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At the Institute of International Bankers Annual Washington Conference, Washington,
D.C.
March 14, 2005

Bank Secrecy Act and Capital Compliance Issues
Good morning. I want to thank you for the invitation to speak at the Institute's annual
Washington conference. International banking organizations are playing an increasingly
important role in the U.S. financial sector. Foreign banking organizations hold more than
$3.5 trillion in banking and nonbanking financial assets in the United States--making these
organizations some of the biggest financial holding companies operating in this country. For
two broad reasons, U.S. banking supervisors give a great deal of thought to the foreign
banking organizations here. First, the management of complex international banking
businesses creates inherent risks, which must be mitigated through sophisticated
enterprise-wide risk management and internal controls. International organizations face
difficult questions of management and control across their geographically dispersed offices.
They often operate in new and unfamiliar financial terrain, which poses strategic challenges.
And they are vulnerable to terrorist financing, money laundering, and other customer fraud
issues that tend to involve cross-border transactions.
Second, international banking organizations are regulated by supervisors in various national
jurisdictions that have different legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks. Thus, the
supervision and regulation of these organizations requires the continuous coordination and
cooperation of host- and home-country supervisors. While banks operate globally,
supervisory and regulatory responsibility for the various operating units of the organizations
is still based on laws and regulations of sovereign states. Complying with diverse laws and
regulations can be complex and costly for global banking organizations.
Today, I want to touch on two regulatory issues that are currently high on the list of both
bankers and supervisors: Bank Secrecy Act compliance and Basel II implementation.
Compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act
Since the passage of the USA Patriot Act in 2001, which significantly amended the Bank
Secrecy Act, compliance in this area has been a major concern for the banking industry. In
large part, bankers' concerns center on the increased burden of complying with the amended
Bank Secrecy Act, the apparent lack of consistency in oversight and supervision, and law
enforcement issues. The Federal Reserve recognizes that banking organizations have
devoted significant resources to helping the government identify and prosecute those who
are involved with money laundering, the funding of terrorist activities, and other crimes. But
some recent events are affecting bankers' perceptions about their role in this critical area,
and have raised serious questions about what bank regulators and other government
authorities--most notably law enforcement agencies--expect of bankers.
Today, I want to provide some background information and describe what the Federal

Reserve is doing, in coordination with the Justice and Treasury departments, to clarify
expectations and dispel misconceptions about compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. But
first I want to emphasize an important point about the Bank Secrecy Act: Implementation of
the act has traditionally been accomplished through a partnership among banks, supervisors,
and law enforcement authorities. The law requires reports and recordkeeping that is useful to
all these entities. Further, the law capitalizes on the role of banks in payment systems. As
collectors of financial information, banks are in a good position to identify questionable or
suspicious payments or activities. For the past decade, the key obligation of banks within
this partnership has been the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports, or SARs, in accordance
with regulations issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and all of the federal banking
and thrift regulators. The agencies' rules require banking organizations to file SARs to alert
law enforcement authorities and federal bank supervisors about a known or suspected
violation of law, or about any suspicious activity being conducted at, by, or through a bank,
thrift, or credit union. By filing SARs, banking organizations put critical information into the
hands of the proper law enforcement authorities in a timely and effective manner. Since the
SAR system was started in 1996, banking organizations have filed more than 1.7 million
SARs. That is an enormous amount of cooperation and information sharing.
However, recent criminal investigations and prosecutions based on Bank Secrecy Act and
SAR reporting violations have attracted significant industry attention. Most importantly,
these cases have generated complaints from the financial industry about the increased
burden of Bank Secrecy Act compliance, as well as the uncertainty of future requirements-particularly for the filing of SARs. Believing that regulators and law enforcement authorities
have set a zero-tolerance level for SAR-filing deficiencies, banking organizations are
concerned that in certain situations failing to file a SAR could result in a criminal
prosecution.
Bankers are telling us that regulatory criticism and criminal prosecutions based on
SAR-filing deficiencies can produce collateral consequences. For example, banks are
tending to avoid customers, such as money transmitters and check cashers, who present
perceived heightened risks. Yet the closing of accounts for these types of businesses is
effectively a denial of banking services to many categories of legitimate customers. Banking
organizations have also begun to file "defensive" SARs in an effort to avoid any criticism of
their judgment about whether some activity is illegal or suspicious, and to avoid sanctions for
failing to file particular SARs. The Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) has reported that these defensive filings threaten to clutter the SAR
database with information that cannot be properly analyzed due to the volume.
Bank regulators and FinCEN recognize that no process for fraud or money laundering
detection and control can reasonably be expected to perfectly detect every transaction. But,
financial institutions are expected to have a sound anti-money-laundering compliance
program. This must include well-defined processes to identify suspicious activities, and those
processes should be tailored to the risk and complexity of each business line. Banks should
provide sufficient training to line staff, compliance officers, internal auditors, and legal staff
to keep employees on the alert for suspicious activities. Further, when questionable activity
is detected, the bank must respond promptly and effectively, and work with appropriate law
enforcement authorities and bank regulators.
I am sure that you are aware by now of the interagency efforts to develop and issue new,
enhanced Bank Secrecy Act examination guidelines and procedures within the next few
months. The Federal Reserve and the other federal banking supervisors, with the active

