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202

Mr. Hanes draft

203
Mr. Blough's office cannot supply date or

identity of this draft -- having no copy

of it in file.
CGH

204

approve 5/1/39
When I appeared before your Committee on March 24th, I said that

I would be prepared to discuss the tax system at your convenience.
Your Chairman, Mr. Doughton, has expressed a willingness to receive

our recommendations for consideration by the Congress at this session.

It is my desire to address myself to two important phases of the

Treasury's relationship to business recovery: (1) our fiscal policy
and (2) remedial Federal taxation.

We are all familiar with the fact that our National income and
the employment of our people are dependent upon the prosperity of

private enterprise. We have all the essentials of economic prosperity -

resources, labor, capital, managerial ability, and a vast outlet for
our products in the domestic market. Although we have made substantial

progress from the depths of the depression of 1932, we are still in a
period of incomplete business recovery and we have a large number of

unemployed. It is highly important furthermore that we increase our

National income. Not only is our material well-being at stake - the
very future of the Democratic form of government rests on our ability

-2-

205

to solve the economic problems before us. As Secretary of the

Treasury I would feel derelict in my duty if I left one stone unturned that might contribute to recovery and the continued prosperity
of the country.

In November 1937, I stated before this Committee "the basic need

of today is to foster the full application of the driving force of
private capital." That statement is as true today as it was then.
I think the events of the past two years have made it even more

apparent today than it was in 1937. that without the free flow of

private capital to industry, recovery is hopeless. It is, therefore,

under

my desire to point out to your Committee all of those things which

one
appear to be obstacles to private investment. An important obstacle
seems to be the uncertainty over the general fiscal policy of the
Government. Almost everyone believes that the budget should be
balanced eventually, and, moreover, everyone knows that it cannot

be done except in one of two ways, namely by cutting expenditures or

by increasing taxes. So long as there is uncertainty as to the desire

Tread

--

206

to balance the budget or when and how it is to be achieved, investors

will not risk their savings in venturesome enterprises.

It is my belief that the only way we will ever be able to put
the large part of ten million people, now idle, back to work is
through investment in private enterprise. Under our economic system
we know that $7,000 is required as investment in land, buildings,
machinery, and tools to put each man to work. We know further that
there are 600,000 men and women coming to employable age each year

who are candidates for jobs. Therefore, to provide capital assets
sufficient to put this new army of people to work, requires a minimum

investment of $4,200,000,000 each year. It is this type of investment
that we have failed to attract during the past decade.
It may not be necessary for Federal revenue to exactly balance
Federal expenditure each year any more than each month or each week.

In periods of depression it is inevitable that there will be deficits.
Revenue declines may occur so quickly that immediate achievement of a

balance by tax increases becomes impossible. We all agree that relief

-4-

207

must be given to human needs caused by a depression. It is long

continued deficits and uncertainty caused by the fear that the policy
has no terminus which causes the investor to become timid and to
hesitate in the making of new commitments.

A necessary sequel to deficits in time of depression is that in
years of activity and prosperous business an excess of taxes above
current expenditures should be collected and applied to reducing the

public debt. In this way only can the Government be prepared for the
strain of new emergencies without the burden of excessively high taxes.

Fiscal deficits are thus defensible, only if they are followed by
substantial surpluses and, further, if they are the result of a
carefully formulated program announced in enough detail to remove

major uncertainties and fears concerning fiscal policy/
The present task is made even more difficult by the fact that
a very large part of our expenditures is caused by the necessity
of supplying armaments for our National defense. I call your atten-

tion to the fact that Great Britain has recently departed from a

--

208

long established tradition of annually balanced budgets, and in the

xigure

fiscal year 1940 is spending $580,000,000 on armaments, of which

change

$352,000,000 will be supplied by borrowed money. Forty-three percent

of the French budget in 1939 is for the same kind of expenditure; in
Italy, 50 percent of the 1939 National budget is devoted to this purpose; and in Germany, the National. government has been spending from

40 to 60 percent of its total outlay in the last few years on armaments.
Relatively speaking, therefore, we have not devoted such a large pro-

portion of our National expenditures to National defense.

I wish to be realistic about our fiscal policy. I know that
balancing the budget this year or next year is impossible. I think
it is clear to everyone that appropriations by this Congress will be
far in excess of estimated revenues. Furthermore, the formulation
and adoption of a sound financial plan pointing clearly to a balanced

budget in a later year will be difficult. The inescapable conclusion,
however, is that if higher taxes are to be avoided, the total of appropriations by the Congress must be sharply curtailed. The time to begin
is now.

209

-TAX
By way of introduction to the specific suggestions
which the
^

Treasury is submitting to you, it will be desirable, I believe, to
state briefly the considerations which have guided us.
The expenditures of the government are, with the exception of

self-sustaining public enterprises, paid for out of taxes, which are
a levy upon the earnings of the people, and out of loans, which are

borrowed from the savings of the people. It is plain, therefore, that
the source of the government's income is the productive effort of
the nation.

The expenditures of the Federal Government today are very much

larger than they have ever been before in time of peace. The increase

of the expenditures is due to the expansion of the functions of government, such as the National defense, and the assumption of new functions

in the field of social security, in the social services, in the protection of the National interest in agriculture, and in the conservation
and development of natural resources. While it is most important that
waste and extravagance should be reduced to a minimum in these activities

--

210

of government, the activities themselves are not likely to be terminated,

or drastically curtailed by this Administration or any other.

It is necessary, therefore, to base our fiscal policy on an
acknowledgment of the fact that retrenchment in expenditure will not

balance the budget with a surplus sufficient to reduce the National
debt. The support of the enlarged activities of the government for
National defense and necessary social services can come only out of

& larger National income. A larger National income can be produced
only by more work, more investment, and more enterprise. If the en-

larged public activities are to be maintained permanently without

impairing the standard of life of the people or the credit of the
nation, then more wealth must be produced than is now being produced

in the United States. This means that the social reforms desired by
the people can be sustained and developed only by the recovery of
private enterprise.

There are fundamentally only two ways of producing wealth. One
way is to conscript labor and capital and put them to work under

--

211

government compulsion. This way is unthinkable in the United States.

The other way is to provide the incentive of wages, interest, dividends,
and profits. This is the way to which we are committed, the only way
we can think of taking.

That being the case, it becomes our duty in the Treasury to
examine carefully the fiscal policies of the government with a view
to determining whether they provide all legitimate and necessary

incentives to private enterprise in the production of wealth. Wherever
we find that the tax system destroys the necessary incentive and so

interferes with legitimate and necessary enterprise, it is the duty
of the Treasury to report its conclusions to the Congress.
I am reporting to you today that after thorough examination the
Treasury finds that there are in the present tax system serious impediments to private enterprise. The Treasury recommends that they be

removed, and that it be made clear to the whole country that it is
the intention of the government to establish a tax system which preserves and increases the incentives that are essential to the perpetuation
of A system of free enterprise in a nation of free men.

-9-

212

The Treasury makes these recommendations in the conviction that
in no other way can the country produce enough wealth to maintain and

elevate its standard of living, to sustain and improve its social
services, to conserve and develop the natural resources which it has
inherited, to adhere unmistakably and successfully to the free economy

with which democratic institutions and human rights are indissolubly
connected. The Treasury is not prepared to say that the tax reforms

it is suggesting will at once remove all the impediments to the full
resumption of private enterprise. Further reforms of the tax system
may be necessary. There may be other impediments that need to be

removed which lie outside the province of the Treasury. There are
no doubt impediments also arising in the disturbance of the outer world
which the government as a whole cannot remove, though it may mitigate
the effects.

But while the suggestions which the Treasury is offering are not

a panacea, it is our conviction that in principle they are just and

that they are sound, and it is our belief that to enact them will greatly

213
- 10 -

increase the confidence of the people and greatly improve the unity

of the nation. Out of that confidence and that unity will come that
increase of the National income which will provide the revenues that
the Treasury must find to support the government and to balance its
budget.

This is what the Treasury has in mind in submitting its program
to you.

- 11 -

214
1. I recommend that the Ways and Means and Appropriations
Committees of this House and the Finance and Appropriations
Committees of the Senate meet at the beginning of each session

of Congress as a Joint Committee on fiscal policy to consider
the over-all aspects of the expenditure and revenue programs.

It is apparent that only in this way can each expenditure proposal

be compared with all others in the light of total resources available. Such a method has been in successful use in the State of

Wisconsin for a quarter of a century. I understand that similar
methods are pursued in Sweden and Great Britain.

2. I recommend that Congress create at this session a small,
temporary, national commission to be made up of men having ability

and public confidence for the purpose of studying Federal, State
and local government taxation. At the present time, more than one-

half the total tax revenues is collected by State and local
governments. There is no unity or ordered relationship between

the Federal fiscal system and the State and local fiscal systems.
Overlapping taxes have grown in number and size as both Federal

- 12 -

and State governments have sought new revenues. Grants-in-aid are
being demanded of the Federal government in increasing amounts.

The results of the fiscal situation have become increasingly unsatisfactory to both the State governments and the Federal government,
and are becoming intolerable burdens upon our taxpayers.

3. I recommend the repeal of the Capital Stock and Excess
Profits tax when it can be done without increasing the rate of
corporate tax. Pending that time, I recommend that the calculation
of the Capital Stock tax be placed on an annual basis instead of

on a three year basis as it is at present.
4. I recommend the repeal of the limitations on the deduction
of net capital losses from other income of corporations.
5. I recommend the allowance of a three year carry-over of

net losses for corporations, including in net losses the net capital
losses.

6. I recommend the repeal of the Undistributed Profits tax.
7. I recommend that corporations be allowed to file consolidated
returns and that the tax on inter-corporate dividends be abolished.

215

- 13 -

216
8.

I recommend the exemption of dividends from individual

r

normal tax.

9. I recommend a wider latitude of deductions for capital
losses be allowed to individuals, and I recommend further that

the period of holding capital assets be reduced from twenty-four
months to six months.

10. I recommend that the surtax rates in the upper brackets
be substantially reduced.

In conclusion, there are many other friction points in the

present tax structure, as well as administrative difficulties,
which my staff will submit to you at the proper time. I am grateful
to your Committee for permitting me to place my views before you.

217

Draft with

FDR suggestions

218 # /
way 2,1939
When I appeared before this Committee on March 24,

I said that the Treasury would soon be ready to submit
for your consideration its suggestions for changes in
the tax system. Your Chairman, Representative Doughton,
together with Senator Harrison, has expressed a desire

to receive our views in time for possible action at

X

this session of Congress.
,In

suggestions

(we have taken account of the fact that we are now in the
midst of a world situation which imposes on this government a special responsibility. We must demonstrate that
a democratic government has the power and the flexibility

to survive prolonged crisis and chaotic world conditions

and yet emerge with the strength of its free institutions
unimpaired.
x over r toy
Preservation of our democratic form of government
keind
requires, in my opinion, a fiscal program which has a

fourfold objective: (1) The promotion of free enterprise

Myro

and private investment; (2) the attainment of full business recovery; (3) the_plasing of our public finances
in a sound and unassailable position, and (4) an

h

219

-2 a more

equitable distribution of tax burdens and - equitable
distribution of national income.
Successful operation of democracy demands that all

four objectives be solidly linked together. When we consider any specific change in our fiscal program we must

satisfy ourselves that the change makes for a better and
not a worse distribution of tax burdens and of national
income; that the change promotes and does not retard

business recovery, and that the change makes it easier

and not more difficult to establish a balanced relationship between revenue and expenditures.

Full attainment of these objectives is made more
difficult by a new and ominous development in world af-

fairs -- the armament race now gripping the important

nations of the world. Great Britain in the coming fiscal
year is spending $3 billion on armaments, or almost 50

percent of its national budget; France is devoting over
40 percent of its governmental expenditure to the same
purpose; Italy, 50 percent; Germany, probably 60 percent;
Japan over 70 percent. These huge expenditures are being

financed largely by borrowing. The race is becoming
more intense and there is no end in sight.

abroad

For us the danger is that these developments may mean a
hams tagether with
hicromaily
increased
cost
for
national
defense
)monetary instability
n

220

-3abroad, disruption of our foreign commerce, and perhaps other unsettlements which we cannot accurately

measure. It is against this background that we
reexamine our fiscal program. No major problem facing
this government today can be properly solved without

full consideration of the position of this country in
relation to the present international crisis. The unmistakable implication of this international situation
is that we

month

To

our fiscal position
house in orden and E redouble our efforts to attain full
recovery. High national income and a sound fiscal position are essential to adequate national defense.
A fundamental objective of sound finance is clearly
a balanced budget. There is, of course, no good reason
why taxes must exactly balance expenditures each year
also
any more than each month, each week or each day. There are
1

may-well- be periods during which sound fiscal policy

calls for an excess of outgo over income. In a de-

pression it is inevitable that there will be deficits.
Revenues decline at the same time that the Federal
Government is called upon to undertake inescapable

social and economic burdens. If, however, deficits are
too long continued, the depressive effects of uncertainty
tend to make recovery more difficult. We cannot face

221

-4an

andless

The sequel to de-

ficits in emergencies should be surpluses during years

of prosperity, (A)
Mere talk of a sound fiscal policy to not enough.
In my opinion we must work out a plan which the community

recognizes to be realistic.
In order

in this

direction

T

suggest

that

the Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees of

It th

malance

this House and the Finance and Appropriations Committees
could

of the Senate meet each session as a Joint Committee on
a

Fiscal Policy to consider the over-all aspects of the
similitiesTom month Frank

expenditure and revenue programs. At the present time
machinery is lacking for the development and execution

of such a plan. The Budget Act of 1921 set up the
procedure for the orderly formulation by the executive

of fiscal proposals and for their submission to the
Congress as a unified budget. No comparable procedure
has been set up in Congress for considering revenues

and expenditures together as two inter-related aspects

of a single problem either in regard to the budget or
to the numerous proposals for expenditures outside

the budget. I hope this committee will agree with me
that 0 am such
innovation would improve the efficiency of the

222

-5Government. By providing for
consideration of

The overall

advertising
legislative
A

it would within

appropriation and revenue measures

broad

Congress

for the management of the government's finances and
permit a

better ordered

coordination between the

executive and the legislative branches in this
field.

This Joint Committee might be a funnel through
which all appropriations and revenue measures should
pass so that Congress could scrutinize each of them in

the light of what the country can afford. Such a Joint
Committee would enable Congress to accept OF reject each

revenue or expenditure proposal on the basis of a funda-

mental consistent fiscal
This
policy.
Committee a could

smilelbe actively studying
have continuous life and should

fiscal problems between sessions of Congress as well as
during the sessions. The Treasury Department would,

of course, cooperate fully in this work to the extent
that the committee desired. I understand that a method

similar to this Joint Committe suggestion has been

in successful use in the State of Wisconsin for quarter
of a century and that Sweden goes even further by

combining both revenue and appropriation legislation

223

-6in a finance act which is voted as the end of the
session.

Thus far I have dealt with the financial problems
of the Federal Government alone. We must remember,

however, that even if we had in operation the best
conceivable Federal fiscal plan, we still would have
touched only half of the tax problem which confronts

the nation. More than 50 percent of the total tax
revenues of the country are collected by State and
local governments.

We have talked about removing injurious Federal-

State tax conflicts for the past five years, and our
predecessors talked about the same problem. It to not
time to set. I recommend that Congress create a small
temporary national commission to report to Congress, (as
soon as possible) on the most desirable intergovernmental
fiscal policy. Such a commission should be made up of

men of ability who enjoy the highest possible public
confidence, who are familiar with the fiscal problems
of Federal, State and local governments, but who will represent the public at large rather than any governmental
unit.

Overlapping taxes have grown in number and size as
both Federal and State Governments have sought new revenue.

I

6.

224

-7Grants-in-aid are being demanded of the Federal

Government in increasing amounts. The results of our

fiscal situation are increasingly unsatisfactory to
both the State Governments and the Federal Government,

and are becoming intelerable to many taxpayers. As the
result of
this Commission's work, we should be able to
a more

achieve - orderby relationship between the Federal
fiscal system and the State and local fiscal system.
Thus far I have talked about two matters of great
importance to the Treasury. Each of my suggestions, if
you agree with me, may require some time to be worked

out. Let us see what we can do now. It seems to me
1. dream mm

that Congress has three choices on revenue legislation
Reumon
during this session:
1. Congress can merely renew the excise taxes and

the corporation income tax which expire this year, or
2. Congress can reexamine the whole tax structure

and in the light of this examination can renew expiring
taxes in their present or a revised form, and can
eliminate those features that are found to be business

deterrents, making provision for additional taxes to replace losses in revenue, -- these revisions to be made
effective beginning with 1939, or
3. Congress can follow the same procedure as I have

7.

225

just outlined, but make the revisions effective beginning in 1940.

226

-9I know that everyone on this Committee is as

anxious as I am to foster the full driving force of
private capital. It is generally recognized that
the following tax revisions would remove factors which
in the opinion of businessmen act as deterrents on
private productive enterprise:

9.

227

Tax-exempt securities
Present law. At present the interest on State and
local obligations is exempt from the corporation income tax
and from the individual normal income tax and surtax. The

interest on Federal obligations is in part similarly exempt
and
in part exempt
onlytax.
from the corporation income tax and
the individual
normal
Recommendation. Enact legislation providing for

full Federal taxation of the interest on Federal, State, and
local obligations issued in the future and conferring power
on
thefuture.
States to tax interest on Federal obligations issued
in the
Reasons for change. The exemption of interest on
government obligations from the income tax is incompatible

with the principle of ability to pay. It provides a tax-free
haven to persons in the higher income brackets, and consequently they are less likely to invest their capital in private enterprise. Further, to the extent that the higher
income classes avoid their share of taxes by holding tax-exempt securities, persons with smaller incomes must be taxed
higher to make up the revenue loss. The elimination of tax
exemption would make the tax system more equitable and stin-

ulate
investment
bear such
risks. in risky enterprises by those best able to
Example. A married man with no children or other
dependents with an income of $100,000, half of which is

derived from tax-exempt interest, is at present taxed at an
effective rate of 8.9 percent, whereas if all his income
were taxable, the effective rate would be 32.5 percent.

an
with
net
sources
For $500,000
individual
from
other of
an investment
in fullyincome
tax-exempt
securities
at 3

percent
results
in thepercent.
same net yield as taxable securities
bearing rate
of 10.71

Revenue effects. For years following the complete
retirement of tax-exempt securities the additional annual
income tax revenue to the Federal Government is estimated

to
The
annual
increase
in
from interest $179,000,000
costs
$337,000,000.
into the Federal Government and Federal

is estimated from to

strumentalities and
the State
$19,000,000
$50,000,000 to
andtolocal
governments
from $40,000,000

$105,000,000. It is difficult to estimate the increased
and local governments. For the immediate
will becost
little additional
future revenue
for there revenue
to Stateorinterest
either Federal or State and local governments.

>228

- 10 -

1. Interest on future issues of
government obligations -- Federal,
State, and local -- should be made

fully taxable.

229

Carry-forward of business losses
Present law. Individuals and corporations are now
taxed on their annual incomes without being allowed a deduc-

tion for business losses sustained in prior years. During

the period 1921-1932 taxpayers were allowed to offset current
income with prior year losses.
Allow net losses of business, both
Recommendation
individual and corporate, to be offset against the income of
the succeeding year, and any loss not thus absorbed to be
carried forward and offset against the income of the following
two years.

Reason for change. The taxation of business income
on a yearly basis may result in taxes being imposed on businesses which over a period of years have no net income Types
of business with irregular incomes pay higher taxes than those

with regular incomes. The allowance of a net loss carry-over

helps to eliminate this discrimination. It would tend to

stimulate new enterprise and the capital goods industries,
both of which characteristically have variable incomes.

that loses
$5,000 in each
Reasons - corporation A
Thances
of summer

of three years and in the fourth makes $15,000 obviously has
no income for the whole four-year period. Yet under the
present law, because losses cannot be carried forward, the
income tax will be $2,025. If losses could be carried forward,
no tax would be levied.

Revenue effects. If individuals were allowed to
carry forward business losses for three years. It is estimated
that the loss in revenue would amount to from $7,500,000 to
$10,800,000 and for corporations the loss would be from

$17,800,000 to $167,200,000 depending upon the level of business conditions assumed and the pattern of income in the prior
years.

230

Thus brown what 5 fir the
pros andAllowance
cons - 11
on for
be -made
business losses to be carried
forward and offset against
income in a limited number of
subsequent years.

231

The limitation on deduction of corporate capital losses.
Present law. Under the present law any excess of
corporate capital losses over capital gains can be deducted

from ordinary income only to the extent of $2,000. Prior
to 1934 corporations were permitted to deduct capital losses
from ordinary income without limitation.
Recommendation. Allow corporate capital losses to
be deducted in full from ordinary income.

Reason for change. The failure to offset net
capital losses fully against ordinary income may result in
imposing a high income tax on corporations with a very low
income or even with a deficit. If corporations were allowed
to deduct their net capital losses from other income without
limitation, they would be less cautious in investing in
securities
of plants.
other corporations and in undertaking expansion
of
their own

Cans

Example. A corporation that has ordinary income of
$25,000 and net capital losses of $125,000 is nevertheless
required under the present law to pay a tax of $3,025, depend-

ing upon the amount of dividends paid out. If capital losses
could fully offset ordinary income, no tax would be levied.
Revenue effects. If the limitation on the deduction
of net capital losses from other income were eliminated it
is estimated that on the basis of calendar year 1939 level
of
business conditions the revenue would be decreased
$68,100,000.

232

I have him waterd etc.
be allowed
3. Corporations
to deduct capital losses from

their ordinary income.

233

Capital losses of individuals
Present law. Short-term losses from assets held
not more than 18 months are allowed to offset short-term
gains but may not offset ordinary income. Short-term losses
in excess of short-term gains may be carried forward to
offset such gains of the succeeding year. In computing taxable income two-thirds of the long-term losses are taken into
account if the assets are held more than 18 but not more
than 24 months, and one-half if the assets are held more than
24 months. The amount of long-term losses taken into account
may be fully deducted from net income, or segregated and a tax
credit computed at a rate of 30 percent, whichever method

results in the greater tax.

Recommendation. Allow short-term losses to offset
both short- and long-term gains instead of only short-term

gains; allow net short-term losses to be carried forward for
three years instead of one year; allow net long-term losses to
the extent not offset against ordinary income of the current
year to be carried forward for three years; and increase the
rate for the computation of the tax credit on long-term losses

under the method of segregation from 30 percent to 50 percent,
to accord with the corresponding recommendation on capital gains,

Reasons for change. The present capital loss provisions
are inequitable and discourage the assumption of business risks.
Short-term losses should be allowed to be carried forward for
more than one year and offset against long-term capital gains.

Since capital gains and losses are highly irregular, the taxation of large gains in one year without allowing an offset for
both short- and long-term capital losses of preceding years
cannot be justified. The allowance of the capital loss carryover, like the allowance of the net loss carry-over, would,
by
putting the tax more rearly on an average basis, improve its
equity.
Example. A married man with no dependents receiving
$75,000 ordinary income and $25,000 long-term capital gains

is now required to pay $22,659 income tax. If two years ago
he had net short-term capital losses of $50,000 and net longterm capital losses in excess of ordinary income of $25,000
under the present law he would still be required to pay the
same amount of tax, because such losses are not taken into

account in the computation of his current year's tax liability.
Under the recommendations, on the other hand, his short-term
two years could offset his current long-

and
the
losses
of
reduce
the
from
in a tax of $8,869 and leaving and leaving

$50,000 years term capital capital ago resulting losses could gains, of ordinary long-term ago income capital $75,000 to two

$25,000 of short-term capital losses to be carried forward.

234

Simner

- 13 -

4. Somewhat greater deduction of

capital losses / be allowed
individuals.

235

Repeal of capital stock and excess-profits taxes

Present law. At present the capital stock tax is

based upon a declared value which the taxpayer may revise

every three years. The declared value may be any figure the
taxpayer desires to make it regardless of the actual value of
the stock. The excess-profits tax applies to profits in
excess of 10 percent of the declared value.
Recommendation. Repeal the capital stock and excess-

profits taxes -- the capital stock tax effective for years
beginning after June 30, 1939, and the excess-profits tax
effective for the first income tax year ending after June
30,1940.

