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For Release on Delivery
4:00 P.M., EDT
June
1986_________

'The Yen-Dollar Relationship:

A Recent Historical Prospecti\

Remarks by
Manuel H. Johnson
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Conference on Japan and the United States Today
New York, New York
June 4, 1986

At the center of the current debate on international economic
policy coordination lies the question of how to foster and sustain a
configuration of exchange rates that contributes to stability in the world
economy.

Common to many recommendations for reform of the exchange rate

system is the notion that exchange rates should move so as to promote more
i

balanced trade among countries.

In this context,

concerning the yen-dollar relationship is:

the question often raised

What level of the yen-dollar

exchange rate would be consistent with a substantial reduction in Japan's
yawning current account surplus with the United States, which reached a
record $50 billion last year?

Posing the problem in this simple manner,

nowoyer, belies the complexity of determining a more appropriate alignment
of exchange rates.
Because the issues of exchar.ge rate alignment and external
balance are inextricably linked in public debate, my remarks today will
focus on their interaction.

I want to stress at the outset that there is

no presumption that bilaterai exchange rates should move solely to achieve
bilateral trade balance.

In particular, while promotion of a reduction of

J a p a n ’s record surplus vis-a->jis the United States is clearly an important,
even pivotal, concern with respect to the yen-dollar exchange rate, key
structural differences between the Japanese and American economies suggest
that balanced trade between them may be improbable and even undesirable.
In looking at the yen-dollar relationship over the 13 years of
the floating exchange rate period,

five main points emerge.

First of all,

while day-to-day gyrations in exchange rates may defy explanation in terms
of fundamental economic factors,

the broad swings in the yen-dollar

exchange rate are consistent with our general theories of the relationship
between domestic and global economic developments and exchange rate

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movements.

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For example, periods of high Japanese inflation have tended to

correspond with episodes of yen weakness.
Second, the steep and rapid appreciation of the yen that has
occurred in the past 15 months is not entirely outside the range of
historical experience.

For example, from the third quarter of 1977 through

the fourth quarter of 1978, the yen appreciated about 30 percent.

However,

such sharp exchange rate movements over relatively short periods do impose
considerable burdens of adjustment on Japanese industry.

A third point is that, for Japan, movements in interest
differentials began to correlate more closely with exchange rate swings
starting in the 1980s after significant liberalization had occurred in
Japanese financial markets.

Thereafter, short-run movements in the yen’s

foreign exchange value are probably best viewed as resulting from the rapid
equilibration of supply and demand in the markets for foreign exchange.

In

efficient financial markets, current exchange rates already summarize all
known relevant information, so it is primarily unanticipated developments
in a wide spectrum of macroeconomic and financial variables that influence
changes in exchange rates.
A fourth feature of the floating rate period is the apparently
strong positive correlation between Japanese current account surpluses and
yen appreciation.

Japan has run current account surpluses almost

continuously since 1965, except during the years immediately following the
two oil shocks of the 1970s.

Periods of growing Japanese current account

surpluses have tended to be associated with periods of yen strength.
As a fifth and final point, it is worth highlighting the
differences between the yen’s movements in the past 13 years against the

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dollar and against other currencies.

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While the yen has made net gains of

about 140 percent against the French franc and pound sterling over the
floating rate period,

it has only appreciated 50 percent against the dollar

on balance and just 20 percent against the mark.

Of course, differences in

inflation and other macroeconomic developments across countries account for
much of these diverging movements.
The yen has exhibited a tendency over the past 15 years to
strengthen on balance against the currencies of all its major trading
partners.

The question inevitably arises as to what longer-term influences

might be generating this secular appreciation of the yen.

The remainder of

my remarks will be devoted to exploring some of the sources of the yen's
remarkable strength over the floating exchange rate period.
Differences in relative prices across countries provide a
starting point for evaluating longer-run trends in exchange rates.
According to the purchasing-power-parity theory,
tastes across countries,

if consumers have similar

international arbitrage in goods markets will lead

prices of identical goods in different countries, expressed in a common
currency, to be equalized over time.
equilibrium,

From a position of initial

if the exchange rate exactly followed such a path,

it would

move in line with shifts in relative prices across countries.
While some degree of arbitrariness is inevitably involved in
picking a year to represent equilibrium for the yen-dollar exchange rate,
it is evident that the yen has not closely followed relative price
movements.

However,

such observations should not be interpreted as

necessarily implying an inappropriate exchange value of the yen:

a number

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of factors can warrant such sustained deviations from purchasing power
parity, and I turn now to an examination of some of these factors.
Since the 1950s, Japanese productivity growth has tended to
outpace that of its major trading partners,

including the United States.

Japan's productivity gains are particularly impressive in its manufacturing
sector which generates about 85 percent of Japan's exports.

