View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Remarks by Governor Laurence H. Meyer

At the Bank Administration Institute, Finance and Accounting Management
Conference, Washington, D.C.
June 9, 1998

Issues and Trends in Bank Regulatory Policy and Financial Modernization
Legislation
It is a pleasure to be here today, and I thank the Bank Administration Institute for inviting
me to be a part of your discussions.
When people think of the Federal Reserve, I am pretty sure that most Americans think of
monetary policy, interest rates, international finance, and the Fed's macroeconomic
responsibilities in all of these areas. And, of course, macroeconomics lies at the core of what
any central bank does. However, as everyone at this conference appreciates, another major
function of the Federal Reserve is the supervision and regulation of banks and bank holding
companies. I would like to use my time this afternoon to discuss some key aspects of this
side of the Fed's activities.
I will begin by outlining, very briefly, some of the key trends affecting the banking and
financial sector. I will then focus on what I see as the most important challenges that these
trends pose for bank supervisors, and suggest some directions that I believe we should
consider when thinking about how bank supervision should evolve over time. Lastly, I will
discuss current legislative efforts to modernize our banking system.
Key Trends Challenging Bank Supervisors
Surely the most profound force transforming the financial, and for that matter other sectors
of our economy, is the rapid growth of computer and telecommunications technology. In
finance, a critical and complementary force is the development of intellectual "technologies"
that enable financial engineers to separate risk into its various components, and price each
component in an economically rational way.
Implementation of financial engineering strategies typically requires massive amounts of
cheap data processing; and the cheap data processing would not be useful without the
formulas required to compute prices. The combination of the two has led to a virtual
explosion in the number and types of financial instruments. Such products have lowered the
cost and broadened the scope of financial services, making it possible for borrowers and
lenders to transact directly with each other, for a wide range of financial products to be
tailored for very specific purposes, and for financial risk to be managed in ever more
sophisticated ways.
Financial innovation has been the driving force behind a second major trend in banking -the blurring of distinctions among what were, traditionally, very distinct forms of financial
firms. One of the first such innovations, with which we are all now very familiar, was

money market mutual funds. In the 1980s, banks began to challenge whether the GlassSteagall Act prohibited combinations of commercial and investment banking. Today, both
the regulators and the courts agree that Glass-Steagall does not imply a total prohibition.
More recently, traditional separations of banking and insurance sales have also begun to fall,
with support from the supervisors and the courts.
A major result of the continued blurring of distinctions among commercial banking,
investment banking, and insurance is a tremendous increase in competition for many
financial services. Greatly intensified competition has also led to increasing pressure for
revisions to many of the banking laws and regulations that, despite some successful efforts
at relaxation or repeal, continue to exert outdated and costly restraints on the banking and
financial system.
Indeed, despite its often frustratingly slow pace, there seems little doubt that deregulation
has been a major force for change in the banking and financial services industries. Two
decades ago we still had Regulation Q, the Glass-Steagall Act was widely viewed as
requiring a virtual prohibition of combinations of commercial and investment banking, and
interstate banking and branching, let alone combinations of banking and insurance, were
barely fantasies even at the state level.
The fourth major force transforming the banking landscape is the globalization not only of
banking and financial markets, but also of the real economy. The interactions of
developments in both the financial and real economies have expanded cross-border asset
holdings, trading, and credit flows. In response, financial intermediaries, including banks
and securities firms, have increased their cross-border operations. Once again, a critical
result of this rapid evolution has been a substantial increase in competition both at home and
abroad.
The final significant trend I will highlight is the on-going consolidation of the U.S. banking
industry. I think that it is fair to say that the American banking system is currently in the
midst of the most significant consolidation in its history. In 1980 there were about 14,400
banks in the U.S. organized into about 12,300 banking organizations. By the end of 1997,
the number of banks had fallen to just under 9,100, and the number of banking organizations
to not quite 7,200. This 42 percent decline in the number of banking organizations was due
in part, but only in part, to the large number of bank failures in the late 1980s and early
1990s. A more important factor was mergers among healthy banks. Since the early 1980s, it
has not been unusual to see 400 or more mergers among healthy banks each year.
While mergers have occurred, and continue to occur, among banks of all sizes, I would
emphasize three aspects of the current bank merger movement. First is the high incidence of
"megamergers," or mergers among very large banking organizations. Several mergers of the
last few years have been either the largest at the time, or among the largest bank mergers in
U.S. history. And, of course, that trend continues.
Second, despite all of the merger activity, a large number of medium to small banks remain
in the United States. Moreover, by most measures of performance these small banks are
more than a match for their larger brethren for many bank products and services. When a
megamerger is announced it is not uncommon to read in the press how small banks in the
affected markets are looking to take advantage of the business opportunities created thereby.
Research seems to support their optimism.