Reason for change. The capital stock and excess-

profits taxes are highly uncertain and inequitable. These
taxes depend upon the amount of profit actually realized
during each year of a three-year period and the taxpayer's
ability to forecast these profits accurately at the beginning

of the period. Forecasts of profits are especially difficult
to make in the case of new businesses and businesses with
unstable incomes. The repeal of these taxes would be stimulating to such businesses, because it would remove the unduly

high tax burdens resulting from erroneous forecasts.
Example. A corporation with incomes of $100,000,
$200,000 and $50,000 respectively, in each of three years,
declaring a capital stock value of $1,000,000, is under the
present law required to pay capital stock and excess-profits

taxes of $12,000 for the three years. If the value declared

had been $750,000, the taxes would have been $16,500 and if
the value declared had been $1,250,000, the taxes would have been

$9,000. The closer the declared value is to ten times average
earnings, the lower are the combined capital stock and excessprofits taxes. Any substantial departures from such a declared
value result in higher taxes.
Revenue effects. If the capital stock tax and excess

profits taxes are repealed, it is estimated on the basis of

calendar year 1939 business conditions that the revenue would

be reduced $122,400,000.

236

- 14 -

5. The capital stock tax, the
excess profits tax and present
corporation income tax could be

consolidated into a single tax
on corporation incomes.

Cantiner dretment against
family imp. braining profits

with up

237

Reduction in top surtax rates
Present law. The maximum surtax rate is now 75
percent on net incomes in excess of $5,000,000. Under
the 1932 Act it was 55 percent on incomes in excess of

$1,000,000, and under the 1926 Act, effective for the
period through 1931, it was 20 percent on incomes in
excess of $100,000.

Recommendation. Reduce the upper surtax rates
to a maximum of 60 percent, leaving the maximum combined

normal and surtax rate at 64 percent.

Reason for change. The present top bracket

rates are too high. Disregarding State taxes, the taxpayer is left with as little as twenty-one cents out of his
highest dollar of income. If State taxes are taken into
account, even less is left. The high rates tend to discourage
the assumption of business risks, to bring about the hoarding
of savings or the purchase of tax-exempt securities, and to
depress the economy. If the surtax rates were reduced,
wealthy individuals would be encouraged to assume certain
business risks which with the present high rates do not
appear to be worthwhile.

Revenue effects. If the top bracket surtax rate
is limited to 60 percent and all other provisions in present

law remain unchanged, it is estimated on the basis of calendar
year 1939 business that the revenue from the individual income
tax would be reduced $11.5 million.

238

-Jame 15
I

6. not
The top rates in the individual
surtax schedule be lowered.

possible changes

ed in further information, my state and I are property
to furnish it and will be happy to stick with you to
the content you may desire. Also, . recognize the
other festures or the Code law are considered by from

be brainsaa deterrents, If you real they take side
stantial determents, we will be glad to exhist the
their examination

2

239

- 16 -

I shall not discuss in detail any of the six
possible changes just mentioned. If you are interested in further information, my staff and I are prepared
to furnish it and will be happy to work with you to
the extent you may desire. Also, 1 recognize that
other features of the tax law are considered by some to
be business deterrents, and, if you feel they are sub-

stantial deterrents, we will be glad to assist in
their examination.

22.

- 17 -

240

Most of the tax changes that I have mentioned

will reduce the revenue-producing capacity of the
system. If these or other similar changes are adopted
ways must be found of replacing the lost revenue. If

tax revision were to take the form only of tax reductions
uncertainty of business with respect to our fiscal program would be accentuated. The result would be to injure
and not help business. We must take no step which the
public may interpret as moving away from the objective

of a balanced budget. The taxes resorted to for replacement of lost revenue should have the least harm-

ful effects on business and should contribute to greater

equity. I suggest the following possibilities:

23.

241
A single corporation tax on net income

Present law. Under the present law several corporation taxes are imposed: a capital stock tax, an excessprofits tax, an undistributed profits tax, and the ordinary
income tax. The income tax itself is complex. A flat rate,
together with what in effect is a tax on undistributed
profits, is imposed on corporations with incomes over

$25,000. Graduated rates are imposed on corporations with
incomes of $25,000 and less. Further, several classes of
corporations,
of their size, are subject to
flat
income taxirrespective
rates.

Recommendation. Substitute for the capital stock tax,
excess-profits tax, and the corporation income tax (which
in the 1938 law includes a tax on undistributed profits in
the form of a credit for dividends paid) a single corporation tax on net income. If other previously recommended
changes in corporation taxes are made to permit loss carryover and deduction of capital losses from ordinary income,
the rates of such a tax would need to be approximately

18 percent on net incomes under $10,000, 19 percent on net
incomes of $10,000 to $25,000, 21 percent on net incomes
of $25,000 to $50,000, and 22 percent on net incomes of
$50,000 and over, in order to replace the revenues of the

existing corporation tax structure.

Reasons for change. The present system of corporate

taxes is complex, discouraging to enterprise, and inequitable. The capital stock and excess-profits taxes have
been discussed previously. The undistributed profits tax
component has added substantially to the complexity of

the corporation income tax. At the present rate it is in-

effective and there seems no possibility of securing

passage of an effective tax, while the hostility to it is
very great. If all corporate taxes are consolidated into

a single tax on net income, the taxes on new business, on
business with unstable incomes, and on business with no income would be substantially reduced. The increases would.
in general, fall on the larger and more stable businesses.
Example. A corporation with net income of $1,000,000

declaring the most favorable value for its stock,

is required
thecapital
law to
porate $10,000,000,
taxesunder
of present
paycorfrom $175,000 to $200,000, depending upon
the distribution
of dividends, as under

single corporation

a less favorable of

poration stock the proposed value made declaration income against tax. $218,900 If capital the cor-

-- either higher or lower -- the taxes under
the present law would be relatively greater. If in the next
year this corporation had no net income, it would under the
present law still be required to pay a capital stock tax of
$10,000, there whereas under the single corporation income tax
would be no tax liability.

242

- 18 1. The corporation income tax rate
could be increased.

Middle bracket individual income tax rates

Present law. The individual income tax rates under
the present law are relatively low on incomes under $250,000.
The effective rate of tax on $10,000 received by a married
man with no dependents is only 4.2 percent; on $20,000 it is
7.9 percent, on $40,000, 14.9 percent, on $100,000, 32.5 percent, and on $250,000, 51.3 percent.

The existing surtax rate schedule of the income tax is

as follows:

:Rate: Total
!per-1 surtax 11
11

Amount of surtax
net income

0

0

6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000

10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 22,000 26,000 32,000 -

$

80

4
$

180

5

300

no
b

440

7

600

8

780

9

1,000
1,260
1,560
2,240
3,380
4,640
6,080
7.700
9.560
11,660

11

20,000 13
22,000 15
26,000 17
32,000 19
38,000 21
44,000 24
50,000 27
56,000 31

38,000 44,000 50,000 56,000 -

net income

1cent:cumulativet

0 $ 4,000
4,000
6,000
8,000

Amount of surtax

62,000

35

!Rate:

Total

:per-: surtax

62,000 - $ 68,000
68,000 74,000
74,000 80,000
80,000 90,000
90,000 100,000
100,000 150,000

|centicumulative
39

$

14,000

43

16,580
47

19,400

51

24,500

55

30,000

58

59.000

150,000 - 200,000
200,000 - 250,000
250,000 - 300,000
300,000 - 400,000
400,000 - 500,000 68
500,000 - 750,000 70
60

89,000

62

120,000

64

152,000

66

750,000 -1,000,000

218,000
286,000
461,000

72

641,000

1,000,000 -2,000,000 73

1,371,000

2,000,000 -5,000,000

74

3,591,000

5,000,000 up

75

The tax and effective rate of tax on a married man with
no dependents at various income levels is as follows:

:

:

:

116

10,000
20,000
40,000

0.3

$ 100,000

1.9

250,000
500,000
1,000,000
5,000,000

415

4.2

1,589
5.979

7.9

14.9

tax

:

8

of

Effective

32,469

$

rate

:

:
$

11 exemption

Amount

:

:

3,000
6,000

:

tax

11 Net income
Effective 11
before
rate

:

of

1

$

Amount

:

Net income
before
exemption

128,294
304,144
679,044

3,788,994

32.5
51.3

60.8
67.9
75.8

recommendation. No specific recomme dations are made.

Reason for change. If the revenue system is to be
made more equitable by removing certain of the undesirable
indirect taxes that now unduly burden the low income classes,

and if the income tax itself is to be improved by allowing
losses to offset profits and gains and in other ways, so
that it will not curb business enterprise, it is necessary
to increase the revenue-raising powers of the individual

income tax. The top rates are now too high and should be

lowered. Consequently, if the individual income tax is to
raise more revenue, the middle bracket rates must be increased.

Example. No specific example can be given.

- 19 -

2. Individual income tax rates
could be increased.

27

245

Exemptions, insurance exclusion, and middle bracket

rates of the estate and gift taxes

Present law. Under the present law a specific exemption
of $40,000 and an exclusion of $40,000 for insurance payable
to beneficiaries other than the estate are allowed under the
estate tax, and a specific exemption of $40,000 is allowed
under the gift tax. The middle bracket estate tax rates are
low. The effective estate tax rate on a net estate of $50,000
is only 6 percent, on a net estate of $100, 000, 9.6 percent,
and on a net estate of $400, 000, 16.7 percent.

The estate tax rate schedule is as follows:
(Dollars in thousands)

: rate :

estate
$

0$

:

tax

-

10

2%

.2

10

20

20 -

30

30

40

40 -

50

10

50

70

12

1.2
2.0
3.0

70

100

14

5.4

100

200

17

200 400

4

6

8

20

600

23

600 - 800

26

400

800 - 1,000
1,000 - 1,500
1,500 - 2,000

rates.

29

32
35

$

.6

9.6
26.6
66.6
112.6
164.6
222.6
382.6

estate

$2,000 - $2,500

2,500 - 3,000
3,000 - 3,500
3.500 - 4,000
4,000 - 4,500
4,500 - 5,000
5,000 - 6,000
6,000 - 7,000
7,000 - 8,000
8,000 - 9,000

9,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 50,000
50,000 -

:Bracket : Cumulative
% rate

tax

$

Bracket : Cumulative 1: Net

Net

38

557.6

$

41

747.6

44

952.6

47

1,172.6

50

1,407.6

53
56
59
61

63
65

1,657.6
1,922.6
2,482.6
3,072.6
3,682.6
4,312.6

67

4,962.6

69

11,662.6

70

32,362.6

The gift tax rates are three-fourths of the estate tax

The tax and effective rates under existing law for
selected sizes of net estate (before exemption) are as
follows:

----3. Estate and gift taxes could be
increased.

:

1,000,000
4,000,000
10,000,000
60,000,000

$

:

50,000
100,000
400,000

:

$

Tax

:

Net estate
before exemption

200

4,200
58,600
211,000

1,388,800
4,936,600
39,334,600

Effective
rate
0.4%

4.2
14.7
21.1
34.7
49.4
65.6

Recommendation. No specific recommendation.

Reasons for change. The excessive specific exemptions

allowed under the present estate and gift taxes limit transfor taxation to a comparatively few large estates. The insurance exclusion discriminates in favor of investment in
life insurance as against other desirable forms of investment.
The transfer tax, like the individual income tax, is levied
at graduated rates and is one of the most important instruments
for bringing about an equitable distribution of tax burdens and
a more equal distribution of wealth. The role of the transfer
taxes should be increased, especially since it is desirable
to repeal some of the indirect and other regressive taxes that
now are included in the tax system. This would be done if the
estate and gift taxes were coordinated, if the exemptions were
lowered, if the insurance exclusion were disallowed, and if
the middle bracket rates of the single transfer tax were raised
substantially above those in the present estate tax.
Example. No specific example can be included.

247

Percentage depletion

Present law. Percentage depletion is allowed
the present
law
for oil and
gas wells
at the
of 27for
in percent
of gross
income;
for metal
mines,
15 rate
percent;
sulphur mines or deposits, 23 percent; and for coal mines,
5
percent. The percentage depletion is limited, however, to
depletion.
50 percent of the net income computed without allowance for
Recommendation. Reduce the percentages for de-

pletion by 50 percent, to be 13 3/4 percent for oil and gas
wells, 7 percent for metal mines, 11, percent for sulphur
mines ordecreases
deposits, could
and 2 be
percent
for coal mines. (Even
greater
justified.)
Reasons for change. The purpose of depletion,

like the purpose of depreciation, is to enable the taxpayer
to recoup his capital investment in the property tax-free,
If, however, the depletion charges are related to gross
income rather than cost, it is possible for the taxpayer to
continue to take a deduction for depletion long after the
full cost of the property has been charged off. So long as
the property is producing, the depletion charges continue.
Percentage depletion thus provides what is in effect a subsidy to the oil and mineral interests, a privilege not
granted to other types of business. This subsidy is not
uniform among the different oil and mineral industries or
among concerns in any of them. Concerns with low-cost, longlived properties receive the most benefit. The excessive
deductions under percentage depletion are thus inequitable,
while they result in a substantial loss in revenue.
Example. If a corporation takes $5,000,000 depletion allowance for oil and gas properties on the basis
of 271 percent of gross income, while only 10 percent of
gross income is required to return the cost of the properties,

to the amount of

the corporation in effect receives tax subsidy of from
$525,000 $604,545,
depending
dividends
distributed.
Sample studies
indicate upon
that onathe
average the
less

percentages of gross income necessary to return cost are
than
10 percent,
in many instances much less than
10
percent
wouldand
be that
sufficient.

248

- 21 special privilege of the present
law is the allowance of excessive

In

A

deductions for depletion of oil and
gas wells and certain mines. As the
Treasury has often pointed out, a
substantial amount of revenue can

be recovered by closing this loophole.
suggesting this change I am fully

say

It

aware that it will be opposed by power-

wing toward

ful vested interests, despite its I of tax

Reterrents

obvious equity.
only

Obriously,

(iscal

one

nomic

substantial

the

Times

discussed

people can look forward with
Give

tes

greath

development

proceed

31.

249

- 22 -

In this statement emphasis was laid first on
the importance of sound fiscal policy, and a suggestion was made for a Joint Congressional Committee

as a means to the formulation of such policy. Secondly,
the need for a commission to study Federal-State fiscal
relations was stressed, and thirdly, alternative programs

for adjusting federal taxes to eliminate features that
may deter business were outlined.

It will take time for the results of fiscal planning toward a balanced budget and for the removal of tax

deterrents to be fully effective. Obviously, fiscal
factors constitute only one of many aspects of our eco-

nomic problem. I feel, however, that if something
substantial is done along the lines I have discussed
people can look forward with more assurance for the next
five or ten years and business growth and development

will proceed more rapidly than they otherwise would.

250

Draft with FDR suggestions - HMJr copy

#1

251 way 2,19

When I appeared before thi 8 Committee on March 24,

I said that the Treasury would soon be ready to submit
for your consideration its suggestions for changes in
the tax system. Your Chairman, Represent tative Doughton,

together with Senator Harrison, has expressed a desire

certain
suggestions
to receive our views inregard
time for to
possible
action
at

them

this session or Congress. made by Fountai congue
and others

In formulating our suggestions for a fiscal program
we have taken account of the fact that we are now in the

midst of a world situation which imposes on this government a special responsibility. We must demonstrate that
a democratic government has the power and the flexibility

to survive prolonged crisis and chaotic world conditions

and yet emerge with the strength of its free institutions
unimpaired.

over a long a buird of years

Preservation of our democratic form of government

requires, in my opinion, a fiscal program which has a
fourfold objective: (1) The promotion of free enterprise
and private investment; (2) the attainment of full busi-

maintanance

ness recovery; (3) the placing of our public finances
in a sound and unassailable position, and (4) -

252

-2a more
equitable distribution of tax burdens and an equitable
distribution of national income.
Successful operation of democracy demands that all

four objectives be solidly linked together. When we consider any specific change in our fiscal program we must
satisfy ourselves that the change makes for a better and
not a worse distribution of tax burdens and of national
income; that the change promotes and does not retard

business recovery, and that the change makes it easier

and not more difficult to establish a balanced relationship between revenue and expenditures.

Full attainment of these objectives is made more
difficult by a new and ominous development in world af-

fairs - the armament race now gripping the important

nations of the world. Great Britain in the coming fiscal
year 18 spending $3 billion on armaments, or almost 50

percent of its national budget; France is devoting over
40 percent of its governmental expenditure to the same
purpose; Italy, 50 percent; Germany, probably 60 percent;
Japan over 70 percent. These huge expenditures are being

financed largely by borrowing. The race is becoming
more intense and there is no end in sight.
abroad
For us the danger is that these development may mean

here together north
increased cost for national defense monetary instability

-3-

253

abroad, disruption of our foreign commerce, and perhaps other unsettlements which we cannot accurately
measure. It 18 against this background that we must
reexamine our fiscal program. No major problem facing
this government today can be properly solved without

full consideration of the position of this country in
relation to the present international crisis. The unmistakable implication of this international situation
should look ahaed
is that we must immodiately act place our fiscal position
house in order and to redouble our efforts to attain full
recovery. High national income and a aound fiscal position are essential to adequate national defense.
A fundamental objective of sound finance is clearly
a balanced budget. There is, of course, no good reason
why taxes must exactly balance expenditures each year
any more than each month, each week or each day. There

wan there are
may well be periods during which sound fiscal policy
1

calls for an excess of outgo over income. In a de-

pression it is inevitable that there will be deficits.
Revenues decline at the same time that the Federal
Government 18 called upon to undertake inescapable

social and economic burdens. If, however, deficits are
too long continued, the depressive effects of uncertainty
tend to make recovery more difficult. We cannot face

she
1937

-4-

254

an endless succession of governmental deficite and

survive as a democratic people. The sequel to deficits in emergencies should be surpluses during years
of prosperity.
a)

Mere talk of a sound fiscal policy is not enough.

In my opinion we must WORK out a plan whi ch the community

recognizes to be realistic.

It for instance
B-InIn order
to move in this direction I suggest that

the Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees of

this House and the Finance and Appropriations Committees
could
of the Senate meet each session as a Joint Committee on
1

Fiscal Policy to consider the over-all aspects of the

simplification would result

expenditure and revenue programs. At the present time

machinery is lacking for the development and execution

of such a plan. The Budget Act of 1921 set up the
procedure for the orderly formulation by the executive
of fiscal proposals and for their submission to the
Congress as a unified budget. No comparable procedure

has been set up in Congress for considering revenues
and expenditures toge the r as two inter-related aspects

of a single problem either in regard to the budget or
to the numerous proposals for expenditures outside

the budget. I hope this committee will agree with me
some
that this innovation would improve the efficiency of the
^

255

-.5 a

Government. By providing for A unified legislative
the overall
consideration of all appropriation and revenue measures

broad picture

the

it would centralize the responsibility within Congress
1

for the management of the government's finances and

better ordered

permit a more intelligent coordination between the
executive and the legislative branches in thi 8
1

field.

7.

This Joint Committee might be a funnel through

which all appropriations and revenue measures should

pass 80 that Congress could scrutinize each of them in

the light of what the country can afford. -Such a Joint
Committee would enable Congress to accept or reject each

revenue or expenditure proposal on the basis of a funda-

mental, consistent fiscal policy. This Committee should could

could
have continuous life and should be actively studying
1

fiscal problems between sessions of Congress as well as
during the sessions. The Treasury Department would,

of course, cooperate fully in this work to the extent
that the committee desired. I understand that a method
similar to this Joint Committee suggestion has been

in successful use in the State of Wisconsin for a quarter
of a century and that Sweden goes even further by
combining both revenue and appropriation legislation

-6-

256

in a finance act which is voted at the end of the
session.

Thus far I have dealt with the financial problems
of the Federal Government alone. We must remember,

however, that even if we had in operation the best
conceivable Federal fiscal plan, we still would have
touched only half of the tax problem which confronts
the nation. More than 50 percent of the total tax
revenues of the country are collected by State and
local governments.

We have talked about removing injurious Federal-

State tax conflicts for the past five years, and our
predecessors talked about the same problem. It 1g DOE

time to not I recommend that Congress create a small
temporary national commission to report to Congress, (as
soon as possible) on the most desirable intergovernmental

fiscal policy. Such a commission should be made up of

men of ability who enjoy the highest possible public
confidence, who are familiar with the fiscal problems
of Federal, State and local governments, but who will represent the public at large rather than any governmental
unit.

Overlapping taxes have grown in number and size as
both Federal and State Governments have sought new revenue.

-7-

257

Grants-in-aid are being demanded of the Federal

Government in increasing amounts. The results of our

fiscal situation are increasingly unsatisfactory to
both the State Governments and the Federal Government,

and are becoming intelerable to many taxpayers. As the

result of this Commission's work, we should be able to
a
nine oderly
achieve ordered relationship between the Federal

fiscal system and the State and local fiscal system.
Thus far I have talked about two matters of great
importance to the Treasury. Each of my suggestions, if
you agree with me, may require some time to be worked

out. Let us see what we can do now. It seems to me
that Congress has three choices on revenue legislation
during this session:
1. Congress can merely renew the excise taxes and

the corporation income tax whi sh expire this year, or
2. Congress can reexamine the whole tax structure

and in the light of this examination can renew expiring
taxes in their present or a revised form, and can
eliminate those features that are found to be business

deterrents, making provision for additional taxes to replace losses in revenue -- these revisions to be made
effective beginning with 1939, or
3. Congress can follow the same procedure as I have

258

8-

just outlined, but make the revisions effective beginning in 1940.

-9I know that everyone on this Committee is as

anxious as I am to foster the full driving force of

private capital. It is generally recognized that
the following tax revisions would remove factors whi ch
in the opinion of businessmen act as deterrents on

private productive enterprise:

259

260

Tax-exempt securities

Present law. At present the interest on State and local

obligations is exempt from the corporation income tax and from the
individual normal income tax and surtax. The interest on Federal
obligations is in part similarly exempt and in part exempt only from
the corporation income tax and the individual normal tax.

Recommendation. Enact legislation providing for full
Federal taxation of the interest on Federal, State, and local obligations issued in the future and conferring power on the States to tax
interest on Federal obligations issued in the future.
Reasons for change. The exemption of interest on government obligations from the income tax is incompatible with the

principle of ability to pay. It provides a tax-free haven to persons

in the higher income brackets, and consequently they are less likely

to invest their capital in private enterprise. Further, to the extent

that the higher income classes avoid their share of taxes by holding
tax-exempt securities, persons with smaller incomes must be taxed
higher to make up the revenue loss. The elimination of tax exemption
would make the tax system more equitable and stimulate investment in

risky enterprises by those best able to bear such risks.

Example. A married man with no children or other dependents
with an income of $100,000, half of which is derived from tax-exempt

interest, is at present taxed at an effective rate of 8.9 percent,

whereas if all his income were taxable, the effective rate would be
32.5 percent. For an individual with net income from other sources
$500,000 an investment in fully tax-exempt securities at 3 percent
results
in the same net yield as taxable securities bearing rate of
10.71
percent.

of

Revenue effects. For years following the complete retire-

ment of tax-exempt securities the additional annual income tax revenue

to the Federal Government to $337,000,000.

increase
in
Government
Federal instrumentalities is to

The annual interest is estimated costs to from the $179,000,000 Federal and

and
to the State and local from to
It governments estimated from $40,000,000 $19,000,000 $105,000,000. $50,000,000 local

is difficult to estimate the increased revenue to State and
governments. For the immediate future there will be little additional
revenue
or interest cost for either Federal or State and local
governments.

261

- 10 -

1. Interest on future issues of
government obligations -- Federal,
State, and local -- should be made

fully taxable.

262

Carry-forward of business losses
Present law. Individuals and corporations are now taxed
on their annual incomes without being allowed a deduction for
business losses sustained in prior years. During the period
1921-1932
taxpayers were allowed to offset current income with
prior
year losses.
Recommendation. Allow net losses of/business, both

individual and corporate, to be offset against the income of the

succeeding year, and any loss not thus absorbed to be carried
forward and offset against the income of the following two years.

Reasms

against
Huse

Reason for change. The taxation of business income on a
yearly basis may result in taxes being imposed on businesses which
over a period of years have no net income. Types of business with
irregular incomes pay higher taxes than those with regular incomes.

The allowance of a net loss carry-over helps to eliminate this
discrimination. It would tend to stimulate new enterprise and the
capital
industries, both of which characteristically have
variablegoods
incomes.
Example. A corporation that loses $5,000 in each of

three years and in the fourth makes $15,000 obviously has no income

for the whole four-year period. Yet under the present law, because
losses cannot be carried forward, the income tax will be $2,025.
If losses could be carried forward, no tax would be levied.

