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For release on delivery
1 p.m. EDT
September 21, 2007

Financial Market Developments

Remarks
by
Kevin Warsh
Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
to the
State University of New York at Albany’s School of Business
Albany, New York
September 21, 2007

It is good to be back in upstate New York. Thank you to the School of Business of the
University of Albany for inviting me. I am particularly heartened to see old friends, new
students, and prominent business leaders in attendance. I played in the New York State Public
High School Tennis Championships on the other side of this campus, so this is certainly familiar
terrain. However, I hope to perform better in my remarks today than I did with my racquet
twenty years ago.
I have been honored to serve in Washington, D.C. for the past 5-1/2 years. My
knowledge of the economy has deepened by working with my colleagues to put fiscal and
monetary policy into practice. Nonetheless, with each passing day, it is more obvious that I
learned much of what I need to know about the real economy in my first eighteen years here in
upstate New York.
The current period of heightened financial market volatility has drawn more attention
than usual to the policy actions of the Federal Reserve. Returning home at this time serves as a
useful reminder that the decisions we make in Washington matter on the front lines of the real
economy. Our monetary tools, for example, affect the ability of aspiring homeowners to take out
a first mortgage. They also matter to retirees on fixed budgets, who are vulnerable to escalating
prices, and to graduates of this and other universities looking for jobs. Our supervision and
regulatory policies, to cite another example, matter to businesses, large and small, looking to
borrow from banks to expand their operations.
On the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), my colleagues and I seek to deploy
our monetary policy tools to help keep the U.S. economy on an even keel. 1 We try to provide the
right mix of policy prescriptions, patience, and perspective to counter possible adverse
1

The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Board of
Governors or of the Federal Open Market Committee. I am grateful for the assistance of Nellie Liang and Daniel
Covitz of Board staff, who contributed to these remarks.

-2developments. In evaluating the state of the U.S. economy, its prospects, and the current stance
of policy, we typically turn to such arcana from the economics textbooks as the term structure of
interest rates, the shape of the Phillips curve, trends on the natural rate of unemployment,
changing risk premiums, the exchange value of the dollar, and marginal propensities to consume
as asset values change, to name just a few.
While these indicators and relationships are important, many of the enduring teachings
needed to evaluate the financial markets and U.S. economy (particularly in times of financial
tumult) are well known without the technical jargon all across the country: Trees don’t grow to
the sky. There is no free lunch. You shouldn’t put all your eggs in one basket. There is no
substitute for doing your own homework. And my favorite, that which can’t go on forever
usually doesn’t.2
My intent today is not to suggest that the Federal Reserve is somehow omniscient
regarding the path of the U.S. economy. Nor is it my intent to suggest that the Federal Reserve’s
knowledge and tools are sufficiently surgical to steer the U.S. economy completely unscathed
through the choppy waters of financial market turbulence. And of course, I do not literally mean
to suggest that common aphorisms provide an infallible compass to guide the economy past
shocks of one sort or another. Instead, my goal is to describe the Federal Reserve’s monetary
responsibilities, highlight the critical role of liquidity in financial markets, and discuss the recent
financial market turmoil. While the subprime-mortgage markets showed some of the earliest and
most pronounced indications of weakness, I believe that problems afflicting the subprimemortgage markets served more as the trigger than the fundamental cause of recent market turmoil
and economic uncertainty.

2

That is a slight paraphrasing of Herbert Stein's self-styled "Stein's Law" (Herbert Stein, 1998, What I Think: Essays
on Economics, Politics, and Life, Washington: AEI Press, p. 32).

-3Monetary Responsibilities and Financial Markets
By way of background, allow me to highlight the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate for
monetary policy, as embodied in the Federal Reserve Act. The Federal Reserve’s statutory
objectives are to institute policies that foster maximum employment and price stability. To
ensure that these objectives are consistent with each other and with strong, enduring economic
performance over time, my colleagues, past and present, interpret “maximum employment” to
mean maximum sustainable employment. In pursuing this objective, the Federal Reserve is
trying to foster an environment in which those who are looking for work can reasonably find it.
Similarly, we generally interpret our congressional mandate to ensure “price stability” to mean
that inflation (the rate of price change for a broad range of products and services) is at
sufficiently low and predictable levels so that it is not a factor in the economic planning of
households and businesses.
The principal instruments of monetary policy conducted by the Federal Reserve--open
market operations, the discount rate, and reserve requirements--do not operate in a vacuum.3
Rather, they operate dynamically in association with ever-changing financial market conditions
to produce effects on the real economy. Indeed, well-functioning financial markets are a
precondition for a sustainable, prosperous economy.
Financial markets facilitate the flow of capital from individuals and institutions that have
savings to individuals and institutions with investment opportunities that are deemed worthwhile.
When functioning properly, financial markets may also lower financing costs by allocating risks
to suppliers of capital most willing and able to bear them. Investments that build human and
physical capital, in turn, generate economic growth and ultimately raise living standards. In
addition, financial markets should serve as a shock absorber of sorts for both individuals and
3

A fuller description of the tools available to Federal Reserve policymakers is in Laurence H. Meyer (1998), "Come
with Me to the FOMC," Gillis Lecture, speech delivered at Williamette University, Salem, Ore., April 2,
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents.