The remarkable

double-digit growth in Japanese manufacturing productivity in the 1950s and
1960s reflected in part the fast pace of technological innovation deriving
from a backlog of exploitable foreign technologies.
Productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing has slowed
considerably since the 19703, and in tne 1980s is only slightly more rapid
than in the United States.

This slowdown in Japanese productivity growth

reflects in part the elimination of ready opportunities to adopt foreign
technologies and in part structural changes in the composition of
investment.

As Japan became a more mature industrial economy in the 1970s,

a greater share of investment was geared towards the service sector (where
productivity was lower),
activities.

social welfare, anti-pollution and other

Still, Japan has maintained faster productivity growth in

manufacturing than the average of its major trading partners.

These

productivity gains are one of the primary factors contributing to
continuing improvements in Japanese competitiveness.
An important impetus to Japan's rapid productivity gains in
manufacturing has been a need to develop a surplus in manufacturing trade
to offset a persistent deficit on trade in energy and raw materials.

Given

an extreme dependence on imported raw materials, Japan typically has run
trade deficits vis-a-vis countries classified as developed primary

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producers and vis-a-vis oil exporting nations.

In contrast, Japan's

dramatic gains in productivity in manufacturing have helped foster a
substantial surplus on its trade in manufactured goods.

Thus, Japan's

longer-run tendency towards a manufacturing trade surplus with the United
States and her European trading partners is in part the counterpart of her
deficit on raw materials.

Still, Japan's gains in competitiveness appear

to have surpassed those required just to achieve balance between its
deficit on primary commodities and its surplus on manufactures.

The result

has been persistent current account surpluses and associated upward
pressure on the yen.
Another factor that, combined with rapid productivity growth, has
resulted in improved cost-competitiveness of Japanese exports is that real
wage growth in the Japanese manufacturing sector has tended to lag behind
labor's productivity gains in recent years, except following the first oil
shock.

This relatively slow growth of real wages is related to the system

of industrial relations that prevails in the large Japanese firms.
well-known, lifetime employment,
profits,

As is

seniority wage setting, bonuses linked to

and company-based unions are key factors contributing to real wage

flexibility in Japan.

This system appears to strengthen employees'

commitment to the company and its long-run vitality,

leading to wage

settlements that are relatively compatible with company interests.
However, while slow real wage growth helps export competitiveness,

it can

also inhibit the expansion of domestic demand and hence limit the derived
demand for imports.
Japan's terms of trade — ■ measured as the ratio of export to
import unit values —

have declined substantially since the 1960s.

Of

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course, some of the movement in the terms of trade reflects exchange rate
changes, but price developments also play a role.

A sizable share of

Japan's imports consists of raw materials that are purchased in relatively
competitive world markets, oil being an important exception.

In contrast,

the pricing strategy of Japanese exporters has tended to enhance Japan's
competitiveness.

Japanese exporters have tended to accept lower profit

margins rather than to resort to sharp increases in export prices during
periods of rapid yen appreciation.

These pricing responses have helped

improve Japan's competitive position and preserve or increase the global
market share of Japan's exporters.
In addition to these factors that have influenced Japan's
international competitiveness, secular developments in Japanese savings and
investment have contributed to the tendency towards persistent current
account surpluses and associated upward pressure on the yen.

A country

that saves more than it invests domestically must have, ex post, a net
capital outflow and a corresponding current account surplus.
The Japanese savings rate is impressively high by comparison with
most other countries.

In 1985, the Japanese personal savings ratio was 22

percent, while in the United States it was only 5 percent.

Japanese

private investment, on the other hand, has not kept pace with private
savings in the past 15 years.

Public sector borrowing in the 1970s

absorbed some of the funds previously invested in domestic industry.
However, since 1979 Japanese fiscal policy has been oriented towards
reducing the level of the fiscal deficit.

The gap between total savings

and total domestic investment in Japan has produced a net capital outflow

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and corresponding current account surplus in recent years.

The prospect

that this gap will be completely eliminated in the near future is small.
Should we be concerned that Japan is a net capital exporter?

Are

measures to reduce savings in Japan really desirable from the standpoint of
world welfare?

Forcing a reduction in Japanese savings would tend to

reduce Japanese net foreign investment and hence to raise the level of
interest rates abroad.

Instead the focus should be on encouraging the most

efficient and equitable global redistribution of Japanese savings.

If

relative real returns in the United States continue to decline and the
fiscal deficit narrows,

it is likely that Japanese foreign investment will

gradually diversify away from U.S. investments.

