum is a critical asterial, need is making sulfuris end nitric aside, as wellaasprocesses. in many laboratory instruments, electrical contacts, and United States The United States is largely dependent - Superto for plation, a though a large part of the importe are in orale form which are refined democrically. U.S. Production (tree imported materials) U.S. Production (tree democitis materials) 87,000 trey 5,000 trey - Importe of Ingere, bare, choole, etc. Free U.S.S.B. From other countries Loss exports (ootimated Apporent - 15,000 two 67.999 twey - 2.00 way 204,000 way - Importe of refined metal have - largely from the United Elagion. Calumbia has supplied a large part of our erate petimen imports. accidential The U.S.S.R. to Income to produce annually between 100,000 and 200,000 trey - of plation, probably nearer the latter figures. Canalustan The United States, in - company, would measurily increase these industries which we platium. the sale of in goods (Jeneary would to effect -the intertries Benever, probably dealine, possibly platious enough increase. Bovertholese, - will have to import - derable quantities. The U.S.S.R., already on - export basis, sign be willing to sell - 60,080 way emote annually, which would card appreciantely 13,000,000. 544 Exhibit a United States trade with the U.S.S.R., 1937 - June, 1940 (Thousands of Dollars) # 1938 8 1937 1939 8 , resports) (including Vegetable food products Crade rubber s , V $ - - 733 " 6,362 Other inedible vegetable products Non-notallis minerals Copper 1940 (6 mothe) and fare alleye Tin 8 1,719 2,521 s 2,352 37 35 47 5,844 3,020 186 437 23 6,940 10,000 3,776 3,266 - 6,984 1,022 sa - 1,852 9,535 8,961 5,092 5,289 6,994 3,213 35,163 5,172 18,655 2,905 10,082 10,028 9,108 6,942 4,075 436 846 233 1.442 1.258 - 642,898 mm 656,637 Irea and steal products and other metals and sunfastures Metal working anchinery Aircraft and parts Other machinery and vehicles Chemicals and related products Other articles Total Experts V Less than 8900 2/ Proliminary and not yet classified - - 7.014 848,102 2/ 545 a - Sentioned United States trade with the U.S.S.R., 1937 - June, 1940 (Thousands of Bellers) 1939 Mible animal products Pura Other inedible animal products 1938 : 1939 XMW i (6 means 8 2,176 8 1,388 . 1,620 e 77 22,600 22,397 12,454 6,099 1,299 No 2,176 see 685 779 2,229 544 2,854 2,939 1,566 960 332 933 337 - 458 ⑉ 110 - 2,385 1,199 1,399 - 3,960 2,662 2,304 2,696 695 964 540 - Insdible vegetable products fartile fibure and uffectures Wood and paper sobastee other montalite aim. erale Management are Plation Other metals aga 13 565 - Chemicals 838 752 1,240 - Other products 246 320 802 827,240 883,908 824,494 Total Importe 683,446 Treasury Department, Division of Monstory Research. September 72, 1940 V Preliatory and mainsified Sources U.S. Department of Gummeree WLU:1re 9/12/40 546 TREASURY DEPARTMENT INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION DATE July 15, 1940 Secretary Morgenthau FROM Mr. Foley For the Secretary's Diary In accordance with your arrangement with Mr. Jones, I attended a conference in his office from 11:30 to 12:30 Friday morning, July 12th. In addition to Mr. Jones and myself there were present Messrs. Emil Schram, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the RFC, Claude Hamilton, General Counsel of the RFC, and Chuck Kades. We first discussed the Wright Aeronautical Corporation matter. I told Mr. Jones that Mr. Van Anda had stated to Mr. Kades yesterday that nothing had been heard from the RFC concerning the proposed loan agreement. Mr. Hamilton stated that he had received a photostat of the draft agreement from Mr. Hotchkiss the first part of the week. (Both Mr. Hotchkiss and Mr. Van Anda are partners in the firm of Spence, Windels, Walser, Hotchkiss & Angell which represents Curtiss Wright and Wright Aeronautical.) I stated to Mr. Jones that this photostat was a copy of the draft agreement which I had sent to Mr. Schram on June 25th, and Mr. Schram recalled having re- ceived it. Mr. Jones then stated he had been waiting to hear from Wright Aeronautical Corporation that the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense had awarded the contracts for the engines to Wright Aeronuatical Corporation and I explained that such an award would have to come from the War Depart- ment or the Navy Department, or both, and that the financing of a new plant in which to build the engines had to be carried out simultaneously with the placing of the orders, to which Mr. Jones nodded assent. 547 -2- Mr. Jones then asked about the ruling relating to amortisation and I handed him a copy of the ruling and the proposed closing agreement as well as a copy of the letter from Wright Aeronautical Corporation requesting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make a ruling to which was attached a copy of the letter from Mr. Jones to Mr. Gordon, Vice President of Curtiss Wright in charge of Wright Aeronautical Corporation. Mr. Jones read the file carefully and asked to see a copy of the regulations upon which the ruling was based which I showed him and which he indicated he thought was very sound and would be useful in many situations. He asked to keep the file so that the ruling could be studied in relation to the possible changes in the plan of financing and I left everything with him. At the conclusion of our discussion of the Wright Aeronautical Corporation's application for a loan from the RFC, Mr. Jones stated that Mr. Schram and Mr. Hamilton would get in touch with Mr. Hotchkiss and Mr. Van Anda the early part of next week with a view to having them come to Washington for a further con- ference and for working out the details of the transaction. We then discussed the Packard-Rolls-Royce matter. Mr. Jones stated that it was the opinion of the RFC that since a large portion of the engines were to be manufactured for the British, the facilities were not being constructed for "national defense" within the meaning of the Act of June 25, 1940, authorising the RFC to advance funds for such purposes. I replied that I thought this interpretation of the law was wrong and that since the new facilities, even though temporarily used to manufacture engines for the British, would always be available for the manufacture of engines for the United States andsince the Govern- ment could at any time give priority to orders for engines for the Army and 548 -3the Navy under $120 of the National Defense Act of 1916, it was a reasonable construction to hold that such facilities were for the "national defense". Mr. Hamilton stated he thought the legislative history did not support my interpretation and I suggested that the matter be referred to the Attorney General for an opinion but Mr. Jones stated that regardless of what the Attorney General might rule he did not want to do it any way. I suggested that as an alternative the financing might be done under the Class-Stegall Bill of 1938 which authorized the RFC to make loans to industry, but Mr. Jones said that Packard was not willing to give acceptable security such as a mortgage to come within the stricter requirements of that bill. Mr. Jones said that it was his understanding that the British had deposited $25,000,000 in escrow to secure Packard against the possibility of the cancellation of orders and that this $25,000,000 would be used only in payment of the last batch of engines and would be left untouched until that time. Mr. Jones thought that if the $25,000,000 was utilized to aid in financing the expansion of Packard, he could advance the balance of the funds needed by Packard. I told him I did not know any of the details of the arrangement between Packard and the British or between Packard and the Advisory Commission but that I thought if the agencies of the Government concerned would get together there was sufficient ingenuity to work out a plan satisfactory to all concerned, and Mr. Jones said that he felt the same way and that he was not averse to taking risks where necessary to get the program under way. Mr. Jones mentioned that officers of Colt's Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Co. had recently spoken to him about funds for the purchase of jigs, tools, dies and special machinery which they wanted installed in the Colt's plant but that 549 they did not want to be under any obligation to repay the funds so advanced, nor did they want the Government to have any right or title to the special machinery which would be purchased with the funds and Mr. Jones indicated he thought this attitude was unreasonable. Mr. Jones asked me who it was in the British Purchasing Commission who spoke for the Commission, and I said that it was my understanding that Mr. Purvis was the one to talk to on the Rolls-Royce matter. Mr. Jones asked where Mr. Purvis' office was and I stated that it was in New York but he was always willing to take a plane and come to Washington whenever requested. We discussed the possibility of handling the Rolls-Royce matter along the lines of the British-Wright Aeronautical leasing arrangement and Mr. Schram asked if we would send him copies of that contract and lease. Mr. Jones asked whether it would not be possible for the Treasury to revise its regulations relative to depreciation and obsolescence so as to provide for rapid amortization of the cost of new facilities acquired for national defense purposes without waiting for the enactment of the excess profits tax with the special amortization provisions. I explained at considerable length to Mr. Jones that the Treasury had to treat all taxpayers alike and could not discriminate in favor of any particular group of taxpayers such as private manufacturers of armament. I explained to him that whatever rate of depreciation and obsolescence was permitted for buildings and machinery used to fill national defense needs would also have to be applied to buildings and machinery used for other production and that it was essential that the Treasury have statutory authority to make any distinction. 