Lastly, while the overall number of banking organizations has fallen since 1980, this does
not mean that new, or de novo, entry has not occurred. From 1980 through 1997 some 3,600
new banks were formed in the United States.
In large part because of the continued viability of smaller banks, while the national
concentration of banking assets has increased substantially since 1980, measures of local
market banking concentration have remained essentially unchanged. Indeed, the stability of
local market concentration in the face of such a large consolidation of the banking industry
is remarkable, and bodes well for the competitive vitality of local banking markets.
While the reasons for bank mergers are varied, the bottom line is that the United States is
well on its way to developing a truly national banking structure for the first time in its
history. We are not quite there yet, but I do not think it will take too many more years.
Future Directions in Bank Supervision
What do all of these changes mean for how we supervise and regulate banks?
Analysis of Competition
Clearly, as the banking industry consolidates we need to maintain competitive markets.
Competitive markets are our best assurance that consumers receive the highest quality
products at the lowest possible prices. As I discussed earlier, there are many reasons to
believe that in recent years competition has increased greatly in markets for a large number
of financial products and services. This is true for many products purchased in local,
regional and national markets. However, in some cases we still observe potential
competitive problems with a proposed bank merger. Fortunately, the antitrust laws, as
written into the banking statutes, give us the means to maintain competition in such
situations. These laws require that the Board approve only those mergers that are not
expected to substantially harm competition.
Over the past year or so, quite a few applicants have pushed very hard at the Board's frontier
for approving merger applications. In response, the Board has occasionally felt compelled to
remind applicants, especially those proposing a merger that would affect a large number of
local markets, that substantial changes in market concentrations will receive careful review.
Moreover, when mergers would exceed the screening guidelines, "mitigating" factors must
be present. By mitigating factors I mean conditions that tend to create a more competitive
market than is suggested by market concentration alone. The greater the deviation from the
screening guidelines, the more powerful and convincing the mitigating factors must be.
I have personally been particularly concerned with cases where a large number of local
markets are affected. In such cases, even if the adverse effect is fairly small in each of
several local markets, it seems to me that the cumulative, or total, adverse effect might be
significant. When a large number of markets are affected adversely, I believe that we should
be especially careful to assure ourselves that there are substantial mitigating factors. In
addition, when a merger would cause a large change in concentration in a market that is, or
becomes, highly concentrated, I think we need to give special attention to the impact on
competition.
Assessing Safety and Soundness
Technological change, financial innovation, the acquisition of new powers by banking
organizations, the increasing geographic scope of banks, and the globalization of financial

