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For Release at 10 a.m. C.S.T.
(9 a.m. E.S.T.)
Thursday, November 11, 1965

INTEREST RATES. GOLD. AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Remarks of

SHERMAN J. MAISEL
Member,
Board of Governors
of the
Federal Reserve System

at the

Joint Meeting of Board of Directors of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas with
Boards of Directors of El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio Branches




Dallas, Texas

November 11, 1965

INTEREST RATES, GOLD. AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Some advised me not to bother discussing balance of payments
in Texas.

Even though the Southwest has a long international border

and important ports, the*' assumed there is less interest in foreign
problems here than on the East or West Coast.

They probably also

guessed that most of you, just as I, wish that our balance of payments
and other international problems would disappear.

A return to earlier

days when we didn't have to hear about the problems of Viet Nam, the
Common Market, or other far off places would be comforting.
Unfortunately the disappearance of foreign problems is a dream,
not a possibility.

We are a major part of the world.

As long as we

remain on this planet, we will have significant problems of international
relations.

It is most unlikely that for any long period in the future

will we again be able to pay as little attention to our balance of
payments as we did from 1940 to 1955.

Balance of Payments and Monetary Policy
Even if you had no concern for foreign problems, you would
still have to be interested in the balance of payments.
affects our daily activities.

It directly

Its impact could become still greater.

Many people believe that it is necessary to shape domestic monetary policy
to fit our balance of payments.

They urge that we tighten credit and

raise interest rates in an attempt to cut flows of money abroad.
believe this is a bad prescription for two reasons:

I

(1) It is based on

a poor theory which is unlikely to work in practice; and (2) Monetary
policy should give primary consideration to our economy*s needs for
growth and price stabilitiy.




2-

My belief is not based upon isolationism, but upon considerations of economic efficiency and progress for both the United States and
the world.

A strong, expanding U.S. economy is not only highly desirable

for ourselves but a necessity if the world is to remain free.
Many times a proper use of monetary policy to achieve our
domestic goals will help our balance of payments also.
does not automatically occur.

However, this

No unseen economic hand guarantees that

either raising or lowering Interest rates and credit will lead to a
satisfactory balance in our foreign exchanges.

On the contrary, the

monetary policy needed for domestic price stability and prosperity may
frequently give poor balance of payments results.
When a conflict between internal and external stability occurs,
we should utilize monetary policy for our domestic objectives.
doesn't mean that we can neglect the external problem.
opposite is true.
rium.

This

In fact, the

We must bring our balance of payments into equilib­

It does mean, however, that along with policies to insure domestic

growth and price stability, we must continue to develop sound selective
instruments that worlc through the price mechanism to enable us to
balance our foreign payments.

What is Our Balance of Payments Problem?
We have all looked at enough balance sheets and know enough
accounting to recognize that all double*entry bookkeeping accounts
balance by definition.
accounts.

Therefore, to find a deficit or lack of equilibrium, we must

define our problem.




This is as true of our foreign as our domestic

-3

This country's external accounts reflect our foreign trading
of goods and services.
lender and investor.

But they do much more.

The U.S. is an important

Moreover, this nation serves as a bank to the

rest of the world--other countries use the dollar as a means of payment
and as a store of value.

A proper appraisal of our balance of payments

position requires an awareness of this three-fold role played by the
United States in the world economy— as trader, investor, and banker.
In the course of trading, American citizens and businesses
pay and receive from foreigners billions of dollars each year.

In these

current account transactions, our receipts exceed our payments by sizable
amounts.
In our lending and investing activity, on the other hand,
we have tended to pay out much more than we receive.
should be.

This is as it

The richest country in the world ought to be a capital

exporter, sharing our enormous savings, our technology, and know-how.
These capital outflows take the form of private direct investment,
purchases of foreign securities, bank loans to foreigners and Government
grants and loans abroad.

Much of this lending is at foreign rather

than U.S. initiative.
Adding our trading and lending activities together, we find
more dollars paid to the rest of the world than they have paid to us.
This excess dollar outflow is a measure of our balance of payments
deficit.




-4-

The Gold Problem
Host people speak interchangeably of our balance of payments
and our gold problem.
different.
problems.