Revenue effects. If individuals were allowed to carry
forward business losses for three years. It is estimated that the
loss in revenue would amount to from $7,500,000 to $10,800,000
and for corporations the loss would be from $17,800,000 to
$167,200,000 depending upon the level of business conditions

assumed and the pattern of income in the prior years.

263

- 11.

to

1. Allowance could, be made for
business losses to be carried
forward and offset against
income in a limited number of
subsequent years.

been aske d to give the pros

cms on /

have

264

The limitation on deduction of corporate capital losses.
Present law. Under the present law any excess of
corporate capital losses over capital gains can be deducted

from ordinary income only to the extent of $2,000. Prior

to 1934 corporations were permitted to deduct capital losses

from ordinary income without limitation.

Recommendation. Alllow corporate capital losses to

be deducted in full from ordinary income.

Reason for change. The failure to offset net
capital losses fully against ordinary income may result in
imposing a high income tax on corporations with a very low

income or even with a deficit. If corporations were allowed
to deduct their net capital losses from other income without
limitation, they would be less cautious in investing in

securities of other corporations and in undertaking expansion
of their own plants.

Cous

Example. A corporation that has ordinary income
of $25,000 and net capital losses of $125,000 is nevertheless
required under the present law to pay a tax of $3,025, depending upon the amount of dividends paid out. If capital
losses could fully offset ordinary income, no tax would be
levied.

Revenue effects. If the limitation on the deduction of net capital losses from other income were eliminated
it is estimated that on the basis of calendar year 1939 level

of business conditions the revenue would be decreased
$68,100,000.

and cons

Refeat

265

- 12 3. Corporations could be allowed
to deduct capital losses from
their ordinary income.

266

Capital losses of individuals
Present law. Short-term losses from assets held
not more than 18 months are allowed to offset short-term
gains but may not offset ordinary income. Short-term losses
in excess of short-term gains may be carried forward to
offset such gains of the succeeding year. In computing taxable income two-thirds of the long-term losses are taken into
account if the assets are held more than 18 but not more
than 24 months, and one-half if the assets are held more than
24 months. The amount of long-term losses taken into account
may be fully deducted from net income, or segregated and a tax
credit computed at a rate of 30 percent, whichever method

results in the greater tax.

Recommendation. Allow short-term losses to offset
both short- and long-term gains instead of only short-term

gains; allow net short-term losses to be carried forward for
three years instead of one year; allow net long-term losses to
the extent not offset against ordinary income of the current
year to be carried forward for three years; and increase the
rate for the computation of the tax credit on long-term losses

under the method of segregation from 30 percent to 50 percent,
to accord with the corresponding recommendation on capital gains.

Reasons for change. The present capital loss provisions
are inequitable and discourage the assumption of business risks.
Short-term losses should be allowed to be carried forward for
more than one year and offset against long-term capital gains.

Since capital gains and losses are highly irregular, the taxation of large gains in one year without allowing an offset for
both short- and long-term capital losses of preceding years
cannot be justified. The allowance of the capital loss carryover, like the allowance of the net loss carry-over, would,

by putting the tax more nearly on an average basis, improve its

equity.

Example. A married man with no dependents receiving
$75,000 ordinary income and $25,000 long-term capital gains

is now required to pay $22,659 income tax. If two years ago
he had net short-term capital losses of $50,000 and net longterm capital losses in excess of ordinary income of $25,000
under the present law he would still be required to pay the
same amount of tax, because such losses are not taken into

account in the computation of his current year's tax liability.

Under recommendations, on the short-term

of two years could current long-

gains, and the losses of

reduce
the
from
to
$50,000 resulting in a tax of $8,869 and leaving $25,000 of

years term capital capital ago the losses could ordinary ago long-term other income offset capital hand, his his $75,000 two

short-term capital losses to be carried forward.

267

- 13 4. Somewhat greater deduction of

capital losses could be allowed
individuals.

268
Repeal of capital stock and excess-profits taxes

Present law. At present the capital stock tax is

based upon a declared value which the taxpayer may revise
every three years. The declared value may be any figure the

taxpayer desires to make it regardless of the actual value of

the stock. The excess-profits tax applies to profits in
excess of 10 percent of the declared value.

Recommendation. Repeal the capital stock and excess-

profits taxes - the capital stock tax effective for years
beginning after June 30,1939. and the excess-profits tax

effective for the first income tax year ending after June
30, 1940.

Reason for change. The capital stock and excess-

profits taxes are highly uncertain and inequitable. These
taxes depend upon the amount of profit actually realised
during each year of a three-year period and the taxpayer's
ability to forecast these profits accurately at the beginning

of the period. Forecasts of profits are especially difficult

to make in the case of new businesses and businesses with
unstable incomes. The repeal of these taxes would be stimulating to such businesses, because it would remove the unduly
high tax burdens resulting from erroneous forecasts.
Example. A Corporation with incomes of $100,000,
$200,000 and $50,000 respectively, in each of three years,

declaring a capital stock value of $1,000,000, is under the
present law required to pay capital stock and excess-profits
taxes of $12,000 for the three years. If the value declared
had been $750,000, the taxes would have been $16,500 and if
the value declared had been $1,250,000, the taxes would have been

$9,000. The closer the declared value is to ten times average
earnings, the lower are the combined capital stock and excessprofits taxes. Any substantial departures from such a declared
value result in higher taxes.

Revenue effects. If the capital stock tax and excess
profits taxes are repealed, it is estimated on the basis of
calendar year 1939 business conditions that the revenue would

be reduced $122,400,000.

269

- 14 -

5. The capital stock tax, the
excess profits tax and present
corporation income tax could be

consolidated into a single tax
on corporation incomes.

The untime deterrent against

family up. leaving profts.

270

Reduction in top surtax rates
Present law.

The maximum surtax rate is now 75

percent on net incomes in excess of $5,000,000. Under
the 1932 Act it was 55 percent on incomes in excess of
$1,000,000, and under the 1926 Act, effective for the
period through 1931, it was 20 percent on incomes in
excess of $100,000.

Recommendation Reduce the upper surtax rates
to a maximum of 60 percent, Yeaving the maximum combined

normal and surtax rate at 64 percent.

Reason for change. The present top bracket

rates are too high. Disregarding State taxes, the taxpayer is left with as little as twenty-one cents out of his
highest dollar of income. If State taxes are taken into
account, even less is left. The high rates tend to discourage the assumption of business risks, to bring about
the hoarding of savings or the purchase of tax-exempt
securities, and to depress the economy. If the surtax

rates were reduced, wealthy individuals would be encouraged
to assume certain business risks which with the present high
rates do not appear to be worthwhile.

Revenue effects. If the top bracket surtax rate
is limited to 60 percent and all other provisions in present
law remain unchanged, it is estimated on the basis of

calendar year 1939 business that the revenue from the
individual income tax would be reduced $11.5 million.

271

- 15 -

6. The top rates in the individual
to

change

surtax schedule could be lowered.

in further Information my are
to
the

furnish it and will be happy to work with you
extent you may desire. Also, I recognize

I n other une features tax of the returns 0.00 71000 riches
tiel deteriente, MP. will be gird to asatac in

people Do they refent in ume from state munial

Income from gifts
Carter glass amendment 60-75 diffending
m in come from gm.)

272

- 16 -

I shall not discuss in detail any of the six
possible changes just mentioned. If you are interested in further information, my staff and I are prepared
to furnish it and will be happy to work with you to
the extent you may desire. Also, I recognize that
other features of the tax law are considered by some to
be business deterrents, and, if you feel they are sub-

stantial deterrents, we will be glad to assist in
their examination.

- 17 -

273

Most of the tax changes that I have mentioned
will reduce the revenue-producing capacity of the

system. If these or other similar changes are adopted
ways must be found of replacing the lost revenue. If
tax revision were to take the form only of tax reductions
uncertainty of business with respect to our fiscal program would be accentuated. The result would be to injure
and not help business. We must take no step which the
public may interpret as moving away from the objective

of a balanced budget. The taxes resorted to for replacement of lost revenue should have the least harm-

ful effects on business and should contribute to greater

equity. I suggest the following possibilities:

A single corporation tax on net income
Present law. Under the present law several corpora274
tion taxes are imposed: a capital stock tax, an excess-

profits tax, an undistributed profits tax, and the ordinary
income tax. The income tax itself is complex. A flat rate,
together with what in effect is a tax on undistributed
profits, is imposed on corporations with incomes over
$25,000. Graduated rates are imposed on corporations with
incomes of $25,000 and less. Further, several classes of

corporations, irrespective of their size, are subject to
flat income tax rates.

Recommendation. Substitute for the capital stock tax,
excess-profits/tax, and the corporation income/tax (which

in the 1938 law includes a tax on undistributed profits in
the form of a credit for dividends paid) A single corpora-

tion tax on/net/income. If other previously recommended
changes in corporation taxes are made to permit loss carryover and deduction of capital losses from ordinary income,
the rates of such a tax/would need to be approximately
18 percent on net incomes under $10,000, 19 percent on net
incomes of $10,000 to/$25,000, 21 percent on net incomes
of $25,000 to $50,000, and 22 percent on net incomes of

$50,000 and over, in order to replace the revenues of the
existing corporation tax structure.
Reasons for change. The present system of corporate
taxes is complex, discouraging to enterprise, and inequit-

able. The capital stock and excess-profits taxes have
been discussed previously. The undistributed profits tax
component has added substantially to the complexity of

the corporation income tax. At the present rate it is in-

effective and there seems no possibility of securing

passage of an effective tax, while the hostility to it is
very great. If all corporate taxes are consolidated into

a single tax on net income, the taxes on new business, on
business with unstable incomes, and on business with no income would be substantially reduced. The increases would,
in general, fall on the larger and more stable businesses.
Example. A corporation with net income of $1,000,000

declaring the most favorable value for its capital stock,

$10,000,000, is required under the present law to pay cor-

porate taxes of from $175,000 to $200,000, depending upon

the distribution of dividends, as against $218,900 under
the proposed single corporation income tax. If the corporation made a less favorable declaration of capital
stock value -- either higher or lower -- the taxes under

the present law would be relatively greater. If in the next

year this corporation had no net income, it would under the

present law still be required to pay a capital stock tax of
$10,000, whereas under the single corporation income tax

there would be no tax liability.

275

- 18 -

1. The corporation income tax rate
could be increased.

will have to being in as much
revenue. This is a very difficult

problem for

276

Recommendation. No specific recommendations are made.

Reason for change. If the revenue system is to be
made more equitable by removing certain of the undesirable
indirect taxes that now unduly burden the low income classes,

and if the income tax itself is to be improved by allowing
losses to offset profits and gains and in other ways, 80
that it will not curb business enterprise, it is necessary to
increase the revenue-raising powers of the individual
income tax. The top rates are now too high and should be

lowered. Consequently, if the individual income tax is to

raise more revenue, the middle bracket rates must be increased.

Example. No specific example can be given.

Middle bracket individual income tax rates

277

Present law. The individual income tax rates under
the present law are relatively low on incomes under $250,000.
The effective rate of tax on $10,000 received by a married man

with no dependents is only 4.2 percent; on $20,000 it is

7.9 percent, on $40,000, 14.9 percent, on $100,000, 32.5 percent, and on $250,000, 51.3 percent.

The existing surtax rate schedule of the income tax is

as follows:

:Rate: Total

Amount of surtax

Amount of surtax

:per-: surtax : :

net income

net income

:cent:cumulative::

0 $ 4,000

4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 22,000 26,000 32,000 38,000 44,000 50,000 56,000 -

::

0

0

6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
22,000
26,000
32,000
38,000
44,000
50,000
56,000
62,000

80

4
$

180

5

300

6
6

440

7

600

8

780

9

1,000
1,260
1,560
2,240
3,380
4,640
6,080
7,700
9,560
11,660

11
13

15
17
19
21

24
27

31
35

$

:Rate:

Total

:per-:

surtax

:cent:cumulating

62,000 - $ 68,000
68,000 74,000
74,000 80,000
80,000 90,000
90,000 - 100,000
100,000 - 150,000
150,000 - 200,000
200,000 - 250,000
250,000 - 300,000
300,000 - 400,000
400,000 - 500,000
500,000 - 750,000
750,000 -1,000,000
1,000,000 -2,000,000
2,000,000- 5,000,000

39

5,000,000 up

$

14,000

43

16,580

47

19,400

51

24,500

55

30,000

58

59,000

60

89,000

62

120,000

64

152,000

66

218,000

68

286,000

70

461,000

72

641,000

73

1,371,000

74

3,591,000

75

The tax and effective rate of tax on a married man with
no dependents at various income levels is as follows:

:

1,589
5,979

rate

:: exemption

0.3
1.9
4.2
7.9
14.9

$ 100,000
250,000
500,000

1,000,000
5,000,000

:

415

:

8

116

:: before

:

$

Effective

Amount

:Effective

of
Tax

:

:

Tax

:

3,000
6,000
10,000
20,000
40,000

of

:: Net income

:

$

Amount

:

Net income
before
exemption

$ 32,469
128,294
304,144
679,044

3,788,994

60.8

67.9
75.8

278

-192. Individual income tax rates
could be increased.

There is merit tv suggestion
between 15.000 and 250 mo.
an relatively low compared with

in unes less than 15 and
th an 250 and
additional nine income could be 9 other
here, the Fun thermum good individual city shiel

its is felt thatoreven
a yearand
more 1500 and family would be

up to
for and
flat tax
thanistro
could 2505

withing should to hay a small

279

:

1,000,000
4,000,000
10,000,000
60,000,000

$

:

50,000
100,000
400,000

:

$

Tax

:

Net estate
before exemption

200

4,200
58,600
211,000

1,388,800
4,936,600
39,334,600

Effective
rate

0.4%

4.2
14.7
21.1
34.7
49.4
65.6

Recommendation: No specific recommendation.
Reasons for change. The excessive specific exemptions

allowed under the present estate and gift taxes limit transfor taxation to a comparatively few large estates. The in-

surance exclusion discriminates in favor of investment in
life insurance as against other desirable forms of investment.

The transfer tax, like the individual income tax, is levied

at graduated rates and is one of the most important instruments
for bringing about an equitable distribution of tax burdens and
a more equal distribution of wealth. The role of the transfer
taxes should be increased, especially since it is desirable
to repeal some of the indirect and other regressive taxes that
now are included in the tax system. This would be done if the
estate and gift taxes were coordinated, if the exemptions were
lowered, if the insurance exclusion were disallowed, and if
the middle bracket rates of the single transfer tax were raised
substantially above those in the present estate tax.

280

Exemptions, insurance exclusion. and middle bracket

rates of the estate and gift taxes

Present law. Under the present law a specific exemption
of $40,000 and an exclusion of $40,000 for insurance payable
to beneficiaries other than the estate are allowed under the
estate tax, and a specific exemption of $40,000 is allowed

under the gift tax. The middle bracket estate tax rates are
low. The effective estate tax rate on a net estate of $50,000
is only 6 percent, on a net estate of $100,000, 9.6 percent,
and on a net estate of $400,000, 16.7 percent.
The estate tax rate schedule is as follows:

(Dollars in thousands)
: Bracket : Cumulative

Net

: rate :

estate
$

0$
10
20
30

10
20

$

30

6

40

8

50

10

50

70

12

70

100

14

100

200

17

400

20

600

23

800

26

800 - 1,000
1,000 - 1,500
1,500 - 2,000

-

2%
4

40

200 400 600 -

tax

29
32
35

.2

.6

1.2
2.0
3.0
5.4
9.6
26.6
66.6
112.6
164.6
222.6
382.6

::
H

Net

:Bracket

estate

$ 2,000 - $2,500

2,500 - 3,000
3,000 - 3,500
3,500 - 4,000
4,000 - 4,500
4,500 - 5,000
5,000 - 6,000
6,000 - 7,000
7,000 - 8,000
8,000 - 9,000

9,000 - 10,000
10,000 - 20,000
20,000 - 50,000
50,000 -

rate

Cumulatin
tax

38
41

44
47

1,172.6

50
53

1,657

56

1,922.1

59

2,482.6

61

3,072

63

65

3,682
4,312

67

69

11,662.5

70

32,362.6

The gift tax rates are three-fourths of the estate tax rates.
The tax and effective rates under existing law for
selected sizes of net estate (before exemption) are as
follows:

- 20 -

3. Estate and gift taxes could be
increased.

281

282

Percentage Depletion

Present law. Percentage depletion is allowed in
the present law for oil and gas wells at the rate of 27 percent of gross income; for metal mines, 15 percent; for
surphur mines or deposits, 23 percent; and for coal mines,
5 percent. The percentage depletion is limited, however, to
50 percent of the net income computed without allowance for
depletion.

Recommendation. Reduce the percentages for de-

pletion by 50 percent, to be 13 3/4 percent for oil and gas
wells, 7 percent for metal mines, 11 percent for sulphur
mines or deposits, and 2 percent for coal mines. (Even
greater decreases could be justified.)
Reasons for change. The purpose of depletion.

like the purpose of depreciation, is to enable the taxpayer
to recoup his capital investment in the property tax-free,
If, however, the depletion charges are related to gross income

rather than cost, it is possible for the taxpayer to

continue to take a deduction for depletion long after the
full cost of the property has been charged off. So long as
the property is producing, the depletion charges continue.
Percentage depletion thus provides what is in effect a sub-

sidy to the oil and mineral interests, a privilege not

granted to other types of business. This subsidy is not
uniform among the different oil and mineral industries or
among concerns in any of them. Concerns with low-cost, long-

lived properties receive the most benefit. The excessive

deductions under percentage depletion are thus inequitable,

while they result in a substantial loss in revenue.

Example. If a corporation takes $5,000,000 depletion allowance for oil and gas properties on the basis of
271% of gross income, while only 10 per cent of gross income

is required to return the cost of the properties, the corporation
in effect receives a tax subsidy of from $525,000 to $604,545.
depending upon the amount of dividends distributed. Sample
Studies indicate that on the average the percentages of gross
income necessary to return cost are less than 10 percent, and
that in many instances much less than 10 percent would be
sufficient.

- 21 -

4. A special privilege of the present
law is the allowance of excessive

deductions for depletion of oil and
gas wells and certain mines. As the
Treasury has often pointed out, a
substantial amount of revenue can

be recovered by closing this loophole.

In suggesting this change I am fully
aware that it will be opposed by power-

ful vested interests, despite its
obvious equity.

283

284

- 22 In this statement emphasis was laid first on
the importance of sound fiscal policy, and a suggestion was made for a Joint Congressional Committee

as a me ans to the formulation of such policy. Secondly,
the ne ed for a commission to study Federal-State fiscal

relations was stressed, and thirdly, alternative programs
for adjusting federal taxes to eliminate features that
may deter business were outlined.

It will take time for the results of fiscal planning toward a balanced budget and for the removal of tax

deterrents to be fully effective. Obviously, fiscal
factors constitute only one of many aspects of our eco-

nomic problem. I feel, however, that if something
substantial is done along the lines I have discussed
people can look forward with more assurance for the next
five or ten years and business growth and development

will proceed more rapidly than they otherwise would.

100ml

285

Jee
Berlin, May 2, 1939.
My dear Mr. Secretary:

I feel very grateful for the opportunity to
its value will be proved in my later reporting.
I think your decision to cancel my instructions to

return to the States which you gave me, and I hope
proceed to Poland, Hungary and Roumania was a wise

one because this tense period is not one in which
to get out of touch with the changing situation in
Berlin.

I returned to find that the financial, monetary

and general economic strain had intensified. But,
as I have reported in my telegrams, the deterioration
is so slow, the power of the Government is still so

great and the passivity of the German people so extreme,

that there is little likelihood that economic difficulties

and the impairment of the standard of living will
generate an effective public discontent which might
modify the unfortunate policies here.
Many of my most useful sources of information

and opinion here are in the second rank of officials.
If you can get them to come out to lunch or dinner
quietly, or, better, to take holiday or week-end
excursions, they will speak more or less frankly.

They are in almost all cases young Germans highly
educated under the previous regime, who have gone into

civil service as a career. Many, perhaps the majority,

of this class have become members of the National

Socialist Party. It is indeed a practical necessity
for them to be members if they are to advance or even
retain their positions in the Government. I know of
some cases where this type of Government official is
not a member of the Party, but usually it is because

some previous connection, say with the Labor Movement

or Social Democrats, made him ineligible for Party
membership. The attitude of these young Liberals is
that
The Honorable

Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,

Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

286
-2-

that, given the strength of the National Socialist
Movement, there is no possibility of combatting from
without. The only alternative, they say, is to

strengthen their position in the government and attempt
to modify the movement and wait until a favorable

internal or external event will bring about its downfall.
It may be said here that in the majority this group
are inclined to be moderately Socialist in their views.
They do not disapprove of the increase of state inter-

vention and the control of industry and commerce under

the National Socialist regime. What they object to is
the restriction on personal liberty, freedom of thought
and the present policy of military aggression, instead
of international cooperation, which they feel will
eventually lead to a European war.

In the main, up to Munich, this group had believed

that a firm stand would be made against Hitler. After
Munich, and particularly after the taking of Czechoslovakia,

about half of them have become entirely pessimistic,
and the remainder do not have too much hope. They believe
that had a firm opposition been manifested by France and
England during the past few years, Hitler would have been
afraid to go to war, and the check to his prestige would
have been sufficient to have started the end of the regime.
If he refused to obey the opposition and went to war,
then they figure that the regime was also bound to crumble,
and they hoped that with a change of regime war could
be stopped on terms not too onerous to Germany.

During the crisis of last September the opposition
to Hitler's policy was almost vocal, as were their hopes
that Chamberlain would take a firm stand with regard
to Czechoslovakia. Most of them profoundly distrust

Chamberlain and the more ardent Democrats amongst them

dislike him, if possible, even more than Hitler.
They regard Chamberlain as being secretly very sympathetic
to National Socialist organization, particularly as
regards the control of labor, and still under the delusion
that Hitler's aims are definitely limited to Eastern

Europe and that the Führer can be "appeased" against
making forays against the Western Powers. They are very

dubious as to the real strength and capacity of Daladier.
Their one hope is in President Roosevelt, in whose
democratic ideals and ability they have a very considerable belief.
This group is more alarmist about Hitler's aims

than the latter's foreign critics. They point to the
program

287

-3-

program and psychology as exemplified in "Mein Kampf"

and his actions since he has been in power. They think
him obsessed with the idea of dominating Europe and with
putting Germany in the position occupied by the British
Empire in the first half of the Nineteenth Century.
The limitations of education, experience, judgment and
tradition which restrained Bismarck after the FrancoPrussian War do not exist in the case of Hitler. They
declare it is only too obvious that he sees history as
sheer battle of force in which one race or country for a
time battles its way to primacy knocking down its
predecessors on the way up. They think that he judges
that now or never is the time for Germany to make this
effort because with further delay opponents will gain
strength faster than she will.
I took a holiday walk in the country recently with
one of this group, a man in the second rank of officers
of one of the most important Ministries. He declined to
believe that the 25 percent additional duties which the
a

Treasury imposed on German exports to the United States

was done in view of the provisions of our anti-dumping

legislation, but said that he highly approved the action
for what, in spite of my explanations, he insisted it
was,- a political move. He said that in his opinion
only further actions of economic restriction, the
successful resistance of China to Japan, and a firm
stand by England and France on the Polish question,

even to the point of sending French and British troops
to Poland, might have some chance of restraining Hitler
and bringing about the end or progressive deterioration
of the National Socialist regime. He remarked that as

a

German he thought that the return of Danzig and the
Corridor to Germany must eventually be conceded; but he
said that such concessions at the present time without
exacting a firm commitment as to disarmament, would be

fatal and merely lead Hitler on to keep up the tension
until English public opinion gave way, and start

stirring up feeling against and in Poland until the
Poles capitulated. He remarked that he had little faith
that either action would be taken; that Chamberlain would
doubtless give way. He ended by saying that if the
present regime were to be checked, that eventually
concessions in the way of Danzig, colonies and trade

would have to be given, but it would be a terrible

error, given Hitler's psychology, to let the offer of
concessions precede an unmistakable firm stand. If
concessions were talked up in advance of opposition
they would be taken as evidence of weakness.