550 Mr. Jones stated that he thought that this was a very reasonable position and that he now understood why the Treasury could not handle the amortization question administratively. I stated to Mr. Jones that there had been a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding on this score but whenever we had had an opportunity of explaining the problem, the need for new legislation became apparent. I referred to the Arthur Krock column which appeared in the New York Times on Wednesday, July 10th, as an example of the prevalence of misinformation and told him how utterly unfair and prejudiced the column was. I explained to Mr. Jones that after a conference last week at Mr. Knudsen's office with Mr. Biggers, Dr. Mead and representatives of Wright Aeronautical Corporation at which the Vinson-Trammell Act and special amortization deductions had both been considered I had stated to you that I thought it was essential to repeal the Vinson-Trannell Act and that you had asked for a memorandum on this subject. After you had considered the memorandum you stated on Monday that you were convinced that the Vinson-Trannell Act was discriminatory, ineffective and was delaying the execution of important contracts, and that on Monday at a conference at the White House you recommended that the Act be repealed and that some special amortization allowances be considered in conjunction with an excess profits tax. I also told Mr. Jones that the President had stated to you that he wanted to consider these matters but that you should discuss them with the legis- lative leaders, and that on the next day, Tuesday, at a conference in your office attended by Senators Harrison, King and George and Congressman Jere Cooper, Chairman of the Tax Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee, you had laid the proposal for the repeal of the Vinson-Trannell Act and provision for special amortization allowances, as part of a general non-discriminatory excess profits 551 tax, before the group. After some hesitation and considerable discussion the legislative leaders agreed with your suggestions and the result was the plan worked out during the conference at the White House on Wednesday which Mr. Jones had attended along with Mr. Knudsen, Senator Harrison and Congressman Cooper, in addition to you, John Sullivan and myself. I told Mr. Jones that I thought that the speed with which the Treasury had acted showed that the Treasury, at least, was prepared to do everything within its power to expedite the national defense program and that the War and Navy Departments must perform their function of awarding the contracts, the RFC its function of financing new construction, and the Treasury its function of ooordinating British procurement with domestic procurement and working out a tax policy all in close coordination if the program was to succeed. Mr. Jones said he realized that the Treasury was trying its best to expedite the progress of the national defense program and said he was willing to do his part to get things done quickly. He said he was in hearty accord with the repeal of the Vinson-Tranmell Act and thought that a steeply graduated excess profits tax of general application was the fairest form of taxation and would help prevent corporations getting too big and having monopoly positions. However, he said he thought that the amortization deduction for special national defense facilities should be permitted regardless whether the financing was done by the RFC or by private banking institutions and that otherwise we were going to get into a most confused situation especially where some of the facilities would be financed from both sources plus existing corporate reserves for plant expansion. I told him that I agreed that any manufacturer whose new facilities were certified by the Army and Navy and the Advisory Commission as being immediately 552 nnecessary for national defense purposes should be permitted to amortise over a five-year period such additional facilities, without regard to the sources of the funds used to construct the new plant or purchase and install the new equipment, and that you had an open mind on the subject and that was the reason why you said to him at the White House you would be willing to discuss the matter with him at any time over a glass of milk. At the conclusion of the conference Mr. Jones seemed to be in a very amiable frame of mind and indicated that he was ready and willing to cooperate to the fullest extent possible. He clearly showed his feeling that the Treasury was doing its part and that the ruling in the Wright Aeronautical case was going to be very helpful. 553 CONFIDENTIAL FOR YOUR INFORMATION July 15, 1940 To: The Secretary From: Mr. Young Friday morning at 10:15, Colonel Burns and I met with Secretary Stimson to confer on the latest "Canadian Army Requirements", copy of which is attached. I explained to Secretary Stimson that a great many of the items included in this list had already come up for discussion by various persons in the War Department, but that, due to the increasing urgency of the situation, these items were submitted for reconsideration. Secretary Stimson read the list over item by item and discussed it informally with Colonel Burns. The result of the conference was that Secretary Stimson asked Colonel Burns for a complete survey of all Army stocks, including ammuni- tion, as well as a survey of all items on order together with production schedules therefor. Colonel Burns stated that he would submit this material to General Marshall together with the "Canadian Army Requirements" and that then General Marshall would discuss it with Secretary Stimson. The Treasury is to receive an answer on this list today. Friday at 3:00 P.M., Admiral Spear and I met with Secretary of the Navy Knox, and the latter in turn requested Admiral Furlong and Captain Deyo (Aide to Secretary Knox) to attend the conference. I followed the same procedure at this meeting that I had used with Secretary Stimson, explaining some of the background, some of the new legal questions involved, and em- phasizing the fact that some of the items contained in the at- tached list, "Canadian Naval Requirements", were resubmitted for reconsideration. Secretary Knox discussed the list informally with Admiral Spear and with Admiral Furlong. I asked Admiral Spear to submit 554 2- an answer by Monday, if possible, at which time I expected an answer from the Army. In addition to the items included on the list, I raised the question with respect to the 400 Thompson sub-machine guns and the 4,093 Browning automatic rifles which had been released by the Navy at a previous date but which had never been made available to the British, because the War Department could not dispose of those items under the old legislation. Admiral Furlong stated that the release of the Browning automatic rifles would have to be withdrawn inasmuch as these rifles were now being purchased and could not be declared surplus. Concerning the 400 Thompson sub-machine guns, however, the release was not definitely withdrawn, and Admiral Furlong is studying this situation further. Both Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox were extremely cooperative, exceedingly pleasant and expressed their willingness to do whatever they could in the interests of the British with whose cause they were personally sympathetic. P. 555 CANADTAN ARMY REQUIREMENTS I have received the most urgent request from Canada to ask your co-operation in obtaining the following stocks of war equipment of which they are badly in needs 1. 280,500 Lee Enfield rifles with as much ammunition as can be supplied. 2. 594 Preferably British pattern, 75 m.m. field guns with 1,000 rounds of high-explosive shells per gun. 3. 20 or more, complete 155 m.m. guns (comprising guns, carriages, sighting and spares) gears, with normal 500 complete tools rounds of ammunition and 600 primer tubes per gun. What platforms are available? 4. 20 Anti-tank guns with 500 rounds per gun. 5. Small calibre guns for antitorpedo boat work. a) 20 or more guns with 2,000 complete rounds of ammunition per gun either armour-parcing or high explosive are desired. b) The following types of guns might be desirable: 3 pounder guns on pedestal 6 pounder guns on pedestal 3 pounder naval guns on pedestal 3 pounder naval landing guns Rate of fire of ten rounds per minute is wanted. 556 2. 6. 200 Small calibre anti-aircraft guns with 2,000 rounds per gun. 7. 8. 50 Anti-aircraft guns, medium calibre with 1,000 rounds per gun. 200 Vickers machine guns for land service, with complementary ammunition. 9. 600 Lewis machine guns for land service with complementary ammunition. 10. 