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For release on delivery
Tuesday, September 27, 1977




Statement by
J. Charles Partee
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy
of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
September 27, 1977

I am pleased to appear before this Committee today to
present the views of the Federal Reserve Board with respect to
recent monetary developments.

As I understand it, the purpose of

this hearing is to provide an updating of the recent monetary
oversight hearings of your parent Committee, at which Chairman Burns
appeared.

My remarks therefore will supplement his, and I think it

would be appropriate to include a copy of the Chairman's testimony
on that occasion as an attachment to my much briefer statement.
As Chairman Burns indicated at the July 29 hearings, the
FOMC at Its July meeting adopted new longer-run growth ranges for
the monetary aggregates that it expected to be appropriate to the
needs of the economy over the coming year.

These growth rate ranges

were 4— 6-1/2 per cent for M-j (defined to include currency and
demand deposits at banks), 7— 9-1/2 per cent for M2 (which is M|
plus savings and time deposits— except for large negotiable
CD's— at the banks), and 8-1/2— 11 per cent for M3 (which is M2 plus
deposits at the thrift institutions).

The Chairman also noted that

implicit in these projections for monetary growth was the expectation
that the velocity of M-j would continue to increase at a faster rate
than it had during comparable periods of previous business-cycle
expansions, and that, because of heightened uncertainty as to the
relationship between rates of monetary expansion and the performance
of the economy, the Federal Reserve would continue to maintain a
posture of vigilance and flexibility in the period ahead.




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The fact is that the pace of monetary expansion now appears
to have been unusually rapid during recent months.

This is especially

true of the narrowly defined money supply, where the increase over
the past 6 months--from February to August— is indicated to have
been at an annual rate of 9.1 per cent.

This rate of expansion, of

course, is well above the FOMC's stated longer-run range of projections.
Broader measures of the money supply, on the other hand, have grown
at rates only a little above the upper end of the Committee's pro­
jected ranges.

During the past 6 months, M2 and M3 have increased

at annual rates of 9.9 per cent and 11.3 per cent, respectively.

I

might note that over longer time periods— the past year, for example—
growth in M-j has been more moderate while the increases in M2 and
M3 have been somewhat higher than those I have just cited.

And over

all of the period of economic recovery, dating from the first quarter
of 1975, the expansion in the narrow money supply has averaged just
over 6 per cent per annum.
As the recent expansion in the monetary aggregates tended
to run above the FOMC's expectations, System operations have been
directed toward holding down on the provision of bank reserves needed
to support the larger monetary totals.

Just as in any other market,

the more limited availability of reserve supplies relative to demands
has meant that prices— in this case, interest rates— have gone up on
day-to-day bank borrowings (Federal funds) and other very short-term
sources of financing.

The rate paid on Federal funds, for example,

is up about 1-1/2 percentage points from the lows prevailing early




-3this year, with almost all of the rise taking place during and
after the April and July run ups in the narrow money supply.

Other

short-term market interest rates also have been affected, but longerterm interest rates, which are of much greater significance to the
economy, have not increased on balance despite the firming since
April in short-term market conditions.
Some would argue that the Federal Reserve should have
responded more forcefully to the April and July bulges in the
money supply.

Indeed, a few would say that the reserves necessary

to support the deposit expansion simply should not have been provided,
letting financial markets and the economy suffer whatever consequences
might result.

But the FOMC continues to believe that the wiser course

is to limit the speed with which money market conditions are adjusted
to changing monetary growth rates.

We believe this partly because

the monetary aggregates— particularly M-j— have proved to be inherently
unstable in the short run.

Bulges of a month or two in duration are

often reversed subsequently, as was the case in the spring and summer
of 1975 and again 1n 1976.

Prudence in our actions is dictated also

by the fact that the relationship between the various measures of
monetary growth and the performance of the economy is loose and
unreliable, since it is subject to rather abrupt shifts as the
result of changing financial practices and economic conditions.
In the current situation, for example, there are a number
of ambiguities for which we do not yet have the answers.




Until

-4there is more information, it seems to me that one should be very
cautious about prescribing a policy of stern monetary restraint.
First, the excessive growth in the narrow
money supply this year has been concentrated in just two onemonth periods— April and July.
for these bulges.

We do not have a good explanation

It may be that they reflect in part a shift in

the seasonal pattern of money demand.

If so, it is entirely

possible that a period of adjustment in money growth could lie
ahead, just as it has in the latter part of other recent years.
Second, the abnormal expansion that has occurred over
the past 6 months has been concentrated in the narrow money supply,
while the growth in broader monetary measures— though substantial--has
been much closer to our expectations.

One reason for this development

may be that the accelerated pace at which other forms of deposit
and liquid asset instruments were being substituted for bank checking
account balances has now slowed, at least temporarily.

That would

modify the meaning of the changed relative growth rates of the
various monetary aggregates, in terms of probable impact on future
economic performance, since it would simply reflect a shift in
holder preference from one form of deposit to another.
Third, the behavior of the economy this spring and summer,
though generally satisfactory, does not suggest that a major new
boom is in process of developing.

Indeed, both the growth in real

activity and the pace of inflation have slowed somewhat in recent
months, following acceleration earlier in the year.

This has been

true also abroad, where most developed countries to date have shown




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only rather sluggish recoveries.

Nor has there been a rush of

business borrowing at the banks, though credit demands In general
have been well sustained.

Thus the current economic data do not

suggest that businesses and households are building up cash balances
with a view to increasing abruptly their rate of expenditure.

Since

sizable unused resources still exist in this and other economies,
moreover, there is no immediate need to restrain excessive expansion,
and there should be time to check any speculative surge in spending
and investment that might develop.
I can assure you that the Federal Reserve has been concerned
about the recently accelerated growth in the narrow money supply, and
that we are monitoring this development closely.

And I want to

emphasize that we have by no means given up on our views as to the
ranges of growth for the family of monetary aggregates that are
appropriate in the longer run to the needs of the economy.

The recent

tendency toward excess has proceeded in fits and starts, however, and
we cannot yet be sure how durable— or meaningful— these increases are
likely to be.

Our efforts to restrain the monetary expansion must

therefore be judicious.

With the unemployment rate nationally still

hovering around 7 per cent, we would not want to contribute to con­
ditions in credit markets that might imperil the prospects for
sustained economic recovery.




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