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MONETARY POLICY AND THE DECLINE IN OIL PRICES
Remarks by Thomas C. Melzer
Commerce Bank of St. Louis Breakfast Forum
April 22, 1986

In recent weeks, financial market sentiment has come to the singleminded conclusion that the bond market version of Nirvana has finally
arrived.

It is widely believed that interest rates will remain low,

perhaps even fall lower, in the foreseeable future.

This view arises, in

large part, from the current disinflationary effects of lower oil prices
on the prices of goods and services.

It has been reinforced by recent

arguments, expectations and deep desires that the Fed should and will
ease monetary policy.
I am tempted to say simply that the market is wrong.

But having

been a professional participant at one time, I have a tremendous respect
for the ability of markets to discount future developments.

On the other

hand, when powerful trends like we have seen recently develop, there can
be a tendency for markets to become overextended—for participants to get
so caught up in the psychology that triggered the move, that other fundamental considerations are ignored for a time.

I believe this could be

happening now in interpreting the effects of oil price declines on the
economy and in evaluating how monetary policy should respond.

Despite

what you may have heard or may even believe, inflation is not dead. Moreover, arguments that the Fed should further ease policy at the present
time are, in my judgment, simply ill-advised.
To see why these current market views may be defective, let us
consider the answers to a couple of general questions.
"How will the lower oil prices affect the economy?"




The first one is

Oil prices have

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fallen by nearly half since the end of 1985.

Gasoline prices have already

tumbled; prices of other, competing sources of energy, such as natural
gas and coal, will fall as well.

These energy price reductions will work

their way throughout the economy's production processes, ultimately
affecting prices of nearly all goods and services.
To be sure, not all firms and industries will benefit equally. We
have heard plenty about those who have been hurt—domestic oil producers,
firms that manufacture drilling equipment and so on.

On the other hand,

industries that rely heavily on energy as an input, like agriculture,
basic metals, transportation, paper and chemicals, will benefit relatively
more than others.
Of course, it takes a little time for the full effects of lower
energy prices to be realized.

Therefore, while the largest declines in

producer prices are likely behind us already, the broader measures of
prices, such as the consumer price index and the GNP deflator, will
continue to be influenced throughout the rest of the year and next year
as well.

For example, our analysis indicates the GNP deflator will rise

about 1.5 percent less this year and in the first half of 1987 than it
otherwise would have, with the largest part of this effect concentrated
in the last half of this year.

Overall, prices will be about 2-1/2

percent lower by the end of next year than they would have been otherwise.
We know why these price level changes occur. When energy becomes
relatively cheaper to use, producers alter methods of production.

As

more energy is used per unit of capital or per unit of labor, output
rises.




In some cases, resources that were used previously to economize

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on oil and energy use now become more efficiently employed elsewhere.

In

other cases, plant and equipment that was previously idle, or used only
marginally, now can be profitably employed more intensively.
Lower energy prices also have other beneficial effects on the
economy.

When costs of operating equipment and structures fall, pro-

ducers invest more in new plant and equipment. Again this process takes
time, perhaps three years or more. While it goes on, the faster pace of
capital accumulation will further improve productivity.
Because we end up, in effect, with more goods chasing the same
quantity of money, prices naturally are lower than they otherwise would
be.

Obviously, the inflation rate temporarily will be lower than it

would be otherwise.

As a result, interest rates, especially short-term

interest rates, naturally decline—for a time.

This, then, is the core

of truth that underlies current market perceptions about the effect of
lower energy prices on inflation.
The basic problem with the typical bond market perception is one of
faulty extrapolation.

The announced declines in producer and consumer

prices in February and March of this year appear to have been extrapolated
into the indefinite future as far as the eye can see.
serious error.

This could be a

The process of output and price adjustment I just

described occurs fairly quickly.

We have ample experience with oil price

shocks to know that, when major energy price jumps occur, inflation will
jump temporarily in the same direction.

However, inflation soon returns

to the rate determined by more permanent fundamental forces.




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One such fundamental force, the rapid pace of money growth over the
past several years, suggests that the longer-run direction of inflation
is upward.

Thus, any decline in inflation brought about by lower energy

prices will be temporary; inflation can be expected to return to the
course it was previously on. What might that course be?

One indication

is that inflation measured by the CPI or PPI had been running at about a
5 percent annual rate in the four months up to January of this year. And
the most recent producer price index for finished goods, although reported
down 1.1 percent for March, reflected an increase of 0.6 percent in prices
of goods excluding food and energy—more than 7 percent inflation at an
annual rate.
There is another important temporary influence on prices besides
the drop in energy prices that is working in the opposite direction.