markets all challenge our ability to examine and assess the safety and soundness of
individual banking firms. One way that examiners are adapting to this changed world is to
focus much of their attention on the information and risk management systems of banks.
The key question they ask is: How effectively are these systems measuring and controlling
an institution's rapidly changing risk profile? The emphasis on risk management is most
critical at our largest, most sophisticated, and most internationally active banks. Many of
these banks use advanced economic and statistical models to evaluate their market and
credit risks. These models are used for a variety of purposes, including allocating capital on
a risk adjusted basis and pricing loans and credit guarantees.
The development by some banks of increasingly accurate models for measuring, managing,
and pricing risk has called into question the continuing usefulness of one of the foundations
of bank supervision -- the so-called risk-based capital standards, or the Basle Accord. The
Basle Accord capital standards were adopted in 1988 by most of the world's industrialized
nations in an effort to encourage stronger capital at riskier banks, to include off-balance
sheet exposures in the assessment of capital adequacy, and to establish more consistent
capital standards across nations. The Accord was a major advance in 1988, and has proved
to be very useful since then. But in recent years calls for reform have begun to grow. I will
outline briefly one of the key problems we are currently facing with the Basle Accord.
The Basle Accord capital standards divide bank on- and off-balance-sheet assets into four
risk buckets, and then apply a different capital weight to each bucket. These weights
increase roughly with the riskiness of the assets in a given bucket. However, the relationship
is rough. Perhaps most troublesome, the same risk weight is applied to all loans. Thus, for
example, a loan to a very risky "junk bond" company gets the same weight as a loan to a
"triple A" rated firm.
This aspect of the Accord clearly gives banks an incentive to find ways to avoid the
regulatory capital standard for loans that their internal models say need less capital than is
required by the Basle Accord. Conversely, banks should want to keep loans which their
models say require more capital than does the Basle standard. And, guess what, banks have
been doing just that. This so-called "regulatory arbitrage" may not be all bad, but it surely
causes some serious problems as well. For one thing, it makes reported capital ratios--a key
measure of bank soundness used by supervisors and investors--less meaningful for
government supervisors and private analysts. Finding ways around this problem is a high
priority at the Federal Reserve.
The arbitraging of regulatory capital requirements is but one of a host of similar conflicts
between banks and bank supervisory rules and regulations. Indeed, one can view much of
the long history of bank supervision and regulation as something of a contest between
supervisors who want to deter excessive risk taking and banks who seek ways around
sometimes inefficient, or just plain uneconomic, regulations. This long history leads me to
seek supervisory strategies that are, in the economist's jargon, incentive compatible. By
incentive compatible, I mean supervisory policies and procedures that give banks strong
internal incentives to manage their risks prudently and minimize the exploitation of moral
hazard. Put differently, we need to design strategies that encourage banks, in their own selfinterest, to work with us, not against us.
When designing supervisory policy, we should always remember that the first line of
defense against excessive risk-taking by banks is the market itself. Market discipline can be,

and often is, highly effective at deterring excessive risk. Indeed, a primary goal of many of
the bank regulatory reforms implemented in the wake of the banking and thrift crises of the
1980s and early 1990s was either to increase market discipline or to make supervisors
behave more like the market would behave. Market discipline was increased, for example,
by raising capital standards and by mandating greater public disclosure by a bank of its
financial condition. Prompt corrective action rules that require supervisors to impose
increasingly severe penalties on a bank as its financial condition deteriorates, and the
adoption of risk-based deposit insurance premiums are examples of encouraging supervisors
to act like the market.
The reforms of the early 1990s were a good start. But I believe that there may well be more
that we can do. Such comments may sound out of place today. Times are good, and almost
everyone seems quite satisfied with the current deposit insurance system. But good times
may be precisely when we should develop ideas for an even more effective system. The
crucible of a crisis is not always the best time to think up reforms -- witness the error we
made in passing the Glass-Steagall Act, an error we have yet to correct after 65 years!
Indeed, it is in part for this very reason that the Board continues to urge Congress to pass
financial modernization legislation. So, in the spirit of being forward looking, let me attempt
to give you the flavor of one idea that seems worth considering.
It may be possible to increase market discipline by requiring large, internationally active
banks to issue a minimum amount of certain types of subordinated debt to the public. An
appealing aspect of this approach is that subordinated debt holders, so long as they are not
bank "insiders," face only downside risk, and thus their risk preferences are very close to
those of the FDIC. Subordinated debt holders would therefore be expected to impose market
discipline on the bank that is quite consistent with what bank supervisors are trying to do,
including encouraging banks to disclose more information about their financial condition.
Observed risk premiums on subordinated debt could perhaps be used to help the FDIC set
more accurate risk-based deposit insurance premiums, and such debt would provide an extra
cushion of protection for taxpayers. An additional benefit of having subordinated debt
traded on the open market is that price movements would provide a clear signal of the
market's evaluation of the bank's financial condition that, even if it were not used to help
price deposit insurance, could serve as an early warning aid to supervisors.
Subordinated debt is not, however, without its problems. For example, the risk preferences
of such creditors are aligned with those of the FDIC only when the bank is clearly solvent.
At or near insolvency, subordinated debt holders may be willing to "bet the bank" in order to
increase the chances that they will not suffer a loss. The fact that the bank closure decision
is still in the supervisor's hands is another complicating factor. In addition, it is unclear just
how deep and liquid a market in bank subordinated debt would be, although limiting any
requirements to the largest banks would ease this concern. For example, at the end of last
year only one-half percent of banks with less than $50 million in assets issued subordinated
debt, but 83 percent of banks with total assets of $10 billion or more did so. However, it
appears that much of existing bank subordinated debt is held by the bank's parent holding
company, not independent third parties. Thus, the question of how deep and liquid a market
might evolve remains. For these and other reasons, an operationally feasible program for
mandatory subordinated debt would require a considerable amount of careful thought. Still,
in my judgment it is thought that might prove very worthwhile.
The Need For Financial Modernization

