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ADDRESS
BY
MARRINER S. ECCLES
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS
TO THE
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN'S GROUP
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
MARCH 2 7 , 1 9 3 6




ADDRESS
BY
MARRINER S. ECCLES
CHAIRMAN OP THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF REMARKS
TO THE
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN'S GROUP
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
MARCH 2 7 , 1 9 3 6

I come before you tonight with a good deal of timidity.

I appreciate,

however, the opportunity of meeting with such a representative group of
"usiness and professional men who show by their presence here that they
ar

e seriously interested in public questions.

MjLbackground and economic philosophy
My experience in public life is of rather short duration. My background, I am sure, was a good deal like that of many of you. Up until the
depression, I had given little or no thought to public questions.

I had

s

Pent twenty-two years in the business of making money, in conducting bank-

ing
and business enterprises in the competitive field.

I have known what

it was to employ thousands of men and I have known what it was to operate
successfully banking and business enterprises. With the coming of the
depression, I was required to confront problems which were entirely new'to
"to 1 and as the depth of the depression continued, the seriousness of these
Problems dawned upon me. When I was put in the position of cutting salaries
fc&d wages, and of discharging or laying off faithful and old-time employees,
I recognized at the same time that there was need for the services of all
the men that were laid off because there were millions of people who needed
a

ndforwanted
Digitized
FRASER the goods


and services that they were able to provide.

- 2 -

I am not necessarily an altruist.

I think I am a realist.

I think

the system of capitalistic democracy is, of necessity, an individualistic
s

ystem, where there must he competition and self-interest. But at the same

time, I think it has been brought home to us that our activities and our
interests are much more closely associated with public interest than we
had ever thought they were.
HLoyd. George in iqoq
I was impressed the other day in re-reading a speech made by the
Honorable David Lloyd George in 1909, known as his "Limehouse Speech."
I will read a very small part of it:
"It is rather a shame for a rich country like ours—probably the
richest in the v/orld, if not the richest the world has ever seen—that it
should allow those who have toiled all their days to end in penury and
Possibly starvation.

It is rather hard that an old workman should have

to find his way to the gates of the tomb, bleeding and footsore, through
the brambles and thorns of poverty. We cut a new path for him—an easier
one, a pleasanter one, through fields of waving corn.

We are raising money

to pay for the new road—aye, and to widen it so that two hundred thousand
Paupers shall be able to join in the march.

There are many in the country

blessed by Providence with great wealth, and if there are amongst them men
who grudge out of their riches a fair distribution towards the less
fortunate of their fellow-countrymen they are very shabby rich men."

The economic system in 1928 and 1929—what v:aa v/rong
We thought in 1928 and 1929 that we had entered upon a new era, that
we had banished poverty. As we look back and see what has happened since,



- 3it is only natural that -.re should try to analyze what was wrong with the
system under which "re operated and what, if anything, we can do about it.
It is evident that there was not a shortage of anything at the tine the
depression struck.

Tie ware better equipped and better able to supply the

needs and demands of the -oeople of this country than we had ever been before in our history.

Our productive facilities of all kinds and our man-

power were recognizod by everyone as being adequate to maintain a reasonably
decent standard of living for the citizens of this country.
of production certainly did not break down.

The processes

I think it has become evident

to all of us that it was largely the system-of distribution that broke
down.
It was not a question of confidence, because confidence was at a high.
It was not a question of an unbalanced budget, and it was not a quostion
of not being on the gold standard.

T7e had everything that was considered

to make for sound financial and sound business procedure.

7e had no infla-

tion in the generally accepted senso. The index of prices generally was on
a very stable basis.
It is true that we did have a speculative inflation.

It is truo that

groat sums of money were going into the stock market very largely through
loans by others, surplus funds, excoss cash holdings of individuals and
corporations.

The total amount of bank credit expansion was not impressive.

There was no bank credit inflation of sufficient amount to cause or create
tho speculative inflation that developed in tho stock market and roal ostato
market.




- UBrookings report on Income distribution
You have all heard about the Brookings report in connection
subject.

with this

I want to read the condition that was pointed out in the report

on page 37 of "Income and Economic Progress."
"The consumptive requirements or wants of the people were far from
satisfied during the period of our highest economic achievement.

The

value of the total national production of goods and services in 1929. if
divided equally among the entire population, would have given to each
person approximately $665.

