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For release on delivery
(12:30 p.m., Wednesday, September 23, 1964)

Summary of Remarks
by
J . Dewey Daane, Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Luncheon Meeting
of the
Richmond Export-Import Club

The Jefferson Hotel
Richmond, Virginia

As I view the Annual Bank-Fund meetings held this year
in Tokyo, in the very short time there has been for any real
perspective on them, it seems to me that there were three main
threads or themes running through the conference, apart from the
question of increased capital for the less developed countries.
1)

Increased international cooperation,

2)

Increased flexibility of monetary institutions and
arrangements,

3)

Increased resources of the International Monetary
Fund.

Prime Minister Ikeda of Japan sounded the keynote of
increased international cooperation in his opening speech at the
Annual Meetings, stressing "the fact that international financial
cooperation has grown in substance and strength from year to year."
There is ample evidence of the increased international
cooperation that we in the United States, along with our European
colleagues, have been experiencing, and benefiting from, during
the past several years.

In monthly meetings .in Paris of fi-

nancial officials of a number of the OECD countries I have seen
at first hand the development of a mutual understanding of the
complex problems facing each of the participating countries, an
understanding that has provided a broader base for cooperative
effort.

It would not be difficult to cite tangible results.

A

good example is found in the agreement incorporated in the General

Arrangements to Borrow, which provides a sizeable addition to
the resources of the International Monetary Fund designed to
cope with any threatened impairment of the functioning of the
international monetary system.

Another cawe in point is the ad

hoc, Basle type, arrangements providing assistance bilaterally to
countries experiencing temporary swings in their balance of payments positions.

Our own network of Federal Reserve swap and

stand-by swap arrangements, now totaling over $2 billion, is a
further illustration of how we have benefited along with the other
countries involved in the cooperative process of constructing this
outer periphery of defenses for the dollar--defenses which also
include the so-called "Roosa bonds," providing another medium for
the investment of dollars acquired by surplus countries during a
period of U . S. balance of payments deficits.
I speak with conviction on this matter of international
cooperation because I believe that the very process of continuous
confrontation is one of the most useful and constructive recent
achievements in the international monetary area.

Simply to be able

to sit down and talk directly and candidly with our financial
official counterparts in the other leading countries is in itself,
in my judgment, a great gain*
As to the second main theme of the Annual Meetings, that
of increased flexibility of international monetary institutions
and arrangements, this again was highlighted by Governor Aquino in

- 3 -

his opening remarks as Chairman of the Boards of Governors of
the several institutions, when he stressed that the Bretton
Woods founders had provided the Bank and Fund institutions with
"not only a strong structural organization but also the necessary
elasticity and flexibility to meet the changing economic problems
of a changing world."

Significantly, he then went on to point out:

"I doubt that any one at Bretton Woods would have
predicted that in 1964 each institution would have 102
member countries, or that we would meet here today as
the Governors of not two, but four, great financial
institutions. But these two facts testify how greatly
the world has changed and how our institutions have had
the flexibility to change with it."
The focal point'of this year's Bank and Fund Meetings,
however, was the implementation of, and implications of, the key
recommendation of the Group of Ten report issued August 10, 1964,
calling for a moderate over-all general increase in Fund quotas,
Plus selective increases for those countries whose quotas are
clearly out of line.

There was universal support for a general

increase in quotas with some expression of view that it should be
limited to 25 per cent and others obviously feeling a larger percentage would be more acceptable.

The general move toward a quota

increase began with a clear call by Managing Director Schweitzer
for an increase, followed by Secretary Dillon's supporting statement, the latter by agreement intended to be a statement of basic
position which would prepare the way for action in the Fund next
year.

The call for quota increases met with support from many of

- 4 -

the Governors in their prepared statements, and culminated in
the adoption by the Fund Governors of a draft resolution to the
effect
"That the Executive Directors proceed to consider the
question of adjusting the quotas of members of the Fund
and at an early date submit an appropriate proposal to the
Board of Governors."
The other principal conclusions and recommendations of
the Group of T e n report were also the target of many of the
addresses and much of the discussion at the Tokyo Bank-Fund
meetings.
As to the conclusions, both Deputies and Ministers concluded that the present international currency system was functionlr

*g w e l l , and reaffirmed that its underpinnings, in terms of fixed

exchange rates and the established price of gold, had proven
their continuing value as a foundation of the international monetary system.

They also concluded that liquidity was fully adequate

for the present, so that the problem of liquidity was a future
problem, not a present problem.
The Group of Ten recommendations were fourfold.

First,

they recognized that any step taken by one country to correct its
Payments deficit or surplus is a matter of interest to other
countries, and also affects the aggregate international demand for
liquidity.

Accordingly, they recommended that Working Party 3

undertake a study of the adjustment process of correcting such
imbalances.

- 5 -

Second, both the Deputies and the Ministers called for
"multilateral surveillance of bilateral financing and liquidity
creation."

As Chancellor Maudling pointed out at the Bank-Fund

Meetings the week before last, this is "intended to represent a
step forward along the road of increasing consultation and cooperation in monetary and economic affairs which we have been
following ever since the end of the war."
The third major recommendation of the Group of Ten study
was the formation of a so-called "Study Group on Creation of
Reserve Assets."

This group is scheduled to examine various pro-

posals regarding the creation of reserve assets either through the
IMF or otherwise.
Finally, as indicated previously, the Report called for
a moderate, general increase in Fund quotas, supplemented by
selective increases for those countries whose quotas were clearly
out of line.
The other item of interest in the meetings and corridor
conversations w a s , of course, the statement by French Finance
Minister d'Estaing which sketched out some of the French differences of view regarding the future course of the payments system.
In essence, d'Estaing argued against the provision of liquidity via
reserve currencies or additional "conditional liquidity" and called
for the construction of a new collective reserve unit, rigidly tied
to gold.

- 6 -

The United States' position with respect to the French
proposal was clearly outlined by Secretary Dillon.

Basically,

he stated the following four objections:
1)

The United States believes in a "multilateral

framework" for handling problems of world liquidity,
whereas the French arrangement would be confined to a
small group of countries, possibly ten or less.
2)

The French proposal, with a fixed link to gold,

would be restrictive, and perhaps even contractive in the
first instance, rather than flexibly adaptable to meet expanding needs.
3)

The French diagnosis as to what is, or is not,

wrong with the present system is incorrect.

Specifically,

Secretary Dillon refused to accept the French view that
the United States is to blame for the inflationary problems
in Europe, noting that the European countries could readily
solve this problem by a change in their restrictive trade
policies, and a more liberal attitude toward the exporting
of capital.
4)

The United States believes in building o n , rather

than discarding, the present system and this, too, was
stressed by Chancellor Maudling in his prepared remarks
at the Fund meetings.

- 7 -

Clearly the subject of international liquidity will
continue to receive much attention and study both in and outside
the international monetary organizations.

From these studies and

the cooperative efforts among the countries involved I can only
conclude, as did the Managing Director of the Fund, that "the
international monetary system will emerge strengthened and even
better equipped to serve the interests of the community of nations."