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Statement by
Robert C. Holland, Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
S. 2298

December 8, 1975




I am pleased to appear before this Committee
on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to discuss S. 2298, and the broad range
of important bank regulatory, supervisory and monetary
policy considerations which are affected by this
proposal.
In the interest of both clarity and brevity,
my prepared statement is addressed to the key reasons
underlying the Board's positions on the provisions of
this bill and on certain alternative proposals.
Thereafter, I shall be glad to try to answer any
questions you may have.
When you introduced S. 2298, Mr. Chairman,
you referred to the speech Chairman Burns made to the
American Bankers Association, in October 1974, concerning
the banking system.

During the past year the Federal

Reserve has made detailed studies of the problems
highlighted in that speech and what might be done to
help correct them.

As a part of those efforts, we

have given careful thought to the structure of bank
supervision and regulation in the Federal bank regulatory

- 2 -

agencies.

Our views have been evolving during the

course of these studies, and they are continuing to
develop.
One of the Board's major conclusions from
this detailed review is that some reform of the bank
regulatory structure is desirable, but that consolidation
of all bank supervisory and regulatory authority in a
separate agency as proposed in S. 2298 would be unwise.
(We also have comments on several details of S. 2298,
which are presented in the attached Appendix A.)
A number of considerations have led the Board
to this major conclusion.

First and foremost, this

bill mandates a decisive separation between the Federal
Reserve, the nation's central bank, and banking regulation
and supervision.

That, we are convinced, would be a

serious mistake.

Now, more than ever, the Federal

Reserve's role as monetary policymaker and as lender
of last resort interacts with the effects of prevailing
bank supervisory and regulatory policies.

Each of these

areas of public policy increasingly influences the
effectiveness of the other.
weaken both.




To divorce them is to




- 3 Because of the importance we attach to this
particular issue, let me give you some concrete
examples of our concern.

Fundamentally, monetary

policy works by affecting the liquidity position of
banks and the financial system.

Good bank supervision

should, and will, examine the liquidity of individual
banks and urge the correction of inappropriately thin
or exposed liquidity positions.

But if bank supervisory

policy is set without full understanding of broad
economic developments or the trend of monetary policy,
the supervisor can be impelling ill-timed banking actions.
The enforced write-downs of bank assets to the unrealistically depressed market values reached during the
Great Depression were among the most unfortunate
examples of such too-narrow supervisory vision.
On the other hand, if the bank supervisor sets
too-low liquidity standards, or none at all, or changes
them at an inopportune moment, he can dilute or frustrate
for a time the thrust of monetary policy.

For example,

the bulge of the past few years in loan commitments -that is, in bank promises to lend money upon request,

- 4 made chiefly to businesses -- both slowed and skewed
the restraining effects of monetary policy, and
thereby helped worsen our inflation.

Those adverse

effects could have been considerably worse, were it
not for the fact that the Federal Reserve, drawing
upon its supervisory as well as monetary responsibilities,
took the initiative in expressing concern to bankers
regarding the large build-ups in their commitments.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, I wish that
our countermeasures could have been even more vigorous.
Bank capital standards set by supervisors also
interact with both national economic and monetary policy.
Supervisory rules that require banks to raise their
capital ratios or that make it more difficult for banks
to raise capital can reduce the availability of bank
funds to prospective borrowers and thus slow the rate
of growth of bank credit and money.

These are matters

of significance to monetary policy.

For example,

right now, in the wake of several years of strong
bank credit expansion and some recent loan reverses,
a strengthening of capital positions of many banks




- 5 is most desirable.

But supervisory pressure for

improving capital ratios should not be overdone in
this environment, as it could deter bank willingness
to lend to the extent of interfering with the
financing of recovery.

Nor, for the same reason,

should supervisory pressure be such as to inhibit
the ability and willingness of banks to go to the
market to raise needed capital.
There are two other important aspects of
interaction between supervisory and monetary
considerations that should be accented.
Bank supervisory activities provide a flow
of information concerning detailed developments inside
the banking system that can be of inestimable value to
monetary policymakers.

Examiner asset evaluations

supply first-hand knowledge of the changing quality
of credit, and of the quality of bank management that
is administering that credit.

Important insights are

gained also into bank policies regarding liability
management and participation in various types of
credit markets.