Ideally, Japanese funds

could be drawn to the Third World as these countries adopt more coherent
macroeconomic policies to help attain sustained lower inflation and
enhance their use of market pricing which in turn promotes more attractive
investment opportunities.
For the part of the Japanese current account surplus that is not
attributable to structural differences between the economies of Japan and
its major trading partners,
rapid adjustment.

the issue remains of how best to encourage

Both yen appreciation and stimulation of Japanese income

growth can promote more balanced trade between countries.

An idea of the

relative importance of income and relative price influences on Japan's
trade balance can be gained from estimates of the Federal Reserve Board
staff's Multi-Country Model —

the MCM.

According to the parameters of the MCM, the price elasticities
for Japanese trade indicate that Japanese exports are highly reponsive to
relative price changes, while Japanese imports are much less responsive to

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relative price movements.
appreciation,

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This would suggest that the recent sharp yen

if allowed to be fully reflected in prices, will result over

time in a sizable reduction in Japanese exports but a less substantial
increase in imports.
The relatively weak estimated response of Japanese imports to
exchange rate-induced changes in relative prices is probably related to the
commodity composition of those imports:

60 percent of total imports are

fuel and raw materials that are relatively difficult to substitute away
from in the production process when their relative prices rise.

In

contrast, about 85 percent of Japan's exports are manufactured goods for
which relatively close substitutes exist in the world market.

As a result,

importers of Japanese goods can more easily switch to cheaper alternative
sources of manufactured goods.
What impact will the 35 percent appreciation of the yen against
the dollar in the past 15 months have on Japan's bilateral trade surplus
with the United States?

A very rough calculation based on the MCM

equations suggests that the yen's recent 35 percent rise against the dollar
could over time result in as much as a $20 billion reduction in Japan's
current $50 billion trade surplus with the United States.

So-called

J-curve effects lasting up to one year, according to MCM simulations, would
prevent this improvement from becoming apparent immediately.

Of course,

any estimates based on historical experience provide only a rough guide to
the current situation;

we may well be in uncharted territory.

Still,

this

calculation illustrates that the yen's recent rise could make an important
contribution towards reducing Japan's current account surplus.

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Efforts to stimulate income growth in Japan and thereby to induce
an increased demand for imports could also help foster external adjustment.
However, the effect of Japanese income expansion may have differential
effects on Japan's imports from different countries.

In particular, the

MCM results suggest that the responsiveness of Japan's imports from
developing countries to increases in Japanese real income is substantial,
roughly twice that for imports from the United States.
On the export side, Japan's exports to the United States are
highly responsive to changes in U.S.

income.

However, one would hardly

want to recommend a recession in the United States to improve our bilateral
trade balance with Japan.

Still, these results may help explain why

Japan's trade surplus with the United States soared in recent years as the
United States economy expanded rapidly.
The interaction between the exchange rate and the current account
has served as a unifying thread in my remarks today.

The yen's exchange

value appears to have played a potent role in fostering current account
adjustment in Japan, but exchange rate movements have not sufficed to
maintain external balance.

Another theme I have stressed is that

developments affecting Japan's current account also have had an important
influence on the longer-run course of the yen-dollar exchange rate.

The

sizable gains in competitiveness and the tendency for savings to exceed
domestic investment have contributed to a tendency towards persistent
Japanese current account surpluses and an associated tendency for the value
of the yen to rise, except in the wake of major disruptions such as the oil
price shocks of the 1970s.

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The tendencies in Japan towards growing trade surpluses and
insufficient domestic absorption were already apparent in the early 1970s.
Although the subsequent decade was punctuated by periods of prolonged
adjustment to the two oil price shocks, those same tendencies have now
resurfaced.

Despite the initial hopes of some proponents of floating

exchange rates, the move to flexible rates has not resulted on average in a
reduction in external imbalances between Japan and her major trading
partners, although sizable adjustments have tended to occur with rather
long lags.
All of this points to the need to rely on factors other than
just exchange rates to bring about better balance in the world economy.
Measures to stimulate income growth in Japan could make an important
contribution to improved external balance.

The more income expansion the

Japanese authorities encourage, the less yen appreciation is required to
foster more balanced trade.

In light of the strains already imposed on

Japan's industries by the yen’s appreciation to date, expansion represents
an important potential impetus to further external adjustment.
From my perspective, Japan appears to have scope for both
monetary and fiscal actions.

Given the recent strength of the yen, further

reductions in the Japanese discount rate could probably have a salutary
influence on the domestic economy without adverse exchange market effects.
Also, fiscal stimulus could be provided without severely compromising
Japan's longer-run commitment to reducing the central government's budget
deficit,

since the fiscal measures could help set in train a self-

sustaining recovery in domestic investment and spending.
medicine,

Whatever the

it is clear that actions to stimulate the domestic economy would

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provide some boost to imports and help lift Japan's economy from its
current doldrums.