I

288
-4-

I recite the foregoing not as a suggestion of
policy or as being a correct analysis of the aims
and psychology of Hitler and the National Socialist
Movement, but merely report it as an interesting
example of the under-cover opposition that still
exists against this regime among German officials.
With Hitler's successes and ineffective opposition
so far manifested against them, this type of
opposition is tending, however, to dissolve into
cynical pessimism that the world is deserting
international cooperation for a period of power
politics, and that if this is the case Germany
might
as well be the victor as well as any other
country.
Sincerely yours,
Donald R. Heath

289
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Embassy, Berlin, Germany

DATE: May 2, 1939, 2 p.m.

Received: May 3, 7:20 a.m.

No. : 304
Reference is made to telegram No. 78 of April 4
from the Department.

The "voluntary"levies applied on practically all
branches of German industry are still the chief source
of the German export subsidy fund. An effort has been
made to avoid the charge that the Government is sub-

sidizing by having the industrial organizations which are
comprised within the Reich Chamber of Economy collect

the levies rather than the Government - but in this

totalitarian state this Chamber is essentially a Government branch. Every industry is assessed a certain

percentage of its domestic turnover. The amount is to
be paid into the export subsidy fund. For certain branches
of industry, however, quite complicated keys are used
as a calculation basis in which production, turnover
and profit are combined; for others there is applied
something in the nature of a flat excise tax on each
unit produced.

Under the original scheme, levies were prescribed

which ranged from 1/2 percent to 3 percent. It was
inaugurated in the early part of 1935, and in the
12 month period after its inauguration was expected
to

290

-2to yield some 622,000,000 marks. It was understood that
later certain industries which did not come under the

levy at first were subjected to it, and the levy on others
was increased, 80 that during the first year the fund
operated some 750,000,000 marks were collected. It was

expected that contributions to the subsidy fund from
other sources would increase the fund to about one billion
marks. Recently new warnings have been issued against

revealing information about present levies, and because

of the heavy penalties, details are practically unobtainable. However, it is understood from a reliable and still
fairly well-informed source that the present levies take
on the average about 1 percent more of the domestic

turnover than was taken by the original levies. There
fore it is supposed that something over one billion marks
per annum might be the total income from the levies now.
However, other sources of income than the levies

help to build the export subsidy fund. As an illustration, domestic prices of many commodities which are

imported have been fixed at levels which are far above

the world prices - either for the protection of domestic
producers, or because the commodity is in general im-

ported and paid for in depreciated #aski marks" or over
"inland accounts* which results in the imported goods

being over-priced. If it is possible for an importer
to

291

-3to get foreign exchange at the mark's official rate,
he can purchase such commodities far below the price on
the domestic market in Germay. However, the importer

is not often allowed to keep this "windfall" profit.
It is understood that in some cases he must pay it
forthwith into the Gold Discount Bank, which in turn

transmits it to the subsidy fund. It is understood that
the subsidy fund also receives mark profits on other types
of transactions, such as the repatriation of foreign
bonds by German concerns.

I have at last been given what I consider is a
roughly reliable estimate that the export subsidy fund
proper will in the year 1939 receive some thirteen hundred
million marks from the "voluntary levies" and miscellaneous

sources, if there is continuation of the present rate of
payments into the fund.
There must be added to the export fund proper, how-

ever, the hidden additional subsidy effect which results
from the fact that German exporters are permitted to
quote their wares in "aski" or other blocked marks selling
at a discount in their trade with Latin America and other
areas. A mark is a mark to the German exporter oror
tonot
anyone else inside Germany, regardless of whether/such

mark was paid for by the foreign importer at the aski
mark rate". Therefore the German exporter does not
have

292

-4have to apply for a bounty as long as the thirty percent
discount, say, at which the mark exchange is bought by
the Latin American customer, is sufficient to bring
the prices quoted by the exporter in line with those

of foreign competition. There is a similar effect from
the "inland account" system by which much of the trade

has been carried on with the United States recently.

The subsidy effect is in this trade divided by the German
consumer who is charged an over-price for commodities

coming from these areas which is equal to the amount
of the discount of the blocked mark which has been used

in the transaction. For the year 1938 imports from
Latin America by Germany totaled some 800,000,000 marks.

Using 30 percent as the average discount of aski marks
used in the trade with Latin America, apparently exports

to Latin America have the effect of a hidden export
bounty which presumably amounts to something like

240,000,000 marks. As yet I do not have available the

figures for imports of cotton and copper from the United
States into Germany under the "inland accounts". There
was about a 33 1/3 percent over-price for cotton, and
apparently some 66 2/3 percent over-price for copper.
Many millions of marks must have been provided in

"windfall profits* through the over-price received for
these

293

-5dollar
these commodities, and undoubtedly the/price of exports

to the United States was brought down through these

profits.
Reports come from certain newspaper correspondents

that the money which was appropriated by the Reich budget

law for the current fiscal year for the purpose of
assuming "guarantees for promoting German foreign trade
up to a maximum amount of 500 million marks" must be

added to the regular subsidy fund of the Reich. The
purpose of this appropriation, according to the best
information and opinion available, is that of a revolving
fund for granting long and medium term credits for German

exports, rather than to provide export bounties. Atten-

tion is called to the fact that during the fiscal year
just ended 100 million marks were appropriated for this
purpose, and 300 million in the year 1937. The German
Government appropriated similarly 200 or 300 million marks

for long term export credits prior to the National
Socialist Hungarian Government (sic). Therefore one
can hardly class as subsidies funds from this appropria-

tion except to the extent that the interest rate
at which they are made available to Germanconstitute
exporters

is so low (practically non-existent) as to faxa/an export
bounty in the form of interest economies.
Recently

294

-6Recently the Reichsbank inaugurated measures which

tend to lower the cost of financing export business and
to restrict the risk connected with foreign exchange
transactions, and these measures are another form of

indirect bounty. The exporter, under these measures,

can discount his bills at the rate existing in the
country in whose currency they are drawn, regardless of

what the rate is in the country in which the bills are
payable. In other words, if a German exporter to Turkey
discounting
quotes in pounds, instead of qxaking/at the Turkish
or the German rate of 4 percent, he can discount at the
British discount rate of 2 percent. The Reichabank will

discount at 1 percent bills drawn in dollars. The
reduction from previous discount rates is as much as
3 or 4 percent in the case of export bills drawn on

certain countries. The handling charges for export
bills has also been reduced by the Reichabank, which

is offering exchange fluctuation insurance in discounting
export bills now.

Still another indirect subsidy the value of which
cannot at the present time be computed in terms of
money is the provision in the new finance plan whereunder

concerns exporting one-fourth of their production are
permitted either to make a deduction from taxable income

or an additional write-off for depreciation of up to
10

295

7-

10 percent of the amount they hold in certain tax

anticipation certificates which the Reich is now issuing.
Those establishments which do not export as much as

one-fourth of their production may make additional

write-offs or subtract from taxable income 1 percent
of the amount of such certificates in their possession
for every 2 percent of increased exports made by them.
There may also be mentioned, in conclusion, the

inducement to export in the form of preferential allocation of raw materials to establishments which export

a substantial part of what they produce. There is a
chronic shortage of raw materials at present, and firms
are prepared to take on or keep up export business

even if they lose on it 80 that raw materials can be
secured to carry on profitable production for domestic
use. No way is of course known of computing how much

this preferential treatment amounts to.
Taking the estimate of 1,300,000,000 marks as the

amount in the "subsidy fund proper", and if exports
continue at the 1938 level of 6,000,000,000 marks, the
rate of subsdidy would on the average be some 22 percent.
If there is added two hundred and forty hundred(sic)

million marks for the subsidy effect on export trade by
transactions

-8-

296

transactions with Latin America in the aski mark, slightly
more than 25 percent would be the average rate of subsidy.
There must be added to this the unknown amounts from the

subsidy effect of aski mark" or inland account transactions
with countries other than those of Latin America. Allowance
must also be made for the subsidy effect of Reichsbank

discount reductions for exporters and the tax reductions
to exporters which the "new finance plan" will effect.
The rate of subsidy is not uniform. There are wide

variations from time to time, in different industries,

in different factories, in different products, in different
shipments, and in different export markets. No subsidy
is needed or granted for certain German specialties.
Where certain countries have considerable blocked balances
forcing them to purchase from Germany, exports to those
countries can be passed on with a minimum subsidy or not

any at all even though competing suppliers could supply
the goods more cheaply. German goods require little or
no subsidies in certain cases where the prices are
maintained and markets are allocated by international

cartel arrangements. Every factory in practice keeps
on file with the subsidy fund examining office their
"rock bottom" prices in marks for the products which they
export.

Fairly

297

-9Fairly reliable information becomes available from
time to time as to subsidy rates on given transactions
or on given commodities. It is thus known that one
factory which exports manufactured copper products

receives subsidies which vary from 11 percent to 22
percent. The average motor vehicle subsidy is about

30 percent, according to a fairly reliable indication,
although there has been reported one instance of a sale
in South Africa where a 46 percent subsidy was paid.

It is also known that a subsidy of 50 percent was offered
in the case of a cotton glove shipments from the Sudetenland.

Publicly and privately various officials have insisted that the average subsidy rate is well below the
dollar devaluation of 40 percent, but I have been
inclined to discount their assertions. However, last
week a similar assurance was given to me by a person

who is in touch with the subsidy program (although not
connected with the administration of the program) and
in whom I have great confidence. This person told me
that he had been surprised at the relatively low
bounties with which German export trade had been able

to maintain itself, in view of the disparity between
German domestic and world prices. He said that if bounties of more than 40 percent had been given, they
constituted

298

- 10 constituted rare exceptions, that in general subsidies
were "considerably" under 40 percent.
Very good information has come to us, on the

other hand, that the over-price for American copper
imported over inland accounts was about 66 2/3 percent.
Such an over-price would enable firms engaged in

such operations to take a loss of 40 percent, minus
their profits, on German goods which is exported in
return for the copper.
Reference is made only to bounties paid from the
subsidy fund, in the foregoing examples of subsidy

percentages. If the inland price level is the standard
of measure, then we must add at least several percent,
since German exporters have been frequently content to

export at little or no profit, and recoup from their
domestic sales, in order to maintain old markets to
spread their overhead costs or as a result of Government

pressure or preferential treatment in allocation of
raw materials. It is reported that one large electrical
firm conducted its export business at a loss, although
international cartel arrangements protect it in certain
areas.

It is requested that the foregoing be transmitted

03V13038

to Treasury as Heath's telegram No. 23.
are 1. YAM
END OF MESSAGE.
TRANTRATION YAURANT

EA:LWW

GEIST. to will
# Industries

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE May 3, 1939
Secretary Morgenthau

Mr. Foley, Acting General Counsel
For your information

At the request of the State Department, Bernstein and I went
over to see Judge Moore and Mr. Hackworth relative to a group of
proclamations and orders which the War and Navy Departments have

been preparing in consultation with the State Department. These

proclamations and orders relate to the neutral position which the

United States will take in the event of the existence of war. The
Treasury was asked to go over the documents and participate in a
conference together with the State, War and Navy Departments to be

held some time during the coming week. I was told that these documents are being drafted simply as a measure of preparation and that

they were to be kept entirely confidential.

i.w.th.

299

300

REB

GRAY

Berlin
Dated May 3, 1939

Rec'd 1:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

313, May 3, 7 P. m.
No. 24 FOR TREASURY FROM HEATH.

The currency circulation of the Third Reich reached
a new high at the End of April according to the Reichsbank
statement issued today. It stood at ten thousand SEVEN
hundred twenty-six million marks a figure two hundred
forty million marks higher than a month ago and roughly
two thousand six hundred million marks higher than a
year ago.

Since the End of February 1938 the currency circulation has increased to date SOME three thousand five

hundred million marks. of this increase one thousand
one hundred and twenty-four million marks is attributable
to the Exchange of Austrian schillings and Czech crowns
as a result of the Anschluss and the Sudetenland acquisi-

tion. An undetermined amount of the increase is occasioned
by the KEMEL acquisition and the taking over of Bohemia,
Moravia,

301

REB

2-#313, From Berlin, May 3, 7 p.m.

Moravia, in which latter areas the mark has the status
of the secondary currency. Making due allowance for
these two last developments and for the increase in

employment and business activity in all sections of the
Reich there remains an increase of apparently something
over a billion marks which must be considered as of an

inflationary nature.
GEIST

HPD

03V13038
org & Yum
YMUSA-FT

adida will
material STE must

302
TELEGRAM SENT

PAP

GRAY

May 3, 1939
2 p.m.
AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)
332

FOR COCHRAN

The Secretary of the Treasury requests you to
return for discussion with the Treasury on the NORMANDIE

sailing May 10. If this is agreeable to the Ambassador
the Department authorizes it.
HULL
(HF)

EA :HF:LNN

03V13038
aro 1 V.M
THENTHA930 VNUPA NT
technical

303
GRAY

PAP

LONDON

Dated May 3, 1939
REC'D 2:22 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

600, May 3, 6 p.m.
FOR TREASURY FROM BUTTERWORTH

Strictly Confidential
OnE. I questioned the British Treasury regarding
the war risk insurance situation referred to in paragraph
No. 1 of my 595, May 2, 6 p.m. and was definitely informed that the war risk insurance measures had not

been designed to hinder or limit arbitrageurs; that they
had been put on a sterling basis merely because the

British monarchical authorities did not wish to under-

take a large contingent dollar liability which, if it
matured, would be at a time when the British Government

would have urgent need of such dollar funds as were avail-

able to it for other purposes. The British Treasury
referred to the informal assurances given to the arbitrageurs by the Bank of England and said that this was
an attempt to Effect a working compromise.

Two. The British Treasury stated that the press rEports to the Effect that Leith-Ross had been authorized
to

304

PAP -2- 600, May 3, 6 p.m. from London
to increase the credit to be given to Rumania under the

"political" Export credit guarantees scheme from five
to ten million pounds WERE incorrect and arose out of the
fact that a reduction in the proposed interest charges
from six to five per cent would be accorded the Rumanians.

But the capital sum of 5,000,000 pounds stood. LeithRoss is still discussing the rate of Exchange problem
and I gathered that an Anglo-Rumanian Trade Corporation

would be set up in which King Cerol will have A personal
and perhaps lucrative interest.
Three. Leith-Ross has been authorized to offer the

Greeks a two million pound credit under the political
export credit guarantees scheme.

Four. Again, for no ascErtainable reason, the London
Stock Exchange was firmer today: most Equities WERE up

and war loan improved one fourth to close at 91 3/4. The
foreign Exchange market was very inactive but the British
control today had to give SOME spot dollars and a good

deal of forward at 2 1/16. 126 bars WERE sold at gold,
fixing of which 37 WERE married the Bank of England supplying SOME 50 bars. Samuel Montagu was the only buyer.

03V13038
HPD

orog s Y&M
VRUFAHRT

extense? ad to
TAKING N N testains

KENNEDY

305
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Embassy, Paris, France

DATE: May 3, 1939, 6 p.m.

NO.: 876
FROM COOHRAN.

Very quiet Paris exchange market, with neither

sales nor purchases by French control. It is said that
yesterday subscriptions to the new French three-year
national defense bonds amounted to 250,000,000 francs.

Attempt is being made by officials to sell to investors
50 percent in these bonds, and 50 percent in the twoyear national defense bonds.
Beck's reply to Germany is awaited on the market,

but in the meantime the market is fairly cheerful.
BULLITT.

03V13038
appy t Y4M
natural not KNO

EALWW
issued

(mither giving me export would
TREASURY DEPARTMENT

bigares
306

INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE May 3, 1939

TO

FROM

Secretary Margenthau

Mr. Haaa DA.

AA

Subject: Causes of the recent upturn in wheat prices.

The recent rise in wheat prices has been confined largely
chiefly to speculative buying on unfavorable crop news from
the Southwest, coupled with covering of short positions in
the May future where a tight technical situation apparently
exists. An increase in the demand for cash wheat abroad
to this country and Canada, and appears to have been due

has apparently been a market influence, though it is difficult to determine whether the price rise has stimulated the
export demand, or whether a more active export demand has

been an underlying price factor.
Recent price trends

In the attached ohart we compare the trends of May
wheat futures in leading world markets from April 17 through
May 2, which covers the period since the beginning of the
recent upturn.

It will be noted (1) that the price at Buenos Aires has
not shared in the rise, and that the Liverpool price has
been affected only during the past two days (though other
wheat futures at Liverpool have been slightly stronger);
(2) that the price at Winnipeg has risen less than at Chicago;
(3) that the price at Chicago is substantially above those in
the other markets, making it impracticable at present to use
this country as a source of supply, except under an export
subsidy. The Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation says

that the rise has spoiled our export business.
Causes of rise

According to trade reports (concurred in by Mr. Mehl
of the Commodity Exchange Administration) the rise has apparently been due to buying induced by adverse crop and

weather accounts coming from western Kansas and Oklahoma,

307

Secretary Morgenthau - 2

and to a lesser degree by the need for additional moisture
in the spring wheat areas. While it appears that most of

the crop damage is still in the potential stage, lack of a
subsoil moisture reserve over important western areas has
intensified the effect of recent dry weather on prices.
A possible contributing factor, in the belief of
Mr. Mehl, may be a tight technical position in the May future
at Chicago, resulting from a relativoly small supply of
ordinary grades available for delivery on contracts. While
trade interests with short hedges in May could deliver

premium grades which they hold, they would receive less than
the market premiums, hence there has apparently been a move-

ment to cover short positions in the May future.

Evidence of this tightness appears in a rise in May

futures to a premium of 1 3/4 cents over September (on
May 1) as compared with a 1/4-cent premium a week earlier.
In contrast, the May future at Liverpool during the same
period had weakened in comparison with the October future,
dropping to a discount of 2 1/4 cents (on May 1) as compared

with a discount of 1 1/4 cents a week earlier.

No evidence was available in the C.E.A. to indicate any
accumulation of wheat futures (in anticipation of war, for
example). While an increased volume of trading has accompanied the rise in prices, there has been a decline in the
open interest -- total of outstanding long (or short) futures
contracts -- from 67,354,000 bushels on April 22 to

65,526,000 bushels on May 1. The open interest in May futures
alone has declined during this period from 20,421,000 bushels

to 10,700,000.

World export demand increased

Trade reports, confirmed by the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation, indicate that an active export demand
for wheat from Canada, Argentina, and Australia has been
evident in the past week, representing a marked increase
over previous weeks. The F. S. C. C. reports the following
export transactions during the past week:
Bushels

April 26:

Argentina to United Kingdom
Australia to United Kingdom
Australia to Shanghai

150,000
150,000
500,000

Secretary Morgenthau - 3

308

Bushels

April 27:

Canada to Greece

Australia to United Kingdom
Australia to China
April 28:
May 1:

Canada to United Kingdom

Australia to United Kingdom
Canada to United Kingdom

Australia to United Kingdom
Australia to China
May 2:

Canada to United Kingdom y

Argentina to United Kingdom
Australia to United Kingdom

Australia to China

750,000
200,000
500,000

1,500,000
250,000
500,000
250,000
250,000

1,500,000
500,000
500,000
500,000

(Exports to China, it should be

noted, may be destined for

Japanese consumption.)

Reports appear to have been definitely confirmed that
Argentina has contracted to sell 10,000,000 bushels to Spain
on credit. Argentina also is apparently pressing wheat on
the British market, part of which is expected to be delivered
on May Liverpool futures. This may explain the relative weakness in that future in comparison with other futures on the

Liverpool market.

Export demand for American wheat has fallen to practically

nothing, since the price rise has put our markets still further
out of line with other world markets. Exports from Gulf ports
recently reported have been on earlier sales. The F.S.C.C.
reports that they have made no export sales of wheat in nearly
a week, though subsidized flour sales have continued at about
the usual level. On May 2, for example, 29,000 barrels of
flour were sold, of which 18,000 went to the Philippines,

4,600 to China, and the rest in small lots to various other
countries.

Cents per Bushel, May Delivery

Closing Prices for wheat

75

608

Chicago-

7+
73

72
71

70

69
68

67

"
65

14
43

Liverpool

Winnipeg

62

61

Been Dires

60

59

7

18

19

20

2/

22

25

24

25

26

27

28

310

5-3-39

w dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I enclosing w proposed draft of reply for
your signature to the letter of Mr. Bradon.
The file is returned herewith.
Sincerely,

The President,
The White House.

Inclosures

311

Dear Sprailles

I was very pleased to receive your letter of March 27, to be
informed of the problems confrenting you, and to learn of President
Santos' cordial attitude regarding cooperation with the United

States. It is apparent that there is enough work in Begeta to
utilise your energy, tast, and insight.

I have noted the President's statement to you that he arranged
for the military and naval missions from our country in large part
as & demonstration of Celembia's confidence in the United States.

This, of course, is extremely gratifying. I - determined, however,
that these missions shall prove their officeey upon a purely pro-

fessional basis. Beth the War and Navy Departments know of my keen

interest in this matter, and I have every confidence that they will

give immediate attention to any recommendations received free
Captains Whitson and Reifenider.

I was glad to find that President Santos was interested in the
relationship between the peso and the dollar. This, it seens to
no, sight usefully represent an item in a broad program of economic
collaboration which sight be developed to the benefit of both comtries. I as sure be understands that such a program would be
facilitated if there were a prior settlement or at least on assampaying settlement, of the Colombian debt default.
I know that you will de what you can to oversome such diffsculties as those presented in the Bogeta telephone situation, and
that you will continue to exercise the excellent judgment which you
have shown in the past in such matters, endesvering to be helpful
without undertaking responsibility in matters not of direct concern
to us.

You know of the importance that I attach to the improvement

of our relations with the other American republica, and it will be
a

pleasure to hear from you from time to time about developments in

Colombia.

with warm personal regards, believe me, I Youre very sincerely,

The Henorable

Spruille Braden,
American Ambassador,
Begeta.
4/26/39

312

(In Miss Le Hand's writing:
"HM, Jr, Is this all right
on the financial end".)
April 14 1939

My dear Mr. President:
I have received your memorandum of April 4
enclosing a letter of March 27 from Ambaseador Braden,
in which he commented on various matters of interest

in our relations with Colombia.

In response to your request, I take pleasure in
enclosing a draft of a suggested reply to Mr. Braden
for your signature.
Faithfully yours,
Summer Welles

Enclosure:

Draft as stated.

From Spruille Braden,
March 27, 1939.

The President,
The White House.
RA:PFM:GRS 3/11/39

313

Dear Spruilles

I was very pleased to receive your letter of

March 27, to be informed of the problems confronting

you, and to learn of President Santos' cordial attitude regarding cooperation with the United States.
It is apparent that there is enough work in Bogota
to utilise your energy, tact, and insight.
I have noted the President's statement to you
that he arranged for the military and naval missions
from our country in large part as a demonstration of
Colombia's confidence in the United States. This,
of course, is extremely gratifying. I am determined,
however, that these missions shall prove their
efficacy upon a purely professional basis. Both the

War and the Havy Departments know of my keen interest

in this matter, and I have every confidence that they

will give immediate attention to any recommendations
received from Captains Whitson and Reifenider.

I was glad to find that President Santos was
interested in the relationship between the peso and

the dollar. This, it seems to me, might usefully

represent an item in a broad program of economic

collaboration which might be developed to the benefit
of both countries. I am sure he appreciates, however,

that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to

proceed with any such program unless there had been a

prior settlement or at least an accompanying settlement,
of the Colombian debt default. I was delighted to learn
that both the President and the Minister of Finance he
have

The Honorable

Spruille Braden,

American Ambassador,
Bogota.

have agreed in the desirability of a mutually satisfactory debt settlement rather than a unilateral
arrangement unfair to the bondholders, and it would
indeed be gratifying if this troublesome problem

could be quickly and satisfactorily adjusted.
I know that you will do what you can to overcome such difficulties as those presented in the
Bogota telephone situation, and that you will contime to exercise the excellent judgment which you

have shown in the past in such matters, endeavoring

to be helpful without undertaking responsibility in
satters not of direct concern to us.
You know of the importance that I attach to the

improvement of our relations with the other American
republics, and 11 will be a pleasure to hear from you
from time to time about developments in Colombia.
with warm personal regards, believe me, I am
Yours very sincerely,

RAILD:CZS:GRS 3/11/39

314

C

0

P

Y

Dear Spruille:

I was very pleased to receive your letter of
March 27, to be informed of the problems confronting

you, and to learn of President Santos' cordial atti-

tude regarding cooperation with the United States.
It is apparent that there is enough work in Bogota

to utilize your energy, tact, and insight.