There were nearly 6 million families with in-

comes less than $1,000; 12 million with incomes under $1,500; over l6
million with incomes under $2,000; and over 19 million, or 71 percent
of the total, with incomes less than $2,500, A family income of $2,500,
at 1929 prices, was a very moderate one, permitting few of the luxuries of
life.

Hence it was clear that the consumptive requirements, and especially

the wants, of the masses of the people were far from satisfied."
Speaking of what appears to be at least one of the reasons for some
of our difficulties, the same report goes on to say:
"As to income distribution and its results, we found ... the proceeds
of the nation's productive efforts going in disproportionate and increasing
measure to a small percentage of the population—in 1929 as much as 23 percent of the national income to 1 percent of the people. We found the unsatisfied

want3—needs according to any good social standard—of the 92

percent of all families who are now below the level of $5,000 annual income
sufficient to absorb the product of all our unused capacity under present
conditions of productivity and still demand much more from such unexplored




- 5 potentialities as might thereafter be opened up. We found the incomes of
the rich going in large proportion to savings and these savings strongly
augmented by others impounded at the source by corporations through the
practice of accumulating corporate surplus. These savings, after providing
for such increase of capital goods as could be profitably employed, we found
spilling over into less fruitful or positively harmful uses, ranging from
foreign loans (bad as well as good) to the artificial bidding up of prices
of domestic properties, notably corporate securities.
Thus, we began to discern the answer to our question whether the
basic defect in our economic system, not discovered in the technical processes
of production, is to be found in the way in which we conduct the distribution of income. The answer is affirmative:

this is the place at which we

do find basic maladjustment,"
Berle and Means on the concentration of wealth and income
Looking a little farther,in the study made by Berle and Means, "The
Modern Corporation and Private Property," they state that the concentration
of income has been accompanied to quite an extent by the concentration of
corporate wealth.

They found that 200 big companies controlled U9.2 percent,

or nearly one-half, of all nonbanking corporate wealth at the beginning of
1930, while the remaining half was owned by the more than 300,000 smaller
companies.

They go on to say that the actual extent to which the concentra-

tion of power has progressed is striking enough. More striking still,
however, is the pace at which it is proceeding.

In 1909» the assets of the

200 then largest nonbanking corporations amounted to only $26,000,000,000,
By 1919 they had reached $^3,700,000,000, an increase of 68 percent in ten




- 6 years.

In the next ten years, from 1919 to 1929» they increased to

$81,100,000,000, or an increase of 85 percent. At this rate, it is estimated that in another fourteen years one-half of the national wealth
would he under the control of just a relatively few big companies.
Now, corporate profits were made and saved, that is, were not passed
along in dividends to the stockholders.

They were not passed along in

lower prices to the extent that that would have been possible, or in higher
wages.

I am speaking of the corporate structure generally; I realize that

there are many notable exceptions. What I am saying, I am saying as a
corporation man.

I am trying to look impartially, if I can, at the problem

and see what it is possible for us to do to create a greater degree of
stability in a capitalistic democracy.
Treasury figures on distribution of corporate income
Speaking of the distribution of corporate income, I had some figures
made up recently from the Treasury records of the total net corporate income
from 1923 to 1933 inclusive.

These figures cover income and dividends paid

by the nonfinancial corporations reporting income.

It does not include

those reporting losses. These figures show a net income of $71|123,000,000.
Dividends paid amounted to $U5,1+33,000,000 and undistributed
$25,691,000,000, or approximately 36 percent undistributed.

income to
Taking the

corporations not reporting a net income for the same period, they paid out
in excess of earnings $5»837»000,000.

These figures include the depression

years to the.end of 1933•
Credit extension by corporations
It seems to me that here is a phenomenon that needs to h.e given some
thought and consideration.



We know that the amount of credit extended

- 7 by banks to corporations diminished since the organization of the Federal
Reserve banks until at the time of the depression in 1929 less than 13
percent of the total assets of the member banks were considered liquid eligible
paper, that is, agricultural and commercial paper. At the present time this
is les3 than E percent.
The credit field was to a very large extent absorbed by corporations.
They have extended terms all the way down to the retailer and to the consumer.

It seems to me that the prosperity that we had in the late twenties

was due in no small measure to the use of credit, not that extended by the
banking system, but to credit which was extended by our corporate structure,
not only the large corporations which I have mentioned but by a great many
small corporations as well.