This kind of information provides

- 6 -

valuable supplements to the meaning of the quantitative
statistics on monetary and credit aggregates.
When one turns to the regulation and supervision
of international banking activities, more monetary
implications ensue.

Changes in bank rules or examiner

standards can generate flows of funds into or out of
this country that markedly alter the international
balance of payments and the foreign exchange value
of the dollar.

Similarly, such changes can create

financial problems for other countries and adversely
affect the relations between our country and others.
In all these supervisory and regulatory matters,
the standards of objective examiner professionalism
need to be respected, but such standards need to take
account of their broader domestic and international
consequences.

To our mind, this reasoning argues

decisively for a close relation between monetary policy
and supervisory and regulatory considerations.
The Board's deliberations have led to the
conclusion that an optimum system of bank regulation
and supervision is one that would achieve three main




- 7 objectives:

(1) to keep banks safe and sound,

(2) to protect the legitimate interests of present
and would-be bank customers, and (3) to be attentive
to overall monetary considerations.
It might seem logical to pursue these various
objectives by consolidating all the public agencies
concerned with them under one roof.

That would

amount to centralizing all banking and monetary
powers in one agency.
However, experience with regulation in industries
other than banking suggests that placing all regulatory
authority in a single agency does not necessarily
result in sound regulatory policy.
entails substantial risks.

Too much centralization

To the extent that the possi­

bilities of criticism and constructive differences of
view from within the regulatory structure are eliminated,
the benefits of knowledgeable checks and balances are
diminished.
are reduced.

The stimuli to initiative and innovation
A sole bank supervisory agency, not

subject to challenge from sister agencies, could tend
to become inflexible, or even ossified.







- 8 -

In addition, any supervisory agency design
needs to take careful account of the danger of the
development of an unhealthy relation between the
supervised and the supervisors.

I believe Federal

government agencies generally make a sincere effort
to avoid becoming captives of the industries they
regulate.

However, the necessary closeness of the

relationship creates opportunities for undue influence
which must be guarded against.
As we have weighed these risks against the
improvements upon recent performance that could
realistically be expected to flow from complete
centralization of Federal bank regulatory authority,
we have concluded that the gains are not worth the
risks, at least at the present stage of experience.
Likewise, we have concluded that there are not such
critical shortcomings in our present bank regulatory
system as to call for the kind of drastic overhaul
proposed in S. 2298.

Too often, we believe, advocates

of this kind of radical change are comparing the real
with an untested idea
show up with some ble




- 9 -

Our analysis of the banking problems that have
surfaced in recent years indicates that many of them
would probably have occurred regardless of what
structure of Federal supervisory agencies was in
place, and that most of them can be dealt with without
a drastic restructuring of the banking agencies.
In the light of recent experience, many
necessary or desirable corrective measures have
already been introduced by both banks and bank
supervisors.

Banks in general have been sobered

by the problems they have faced and are taking a
more prudent posture both in pursuing new activities
and in monitoring possible excesses.

The agencies,

on their part, have launched a number of important
remedial measures to improve bank examination,
supervision, and regulation.

Without taking the

time to identify all the improvements that have
been undertaken, I will simply attach as Appendix B
to this testimony a list of some of the significant
changes and proposals that the Federal Reserve itself
has made.

- 10 -

Surveying all these and similar changes,
we believe they promise a substantial and responsible
improvement in the banking environment.

But I am not

here to try to lull this Committee into inaction with
a claim that "Everything is fine."

On the contrary,

we believe there are certain problem areas where
current progress is not good enough, or fast enough,
or uniform enough to be satisfactory.

Accordingly,

the Board believes that some change in the Federal
bank supervisory structure, designed to improve
performance in those particular areas, would be
worthwhile.

To be specific, the objectives that

we have in mind are:

(1) to more efficiently and

uniformly modernize bank examination and surveillance
procedures, (2) to provide for more vigorous and
consistent follow-up procedures when bank examinations
reveal weaknesses, (3) to attain greater consistency
in some regulations, and (4) to improve the coordination
of bank supervision with monetary policy.




- 11 -

What agency changes would do most to foster
these objectives while avoiding the pitfalls cited
earlier in this testimony?

The answer to that

question is, in the end, a matter of personal
judgment.

On balance, no one proposal for agency

reform has gained the support of a strong majority
of the Board at this time.