-4businesses. The capital cushions of financial intermediaries, for example, should help mitigate
the impact of financial shocks on the overall economy.
Conversely, when financial markets function poorly, the capital allocation process I just
described is impaired, and worthwhile investment projects may go unfunded. In the extreme,
savers refuse to part with their funds for capital investments at virtually any price. Instead, they
retreat to the shore for safety, waiting for calmer seas and cooler heads to prevail. As I have
noted previously, “While policymakers and market participants know with certainty that these
episodes will occur, [we] must be humble in [our] ability to predict the timing, scope, and
duration of these periods of financial distress.”4
To avoid these outcomes altogether, some believe that the Federal Reserve should treat
financial stability itself as a goal. Often that is seen to imply a preference by policymakers for
the perpetuation of existing financial institutions and products. That is not a view I share. The
level of economic activity would invariably be lower if financial stability alone were our guiding
light; protecting incumbents at the expense of innovators would prove detrimental to the longterm vibrancy of the economy. We should be extremely wary of protecting financial institutions
and their various stakeholders from incurring losses. Such actions distort asset prices and
critically impair the efficiency of capital allocation. The desire for well-functioning markets
does not require us to insulate asset prices or individual financial institutions from the buffeting
of the marketplace.
Liquidity and Well-Functioning Financial Markets
Now, let me briefly highlight a key attribute of well-functioning financial markets: they
function best when they attract sufficient liquidity. In previous remarks, I advanced the notion
that liquidity can be thought of as roughly comparable to investor confidence.5 Liquidity exists
4

Kevin Warsh (2007), "Market Liquidity: Definitions and Implications," speech delivered at the Institute of
International Bankers Annual Washington Conference, Washington, March 5, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents.
5
Kevin Warsh (2007), "Financial Intermediation and Complete Markets," speech delivered at the European
Economics and Financial Centre, London, June 5, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents.

-5when investors are confident and willing to assume risks. And liquidity persists when risks are
quantifiable and investors are creditworthy.
To trace the origins of recent financial markets turmoil, let’s recall a time when the
environment was more benign and financial markets were flush with liquidity. This does not
require a long memory, as it aptly characterized our capital markets just four months ago. In
early June, I remarked that:
There is little doubt, then, that liquidity in most financial markets is high today and that investors
seem willing to take risks, even at today’s market-prevailing prices. In the United States, term
premiums on long-term Treasury yields are very low, corporate bonds appear to be nearly ‘priced
for perfection,’ and stock prices are setting new records. Credit markets are highly
accommodative for issuers, and the volume of loans to finance highly leveraged transactions is
escalating rapidly.6

These financial market conditions were, in part, I argued, the consequence of a long period of
remarkably supportive macroeconomic conditions, the acceleration in financial innovation,
particularly the growth of structured finance products, and the continued export of the culture of
capitalism to emerging-market countries. Taken together, confidence fostered the continued
propagation of new securities, new products, and new markets. Not surprisingly, liquidity was
ample.
Did Success Sow the Seeds of Distress?
So, what could go wrong? In times of abundant liquidity, investors that were no longer
comfortable with their financial positions could readily sell their holdings. Similarly, financial
institutions could distribute the securities they originated with few constraints. Like others who
had grown increasingly watchful about the ebullience in the financial markets, I wondered
whether the risks were being given their due:
These prices, terms and credit conditions may reflect solid economic fundamentals--low output
and inflation uncertainty, healthy corporate balance sheets, and corporate profits that exceed
market expectations--and if so, they may help to ease the effects of fluctuations in liquidity should
they occur. The prices and conditions may also reflect increased appetite for risk; or, far less
auspiciously, they may be indicative of investor overconfidence.7

6
7

Warsh, "Financial Intermediation and Complete Markets."
Warsh, "Financial Intermediation and Complete Markets."