500 Thompson sub-machine guns with 1,000,000 rounds of .45 calibre ammition. The ammunition desired is armour- piercing with penetration equal to 2 1/2 inches at normal on 50 ton steel plate at 5,000 yards. If this is not available, can high-explosive (fused) shell be supplied instead? Hand books and range tables would be desired. A.B.P. July 11, 1940 557 CANADIAN NAVAL REQUIREMENTS The Canadian Government has requested me to ask your co-operation in obtaining the following stocks of Naval equipment of which they have urgent need: 1. 50 BL 4-inch guns, mountings, ammunition, tools and spare parts. The ammunitie desired is 150 service and 150 practice rounds per gun. 2. .50 calibre Colt guns and mountings. Requirements are: 100 in number by the 1st of September 1941, with 50 in number twin mountings. 400 in number before the end of June 1941, with 200 in number twin mountings. 3. 50 4. 640 5. 50 Modern dual-purpose guns Depth charges Each of: range finders, and range deflection transmitters and receivers 6. 7. 6 Search Light Controls a. 25 simple type coincidence range finders, about 9 ft. base with ship mountings. (R.N.) b. 100 simple type coincidence range finders, about 1 metre or 80 centimeter base with belt or rail mounting. (R.N.) 558 2. 8. a. 50 height finders b. 20 range finders (American coincidence type of range finders and height finders of 12 to 18 foot base length required for fitting in control towers, with the stipulation that if possible, maximum diameters of 9 inches for the smaller range finders and height finders, and 17 inches for the larger range finders should not be exceeded.) U.S.A. Naval type wireless 9. telegraph sets for installation in destroyers and cruisers. It would be greatly appreciated with regard to the instruments - a. If they could be released to us from stock, or b. If we could be permitted to place an order for their manufacture with a sufficient priority to enable us to obtain them as soon as they could be manufactured. In the latter connection, we would like to know the names of suitable firms for manufacture. These requests are being made most urgently because it is not now possible to obtain the materials referred to from sources which had been previously open to us. 559 3. C.T.B. * Can the designs for the wireless telegraph sets be released to an American manufacturer in the event of our placing a substantial order? What information can now be given to us with regard to the firms which could undertake such an order as to the possibility of deliveries, as to frequency of range, as to power of supply required and as to size of set and cost. July 12, 1940 560 CONFIDENTIAL FOR YOUR INFORMATION July 15, 1940 To: The Secretary From: Mr. Young Attached herewith is a memorandum of July 12th, received from Mr. Purvis, inquiring as to whether the new export control system will embrace Swedish orders for Republic and Vultee airplanes. The request is re- nowed either for the Army to take over these orders and release some older planes to the British, or for some method whereby the United Kingdom could take over these orders directly. In the report of July 3rd, received from Colonel MacMorland, it is noted that Sweden has on order 153 Republic and 156 Vultee planes. Both of these types are pursuit planes. Also attached is a memorandum of July 9th, received from Mr. Purvis, requesting Norden bomb sights. The arguments used for the release of this bomb sight are that the British sight is just as good, that the German sight is just as good as either the United States or the British model, and that every effort will: be made to prevent the bomb sight falling into German hands. The request arises from the fact that the United Kingdom production of stabilized bomb sights is slow. P. Gerry hav not such Ry.has 561 AIDE MEMOIRE FOR MR. MORGENTHAU copy7-15-40 ij It is desired to obtain consideration as to whether the new export control system applicable to certain materials, will be applied to embrace Swedish orders for Republic and Vaultee Fighter aeroplanes. In a conversation with you early in June it was suggested that the United States Army Air Corps might exercise its priority rights to embrace the aeroplanes on order by Sweden. At that time the United States Air Corps did not feel the necessity for these aeroplanes. Having regard to the fact that Germany has since strengthened her strategic position and in the light of present circumstances, a strong hope is expressed that, should restrictions be applied upon the export of the planes ordered by Sweden, it will be found possible to release a corresponding number of service planes from the United States Army or the Navy Air Corps for purchase by Britain. Alternatively the United Kingdom Government would be grateful of an opportunity to consider purchase of these aircraft if the restriction referred to above should be applied to them. A.B.P. Sery has nathan 562 VERY SECRET 7-Rs MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MORGENTHAU The United Kingdom Government is extremely anxious to obtain a supply of the Norden bomb sights, and indeed of any other bomb sights - however elementary - which are stabilised. The United Kingdom is interested primarily in obtaining sights from stock, though priorities in the next few months would also be extremely valuable. Brigadier General Lindemann, who is on this side, advises that it is not a question of obtaining information as to the American sight, the point being to obtain the sightxs themselves. The United Kingdom is prepared to show, and they hope to convince, the United States attaché or anyone that he cares to nominate, that the British sight is the equal of the Norden, and therefore that there will be no danger in giving us the release in question. There may be a feeling of danger that the sight may fall into German hands. Here the United Kingdom Government believe the Germans also have a sight as good as the best U.S. or British models. Every effort will be made to prevent the bomb sight falling into German hands, however, because of the great loss which might otherwise result to the Fleet. This anxiety is in itself a guarantee that everything possible will be done to prevent the sights falling into enemy hands. Naturally also, any suggestions as to methods of destruction in the event of forced landings or crashes over enemy territory would be welcomed, if the adoption of these were important to the release of the sights. The reason we are making this application is that our production of new stabilised bomb sights in the 563 2. United Kingdom is disappointingly slow. The matter is very urgent, and your assistance would be appreciated greatly by the United Kingdom Government. New York 9th July, 1940 DARI Si JUL - wasn't society gent to asilia 564 RE DEPARTURE PERMITS Present: Mr. Bell Mr. Berle Mr. Harris Mr. Bernstein Mr. Foley July 15, 1940 2:30 p.m. Mr. Young Mr. Coohran Mrs Klotz Mr. Cairns H.M.Jr: I will have to call up General Watson and tell him that I am broke and the President is going to have to ask me to do this. Berle: You want me when I get back to call up General Watson and tell him the Treasury is broke, so far as Coast Guard is concerned? H.M.Jr: That is all. I will do that. Berle: H.M.Jr: Berle: And if the President wants us to do it, he will have to call me up. Mr. Roosevelt has received from me everything he has asked for for seven and a half years, and I can't get anything today and I am just going to sit tight now. All I can say is that as far as I am con- cerned, it is entirely justified, but I have just been watching Greenland and if H.M.Jr: it finally develops that there is a submarine base or an air base or something of that kind -Right, and if the Coast Guard is so poor that the great Army and Navy haven't got the equipment, every time there is any boat out at sea for three months the Navy wouldn't have that Northeastern patrol. I took it all winter. My ships were racked from stem to stern while the Navy played in the sun off Guantanamo and then when I come along with an appropriation which is about one one-thousandth of what the Navy wants, I can't even get the President to see Admiral Waesche. I am just going to sit tight until the President calls and then I will tell him. In the meantime, I will make 565 -2preparations so she can go. (Discussion off the record) Berle: H.M.Jr: I will agree that I will call up General Watson and tell him that as far as Coast Guard is concerned, the Treasury is busted, and then I will stop. That is all right, but Mr. Roosevelt is going to have to call me. I am serious. We get these things all the time and why suddenly the Coast Guard should be the stepchild, I don't know, and I don't know any other way to get the money. Berle: H.M.Jr: I am so accustomed to being a financial stepchild, because the State Department hasn't had an increase in promotion money for I have forgotten how long. Whenever there is a difficult job to do, we have got to do it and we can't get the money. I am serious. I can't get a dollar. Berle: I know exactly how you feel. H.M.Jr: I understand you wanted a plane put out on another cutter and sent up there. Yes. That seems to be the - Admiral Waesche Berle: has all the facts. The Army tells us and we agree that they ought to have that surveyed. H.M.Jr: If there is nothing there, we are suited. I take it you want an Army observer, not a Navy observer. Berle: H.M.Jr: I don't care which observer it is, myself. I am telling you that I will get the thing ready so we don't lose any time in case Mr. Roosevelt should telephone me. Berle: By accident. 