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For release on delivery
10 : 00 a.m. , EST
February 8, 1994

Statement by
Lawrence B. Lindsey
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Syst
before the
Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance
of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives
February 8, 1994

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before this subcommittee to discuss Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) reform.

The Community Reinvestment Act is intended to

ensure that every community has access to adequate credit to help
meet its needs.

We at the Federal Reserve Board believe that the

lav; has produced substantial benefits.

However, the CRA has not

-- nor .should it be expected to have -- cured all the problems
that plague our cities.
As you know, the federal financial institution
regulatory agencies are actively engaged in an effort to reform
CRA by amending our regulations.

This effort is the result of

the President's request to make CRA more objective, the ratings
more uniform and the paperwork less burdensome.

This effort is a

challenging one; it involves a substantial commitment by the
agencies and encompasses many difficult issues.

We are very

conscious of the fact that what we do could significantly affect
financial institutions and the public alike and that care must be
exercised when undertaking such an important project.

As we are

midway in the process and still receiving comments from the
public, our report to you necessarily will be somewhat
preliminary.

History of CRA and the Current Reform Effort
Before discussing the proposal to reform CRA, I'd like
to briefly- review the law and a litt i.e of its history, since that
history is very relevant to the reform project.

The Community

2
Reinvestment Act calls for the financial regulatory agencies to
use their examination authority to encourage institutions to help
meet the credit needs of their communities, including low- and
moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound business
practices.

The agencies are required to assess the community

lending records of the institutions they supervise as part of
their examinations and to take into account those records in
considering applications.

The law, however, gives no other

indication how the agencies are to accomplish these tasks, and
does>not define key concepts, such as how an institution's
community is defined or what constitutes satisfactory
performance.

A considerable responsibility, therefore, was

placed by Congress on the agencies.
The regulations adopted in 1978 by the financial
regulatory agencies focused, at least in part, on factors related
to the process used by institutions to determine the credit needs
of their community and how they responded to those needs.

To

avoid credit allocation, and to allow for the maximum amount of
creativity by institutions in meeting the varying credit needs of
their localities, these regulations did not attempt to prescribe
any particular level of lending.

Instead, the evaluation of a

financial institution's performance has been based on the
application of twelve assessment factors, including how community
credit needs are ascertained, the geographic distribution of
loans, the record of opening and closing branches and providing
services, participation in local community development projects,

and the financial and legal capability of the institution.

In

determining how well an institution ascertains the credit needs
of its community, examiners have taken into account such matters
as the institution's community outreach and credit marketing.
In the course of our review of CRA, we have heard from
many consumer and community groups about how valuable the law has
been in getting credit extended in low- and moderate - income
areas.

Some groups put the success of CRA at $30 billion, which

they estimate to be the level of CRA commitments for new credit.
I suspect the total impact of CRA considerably exceeds the $30
billion estimate.

And, to date, this has occurred with a

comparatively light hand from Washington.

Indeed, one of the

strengths of the present system is that it allows great
flexibility in fashioning programs to meet the different and
changing credit needs of this country's diverse communities.
Despite the significant benefits that communities have
seen from CRA, the approach taken in the regulations, and the
agencies' implementation of that approach, has generated a good
deal of criticism.

Financial institutions have frequently

complained that they are burdened from imprecise rules and
inconsistent evaluations on the one hand, and overly prescriptive
documentation requirements on the other hand.

Small

institutions, Ln particular, complain about the costs of
compliance and contend the law is unnecessary because they must
serve their entire community to succeed.

Further, it appears to

some that there is little incentive for institutions to try to

4
achieve an outstanding rating, especially when applications filed
by institutions with outstanding CRA ratings may still be
protested by the public.
Community representatives have complained that the
regulators emphasize documentation of CRA activities in their
examinations of financial institutions, instead of actually
measuring the degree to which they are meeting community credit
needs.