I have noted the President's statement to you

that he arranged for the military and naval missions
from our country in large part as a demonstration of
Colombia's confidence in the United States. This,
of course, is extremely gratifying. I an determined,
however, that these missions shall prove their
efficacy upon a purely professional basis. Both the

War and the Navy Departments know of my keen interest

in this matter, and I have every confidence that they

will give immediate attention to any recommendations
received from Captains Whitson and Reifsnider.

I was lad to find that President Santos was
interested in the relationship between the peso and
the dollar. This, it seems to me, might usefully

represent an item in a broad program of economic
collaboration which flight be developed to the benefit

of both countries. am sure he appreciates, however,

that 4t would be very difficult fif not impossible, to

proceed with any such program whose there had been .
prior settlement or at least an accompanying settlement,

of the Colombian debt default, I was delighted to learn
that both the President and the Vinister of Finance
have

understand that such
a program would be
The Honorable
Spruille Braden,
American Ambassador,quality facilitated if
Bogota.

then were a

315

-2have agreed in the desirability of a mutually satisfactory debt settlement rather than a unilateral

arrangement unfair to the bondholders, and it would
indeed be gratify ing if this troublesome problem
could the quickly and satisfactorily adjusted.

I know that you will do what you can to overcome such difficulties as those presented in the
Bogota telephone situation, and that you will COBtinue to exercise the excellent judgment which you
have shown in the past in such matters, endeavoring

to be helpful without undertaking responsibility in
matters not of direct concern to us.
You know of the importance that I attach to the
improvement of our relations with the other American
republics, and it will be a pleasure to hear from you
from time to time about developments in Colombia.
With warm personal regards, believe me, I am
Yours very sincerely,

Lilefrix

Personal and Confidential

Bogota, March 27, 1939.
lick drifted 3/11/31
RA:-D

My dear Mr. President:

Having on February 15 presented my letter of
credence as your Ambassador to Colombia, I should

have reported to you long before now had I not
been completely overwhelmed by work on certain

situations requiring immediate attention. For
example:

1. From 1935 to 1937 inclusive,

I find the Texas Petroleum Company has

rendered false salary returns, thus although without direct benefit to
itself - bilking the Colombian Govern-

ment of taxes. I urged the company's
manager, who apparently is not
responsible for the fraud, to make. a
clean breast of it to the President and
to pay the defalcation (which including
fine amounts to $171,000 U.S.Cy.). But,
hoping not to be found out and fearing
his confession would not be treated in

the spirit
The President,
The White House.

-2-

the spirit it was made, he prefers to

follow the advice of his Colombian
lawyers and to risk possible discovery

by the authorities with resulting fine,
imprisonment and public denunciation.

2. Through the device of having
subsidiary corporations take up oil

concessions, some of the American
companies (although the Shell group is
the worst offender) have evaded the

acreage restrictions of the Colombian
petrolewi law. This is an unsound basis

on which to initiate, especially with
foreign capital, an industry which
promises to develop greatly in this
country and it may lead to trouble in

the future; therefore I am endeavoring

with both the Government and the
companies to assist in the accomodation

of the matter.

3. The Associated Telephone and
Telegraph Company, controlling close to

eight million dollars of telephone

properties in Colombia, has given such
execrable service, SO antagonized the

public and irritated Colombian officials
by stupid and procrastinating, not to
mention worse, tactics over the last

seven years that the summary expropriation

of their Bogota subsidiary was only
averted on March 6 by a hair's breadth.

The situation still is delicate, although

in a long distance telephone call to the
States I sufficiently aroused him to
bring about a more constructive attitude
by his representatives here. Also the
mayor of Bogotá has promised me not to
resort to extreme measures without first
consulting me and giving sufficient time
to arrive at some solution other than
expropriation and, if worse comes to the
worst, there will be prior indemnification.
president of the company in the United

The foregoing
TO

-3The foregoing and some other similar situations,
such as the United Fruit Company, American and

Foreign Power Company, etc., seem to justify

President Santos' request that I cooperate with him
in regard to the American corporations operating in
Colombia. He added: "Formerly the American
interests endeavored to coerce our governments by
threatening appeals to Washington - now we warn them

we will protest to Washington." I, of course, told
the President that while I was here his complaints
would not have to go beyond me since I was satisfied
I could bring any erring and recalcitrant American
companies into line.

Pursuant to your instructions, I informed
President Santos that you desired me to discuss with

him: A. The stabilization of the Colombian peso with
the dollar; and B. political cooperation between our
two Governments.

A. When I outlined your ideas concerning the need for and the manner in
which stabilization might be accomplished
through a Treasury to Treasury loan of

gold bullion, including therein the right
to purchase the metal over a period of
time, President Santos said he was very
grateful

-4grateful for the suggestion and decidedly
interested, particularly as Colombia's
problem was not to sustain the peso but

rather to prevent its appreciation in
value. He is anxious to explore the
possibilities of such cooperation and
will instruct his Minister of Finance to
pursue the subject with me.

B. President Santos in his reply to

my speech presenting credentials seized
upon certain expressions of mine to say:
"Never were circumstances

for the intensification of a

policy of rapprochement between

our nations more suitable than
today. The doctrine of President

Roosevelt, of solidarity for
common defense, based upon constant fidelity to the principles

of right and of Justice, has made
understanding between our peoples

easier and will make our friendship more solid, cordial and

lasting.

In a subsequent conversation, he
emphasized this viewpoint and said he

often had told his fellow citizens that

Colombia's greatest need was not morely

for friendship with the United States
but for the most Intimate confidence and
collaboration. Moreover Colombia, having
coasts on both the Atlantic and Pacific,

constituted the first line of defense for

the United States, and especially for the

Panama Canal, and since any armed attack
on us might woll be made through Colombia,

she, too, would suffer soverely therefrom.
A month ago he feared only Japanese

activities but recent events in Europe

have impressed him dooply and on March 22

he promised in person to keep me fully

informed

-5informed with respect to all Rome-BerlinTokyo activities In Colombia and to have
a ranking officer in the War Department

act in a limison capacity with this

Embassy on these matters. Furthermore,
the War Minister expressed to me the desire

to have a United States intelligence
officer attached to either our Naval or
Military-Aviation Missions. This would be
all to the good.
President Santos believes that
Germany and Italy, now that Franco's

victory In Spain is assured, will attempt
to forward their propaganda and other
activities in South America through the

new Spanish Government. He promised to

watch this situation and keep me posted.
He solemnly assured me that Colombia
always would stand with the United States
in defense of democracy and never would

play with the totalitarian States through

Franco or otherwise. Finally he asked me
to tell you that he had contracted for our
Military and Naval Missions not merely to
obtain the benefit of their superior
instruction for Colombian forces but even
more as a demonstration of this country'
confidence in the United States.

While on this subject, it is fitting to remark
that Colombia both in principle and in practice is the
most basically democratic country in South America.

Nevertheless it must be kept in mind that living
standards are low and the masses inexperienced and

uneducated. These conditions if not cured, in view of
the sweeping alteration now occurring in the country's
economic structure, can conceivably result in social
troubles

6-

troubles with political repercussions.
Captains Reifsnider and Whitson, respectively,
chiefs of our Naval and Military-Aviation Missions,
have made excellent impressions here but their
recommendations should be met promptly and fully by the
War and Navy Departments in Washington. If their

advice is not followed the value of the missions will
be greatly lessened both for the Colombians and

ourselves and we may unwittingly slight our contractual
obligations to the Colombian Government. A word from
you to War and Navy would be most helpful. Moreover,
the work of these missions should be supplemented by
arrangements which would enable Colombia to send

officers and students to the United States for training
without being subjected to the heavy expenditures now

required. For Instance, to place on Army captain,
accompanied by his wife, with one of our military units

for a year's training presently means that officer's
receiving, in addition to traveling expenses, a larger
salary than does the Commander-in-Chief of the
Colombian Army. It has been my experience throughout

South America that the greatest boosters and friends we
have

7-

have are precisely those who have lived in the United

States. . It is also pertinent to observe that our
German and Italian friends give such officers trips to
and from Europe, training, and even entertainment

allowances while there, free of all charge.
Both our missions have a task to perform as

difficult as it is important and will have to build
from the ground up; in fact the Naval Mission must
undo much that was done by their predecessors, the
British Mission, who apparently performed a very sloppy
job and incidentally tried to prejudice the Colombian
officers against our mission.
I am already greatly impressed with the benefits
resulting from our loaning at small or no cost
civilian experts to the American Republics and I do
hope the program for so doing with military and naval
officers may be promptly put in effect.

----Since my arrival, occasional references to our
former "imperialism" have been made to me; as for
instance when the Governor of Cundinamarca, in good

humor, amusingly told of the Yankee who, irked by the
tedious piety of Heaven, moved to Purgatory only to be
bored

8-

bored by the many priests and holy people in transit
there, and so went on to Hell where he found himself

surrounded by all the great figures of history, and
life thoroughly charming. Inquiring why Hell was so
defamed on Earth, he was told it was because of the
fear that were the truth known the Americans would grab

it. The manner in which this story was told
illustrates that the Panama incident while not entirely
forgotten is at least now forgiven by most Colombians.

Although presumably for reasons of internal politics,
some of the Conservative or opposition Party and press

are still disposed to be critical of the United States,
the Liberals and the general public are sincerely our

friends. By all odds, the greatest influence in this
development is their admiration for and complete confidence in you and your policies.
In my opinion the Colombian Government so far have

been honest in their attitude on the foreign debt and

the responsibility for the continued default lies at
least equally in the United States, where it has been
inexpertly and untactfully handled by the Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council, to say nothing of
certain

-9certain maliferous interlopers such as a man called
Hoover. President Santos tells me he will make

another attempt in April to reach an adjustment. I
think he may be successful if the Protective Council

will abandon its arbitrary and undiplomatic attitude
and instead, by conciliatory and educational methods,
endeavor to lead the Colombians, who are inexperienced

in such matters, to a mutually satisfactory agreement.
I shall, of course, lend my good offices in every way
possible and, I may say that both the President and
Finance Minister have agreed with me that they should
not seek a debt agreement on the lowest possible basis
but rather should accept a resumption of service at a

rate which in so far as possible will reestablish
Colombia's credit.

I am impressed with the potentialities of this
country and believe it is on the eve of a very
important industrial development, particularly in oil.
It will be a good credit risk and will present an
attractive market for our exports. The Colombians are
economically dependent on us and therefore prefer to

direct their purchases of airplanes (especially for
military

- 10 military purposes), railroad and power plant equipment,

etc. to the United States, even at higher prices. But
we must meet the competition, especially on long term

credits - up to five years - of the Germans. Hitherto
the Export-Import Bank has held off from financing
here because of Colombia's debt default. I am not unmindful of the political kickback which would ensue
were the United States Government to finance Colombia

prior to at least some token accomodation of the debt
being made. Nevertheless the Export-Import Bank's
financing of trade with this country might even. be

utilized to aid in adjusting the debt. On the other
hand, if the debt is not settled It would be somewhat

in the nature of biting off our nose to spite our faco
to continue the refusal of credits, thus losing to our
competitors orders especially in the heavy industries
where they are most needed and which moreover mean a

continuing business in spare parts and replacements.
Therefore, I hope some plan analogous to that recently
entered into with Brazil may be made with Colombia.
The President, 'in my conversation with him,
warmly reciprocated your personal best wishes which P
delivered

- 11 -

delivered to him and particularly requested me to
convey his very cordial regards to you.
Please permit me once again, Mr. President, to
express my great pride and deep sense of responsi-

bility for the confidence you have reposed in me and

with my sincerest expressions of respect and loyalty,
I am

Faithfully yours,

Sprink Bead

327
GROUP MEETING

Present:

Mr. Hanes
Mr. Gaston

May 3, 1939.

9:30 A. M.

Mr. Duffield

Mr. White

Mrs. Klotz
Mr. Foley

Mr. Haas
Mr. Lochhead
Mr. Graves
Mr. Gibbons
Mr. McReynolds

H.M.Jr:

John?

Hanes:

I just got a memorandum for you on that thing
Graves did for me on that Tom Heflin thing. I'11

just leave that with you. We'll talk about that

afterwards.
H.M.Jr:

Yes. I liked your talk very much; think it was
fine.

Do you think I have to do anything about this?
Hanes:

H.M.Jr:
Hanes:

Gaston:

I don't think so, no.
When I go to the President, I'll take it with me.
Just hold it when you go over there, so you'll

be familiar with the facts.
I have a letter, which I didn't bring in, to me
from White, New York State Bank Commissioner,

on behalf of the National Association of Bank
Supervisors, very strongly and vigorously opposing
the Brown bill and any movement to separate the
national bank supervision from - or to combine
the national and state bank supervision. I don't
know whether we want to make it public or leave

it to them, but they indicate that it is their

desire to do anything they can to prevent the
combination of the Comptroller's office with FDIC.
H.M.Jr:
Gaston:

I'd give it out. Give it out from your office.
All right.

328

-2H.M.Jr:
Hanes:

Duffield:

And
if thesethrough
fellowswith
will come
through with a letter you coming
a letter?
I okayed it last night.

I circulated it last night, said in a little note

they should call either you or Mr. Hanes by noon.

McR:

You mean the one that was signed?

Duffield:

No, Mac.

Hanes:

It was a new letter.
Well, I'm here.

H.M.Jr:

No, I'd give it out.
Gaston:

H.M.Jr:

What do you think of submitting a copy of that letter

with your letter to the Hill on the question?
Well, handle it any way you want. But I don't see
any reason we shouldn't be aggressive about it.

Foley:

We
ought to get somebody to put it in the Record,
I think.

H.M.Jr:

That's good, too.

Gaston:

Yes, yes.

That's all I have.
H.M.Jr:

Will you let me know about Lowell?

Gaston:

Yes, I called his office, but he wasn't in yet;

H.M.Jr:

they're going to let me know.
Do I do this in a broadcasting or recording machine?

Gaston:

You go to a recording company here, to their studio.

H.M.Jr:

Yes.

Duffield:

Nothing, except that I did send that letter out
just saying that you opposed removal of the Comptroller's office from the Treasury at this time,

329

-3and if they had any comments or suggestions to

call either you or Mr. Hanes. That's all.

H.M.Jr:

Eddie?

Foley:

I have a memorandum discussing the sub-committee
of the Senate Banking and Currency, how they

stand now. It's just for your information.
And here's an affidavit
H.M.Jr:

This goes with me to the President if and when he
sees me.

Foley:

to be used in an action in the State Court

up in New York in which the Federal Reserve Bank

is a party, and it involves the procedure followed
in fixing the exchange rate for milreis in connection with customs matters.

H.M.Jr:

Do you guarantee I won't go to jail?

Foley:

Yes, sir, it's all in the statutes.

H.M.Jr:

Any more?

(Foley points out places for signature on documents)
(On phone) Hello. (Holds conversation with Merle
Cochran in Paris)

She (Mrs. Cochran) is here. She's had all these
sinue operations. She's in - not Washington - she's
in New York. You (Lochhead) take care of it.
Lochhead:

I'll take care of it.

H.M.Jr:

Feis comes at 10:00 o'clock. You can tell him.
Government expense - he's coming back.

Lochhead:

Regular trip.

Foley:

Mr. Secretary, I think that we ought to indicate to
the Germans what we are going to do about that
countervailing duty proposal that they made.

330
4

-

H.M.Jr:

I'm not familiar with it.

Foley:

Well, they came in on the 22nd of April.

H.M.Jr:

Oh, let's sit down and do that. I'll give you

Foley:

All right.

H.M.Jr:

If you'll make a note - I mean I want Johnson in

Foley:

Sure.

H.M.Jr:

And Cairns, see?

White:

We got some cables from our own men that might alter

H.M.Jr:

Well, when you men are ready and have got a definite
recommendation, let Mrs. Klotz know. But get to-

an appointment on that.

on that.

the situation. I don't know whether they're available to you yet or not.
gether first, will you please?

Foley:

Yes.

H.M.Jr:

And then I'll see you.

Foley:

All right.

H.M.Jr:

There was a letter from Morris Ernst asking for an
appointment on the 8th of May to discuss legislation to continue the President's power to alter
postage rates for books.
I know. Well, we've sent word to him that when he
comes he should call up in the morning. I can't

make these long-distance appointments, long distance
being more than one day.

Foley:

Well, we don't have a direct interest in that.
That's a matter for the Post Office. But I guess
he feels that maybe some push from you would be

Klotz:

necessary to get action.
Can't we write him that?

331

-5H.M.Jr:

No, I'd like to see him. No, I'd like to see him.

He very seldom asks to see me.

Klotz:

See him, yes. But he wanted, I think, some advance

H.M.Jr:

Well, if you think I should write, I'll write.
Anything else?

Foley:

Nothing else.

H.M.Jr:

George, this report this week is particularly good,
I thought. And continue to watch commodities,
copper, et cetera.
We're making quite an extensive study of that, so
we'll give you a report on commodities alone.

Haas:

H.M.Jr:

And the thing that surprised me was to see our
unemployment figures move with the British. Went

off in 137, did they?

Haas:

Yes.

H.M.Jr:

Went off almost the same day. It's very interesting.
I was surprised to see how they moved. You know,
the unemployment figures - that they should move
together.

Haas:

And they are going up very sharply over in Great
Britain now - I mean employment.

H.M.Jr:

Is what's-his-name back - your man - from Detroit?

Haas:

Yes, I have his report.
(Haas hands report to H.M.Jr.)

H.M.Jr:

So you can tell your people what I decided on my
bonds last night

Haas:

That 19th there was the one that came in at 3:00

o'clock. Probably feels a little better now,

Keller does.

332

-6H.M.Jr:

Give Mr. Hanes a copy.

Hass:

Yes, sir.

H.M.Jr:

Oh, that's swell. Chrysler jumped almost 2,000
cars the week of April 29 - up.

Haas:

of course, the peak of automobile production has

H.M.Jr:
Haas:

probably passed.

Well, Ford is up.
That's right.
Now, on the wheat - if you gave me the full 24 hours
that would have meant a little later yesterday. The
reason I asked is this, that yesterday's market some very interesting situations developed in
yesterday's market. I have the report, but I want
to include yesterday's, I want to check on it.

Haas:

Well, get it to me by 1:00 o'clock.
I can have it before then.

H.M.Jr:

I don't know how long the situation will wait on

H.M.Jr:

me.

Haas:

I'll have it here by 11:00 o'clock. That's all.

H.M.Jr:

Harry?

White:

Just something of passing interest. I learned last
night from some men who know that there is a very
substantial movement of Dutch-owned American
securities into American names, 80 that they cannot

be touched in the event of any difficulties. They
still belong to the Dutch, but they are putting
them in American trustees in amounts - very large
sums. The British are doing it on a smaller scale.

H.M.Jr:

Anything else, Harry?

White:

That's all.

Lochhead:

You have decided about this HOLC?

333

-7H.M.Jr:

Lochhead:

Yes, I knew there was something I wanted to say.
Walking home last night with Bell, we decided we
are going to Monday refund the 325 million dollars
worth of notes - 40 percent, one-year notes; 60
percent, two-year notes - and nothing else, sit
tight and see what happens.
For your information, we do not have any other

maturities around those dates - that is, on those
dates. RFC note comes due on July 20, 41; that's
about the closest. But we don't have any identical
dates.
H.M.Jr:

Nothing else coming due on June 1.

Lochhead:

None of our regular.

Haas:

Just going to take the little one that you have to
take.

H.M.Jr:

325 million dollars. Of course, you fellows are

Haas:

Haas:

I've been reading Einstein on relativity.
That's the danger, I swear. I mean - Dan isn't
here; he's in New York - a billion two, just like
that. And if something happens, believe me,
325 millions will look like a lot of money.
That's right.

H.M.Jr:

I've got to watch you fellows. "It's just a little

H.M.Jr:

all

one - 325."

Haas:

H.M.Jr:

Well, it's only one-third of the 955.
I would be surprised if private capital from the

first of January to date has done 325 million. Do

you (Hanes) think they have?
Hanes:

I doubt it very seriously.

H.M.Jr:

What?

Hanes:

I doubt it very seriously.

334

-gLochhead:

They have put out some very good issues.

H.M.Jr:

I'm very serious. We've just got to watch ourselves that we don't get in the attitude "a billion

two - bing - just like that."

H.M.Jr:

This refunding of that large one, the 955 - the way
it's distributed would not make an easy refunding.
A million pieces out.

Haas:

That's right.

H.M.Jr:

I've got myself - I do my homework. There's a

Haas:

Haas:

million pieces out. A million different people
hold that thing.
Be very difficult to price the refunding issue, too.

H.M.Jr:

O. K.

Lochhead:

Nothing else. The securities markets - the foreigners
are doing just as little as our own domestic people;
you'll notice that these last two or three days.

H.M.Jr:

I talked to General Watson about getting me a

fellow. I said, "A General."

He said, "No, I won't get you a General because he
always has to have somebody to assist him." He

said, "I'll get you a good working Colonel."
I said, "Some fellow that would even be willing to
change a tire if he had to."

He said, "That's the kind of fellow." He said,

"These Generals lose their touch." He said, "I'11

have somebody for you in a day or two."
And now what I've offered him - and you (Lochhead)
might sound out Chen - ten thousand dollars and
traveling expenses for himself and his wife there
and back, and a per diem when he is away from his
base.

Foley:

Can I go?

335

-9H.M.Jr:

Are you an expert on transportation?

This fellow isn't going to be any stuffed shirt.
This fellow is going to know how to move trucks

and move other things related also. And I told

General Watson, "This man is a personal representative of the President, so he can't be any booze
hound or anything else."
Gaston:

Is it to Burma?

H.M.Jr:

It's to take charge of directing for Chiang Kai-shek
all transportation for the Chinese, and unify all
transportation.

Gaston:

Well.

H.M.Jr:

I mean this can't be any booze hound or any tin-horn
soldier. What?

Klotz:

It's a wonderful job.
It's a hard job. This man will have to be working
night and day, night and day, traveling all the

H.M.Jr:

time.

Gaston:

Have to have more than one pair of boots.

H.M.Jr:

What?

Gaston:

More than one pair of heavy boots.

Foley:

Rubber ones.

H.M.Jr:

The kind of man I visualize will be on the road all

Klotz:

That's wonderful. That sounds grand to me.

Lochhead:

All right, I'll take care of that.

Graves:

(Node nothing).

Gibbons:

In connection with the list that Ed gave you, I

the time.

talked to Bob Wagner yesterday afternoon (handing
H.M.Jr. a list of names), and those checked
in red are members of the sub-committee that he's

336

- 10 sure of. Now, he talked to Jimmy Byrnes. He's
not sure they'11 go along with the stabilization.
Foley:

That's the full committee you have there. I'll
talk to Jimmy Byrnes today.

H.M.Jr:

The red is absolutely O. K.?

Gibbons:

Yes. The ones in pencil, for instance, Herring of
Iowa - he's sure of him but hasn't talked to him.
And Frazier, the Republican, he's sure of.

H.M.Jr:

Now, Jim is going to talk to Bob this morning.
Miller of Arkansas is sore because Murphy is giving
everything to Mrs. Caraway. He won't talk to anybody. Just a question of patronage. We haven't
anything in our shop that we can give him.
Who did you talk with?

Gibbons:

I talked with Jim and Bob Wagner.

H.M.Jr:

Well, get that

Gibbons:

I'm going to talk to him - going to talk to Jim
as soon as I get out of this meeting again. I'11
send you a memorandum about it.

H.M.Jr:

Mac, you got anything on Procurement?

McR:

Yes. There 1s probably in my office now a memorandum.
Briefly, the thing is just this, that this fellow
Stevens is one of six men who were assigned at the

request of the Committee, and Peoples tells me at
the request of and with the approval of the Budget,
to assist that investigating committee in WPA. They
asked for six of their engineers.

H.M.Jr:

Well, I want photostated copies of the communications
from the Committee to Peoples. In other words, I'd

like to see the whole stuff. will you get it, Mac?
McR:

I'11 see you get everything that is in writing.

H.M.Jr:

Well then, this isn't this investigation

McR:

Hasn't anything to do with the former investigation.
This fellow Stevens

337

- 11 H.M.Jr:

That's what Gene thought.

McR:

I thought it was.

H.M.Jr:

Thought it was the old stuff. But this ie new.