participation of FinCEN, are drafting these more-detailed uniform examination guidelines
and procedures. We are reaching out to the industry during this stage of the project. Once
the procedures are completed, we will work hard to educate our examination forces and the
industry about the guidelines and procedures. These efforts are intended to better ensure
consistency in the Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money-laundering supervision programs of the
bank regulators and FinCEN--the entity within the U.S. Treasury that is statutorily
responsible for the implementing the Bank Secrecy Act.
In addition, the Federal Reserve and the other federal bank supervisory agencies recently
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with FinCEN to share critical information about
banking organizations' compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act. By providing pertinent Bank
Secrecy Act information to FinCEN, which is adding additional staff to fulfill its
responsibilities, the Federal Reserve and the other regulators can now better coordinate their
supervision and enforcement efforts, thus further reducing the potential for unwarranted
compliance burdens. FinCEN is also committed to providing both bankers and regulators
information about emerging money-laundering schemes and guidance for continually
improving Bank Secrecy Act compliance.
The Federal Reserve is also working with senior Justice and Treasury officials to ensure they
understand the efforts of banks and the regulators to ensure compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act. We want awareness of these compliance efforts to be consistent throughout the
criminal justice system so that the industry and its regulators can continue building
partnerships with law enforcement authorities.
I would now like to move on to a discussion of Basel II implementation.
Basel II Implementation
Basel II represents a fundamental change in how bank capital is determined for regulatory
purposes. The advanced approaches require banking organizations to make significant
investments to improve risk-management processes and measurement so that minimum
regulatory capital better reflects each institution's unique business mix, risk appetite, and
control structure.
Internationally active banking organizations, in particular, have understandable concerns
about the prospect of each national supervisor across the expanse of their global operations
asking a multitude of questions about Basel II implementation, demanding considerable
amounts of data, applying the framework differently, or taking other actions that increase
costs. Inevitably, some of you will find your institutions calculating capital under different
approaches in the various jurisdictions in which you operate.
To help national supervisors coordinate and achieve greater consistency in the
implementation of Basel II within their individual countries, the Basel Committee, as you all
know, has established the Accord Implementation Group (AIG), headed by our colleague
Nick Le Pan, Canada's superintendent of financial institutions and the vice chairman of the
Basel Committee. Nick is here today and will be addressing the recent efforts of the AIG
and the greater issue of home-host supervisory coordination in some depth.
I want to assure you that U.S. supervisors are sensitive to the need to coordinate their
efforts. We will do our best to make compliance manageable for global banking
organizations and to improve our coordination efforts with foreign supervisors. These
initiatives include entering into written supervisory cooperation and information-sharing
arrangements with financial institutions' supervisors in countries that share cross-border