Two different reform

proposals, however, have developed strong support
within the Board.
The first, and perhaps the simplest, is to
consolidate the functions of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency within the Federal
Reserve System.

This change would accomplish a

good deal of what is claimed would be accomplished
by a complete consolidation of Federal bank supervisory
functions, without some of the dangers of complete
unification.
There is logic in this proposal, because all
national banks are required to be members of the
Federal Reserve System and thus subject to its
regulations, but their primary examination and




- 12 -

supervision lies with the Comptroller; the Board
has supervisory responsibility for all bank holding
companies, and yet many of the major bank subsidiaries
of such holding companies are national banks; the
Board must approve the opening of foreign branches
of national banks consistent with its international
monetary responsibilities, but the supervision and
regulation of those branches rests with the Comptroller;
the Board authorizes Edge Act corporations, but many
of the banks with whom those corporations are associated
are supervised by the Comptroller.
The examination and supervision of national and
State member banks could be integrated efficiently.
At the same time, the continued existence of the FDIC
would provide another Federal banking agency to check
or stimulate the supervisory and regulatory actions
of the Federal Reserve.
If the Congress should make such a change in
bank regulatory structure, it would then seem appropriate
to have the incumbent of the Office of the Comptroller







- 13 of the Currency added as an eighth member of the
Federal Reserve Board until the next Board vacancy
occurred, at which time he would be appointed to
fill that vacancy.
The second reform proposal which has developed
strong support within the Board is the creation of a
Federal Bank Examination Council.

Such a Council

would be focused on the areas that we believe are
most in need of improvement -- i.e., efficient and
uniform modernization of bank examination and vigorous
and consistent follow-up procedures when bank weaknesses
are revealed.

Such a Council could be established

administratively, or by statute.

Its statutory

authorization would undoubtedly give more impetus
to the establishment of such a Council, and would
also provide it with more clear-cut authority to
take definitive action within its statutorily
defined areas of administration.




- 14 The Federal Bank Examination Council should
have authority to establish £t£ndardo and procedures
for bank surveillance, examination and follow-up,
applicable to all the Federal banking agencies,
and it should review significant problem cases when
and as they develop.

All three Federal banking

agencies should be represented on the Council.
Because of the importance of close coordination
between bank supervision and monetary policy, we
would favor appointing a member of the Board as
our Council representative and making him Chairman
of the Council.
Establishment of a Federal Bank Examination
Council of this kind would be consistent with an
experimental and evolutionary course.

Experience

with the Council would conceivably lead in time to
the conclusion that some further consolidation of
banking regulatory and related authorities would
be desirable.

If so, that decision would be based

upon actual experience and a greater practical
awareness of the difficulties to be overcome than




- 15 we now have.

This step-by-step approach to reform

in bank regulatory structure could, we believe,
bring about significant improvements in bank
supervision.
The adoption of either of the two reform
proposals that I have sketched should help to reduce
instances of "competition in laxity" such as were
noted by Chairman Burns in his October 1974 address.
They would, at the same time, continue a system of
checks and balances which, as Chairman Burns also
observed, "is the traditional way of guarding against
arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority."
The Board recognizes that reasonable men
differ on the scope and desirability of revisions,
if any, in bank regulatory structure.

As I have

tried to indicate, we are not wedded to the status q u o .
We look forward to continued work with your Committee
in developing the most workable and desirable revisions
in bank regulation and supervision.

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APPENDIX A

The Board offers the following comments on
substantive changes in various statutes that would
be made by the passage of S. 2298.
Section 1 9 9 :
Sec. 199 would amend 12 U.S.C. 301
by adding:
"In no event shall any discount, advance,
or accommodation be extended to any member
bank for the purpose of ameliorating the
consequence of any unsafe or unsound
condition unless the Federal Bank Commission
certifies to the Board that such advance,
discount, or accommodation is necessary
in the public interest and the Board shall
find affirmatively that such advance,
discount, or accommodation may alleviate
a significantly adverse impact upon the
economy of the Nation or any section
of the country."
Under present law and regulations Federal Reserve
credit may be made available to a member bank in difficul
because of financial strains arising from particular
circumstances affecting the individual bank, including
sustained deposit drains, impaired access to money market
funds, or sudden deterioration in loan repayments.
As long as the member bank is solvent (based upon the
bank's primary supervisor's determination), Federal

- 2 -

Reserve credit assistance can play a role in
providing the time needed to develop a longer-run
solution to the bank's problems.