566 -3H.M.Jr: But in the meantime, I am going to sit tight. Berle: That is all on this, I guess. All right. Now, before we go on the other thing, Sir Frederick Phillips is here. We started our talks. I wish you would tell Mr. Hull. I think the way that would be H.M.Jr: easier for me is, as something important happens, I think I will have a memorandum drawn up and tell it to Mr. Hull and if at any time he wants me to ask him anything or has any suggestions, I would welcome them. I think that would be the easiest way. Berle: Mr. Hull, you know, will be leaving for Havana on Thursday. H.M.Jr: And you are going with him? Berle: I think so. H.M.Jr: Who is going to take your place on these other meetings? You had better ask Mr. Hull. We are just getting nicely started. Berle: H.M.Jr: You know, most of the State Department being better trained and wiser than I am, they don't go out on the end of so many limbs or quite as fast. What do they call that restaurant, Sloppy Joe's? I would bring it up here if you would stay here. Berle: It is a horrible place. H.M.Jr: I have never been there. Berle: Don't go. H.M.Jr: This is known as my shipholding committee. 567 --4- Berle: May I also make an observation about that? H.M.Jr: (To Lieutenant McKay) Mac, tell Admiral Waesche to be ready in case we do want to send the This comes in the nature of confession. The question was raised about that ship for Casa Blanca. This morning I got a call from my former law firm in New York -ship, in case the President should ask me, an airplane to Greenland, to work it out, you see, what would be the way to do it. He knows? McKay: He gave me three propositions and recommended H.M.Jr: You give them to me afterward. Berle: This morning my former law office in New York telephoned me to find out whether there was a blockade between France, including Casa Blanca, one. by the British. It then developed that they had been retained - the problems arising from the sugar which was to be shipped to France, including this Casa Blanca shipment. If I had known that, I would not have even opened my head about that Greek ship which turns out to be one of a number of ships involved in it. I had not the remotest idea when I talked about it. I merely mention that fact now. Therefore, if you want to cancel any advice of mine, please feel free to do so. It is just one of these damn things that happen. H.M.Jr: On the record, I take full responsibility because it was after consulting with everybody. It was concerted action. Who knows what ships are being held? Cairns: We are holding three ships and McKay just handed me the fourth. We are holding two Texas tankers at Port Arthur. We are holding the Finnish Koura carrying oil to Finland. The fourth vessel which I have just been handed is a Norwegian steamship, the Simla, at Philadelphia. No request made yet for departure, but pertinent facts are now 568 -5presented. The destination is the United Kingdom. The ownership is the Royal Norwegian Government. It is operated by the British Ministry of Shipping and is chartered to the British Iron & Steel Corporation, Limited, London. The vessel is at anchorage in the stream. No arms. It has loaded 7,000 tons of steel billets. The master of the vessel is an outspoken Nazi sympathizer; has expensive short-wave radio receiving set and receives Berlin broadcasts; vehemently denounced the British to the boarding offi- cer, vowed he would take the ship to Norway if possible; boasted two successive evasions of the blockade. This next sentence doesn't make any sense to me. Avers he will go to no port in the British Isles except Glasgow. Crew will not work vessel unless paid a bonus and refuse to work vessel from dock to anchorage in stream. Formal request for departure to follow. Here is a supplementary note. Office of Collector Mr. King while talking to me by phone mentioned that this vessel she intends to run the British blockade and was having crew trouble, probably because take cargo to Germany. H.M.Jr: Well, let's let that one pass for a minute. As I get the thing - I didn't read your report - a thumbnail sketch to bring Mr. Berle and me up to date on the two American flag vessels in Texas. Cairns: We had a conference in Mr. Foley's office with T. E. Buchanan, the General Manager of the Marine Department of the Texas Company, and L. A. Moricca, Assistant to the Manager of the Export Department. They were told that careful consideration had been given to the issuance of departure permits for 569 6- the two American flag vessels and the Swedish vessel. They were asked if they knew the value of the cargoes of the two American flag vessels. They stated that the Nevada cargo was valued at $290,000, including $180,000 freight, and the Aryan, $380,000, including $180,000 freight. They were asked if they could furnish estimates of the amount of petroleum products moving to Spain for the six months period beginning July 1, 1940. They had no definite figures, but their best estimate was 70,000 tons a month. H.M.Jr: And the next move is from them, isn't it? Cairns: Yes. They were unable to state whether or not this represented Spain's normal peacetime needs, but as we left it with them, they understand that if any more vessels carrying Texas oil move from the United States, they should first present this estimate, with a justification. They were told that it had been decided to permit the Bera, which was a Swedish vessel, to depart and to hold the two American vessels. They were told also that the Treasury representatives were not in a position to state the reason for the decision. We then suggested to them the steps that might be taken to relieve them of financial loss. They said that was a policy matter they could not discuss, but we would probably hear from another representative of the company. H.M.Jr: We haven't heard? Cairns: No. H.M.Jr: So we don't have to do anything. We are all right on that. Now, on the thing we fussed so much about, the Vel-Ragnar, she has sailed? Caims: No. They applied this morning for the permit. 570 -7 We were told that all the ammunition had been taken off, the Pratt & Whitney engines were off, the magnesium was on and the aluminum was on. We gave them the departure permit. H.M.Jr: I am not fussing about the aluminum and mag- nesium. I talked again to General Watson this morning. He called me up about this thing. I said, "This is all right, we will let it go, but please cancel all outstanding permits." I said, "Send Colonel Maxwell over there once more and I think you will get a better reception this time. Cairns: You also wanted to know when the Bera sailed. H.M.Jr: It sailed Saturday morning at 7:00 a.m. There were two down at Port Arthur. Cairns: And the Koura at Philadelphia. H.M.Jr: Cairns: Is that the one with the 7,000 tons of bullets or is there another one? This is another one, this is a new one. We are holding just three vessels, two at Port Arthur and this Finnish vessel carrying oil to Finland. H.M.Jr: Then that is a new case. Cairns: Since our last conference. H.M.Jr: Now, what do we do about oil for Finland? Does it go to Petsamo? Cairns: Yes. H.M.Jr: That is a new case. Caims: Yes, it came in Saturday. Berle: The state of affairs is that the Russian preparations for either a big defense or a big offense are increasing by the minute. The 571 -8German troops are piling up in East Prussia. It is assumed that Russians will make demands on Finland fairly soon. Probably the Germans would support the Finnish in that case if they could get an agreement out of their Government to do so, Finland being one of the probable battlegrounds. I should be in- clined to think that the bulk of this oil things go now. I doubt if it would get probably would be consumed in Finland as very far away from there. Cairns: Berle: H.M.Jr: These are round numbers. 160,000 gallons of Gulf furnace oil, 371,000 gallons of 68 octane gasoline, 371,000 gallons of 68 octane gasoline, 2,000 drums of lubricating oil. That is 113,000 gallons. The bulk of that are munitions. The low octane -- Berle: That is not good for fighting planes. Except that they doctor it, I suppose. Cairns: There is also coffee, sugar and wheat on board. Berle: Coffee, sugar and wheat are something that ought to go. Bell: Do they have any difficulty getting through Harris: No. Berle: There have been some actions off Iceland. H.M.Jr: Berle: to Finland now? The British have a control station at Reykjavik. My Icelandic is poor. Sounds all right to me. Boats have been getting through to Petsamo. The blockade, I think, is sketchy up there. My instincts would be to let it go. 572 9H.M.Jr: Mine also. Dan? Bell: It is all right. H.M.Jr: Let's let her go. Now, let me read this a minute. "Mr. Cameron telephoned me from the Federal Reserve Bank this morning. He stated that a cablegram had been received from the Central Bank of Lithuania authorizing the transfer from its gold earmarked account with the Federal of $2,750,000 to the account of the State Bank of Russia. This would leave only about 1,800 ounces of gold in the Lithuanian earmarked account with the Federal. There is a dollar balance of approximately $48,000. The Federal has not yet received the necessary wire from the State Bank of Russia to accept the transfer. Consequently it will not take place today. I told Cameron in confidence that we were studying the problem of balances in Baltic countries and