They point to the fact that almost 90 percent of

institutions receive "passing" ratings, and the fact that the
agencies rarely deny applications for CRA reasons alone, as
evidence that regulatory enforcement of the law has been weak.
They also wish to have a more formal role in the evaluation
process.
While we have tried to respond to these various
concerns through modifying our process and providing official
guidance, it has become clear that CRA enforcement needs a broadbased review to see whether improvements are in order and if so,
what they should be.

Consequently, the President requested the

Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of Thrift
Supervision to reexamine che regulations.

The President asked

the agencies to improve them by addressing several areas of
concern.

The objectives outlined by the President, which we also

believe are important to the ultimate reform of CRA, include:

•

replacing paperwork and process - related requirements

with clear objective criteria that measure actual
performance; and
•

working together to improve uniformity in

evaluations and instituting more effective sanctions
for consistently poor CRA performance.
The ultimate goal, according to the President's request, is to
"replace paperwork and uncertainty with greater performance,
clarity and objectivity."

We are in full accord with this

obj ective.
The agencies held a series of seven public hearings
throughout the country to gather information on the best way to
amend our CRA regulations and enhance our enforcement.
witnesses testified, many raising common concerns.

Over 250

We were

strongly encouraged to revise our regulations so that CRA
performance would be evaluated in as objective a manner as
possible and to give better guidance on how different types and
levels of performance will be rated.
While witnesses stressed that CRA should continue to
focus on lending, many also recommended that greater weight be
given to investments (such as in community development projects)
and the provision of banking services (such as through locating
branches and providing low-cost accounts or noncustomer check
cashing).

Many witnesses requested that institutions be required

to collect more data on the geographic distribution of loans in

6
order that they may be better able to evaluate an institution's
CRA performance.
Representatives of smaller institutions, on the other
hand, generally criticized the burden and expense they bear from
existing documentation requirements.

Other witnesses recommended

that institutions be allowed to develop their own CRA plans
against which their performance would be rated, with these plans
reviewed by the agencies.

Finally, most witnesses, other than

those from financial institutions, opposed providing a safe
harbor from CRA protests to institutions rated satisfactory or
outstanding.
Following these meetings, we developed the proposed
changes to our CRA regulations in conjunction with the other
agencies and published them on December 21, 1993.
proposal has been requested by March 24.

Comment on the

We have extended our

comment period to that date to accommodate the numerous requests
for time to do a complete analysis of what is a very complex
proposal.

We do not know how many comments will ultimately be

received and whether fundamental changes in our proposed approach
will be called for.

Although I cannot state when a final rule

will be adopted, we do intend to move the process along as
quickly as is appropriate.

And,

I want to emphasize that I would

not expect any final rule to become mandatory until after an
adequate lead time - - particularly if the proposed data
collection requirements, or something similar, are retained.

7
Most important, I am committed to making sure that our
final rule will work.

We will do no one any favors by

promulgating a rule that is operationally untenable.

During this

comment period, I am paying particular attention to questions or
complaints about the details of implementation and of unintended
consequences from how the proposal will work in practice.

Balancing Competing Objectives
With this proposal, we have attempted to achieve the
difficult and important goal of balancing the competing concerns
of providing greater specificity on what is expected on the one
hand without dictating credit decisions on the other.

The

proposal attempts to clarify our expectations for CRA performance
by (1) creating a new, more numerically driven system for
assessing CRA performance in three critical elements: first and
foremost, lending, and secondarily, services and investments;
(2) requiring the collection of data on the number, amount, and
geographic location of small business, small farm, and some
consumer loans to use in the assessments; (3) providing for
streamlined review of small institutions; (4) permitting
institutions to submit their CRA plan in advance to their
regulator for approval and public comment as an alternative to
being evaluated under the general assessment scheme; and
(5) specifying the regulatory sanctions that are possible from
noncompliance with the regulations.

