View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Eã
¡|\
rr

9

Írl
-¿:

|J

i;'

Internatlonal Developments and Monetary pollcy

l{. Lee Hoskl ns , Pres I dent
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Boston Assoclatlon of Buslness Economlsts
Boston, Massachusetts
May 23, 1988

EmAt

RE$En'/E BANK

'" 6ÍAl'¡SRs

i luw rr

ii''

isri,

LFtffiri','-..

Internationaì considerations have taken on a more promlnent role
recently in

economìc

policy decisions around the world. Partly this refìects

the growing interdependence and openness
trade and capital

nations, characterized by large

flows. It also reflects the problems of the day,

particularly the serious international
l'le now seem

among

imbalances

that currently

to be on a path towards redressing the global trade

imbaìances. A long journey remains, and the conditions that
when we reach

today. I

exi st.

our destination

will

depend on the

sense an increasing uneasiness

will

policy choices

be

in

pìace

we make

in financial markets about

policymakers' willingness to maintaÍn the progress they have made towards
achieving price

stability.

This uneasiness does not stem as much from recent

price or money-growth trends, as from a sense that future economic policies

wllì not be adequate to manage the difficult transition ahead. Central
continue to establish multiple objectives
lmportance they attach

Tonight,
monetary

I vill

for

nronetary

banks

policy and to alter the

to each.

review what

I

believe is the appropriate role for

policy ln an international context.

I will

argue

that an emphasis

on

price stabllity both in the United States and abroad not only could reduce
price uncertainty, but could also keep us on the desired path of adjustment in
our international




accounts.

-2Correctlnq Internatlonaì Imbalances

late 1985, the exchange market began to vlew trends in global trade

By

imbalances and

exlsting exchange-rate configurations as unsustainable.

Protectionist sentlments were growlng, and the dollar had begun to

depreciate.

to global trade imbalances relies on
pol icies in both defictt and surplus countries and on

The standard textbook remedy

expenditure-adjustment

exchange-rate management. Domestlc expenditure patterns began to adJust ln

late 1985, but the market did not vlew these adJustments as proceeding qulckly
enough, and completely enough,
exchange

rates.

to obviate a sharp realignment in dollar

By mid-1986, Germany and Japan became increasingly concerned

about the impact that the

dollar's rapld depreciation could

economles. Exports vere an ìmportant source

countries.
markets

of

economic growth

By mid-1986, Germany and Japan were lntervenlng

in

in

1986 and

result

was an

acceleratlon in the growth of their

1987. For exampìe, central-bank

percent annual rate
and 6.0 percent

in

money

in

in .l986 and 1987 compared to

these years

respectively.

money

Germany greu

upper targets

their

both

exchange rate

-- at tlmes ln very large amounts -- to slow the dollar's

One

depreciation.

supplies in

at nearìy an 8

of 5.5

Money growth (M2 & CDs)

accelerated from an 8 percent annual growth rate

ll

have on

in late

percent

ln

Japan

ì985 to approximately

ln 1987. Other countries, notably Canada and the Unlted
Kingdom, also intervened to slow the dollar's decline and consequently
percent late

experi enced accel erati ng rnoney-growth rates
money

(Ml) grew rapidìy in

r 987.




1985 and 1986,

.

Meanwhi ì

well

above

e, i n the Uni ted States,

target, before sìowing in

-3-

0n the Path of AdJustment
To

date, the effect of these policies has been to put us on the path to

adjustment. The dollar

now stands approximately

at ìts

ì980 leveì, before our

serious trade balance problems began. Real net exports in the United States
have begun

in

demand

to adjust, as have real net exports in

many

Germany and

Japan.

forelgn countries, especially in Japan, has improved.

the stlmulative policies undertaken to date not only are foreign

Domestic
Given

economies

likely to continue expanding, but growth probably will accelerate.

The IMFs

recent l,lorld Economic Outlook shows domestic demand in most foreign countries
growing as the export sector slows and malntainlng overall
acceptabl

I

e

real growth at

an

pace.

do not mean

abroad does seem

to

to suggest that a boom is in progress abroad. But growth
be picklng up, and exceeding expectations

in

most

countries with the possible exception of hlest Germany. Although high levels

of

unemployment and excess capacity

with the recent shift in real

exist, these countries

exchange

rates,

have coped well

and economic Arowth, led by

domestic demand, has picked up.

