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For release on delivery
9:15 a.m. EDT (8:15 a.m. CDT)
August 30, 2017

The Role of Boards at Large Financial Firms

Remarks by
Jerome H. Powell
Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Large Bank Directors Conference
Chicago, IL

August 30, 2017

Good morning. Thank you to President Evans for inviting me to speak here today about
the role of boards of directors of large banking firms. 1 Ten years ago this month, the world
witnessed the first tremors of what we now think of as the Global Financial Crisis and the
subsequent Great Recession. For the United States and many other countries, this would turn out
to be the most painful economic period since the Great Depression.
In the wake of the crisis, governments around the world instituted a wide range of
reforms that were designed to reduce the likelihood and severity of a recurrence. In the United
States, the core elements of those reforms included significantly higher capital standards; new
liquidity requirements; forward-looking stress tests; and resolution planning. Our largest
banking firms are without question much stronger than before the crisis. We are nearing
completion of the major parts of this reform program, and are undertaking a thorough review to
help assure that the reforms we put in place are both effective and efficient. 2
During the crisis, some large banking firms incurred massive losses. Some of these losses
were from products – such as super-senior collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or structured
investment vehicles (SIVs) – whose risks were not even on the radar screen of the firm’s board
of directors. After the crisis, the Federal Reserve significantly raised our expectations for the
boards of directors of large banking firms. Taking risk in service of clients is an essential part of
the business of banking, including credit risk, interest rate risk, and various forms of operational
risk. Our reforms were designed to assure that boards of directors understand and approve the

1

The views I express here are my own and not necessarily those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
2
Jerome H. Powell, “Relationship Between Regulation and Economic Growth,” (testimony before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 22, 2017),
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/powell20170622a.htm.

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strategy of the company and the risks inherent in that strategy, and that the institution has the
capital, liquidity, and risk management capabilities necessary to manage those risks.
Today, the role of a director of a large banking firm is more expansive, more challenging,
and more important than ever. Boards now oversee management’s participation in highly
challenging annual exercises, such as stress testing, capital planning, and resolution planning,
that have fundamentally changed the business of our largest institutions. Boards now more
carefully evaluate the compensation practices of these large institutions to assure that they
reinforce positive incentives and discourage unwanted risk taking. Across a range of
responsibilities, we simply expect much more of boards of directors than ever before. There is
no reason to expect that to change.
We do take seriously our obligation to assess whether our reforms are achieving their
desired effects, without imposing unnecessary burden. In 2014, we began a review of these
higher expectations for directors. We found that many boards have significantly improved their
practices. We also found some ways to make our reforms both more effective and more
efficient. For example, while directors generally say that they understand and embrace their
more challenging responsibilities, we consistently hear that directors feel buried in hundreds or
even thousands of pages of highly granular information, to the point where more important
strategic issues are crowded out of board deliberations. Some of this granular information was
likely driven by our supervisory guidance, which included specific expectations not only for the
management of the institution, but also for the board of directors. Over time, this guidance has
increased the number of specific directives aimed at boards well into the hundreds, which may
have fostered a “check-the-box” approach by boards.

-3-

There is also a widespread feeling that our supervision seems to have downplayed the
difference in roles between boards and management. Our current ratings system for bank
holding companies, which for large banking firms would be replaced by the currently proposed
LFI ratings system, refers to the “board and senior management” as a subcomponent rating of
risk management. 3 We have also combined the roles of the board and senior management in
many of our supervisory feedback letters.
After careful consideration, last month we proposed a new framework for our oversight
of boards. 4 In formulating this proposal, we had discussions with academics, consultants, legal
practitioners, and directors of banking firms.
Let me start by saying what the new approach will not do. We do not intend that these
reforms will lower the bar for boards or lighten the loads of directors. The new approach
distinguishes the board from senior management so that we can spotlight our expectations of
effective boards. The intent is to enable directors to spend less board time on routine matters and
more on core board responsibilities: overseeing management as they devise a clear and coherent
direction for the firm, holding management accountable for the execution of that strategy, and
ensuring the independence and stature of the risk management and internal audit functions.
These were all areas that were found wanting in the financial crisis, and it is essential that boards
get these fundamentals right.
Our new proposal will move to a principles-based approach. We have identified five
common attributes that effective boards should exhibit, and for which we will have high
expectations. This principles-based approach recognizes that large firms have a broad range of

3

See SR letter 04–18, ‘‘Bank Holding Company Rating System,’’ 69 FR 70444 (December 6, 2004), at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2004/sr0418.htm.
4
See www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20170803a.htm.