8

In part, the balance we seek to achieve in the proposal
is intended to respond to those most concerned by CRA - - banks
and representatives of communities.

Despite their different

perspectives on CRA reform, I think that in many respects the
interests of banks and community representatives are consistent
rather than at odds.

Both want local lending institutions to be

strong and viable so that they will have the capacity to
effectively serve their communities over the long term.

Both

want to assure that the projects that are funded make economic
sense for lender and borrower alike.

Both also have a common

interest in a CRA evaluation system that is fair and consistent,
and that avoids unnecessary paperwork.

To be sure, community

groups may favor more data collection, greater public
participation and more stringent accountability than lenders, but
on balance, I believe there is greater commonality of interest
among the groups in the goals of reform than is often assumed.
Having said that, however, I am sure there are some
specific points in the proposal where views may differ -- for
example, on the appropriate cut-off level for the more
streamlined review procedures for "small banks."

Points of

difference like this seem unavoidable in a proposal as
comprehensive and complicated as ours and the public comment
should help us resolve some of the disagreements about the right
approach.

I can assure you that we have struggled throughout

this process to achieve an appropriate balance to the competing

9
interests where it does exist; how well we have done this will be
judged in the public comment process.

Issues Raised by the Proposal
Given Comptroller Ludwig's description of the proposal
for the subcommittee, I will not also review the details.

As is

well known, however, although the Board joined with the other
agencies in seeking public comment on the proposal, Board members
have a variety of concerns about the proposal.
•

For example:

The proposal is intended to provide greater

certainty to institutions in the type of evaluation they might
expect to receive, primarily based on their performance relative
to others.

Yet, measuring an institution's performance against

other lenders in the service area at year-end means that the
standard will necessarily be fluid from year to year.
Moreover, the terms used to describe different levels
of performance include "roughly comparable," "significant
amount," and similar words that are anything but precise.

These

general standards have been proposed, in part, to avoid giving
specific numbers which would risk resulting in the specific
allocation of the amount, type, or terms of credit institutions
must provide.
Institutions will have to speculate about the
activities qf their competitors, and examiners will be forced to
interpret these terms on a case-by-case basis, when evaluating
individual institutions.

Thus, an institution may have some of

10

the same uncertainty about how its performance will be evaluated
that it has now.

To some extent we will always be plagued by the

dilemma of how to provide better guidance and certainty in the
CRA area without reducing needed flexibility.

But we expect

these issues to be resolved over time although ultimately the
experience may prove frustrating to both financial institutions
and community groups.
•
share" test.

There may be problems associated with the "market
One such problem may result from the fact that the

market share for other than mortgage loans will be computed only
in comparison to other depository institutions who must report
data.

Leaving out small depositories (generally under $250

million in assets) and nondepositories, the percentage of those
who are subject to CRA and included in the market share
comparison will be low.

In some localities, a very few or even a

single institution may be included in the "market."

This could

cause practical problems and anomalous results.
•

The new requirement for summary reporting of the

number, amount and geographic distribution of small business,
mortgage and some consumer loans is a significant one.

It is

important to the goal of making the CRA process more
quantifiable; yet it could be costly.

For covered commercial

banks, the annual cost for the small business portion of the data
collection alone has been estimated by our staff to approach $21
million.

In all, about 3,400 institutions will be required to

gather new data.

11

Because of these concerns, we have also asked for a
discussion of burdens and benefits of this requirement in the
public comments.
•

The appropriateness of the streamlined review

procedure for small institutions under $250 million in assets
will surely be questioned in the comments -- as well as the
impact of the presumption that such small institutions have a
"reasonable" loan-to-deposit ratio if it is 60 percent.

