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For Release on Deli.vary
Approximately 8:00 p.m. PDT
Friday, May 29, 1959)

MONETARY POLICY DECISION-MAKING
Address by C, Canby Balderston,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,




Before the Western Assembly on United States Monetary Policy,
Lake Arrowhead Conference Center, California,
Friday, May 29, 1959.

MONETARY POLICY DECISION-MAKING

The quality of monetary policy and business policy decisions is
important at all times but especially so during prosperity.
fluence the duration and soundness of the current expansion.

It will in­
Steady,

consistent economic progress calls for decisions of high quality if orderly
growth is not to be interrupted by the violent dips that follow extreme
booms.

As Dr. Winfield Riefler has remarked "A business situation is no

better than the quality of decisions that businessmen make," and as Chair­
man William McC, Martin has observed, "The state of the Nation tomorrow—
its progress and prosperity— rests with the decisions of today."
This discussion does not deal with the decisions of entrepre­
neurs, important as these are, but with the monetary-policy decisions of
the Federal Reserve System.
The decisions made by the Board of Governors and by the Open
Market Committee of the System may be grouped into three categories.

One

of these consists of personnel and other decisions having to do with the
internal operations of the Federal Reserve Banks and of the Board's staff.
A second class consists of supervisory decisions made by the Board of
Governors in carrying out its duties

of examining member banks, of seeing

that they remain sound and adequately capitalized, and of enforcing such
statutory requirements as the Congress has determined upon. These supervisory
responsibilities encompass admission to membership, the granting of trust
powers, the restriction upon the payment of interest, the authority of
member banks to merge in case;'éit|ië:r>the capital or the surplus is diminished thereby, the authorization of ¡branches for state member banks, and
the enforcement of the Bank Holding'Company Act.




The third and most

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important group has to do with monetary policy, which involves decisions
as to the extent and timing of open market operations, and of changes in
discount rates, in reserve requirements and in margin requirements.
These policy decisions stem from the goals toward which monetary
policy is directed.

As long as these objectives are stated in general terms,

there is little dispute.
to continue to rise.

Everyone wants the country's standard of living

Strong economic activity and adequate job opportuni­

ties are goals that all agree upon, and so sustainable growth without in­
flation is high among accepted objectives.

Political and economic freedom

are American hallmarks.
Monetary policy actions, however, must be specific and decisions
on such actions must be made in relation to definite policy objectives.
Accordingly, from these generally accepted goals one may distil four ob­
jectives which flow from the mandates that are implicit in the Federal
Reserve Act and the Full Employment Act, These are:

to foster orderly

economic growth; to sustain maximum employment; to protect the purchasing
power of the monetary unit; and to keep international payments in balance
(a main purpose of monetary policy for most countries even more than for
our own.)
Although these specific goals might receive general acceptance
it must be recognized that they represent plural objectives that may seem
incompatible.

For instance, certain nations have been forced to slacken

their rate of domestic growth in order to balance their international pay­
ments,

Moreover, there is considerable debate in this country whether the

goals of full employment and stable prices are completely reconcilable,




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Most of the day-to-day problems in economic policy making, however, arise
not out of differences as to objectives, but out of the choice of specific
policies which wd.ll promote those objectives.
Decision-making process
In any board of seven members judgments as to what ought to be
done are likely to differ on occasion even when the pertinent facts are
agreed to.

This is sometimes true of the Board of Governors.

cases, however, analysis of the facts does lead to agreement.

In most
Where it

does not and the differences in point of view lead to different value
judgments, a formal vote is required. Such instances, however, are rela­
tively rare, as will be noted from a perusal of the Annual Reports.

If

a member dissents, his vote is of course recorded, either with or without
a supporting statement.
The great majority of the Board decisions are arrived at by the
general agreement of those present and voting.

Since staff memoranda setting

forth the facts and legal opinions concerning the supervisory and other
matters coming before the Board for determination are circulated to Board
Members in advance of their formal consideration, the usual procedure in
Board meeting is to decide each instance promptly.

Members of the staff

who have knowledge of a case are present, however, so that a Board Member
wishing clarification of the issue, elaboration of the facts, or elucida­
tion of the law may ask questions before the decision is made.
The policy determination for which the Open Market Committee is
responsible is of a somewhat different nature.