banking operations with the United States. However, while we can strive to minimize the
burden on regulated institutions, we cannot eliminate it.
A critical point for this audience, and this is true for Bank Secrecy Act issues as well, is that
we as regulators are committed to applying the same rules to foreign-owned organizations
that we apply to domestic ones. Foreign-owned U.S. bank holding companies, banks, and
thrifts that meet the criteria for mandatory Basel II institutions will be required to follow the
advanced approaches. U.S. bank holding companies, banks, and thrifts owned by foreign
organizations that do not meet these criteria--including the great majority of institutions
represented in this audience--will have a choice to either follow our current capital
framework in the United States or to "opt in" to the advanced Basel II approaches. If you
decide to opt in, you will have to meet the same qualification requirements as domestic
organizations.
The new Basel II rules are expected to take effect on January 1, 2008. To qualify by that
date, both supervisors and bankers have substantial work to accomplish. Currently, we are
reviewing the submissions received from various banking organizations as part of a
quantitative impact study, QIS-4, to assess the effects of Basel II rules on bank capital levels.
This summer, the agencies will issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) for Basel II. We
will also issue for comment, amendments to the existing capital framework. Thus, bankers
will be able to compare the two alternatives and to evaluate which is appropriate for their
U.S. operations. In the run-up to 2008, institutions subject to the new rules will be required
to conduct a year of parallel calculations; that is, institutions will have to perform a dress
rehearsal, if you will, to demonstrate not only that the design of the Basel II systems is sound
but also that the rules can be practically implemented.
As you know, the federal banking agencies in the United States have stated that a small
number of large, internationally active banking organizations will be required to follow the
advanced approaches of calculating capital under Basel II. A year and a half ago, we
proposed setting the threshold at $250 billion or more in total banking assets or $10 billion or
more in foreign banking assets. The criteria in the forthcoming notice of proposed
rulemaking are unlikely to differ materially from those levels.
At the same time, U.S. regulators--especially those among us who spent the greater part of
our careers as bankers--are very sensitive to the competitive implications of having two sets
of rules for the banking industry. Regulators recognize that Basel I can be enhanced and that
the Basel II standardized approach is not well suited to the needs of our domestic-focused
community banking organizations. Accordingly, we are now seriously considering making
some targeted adjustments to our existing regulatory capital rules and looking for ways to
enhance their risk sensitivity without increasing regulatory burden. The staffs of the agencies
are drafting an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) suggesting possible changes
to our existing capital rules. This advance notice will be published close to the publication of
the Basel II notice of proposed rulemaking.
Finally, those institutions considering adoption of the advanced approaches at the earliest
possible date should begin defining the details of their own implementation plans, while
identifying gaps and placeholders for further discussion with supervisors. In this regard, the
U.S. banking agencies recently issued guidance describing how we expect the
implementation process will work in the United States and some steps that banking
organizations could consider. To be sure, several important implementation issues still need
to be worked out, but the focus on enhanced risk management in Basel II (especially in the

advanced approaches) means that banking organizations should not view Basel II
preparations with a checklist mentality. Rather, they should be moving ahead on many
fronts, looking at how to make the fundamental changes needed for better risk identification,
measurement, management, and control. By doing so, banking organizations can position
themselves to succeed in implementing the accord on a timely basis.
Throughout the process, it will be critical that you regularly communicate with your primary
supervisor about whether you plan to "opt-in" to the advanced approaches and about your
timeframe for compliance. Regular communication can help the supervisor allocate
resources to support the qualification process. It can also help the supervisor focus on your
implementation efforts, identify issues that need to be addressed, and provide prompt
responses to your questions.
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Last update: March 14, 2005