While the two are related, they are very

Gold figures are a poor measure of our international exchange
They are dramatic but not too useful.

problem can exist with no gold loss.

A balance of payments

Contrariwise, gold may flow out

with no balance of payments problem.
These differences arise because of our third international
function--as banker to other countries.
Some of the exce6s payments abroad--that is, a portion of our
deficit--serves to meet the dollar balance needs of foreign banks and
traders to help finance the growing volume of international trade.

Since

1960, for example, such dollar balances privately held by foreigners have
increased $4.3 billion, or more than 60 per cent.
Other excess dollar outflows meet the needs of foreign
monetary authorities for more reserves in the form of dollar balances.
They invest these dollars in the United States and thereby earn interest
on them.
Finally, some excess dollars may be used by foreign monetary
authorities to purchase gold from the United States.

As the major

reserve currency country, we stand ready to buy and sell gold for dollars
at $35 per ounce.
Since only the last type of transaction causes a gold loss,
it is clear that the flow of gold abroad is not a reliable measure of
a balance of payments disequilibrium.




The flow of gold can be, and

-5-

usually is, much smaller than the deficit.

But it can also be larger,

as it was in the first half of 1365, if foreign countries buy gold with
previously accumulated dollars.
A normal or equilibrium position for our balance of payments
deficit is not zero.

As long as foreigners want to increase their

holdings of dollars, the United States supplies them.

But by the

broadest definition of a deficit— although probably a poor one--voluntary
accumulations of dollars by foreigners show up as U.S. deficits.
Without in any way entering the argument over the costs or
gains due to the U.3. status as a reserve currency country, I merely
note that to the extent that foreign countries use the dollar as a
reserve currency, we cannot avoid deficits, by the usual definitions.
These are not common deficits.

We have actually been increasing our

international net worth at a rapid rate.

They are more closely related

to the way a bankfs liabilities expand when depositors desire to hold
more assets in the form of bank deposits.

A Fractional Reserve System
Let me make two asides:
The first is to draw your attention to the similarities of
our problems as a banker to those suffered by New York City banks prior
to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.

Every time other

parts of the country changed their ratios of gold to money either through
private hoarding or for additional bank reserves, Mew York banks were




-6-

placed under severe pressure.

They had to tighten credit.

This

frequently led to panics which hit hardest those who had sought to in­
crease their reserves at the expense of New York.
Secondly, I recently noted a study which showed that the
results of speculation in gold (fortunately illegal for Americans, who
are thus saved large losses), were much poorer than almost any possible
investment in dollar assets.

On most investment lists, it shows the

largest probable losses.
Many people don't recognize how expensive it is to hold gold.
They fail to count the interest lost in holding this sterile asset.
When lost interest is charged and measures of actual gains and losses
from holding gold are compared to other holdings such as of bonds or
stocks, the man or bank holding gold turns out to have held an expensive,
money-losing asset.
I think people get confused because they don't recognize that
in this century the value of gold has depended completely on the
dollar.
value.

The uninformed think that gold has some unchangeable, intrinsic
They don't know that its intrinsic or symbolic value is far below

the amount paid for it by governments who place it in monetary reserves.
Without the governments' and central banks' demand for gold for reserve
purposes, industry or individual users would have to pay a much lower
price.
Another source of confusion about gold is that we don't publish
an index of the value of gold, which would show its sharp changes over
time.




The reason is that we don't have to.

Since its price has been

-7-

pegged to the dollar, its value is identical to that of the dollar.

To

find how the value of gold has changed since 1S35, simply look at the
U.S. price level.

In Theory How Does Tighter Credit Help?
Let us now turn back from this digression on defining the
problem of gold and the balance of payments.

What I mainly want to

discuss is how an existing deficit can be ended.

First, let us see

how, in the theoretical world, an adjustment might be made.
I guess that most bankers and economists would agree with
the theory recently expressed at a symposium sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute:
"Suppose that a country has an overall deficit due to
capital export in excess of its surplus on current account.
All that is then required in order to restore equilibrium
in the overall balance is a restrictive credit policy, im­
plying higher interest rates which, by putting a brake on
aggregate domestic demand, lead to a fall in prices and/or
employment, and hence to higher exports and lower imports,
and a larger surplus in the balance of payments on current
account. The rise in interest rates also has the effect of
reducing the capital export, or at least that part of it
which is governed by commercial considerations...there
obviously exists some level of interest rates at which the
current account surplus will be great enough, and the capi­
tal export small enough, for the two things to balance."

