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For release on delivery
7roo p.m. Ë.S.T.
March 15, 1988

Recent Economic Developments
and
Indicators of Monetary Policy

Address by
Manuel H. Johnson
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
before
The Money Marketeers of New York University

New York
March 15, 1988

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND INDICATORS OF MONETARY POLICY

I am pleased to be here today for several reasons.

First and

foremost, it is always a pleasure to speak before a group that is as

interested in and as informed about monetary policy as is this one.

addition,

In

I am eager to talk about my views on monetary, policy

indicators.

I understand that the speech that I gave last month on this

topic caught the attention of a few of you here.

Thusf I feel fortunate

to have a chance to elaborate further on the subject.

Before turning to monetary policy indicators,

however, I want to

start with a brief look at recent economic developments.

Not only is

the economy of interest in its own right, but it also provides a useful

backdrop for the rest of my comments.

Recent economic developments

The economic outlook has been subject to more than the usual

variety of uncertainties in recent months.

expanding strongly through the summer,

While the economy had been

no one could be certain about the

effect of last October's stock market crash.

As I am sure you recall,

2

most private forecasters sharply reduced their expectations for economic

growth in 1988, and some actually projected a recession for the first

half of the year.

And economic data for late last year and early 1988

seemed to suggest the possibility of a substantial slowdown.

Although

considerable uncertainty remains, the resiliency of the U.S. economy is

becoming increasingly apparent as economic data become available for the

first quarter.

Recession fears seem to be fading,

and it now appears

that we have experienced only a moderate slowdown in real GNP growth

from last quarter's 4-1/2 percent pace.

One need look no further than the most recent labor market report

for evidence that the economy has continued to expand substantially.

Nonfarm payroll employment increased a surprising 531,000 in February.

This advance may have been exaggerated a bit by seasonal adjustment

problems, but the average of January and February's figures nevertheless

was about equal to the healthy average increase of the preceding four

months.

3

Over the past year, the much needed improvement in our foreign

trade position has provided a major impetus to the economy.

depreciation of the dollar,

increases,

The

coupled with restrained wage and cost

has significantly improved our competitive position in

international markets.

Real merchandise exports advanced at a rapid

pace in the fourth quarter and in 1987 as a whole, while growth in real

merchandise imports slowed substantially.

Consequently, the deficit in

real net exports— a broad measure of our trade balance in goods and

services— narrowed for the first time since 1980, and further progress

is likely this year.

The increased demand for U.S. products has led to a revival of

activity in the industrial sector.

In 1987, industrial production

recorded its largest percentage increase since 1984, with particularly

large gains occurring in the output of business equipment.

This

reflects not only a strong foreign demand for U.S. capital goods, but

also the need of domestic producers to expand capacity.

Although excess

inventories in the auto industry contributed to a slowdown in the growth

4

of manufacturing output at the beginning of this year,

"pause" to be temporary.

comfortable levels,

I expect this

Auto inventories have been reduced to

factory orders were strong early this year, and with

the continued stimulus from the external sector, output gains in the

manufacturing sector should pick up again in coming months.

With income growth continuing and confidence improving,

consumption spending seems to be satisfactory.

even

There had been some fear

at the time of the stock market collapse that the drop in household

wealth would lead to a significant retrenchment in consumer spending.

Although real personal consumption expenditures fell in the fourth

quarter of last year,

consumer spending is still likely to contribute to

growth in the first quarter.

With economic activity continuing to expand at a healthy pace,

it

obviously is important for the Federal Reserve to be vigilant against a

reacceleration of inflation.

But, at this point,

optimistic about the inflation outlook.

moderate,

I am reasonably

Wage increases have remained

and given the recent softness in oil prices,

energy prices

5

should put a damper on CPI and PPI increases.

As a matter of fact, the

February Producer Price Index declined .2 percent,

growth to 1.7 percent over the past 12 months.

slowing its rate of

Although capacity

problems have developed in a few industries, they are by no means

widespread.

Of course, rising import prices will be adding to measured

inflation, which is an inevitable part of the international adjustment

process.

But we cannot allow these price level adjustments to become

part of a renewed inflation process.

Indicators of Monetary Policy

Monetary policy obviously has a key role to play in supporting

continued economic expansion with ongoing external adjustment and in

preventing any buildup of inflationary pressures.

I would like to think

that we have had something to do with the rather good economic

performance our nation has enjoyed for the past 5 years.

has certainly been challenging,

But, the task

and I don't for a second expect that

challenge to recede as we move along into the future.

I am continually

6

reminded of this whenever I see the conflicting advice given to the

Federal Reserve in the many financial newsletters I receive.