Technology and globalization are changing markets all over the world, but perhaps none
have been more affected than the financial markets. Yet in the United States much of our
legal framework has essentially not changed since the 1930s. The resultant pressure on
financial institutions to be able to compete has thus been reflected in the search for
loopholes and in efforts by regulatory authorities to find ways within their charter to permit
new activities. The process is not only inefficient, but creates new inequities, institutions
that may be producing unintended risks, and the misallocation of resources. That is why my
colleagues and I are such strong supporters of H.R. 10, The Financial Modernization Act of
1998, which the House passed last month and the Senate Banking Committee will be
discussing next week.
This bill brings our financial institutions into the 21st century in a framework that minimizes
risks and inequities. The task it sets for itself is not easy. Each set of our financial
institutions--and their regulators--have special privileges and advantages that they wish to
maintain and limits and restraints that they wish to shed. Balancing these realities results in
provisions in the bill that no one--including me--can say that they like completely. But the
balancing in H.R. 10 is, I think, the best that is possible; indeed, in many respects it is so
balanced that most adjustments to address the concerns of one set of institutions would
probably eliminate the support of another set of institutions. What is critical, it seems to me,
is that the bill not only does a fine balancing job, but it is in the public interest, something
that I am sorry to say that all too frequently we lose sight of. Let me share with you the
specific reasons why I think this is a bill that deserves support.
First and foremost is that the bill would finally let financial institutions get into each other's
businesses, and thus widen the scope and range over which institutions can compete for the
public's business. Mind you, this is not a statement that says financial supermarkets and/or
large institutions will be better or more successful than specialized and/or smaller
institutions. But the benefit is that the public, not regulators, will decide which will prosper
as competitors all bend their efforts to serve the consumer.
That is the bottom line. It's the reason why there should be financial modernization. But the
structure that the bill establishes is consistent both with efficient resource allocation and
with minimizing risk to the stability of the economy and the taxpayer. Let's take a closer
look at that structure.
The most critical element is that H.R. 10 would permit banks to conduct in their own
subsidiaries (so-called operating subsidiaries or "op subs") only the same activities that they
may already conduct in the bank and financial agency activities, which by their nature
require minimal funding and create minimal risk. These limitations, it seems to me, are
crucial for several reasons. Banks have a lower cost of funds than other financial entities
because of the safety net--the name we give the collection of deposit insurance, access to the
discount window, and access to the payments system. This subsidy is provided by the
government in order to buy systemic stability, but it has a cost: increased risk taking by
banks, reduced market discipline, and consequently the need for more onerous bank
supervision in order to balance the resultant moral hazard. The last thing we should want is
to extend that subsidy over a wider range of activities, which is, I believe, exactly what
would happen if bank op subs could engage in wider nonbank financial activities. Not only
would that increase the moral hazard--and the need for bank-like supervision--but it would
also unbalance the competitive playing field between bank subs and independent firms
engaging in the same business, a strange result for legislation whose ultimate purpose is to