that he should consult us further on Monday before taking any action. He promised to send copies of the Lithuanian cablegram to us today, as well as any message that may be received from Russia. "At 12:45 noon Mr. Livesey telephoned me from the State Department to the effect that Mr. Henderson, in charge of the Russian section of the State Department, was again discussing in the Department the reported withdrawal from banking accounts in New York of the three Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. I told Livesey that we had prepared a letter for the Department of State, at their request made two days ago, giving the balances of these three countries on the American mar- ket. I reminded him that we had had up with the State Department some days ago the ques- tion of applying our control to this area, but that the State Department had opposed such action. Mr. Livesey stated that his Depart- ment desired that the Treasury ask the 573 - 10 following banks: the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, National City, Guaranty Trust, Irving Trust, American Express Company, and Chase National Bank not to permit any im- portant withdrawals from Baltic accounts until after consultation with the Treasury. Livesey said this was a temporary arrangement pending the return of Mr. Berle from New York so that he may be consulted on a definite program. "I telephoned the Federal immediately after receiving this message, but did not reach Mr. Cameron until 3 p.m. I told him that if he did not hear from us to the contrary before the opening of the New York banks on Monday morning, he should informally solicit the cooperation of the above-mentioned banks in the sense desired. Berle: "I telephoned Under Secretary Bell at 9:30 a.m. Sunday, to give him the above story." We have been discussing that with a good deal of care. That raises some pretty hard issues. Our conclusion is that those balances of those three Republics now ought to be blocked. The Latvian Minister has come into the Department and presented us a memorandum stating in substance that the Soviet demands represent an encroachment on Latvia and he has asked that. I am not aware of a similar action either by Lithuania or Esthonia. On the other hand, it is perfectly plain that these countries are now about to be completely engulfed, whether in form or in fact. The fact probably will be that they will be put in the Communist Government and Lithuania later swallowed, but that seems to be the case. I think you have to draw a distinction. I the gold is transferred to the State Bank of Russia or not. It seems to me if practice is blocked and the Russians argue about it, it is quite all right. I can envisage the don't know that it matters very much whether situation where we might for reasons of our 574 - 11 - H.M.Jr: own want to be very tender with the Russians. But in the meantime, you would block all three countries? Berle: I think so. H.M.Jr: Suits me. We have been wanting to do it for some time, haven't we? Bell: We talked about it at the time we talked about the Germans and the French and the Italians. Cochran: Because cablegrams now show that the central banks in each one of these three countries have been asked to transfer all of their gold holdings to the Russian State Bank. Bell: And that has been confirmed, hasn't it, this morning? Cochran: Yes. We had a second cablegram. That was from the Lithuanian Bank. Then we had the complementary cable this morning from the State Bank of Russia. Now we have one from Latvia requesting the transfer and then we have one from the diplomatic officer stating that the Esthonians have been requested to turn theirs over. Berle: I should like to state that that does not necessarily cancel the possibility of granting licenses either to the Esthonians or to the Russians, as the case may be. I think you have to hold a flexible arrangement there. H.M.Jr: I just want to say this. If you by any chance are going to come in tomorrow and ask us to release this, I would rather let this slip through my fingers than give a precedent of, once having blocked it, then turning it over, and give the Germans that precedent to go on. Cochran: We have two things to act on today. H.M.Jr: I would rather let it slip through. 575 RE EXCESS PROFITS TAX Present: Mr. Paul July 15, 1940 4:20 p.m. Mr. Sullivan Mr. Foley Sullivan: When I asked for this appointment, Mr. Secre- tary, it was because in our original conversations we talked of a spread of allowable exempt profits of six to twelve percent and both you and the President thought that the top should be dropped down to ten and in the memorandum we gave, we spoke about our dis- criminatory treatment in favor of the small corporations as against the bigger ones and it now appears to them -H.M.Jr: Who is them? Sullivan: Well, the economists and Mr. Paul and Mr. Tar- H.M.Jr: leau. It appears to them that the more feasible way of working out a discrimination in favor of the smaller companies is by raising that ceiling from ten upward and I told them that before anything like that was drafted in that law, I thought I should clear with you. How do you do that? That is a new language to me, discrimination in favor of. I have always heard the word used as meaning against. Sullivan: Well, if it is against somebody, it has got H.M.Jr: All right. Sullivan: On the memorandum we brought over to the to be in favor of somebody else. President, you remember it was under that we were to allow a corporation at least four percent of its invested capital and not more than ten percent and in between there, we were to allow them whatever they made in the base period and the suggestion has been made that in the case of the cor- porations with total assets of less than $500,000, that be spread from six to fifteen rather than from four to ten. We might want to end up six to twelve or something of that sort. 576 -2Paul: That is my view, that it is as far as we should go, six to twelve. I don't think we should go up to fifteen, but I do think we ought to do something for the small corporations. H.M.Jr: Let's just talk for argument's sake. Six to twelve as against four to ten. Is that the theory for the fellow with - you say a half a million? Sullivan: Less than half a million. Paul: Well, the theory is, the way we put it is, that that is the rate on the first five hundred thousand of capital. That is the way we have been talking. It isn't only for the small fellow, it is on the first five hundred thousand. That is the way we have been talk- ing. Sullivan: Paul: That is right. Otherwise, we would be discriminating very grossly against the bigger corporations, but of course it doesn't make any difference with the big man, it is infinitesimal, but for the small man it is life or death. A billion dollar corporation such as General Motors, this is just a drop in the bucket. H.M.Jr: Would you give them the first five hundred thousand exemption, to General Motors? Sullivan: Oh, no, not five hundred thousand. H.M.Jr: No, but I mean he can make six to twelve on the first five hundred thousand? Is that what you're talking about? Paul: It is utterly insignificant in the General Motors case, because they have over a billion dollars invested capital and I don't like to discriminate in saying only the very small corporation shall have it and Mr. General Motors shall not have it. 577 -3 H.M.Jr: If you are coming in here - and I am just arguing - I certainly would start with a hundred thousand. Paul: H.M.Jr: That is on the theory, I take it, that that would be raised. Just the way it is on taxes. A corporation is twenty-five thousand, isn't it? Isn't that where you start on income tax for cor- porations? Sullivan: H.M.Jr: Income tax is below that. That is a present rate of almost 21 percent. But isn't twenty-five thousand a jumping off place? Paul: On the income tax. Sullivan: Yes. H.M.Jr: Well, if this is the way to do it - are you convinced it is? Paul: Sullivan: H.M.Jr: I am convinced we have got to do it. I hold no brief for any particular figure, whether it is a hundred or five hundred. I think a hundred is a little low, but five hundred is a little high. I think two fifty. That means all their assets, borrowings and everything. I know. Believe me, there is a lot of busi- nesses in Poughkeepsie with 40 or 50 thousand people that a hundred thousand dollars looks big to and that goes for Albany, too, and Jamestown, the birthplace of Robert Jackson. Foley: Albany has about 130,000. Sullivan: It probably looks bigger. H.M.Jr: I still say 100,000. I don't know about the principle. 578 -4. Paul: I am satisfied about the principle and I don't know about the hundred thousand. H.M.Jr: What do you think, Ed? I can't tell with your face like that whether you are for or against it. Foley: Well, this is as new to me as it is to you. Listen, can't I sleep on this? Have you got H.M.Jr: to have an answer tonight? Sullivan: No, that is all right, if we can have it in the morning. H.M.Jr: Who are the economists? Sullivan: Shoup and Blough. Paul: I think they are right in this principle. They are right on the principle, but I didn't Sullivan: H.M.Jr: Sullivan: H.M.Jr: dare let them go ahead on anything like fifteen percent after conversations here and across the street. Well, we were talking about twelve. Fifteen is too high. It doesn't make a damn bit I have learned this after seven and a half years, that if we agree that these fellows the little fellows should get a little higher rate, we can say we will make it one and six, you see what I mean, and then Congress will always adjust it, anyway, so it is just as to the idea, is the idea right. The idea is right, sir, I think. In these days I would rather play a little closer than to have some body else trim me down. I would rather have Congress raise it to fifteen. Paul: But on the other hand, I hate not to do something on it and then to have Congress do it and get all the credit. 