The

value of the dollar has fallen 30 percent over the past year against
other currencies, a sharp turnaround from its 15 percent per year average
appreciation from 1980 to early 1985. According to some estimates, the
prior rise in the dollar's value temporarily reduced inflation by about
1.5 percent last year. With the sharp drop in the dollar's value, we can
expect the opposite effect on inflation this year.

Imported goods cost

more, and domestic producers of import-competing goods have room to
increase prices as well.

The effect of recent exchange rate movements

alone in boosting inflation could largely offset the downward push from
the oil price decline.
Thus, given the underlying inflationary pressures and the offsetting
effects of a lower dollar, inflation for this year and next is likely to
be about the same as, or possibly somewhat higher, than last year.




During

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1985, broad measures of prices rose 3 to 4 percent and producer prices
rose about 2 percent.

The upward momentum of the underlying forces of

inflation will still dominate the broad measures this year.

Producer

prices are likely to rise more slowly in 1986 only because the decline in
oil prices has a greater immediate effect on this measure of prices.
The oil price decline, then, at best, has postponed a deterioration
in price performance.

But looking out to 1987, the prospects for renewed

growth of output and employment carry with them a strengthening in domestic demand for labor and accelerating wage and price pressures. Likewise,
the oil-induced faster growth of output will increase the demand for
credit, especially for larger plant, equipment and inventory financing,
putting further upward pressure on interest rates.
Moreover, over the next year, most analysts are looking for a
significant improvement in the U.S. trade deficit.

The counterpart of

this improvement, however, is a reduced supply of credit from abroad.
Thus, in 1987, when cyclical pressures and pressures from past monetary
stimulus may already be causing acceleration in inflation and higher
interest rates, we could also be facing an imbalance in the supply and
demand for savings. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to justify
policy actions now that could worsen the inflation and interest rate
outlook for 1987.
But many analysts and policymakers ignore these prospects in asking
"What should the Fed do?"

They strongly suggest, even urge, that the Fed

should ease policy in light of current developments.

The rationale,

generously interpreted, is that, because inflation is "licked" and the
public's inflation expectations are dead, the Fed can safely ignore it,
and use policy to further stimulate the economy.



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1 don't know whether I should be amazed or amused by such arguments.
I do know that there is a group of analysts that, no matter what political
or economic developments arise, will inevitably argue that a strong case
exists for easing monetary policy.

I am not surprised that they should

rear their heads when oil prices decline. After all, many of these people
argued in 1974 and 1979, when oil prices rose, that the Fed should ease
then as well.
Sharp changes in oil prices always provide a dilemma for policymakers, although the choices are more pleasing when oil prices fall than
when they rise.

Falling oil prices make easing look appealing because

its inflationary consequences are hidden for awhile.

Tightening, however,

is also appealing because its adverse short-run influence on output and
employment growth is hidden by the positive real effects of the oil price
decline.

The choice between tightening or easing in such circumstances,

depends upon your policy outlook for inflation.

A tighter policy allows

the beneficial short-term inflation effect of the oil price decline to be
extended into the future.

An easier policy temporarily reinforces the

positive effects of the oil price decline on output and employment, but
worsens the long-term inflation outlook.
While the oil price decline temporarily lessens inflation concerns,
fundamental forces indicate the possibility of higher inflation and
interest rates in 1987 and beyond.

These upward trends will look much

worse as the oil price effect wears off.

Instead of a moderate and

steady climb, the oil price effect will temporarily slow inflation now,
but inflation will jump back up sharply down the road.

Easier money

growth this year will worsen the extent of that surge, and it will worsen
the long-term inflation problem we will face at that time.



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Finally, let me emphasize that there are substantial differences in
the timing and the nature of the effects of oil price shocks and monetary
policy actions.

Oil prices affect the economy relatively quickly; when

the smoke clears, however, the future growth rates of prices, output and
employment are hardly affected at all.

The effects of monetary policy

actions, however, build slowly, gradually and, for spending and inflation,
permanently.
This divergence between the timing and nature of these effects
argues strongly against the further easing of Fed policy at the current
time.

Most of the impact of the oil price decline will long be over by

the time that the effects of faster or slower growth in money stock would
be fully realized.

Responding to oil price shocks with monetary policy

would sharply destabilize the pace of money and credit growth.

Easing

money growth now would yield no lasting gains, but would permanently
worsen the outlook for future inflation.
In the 1970s, most monetary policymakers around the world wisely
resisted strong calls for monetary easing that arose due to the temporary
effects of oil price increases.

This time around, we are not likely to

hear the logical counterpart, calls for monetary tightening.

Certainly,

the case for easing now, as some have recently demanded, is far flimsier
than it was in the 70s. That won't keep such demands from continuing;
however, I am hopeful that now, as then, these demands will be ignored.