increase the competition for financial services.
The subsidy that is so integral to the op sub would surely induce banks and other financial
institutions to organize in a form that would maximize their use of that subsidy. Indeed,
stockholders would have every reason to be critical of management that did not avail itself
of the opportunity to raise low cost funds. The profits of bank subsidiaries would surely
benefit the bank parent since GAAP accounting, economic and legal reality, and common
sense all call for consolidation. But losses, too, would consolidate into the bank parent and
such losses would fall directly on the safety net, and ultimately the taxpayer. These safety
and soundness and safety net risks ultimately would bring with them the need to regulate op
subs the way banks are regulated, creating inefficiencies and reductions in innovation, let
alone conflicts with functional regulators.
The legislation I support would require that organizations that conduct both banking and
other financial businesses organize in a holding company form where the bank and the other
activities are both subs of the holding company. Profits and losses of the business lines
accrue to the holding company and thus do not directly benefit nor endanger the bank, the
safety net, or the taxpayer. The safety net subsidy is not directly available to the holding
company affiliates and competition is thus more balanced. Moreover, traditional regulators
like the SEC and the state insurance commissioners still regulate the entities engaged in
nonbank activities as if they were independent firms. Functional regulation is desirable not
only for competitive equity, but is a political necessity and a practical reality in the process
of balancing that is required to move financial regulation. In principle, functional regulation
could also be applied to op subs, but the safety net, I submit, would soon create regulatory
conflict with that structure.
Importantly, the bill passed by the House would prohibit commercial affiliations with banks.
There is no doubt that it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw a bright line that
separates financial services from nonfinancial businesses; it will only become more difficult
to do so. But, the truth is that we are not sure enough of the implications of combining
banking and commerce--potential conflicts of interest, concentration of power, and safety
net and stability concerns--to move forward in this area. Better, I think, to digest financial
reform before moving in an area that will be very difficult to reverse. The bill, by the way,
would shut down new unitary thrifts that can affiliate with non-financial firms, but
grandfathers the rights of the over 700 existing unitary thrift holding companies to acquire
or be acquired by commercial enterprises. I would hope the Senate would instead freeze
such activities in place until the banking and commerce issue is addressed directly; the fact
that the House did not simply reinforces my point on how hard it is to reverse such powers
once gained.
Finally, I support H.R. 10 because the holding company framework would keep the Federal
Reserve--the central bank of the United States--as the umbrella supervisor. I believe that the
Fed has an important role to play in banking supervision in order to carry out its
responsibilities for monetary policy, economic stabilization, and crisis management. I
cannot grasp how we could possibly understand what is happening in banking markets, what
innovations are occurring and their implications, and the nature and quality of the risk
exposures and controls so critical for crisis management and policy formulation without the
hands-on practical exposure that comes from supervision. An umbrella supervisor is needed
for complex organizations in order to assure that the entire organization and its policies and
controls are well managed and consistent with financial stability. At least for the large

organizations, I believe that supervisor should be the Federal Reserve so that we can play
our role as a central bank and international crisis manager. Many people are surprised to
hear that the Fed directly supervises only 5 of the largest 25 banks--the state members. Our
window into banking is through our umbrella supervision of bank holding companies.
Unfortunately, but understandably, the view that the Fed wants new activities to be in a bank
holding company is often construed as a "turf" issue. I believe that there are two separable
arguments. I would prefer the holding company--for reasons I have discussed--even if the
Fed were not the umbrella supervisor. But I also think that we have to be involved in bank
supervision--again for the reasons I have discussed. Who should be involved in what
activities, and who should supervise the resultant organization and its component parts are
genuine and important policy issues that should be debated and decided by the Congress. To
simply dismiss them as turf issues misses the point, I think, and chokes off that debate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I hope that my remarks have helped you to better understand the forces
affecting our banking and financial system. Equally important, I hope that I have given you
a good feel for the challenges these forces have created for bank supervision, how we are
meeting these challenges today, and how we may deal with them in the future. Even more
importantly, I hope that I have convinced you to support enthusiastically H.R. 10! In all
seriousness, it really is time that we modernized our financial system and got on with the
business of serving consumers and maintaining a healthy, stable, and competitive banking
system.
Return to top
1998 Speeches
Home | News and events
Accessibility | Contact Us
Last update: June 9, 1998, 1:00 PM