-6Confidence can be fleeting. Confidence can beget complacency. If, in liquid times,
investors in structured products become complacent, they may not understand fully the value of
the underlying assets. High levels of confidence, perhaps even complacency, were also
observable in the behavior of many financial intermediaries. Many hedge funds, growing in size
and scope, invested in less-liquid assets in search of higher expected returns. Many commercial
banks increased sponsorship of structured investment vehicles to invest in long-term securities,
often financing them off-balance-sheet with short-term commercial paper. Those financial
intermediaries that recognized the risks of extrapolating high levels of liquidity indefinitely were
threatened with eroding market share and less-impressive profit profiles. They may have hoped
that robust trading markets would allow them to exit positions ahead of a crowded trade. But, to
paraphrase an old Wall Street saw, they don’t ring a bell when the markets are at the top or at the
bottom.
As you know, liquidity conditions started to deteriorate by mid-July. Subprime-mortgage
markets suffered significantly from a rapid withdrawal of liquidity. They were a particularly
tempting target: Many subprime mortgage products were newer, performance histories were
shorter, prices were rising faster, securitization structures were more complex, disclosure was
more opaque, and credit standards were weaker than most other asset classes.
But, were subprime credit problems the source of contagion causing broader reductions
in liquidity and market functioning, as has become a common refrain? Or did reductions in
liquidity--and concomitant changes in investor sentiment--simply manifest themselves first in the
subprime-mortgage markets? If the latter is the case, then the true causes of recent financial
tumult may well have preceded the turmoil in the subprime-mortgage markets altogether. And
policy prescriptions should be judged accordingly.

-7Subprime Lending: The Spark, Not the Cause
Throughout the summer, delinquency rates for subprime adjustable-rate mortgages
jumped as house prices decelerated and effective interest rates rose. The rate of serious
delinquencies for subprime mortgages with adjustable interest rates reached close to 15 percent
in July. Investors incurred large losses from forced sales of securities backed by subprime
mortgages. Credit-rating agencies downgraded numerous securities backed by subprime and altA mortgages.
The resulting investor skepticism about the accuracy of ratings, combined with mounting
losses at mortgage lenders, caused investors to pull back from a broad range of structured
products, even though unrelated to mortgages. Financing for leveraged buyouts halted; demand
for securities backed by syndicated loans evaporated. Investors began to shun non-mortgage
related asset-backed commercial paper.
These subsequent financial problems may not be a reflection of subprime contagion after
all. Instead, it may be that investors fundamentally lost confidence in their ability to value a
broad range of assets, particularly those that rely on robust securitization and secondary markets.
Moreover, uncertainty about the ability of large financial institutions to fund their commitments
eroded confidence in counterparties more generally. Risk premiums and term premiums rose
rapidly, and investors sought refuge. The principles, products, and practices that served so
many so well for so long seemed somehow ill-suited to the evolving financial architecture.
Markets that rely less on securitizations, and are more transparent, have fared better in
recent days and weeks. The stock market, while quite volatile, is about unchanged from midJune levels. In the corporate bond market, spreads have widened somewhat, but current levels
are close to historic averages, and issuance of investment-grade bonds has been quite sizable.
Issuance of speculative-grade bonds has been sharply reduced, but aside from difficulties of

-8LBO-related deals, this may reflect issuers’ willingness to await improved conditions.
Not unlike prior episodes, it seems increasingly apparent that many investors and
financial intermediaries became so content with the benign economic conditions and robust
financial markets that they tended to act with confidence greater than warranted by the
fundamentals. Indeed, some may have overly relied on credit ratings as sole gatekeepers for
evaluating risks. So perhaps, in some sense, markets can become too liquid. In this case,
markets may appear to function smoothly, but the risk-based pricing that lies at the heart of how
financial markets efficiently allocate capital is impaired. The gloss of confidence may cause a
misallocation of resources, and investors and financial intermediaries can be sidelined for a time,
undermining the normal functioning of market operations.
Conclusion
Some months ago, I asked, “What happens when liquidity falters?”8 Highlighting the
risks of a liquidity shock at some indeterminate point in the future is easier than ascertaining the
consequences with precision. Reduced liquidity conditions in markets today stem from a
pullback in investors’ willingness to take risks, which may have been triggered, but I argue not
caused, by losses in subprime-mortgage markets. Thus, a broader reassessment of risk positions
appears at work, especially for products that are opaque or complex. Investors who had relied on
credit ratings alone are now confronted with having to perform their own credit and market
valuations. Some may now find they are not well-equipped to make these evaluations. How
quickly markets normalize may depend on the speed with which investors and counterparties
gain comfort in their abilities to value assets.
The adjustment process by private investors has increased the risk that banks may
increasingly be called upon as backup providers of funding. The Federal Reserve responded to
these developments by providing reserves to the banking system; it announced a cut in the
8

Warsh, "Financial Intermediation and Complete Markets."

-9discount rate of 50 basis points and adjustments to the Reserve Banks’ usual discount window
practices to facilitate the provision of term financing. In addition, earlier this week, the FOMC
lowered its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points. The action was intended to help
forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might arise from the
disruptions in financial markets and to promote moderate growth over time. Recent
developments in financial markets, including impaired price discovery, have increased the
uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook. What originated as a liquidity shock could
potentially give rise to increases in credit risk. The Committee will continue to assess the effects
of these and other developments on economic prospects and will act as needed to meet our dual
mandate, fostering price stability and economic growth.