McR:

This is new, and what he testified before the
Committee was on current projects that he had
investigated by direction of the Committee.

H.M.Jr:

Well, if that's it, it's all right. But in case

anybody - but will you please get after it for me?

McR:

H.M.Jr:
McR:

H.M.Jr:
McR:

There's a memorandum probably on my desk now.

Peoples told me he'd have it over there.
But this is new stuff and not what you
All the new.
Not what you and I thought it was.
Not what we thought it was.

H.M.Jr:

In case anybody - I mean this is - I gather that we
loaned them some men. Confidentially, we made an
investigation a year or two ago.

McR:

A year and a half ago.
I was afraid this was it, and they might jump on me

H.M.Jr:

and say, "Why turn over your stuff?" I wouldn't

without direction of the President. But if that's this was a loan of six men and they went up there

and found this stuff.
McR:

Current investigation of what went on in building
these projects.

H.M.Jr:

Now if McReynolds and Graves and Gaston and Hanes

would stay a minute, please. Incidentally, we have
this 10:00 o'clock meeting with the State Department,
you know.

338

May 3, 1939
9:35 a.m.

Operator: Go ahead.
Hello.
HMJr:
H. Merle
Cochran:

Hello, Mr. Secretary.

HMJr:

How are you?

C:

This
is Merle Coohran. I'm quite all right, sir, thank
you.

HMJr:

Go ahead.

C:

Saturday I talked with Archie about two things.

HMJr:

Yeah.

C:

About regulating markets and also about coming home.

HMJr:

Yeah.

C:

HMJr:
C:

I had hoped then that that operation on my wife could be
delayed until about May 25th.
Yeah.

But I had a cable this morning and she's not getting on
at all well and that an earlier operation appears
imperative.

HMJr:
C:

Well now, where is she?
She has been in New York; then she went down to Washington
to have some dental work done which she wanted done before

the operation. Then she wired me that she had to go back
to her Doctor in New York at once. She wired me that

yesterday.
HMJr:
C:

Is she in Washington now?

Oh, she -- she's probably in New York today. She was to

go back to New York today.
HMJr:

I mean, is there anything that I can do?

C:

No, there -- there's not a thing, Mr. Secretary. The

only thing, I was going to try to make some
about what -- what I am to do myself.

2-

HMJr:
C:

339

Well, when did you want to sail?

Well, I -- I planned to stay here on account of that

B.I.S. meeting this weekend, you see.
HMJr:
C:

Yeah.

I mean, this is the annual meeting and I'm seeing your
friends down there on this other matter to see if you
have any new ideas and 80 on.

HMJr:

Well, when did you want to sail?

C:

Well, that -- that would have me sail the 10th on the
Normandie.

HMJr:
C:

HMJr:

The tenth?

That is if you feel that you could order me home properly.
Well now I tell you what you do, you make your reserva-

tions and I'll get an order out.

C:

HMJr:

Yes.

But a little bit depends upon what's going to happen in

Europe.
C:

I know. That's why I've stayed over here. I sent
my
of course,

wife home alone, but I
because I wanted to stay.
HMJr:

Well, unless -- unless things -- I tell you, we'll get
out a -- an order today and I'll tell Archie that -- to
give you definite orders on Monday.

C:

Definite orders on Monday.

HMJr:

How's that?

C:

Well, the thing is -- is just this, to be quite frank -I -- I've got to wire my wife tonight because she's
going up there, or she's probably there by this time.

They'11 have to make the decision to have the operation

or wait until I get there or what not.

HMJr:

Well, if -- if she's -- if she's that sick you better
look after your wife and we'll -- we'll have to take
our chances.

-3C:

HMJr:

340

Well,
tenth. I -- I don't think I should postpone it beyond the

All right. Well then
order me by that time.

C:

HMJr:

All
right. Well, we'll get out a telegram today telling
you to come back on the tenth.

C:

Because if I were on my own, I -- I would probably leave
tomorrow or the next day, but I

HMJr:

All right. Well, I'll -- Archie 18 here now and I'll tell

him.
C:

Good ! I appreciate it a lot and if I should get any word
from her that it could be postponed, why I -- I would

postpone my sailing too.
HMJr:
C:

All right.
But if you can do that it would help a lot. Now, I'll
send her a cable right away then that I'll sail on the

tenth.
HMJr:
C:

How do things look in Poland?

Not too bad yet. It's all mainly gossip -- and so on;
that the Poles will give a pretty stiff counter-proposal
some
tomorrow. On the other hand there's a
intervention by the British may come about.

HMJr:

Um-hm.

C:

HMJr:

All right, Cochran.

C:

Well, thank you a lot. Here everything is fine. The

HMJr:

markets are very, very dull.
If I can do anything for Mrs. Cochran, tell them they can
get in touch with me. In your cable, tell her to get in
touch with me if there's anything that I can do.

C:

Thank you so much, and when I sail on the Normandie,

then I'11 let you know when I get to New York. If I can

341
4

-

I'll come down. If she's there and she has to have the
operation, I'll go right there and telephone you.
HMJr:

Yeah,
with
me.but

tell her if she wants anything to get in touch

C:

Fine 1 Thank you a lot.

HMJr:

O. K.

C:

Good bye.

342

May 3, 1939
3:38 p.m.
HMJr:

Hello.

Operator:

Captain Collins. Go ahead.

HMJr:

Hello.

Captain

Collins:

Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.

HMJr:

Collins, how are you?

C:

Very well, thank you, sir.

HMJr:

C:

HMJr:
C:

HMJr:

Mac told me about what the French want to do for you
and I'm delighted.

Well, I appreciate your calling, sir.
Mr. Chen is here with me......
Yes, sir.
And he's got a copy of the contract with the Chinese
Government -- on planes from the United States.

C:

HMJr:

Yes, sir.
And they'd like you to take a look at it to make sure

that they're getting a fair deal.

C:

Yes, sir.

HMJr:

Will you cooperate with them?

C:

I'11 be very happy to, Mr. Secretary.

HMJr:

Well, Mr. Chen will call on you.

C:

Thank you very much, sir.

HMJr:

O. K.

C:

Thank you for calling, sir.

HMJr:

Good bye.

C:

Good bye.

ROOSEELT TO CONFER WITH MORGENTHAU ON
REORGANIZATION PLANS

1050 MAY 3- 1939
WASHN - PRES ROOSEVELT WILL CONFER THIS
AFTERNOON WITH SECY OF TREASURY MORGENTHAU

ON THE SECOND REORGANIZATION PLAN WHICH WILL
CONCERN INTER-DEPARTMENTAL AND INTRA-DEPARTMEN-

TAL CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE
DEPARTMENTS - THE PLAN IS EXPECTED TO BE
SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS EITHER THE END OF THIS
WEEK OR THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK
SECY MORGENTHAU VISIT WILL BE PRECEDED
BY A CONFERENCE WITH BUDGET DIRECTOR SMITH AND
MEMBERS OF THE REORGANIZATION COMMITTEE
ADD ROOSEVELT
WASHN - THE WHITE HOUSE SECRETARIAT STATED
THAT THE CONFERENCE WITH SECY MORGENTHAU
DEFINITELY WOULD NOT CONCERN TAXES

-0-

344

Taxes

V

HSK

SPEAKER BANKHEAD SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT HOUSE LEADERS
ARE LEAVING TAX PROBLEMS ENTIRELY TO THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE,

AND ARE NOT ATTEMPTING IN ANY WAY TO INFLUENCE ITS DECISIONS.
HE MADE THE STATEMENT IN REFERENCE TO SENATE STATEMENTS THAT THE
HOUSE LEADERS HAD AGREED ON A THREE POINT TAXATION PROGRAM OF CONTI-

NUANCE OF NUISANCE TAXES, RETAINING THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AT THEIR
PRESENT LEVEL, AND CONTINUATION OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX.
BANKHEAD SAID, AND HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER RAYBURN AGREED, THAT THE
LEADERS "HAVE NOT UNDERTAKEN IN THE SLIGHTEST DECREE TO IMPRESS ANY
VIEWS ON THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE AS TO THE CHARACTER OF LEGISIATION TO BE BROUGHT OUT.

"AS FAR AS OUR ATTITUDE IS CONCERNED, WE ARE LEAVING IT TO THE GOOD
JUDGMENT AND DISCRETION OF THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE WITHOUT UNDER-

TAKING IN ANY WAY TO INTERFERE WITH THEIR DECISION."
RAYBURN SAID "THE LEADERSHIP HAS UNDERTAKEN IN NO WAY TO LAY OUT
A PROGRAM OF TAX REVISION."
BANKHEAD ADDED THAT HE WANTED HIS ATTITUDE TO "BE THOROUGHLY AND
FULLY UNDERSTOOD."

5/3 ON1233P

345

May 3. 1939

Jesse Jones sounded me out about selling

Russia one million bales of cotton on credit and I
said that I had a much better idea and that is why

not swap cotton for manganese. He said yes that he
had heard about it some months ago and that he would

go after it. I asked him to keep me informed.

346

May 3, 1939

Present:
Mr. Chen

Mr. Lochhead

Mr. Chen handed the Secretary the attached memo-

randum on inviting American experts to China, which
the Secretary read.

HM,Jr: I have a suggestion for you, from the
President, for your Government. I told him about our

conversation and what you were doing and he was very
much interested and he reminded me of the suggestion
he made, about a year ago, about dividing the Army so
that you have the Eighth Route Army. He wants to know

whether you have a dynamite factory. He thinks it is

very important that you should have a factory for dynamite somewhere up in a remote corner, some place where

you are making airplanes. He thinks that it is very
easy to build such a factory and the materials that go
into dynamite and TNT are not difficult to get. It is
like a macaroni factory. For the kind of warfare that

He
you have, dynamite will be very useful to you.
wanted me to tell you this unofficially and of course
(facetiously) you know we are strictly neutral.

Mr. Chen: We used to have one in Changsha. How-

ever, it has been moved and I do not know where it is

now.

ident.

HM,Jr: I am passing this on to you from the PresMr. Chen: Just as soon as I find out whether we

have such a factory, I will let you know.

The other day you asked about the airplane contract between China and Mr. Patterson of the United

347
-2-

Aircraft. In the meantime, I found a copy of the
contract. I have made a digest for you. (Copy
18 attached.) I also received a letter from Mr.

Kung
asking me to find out whether these prices are
correct.

HM,Jr: Didn't you speak to Captain Collins
about that?

it first.Mr. Chen: No. I wanted to speak to you about
this.

HM,Jr: I would like Captain Collins to see
(At this point, HM,Jr phoned to Capt. Collins

and the following is a record of their conversation.)
"HM,Jr: Hello.
Capt. C: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary.
HM,Jr: Collins, how are you?

Capt. C: Very well, thank you, sir.
HM,Jr: Mac told me about what the French

want to do for you and I'm delighted.

Capt. C: Well, I appreciate your calling, sir.
HM,Jr: Mr. Chen is here with me ....

Capt. C: Yes, sir.
HM,Jr: And he's got a copy of the contract

with the Chinese Government -- on planes from the
United States.

Capt. C: Yes, sir.
HM,Jr: And they'd like you to take a look
at it to make sure that they're getting a fair deal.
Capt. C: Yes, sir.

348

-3-

HM,Jr: Will you cooperate with them?

Capt. C: I'11 be very happy to, Mr. Secretary.
HM,Jr: Well, Mr. Chen will call on you.
Capt. C: Thank you very much, sir.
HM,Jr: O.K.

Capt. C: Thank you for calling, sir.
HM,Jr: Good-bye.

Capt. C: Good-bye.

P. S.

When the Secretary went to the White House

to see the President at four o'clock today he gave a
copy of the memorandum on inviting American experts
to China to General Watson and he immediately sent

it over to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

349
Memorandum on

Inviting American Experts to China.

1. Title.

The experts invited to China are suggested

to be at the invitation of the Ministry of Communications.
Their mission is to inspect the existing road conditions
and to make studies on plans of improvement. No special

organization will be established for the mission.
2. Number of Experts. Two experts are suggested to be invited: one with full knowledge and experience on road
transport management and automobile operation, and the

other on automobile mechanical engineering including

repairing, maintenance and servicing.

3. Scope of Mission. When the experts have arrived in China,
the Ministry of Communications will send competent men

accompanying the experts to inspect the different roads.
The experts will then make recommendations upon improvement

plans to the Ministry for its consideration and putting
into execution. In case there arise any problems relative
to road traffic or mechanical features, the Ministry may
4.

also refer them to the experts for their study and suggestion
Time for the experts to stay in China
Time of Mission.
will be one year.

-2-

350

5. Compensation. Compensation for the service of the
experts and their travelling expenses in China will be
borne by the Ministry of Communications. As to the
amount it is suggested to leave this to Mr. K. P. Chen
in consultation with Secretary Morgenthau.

351

MEMORANDUM RE PURCHASE
by

CHINESE GOVERNMENT

of
AIRPLANES AND AIRPLANE PARTS

On February 24th, 1939 a contract was signed between the Chinese Government and Consolidated Trading Company,

Ltd. for the purchase of airplanes and airplane parts of not
exceeding U. S. $12,800,000.

It was agreed that any and all orders under the

principal contract had to be placed within thirty days.
The present supplementary contract dated March 25th,

1939, an outline summary of which is attached, 18 to carry out
this requirement, and contains both a delivery schedule and

specifications.
Under both the principal and the supplementary con-

tract the prices are subject to certain adjustments, based upon
prices paid by the United States Government for the same type

of planes and parts.
Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance, has
asked me to assist him in checking on these prices. He says

in his letter of April 3rd, 1939:
"As you know, Secretary Morgenthau has

taken quite an interest in assisting the Chinese
and the best qualities in the case of goods purchased in the United States. Hence I should appreciate your confidentially making available this
contract and the price list for spare parts to an
Government to obtain the most advantageous prices

expert or experts designated by the American Treasury
or Government in crder to ascertain whether the prices
charged are aboveboard. Please telegraph in Chinese

as soon as practicable their views."

352

Outline Summary of Supplemental Contract
dated March 25, 1939
for
Purchase
by

Chinese Government
of

Airplanes and Airplane Parts

Principal contract dated February 25, 1939 was for
purchase of not exceeding U. S. $12,800,000. worth, and any and

all orders were required to be placed within thirty days.
1. Purchases.
Seversky

54 planes plus parts

$3,875,000.

Vought

25 planes plus parts

2,130,000.

Ryan Trainers

70 planes plus parts
North American Trainers

725,00.

50 planes plus parts

2,100,000.

Total approximately

$8,830,000.

2. Delivery Schedule.
Second month - one plane.

Third to eleventh months - ments
balance
in installof 7oftoplanes
48 per month.
3. Equipment and Parts.

Flexible provisions for variation.
4. Payment.
Cash - approximately $2,215,000.

Balance of $6,615,000. - notes payable in thirty equal

353
2.

monthly installments at 6% per annum (simple) with acceleration

provision in the event of any default.
5. Adjustment of Prices.
Prices to be compared with those paid by United States
Government for similar items at approximate time of contract,
to be determined by person appointed by mutual agreement. Any

items found at prices excessively higher than those paid by the
United States Government to be readjusted accordingly. Not more
than 3% for expenses and 1% for commissions (on manufacturer's

prices) to be allowed in determining difference.
6. Transportation.
Charges cover c.i.f. Rangoon, subject to adjustment if
shipped at request of buyer to another port, war risks to be
borne by the buyer, but only actual boxing and transportation
charges within the United States are to be paid by the buyer.

7. Inspection and Testing.
To be made at the places of manufacture by a duly ac-

credited representative of the buyer.
8. Manufacturing Rights.
For Seversky, Vought and Ryan airplanes, to be furnished

gratis by the seller.

354

MAY 3 1939

My dear Mr. Secretary:
Recently you asked me about the possibility of
the Treasury issuing additional bonds against the Panema

Canal without obtaining further authorisation from the
Congress.

In the opinion of this Department, no additional
bonds can be issued against the Panama Canal for the reason
that the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, absorbed and

extinguished the right to issue additional Panama Canal

bonds, leaving, therefore, no specific unused authorisation
to borrow against the Canal.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd) H.

Secretary of the Treasury

Honorable Harry H. Woodring,
Secretary of War.

DWB:HBW

4/26/39

355

May 3, 1939
5:54 p.m.
HMJr:

Hello.

Johnny
Hanes:

Hello, Henry.

HMJr:

Johnny?

H:

Yes, sir.

HMJr:

Well, what's left of me is back.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

I'm 75 per cent successful.

H:

Really?

HMJr:

Yeah.

H:

Oh, good !

HMJr:

Yeah, I think it's all right.

H:

Oh, fine !

HMJr:

And we went over every single word. None of the suggestions have been eliminated

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

H:

HMJr:

but the method of presentation -- he wants to

change it a little bit.
Yeah.

But I'm very happy and he said -- I asked him should I
show it to anybody, discuss it with anybody. He said,
"No make the changes I've suggested and as soon as

you I re ready, come back again.
H:

I see. Well, were the -- were the changes suggested bad?

HMJr:

No, no. It's the method. He wants to get a wage
recommendation, you see.

H:

Yes.

HMJr:

But as to the particular items, he's left them all in.

-2H:

HMJr:

356

Yeah.

But it's merely on the -- more or less on the presenta-

tion and toning down some, and instead of my saying,
"Maybe the spending program was helpful - makes me think

it was helpful -- my pussy foot." Well, that's my
conception -- that's my thought; I'll have to bear that.
H:

HMJr:

Yeah.

But I thought on the whole, considering the various

positions he has taken, I -- I think that he was fair.

H:

HMJr:

Yeah,98
in per
view
of yesterday's
were
cent
successful. interview, I should say you
But I'm glad I was there alone. I wouldn't want anybody
to see what happened to me the first twenty minutes.

H:

Why?

HMJr:

Well, there was plenty !
Was it really?

H:

HMJr:

Yeah.
Tough?

HMJr:

Tough. An hour and forty-five minutes.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

But it's all right, Johnny. I -- the only thing that

I'm worried about is that -- that something or somehow
some damn dolumnist will write something and get him off
on his ear.
H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

But right now he's all right.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

See?

H:

This -- this -- I was awfully afraid about this damn

Chamber of Commerce thing. I thought that would upset

him.

357

-3HMJr:
H:

HMJr:

Well, as of tonight, I'm going to bed satisfied.
Yeah.

And
there'seither.
nothing in it he suggested that you couldn't
underwrite

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

See?

H:

Well, that's grand, Henry. I congratulate you. I think
you've done a swell job and nobody in God's green earth
but you could have done it -- that's the truth.

HMJr:

Well, in all due modesty, I agree with you.

H:

HMJr:

I swear, I think -- I know it's the truth.
Because nobody could have gone through and watched him.

the way I did, and let him get it all out of his system.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

And then say, "All right, Mr. President, what will you do!
Yeah.

HMJr:

Well, what he's done is -- calling it pro and con number
one. Then I'd say about the taxes -- pro and con number

two. Well, o.k., it's all right with me, I'll call it

H:

con and pro -- anything.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

What?

H:

That doesn't make any difference.

HMJr:

And then he said, "Give the con as well as the pro."

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

So we'll have to rewrite the thing where we show

Well, that's all right.

why 1 t's good. He also wants to show why the --

where they could evade it, you see, -- the loopholes.

-4H:

HMJr:

Yeah.

Icon
think
-- I think it's swell. Let's call it pro and
number one and pro and con number two.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

What?

H:

HMJr:

358

I don't see any objection to that.
He can call it anything he wants.

H:

Sure.

HMJr:

It's all right, and he was -- on the whole, very fair.

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

So if we can just keep it in the Treasury now, so that

no fellow will stir him up, why I think we're all right.

H:

Well, that's grand !

HMJr:

And I said, "When do you want to see me again"? He

H:

Yeah.

HMJr:

He said, "I'm here."

H:

Yeah. Well, that's all right. Well, I think that's

said, ."Just as soon as you've got it rewritten."

grand. I congratulate you. I knew you'd do it.

HMJr:

Well I

H:

But I'm delighted for you.

HMJr:

Well, put five dollars on a horse for me, will you?

H:

All right, I will.

HMJr:

Don't forget now.

H:

HMJr:
H:

I promise you I will.
Put five dollars.
You bet, I promise you I will.

359

-5HMJr:
H:

All right.
Thank you, Henry, very much for calling me. You've

taken a load off my mind like forty tons of brick.
And
delighted for you -- I can't tell you how
happyI'm
I am.
HMJr:

Well, we're both in the same boat, Johnny.

H:

Well, I'm delighted for you. I swear I am.

HMJr:

All right. Well, thanks for all the help.

H:

O. K.

HMJr:

Good bye.

H:

Good bye.

360
COPY
May 3. 1939

To:

Commissioner Helvering

From:

Mr. Hanes

With respect to Mr. Berkshire's memorandum of April 26th,
which was submitted at my request, pertaining to the applications
received from members of the alcohol industry who wish to use

specially denatured alcohol in anti-freeze preparations, it has
been determined that the current Treasury policy established in
July 1934, should be revised in accordance with the opinion expressed

by Mr. Berkshire, to wit:

"In the event there is contemplated a change in the Department's
policy authorizing the use of wood alcohol as a denaturant for
anti-freeze compounds, it is believed that the proposal to
withdraw Formula No. 1 should be approved, provided there is
no further addition of methanol and the product is packaged
and sold in gallon and quart containers under a trade name
and without the use of the word 'alcohol' on the container,
and with such poinson label as may be approved by the Bureau.

"Those producers still desiring to produce and distribute in
bulk containers will be required to continue to use the present
completely denatured alcohol formulae."

PY:bj

361

April 27, 1939

To:

The Secretary

From:

Mr. Hanes

11A

O.K.

Members of the Alcohol Industry have appealed to you

for a change in the policy which you established in July, 1934,
pertaining to the use of wood alcohol in anti-freeze preparations.

It appears that during the past few years the consumption of completely denatured alcohol for anti-freeze purposes
has progressively decreased from approximately thirty-eight
million gallons in 1934 to approximately eighteen million gallons
in 1938, largely because of the competition of materials such as
synthetic methanol and other non-odorous liquids over which the
Treasury exercises no control.
Considered both from the point of view of protection

to the revenue and of public health liability, it now appears

possible to permit the use of a denatured alcohol containing
a small quantity of slightly odorous wood alcohol if such a
product were merchandised under strict regulatory control.

Although the distillers in their filed applications

have requested a denatured alcohol completely free of warning

odor and, incidentally, of high toxicity, they have in conference indicated not only the acceptability of a considerably

less poisonous product such as described above, but also their
willingness to abide by strict regulations which can be so
designed as to reduce public health hazards.

The question that arises is one of policy, and it is
my belief that in accordance with the opinion of the Alcohol
Tax Unit a ruling can be issued which will give the wood and
ethy1 alcohol people a chance to live. Although it is my belief
that these manufacturers will be driven out of the anti-freeze
business eventually by the manufacturers of synthetic materials,
it seems only fair and reasonable to give them an opportunity to
compete for the business as long as possible.

I recommend that the policy outlined above by the Alcohol
Tax Unit be accepted.

J.w.tts

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
ADDRESS REPLY TO

OF INTERNAL REVENUE

April 26, 1939.

AND REFER TO

Memorandum for Mr. Hanes:

In accordance with your request, I am giving you a brief
review of the use of wood alcohol (methanol) as a denaturant

for ethyl alcohol sold for anti-freeze purposes.

The law provides for the denaturation of ethyl alcohol

under regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue so

that it may be withdrawn taxfree for industrial use.

The regulations of the Commissioner provide for two
classes of denatured alcohol, - specially denatured aloohol
and completely denatured alcohol.

Specially denatured alcohol is handled only under permit
issued by the Alcohol Tax Unit and includes alcohol denatured
for special purposes, such as the manufacture of pharmaceuti-

cals, laoquers, solvents, eto.

Completely denatured alcohol is sold freely in commerce
as any other merchandise, virtually without supervision on the

part of the Alcohol Tax Unit. It is used ohiefly in the manufacture of anti-freese compounds.
From 1906, when the law authorizing the denaturation of
alcohol was first adopted, until 1930, wood alcohol was commonly used as a denaturant for competely denatured alcohol. On
January 1, 1931, following numerous deaths supposed to have
resulted from the drinking of completely denatured alcohol,
the use of wood alcohol as a denaturant was discontinued by

order of the Seoretary of the Treasury.
During the early months of 1934, great pressure was brought
on the Department to restore denaturing grade wood alcohol as
a denaturant for completely denatured alcohol. A public hearing
was held on this question on July 19, 1934, at which representatives of all interested groups appeared and gave testimony.
Following this hearing, the Commissioner submitted to the Seoretary a recommendation that the use of wood alcohol as a denaturant
for completely denatured alcohol should be authorized. This

362

Page 2.