One reason for the difficulty in conducting policy and the lack of

consensus among "Fedwatchers" and others is the lack of a single,

reliable intermediate guide upon which to focus policy.

the money supply,

especially Ml,

For a while,

seemed to meet the need, though it

always had to be interpreted with some care.

But for reasons that are

by now well-known to you, Ml in particular, but the other aggregates as

well,

have become less useful guides to policy.

Consequently, both you

and we have been forced to identify other economic and financial

variables that can be used to predict trends in spending, production,

and inflation in order to judge what policies might be appropriate in

any given situation.

The point of my previous talk was to give you

reasons why I and other Governors pay particular— but not exclusive—

attention to three measures in assessing the stance of policy.

Over the years,

contexts,

the word "indicator" has been used in a variety of

which has led to a great deal of confusion.

Consequently,

I

want to be clear about the meaning I will be attaching to the term

tonight.

I am using it in an informational sense.

More specifically,

indicators are variables that enable us to determine in a quick and

timely fashion whether a given monetary policy is having the intended or

desired effect on the economy.

That is, indicators provide us with

information needed to answer the question "Is the current stance of

monetary policy appropriate?"

The need for indicators arises because policy is, by necessity,

formulated in an environment of incomplete information,

il

is extremely

difficult to determine the current state of the economy and how it may

be responding to economic policies.

partly from data lags.

are always dated,

The lack of information arises

The most recently available data on the.economy

especially those coming from the GNP accounts. An even

more difficult information problem results from the lagged effects that

changes in policy have on the economy.

Policymakers need to have some

sense of how the economy will be behaving in the future,

can adjust policy to bring about desired results.

so that they

8

In this environment,

indicators serve the purpose of providing

early readings on where the economy is headed and how its direction is

being affected by monetary policy.

As such, indicators play a crucial

role in formulating and evaluating monetary policy.

If they indicate at

an early stage that policy is not having its desired effect, policy can

then be adjusted to a more appropriate stance.

Consequently,

indicator

variables not only play a part in assessments of the economy's response

to monetary policy, but they may also influence the choice of future

policies.

To function adequately in this role,

indicator variables should be

correlated with the future data that reflect the lagged effects of

policy actions.

It is also essential that indicator variables themselves

be readily available.

In addition,

they should be accurately measured

and not so subject to revision that initial readings might provoke

inappropriate policy responses.

At the Federal Reserve,

a wide variety of financial and

nonfinancial indicators are used in the conduct of monetary policy.

9

What I would like to do tonight is single out three of them— the spread

between long-term and short-term interest rates,

exchange rates,

and

commodity prices— that, when interpreted carefully and in context,

do

meet many of the criteria for indicator variables.

I do not want to give the impression of having found some new

indicators that heretofore were unknown to the FOMC.

In truth, these

three variables have been used as informational variables in policy

considerations for quite some time.

For example,

softening commodity

prices and a flatter yield curve played a role in the decision to ease

in 1986.

During much of 1987, a steepening yield curve,

commodity prices,

rising

and downward pressure on the dollar were important

signals to the Federal Reserve of a need to be concerned about the

potential for a pickup in inflation.

I do want to emphasize at this point that I am not suggesting that

yield spreads,

exchange rates,

monetary policy,

fact,

or commodity prices be used as targets of

even though it is conceivable that they could be.

combined objectives for exchange rates and one

In

10

commodity— gold— in effect dictated monetary developments during the

gold standard period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Exchange rates also had considerable weight in policy deliberations

under the Bretton Woods system.

But, in the context in which I am using

exchange rates— and, for that matter, commodity prices and yield

spreads— I do not envisage them becoming targets of monetary policy.

Rather, I see them as providing valuable information on the economy's

performance and the effect of the Federal Reserve's policies.

Indeed,

once a variable becomes a target of monetary policy, it ceases to

provide this kind of information, as was the case when fixed exchange

rates prevailed.

As experience has shown, no one of these indicators can be.

used alone.

Each is subject to a number of influences that may not be

directly related to monetary policy, but rather result from non-policy

factors.

Taken together, however, and interpreted with care, they

possess a number of desirable properties.

11

Data on yield spreads,

readily available,

exchange rates, and commodity prices are

in some cases by the minute,

24 hours a day.

The

data are not subject to revisions and other adjustments that affect many

economic and monetary series.

In addition,

each indicator incorporates

the collective judgment of the highly informed participants who trade

the assets and commodities, thereby reflecting the consensus about*

current and future factors that determine their values.

Finally, these

indicators are responsive— at least to a degree— to monetary changes,

which is a necessary ingredient to their success as indicators.

They

can also change in response to a variety of other factors, which as I

mentioned in my earlier speech,

is why they must be used in conjunction

with one another.