Some of these surplus funds, particularly of

the larger corporations, went into the call market and stimulated, as we
know, great speculation.
The conditions leading to Government intervention
Now, for a century and a half in this country we have always had
reason to believe that we could not over-cave as a nation, that savings
would go into new capital equipment.
most of our history.

We had a shortage of capital through

We were a great frontier nation.

nation until the time of the war.

We were a debtor

We had a rapidly increasing population.

Our technical development was advancing slowly.

There was a need for the

population as a whole to consume a minimum over the standard of living,
and to save and invest a maximum.

We had high interest rates, except for

short periods, over a good part of the last century and a half.

It is

true that we have had depressions during that period, some very serious
ones, but from very different causes than the present one that we have
been going through.



-s It now appears that, when surplus funds are saved or accumulated, whether
by corporations or individuals, they go into the capital market and provide
more facilities and produce more goods and provide more transportation than
the people as a whole are able to buy; in other words, creating a situation
where productive capacity gets out of balance with consumer buying-power, so
that we have the paradoxical situation of an economy of abundance with
millions of people out of work and idle factories and unused goods as the
flow of money stops and slows up.
The volume of money times the velocity of turnover of that money
measures our volume of business.

In 1929 we had a volume of adjusted demand

deposits eliminating the inter-bank balances of $22,7^.000,000 in all banks.
That excludes time or savings deposits. At the present time, there is approximately the same volume of adjusted demand deposits as at the peak in
1929.

But in 1929 these deposits were not in the hands of the people who

needed better houses, better furniture, better and more food, clothing, and
education, as I have indicated by reference to evidence from the Brookings
report on the distribution of income. We kept up prosperity by installment
credit of all kinds at high rates to the masses of our people until it
seemed to me that the point of saturation had been reached in the credit
structure—not in the bank credit structure, but in the corporate credit
structure.

We know what happened.

Even in 1929 it is generally admitted that we lacked at least 20 percent of utilizing our capacity to produce, based upon the existing productive
facilities and available labor.
banking system.

We know what the depression did to the

In the process of deflation, bank deposits were decreased




-9 by about one-third as the result of credit contraction over which tlie
individual banks had no control. This credit contraction brought about a
similar reduction in the velocity or turnover of money, so that the national
income dropped from more than $SO,000,000,000 down to a low point of less
than $1+0,000,000,000, in direct relationship to the volume and velocity of
our money supply. And yet all during that period everything that is accepted
as orthodox in order to give and maintain confidence was done. An effort was
niade to keep the budget in balance through rigid governmental economy, at
least for a time. We fought to preserve the gold standard at all hazards
as though it were a very sacred thing.
ference.

There was little Government inter-

There was little legislation of a disturbing nature* And yet

confidence did not come back.

Why

should it come back?

Why should people

with money invest that money in new productive enterprises when everything
they had was becoming less valuable every day?
She objectives and results of Government spending
The intervention by Government was an absolute necessity.

Through

Government spending we supplied buying-power that otherwise did not exist
and thereby restored solvency.. The money for Government spending was provided by the banks who purchased Government bonds, some in small amounts,
at least for the first several years of the budgetary deficit.

The bonds

were also purchased by investors and insurance companies, but the bulk were
purchased by banks. The credit which the banks were unwilling and unable
to provide to private individuals and corporations, largely because there
were no borrowers, they provided to the Government,

This credit to the

Government served to replace the deposits that were extinguished through




- 10 -

the credit contraction by the banks during the depression until today we
have demand deposits back to where they were in 1929. That

can be

accounted

for entirely by the gold imports which were largely a result of devaluation,
a small amount of silver purchasing for which silver certificates were issued
in payment, and Government bonds and bonds guaranteed by the Government
purchased by the banks, less the amount of private credit contraction which
continued at banks even after the low point of deposits had been reached.
Had it not been for the credit which was extended to the Government and
Government agencies and the gold imports, the volume o.f deposits would be
less today than at the time of the banking holiday because the amount of
outstanding credit by the banks outside of that extended to the Government
is less than it was at that time.
This borrowing by the Government and the resultant spending is
responsible for the business recovery that we have had.

It is responsible

for an increase in the Federal revenue of nearly $2,000,000,000. It is
responsible for an increase in national income from a low point, $Uo,000,000,000, to the present income of about $60,000,000,000.

Considering the

results accomplished by this spending, the amount spent is insignificant
in contrast to the wealth that it has resulted in creating.
Spending and the Government debt
At the time of the banking holiday, the Federal debt was approximately
$21,000,000,000.