-4-

business models, structures, and practices. While we want to be clear about our expectations,
we also want to give directors the flexibility to meet them in a manner that works for their
particular boards.
First, an effective board should guide the development of a clear and coherent strategy
for the firm and set the types and levels of risks it is willing to take. Alignment of business
strategy and risk appetite should minimize the firm’s exposure to large and unexpected losses. In
addition, the firm’s risk management capabilities need to be commensurate with the risks it
expects to take.
Second, an effective board should actively manage its information flow and deliberations,
so that the board can make sound, well-informed decisions that take into account risks and
opportunities.
Third, an effective board should hold senior management accountable for implementing
the firm’s strategy and risk appetite and maintaining the firm’s risk management and control
framework.
Fourth, an effective board should ensure the independence and stature of the independent
risk management and internal audit functions. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this.
Risk management systems and controls may discourage or limit certain revenue-generating
opportunities. Failure to ensure the independence of these functions from the revenue generators
and risk takers has been shown to be dangerous, and this is something for which the board is
accountable.
Finally, an effective board should have a composition, governance structure, and set of
established practices that are appropriate in light of the firm’s size, complexity, scope of
operations, and risk profile. Boards need to be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses, and

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to ensure that directors bring an appropriately diverse range of skills, knowledge, experience, and
perspective. Significant events, such as an unexpected loss or compliance failure, should cause
boards to reflect and reassess their structure, composition, and processes. An effective board
takes a preventative approach and engages in probing self-assessments regularly and
systematically.
Before I conclude, let me say a few words about an aspect of the proposal that has
attracted some attention, which is the reversal of a relatively recent practice of directing all
examination and inspection findings--what we call “matters requiring attention” (MRAs) and
“matters requiring immediate attention” (MRIAs)--to the board as well as to management. 5 The
practice resulted in boards of directors reviewing and signing off on management’s compliance
with every MRA and MRIA. When we began that practice in 2013, our intention was to ensure
that directors were in a position to hold management accountable in addressing risk management
shortcomings. By 2014, we realized that the practice was “almost surely distracting from
strategic and risk-related analyses and oversight by boards”. 6 For perspective, a large banking
firm may have one hundred or more MRAs outstanding at a given time, many of which are at a

5

MRIAs are matters of significant importance and urgency that the Federal Reserve requires banking organizations
to address immediately and include, for example, matters that have the potential to pose significant risk to the safety
and soundness of the banking organization, matters that represent significant noncompliance with applicable laws or
regulations and repeat criticisms that have escalated in importance due to insufficient attention or inaction by the
banking organization. MRAs, on the other hand, are matters that are important and that the Federal Reserve is
expecting a banking organization to address over a reasonable period of time, but when the timing need not be
“immediate.” See Supervision and Regulation (SR) letter 13-13/Consumer Affairs letter 13-10, “Supervisory
Considerations for the Communication of Supervisory Findings,” at
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1313.htm.
6
See “Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation,” remarks by Governor Daniel J. Tarullo at Association of
American Law Schools Midyear Meeting, June 9, 2014. (“We should probably be somewhat more selective in
creating the regulatory checklist for board compliance and regular consideration. One example, drawn from Federal
Reserve practice, is the recent supervisory guidance requiring that every notice of a “Matter Requiring Attention”
(MRA) issued by supervisors must be reviewed, and compliance signed off, by the board of directors. There are
some MRAs that clearly should come to the board’s attention, but the failure to discriminate among them is almost
surely distracting from strategic and risk-related analyses and oversight by boards.”)
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/tarullo20140609a.pdf

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level of granularity that is more appropriate for management to remediate, with board oversight.
The new proposed framework is designed to make boards more effective in holding management
accountable in these efforts. While we have proposed that most MRAs and MRIAs be addressed
in the first instance to management and not to the board, the board would continue to receive
MRAs where board practices are at issue or where management has failed to promptly and
adequately take the required actions. The board would also continue to receive copies of
examination and inspection reports, including formal communications with the institution. In the
parlance of the proposed guidance I just outlined, we fully expect the board to actively manage
the information flow related to MRAs and to hold management accountable for remediating
them. In doing so, a board may choose to track progress and closure of MRAs through an
appropriate board committee, rather than getting into the granular detail on every individual
MRA.
Conclusion
We need financial institutions that are strong enough to support economic growth by
lending through the economic cycle. To achieve that goal, we need strong and effective boards
of directors at firms of all sizes. A strong and effective board provides strategic leadership and
oversight, which is much more challenging and important than checking off lists of assigned
tasks. I look forward to our continuing dialogue on this subject today and in the months to come,
and reviewing carefully the comments received on the proposal.