The Real versus Theoretical World
In much of economics, theories have been reshaped to take
into account the frictions and imperfections of the real world.

Such

revisions have been slower to be accepted among the theories of international trade and finance.




The world of theory departs from the world of reality in
three significant ways:
1.

There is no way to know if a balance could be brought

about at all by this method.

But even if it could, what would be the

level of domestic output and employment?
2.

The theory neglects the important part in the problem

played by considerations of national policy.

Our military and foreign

policies need economics so that we can achieve our national goals as
cheaply and efficiently as possible.

Economists agree, however, that

neither in theory nor in fact should these policies be dominated by
economics.

For example, we have to find the money to support our

troops in Viet Nam.
we had

Given a national decision that we fight there,

better supply all requirements, not curtail them for balance

of payments reasons.
3.

The theory neglects the actual institutions through

which economic policies have their impact.
large, free, competitive capital markets.

As an example, we have
Most of Western Europe's

markets are small, restricted and marked by a much higher structure
of interest rates.

This means that capital flows may not be halted

except by extremely large changes in interest and profit rates.

Frictions and Transfers
The great progress that economics has made in the past 25
years occurred because economists took a more careful look at the real
world.

They saw taxes, unions, giant corporations.

They noted tariffs,

trade quotas, long transportation hauls, lack of information.




These

9facts of life mean that when you start raising interest rates to halt
imports and raise exports, you don't know what results you may end up
with.
The theory says that if money is tight enough, sufficient
unemployment will be engendered to cut imports.

It doesn't say whether

the needed increase in unemployment will be 1 or 10 per cent.

It

supposes that unemployed resources will transfer to export industries.
It doesn't say what wages will be offered or whether anyone will accept
them.
We do know that the smaller the percentage of foreign trade
in an economy, the more difficult and more expensive it will be to
adjust the large domestic sector to the small portion made up by foreign
trade.

Most European countries are in a very different situation

from the U.S.

While our domestic trade is 15 to 20 times our foreign,

their ratios are more likely to be 3 or 4 to 1.
We also have fairly good proof that the theory doesn't work
to start with.

Unwanted dollar balances in foreign hands are an

indication that the real goods transfer mechanism is out of whack.
We think that Europe must have a large need for capital because their
interest rates are high.

We know our capital must be cheaper and more

efficient because comparatively, our interest rates are low.

The

failure of real goods to follow money flows shows that tariffs, quotas,
monopolies, or similar interferences with a free market are holding
them back.




-10-

Foreign Policy and Balance of Payments
We have recognized that government spending and taxes form
an important share of our domestic economy.

The same is true in the

international sphere.
Ue are doing extremely well in our commercial or business
current accounts with the rest of the world.

Our commercial foreign

exchange balance since 1960 has averaged somewhere between $5.2 and
$7.5 billion, depending on how it is calculated.
In this period, however, our deficit as a result of military
operations overseas plus government grants and loans has on a minimum
estimate, run about $3.5 billion per year or, neglecting offsetting
sales, as high as $6.0 billion.

Our military expenditures have averaged

from half to two-thirds of the total.

These total governmental

expenditures have far exceeded our net deficit.
The traditional theory agrees that deficits caused by these
expenditures require special adjustments.

They will not and should

not be influenced by monetary policy.
Economics does tell us that when we have been out of equilib­
rium for an extended period, something is wrong.

Because their impact

on the balance of payments differs from their impact on the government
budget or GNP, the actual costs of military and economic assistance
may be far higher than we recognize.
includes balance of payments effects.

The proper pricing mechanism
There is a question as to whether

each dollar sent overseas by the government is returning its true value.
Calculating the true costs is difficult and a constant battle.




President

-11-

Johnson recently instructed each governmental unit to emulate the
Defense Department in an attempt to see that the best and latest
cost techniques are

used.