As you know, this Commit­

tee, consisting of the seven Board Members and five of the Reserve Bank




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Presidents, has statutory responsibility for open market operations.

Be­

cause the use of this instrument is so closely related to the use of dis­
count rates and reserve requirements, the discussions of this Committee
encompass all three even though its directives are confined to open market
operations alone. What is involved in its decisions is to determine the di­
rection and degree of change in open market policy; whether to move in the
direction of restraint or of ease, and how fast.
It is usually not possible for the Chairman to state open market
issues in such form that the members can vote "yes" or "no".

On the

contrary, he has to determine as best he can what is the "sense of the
meeting" when he summarizes the general instruction of the Committee to
the Manager of the Open Market Account at the end of the meeting.

The

Manager of the Account has available to him both this resumé, to which any
member may object if he feels it does not reflect the majority opinion, and
also the minutes stating the position of each individual member.

This con­

sensus reflects any policy change that the Open Market Committee wishes to
have made and is an important supplement to the written directive that is
adopted formally at each meeting,

Guided by this consensus, the Manager

of the Account deals with day-to-day changes much as a chauffeur keeps his
vehicle on the road by adjusting to bumps, dips, and obstacles.

But changes

in destination and pace are guided by the formal directives of the Committee,
Decision-making problems
The interpretation

of the economic facts put before the Open

Market Committee might be comparatively simple if the facts always gave
a clear and consistent picture.




Actually, however, conflicts often appear

among them.

Income and prices may seem to point in one direction; produc­

tion in another.

The monetary facts may not square with the presumed measures

of real economic activity. For instance, interest rates in short-term money
markets may seem to show more demand for funds than can be explained by the
monetary position, or by inventory growth or other sources of demand for
credit.

Finally, conflicts in economic developments may be puzzling«

As

usual in a recovery period, the growth in physical output from factories
has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in employment.

This

reflects a rapid improvement in productivity that is, in part, the fruition
of earlier capital outlays and of management steps to increase efficiency.
Such developments are of long-run importance since they reflect increased
capacity to improve our standard of living.

Nevertheless, the short-run

problems of absorbing all of the individuals who are still unemployed are
of social and economic significance0
Moreover, even if there is basic agreement as to the facts, they
are not interpreted alike by all individuals.

On occasions an increase in

business inventories may appear to some as voluntary adjustment by business­
men in anticipation of rising production and sales, while to others it may
appear to be an involuntary adjustment resulting from a failure of sales to
keep pace with businessmen's expectations.

In the early phase of the present

recovery, the slow growth of bank loans to business might have signaled to
some that monetary policy was too restrictive while to others it seemed a
signal of high business liquidity and ample availability of funds from
internal sources.




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Another problem in policy-making is that many of the economic
facts needed for policy formation are frequently unavailable, or become
available so late as to be of little use in current policy formation.

In

the interim, it is necessaiy to rely upon "straws in the wind." obtained
by word-of-mouth»

Decision-making within the Federal Reserve System faces

the same difficulties as decision-making in other areas, including the
necessity of having to make decisions before the evidence is complete.
For monetary authorities, the most fundamental problem of timing
is to foresee changes in the business climate in order to take compensatory
action before the figures actually prove the necessity.

Promptness of

action is imperative if the anticipated results are not to be reduced
unduly by the time lag between changes in monetary policy and their ef­
fects on business activity.

If action is delayed until figures demon­

strate the need beyond question, the action may lose its effectiveness
in whole or in part.

But the perils of action that anticipates the figures

are obviousI
Finally there are problems arising out of the need for monetary
policy to be coordinated with Treasury financing.

If we had the kind of

fiscal policy sometimes hopefully and idealistically outlined in the text­
books there would be no need to finance Government deficits except in peri­
ods of low business activity.

During such periods the financing of defi­

cits creates no real problem for the monetary authority.

Unfortunately,

Government deficits often have to be financed in periods of expansion—
an unhappy fact that the Federal Reserve cannot ignore.

In addition, the

Treasury faces a continuing problem of refinancing the vast volume of secu­
rities maturing in the course of a year and of engaging in large borrowing




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and debt retirement operations to compensate for the uneven flow of tax
receipts»
Monetary policy must take heavy Treasury financing operations
into account so that the success of those operations will not be placed
in jeopardy,

Cn the other hand, monetary policy must not be subordinated

to fiscal policy.