363

recommendation was disapproved on the ground that the proposed

restoration of wood alcohol would be bound to be misinterpreted
by the press of the country and would weaken public support of

the Department's enforcement program. The same question was
again considered by the Treasury Department in May, 1935, and

February, 1936. Following conferences with interested groups,
and
after considering
the present
policy. their proposals, no change was made from
Members of the ethyl alcohol industry have appealed to
you for a change in policy and, with your approval, a conference
was held April 6, 1939, at which various phases of the problem
were again discussed. It appears that during the past few years
the consumption of completely denatured alcohol for anti-freeze
purposes has progressively decreased, largely because of the
competition of materials such as synthetic methanol and other
non-odorous liquids. The producers of ethyl alcohol claim that
this decrease is due to objectionable odor, while methanol and
other competitive materials are odorless. These producers do
not request, as heretofore, that the formula for denaturing
completely denatured alcohol be changed by the addition of wood
alcohol, but petition the Treasury Department for authority to
withdraw one of two recognized specially denatured alcohol formulae; to wit, Formula No. 1 or Formula No. 30, under permit and
bond, for the purpose of manufacturing on their premises antifreeze preparations to be packaged and sold in gallon and quart
containers and bearing poison caution labels to be approved by
the Department.

Since this hearing, several producers have filed application
for the use of Formula No. 30, which contains 10% of pure
methanol, and propose to manufacture anti-freeze products by the

addition of dye, odorless petroleum distillates similar to kero-

sene, rust inhibiters, and an additional amount of approximately
5% of synthetic methanol. Synthetic methanol is not only odorless,
but also tasteless, and furnishes no warning of its presence in
ethyl alcohol. Formula No. 30, by virtue of its content of 10%
pure methanol, is toxic if used as a beverage in substantial
quantities, and the proposal to add an additional quantity of

methanol would definitely increase its deadly effect. For that
reason, it is not believed that the Treasury Department should
approve the withdrawal of Formula No. 30 for use in the manu-

facture of anti-freeze products.
Specially Denatured Alcohol Formula No. 1 contains 5% of
denaturing grade wood alcohol, which is the natural product extracted from wood, and contains only approximately 60% methanol,

364
Page 3.

the remaining constituents being volatile substances which
impart a characteristic taste and odor to the denatured alcohol

and are relatively difficult to remove. Aloohol thus denatured
is considerably less toxic than Formula No. 30, on account of
the reduced methanol content. Thus if any diversion of a
product containing Formula No. 1 were undertaken, there would
be less hazard involved, - first because of its lower poison
content and, second, because of its distinct warning taste and
odor.

So long as the Department adheres to the policy determined

by the Secretary in July, 1934, however, it is not believed
that the applications now pending could consistently be approved.
In the event there is contemplated a change in the Department's policy authorising the use of wood alcohol as a denaturant for anti-freeze compounds, it is believed that the proposal
to withdraw Formula No. 1 should be approved, provided there is
no further addition of methanol and the product is packaged
and sold in gallon and quart containers under a trade name and
without the use of the word "alcohol" on the container, and
with such poison label as may be approved by the Bureau.

Those producers still desiring to produce and distribute
in bulk containers will be required to continue to use the
present completely denatured alcohol formulae.

Stewart Berkshire,
Deputy Commissioner.

gta

2.

a

365
Treasury Department

Division of Monetary Research

Date May 4, 1939. 1938
To:

Secretary Morgenthau

This article by Keynes is stirring
a lot of interest because it represents
the program that England is very likely
to follow in her armament boom.

MR. WHITE

Branch 2058 Room 208

366

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

M

DATE May 3, 1939

TO

Mr. White

FROM

S. Adler

Subject: Mr. Keynes on "Crisis Finance" (the London Times, April 17 and 18)
Employment and the Budget

(a) As the prospective increase in demand resulting from increasing
government expenditure on armaments will involve the employment of not
less than 750,000 and perhaps as many as one and a half million of the
unemployed, and as the total number of unemployed in England is now

2 million, the problem of abnormal unemployment will cease to exist
in the financial year 1939-40, and no budgetary provision should be
made for it.
(b) The national income will increase by about 8 percent over 1938
(64.8 billion in 1938). The Treasury can therefore legitimately expect
increased tax receipts and a fall in expenditures on unemployment.

(c) Loan expenditures will be at least 1350 million, an increase of
L220 million on last year. This expenditure will involve an increase
in direct demand of L200 million and in indirect demand of another
6200 million, or perhaps a total of 1400 million, which is 8 percent
of the 1938 national income.

If loan expenditure is 1400 million, it will be, expressed as a
percentage of the national income, almost twice as much relatively as
the highest United States Treasury deficit (excluding bonuses).
(d) The problem facing the United Kingdom, therefore, will soon be not
that of unemployment and unused capacity but of shortage of labor and
capital resources.

(e) The other important "physical" problem will be the shortage of
foreign exchange resources, as (1) imports will increase, and (11)
political loans to foreign countries will be necessary.
(f) As ultimate gold resources should be left unimpaired, and the
Treasury in its loan policy must be free to pay regard solely to domestic

considerations, it follows that:

1. The handling of foreign trade should not be left in
the hands of individual enterprise.
11. The embargo on British nationals sending capital
funds overseas must be tightened.

367
Mr. White - 2
The Supply of Savings

(a) If private investment is not curtailed, the public will have to
save $200 million more than last year.

(b) Net savings last year were 1400 million. But there are three
sources from which the extra savings can come.

i. Depreciation and maintenance, estimated at 1400. mil-

lion annually, can be curtailed.
ii. The waste of savings to offset business losses will
largely disappear and there will be an increased
retention of profits within business.
iii. Personal savings will increase with increased income.
(c) The main problem with respect to savings will be not their adequacy
but the form in which they should be held (Bank of England balances,
Treasury bills and bonds, longer-dated debt).

(d) There is no danger of inflation as long as the physical capacity
of the country is not strained and the adverse balance of trade does
not rise too rapidly. The form in which the government debt is held
has no relevance to inflation.
(e) The two principles of loan policy to be followed are:
i. Loans must be raised after and not before expenditure
is incurred, or a stringency in the money market will
result.

ii. The form of the loans should be dictated by the preferences of the public. If they prefer short-term loans
it would be futile and dangerous to force long-term
loans into their hands.

(f) Stability of interest rates should be preserved. If capacity is

approached, the correct remedy is not higher interest rates, but govern-

ment priorities and the control of new issues. The correct policy is

under no condition to. issue loans at more than 2 percent, and to begin

with a large addition to the volume of Treasury bills.
(g) A Department of Coordination attached to the Treasury should be

set up for dealing with the supply and mobilization of labor, the allo-

cation of limited resources, and preventing an excessive adverse
balance of trade.

368
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY MORGENTHAU:

I spoke to the Chief of Staff and
they are now searching for such an officer
as you suggested for service in China.

I told them that the salary would
be $10,000, plus passage there and back for

self and wife, and a suitable per diem for
days spent away from headquarters.

I also assured them that at least
the years' salary would be guaranteed by
a suitable deposit in America.

E.M.W.

369

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE

TO

FROM

Secretary Morgenthau

May 3, 1939

E. H. Foley, Jr.

Larry Bernard reports that Senator Glass will be out of town until

the first part of next week. I think you may forget about appearing before
Senator Glass' subcommittee on the repeal of the Silver Purchase Act until
his return.

It is Senator Townsend, the author of the repealing legislation,
who is insisting upon your appearance. When you have lunch with Senator
Wagner tomorrow you might discuss with him your reluctance to appear since

you have already testified on silver before Senator Pittman's special committee and have nothing further to offer.
In the meantime, Larry Bernard will continue with his efforts to
make it unnecessary for you to appear.

ENTL

370

Secretary Morgenthen

May 3g 1939

E. H. Foley, Jr.

Larry Bernard reports that Senator Glass will be out of town until

the first part of next week. I think you may forget about appearing before
Senator Glass' subcommittee on the repeal of the Silver Purchase Act until
his return.

It is Senator Townsend, the author of the repealing legislation,
who is insisting upon your appearance. When you have lunch with Senator
Tagner tomorrow you might discuss with him your reluctance to appear since

you have already testified on silver before Senator Pittman's special committee and have nothing further to offer.

In the acantine, Larry Bernard will continue with his efforts to
make it unnecessary for you to appear.

(Signed) B. H. Poley, Jr.

EHF:8 Typed 5/3/39

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

371

PROCUREMENT DIVISION
PUBLIC BUILDINGS BRANCH
AND

THESE

WASHINGTON

PB-SE

SOLTING QUOTE THE ABOVE sub

LETTERS

May 3, 1939.
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY:

In response to a request from Honorable Edward T. Taylor,
Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives,
addressed to you, for assignment of engineers from the Procurement
Division to duty with a Subcommittee of the House making an in-

vestigation of the Works Progress Administration activities, the
following engineers were assigned: A. W. Stephens, P. L. Hein,
H. W. Rathsack, Chester L. Post, W. C. Spiker and John England, Jr.
The Committee delegated Messrs. Stephens and Hein for investigation in the New York and Pennsylvania area and these engineers
were called to Washington for personal report to the Committee on
May 2.

Without having the benefit of the records of the Committee
I an unable to analyze what was said on the witness stand, but the
following information is derived from personal conversation of
Messrs. Stephens and Hein with Supervising Engineer Melick, of

this Division.

Nine projects have been investigated in the New York City area,
as follows: all as selected by the Committee.
1. Highway Improvements & Landscaping 5.&Police
Station,
94th St.
43rd Ave.,
Elmhurst,
L.I.
Queensboro Bridge Plaza,

Long Island City, N.Y.
2. Trunk Sewer, 19th Ave & 32nd St.
Boro of Queens.

3. Public School Building No. 64,
101st Ave & 83rd St.
Ozone Park, L.I., N.Y.

4. Residential Highway Construction
near World's Fair.

6. W.P.A. Exhibit Building,
New York Fair.

7. Repaving upper roadway of
Bridge & Manhattan approach,
Queensboro Bridge.

8. Public School #27, Hicks &
Huntington St., Brooklyn.
9. North Beach Airport.

These engineers are reporting on facts as they find them as to
costs, methods of construction and employment. They are carefully
refraining from expressions of opinions. They are not making any

investigation regarding alleged political activities nor any alleged

personnel grievances.

Memorandum to the Secretary

372
-2-

Messrs. Stephens and Hein have been ordered by the Committee

to the Pennsylvania area. It is understood Messrs. England and
Spiker have been ordered in for a report on projects in Tennessee.
It must be forne in mind that these men are acting in accordance
with instructions received direct from the House of Representatives
Committee itself. They are conservative, capable men in every respect.

Director of Procurement.

3

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373

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I can contact one of the men.

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COPY

374

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Washington, D.C.

April 11, 1939.

Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary Of The Treasury,
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:
The House of Representatives
by House Res. 130 has directed the Committee on Appro-

priations to make a study and investigation of the
Works Progress Administration. A supplementary
resolution, House Res. 152 contains the following
section:

"Sec. 3. The heads of the executive
departments and other executive agencies

are requested to detail personnel temporarily
to assist the committee or subcommittee upon

request of the chairman thereof."
In accordance with the

foregoing I beg to request that the subcommittee
may have the use of four or five construction
engineers of the Procurement Division for

assignment in connection with the duties imposed
upon it by the House.
Your compliance with this

request will be greatly appreciated.
Very cordially yours,
(signed) Edward T. Taylor
Chairman.

PROCUREMENT DIVISION, P.B.B.

COPY

375

April 18, 1939

My dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director of Procurement advises that he
has detailed Construction Engineers from the Pro-

curement Division for assignment to duty with the
sub-committee making a study and investigation of
the Works Progress Administration.

This is in reply to your communication of
April 11.

Very truly yours,

S

Hmorgenthaugh
Secretary of the Treasury.

Honorable Edward T. Taylor,
Chairman, Appropriations Committee,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

NAM:LH

COPY

376
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Washington, D.C.

April 12, 1939

Hon. C. J. Peoples, Director
Procurement Division,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Peoples:

Request is hereby made for the assignment of the
following engineers to the subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations investigating WPA under House Resolution
130: P. L. Hein, A. W. Stephens, H. W. Rathsack, Chester
L. Post, W. C. Spiker, and John England, Jr.

It is contemplated that Mr. Hein and Mr. Stephens
will be assigned for investigative work in the New YorkPennsylvania area, Mr. Rathsack and Mr. Post will be

assigned for investigative work in the Ohio-Illinois

area, and Mr. Spiker and Mr. England will be assigned
to Tennessee and Louisiana.

There is enclosed for the use and information

of these engineers authority for their investigations

and both general and special instructions covering the
manner in which they shall conduct their work. There is
also enclosed a project data sheet, copies of which will
be furnished them and which they will use in making
their reports.
Traveling expenses in accordance with the general
instructions will be allowed these men while away from
Washington, D.C. We have taken up with the House of
Representatives the question of possible advancement

of funds to cover their expenses, but find this impossible under the rules of the House.

Your cooperation in this matter is greatly
appreciated by the Committee.

Very cordially yours,
(signed) Edward T. Taylor
Chairman.

377
PROJECT DATA SHEET (FIELD)

PAGE 1

Date

Project

Examiner

Classification
Project No.
PERSONNEL

State Director
Resident Engineer
Project Manager

CONTACTS

SPONSOR-

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT

NAME

ADDRESS

378
PROJECT DATA SHEET (FIELD)

ESTIMATED
COST OF PROJECT

Sponsor's share of cost
Government's .

#

Overhead

Materials by Government
SPONSOR'S FORM OF CONTRIBUTION

(Cash, Land, Materials, Etc.; Check prices charged.)

PRESENT STATUS OF PHYSICAL COMPLETION

DESIGNER-

ADEQUACT OF DESIGN - DRAWING AND SPECIFICATIONS

(Good - Over - Under)

PAGE 2

ACTUAL

379
PROJECT DATA SHEET (FIELD)
ADEQUACY OF SUPERVISION

(Too Much or Too Little)

(Good - Over - Under)

COORDINATION OF PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS WITH FIELD OPERATION

MATERIALS EMPLOYED AND TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION

(Include any appropriate comments as to suitability of
materials and types of construction)

PAGE ,

380
PROJECT DATA SHEET (FIELD)
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND PROGRESS

QUALITY OF WORKMANSHIP

EQUIPMENT

(1) How secured.

(a) Adequacy of utilisation.

(3) Care of equipment.

PREVALENT WAGE SCALE (Determined is what masser. Through what

Agencies is labor obtained - unica and non-usion)

PAGE 4

381
PROJECT DATA SHEET (FIELD)
EFFICIENCY OF RELIEF LABOR

ESTIMATED COST OF THIS PROJECT IF BUILT UNDER CONTRACT ON BASIS
OF PREVAILING WAGE

JUSTIFICATION OF PROJECT

(a) Economic

(b) Work Relief

(c) Is this project one that should have bees done by some
other agency, public or private?

PAGE 5

382
PROJECT DATA SHEET (FIELD)

ABILITY OF SPONSOR FOR FUTURE MAINTENANCE

COMPLAINTS

CORRELATIVE MATTERS

PAGE 6

PROCUREMENT DIVISION, P. B.B.

COPY

383

SE

April 15, 1939.

My dear Mr. Chairman:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of April 12,
requesting the assignment of the following engineers to the
subcommittee making a study and investigation of the Works

Progress Administration: P. L. Hein, A. W. Stephens, H. W.
Rathsack, Chester L. Post, W. C. Spiker, and John England, Jr.

Copies of your individual instructions, as addressed
to these engineers, have been delivered to them.
The engineers have been detailed to your Committee

in accordance with your requests.
Very truly yours,
(signed) C. J. Peoples
Director of Procurement.

Honorable Edward T. Taylor,
Chairman, Appropriations Committee,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

NAM:LH

384

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION
DATE

TO

Secretary Morgenthau

FROM

E. H. Foley, Jr.

May 3, 1939.

For your information
Larry Bernard has just informed me that the House Ways and Means

Committee this afternoon adopted all of your recommendations as to changes

in Title II of the Social Security Act, except the suggestion that the
taxes be termed "contributions." The Committee is holding morning and after-

noon sessions and it is expected that the bill will be reported out around
the middle of next week.
Congressman Doughton told Larry Bernard that the Committee would

take action on the President's recommendation to remove the partition as
to the amount of bonds that the Treasury may issue just as soon as the

Social Security legislation is out of the way.

F.NH

385
RE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR NICARAGUA
(AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES)

Present:

May 3, 1939.
10:00 A. M.

Mr. White

Mr. Lochhead

Mr. Foley

Mr. Young

Mr. Jesse Jones
Mr. Warren Lee Pierson
Mr. Sumner Welles

Mr. Feis

Mr. Laurence Duggan

Mr. Briggs
Mr. Collado

H.M.Jr:

All right, Mr. Welles.

Welles:

Want me to start in?

H.M.Jr:

If you please.

Welles:

During the past week the Department of State has

been canvassing this situation with regard to
Nicaragua, and have come to the conclusion set
forth in this memorandum. And I imagine that the
wisest thing for me to do is simply read the
memorandum.

H.M.Jr:

Would you please?

Welles:

"It is proposed that economic cooperation with
Nicaragua take one or both of the following forms:
(1) Export-Import Bank assistance in carrying out
a modest program of road and other public works
construction, and (2) a line of credit extended
by the Export-Import Bank to the National Bank
of Nicaragua, Incorporated.

On the first point: "It is suggested that the

Export-Import Bank assist in financing road and
other public works construction on the Haitian
model. It is further suggested that such financing
cover all external expenditures - for imported
materials and equipment, foreign engineers, and
the United States engineering firm's services while the Nicaraguan Government finds funds for
domestic materials and labor. This is the plan
which has been put forward for Paraguay. A

386

-2partial indication of the relative amounts this

would involve may be obtained from the following
estimates of the expenditures necessary to complete the Pan-American highway in Nicaragua:
Engineering supervision, $787,000; materials,

$2,129,000; equipment, $920,000; equipment upkeep

and fuel, $2,324,000; local labor and operators,
$2,258,000. Total, $8,418,000. It is apparent
that perhaps 50 percent or more of the cost would
be borne by Nicaragua.

"It is suggested that projects to be considered
might include certain links of the Pan-American
highway, lateral feeder roads, and possibly some
municipal sanitation and some hydro-electric development. It is suggested that credit not to exceed
three million dollars over two to five years might
be sufficient to accomplish suitable projects,
including the central stretch of the Pan-American
highway in Nicaragua. There is no need to plan
to complete this highway at once to the borders,
since neither Honduras nor Costa Rica are well
advanced in their section."

Now, on the second point, that is, the line of
credit to the National Bank of Nicaragua:

"It is suggested that a modest line of credit up
to not more than 500 thousand dollars be extended
to the National Bank of Nicaragua....
(Jones comes in)

Well hello, Jesse. How are you?
Jones:

Hello.

Welles:

The second point

H.M.Jr:

By being late they have taken three million dollars
away from you. So it's cost you three million
dollars already.
Well, the second is more agreeable to you, then,
because only 500 thousand dollars is involved in

Velles:

We are discussing here the

possibilities of what we can do for Nicaragua.

the second point.

387

-3"It is suggested that a modest line of credit up

to not more than 500 thousand dollars be extended
to the National Bank of Nicaragua, Incorporated,

by the Export-Import Bank, for a term, possibly,
of one year, renewable up to five years. The
purpose of such a line of credit would be partly
psychological, and partly to enable the Bank to
eliminate seasonal and unusual fluctuations in
the rate of exchange. Since it would not be the
purpose of this line of credit to enable the Bank
to maintain the exchange rate fixed in the secular
sense, amortization should be possible in the
normal course of exchange transactions."

Then comes a brief statement as to the position of
the Bank:

"As of December 31, 1938, the Issue Department of

the Bank held 329 thousand dollars of gold, 360
thousand dollars of devisen, a total of 689 thousand

dollars equivalent at five cordobas per dollar to
3 million 448 thousand cordobas, against notes
and coins outstanding of 10 million 770 thousand

cordobas, or 32 percent. In addition, the Banking
Department held gold and silver in the amount of
323 thousand cordobas and foreign balances of
3 million 143 thousand cordobas. Funds awaiting

remittance abroad amounted to 1 million 666 thousand

cordobas, leaving a net position of 1 million

477 thousand cordobas or about 295 thousand dollars.

It is not known how much of this represented

German blocked marks, but on August 31, 1937, an

audit indicated that about 30 percent was in blocked

marks.

"Following the marked depreciation of the cordoba,

which fell in the official market from two to the
dollar in 1937 to five to the dollar following the

law of June 8, 1938, there has been a tendency
for the exchange position of the Bank to improve.
Imports have been restrained both by the great
increase in import prices in terms of cordobas and

by the restriction by the Bank of credit to importers.
As a result the demand for foreign currencies relative to their supply has diminished, as is evidenced
by strengthening the cordoba from 6.70 to the dollar
in the then 'uncontrolled' market on April 30,

1938, to about 5.30 in the 'curb' market at the

present time.

388

-4"It would be a necessary condition of the extension
of any such line of credit that the Bank employ an
American financial advisor, approved by the ExportImport Bank, to control the use made of the funds.
Experience indicates that Nicaraguan management

has regularly proved incapable of satisfactorily

conducting the affairs of the Bank. When Mr. Edwards
took over the management of the Bank in 1937

following the resignation of Dr. Vicente Vita, he
found no accounting worth the name, and was forced
to write to the Bank's foreign correspondents to
find out what balances the Bank had abroad.

Recently, following his resignation, the American
auditor of the Bank, Mr. Alfred Gini, resigned over
what he called improper methods in the preparation
of the Bank's statements.
"In examining the prospects for the amortization of
any credit which may be extended, one should investigate both the budgetary position of the
Nicaraguan Government and the balance of inter-

national payments of Nicaragua. Satisfactory information is not available regarding either of
these.

"Although no recent complete figures are available,
we are informed by the Nicaraguan Minister that
revenues have improved and that the budget shows

a surplus. At the same time the debt, internal
and external, of Nicaragua is very low, and has

been reduced markedly during 1938.

"No complete balance of payment estimates are

available. Tables indicating the foreign trade
of Nicaragua are appended. It will be noticed that
the position of the United States has improved
considerably during 1937 and 1938, while that of
Germany has declined. The large drop in the value
of exports in 1938 was due to reduced prices for

coffee following the decision of Brazil to diminish
its coffee restriction program, as well as poor
yields for coffee and bananas, the latter due to
the ravages of banana diseases. The decline in
imports may be attributed, as indicated above, to
the fall in the cordoba and, to some extent, to
credit restriction employed during part of 1938
by the National Bank.

389

-5"Other known items of the balance of international

payments include annual payments of 122,500 on

the sterling debt in accordance with the 1937
agreement with the Council of Foreign Bondholders,
and about $160,000 on the frozen commercial debt
in accordance with the 1938 agreement with the
National Foreign Trade Council, Incorporated."

Now, I have here a much further ampler memorandum

in a form which is suitable to be handed to the

President of Nicaragua when he arrives here, provided the general ideas are agreed to.
Jones:

This is a proposed loan of a half million?

Welles:

There are two things involved. Before you came in,

Jones:

firm.
For construction purposes?

I had suggested that a loan of three million dollars
be extended to Nicaragua along exactly the same
lines as that of the plan which we put through
in Haiti; that is, through an American engineering

Welles:

Road construction primarily and one or two other
minor public works.

Jones:

And five hundred for some cash in the pocket, huh?

Welles:

For the Bank.

Jones:

What's the purpose of the loan?

Welles:

Well, I think I'd better take up the second memorandum.

Jones:

Welles:
Jones:

Then we can go into it fully.
Well, you needn't read it, just

Well, the first loan of the three million.
That's - I know that's the public works.

Welles:

There would be a responsible United States engineering
firm and so on.

Jones:

And the other - I mean what do we want to attain,
what's the object?