We can hope that the attempts to revalue

foreign expenditures will be successful and will lead to better policies
plus savings in this sphere.

Capital Flows
The final large segment of foreign expenditures is the $4
billion or more a year of short- and long-term lending and investment.
Again, this sum considerably exceeds our total deficit.

At first,

these flows would seem the most likely to respond to interest and
credit changes.

We know that some money flows do occur as a result

of interest differentials.

The question is whether they and enough

others could be halted by feasible credit movements.
The recent past looks discouraging.

Since 1961, our short­

term interest rates have been raised for balance of payments purposes.
Capital outflows have not responded as one might hope.
opposite is true.

In fact, the

A high correlation, which should not be assumed

to be causal, exists between these interest rate increases and an in­
creased flow of credit overseas.
This result should not surprise us.

We know from our domestic

experience the many possible reactions to interest rates.

We also

know that some of our rate increases were simply matched abroad.
Everyone reached a higher level with no differential impacts.
some flows were cut off.
and more rapidly.




Perhaps

But in this period, demand was growing more

-12-

More significantly there is really not much reason that
interest rate increases of the type we have experienced, even those
since 1961 of 170 basis points, or 75 per cent, in the short-term rate
and 50 basis points, or 12 per cent, in the long-term rate, should
be expected to stop money from flowing abroad.

Secretary of the

Treasury Dillon, in one of his final official speeches at Princeton
last March, gave an excellent analysis of why this is so.

The main

reasons are foreign and domestic differences in profit projections
and capital markets.
Direct investment has moved abroad because American busi­
nesses thought they saw higher possible profits from operating foreign
plants.

Many reasons are cited for this.

expanded faster.

European markets have

Our rate of growth had been slowed.

They have lacked

competition while internally our competition has been intense.
inflation was faster.

Their

Our tax laws gave subsidies not available in

this country to foreign investment.

Their changing tariff situation

made production within their markets better.

Past unfavorable

factors had disappeared while favorable ones had accumulated.
Some of these reasons are conflicting.
Some indicate dangerous illusions by investors.
in governmental policy.

Some are temporary.
Others show a lag

On the whole, however, most of these forces

would not be reduced by a higher interest rate policy here, while
several would be strengthened.
The reasons why foreigners want to borrow in our markets
are even clearer.




Foreign financial markets tend to be poorly developed.

-13Intermediation is faultyi

>kchatiifeMs for tyitig

savings with long-term lending ar*e Inciting.
a few institutions.

together short-term

Funds flow through only

Many markets are government controlled, and

channel most available funds to governments rather than to private
investors.
In contrast, American money markets are huge.
large.

Competition is intense.

Savings are

Large demands are handled with ease.

Funds flow readily from one market to another.
As a result, our lending rates have been far more reasonable
than Europe's.

It would take sharp, unreasonable curtailments of

credit in this country to narrow the gap.

An Analogy
I might sum up my view of the problems by an analogy.

We

can picture our domestic and foreign trade situation as a lake behind
a dam connected to another lake at a lower elevation by a canal.
The first lake is our domestic economy.
to other economies.

The canal is the connection

The relationship of its size, which is small

compared to that of the lake, reflects the relative magnitudes of our
domestic and foreign commerce.

The water flow through the canal is

controlled by sluicegates at each end.

A balance of payment problem

exists when the rate at which water is let into the canal is greater
than the rate at which it is let out.

This leads to an overflow.

Clearly there are three ways of solving the problem of over­
flow.




One could drain some of the lake; a lower level would lower

-14the pressure on the canal.

Or one coüld partially close the dpper

gate; this, too, would reduce the flow of water through thé cânali
Or one could widen the opening at the lower gate, thus allowing the
water to flow out faster.

Some Methods of Adjusting the Flow
Lowering the level of the lake to halt the overflow is likely
to be a very inefficient method of handling the problem.

Experience

teaches that drastic reductions in the total are likely to be re­
quired to achieve small adjustments in a special structural area such
as foreign trade.

The cost to the United States and to the world of

reducing the level of our economic activity below its best growth
line would be great.

It should be adopted only as a last resort.