579 -5H.M.Jr: Well, that doesn't bother me anyway. Did you hear the show I put on for Doughton and got his name in the paper? Paul: I know, but I want the Treasury to get the credit for the small man part. Foley: Could we have a couple of examples? Paul: Certainly. They just love to make examples. Do you want an example? Paul: Yes, I think if we could have an example on a piece of paper, it would be easier, at four and ten and again at six and twelve for the same corporation. Take a little one and then a big one. I can do that. H.M.Jr: I will tell you what I will do. You fellows Foley: come in at 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning. My mind will be as clear as it ever is, whatever that means, and I will put you down at 10:00 o'clock. How is that? Paul: Fine. In the meantime, we will give Ed an example and bring you one, if you want one. H.M.Jr: Everything else lovely? Sullivan: Yes. Paul: They have got this provision all drawn, as a matter of fact. It is only the matter of the figures. Sullivan: The progress among the technical fellows is better than the attitude on some of the com- mittee. H.M.Jr: Sullivan: That is all right. You would expect that. I mean, Stamm is very definitely trying to delay this thing in the hope that if it is 580 -6delayed long enough, they will never get to it, and I think the other fellows understand that. He isn't agreeing to anything we do and he won't tell us why he disagrees. Paul: Sullivan: He can't tell you. He doesn't know enough. Mr. Doughton asked for a meeting at 2:00 o'clock on Monday with Stamm and Jere Cooper. Foley: Next Monday? Sullivan: And Senator Harrison and yourself, at which time we are to present a bill if Stamm agrees to our provisions. Otherwise, we are to pre- sent what we have agreed upon and the statement of what we disagree upon and the state- ment of how long we think it will take to come into accord and I propose to have a completed bill with a statement as to what Mr. Stamm has agreed upon and the remainder that he does not agree on. Don't you think that is preferable? H.M.Jr: Sure. Don't wait for Stamm or anybody else. Paul: You couldn't make any prophesies as to how long it will take to agree with Stamm. Sullivan: He is just trying to hold this thing up. I am pretty well convinced he has instructions on it. H.M.Jr: Well, we have got to keep moving. Okay, gents. I will be ready for you at 10:00 if you are ready for me. 581 PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM: American Legation, Kaunas NO.: 154 DATE: July 15, 1940, noon Reference is made to the Legation's no. 153, dated July 13, 10 p.m. According to the same source from which I received the information transmitted in the above-mentioned telegram, the dollar payment for the gold transfer is merely in the form of a receipt. The local bank has as yet received no cash. NOREM 860M.51/170 EA:EB 582 ALLISON ENGINEERING COMPANY Deliveries of Airplane Engines : Actual : deliveries : Estimated deliveries on existing orders : 1940 January 10 May 1 - 23 May 24 - June 1 June 2 - 8. June 9 - 15 June 16 - 22 June 23 - 30 10 June 30 - July 6 July 7 - 13 5 2 8 11 8 6 18 July 14 - 31 132 160 310 October 351 331 332 August September November. December 1941 January February March April May June July August September October November December 362 416 416 414 408 437 320 294 431 45 45 45 1942 January February Office of the Secretary of the Treasury, Division of Research and Statistics. 25 21 July 15, 1940. 583 July 15, 1940. MEMORANIZM FOR THE PRESIDENT Innesed are - Executive Order and Regulations which amount the outstanding Inecutive Order and Regulations relating to Smith, Barragion, Motherlands, Belgian, and Freed property se as to apply the same central to Lativian, Botonian and Lithmanies property in this country. General. The documents have been cleared with the Attorney /3/ Tv. margenthan, Jr. Secretary of the Treasury. 584 -.* REBOUTIVE - ANNIVERSITY OF ASSOCIATE ORDER no. on or APREL 10, 1940, AB By visine of the authority vested is - w action s(b) of the not of October s, 1927 (40 state 411), as - and w visius of all other authority vested in m, 1, FRANKLES a. RECEIVILS, PRESENT of the SEASES w - do hardly - Insecutive - ⑉ 8309 of April 10, 1040, as - - as w extend all the provisions Marrot w, - with respect w, property is which - 14 - - actional thousan has at time - or alase say 10, 1960, had - interest of - sature direct or indirects except that, is definites " and thereof the date July 10g 1940° shall be abstituted for the dates opposing is the definitions of countries and thereof. /51 Franklin D. Rooswell - - HOUSE, July 15, 1960. (he 8484) 585 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS Title 81 - Money and Finances Treasury Chapter Part 180 I - Monetary offices, Department of the Treasury TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Office of the Secretary, July 15, 1940. AMENDMENT TO REGULATIONS® The Regulations of April 10, 1940, as amended (Sections 180.1 to 180.6), are further amended se as to extend all the pre- visions thereof to, and with respect to, property in which Latvia, Estenta or Lithmais or any national thereof has at any time on or since July 10, 1940, had any interest of any nature whatseever, direct or indirects except that reports on Form TFR-100 with respect to all property situated is the United States on July 10, 1940, in which Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania or any national thereof has at any time on or since July 10, 1940, had any interest of any nature whateoever, direct or indirect, shall be filed by August 10, 1940. H. Margenthau Jr. Secretary of the Treasury. APPROVED: July 15, 1940. K/FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Sections 180.1 to 180.00 - Sec. 5(b), 40 Stat. 415 and 966, Sec. 2, 48 Stat. 1, Public Resolution No. 69, 76th Congress) 12 U.S. C. 95a) Ex. Order 6500, Jan. 15, 1954, Ex. Order 8369, April 10, 1940, Ex. Order 8405, May 10, 1940, Ex. Order 8446, June 17, 1940, Ex. Order 2424, July 15, 1940. 586 SECRET Washington, D.C. I5 July I940 For the Honorable Secretary of Treasury, Lord Beaverbrook says that following data was sent to Morris Wilson June 7th. Hurricane plans complete except leak-proof tanks. Frazier nash turret complete details with controls. Spitfire plans okay except for amor plate and gun controls which will be sent separately. Lord Beaverbrook has oabled Wilson to supply above to you. Also Lord Beaverbrook says that he will reply to other items within forty-eight hours. Sample plates leak-proof tanks shipped navy today. Full details all types magnetic minesweeping have been delivered navy. Mr. Kennedy tor ooderoom 1230/16 SECRET 587 July 15, 1940 Carl Ward gave HM,Jr his carbon copy of the report when he had lunch with the Secretary today 80 that the latter might make a copy for his file. 588 Dated at Bordeaux June 14, 1940. TO: Colonel Jules Meny, Sous-Secretaire de 1'Air via General Martinot Legarde - Inspecteur General de 1'Aeronautique, In accordance with our understanding with you, this memorandum will serve to present to you a brief summary of the work, the observations, and the recommendations of the group of American representatives sent to France in res. ponse to your request directed to Mr. Alfred P. Sloan, Chairman of the Board of the General Motors Company, and who were gathered together in the United States by the General Motors Company for this purpose. Upon our arrival in France, at Paris, on the morning of May 29th, we received your summary of the general production plan of the Air Ministry for the production of aviation motors and also the understanding that production of aviation motors in France constituted the limiting feature for the production of complete airplanes. It was also made clear that training planes and motors for training were not a serious production problem. It was also explained to us that the Ministry was concerned with improving the quality as well as the quantity of completed aviation engines. 