In the United States, domestic demand slowed in
sector

became

1987 and the export

the drivlng force for real growth. Recent data, however, show

strong rebound in consumption growth. The U.S. economy appears strong,

a

and

is low by recent yardsticks.
My concern is that we have made onìy part of the adjustments necessary.

unemployment

to elimlnate the trade balance without a resurgence in ìnfìation both here and
abroad. Through the dollar's depreciation, the terms of trade have been




-4-

aìtered and a shift in worldwide

demand towards

U.S. goods and services ls

underway. Through expansionary policies abroad, our major trad'ing partners
have begun

to increase

domestic expenditures, but a counterbalancing reductlon

in domestic expenditures in the United

States has yet to be made.

the future resource demands -- domestic and foreign

at a point in the adJustment

--

be

How

satisfied?

will

Ne stand

process where policy choices must be made, both

here and abroad.

Pri ce Uncertai nti

es

Concern about the choices

that world policymakers might make is

manifested in recent uncertainty about

inflation.

The

rapid growth in

money,

against a backdrop of continuing real economic growth, the disappearance of
margin

of

commodity

excess capacity here

in the United States, and a firming

a

in

prices, has increased concern about the future prospects for

inflatlon, not only in the United
United Kingdom. Evidence of this

States but also ln Germany, Japan, and the
concern rras found

in a steepening of

most

industrial countries yield curves last year as well as in moves by the Federal
Reserve to drain liquidity ìast summer and early fall. The stock-market crash
lnterrupted these rnoves and resulted ln a temporary increase in global
I

iquidity. Inflatlon

concerns subsided immedlately fol loning

crash, but have recently resurfaced as the

real

economìc

activity

have not proved




effects of the crash

on

to be discernible.

in the major developed countries provìde littìe
yet of a serious acceleration of gìobal lnflation. However, it is

Recent price trends

evidence

dampenlng

the stock-market

E

clear that
Most

not making further progress towards reducing lnflation.

we are

fndustrial countries currently are experiencing inflation rates of

approximately 4 percent

-- or slightìy higher.

exceptions. In these countri es,

Germany and Japan are

, after decl f ni ng i n I ate I 986
and early ì987, are rising at approximately a one percent annual rate. France
and

Italy

have demonstrated

in recent years.

Consumer

consumer pri ces

a substantial moderation in their inflation rates

prÌces in the United States accelerated

but they are rising at a modest pace relative to the experience

in 1987,

of the late

I 970s.

risk is that forelgn inflation rates may converge towards the
infìation rate experienced in the United States. This may not be surprislng
The

given the relative slze

dollar

to

inflation largely will

vhere demand will

inflation trends




yillingness of

the

ly to el iminate inflation.

dolìar depreciation potentially has begun to redress global

trade imbalances.

growi ng.

the importance of

depend increasingly on the

united States to reduce and eventual

The sharp

and

rates to foreign economies. The outcome of norldwide efforts

exchange

reduce

of the United States'economy

hle

are on a path where real growth abroad

shlft

more and more tovards U.S. goods and

remain moderate, uncertainty about

is

conilnuing

and

services. l{hile

future inflation is

-6-

theory, however, warns that nominal exchange-rate deprecÍations
can Íntensify price pressures and ultimately wlll fail to improve trade
Economic

imbalances

if

not accompanied by appropriate adjustments in domestic

countries must increase

deficit and surplus countries. Deficit
private savlngs relatlve to investment and reduce

thelr

deficit.

expenditure trends in both the

government budget

Surplus countries must increase prlvate

and

public consumption. consequentìy, our Journey ls bringing us closer and
closer to an inevitable crossroads, and we must choose dovn whlch path we wlll

travel.

inflailon, the other does not.
The path leading to renewed inflation is one yhere we fail to institute
the necessary mix of monetary and fiscal policles to reduce domestic
One path leads

to

renewed

expendltures. The exchange-rate change increasingly ra'ises
U.S. goods and servlces, both by reducing U.S.
increasing foreign

demand

demand

for forelgn

for

goods and by

for U.S. goods. However, trìthout a counterbalancìng

demand

slowing in real domestlc expenditures, domestic capaclty eventually
unable to accommodate

inflation

this shift in

ttouìd accelerate

-- offsettlng

the

lnitial

many

demand

patterns. If this

were

wlll be

to occur,

-- lnitially in the United States and later abroad

competitive effects

this polnt the trade deficlt

of the dollar depreciatlon.