They must work as a team.

A well-known example of the

lack of such teamwork was the inflationary "pegging" of government bond
prices after World War II*
Occasionally, the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies
encounters difficulties of timing.

For example, consider the problem

posed for both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve when the state of
the economy called for raising the discount rate in the Spring of 1957«
For some months business confidence had been mounting.

It was evidenced

by a rise of industrial orders and of loans, by buoyant stock prices, by
plant expansion, by a scarcity of steel, cement and glass, and by increas­
ing material prices,

The indicated discount change was delayed by Treas­

ury financing activities in February, March, May and July 1957«

The

Federal Reserve Banks, with the approval of the Board of Governors, finally
raised their discount rates in August. This action that was needed for
technical as well as economic reasons was delayed by these financing opera­
tions so that it came nearer the cyclical peak than would have been desir­
able,

It is noteworthy that the Treasury has made much progress in the

structuring and spacing of its floating debt to the end of minimizing the
market impact of financing in the short-term area.




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Additional complications stem from the so-called administrative
lag in the use of fiscal policy»

Since it is necessarily long in the making

and in the execution, it may exert an impact on business at just the wrong
time to improve the stability.

In fact, governmental buying that \fas orig­

inally intended to be compensatory might actually be superimposed on a boom
in a private sector, and further accentuate demand that is distorting the
economy.
Influence on monetary policy of free markets and freedom of choice
The problems of monetary policy are the problems of a society or­
ganized around the principles of fr*ee markets and freedom of choice.

In

an economy where freedom is exercised by individuals and by business units,
effective regulation of the money system is of prime importance.

In fact,

the major concern of monetary policy in such an economy is to minimize the
unstabilizing effects of changes in the use of money and credit which
businesses and individuals generate in the exercise of freedom.

But free­

dom, even though it entails flaws, is the wellspring of social and economic
advance.

It spurs the creative process and permits experimentation leading

to change. The resultant economic hazards are small prices to pay for the
rewards.
In the field of credit, the Government cannot compel any man to
lend his money against his will— even to the Government itself— in circum­
stances or upon terms not acceptable to him.

This important freedom of

the lender— matched of course by the freedom of the borrower to reject
unacceptable terms— can have embarrassing results for the Government, as
happens when many investors abstain from purchasing Government bonds.




But

- 9the freedom nevertheless serves the public interest, for it imposes upon
the nation's elected representatives and upon all other branches of the
Government the necessity of following sound fiscal policies.
Another freedom of concern in monetary policy determination is in
the use of money itself.

Those who hold cash balances may allow idle cash

reserves to accumulate when interest rates are only moderately attractive.
However, when short-term interest rates are high there is an incentive to
economize in the use of cash balances.
and income velocity of money.

Increases occur in the transaction

Sometimes such increases are reasonably

predictable on the basis of interest ratesj at other times, other influ­
ences make them unpredictable. An increase in velocity represents a legiti­
mate exercise of economic freedom, but it complicates decisions as to what
money supply is appropriate to sustain economic growth*
Still another economic freedom that has repercussions on the
monetary system is the choice among inventory policies.

The recession that

began in the fall of 1957 was accompanied by rapid inventory liquidation.
Indeed it continued after the bottom of the cycle was reached, but manufac­
turing inventories are now increasing rather briskly.

The choice of inven­

tory policy requires business judgment that is usually best exercised by
private citizens.

Nevertheless, the great buying or liquidating waves that

flow from changes in inventory policy create a real challenge not only for
those concerned vdth monetary policy but ultimately for individual business­
men themselves.
The problems which are the concern of monetary policy in a free
society are those which flow from the exercise of freedom in the use of




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moneya

These problems are ever changing and no mortal can predict with

certainty where they will lead.

Accordingly, monetary policy can never

be reduced to formulas or the application of routine adjustments to stan­
dard situations*
omic environment,

It must continuously be modified to fit a changing econ­
It is my belief that the Congress, in creating the

Federal Reserve System, has designed an institution eminently suited to
formulate monetary policy that is flexible.
of our economy and to its changing moods.
banking is an art and not a science.




It is suited to the variety
It recognizes that central