589 2. This was followed by a succession of visits to various manufacturing and allied facilities, as follows: May 30th - S.N.C.M. Factory, Argenteuil. May 31st - Conferences at Hotel Meurice (S.N.C.M.) June 1st - S.N.C.M. Factory, Argenteuil Talbot Motors, Suresnes. June 2nd - Chantilly - Air Headquarters. June 3rd - Hispano-Suiza - Bois-Colombea June 4th - Ford Air - Poissy Hispano-Suiza, Laboratory June 5th - Gnome-Rhone - Gennevilliers. B.G., Paris. June 6th - Conference, Hotel Meurice (Talbot) June 7th - Ford, Aeniwres Turbomeca, Billancourt. June 8th - To Le Mans - Gnome-Rhone June 9th - Gnone-Rhone (under construction) To Bordeaux. June 10th - Ford Air - Bordeaux Bloch S.N.C.A.S.C. - Bordeaux, Merignac. June 11th - Ford Air - Conference. June 12th - To Tarbes and return Hispano-Suiza - Tarbes June 13th - Bordeaux, Repair and overhaul Depot. Before entering into the enumeration of the recommendations or suggestions of the Commission, it might be well to set down a 590 3. few general observations. Thus, in general, it may be said that the volunne of aircraft engine motor production, as well as the facilities for production and the methods used, both for technical processes and for plant management, were on the whole better than the Commission had been led to expect through informa- tion which had reached it in America. It could be generally said that each of the various works visited showed unusual ingenuity with respect to certain phases of its operations. It is likewise true, as will be pointed out later, that in nearly all cases, specific improvements could be made which would tend to increase the general production and improve quality in accordance with the desires of the Air Ministry. Secondly, it should be pointed out that conditions changed very greatly from those in existence at the time of the Commission's arrival, due to military operations which, in turn, necessitated movement of many of the manufacturing units, as well as cutting off a large number of suppliers. Thus, the character of the problem changed daily. Naturally, this affected the ability of this Commission to follow through your original request as it was primarily outlined. Consequently, while the present unstabilized military situation persists, with the resulting necessity for evacuation of plants from day to day, it is the considered opinion of the Committee that pro- 591 4. duction cannot be stabilized. Thirdly, in view of your statements that the American aviation equipment now being used in your military operations is superior in nearly all cases to the remainder of the available equipment, it is obvious that the greatest assistance can come through speeding up production of American aviation equipment in the United States and perhaps supplementing this production by furnishing necessary raw materials or partly fabricated materials to take the place of supplies which are now out off from your plants due to the advance in military operations. As the Committee has already intimated to you, it is the private opinion of this Commission that any equipment made in America and furnished as complete equipment should, in accordance with the above, be made to American designs. It does not seem necessary herein to give all of the reasons for this Commission's opinion with regard to the above, since the discussions were covered in detail with you in Asnieres, and again informally during a discussion held at the Hispano works in Tarbes, on June 12th. It seems unnecessary at this moment to repeat the recom- mendations given to you with respect to the Government's S.N.C.M. works at Argenteuil and the Government's Pratt-Whitney 1830 engine license at the Talbot Motors in Suresnes. These 592 5. have already been submitted to you in detail as well as to the management of the S.N.C.M. and, through you, to the Talbot organisation as well. It is interesting to point out, however, that the Commission's recommendation with respect to moving the new American machine tool equipment from the Paris area has now been borne out by the military situation existing at present. It is also felt that the Committee's recommendation that the Talbet equipment be kept intact for the furnishing of spare parts and later on for the manufacturing of motors of Prett-Whitney design will be more desirable than ever before in view of the fact that the French engine industry will now have to rely to a greater extent on American sources of raw materials. It is further supported by the fact that the Prett-Whitney engine has been evaluated by those of your military authorities who were contacted as the most satisfactory and useful of its various engine equipment now in use at the front. The most important specific recommendations follows Technical Design and Engine Considerations1) Wherever required engineering design tolerances should be readjusted to provide interchangeability. Hand fitting (adjusting) is now required in order to assemble the finished product. (Note: By studying the conditions in the Bordeaux Overheuling Shop with respect to new parts furnished by Prett and 593 6. Whitney for motors, it will be clear what is meant by the above). 2) Process grinding should be substituted for hend operations wherever possible in manufacturing highly stressed parts. Such parts can then be readily polished without the necessity of removing much metal. 3) Highly stressed parts should be highly finished, and all tool marks eliminated. (Note: In many of the plants visited it was observed that highly stressed parts were highly finished, but this was not a universal practice in all factories). 4) Eliminate unnecessary operations contributing to appearance only. Thus, to conserve man hours much painting, matching of surfaces on parting lines, particularly on castings and the hand polishing of relatively unstressed parts can be dispensed with, subject to engineering approval. 5) Avoid putting engineering changes into effect in such a manner as to delay production. Carefully schedule them for this purpose. 6) As was suggested in connection with the operation drawings submitted at the S.N.C.M. factory, it would be well to study the elimination of such drawings and the substitution of operation sheets wherever possible, thus conserving engineer- ing facilities under the present conditions. 594 7. 7) In a great many factories more attention to keeping parts clean during assembly operations is urgently needed. Thus, it was noticed that ball bearings were frequently seen lying on benches without being properly covered. Floors should be cleaned and dust reduced to a minimum. Between shifts, partly assembled mechanisms should be carefully covered. 8) Parts should be carried in wood containers or containers lined with soft material and should not be set down on steel shelves or plates, or they will be scratched. 9) Engineering designs should be reviewed to see where manufacturing can be simplified by minor engineering design changes. Manufacturing.- 1) Where automatic machines have been provided, a study should be made to see how many machines can be operated by one operator at the same time. It was observed in one factory that one san operated a single automatic machine which was timed to operate on a twenty-minute cycle. Adjacent to the machine was another automatic machine with a separate operator approximately on the same cycle. A single operator could have readily operated both machines, Similar conditions were noted in many places. 2) Spare sets of cutting tools should be provided for each important operation. This will eliminate the down time observed 595 8. where machines are idle waiting for tools to be re-sharpened. 3) In certain factories highly flexible machines were used for relatively simple operations. Equipment in such cases sho 1d be studied with a view to reallocation and the use of single purpose machinery on such operations, thereby releasing the more flexible machine for more complicated operations. Thus a brand new Hendey tool room lathe was seen operating on a relatively simple operation which could have been done by a manufacturing lathe, releasing the tool room machine for badly needed tool room equipment. 4) In one factory there was observed a wide difference between the time study or standard time for an operation and the actual time. Factories lacking specialists for speeding up such laggard operations should institute an activity of this character. 5) In certain factories, machines were not placed to avoid unnecessary material handling. In other factories this feature was admirably taken care of, In some of the newer units this feature seemed to be well studied. 6) It is suggested that plenty of coolant - 1.6., outting oils - should be flooded on the work in order to prevent burning up the tools and increasing machine down time caused thereby. 7) Tools should be ground on a periodical basis and not allowed to run until they produce bad work. When the latter is done, the tool life is much shorter and the loss of time on the 596 9. machine is greater. 8) In many shops attention has been given to work containers. However, those were not universal in all factories, and should be adopted. 9) Lighting should be carefully checked. Some factories were poorly lighted for night work, thereby running the risk of poor work and lost time. Management.- 1) It is recommended that, if there does not at this time exist a strong planning unit in the Ministry with coordinated planning agencies in the various production units, such a function be set up without delay. The detail planning functions within the manufacturing organizations should be left largely to the local managements, in order to adapt them to local oonditions. However, the system as a whole should be carefully coordinated. 2) Professional workers, engineers and supervisors, where urgently needed for vital machine production should not be sub- jeet to draft in the army, without careful consideration of all the circumstances. Evidence existed in certain plants that organizations were being crippled as to supervisors, executives, tool makers, engineers and the like. 3) Liberalized contractual relations with private organisations by the Government, in order to meet the unusual production conditions now existing are needed. Everything should be done by the Ministry to prevent loss of production through inability 597 10. of local managements to make decisions to adapt themselves to the quickly changing conditions. 