At

would no longer lmprove and could begin to

deterlorate agafn. The growing U.S. internatlonal debt could impìy a further
slowlng in the growth of our standard

of living,

of our future GNP would service our foreign
The

effect could even snowbaìl

lf

uncertai nty about pol i cy encouraged a




as an increaslng proportion

debts.

the acceleration in U.S. inflation

and

fl i ght from hol di ng dol I ar-denoml nated

-7-

assets. In

1987, private

foreign investors

began

to

show an increased

reluctance to hold dollar-denominated assets. Interest-rate spreads

dollar depreciated further.

and the

The inflow

widened

of foreign capital in

recent

years has helped to finance private and publlc credit demand 1n the United

States. Unless a reduction in foreign capital inflows is
increase in U.S. savings (including a reductlon

deficit),

If

an

in the federal budget

U.S. investment growth could slow.

we want

policles that
us to

matched by

shift

to avoid traveling

down

this inflationary path,

we must adopt

reduce domestlc expenditure growth, encourage savings, and allow

resources

to the export sector as foreign

demands

for our products

rise. In thìs case, prices will not rlse and offset the terms-of-trade effect
assoclated with the recent exchange-rate depreciatlon. This scenario does not

imply a reduction in our long-run growth, but

it

does imply a trade-off of

current consumptìon for future consumption.

The Role

I

of

Monetarv Policv

have already lndicated

that the recent uncertainty about inflation

of the recent price numbers. l,lhile there
of future problems, prlce and wage behavior

does not stem solely from a reading

are worrisome signs and harblngers

has been better than past experience might suggest. Moreover, glven the

shifts in recent years in the short-run linkages between money and prices, it
ìs not clear that the uncertainty stems ìn large part from the past rapid
growth of money. Nhile these events certainly are important, the chief source




-8-

of

concern about

future path

the long-run prospects for inflation is uncertainty about

poì i cymakers wi I

I

the

take.

It is lmportant, therefore, that the Federal Reserve System and other
central banks commit and persistentìy pursue a goal of prlce stabilization.
Central banks throughout the industrlallzed trorld continue to pursue muìttple

objectives including price stabi

I

ity,

exchange-rate obJectives, and output

to tlme to change focus and emphasis among these
of this failure to assert the pre-eminence of a "zero

growth, and tend from time

goaìs.

The consequence

inflation" obJective is that the market cannot be certain about the future
course

of

monetary policy.

The basic

level.

objective of monetary policy should be to stabilize the price

Monetary

and services

policy can do little directly to affect the supply of

goods

to the publlc; these depend on the supply of productive

resources. Central banks can affect the price level and can

encourage

investment, employment, and real economic growth by providing a stable price
env i ronment.

l'lhen

central banks lose credibiìity by failing to commit to

a

zero-inflation obJective and following through with credible actions to
achieve

it,

they create uncertainty. Individuals become more cautious about

looking ahead. They become reluctant to proceed yith plans

entail fixed

commitments

or balance-sheet

exposure

in

some

if

those plans

future period when

inflation might be different than anticipated today. They seek a risk premìum
and pursue alternatlves that pay off quickìy. The information that prices,
wages, and

interest rates provlde can become clouded and resources can be

mi saì I ocated




.

-9-

l^lhen

central banks stabi

I i ze

pri ce I evel s, they create a heal thy

environment

for private

declsionmaking and resource

contracts.

They insure

that

allocation. They prevent
inflation from becoming rlorse and they prevent inflation expectatlons from
becoming embedded in wages, in long-term interest rates, and in other fixed
efficlent

medium

of

money

exchange, and

serves

its purpose as a unit of account, an

a stable store of value.

Therefore, recent uncertainty about Ìnflatlon

price trends, nor does
depend on

it

depend on

recent trends in

credi bÍ I ì ty

of central

money

the

amount

growth.

It

of

is not rooted ln recent

excess capacity, nor does

depends

it

primarily on the

banks' pri ce goal s.

Conclusion

Inflation presented a persistent threat to global growth ln the 1970s.
The

ultimate lesson of the

things at

alì tlmes.

inflation

and unemployment

direction.

decade was

Attempts

that central

banks could not do

to shift the focus of

failed to achieve lasting

monetary
success

l'le learned that monetary pol icy can contrlbute

indirectly by providtng a stable price
l,le have gone through

policy

all

between

in either

to real growth only

envlronment.

a protracted, and palnfuì, period in the 1980s of

reducing tnflation to a'low
Kingdom, the United States,

level. In many countries -- Germany, the United
Japan -- much of the success of that effort was a

result of a demonstrated willingness to eliminate inflation despite continued
weakness




in real output and hlgh levels of

unemployment.

-l 0-

In the past few years, we have been fortunate. l^le have lnltlated
pollcles that have begun to redress our global trade imbalances wtthout
aggravatlng

lnflatlon.

Our good fortune

clearly is being stretched.

Federal Reserve and forelgn central banks must reafflrm

actlons a commltment to prlce stablttty.




ln

The

statements and ln