Let's now take a closer look at each of the three indicators.

With

regard to the yield spread, I have in mind specifically the difference

between the rate on long-term Treasury bonds and a short-term interest

rate.

I prefer to use the federal funds rate rather than the 3-month

Treasury bill rate, because it is less subject to short-run

12

developments,

such as Treasury financing patterns or foreign central

bank purchases.

Both the long-term rate and the federal funds rate

react to policy changes as well as to a variety of other factors.

addition,

because the two differ significantly in maturity,

In

the federal

funds rate tends to be influenced by monetary policy to a greater

degree, while the long-term rate is influenced more by expectations of

future economic developments.

Consequently,

the yield spread captures

these expectational factors, which relate primarily to future movements

in short-term interest rates.

Expectations of changes in short-term

interest rates could reflect either real factors or inflation.

With an

easing in monetary policy, the yield spread should initially widen as

investors are quick to realize, given all else, that the future.economic

expansion or greater price pressures will cause future short-term rates

to rise.

Similarly,

the yield spread should initially narrow

following a tightening in monetary policy,

economic activity are expected to decline.

as inflation and real

13

In addition to monetary policy factors, the yield spread can be

influenced by a number of other factors that affect expectations of

future economic activity and inflation,

in short-term interest rates.

and hence, prospective movements

Changes in fiscal policy are one obvious

example, as are changes in economic policies in other countries.

Movement in the yield spread can also reflect changes in risk and

liquidity premiums,

and changes in the supply of Treasury securities at

different maturities.

Finally, the yield spread can, on occasion, be

especially difficult to interpret because market expectations of changes

in monetary policy can affect its movement.

All these considerations imply that movement in the yield spread

must be interpreted cautiously.

In other words,

its value as an

indicator is tied primarily with its use with other indicators.

Another such indicator is the exchange rate.

Like interest rates,

exchange rates are sensitive to changes in monetary policy.

With an

easing in monetary policy, the drop in interest rates would initially

cause the dollar to depreciate,

as lower interest rates in the U.S.

14

relative to foreign countries induce capital outflows.

Similarly,

a

tightening in policy would initially result in an increase in exchange

r a t es .

Also like interest rates,

of other factors,

exchange rates are affected by a number

such as foreign monetary and fiscal policies and

productivity growth differentials.

This is why it is important to

compare exchange rate movements with other indicators.

For example,

in

1986 a falling yield spread and declining commodity prices suggested an

easing in policy was clearly appropriate,

despite the falling dollar.

As suggested, the information contained in the yield curve and

exchange rates can also be combined with movements in commodity prices

to signal those situations in which generalized inflation or deflation

may become a possibility,

this context,

thereby necessitating a policy reaction.

I have found Governor Angell's research project showing

commodity prices leading turning points in the CPI to be very

interesting.

In

But I realize that many factors other than generalized

demand pressures can influence commodity prices,

and substantial

15

questions remain regarding the strength of the relationship.

Study is

currently underway at the Federal Reserve to determine the extent to

which commodity prices signal the buildup of inflationary pressures

before prices generally begin to rise.

To the extent that they do, an

excessive easing in monetary policy that raised inflationary

expectations would presumably be associated with an increase in

commodity prices, along with a widening in the yield spread and a

decline in the dollar.

Similarly, these indicators would jointly signal

a tightening in the effect of monetary policy through a narrowing of the

spread, an appreciation of the dollar, and a fall in commodity prices.

Qualifications

In closing, let me re-emphasize several points that have b$en a

part of my discussion of the use of these indicators.

First, my

proposed use of the yield spread, exchange rates, and commodity prices

is solely as informational variables for monetary policy.

suggesting that they become policy targets.

I am not

Second, these are not the

only indicators that can be and, in fact, are used in gauging monetary

16

policy.

However, when used jointly and in conjunction with other

information,

they are very useful additions aiding in the formulation

and implementation of appropriate price stabilizing monetary policies.

Third,

further study on these three indicators is continuing at the

Board of Governors.

further analysis.

A number of aspects regarding their use requires

For example, empirical evidence has questioned the

extent to which exp^ctational factors alone cause changes in the yield

curve.

Thus, the behavior of the yield spread should be explored

further.

Finally,

it would be incorrect for investors to conclude that these

three indicators are the only ones being given any weight in the Federal

Reserve's policy deliberations.

No method of assessing the effects of

monetary policy on the economy is so foolproof that it can be applied in

isolation from other factors.

It is prudent to use all available

information in judging whether monetary policy is having the intended

effect.

What I have simply offered this evening is an explanation of

17

how the yield spread, exchange rates, and commodity prices can be used

to help effectively assess the impact of monetary policy.

Thank you.