4) The above is particularly true due to the disorganization of the telegraph and telephone systems under present conditions. If conditions cannot be improved, then greater initiative should be permitted for individual organisations to make emergency decisions. 5) As has been pointed out above, many efficient processes and operating methods have been viewed in certain plants, and are not general in others. Greater freedom of interchange of information should be provided for if possible. A good example, is the tinning of cylinder sleeves to be nitrided. In one plant this was done by hot tinning, hand wiped, and in another plant by an efficient hot metal spray gun. 6) In view of moving large bodies of workmen, organizations should be set up in each manufacturing plant to effi- ciently cooperate with local authorities in the matter of housing employees who are suddenly transferred. No doubt this has already received much consideration as is evidenced by the City in the Pines at Le Mans. 7) Many difficulties have been experienced in servicing and installing American manufacturing equipment due to not receiving specific information from the Air Ministry representatives. It has been suggested that the various American 598 11. service, installation and engineering representatives should be put in touch with each other, with the idea of freely interchanging information for the use of all American companies, in order to promote a more efficient servicing of the French operated American aviation equipment. It is also suggested that the Air Ministry institute a coordinating bureau for the purpose of contacting the various American representatives so that the work may be done in the English language, owing to the unfamilierity of many of the American representatives with the French language. A headquarters location should be established for all these units, instead of each American company establishing its own location independently of each other and of that of the Ministry representative. General As has been stated in various places in the above, many capable and efficient arrangements have been inspected and especially notable is that of the use of women workers and young men on precision operations. At one plant women were found in supervisory positions as job setters, and vestibule schools were also in evidence for the training of unskilled workers in preparation to maohine operation. Thus, the Commission feels that if quick decisions can be furnished or 599 12. made by local managements and also if there is the free interchange of information together with the quick procurement outside of France of needed raw materials plus the purchase complete of Amerloan units to supplement French production, that much can be accomplished. The Commission concludes with the thought that it can be of more service by returning to America without further delay than by any further advice it can give or action it can take have, where the situation is so involved. The Commission is particularly indebted to the executives of the various plants it has visited for their unfailing courtesy and their freedom in answering questions of every nature. It is equally indebted to the Air Ministry representatives who have made all of the necessary arrangements and, lastly, for the unfailing care taken of the members and the many courtesies extended to them by the Ministry's representative, General Martinot Legarde. In view of the inability of the Commission to make contact with you since leaving Paris, a copy of this report is being delivered to General Lagarde in person, in turn for delivery to you and on your behalf. W. J. Davidson B. D. Kunkle Arthur Nutt J. Carlton Ward, Jr. Chairman STATE 600 DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON July 15, 1940. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury, and encloses one copy of paraphrase of telegram No. 2136 of July 12 from the American Embassy, London. of 601 PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM: American Embassy, London, England DATE: July 12, 1940, 10 p.m. NO.: 2136 The following is confidential for the Secretary of the Treasury: Last night I had a talk with Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England. The Governor said he saw your position on the matter of importing gold in American ships. However, as to the cancellation of credits, he said Phillips knows nothing about the question. Very confidentially, for your information, He added that he did not expect to live long enough to be able to explain it to him. This indicates that between the Bank of England and the Treasury good will 18 running high. KENNEDY. EA:LWW OFFICIAL COMMUNECATIONS TO 602 THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON D.C. DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON In reply refer to EA 841. .51/1591 July 15, 1940. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Treasury and encloses a copy of a paraphrase of telegram no. 1700, dated July 10, 1940, to the American Embassy at London, regarding gold shipments. Enclosure: To London, no. 1700, July 10, 1940. It 803 PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT TO: American Embassy, London NO.: 1700 DATE: July 10, 1940, 6 p.m. FOR AMBASSADOR KENNEDY Your nos. 1914 of July 1, 7 p.m., and 2028 of July 6, 3 p.m., and Department's no. 1645 of July 6, 4 p.m. The following comment has been sent to the Department by the Treasury Department: QUOTE. The Government of the United States does not feel that in view of the volume and the regularity with which shipments of gold from England to this continent are now taking place on other vessels it would be warranted in trying to make arrangements for the acquisition of gold abroad and importing it here on United States warships. The Vincennes case in which this was done was a very exceptional one. American banks have not consulted the Treasury Depart- ment regarding the canceling of credits to the London market. Pending the arrival of Sir Frederick Phillips, the Treasury is hesitant about making any inquiry in this regard. END QUOTE. Subject to further advice and recommendation from you, the Department is in agreement with the above. Please keep closely in touch with the matter and report to the Department. EA:HF:EB EA:EB 604 Lima, July 15, 1940. No.223 Subject: British policy concerning the Freezing of Funds of Certain European Countries. CONFIDENTIAL The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Sir: I have the honor to report that during a recent conversation, the British Minister in Lima informed me that he has had instructions from his Government to attempt to secure, on the part of the Peruvian Government, & policy of freezing funds - similar to the policy of the United States - of European countries now occupied by German forces. Mr. Forbes observed that he doubted if the amounts involved in Fora would justify making an issue of the matter. Respectfully yours, R. Henry Norweb RHN/ald File: 851.51 605 July 15, 1940 4:40 p.m. H.M.Jr: Hello. Operator: Mr. Knudsen. Go ahead. Wm. S. Knudsen: Hello. H.M.Jr: Hello, Knudsen. K: H.M.Jr: K: Yes. Morgenthau. Yes, sir. H.M.Jr: How are you? K: Pretty good, sir. How are you? H.M.Jr: Good for you. Knudsen, it's only a little matter but just so that we keep our wires straight. This morning we had a request to let olley use the Treasury telephone to England. You see? To talk to Rolls Royce, and this fellow Olley -- he's always getting into my hair by trying to go through some back door. K: Well, I've got a letter from him in which he quits. H.M.Jr: Who? K: Olley. H.M.Jr: He quit. K: Yeah. H.M.Jr: How do you mean he quit? K: He claims that he's going to confine himself entirely to the purchase of other equipment for the Rolls Royce Company in this country. 606 -2H.M.Jr: Well, this has been going on all day. McReynolds over there finally called up and tried to get my operator to put the call through and I told him, no, we can't do that. He can go up to the British Embassy. K: H.M.Jr: Yeah. I mean, they can't use the Treasury, a British agent, my -- I mean this Treasury as though we were a switchboard, you know. K: (Laughs). I see. H.M.Jr: What? K: All right. H.M.Jr: I mean, you wouldn't do it, I mean, if they called up -- could they call through General Motors. K: No. H.M.Jr: You wouldn't let them do it. K: That's right. H.M.Jr: What? K: That's right. H.M.Jr: And I wanted to explain it because somebody K: Well, if they do, I'11 come right back to you H.M.Jr: I mean, any time you want anything you can K: will most likely come and tell you that I turned them down. I did. have it, but I don't know this fellow Olley I'm not in on this at all. I haven't heard a thing about it. 607 -3H.M.Jr: Well, a man by the name of Dr. Taylor called up and then McReynolds called up and they're always -- this Olley crowd, they just make, asthemselves. far as I'm concerned, a God-damned nuisance of K: H.M.Jr: Well, you see, Purvis told me that he was -he had nothing to do with them. I know. But I wanted you to get it right from out of my own lips. K: H.M.Jr: (Laughs). All right, sir. And I can't let Olley, who I don't know, use my Treasury telephone to England to get by the censor -- that's what it amounts to. K: All right, sir. H.M.Jr: O. K.? K: Fine. H.M.Jr: Thank you.