All loans to

member banks must be secured and a Federal Reserve
Bank will not lend if it cannot reasonably expect
to be fully repaid.

In cases where borrowing is

expected to continue for an extended period of
time, the bank must provide a plan outlining the
steps it will take to resolve its problems and
eliminate the need for credit assistance.

In

determining whether to make advances in exigent
cases, the Federal Reserve Bank evaluates the role
of the bank in its community, as well as the impact
of its possible failure.

The Reserve Bank has the

authority to require a special, higher discount
rate when a bank borrows for an extended period.
Such a rate is intended to reduce or eliminate any
undesirable margin below prevailing market rates
and to encourage prompt repayment.







- 3 The Board thus believes that the additional
restrictions on borrowing by member banks proposed
by section 199 would be both unnecessary and
undesirable.

Such added restrictions might delay

or otherwise hamper timely credit assistance to
individual member banks.

These possible delays

and the uncertainties associated with the Federal
Bank Commission's certification deliberations could
give rise to concern by market participants that
Federal Reserve loans will not be forthcoming with
sufficient speed, in sufficient volume, and for
sufficient duration.

This would be the case

particularly if the market perceives Congressional
intent as being to minimize the use of Federal
Reserve credit to mismanaged banks, regardless of
the implications of a large bank failure.

As a

result, depositors and lenders to banks would be
likely to withdraw more rapidly from any bank or
banks that are suspect.




- 4 In short, market fears of impairment in
the Federal Reserve's ability to use its "lender
of last resort" powers promptly and in the degree
needed could produce expectations that would adversely
affect the stability of the financial system.
Moreover, such concerns would limit the time
available to policymakers to restructure distressed
banks and rebuild confidence in the banking system.
In addition, it should be pointed out that
access to the discount window is one of the most
important advantages of membership in the Federal
Reserve System.
By becoming members of the System banks now
suffer a marked competitive disadvantage, because
they are required to maintain a significant share
of their assets as nonearning reserves.

One reason

for banks leaving the Federal Reserve System is this
loss of revenues from nonearning assets.

For the

same reason, nonmember banks and newly chartered
State banks may choose not to join the Federal Reserve
System.




- 5 We believe that any further impediment to
access to Federal Reserve loans by member banks, at
least until such time as all banks are subject to
the same reserve requirements, could be damaging
to the maintenance of Federal Reserve membership
and could lead to a serious erosion in the base
for Federal Reserve monetary policy.
Sections 205 and 2 3 4 :
Sec. 234 proposes to amend 12 U.S.C. 1814
by striking out the sections of the law which provide
that every national bank and every State bank which
becomes a member of the Federal Reserve System shall
be an insured bank from the time it is authorized to
commence business or become a member of the Federal
Reserve System.
Sec. 205 amends 12 U.S.C. 329 to provide
that "no bank shall be admitted to membership (in
the Federal Reserve System) unless it is approved
for deposit insurance under the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act by the Federal Bank Commission."

- 6 The combination of these two provisions
would require a newly organized State bank to obtain
three supervisory approvals, from the State chartering
authority, the Federal Bank Commission, and the
Federal Reserve before it could become a member of
the Federal Reserve System.

Again, because of the

possible further erosion in the Federal monetary
policy base through an added deterrent to membership,
the Board objects to these provisions.

It is suggested

that Sec. 234 amend 12 U.S.C. 1814 so that a State
nonmember bank which becomes a member of the Federal
Reserve System would continue to obtain Federal
deposit insurance coverage as a result of that
membership.
Section 2 5 8 :
Sec. 258 provides for audit of the Federal
Bank Commission by the Comptroller Generi 1 of the
United States> and specifically states that repre­
sentatives of the General Accounting Office shall
have access to "reports of bank examinations and
related papers, from whatever source."







- 7 -

The Board has serious reservations about
making bank examination reports available to the
General Accounting Office.

There is a strong

public policy favoring confidentiality of bank
examination reports.