The solution to the balance of payments problem should be
sought directly in the foreign flow of funds.

It must be recognized

as an international, as much as a national, problem.

The gates

regulating foreign interchange are manned at both ends.

International

agreement must be achieved on available selective instruments.

They

may either reduce the flow from the U.S. or increase the rate at
which foreign economies accept our goods and services.
I can list only some of the many proposals which I feel
offer possibilities.

Some affect our role as trader; others as lender,

and still others as banker.
As a Trader:

Let us consider our current accounts as in­

cluding commercial exports and imports, plus military and government




-15grants and loan expenditures.

Substantial improvement in these accounts

will be hard to achieve, but may be possible.
are being made to expand exports.

Domestically, efforts

Other services may also be pushed.

The balance of payments costs of our trade policies, our
military forces overseas, and our grants have been under constant
surveillance.

Many believe that partly because of a basic misunder­

standing of the real balance of payments problem, our allies have
not been carrying their full weight.

I would hope that in the light

of a complete reexamination of the marginal balance of payments cost
of each part of our foreign policy, we could get more for our funds,
while convincing other countries of the need to carry their true
share.

The reexamination should include our trade policy also.

Failure of the transfer mechanism indicates critical problems in the
trade sphere which are frequently neglected in balance of payments
discussions.
As a Lender: We have already taken several steps.
used the Interest Equalization Tax.
Foreign Credit Restraint Program.

We have

We have adopted the Voluntary
The Administration suggested--

and some progress was made toward— a reconsideration of our income
tax policy with respect to foreign earnings.
appear to subsidize investment sent abroad.

The present tax laws
Policy in the past was

frequently based on the idea that spending abroad should be encouraged.
Times have changed.

Probably policy should change also.

Another major improvement, particularly aimed at speculative,
short-term money flows, which have had a most destabilizing effect,




-16-

has been promised by the advocates of widening the margin of permissible
limits of exchange rate variation.

They claim that broader limits

would cut our short-term speculative capital outflow since the costs
of covering forward would exceed the small interest differentials
which now lead to capital exports.

Trade would not be influenced

since it would still take place either in dollars or at agreed upon
exchange rates.

They have suggested that we broaden the limits by

widening our gold margins.

This would have to be done by lowering the

purchase price of gold, since we have a firm national commitment to
maintain the selling price at $35 an ounce.

The Joint Economic Committee

of Congress recently urged a much closer examination of this proposal.
I agree that a study of the pros and cons of this type of proposal
would be worthwhile.
As a Banker; Finally, our role as a banker needs clarifica­
tion.

There are both short

and long-run problems.

Some reexamination

is necessary of the proper banker-depositor relations under a
fractional reserve system.

Failure to agree on how reserves should

be handled caused tremendous difficulties domestically under the
National Banking System.

Similar uncertainties become a constant

source of worry and of consequent wrong action for a reserve currency
country.

Many logical plans on reserve ratios, value guarantees,

funding of

overages,

etc., have been advanced that would reduce

this problem internationally, just as the Federal Reserve and FDIC
Acts have reduced it internally.




-17Another area in which progress may be expected is in methods
of improving the future operations of the world monetary system,
particularly with respect to the way future world monetary reserves
will be provided.

The United States is now engaged in negotiations

with other countries to improve present procedures.

The results of

these efforts will be most significant.

Conclusion
As must be clear, I have no panacea for our monetary problems.
I do feel it important for all of us to recognize that the panacea
offered by others of tighter credit as a basic solution to our balance
of payments problem is not likely to work.

In order to bring our

balance of payments into equilibrium, as we must, we require a much
more complete examination on both a national and an international
basis, of possible steps to improve the situation.
are a multi-national problem.

Foreign exchanges

Valid solutions are not easy to find.

However, many selective policies have been suggested.

They promise

to be more efficient than an overall reduction in demand.
It is important that the various proposals be carefully
reconsidered both individually and as part of a broader package.

How

can we make our price, lending, and trade mechanisms approach more closely
to the goals of free competition?

Improvements probably will require

international agreements covering a large number of specific policies,
some directed toward slowing down the flow from our end, and others
toward increasing the rate at which goods and services are accepted
at the other.