390
-6--

Welles:

Well, specifically, as I said here, the purpose of
such a line of credit of 500 thousand dollars would
be partly psychological and partly to enable the
Bank to eliminate seasonal and unusual fluctuation
in the rate of exchange.

Welles:

Well, you don't get my point. I mean what are we
to gain from making the loan?
The benefit, of course.

Jones:

The United States.

Welles:

The benefit, of course, would be partly political
and partly to our own export trade.

Jones:

Well now, I assume.

Welles:

I ought to say at the beginning that the President
of Nicaragua is coming up here with extremely highflown ideas. First of all, he wants to persuade

Jones:

the United States Government that the Nicaraguan
Canal should be constructed immediately. The

Jones:

estimate for that, as you may not know, and it was
a surprise to me - I thought it was about 785 millions I'm told the War Department now estimates the cost
at one billion one hundred million dollars.
The cost of the

Welles:

The cost of the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal.

Jones:

That's what he's coming for?

Welles:

That's one of the things he's coming for. The
second thing he's coming for is that under the

terms of the 80-called Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of

1915 - '13, I guess it is.
Duggan:

16.

Welles:

'16 - by which we acquired the option for the right

of way to construct a canal if and when we wanted

it, for 99 years. We paid three million dollars
for that option at that time. He now would like us
to feel that they have waited a long time and they'd
like some more money for that option. If he can't

391

-7get that, he would like us to spend a good deal
of money in the so-called canalization of the
San Juan River in Nicaragua, which is a part of

the line of the canal. And we feel that there is

no
reason,
no valid reason at all for doing any
of those
things.

He has certain other ideas as well, which I needn't
go into. But I think that the two things we have
suggested here are relatively small in amount and
I think they probably would be sufficient to maintain a friendly and satisfactory relationship
with the Nicaraguan Government at a time of con-

siderable importance, and I think they are inherently

sound in the interests of American business.
Jones:

Suppose we don't make the loan. What happens?

Welles:

Well, of course, I can only speculate. I would
speculate in this way: I think probably Nicaragua
will increase very materially her barter trade
with Germany, and I think it is not at all unlikely
that certain German interests will undertake to
construct some of these public works that they
want in Nicaragua, and would undertake some form
of more or less rigid, water-tight economic and
financial relationship with Nicaragua, which would

be very definitely to our prejudice. That's
speculation, but I think it is probably fairly
well founded.

Jones:

How many people in Nicaragua?

Welles:

Do you remember the exact population, Mr. Duggan?

Duggan:

Around a million.

H.M.Jr:

One thing I don't think you pointed out to Mr. Jones.

Welles:

that right?
That's right.
Am I right on that?

H.M.Jr:

I think you said the Nicaraguan Government on this
road thing would spend as much money again. Is

392

-gWelles:

The Secretary is right. The Nicaraguan Government
itself would spend approximately 50 percent of the

estimated cost for the construction of the Pan-

American highway in Nicaragua of eight millions.
In other words, our engineering company would get
paid 787 thousand dollars; American materials used

in construction of that road would be two million

one hundred twenty-nine thousand dollars; further
equipment would be 920 thousand dollars; and part

of the upkeep and 80 on would have to come from
the United States; whereas Nicaragua would pay for
local labor and operators and Nicaragua would pay

approximately 50 percent of that total of eight
million.

Jones:

If we put in three millions of that, two million
one would be for materials and 800 thousand for
cash, huh? Is that it?

Welles:

Let me show you this little estimate there, Mr. Jones.

Jones:

Does this indicate the amount that would be exported
from this country?

Welles:

I think the first three items give you that fairly
clearly.

Jones:

First three items: equipment and materials and
engineering. Well, in this case the equipment and
materials amount to three million dollars.

Welles:

Amount to what?

Jones:

The equipment and materials amount to three million
and 49 thousand, on these figures, so we would be
furnishing equipment and materials.

Welles:
Duggan:

That's right.
Might I point out,....

Welles:

Please.

Duggan:

....Mr. Jones, that those figures there are the
estimates for the total construction of the highway
from the Honduran border to the Costa Rican border.

393

-9 It would only be proposed to construct that section
which can be really utilized at this time, inasmuch
as Honduras hasn't built its section up to the border,
nor has Costa Rica. So those figures really are
higher than necessary to build the piece which could
be commercially utilized at the present time.
Those figures, moreover, aren't broken down precisely
to show the foreign exchange necessary - that is,
foreign expenses and domestic expenses - but total
expenses; and some of the items include both domestic
and foreign expenses.
Jones:

Welles:

Well, is this meeting to take action or to get
acquainted with it or to anticipate the visit or what?
I think the purpose is to find out if these ideas in
general are satisfactory, in order that we'll have a

basis on which to talk with the President of Nicaragua
the day after tomorrow, when he arrives.

H.M.Jr:

Jones:

Welles:

Kind of short, isn't it? I've been accused by the
State Department of giving time limits. This is
kind of short.
Would it be feasible to - desirable to find out what
they want first, and then have a meeting and time to
consider it?

Well, we asked about six weeks ago what he did want.
I've outlined to you in general what he does want.
And we have had one further meeting here with the
Secretary of the Treasury, which you were not able

to attend - Mr. Pierson was here - in order to go
over the general outline. And this second meeting

is in order to make it possible for us to talk with

the President when he gets here and not let him be
in Washington with the feeling that we weren't even
far enough advanced to be able to talk with him at

Jones:

Welles:

all.
Well, I'd be glad - if my advice or counsel is
desired, I'd like a chance to read it and get better

acquainted with it.
Please. I think Mr. Jones had better have this

second, more ample memorandum. Has Mr. Pierson

got a copy of this?

394

- 10 -

Collado: Yes.
Welles:

Then I think I might give my own copy to the
Secretary
of the
want to read
it. Treasury and Mr. Jones if they

Jones:

I'd like to - like time to read it.

Welles:

This is an amplification of that.

H.M.Jr:

Which is the

Velles:

This is the better one that you can take.

H.M.Jr:

Well

Lochhead:

We have a copy of that, Mr. Morgenthau.

H.M.Jr:

We have a copy. (Hands to Jones Mr. Welles' copy).

Well, in order that you people know what you want I mean you're using this room as a meeting place is 24 hours long enough for you?
Jones:

I don't know whether it is or not.

H.M.Jr:

Well, I mean to say yes or no.

Jones:

Well, if that's one of the things to do - if 24 hours
is all I could have - I would rather have 48.

Welles:

I think Jesse had better have these schedules too.

H.M.Jr:

When does this fellow get here?

Welles:

At 11:20 on Friday morning.

Jones:

We can get back to you before that.

H.M.Jr:

He said 11:20 on Friday morning.

Welles:

That's right.

Jones:

You mean you're meeting him at 11:20 Friday morning.

Welles:

He'll be met at the station here by the President.

- 11 -

395

Jones:

At 11:20. Well, you're not going to talk business
before you give him a cocktail and some food and
mess around a little bit.

Welles:

Well, he'll want to talk business with the President

Jones:

at 5:00 P.M. on Friday afternoon.
He will?

Welles:

Yes.

H.M.Jr:

Why don't we get together Thursday afternoon?

Jones:

That'11 be all right.

H.M.Jr:

4:00 o'clock?

Welles:

(Nods yes).

Jones:

Yes.

H.M.Jr:

4:00 o'clock.

Welles:

H.M.Jr:

That's all right.
Is that all right?

Jones:

(Node yes).

Pierson:

Mr. Secretary, going back to our conversation of

Welles:

Pierson:

last week, this thing really has to be put largely
on a political basis. Can't we all agree on that?
No, I want to take issue with that. I think the
first section, that is, the road construction,

public works construction, is a perfectly sound
commercial transaction. I think the second item,
the extension of a small amount of credit to the
National Bank of Nicaragua, is frankly more political
than anything else.
You feel they can amortize the road construction
expenditures all right?

Welles:

Yes, yes.

H.M.Jr:

Well, as a horseback opinion, I agree with Mr. Pierson.

396

- 12 -

I think that that is the bridge that we've got to
cross. I mean I charge it up to North and South

American good neighbor
Welles:

Now wait a minute. Charge it up to something else
as well. This expedites very much the construction
of the Pan-American highway

H.M.Jr:
Welles:

Well, that's part of it.
which I think is of commercial interest to us.

H.M.Jr:

But the little I know about it - I mean I certainly
don't think it's a banking risk.

Welles:

Well, do you consider the Haitian road construction,

Pierson:

facilitation of credit, a good banking risk?
I think it is much better than the Nicaraguan. They
have a miserable history of meeting obligations in
Nicaragua.

Welles:

H.M.Jr:

I think if this is handled properly with proper
supervision, as you did in the case of Haiti, it
would be all right.
But that doesn't mean that I wouldn't instruct our
representative, who is a director of the Export-

Import Bank, not to vote for it. But I mean I'm...

Jones:

You': re just acknowledging what you think to be

H.M.Jr:

the fact. You're not fooling yourself.
Well, I try not to.

Lochhead:

Mr. Pierson, have you got that much money uncommitted

Pierson:

We have four and a quarter million dollars.

H.M.Jr:

How much?

Pierson:
Jones:

Four and a quarter.
What other customers have we got prospectively?

Pierson:

Paraguay is quite close.

in the Export-Import Bank?

397

- 13 Jones:

Welles:

Did you intend to talk about that this morning?
I'd be glad to, but the conversations have been
held directly between the Minister and Pierson.

Pierson:

I haven't seen him since that first time two months
ago. He hasn't been in since he saw you.

Welles:

In the meantime he was elected President on Sunday,
and he was also up at the opening of the World's

Fair; I imagine he just got back.

Pierson:

He wanted substantially the same thing, money for
an internal public works program, and money for
their National Bank.

Jones:

How much did they want?

Pierson:

About five millions.

Welles:

Yes.

Jones:

And what else have you got in South America?

Pierson:

Well, we have a very important question, I think,
coming up soon in connection with Chile, and
probably with Argentina. Also we have a more or
less - something of a moral commitment to Brazil
1f and when we have the money.

H.M.Jr:

Jesse, I don't know whether anybody told you the
suggestion which I made the last time, that the

Administration ask for a new bank, call it the

Bank of North and South America, and ask for a
hundred, two hundred million dollars worth of

capital, whatever is necessary, and then tell

Congress when we're asking the kind of loans that

we expect to make.
Jones:

Uh-huh.

H.M.Jr:

And that there would be this sort of thing in the

new Bank. But explain to Congress that this 18 the
kind of thing we've got in mind. And maybe they'd
like it. But rather than - the suggestion that I
made - I don't know if it was passed along - rather
than ask for an increase in the present Bank, a

398

- 14 new Bank under the same management, same Board of

Directors, but

Jones:

Why shouldn't we between now and Thursday evening

kind of cast up counts and see what it is that we
might be willing to do regardless of what consideration - whether it was political or whether it was
industrial loans? Why wouldn't we do that and see
about what it's going to take to get by - do the
things we want to do

H.M.Jr:
Jones:

H.M.Jr:
Welles:
Jones:

Get a whole list.
if we want to get into South America, and see

what it comes to. Why isn't that an idea?
I think Mr. Welles is prepared to give that to you
today.

Well, only in those general terms.
Give it to us in general terms, then.

Welles:

You asked a few minutes ago what prospective customers there were.

Jones:

Yes.

Welles:

Jones:

In addition to those that Mr. Pierson has mentioned,
I think Ecuador would be a prospective customer for
very much the same kind of thing that Nicaragua and
Paraguay are asking for: primarily, road construction.
Primarily what?

Welles:

Road construction.

Jones:

Road construction. How much?

Welles:

I haven't any estimate as yet. There have been no

Jones:

You'll make a note of these, will you, Warren?

Pierson:

(Node yes).

Welles:

There's nothing definite. The Ecuadorean President
has mentioned loans of ten to fifteen million.

estimates sent down, have there?

1

399

- 15 -

Our
Minister believes that five million dollars
would be more than acceptable.
In the case of Chile, we undoubtedly will have

something coming from Chile before long. We have

told, as a result of our last talk - told the

Minister of Finance of Chile we'd be glad to have

him come up, but at the same time we have asked

him to specify very clearly what it is he wants
and what it is he wants to talk about before he

Jones:

Welles:

comes up; and we have not as yet had any reply.
What
is that as far as we know? What do we think
he
wants?

Reconstruction in the devastated area, and the construction of one or two plants. The Chilean Government, for instance, wants to construct a smelter,
which the Germans have already made a bid for. There

are one or two things of that kind.

Jones:

Have you any figures on that, Warren?

Pierson:

The smelter would be around three million dollars,
and they want substantial railway equipment - about

two million additional. And then there is the re-

construction sum, which would go as high as twentyfive million according to some of the private letters
I have received.
Duggan:

Collado:

That's twenty to twenty-five million spread over
five years.
That would be the total.

Pierson:

Quite a different situation in Chile, as you know,
from our standpoint, than there is in Nicaragua
and Paraguay; I mean from the standpoint of American
interests.

H.M.Jr:

How do you mean?

Pierson:

Well, I was thinking of our copper - the copper people
and the nitrate people; we have very heavy invest-

ments there.
Jones:

What other countries?

400

C

- 16 Welles:

Pierson:

Welles:

That's all that I know of at the moment.
Well, there will be substantial sums in Colombia
if the
debt
settlement goes through, and they'11
be
good
loans.
The Colombian Minister came in to see me yesterday
and said that before the end of this week he was
going to complete his memorandum as to his proposals
for the settlement with the Government of Colombia.

By that time he would send that to the Protective

Council of Foreign Bondholders, and they would begin

negotiating. That at last is under way.
Pierson:

Anything we are adding up now should include Colombia

and probably the Argentine.

H.M.Jr:
Duggan:

I was going to say the Argentine.
Don't forget Cuba.

Pierson:

That's right.

Welles:

You have had Cuba on your list for some time.

Pierson:

But it isn't in this.

H.M.Jr:

New list.

Pierson:

It isn't included in the amount of money we have
mentioned.

Jones:

We'll have to consider them all more or less together
before we can make a plan.

Welles:

What I'm trying to do as quickly as I can is to get
some idea of the amounts involved in each case. But
in a case like Chile, where there is a political

situation of some uncertainty, it is very difficult

to get any concise statement from them.
Jones:

I think it is essential to know the priority of these
in our consideration: which is of the most desirability,
so forth and so on. So if you'll give us that, why,
we'd like it.

401

- 17 Welles:

Right.

H.M.Jr:

And I think we ought to recognize that in most of
these
that we're talking about we're going
into
a loans
new field.

Jones:

Oh yes, absolutely.

H.M.Jr:

It's something new.

Jones:

Absolutely.

Duggan:

I think it would be possible for us, Mr. Welles, to

prepare a brief statement with an estimate of the
probable amount, or the amount at least being talked
about, for each country. We could do that this
afternoon.

Welles:

I think the sooner we can send that to Mr. Jones
and the Secretary of the Treasury, the better,

although I repeat in some cases it is very difficult
to estimate what the amounts involved would be.

We'll do the best we can.
Jones:

Did you promise any money to Bolivia?

Welles:

There is no request.

Jones:

Did they quit fighting or something like that?

Pierson:

Just some private requests there - some private
firms have come in - but they don't amount to much.

Jones:

Haven't they quit fighting in the hope of getting

Pierson:

Paraguay and Bolivia stopped fighting.
The over-all amount is about 125 million in South

some reward for it?

America.

White:

How much does that allow for Brazil?

Pierson:

That puts only 25 for Brazil.
Well, if you're going to get into these kinds of
loans, you'd better multiply that by two.

H.M.Jr:

402

- 18 Welles:

What was that?

H.M.Jr:

Multiply it by two.

Jones:

You mean like on Brazil.

H.M.Jr:

I mean if these countries see we're going to do
business this way, I think you're going to have
a lot more customers.

Jones:

No doubt about that. If we lend one and don't
lend the other

H.M.Jr:

Wouldn't be a good neighbor.

Jones:

That's right.
Well, it depends, of course, in each case on the
type of project which they submit to us for our
consideration and also the assurances they can give
as to repayment. That varies in each case. But
we're trying to - we'11 try and send those estimates

Welles:

to you.

403
RE CERTAIN FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH
GOVERNMENTS OF SPAIN AND POLAND

Present:

May 3, 1939.
10:45 A. M.

Mr. White

Mr. Lochhead

Mr. Foley

Mr. Young

Mr. Jesse Jones Mr. Warren Lee Pierson
Mr. Sumner Welles

Mr. Feis

Mr. Laurence Duggan

Mr. Briggs
Mr. Collado

Welles:

If I may, before the meeting breaks up, speak about
another matter which has not got anything to do

with the American continent but which is of interest
to the Secretary of the Treasury and also Mr. Jones

and the Bank. The Spanish Ambassador came to see

me a few days ago and was instructed officially
by his Government to make a request for credit
facilitation from the Export-Import Bank for the
purchase by the Cotton Syndicate of Spain, which
18 an appendage of the Spanish Government, of 300,000
bales of cotton. I understood that some unofficial
representatives from the Franco Government had been
here last December and had seen you (Jones), but

that nothing was done at that time. And now the
present Government has officially asked that this
matter be taken up with the Bank and is very anxious
to get some word on it as soon as possible. We have
asked the Ambassador to get us some information
which he didn't have, by cable.
Jones:

How does the State Department feel about it?

Welles:

In principle we are entirely in accord. However,
we feel that the time should be shorter than that
which they have asked for. They have asked, as I

recall it, for one year.

Feis:

I'm finding out what the Ambassador - what information he had. We thought we'd save time and break
the ice by asking him to secure further information
on a series of points. As I remember them, we first
asked for more information regarding this Cotton
Syndicate and its relation to the Government. Second,

404

-2we found him vague as to who would be the ultimate

creditor, 80 we asked him to determine that rather

decisively. At one point in the conversation he
seemed to believe that J. P. Morgan was going to
guarantee this credit, and then that faded out.
At any rate, we asked him to ascertain that.

Then we asked him to ascertain what guaranties would
be given as regards making exchange available when

the thing fell due. We asked him to ascertain
whether they'd agree that whole or part of this

would be carried on American ships, something which
the Maritime Commission had raised. And there were

one or two other points. He's getting that material.

Welles:

One important point was some guaranty that the
cotton would actually be used in Spain and would

not either be resold or transferred.

Lochhead:

Keeping in mind also the suit they have against us have you spoken to them about that at all?

Welles:

What's that?

H.M.Jr:

Let me just - I was going to wait. The Treasury
Department officially brought to the attention of
the State Department that there is a suit pending

against the United States Government by the Franco
Government, and we asked the State Department

before they would recognize Franco that they would

try to get them to drop this suit. As far as I
know, the State Department didn't do anything about
it.
Jones:

Could do nothing?

H.M.Jr:

Did nothing about it. They could have, but did

Foley:
Welles:

nothing. Is that right?
That's right. Very carefully brought to the attention of the State Department.

May I interrupt to say that Franco stated very
specifically that he would not agree to contingent
or conditional recognition under any circumstances.

H.M.Jr:

Well, I certainly will do anything that I can to

see that the Government does nothing in any way -

405

3-

I'm sure I have the 100 percent backing of the

President - to give any kind of credit to Spain
until this Government brings forcibly to the
attention of the Franco Government this suit. And
I'm sure I'll have the 100 percent backing of the
President, because when we did this, bought this
silver, I did it with the President's approval.
And until the Government takes some steps to get
them to drop this suit, certainly I'm going to do
everything possible to get the President to say
that nothing should be done with the present
Government until they drop it. They are suing us
over this purchase of silver, you see.
Jones:

I certainly wouldn't lend them any money or sell
them any cotton or give them any credit until that

was adjusted or, certainly, adjusted in the transaction.

H.M.Jr:

Well, the easiest thing is - I mean our own attorneys

Welles:

What is the present status of that, Henry?

Foley:

Well, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the

Welles:

Welles:

Any idea when it's coming to trial?
I couldn't say exactly. It depends on the congestion
of the calendar. Probably won't be reached for trial
before sometime next fall at the earliest.
As late as that? How much are they suing us for?

Foley:

I think it's around three or four million.

Lochhead:

The total suit would be

Foley:

The purchases involved about 15 million dollars.

Foley:

and Mr. Henry Stimson, who 1s our attorney, all
advise us that the Spanish Government have no suit.

party that is being sued, as they bought the silver
as our agent. The action is - summons from the
complaint has been served in three or four actions;
the matter hasn't come to trial yet. It's awaiting
its turn on the calendar up in New York.

I don't think that all of that is

406
4

-

Lochhead: They put attachments on every shipment.
H.M.Jr:
Welles:

H.M.Jr:

About 15 million dollars.
Poor leg to stand on.
No, but I just - I'm sure I have the 100 percent
backing of the President, and I can't be too

determined in my statement that until they drop
the suit, why, I'm opposed to giving them any kind
of credit, and I'm sure you'd (Jones) back me up.

Jones:

Yes, I would do that. I might do it in a negotiation. I might say, "All right, here's one and the
other. What're you going to do about it? If you

want to do business with us, are you going to keep
suing us or are you not?" I agree with you on
that.

Welles:

I think it might be more expedient to handle it that
way. We've got a tremendous interest, as we all

know, in trying to get rid of cotton. I think we
could get rid of it this way. So much better if
it could be washed out - the silver transaction in the course of those transactions. Perfectly
agreeable to me.

Jones:

You'd have to wipe that out, I would think, or you
wouldn't sell them any cotton, give them any credit,
or anything.

H.M.Jr:

The point I want to make is that certainly it hasn't

Welles:

Their Minister hasn't even yet been received by the

H.M.Jr:

been brought to the attention of the Franco Government yet that before we're going to do business with
them as a Government, we expect them to drop that
suit.

President. You see, it's preliminary.

Certainly they have left no stone unturned to be as
aggressive as possible in trying to - I mean they
went 80 far at one time that they had every shipping
company frightened in even handling the silver.

407

O

-5Jones:

Any others that you've got in mind?

Welles:

No.

Pierson:

I have one small point which I'd like to bring
up, since practically all the Committee is here,

Mr. Secretary. We have a commitment now of

six million to Poland for cotton and copper. Now,
out. And they have recently asked us whether or
not we will, first, make that commitment revolving,
and second, whether if they give us the outright
guaranty of the Polish Treasury we will reduce the
interest rate from 3 percent to 2h percent per
annum.

of that, about a little over two million is actually

Now, in support of that last request they say they
had some conversations with the Treasury last fall,

when Mr. Taylor was here, and the point was brought
up that 1f the Polish Treasury guaranty was given,
the Bank might take a more reasonable view on the

interest rate. No commitment, as I understand it.

H.M.Jr:

Young, will you look that up to see if there is any

memorandum from Mr. Taylor on that. I'm not familiar

with it.

Pierson:

It may have been with Dr. Feis.

Jones:

Feis:

We talked about that the other day.
We talked about it.

Pierson:

We talked about making it 3 percent.

Jones:

And something about the revolving fund - that we
would continue until stopped, huh?

Pierson:

Yes.

Jones:

Instead of making a definite commitment, an indefinite
commitment; we would just go ahead with the right
to stop anytime we thought we should stop.

H.M.Jr:

Well, I have no interest in it.

-6-

408

Jones:

That strike you (Welles) all right?

Welles:

Does to me.

Pierson:

They're pressing this very hard on the interest
rate. They always have. The first time the question
came up three years ago, they didn't take a loan at
that time because the interest rate asked was 3A.
I'll just add what you probably know, that on their

Feis:

dollar bonds here they have maintained service, and
about six months ago they put through a settlement

with the Council which is probably the most satisfactory settlement that any foreign government has

made on its bonds.
Jones:

Well, our experience with them has been very satisfactory and I think we ought to continue along, do
business in the same way.

Feis:

Jones:

Second, the Minister of Commerce is going to be here

in two weeks with the idea of negotiating a trade
agreement with them. So everything seems to be
moving satisfactorily.

Our principal risk would be war, as I see it. It
is a perfectly good loan as long as they can - unless
there is war. That's our risk. We take that risk
in everything we do.

Have you got anything else, Mr. Pierson?
Pierson:

No, but I'd like to go ahead on the compromise of

Jones:

I don't think anybody objects.

Pierson:

There's no objection?

Jones:

He cried me out of that half percent the other day.

H.M.Jr:

Then he must be pretty good.

Jones:

Yes, he's pretty

H.M.Jr:

Have you got anything else?

Welles:

That's all.

3 percent.