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For release on delivery
6:00 a.m. EDT (12 noon local time)
June 26, 2017

Remarks by
Jerome H. Powell
Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Salzburg Global Seminar
Salzburg, Austria
June 26, 2017

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I appreciate the opportunity to speak at the Salzburg Global Seminar. Today I will
discuss our current regulatory regime, and areas where we may be able to make adjustments. As
always, the views I express here are my own. 1
We need a resilient, well-capitalized, well-regulated financial system that is strong
enough to withstand even severe shocks and support economic growth by lending through the
economic cycle. The Federal Reserve has approached the post-crisis regulatory and supervisory
reforms with that outcome in mind.
There is little doubt that the U.S. financial system is stronger today than it was a decade
ago. Loss-absorbing capacity among banks is substantially higher as a result of both regulatory
requirements and stress testing exercises. The banking industry, and the largest banking firms in
particular, face far less liquidity risk than before the crisis. And progress in resolution planning
by the largest firms has reduced the threat that their failure would pose. These efforts have made
U.S. banking firms both more robust and more resolvable.
Evidence overwhelmingly shows that financial crises can cause severe and lasting
damage to the economy’s productive capacity and growth potential. Post-crisis reforms to
financial sector regulation and supervision have been designed to significantly reduce the
likelihood and severity of future financial crises. We have sought to accomplish this goal in
significant part by reducing both the probability of failure of a large banking firm and the
consequences of such a failure were it to occur.
As I mentioned, we have substantially increased the capital, liquidity, and other
prudential requirements for large banking firms. These measures are not free. Higher capital
requirements increase bank costs, and at least some of those costs will be passed along to bank

1

These remarks are substantially similar to the testimony delivered at the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
& Urban Affairs hearing titled “Fostering Economic Growth: Regulator Perspective” on June 22, 2017.

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customers and shareholders. But in the longer term, stronger prudential requirements for large
banking firms will produce more sustainable credit availability and economic growth.
Our objective should be to set capital and other prudential requirements for large banking
firms at a level that protects financial stability and maximizes long-term, through-the-cycle credit
availability and economic growth. To accomplish that goal, it is essential that we protect the
core elements of these reforms for our most systemic firms in capital and liquidity, stress testing
and resolution.
With that in mind, I will highlight five key areas of focus for regulatory reform. The first
is simplification and recalibation of regulation of small and medium-sized banks. We are
working to build on the relief we have provided in the areas of call reports and exam cycles, by
developing a proposal to simplify the generally applicable capital framework that applies to
community banking organizations.
The second area is resolution plans. The Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation believe that it is worthwhile to consider extending the cycle for living will
submissions from annual to once every two years, and focusing every other of these filings on
key topics of interest and material changes from the prior full plan submission. We are also
considering other changes, as I discussed last week when testifying to Congress.
Third, the Federal Reserve is reassessing whether the Volcker rule implementing
regulation most efficiently achieves its policy objectives, and we look forward to working with
the other four Volcker rule agencies to find ways to improve that regulation. In our view, there
is room for eliminating or relaxing aspects of the implementing regulation in ways that do not
undermine the Volcker rule’s main policy goals.

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Fourth, we will continue to enhance the transparency of stress testing and the
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). We will soon seek public feedback
concerning possible forms of enhanced disclosure, including a range of indicative loss rates
predicted by the Federal Reserve’s models for various loan and securities portfolios, and
information about risk characteristics that contribute to the loss-estimate ranges. We will also
provide more detail on the qualitative aspects of stress testing in next week’s CCAR disclosure.
Finally, the Federal Reserve is taking a fresh look at the enhanced supplementary
leverage ratio. We believe that the leverage ratio is an important backstop to the risk-based
capital framework, but that it is important to get the relative calibrations of the leverage ratio and
the risk-based capital requirements right.
U.S. banks today are as strong as any in the world. As we consider the progress that has
been achieved in improving the resiliency and resolvability of our banking industry, it is
important for us to look for ways to reduce unnecessary burden. We must also be vigilant
against new risks that may develop. In all of our efforts, our goal is to establish a regulatory
framework that helps ensure the resiliency of our financial system, the availability of credit,
economic growth, and financial market efficiency. We look forward to working with our fellow
regulatory agencies and with Congress to achieve these important goals.
And finally, I would also like to note that work continues to address the risks identified
with existing reference rates. Just last week, the Alternative Reference Rates Committee
(ARRC) selected a new rate suitable for use with new derivative contracts. I am confident the
broad Treasuries repo rate, which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has proposed
publishing in cooperation with the Office of Financial Research, is based on a deep and actively

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traded market and will be highly robust. With this choice, the ARRC has taken another step in
addressing the risks involved with the LIBOR.