We have

heard from the small banks who have commented on the proposal
thus far that this is an unrealistically high loan-to-deposit
ratio for them, especially for good quality loans, and we have
some concerns that small institutions who want to benefit from
the streamlined CRA review might be forced to imprudently change
their lending standards in order to meet this presumption.
•

There are other potentially controversial aspects to

our proposal, such as whether the alternative evaluation for
banks with preapproved plans is workable, whether the role of the
public and community groups in development of the plans is
adequate, and whether we, in fact, should be treating
institutions receiving low ratings as being in violation of the
regulation and subject to our enforcement authority.

These

important issues will also receive considerable attention by us
and, I hope, by the public.

12

Discussion of Specific Issues Raised in Letter of Invitation
In addition to many of the issues I have already
addressed in my statement, I would like to respond to some of the
questions raised in your letter of invitation:
•

The Appeals process:

Financial institutions have

always been able to request supervisory personnel at Reserve
Banks to review the ratings issued by examiners --whether
involving CRA or other supervisory issues--but we do not consider
this a formal appeals process.

We anticipate that our informal

system for appeals would complement the opportunities for input
in CRA evaluations.

The proposal would permit institutions to

rebut presumptive ratings under the lending, service and
investment tests.

But the proposal also provides that the

agencies would announce upcoming examinations in order to get
public comment on an institution's performance.

These comments,

and those in the institution's public file, would be taken into
account in our assessment of their performance.
•

Frequency of examinations for institutions rated

"outstanding":
frequency.

The proposal does not address examination

Our current policy, however, does allow evaluations

to be conducted less frequently for outstanding-rated
institutions.

Presently, state member banks rated outstanding,

with at least satisfactory ratings in consumer compliance in
general, are examined once every eighteen to twenty-four months,
compared to the six- to twelve-month examination frequency for

13

poor performers.

At this point, I would assume that we would

maintain our current policy even with regulatory changes.
•
ratings;

Effect of investment credits and indirect lending on

Under the proposal, investment activity by retail banks

could help to increase their base rating in the lending test, up
to two levels if the investment performance is outstanding.
Investments will be the sole criteria for measuring the
performance of wholesale and limited-purpose banks, however.
Indirect lending activity may be taken into account under either
the lending or investment tests.

These aspects of the proposal

are controversial, and of particular concern to community groups.
We will be evaluating their comments very carefully as we
consider what the appropriate treatment of investments and
indirect lending should be.
•
applications:

Effect of ratings and public involvement on
CRA ratings, as well as public comments on

applications, can and do influence significantly the Board's
consideration of an institution's application.
made clear in earlier CRA policy statements.

This has been
The proposal is

more explicit than our current regulation about the effect
different ratings will have on the Board's consideration of an
application.

For example, under the proposal, an "outstanding"

would be looked on very favorably and a "substantial
noncompliance" rating generally would result in the denial of the
application.

We are aware of the concern of community groups

that there may be an implicit "safe harbor" in the proposal.

A

14
"safe harbor" was not intended, and to the extent that there is
any misunderstanding, it will be clarified in the final version.

Conclusion
Through our internal review of CRA and the public
hearings on CRA reform, we have been afforded a unique
opportunity to step back and take a fresh look at the enforcement
of one of the most important, yet controversial, laws affecting
financial institutions.

In proposing our comprehensive

regulatory reform of CRA, we have been highly aggressive in
approach.

Our efforts are bound to generate a good deal of

debate and concern -- for example, that we are demanding too much
or not enough, that we have been too specific or too vague, and
that we have been too sensitive to small banks' concerns about
paperwork burden or not sensitive enough.
As I said during the Board's public deliberations on
the proposed amendments to our CRA regulation, although I take a
natural pride of authorship given the time I have invested with
m y colleagues, I am not unalterably wedded to this specific
proposal.

If the public comment points out serious flaws,

particularly in the areas of operations or implementation, or if
better ideas emerge, I am perfectly willing to recommend to my
fellow regulators and members of the Board of Governors that we
return to the drawing board.

We should not hesitate to do so if

that is the way to ensure that we have done the best job

15

possible.

To give the public anything less than the best is a

goal that no one involved in this process would condone.