There had been a deficit of nearly $1,000,000,000 in 1931

and a deficit of $3,153,000,000 in 1932. During the period of the twenties,
we made four major reductions in the income tax rates, the theory being that
tho lower the income tax, the greater the prosperity and the surer we were
that private capital would continue to take care of the unemployment problem.



- 11 -

The gross debt as of December 31, 1935, was approximately $30,000,000,000,
an increase of between $9,000,000,000 and $10,000,000,000 from the period
of the banking holiday.

However, from the total debt of $30,000,000,000

must be deducted the United States interest in assets owned by the B.F.C.
and other Government agencies estimated to be worth around $U,000,000,000.
The Treasury balance was $2,200,000,000 exclusive of the stabilization fund,
which is not in the money system.
and has not been utilized.

It is the gold profit held in the Treasury

The net increase in the debt then, excluding the

stabilization fund, for that period of time is less than $6,000,000,000, or
less than one month of the national income of 1928 or 1929•

The total debt

of $30,000,000,000, large as it is, is not much more than four months of
the normal national income,

In this connection, I think it is worthwhile

noting that the interest rate on Government debt has dropped from 3.*+l percent in 1932 to an average of 2.55 percent in 1935, and that the total interest charge has increased from $697,000,000 a year in 1932 to $751,000,000
a year in 1935. <>r an increase of only 8 percent in the total interest paid
while the increase in the total debt was kk percent.
A debt comparison with England
Tou have heard the comparison made with the English situation.

I

mention it only because England is spoken of as a country well able to
manage her affait*, and of all the capitalistic countries under democracy
she, perhaps, is the best example we have. The central government debt of
the United Kingdom is 158 percent of the national income of the United
Kingdom in 193^t and it would take one and one-half years of her income to
pay it. Our debt was 38 percent of our national income in 193U.

The debt

of all public bodies, city, State, county, was 19U percent of the I93U national



- 12 -

income in Great Britain and our total public debt was 7^ percent of our
193 4 income. The interest we paid on the debt of all public bodies was
3 percent of the national income of 193^«

Eight percent of the 193*+ in-

come of the United Kingdom would be necessary to pay the interest on her
public debt.
Recovery in real estate
You are familiar with some of the figures showing the extent of
recovery.

As we have seen, I think, they are largely the result of the

spending I have referred to and also of the credit that the Government has
extended in stepping into the picture to relieve creditors as well as
debtors.

By the way, the great credit agencies of this Government are now

collecting more than they are lending for emergency purposes; emergency
loans are in the process of liquidation.
We know what has happened in the real estate market, compared to what
it was. Mortgages that looked worthless a couple of years ago look pretty
good again.

The loans the Government made through the R.F.C., the Home

Owners' Loan Corporation, the farm Credit Administration, and several other
agencies, which looked very bad when they were made, are an entirely different picture today, A loan that is perfectly good on an $80,000,000,000
national income looks very bad on a national income of $U0,000,000,000. The
ability to pay debts and taxes relates to national income.

Taxes are large

or small according to the size of the national income, and debts may also
be good or bad in the same way.

So what we are primarily interested in is

the maintenance of national income.




- 13 Building new homes
I agree with most business men and bankers that a budgetary deficit,
if continued, will create inflation. We have re-established or restored
our volume of money. Unfortunately, it is all too much concentrated, and
will not be used in putting people to work until the buying-power and the
demand for goods, generally speaking, will make industrial modernization
and expansion profitable.

However, one big field is open, That is the

mortgage field for home construction which, if it can be gotten under way
on a long-term, low-interest, amortized basis, would be the means of creating
our next period of real business activity.

The Government is attempting to

stimulate some activity in that field through inducing the agencies that
have the funds to lend them.

The banks now have a large part of the unused

time funds for lending and that is why banks must either get rid of their
savings funds or put them to work.

Insurance companies and mutual savings

banks, of course, have large amounts of money.

Those three agencies have

lending capacities of several billions of funds for mortgages.
Balancing the budget—raising taxes
The reason that a continued budgetary deficit would create inflation
beyond the control of the Federal Reserve System is that such a deficit financed
by banks would continue to pile up bank deposits.