That policy has been confirmed

by the Congress in 18 U.S.C. 1906, which makes it a
crime for any bank examiner, without the Board's
authority, to disclose information regarding
individual loans.
In the course of making an examination
report, an examiner will carefully review and
appraise three major factors —

quality of assets,

adequacy of bank capital, and quality of management -to reach a judgment as to the overall condition of a
bank.

Consequently, bank examination is an expression

of the examiner's judgment as much as it is a fact­
finding procedure.

The possibility of disclosure

might curb examiners' willingness to make frank
judgments.

- 8 -

Bank examination reports contain much
information that is sensitive and potentially
damaging both to the bank and to the bank's
customers.

The confidential affairs of every

debtor whose loan is classified are revealed in
such reports.

Disclosure of this type of infor­

mation could have a serious impact on bank-customer
relations generally.
The Board believes that access to reports
of examination made by the proposed Federal Bank
Commission should be limited to the traditional
Federal law enforcement agencies and, in the case
of a State-chartered bank, to its State supervisory
agency.

The Board is concerned that access to these

reports by the General Accounting Office or other
Federal agencies would increase the dangers of
disclosure and therefore should not be permitted.







- 9 -

Section 5(b):
This section transfers all functions of the
Federal Reserve System under certain specified laws,
including the Banking Act of 1933, to the Federal
Bank Commission.

The basic authority to regulate

the payment of interest on time and savings deposits
of member banks (12 U.S.C. 371b) was conferred by
the Banking Act of 1933.

It is noted that in the

conforming amendments no change is made in 12 U.S.C.
371b, however, and therefore the Board assumes that
it is the intention under the bill to leave this
authority with the Board.
It is the Board's view that interest rate
ceilings should be phased out, as provided in the
proposed Financial Institutions Act.

As long as

interest rate ceilings are imposed, however, they
are regarded as such an important adjunct of monetary
policy that there should be no possible question
about the Board's continuing authority to set such
ceilings for member banks.

- 10 -

Accordingly, even though at the present
time the Board's interest rate regulations are
promulgated under the temporary authority of the
Act of September 21, 1966 (P.L. 89-597, 80 Stat. 824),
as amended, it is suggested that, to remove any
possible ambiguity, section 5(b) be amended by
inserting, after "the Banking Act of 1933" the
phrase "(except those provisions dealing with the
payment of interest)".







APPENDIX B

Recent Activities by the Federal Reserve in
the Area of Banking Supervision and Regulation,
Including Legislative Proposals and Regulatory
and Administrative Actions
A.

B.

Legislative Proposals
1.

Bill relating to the supervision of foreign
banks in the United States (S. 958, H.R. 5617).

2.

Bill to permit more expeditious handling of
problem bank and bank holding company
situations and to permit acquisition of
a problem bank by an out-of-State bank
holding company (H.R. 4008).

3.

Bill to:
(a) strengthen penalties for
violation of cease and desist orders;
(b) place aggregate limits on loans to
insiders and their interests; (c) permit
easier removal of officers or directors
of a banking institution; and (d) permit
divestiture of a bank holding company
subsidiary (S. 2304).

4.

Bill extending application of reserve
requirements to all depository institu­
tions (S. 2050, S. 1961).

Regulatory Actions
1.

Changes in Regulation A relating to member
banks' access to longer-term emergency
c r edit.

2.

Amendments to Regulations H and F requiring
State member banks to treat standby letters
of credit and ineligible acceptances in the
same manner as loans.




- 2 -

3.

Proposed guidelines for evaluation of
requests, and regulatory changes to
increase flexibility in the issuance
of notes and debentures by State
member banks.
(Comments under review)

C . Administrative Actions
1.

Increased efforts to examiners to identify
potantial problem State member banks.

2.

Increased efforts to identify potential
liquidity problems of all banks.

3.

Intensified and more uniform follow-up
procedures when a problem bank is identified,
including progress reports, meetings with
directors, and special-purpose examinations.

4.

Uniform procedures relating to identification
of bank holding company liquidity problems
end on-site examinations.

5.

Introduction of interagency early warning
system regarding subsidiaries of bank
holding companies.

6.

Initiation of an expanded computerized
surveillance system for bank holding
companies.

7.

Expanded efforts to identify risks associated
with banks' foreign exchange trading and to
improve ba n k s ' audit and control procedures.

8.

Clarification of limitations on bank
extensions of credit to their holding
company affiliates.
(Being transmitted
to banks)