The Government spends

the money that it gets from credit extended by the banks, and the money
gradually goes back into the profit system and is reflected in idle deposits.
There was a tremendous increase in corporate profits last year, but very
little increase in the average wage levels, nationally speaking, and the
price levels have remained pretty stable, outside of the prices of farm




- lU products and raw materials. You will see, therefore, that Government spending is resulting in a huge increase in idle deposits by corporations and
wealthy individuals.

It is a matter of logic that if we continue to build

up idle deposits, it means that some time or other they are going to flow
over, and when they do you will have a speculative inflation at least. The
stock market up to the present has been financed very largely without the
use of bank credit.
We must look to a period of balanced budgets. The matter of a few
billion dollars more added to bank deposits would not be material because
time deposits are substantially below what they were in 1929, But we must
look in the next year or two to a balanced budget. Personally, I would like
to see it by 1938.

I think it can be brought about by an increase in the

national income and in profits with a revision of the tax system somewhat
along the lines that are now being proposed.

I am in accord with the

principle of the new tax proposals, although there are many of the details
that I would take issue with. But to me the principle of forcing idle money
in corporations into circulation is absolutely fundamental if we are to avoid
inflation.

That will tend to balance the budget.

Can we quit Government spending?
Many of us would say that the way to balance the budget is quit spending.
That cannot be done and it should not be done so long as we have an army of
unemployed people.

You business men could not afford to have it done because

a too rapid contraction of Government spending could easily precipitate another
deflation.

We have not reached a stage in our recovery where we can stand

any such shock as the loss of that buying-power.




Only as national income

- 15 increases and private spending and private credit expansion takes hold, can
we socially, politically, or economically

decrease Government spending by

any great amount.
I am not speaking about the bonus nor about any other special legislation of that sort.

I am speaking about unemployment relief and public works.

I am not speaking about the methods of spending that have been used.

There

may be much difference of opinion on this point. Maybe we could get more for
our money, or could spend it more wisely where it could do more good. But
so far as the actual amount

of money being spent is concerned, to try to

spend less would only mean that there would be less buying-power and a
lowered standard of living on the part of those unemployed, and God knows,
generally speaking, what they get is not very excessive.
Dumping the unemployed
If we expect capitalism to have the right to draw from the pool of
unemployed when the services of men can be used profitably and then to have
the liberty to dump them back into the pool of unemployment again, then the
rights and liberties of those men, who through no fault of their own are put
on relief, must be taken care of by all of us through the Government.

The

only salvation of capitalism is to recognize that the cost of unemployment
must be borne in one form or another by all of us through Government.

The

thing that we cannot afford is not the cost of relief of $2,000,000,000 a
year, nor is it the cost of a budgetary deficit of about $10,000,000,000 in
the last four years; but the thing that we cannot afford is the wasting of
our great resources of

manpower and idle facilities, the loss of $Uo,000,-

000,000 national income in one year, such as 1932.




- 16 -

War debts
Do you know that the per capita debt in this country at the present
time is less than it was in the year following the war, and that the per
capita wealth is far in excess of what it was at the end of the war?

Do

you know that we had a deficit in one year during the war of $9,000,000,000
and the next year of $13,000,000,000; a two-year budgetary deficit of
$22,000,000,000.

It did not bankrupt us. We reduced that Government debt

during the period of the twenties by about $10,000,000,000. While we were
doing that, we added tens of billions of dollars of new wealth in new
capital facilities of all kinds, and we made some foreign loans, and we
reduced income taxes four times. So far as our physical capacities were
concerned, we could have paid it all off and knovm little about it.
Summing up
I believe we can have a stable capitalistic democracy,

I believe

that it can be accomplished through recognizing that the Government is a
compensatory agency in our present economy, not a competitor in the field
of private business except possibly to extend credit in an emergency, but
an agency to bring about better income distribution. When unemployment
first develops, it is an indication of an absence of buying-power and this
ia a self-generating thing.

That lack of buying-power must be met in the

beginning by having a program of public works, so that we will not lose in
our economy the value of the services of our citizens.

In this way the

unemployed will be ussd on socially beneficial projects which are not
entered into because of the profit motive alone.

We should divert Federal

funds in good times to retire the Government debt held by the banks to offset




- 17 the private credit which the banks will be extending to corporations and
others.

That will be one of the most effective means of inflationary

control that can be developed.

In other words, the Government fiscal

policy and the central bank policy, credit expansion and contraction should
be coordinated.

I think that within the Treasury and the Reserve System

there is a real possibility of money management.