Full text of Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920 : with a Personal Estimate of the President : Volume 2

View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

EIGHT YEARS WITH
WILSON’S CABINET

Photo from Underwood W Underwood

President Wilson reading his war message to the Congress on April 2nd, 1917

EIGHT YEARS WI TH
W I L S O N ’S C A B I N E T
1 91 3 to 1920
With a Personal Estimate of the President

by
D A V I D F. H O U S T O N

In Two Volumes

VOLUME

GARDEN CITY

DOUBLEDAY,

NEW YORK

PAGE
1926

COMPANY

COPYRIGHT, 1 9 2 6 , BY DOUBLEDAY, PAGE
ft COMPANY.
ALL BIGHT* BESEBVED.
HU NTED IN TH E UNITED STATES AT TH E
COUNTBY L IPS FBESS* CARDEN CITY, H . Y.

FIRST EDITION

CONTENTS
VOLUME II
CHAPTER

XXI.

A ttack

XXII.

P r e s id e n t G

oes

XXIII.

XXIV.

p p o in t e d

XXV.

ongress

X X V I.

XXVII.
XXVIII.
XXIX.

ast

Settle
ays

th e

x e c u t iv e

reasury

em and

th e
th e

.................................. 91

n a n c e
to

........................... 36

th e

........................... 18

e s t

ncroach es

and

aGI

reaty

o l l a p s e

F a r m e r s B e g in

Secretary
E

A ttem pts
T

th e

r e s id e n t ’s

P o l it ic s
T

e l ie f

10 3
117

ebts

d m in is t r a t io n

140

A n E s t i m a t e o f W o o d r o w W i l s o n ..............................1 5 5

APPENDICES

I.
II.

W hy We W en t to

III.

St e p s

IV.

d dress

c h ie v e m e n t s o f t h e

d e x

Vi
D

c t o r y

e m o c r a t ic

P arty .

257

a r .........................................2 7 1

...................................................... 3 0 1

e l iv e r e d a t

arch ,

F ort W

orth ,

e x a s , in

1 9 1 8 ...................................................3 2 5

..............................................................................

349

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
President Wilson reading his war message

Frontispiece
FACING r A C t

President Wilson and his C abinet..............................

EIGHT YEARS WITH
WILSON’S CABINET

E I G H T YEARS W I T H
W I L S O N ’S C A B I N E T
CHAPTER XXI
THE ATTACK ON THE TREATY

The Round Robin— The President's Discussions with Lodge,
Borah and Harding

N TH E 5th of March, the President again left
New York for Paris. On the day preceding,
immediately following the President’s confer
ences with the members of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Lodge rose in the Senate and offered
the following resolution for the immediate consideration
of which he asked unanimous consent:
“ Mr. President, I desire to take only a moment of the
time of the Senate. I wish to offer the resolution which I
hold in my hand, a very brief one:
“ Whereas under the Constitution it is a function of the
Senate to advise and consent to, or dissent from, the ratifi
cation of any treaty of the United States, and no such
treaty can become operative without the consent of the
Senate expressed by the affirmative vote of two thirds of
the Senators present; and
“ Whereas owing to the victory of the arms of the United
States and of the nations with whom it is associated, a

[i]

Peace Conference was convened and is now in session
at Paris for the purpose of settling the terms of peace;
and
“ Whereas a committee of the Conference has proposed
a constitution for the League of Nations and the proposal
is now before the Peace Conference for its consideration;
Now, therefore, be it
“ Resolved by the Senate of the United States in the dis
charge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to
treaties, That it is the sense of the Senate that while it is
their sincere desire that the nations of the world should
unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the con
stitution of the League of Nations in the form now pro
posed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by
the United States; and be it
“ Resolved further, That it is the sense of the Senate that
the negotiations on the part of the United States should
immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the
urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany
satisfactory to the United States and the nations with
whom the United States is associated in the war against
the German Government, and that the proposal for a
league of nations to insure the permanent peace of the
world should be then taken up for careful and serious
consideration.”
Senator Swanson objected to the introduction of the
resolution. Further record is as follows:
“ Mr. Lodge: Objection being made, of course I recog
nize the objection. I merely wish to add, by way of ex
planation, the following:
“ The undersigned Senators of the United States, Mem
bers and Members-Elect of the Sixty-sixth Congress,

hereby declare that, if they had had the opportunity,
they would have voted for the foregoing resolution:
“ Henry Cabot Lodge
James E. Watson
Philander C. Knox
Thomas Sterling
Lawrence Y . Sherman
J. S. Frelinghuysen
Harry S. New
W. G. Harding
George H. Moses
Frederick Hale
J. W. Wadsworth, Jr.
William E. Borah
Bert M. Fernald
Walter E. Edge
Albert B. Cummins
Reed Smoot
F. E. Warren
Asle J. Gronna
Frank B. Brandegee
Lawrence C. Phipps
William M. Calder
Selden P. Spencer
Henry W. Keyes
Hiram W. Johnson
Boies Penrose
Charles E. Townsend
Carroll S. Page
William P. Dillingham
George P. McLean
I. L. Lenroot
Joseph Irwin France
Miles Poindexter
Medill McCormick
Howard Sutherland
Truman H. Newberry
Charles Curtis
L. Heisler Ball.”
It will be remembered that this action was taken when
the draft of the League was in its preliminary form. A
full report of the action of the Republican Senators was
cabled to Europe and confronted the President when he
arrived in Paris on March 14th. It was eagerly seized
upon by those whom the President had to fight and greatly
complicated his task, which was already more than
sufficiently heavy.
While the President was still in Paris, Ex-President

T aft took steps to ascertain whether it would be agreeable
to the President for him to cable certain suggestions affect
ing the League plan over which he had been thinking since
the President’s departure. The President cabled that he
appreciated Mr. T aft’s offer, and that he would welcome
his suggestions. Mr. T aft offered suggestions concern
ing the Monroe Doctrine, the fixing of a term for
the duration of the League, the limitation of armament,
unanimity of action in the executive council, and safe
guards against the League’s action in domestic matters.
Attacks by Senators continued during the President’s
absence in France. On June 9th Senator Borah inserted
in the Congressional Record a copy of the Treaty which he
reported had been brought by newspapermen. This was
scarcely a seemly thing for a Senator to do when he
knew that the President of the United States, charged
with negotiating treaties, would soon report the completed
work of the Conference. On June 10th, Senator Knox
served notice that the Covenant would have to be sepa
rated from the Treaty.
The President had left Paris on June 28th and immedi
ately after his return to Washington, that is, on July 10th,
he presented the Treaty to the Senate, and then the fight
was out in the open.
The Senate Committee took the matter under advise
ment and began its study of the Treaty, including the
Covenant.
I was in the West when the President landed on his
second return from Europe. Both in Washington and
through my contacts with the people in various sections
on this Western trip, I had become fully aware of the
efforts o f the opposition to create antagonism to the
W

Treaty and particularly to the Covenant. I had the im
pression that certain Republican leaders were determined,
not so much to bring about the rejection of the Treaty, as
to destroy the President’s prestige, to pull him down, and
to make such modifications of the Treaty, whether neces
sary or not, as would enable them to say that the final out
come was their accomplishment, and that they had saved
the nation from the ills which the Treaty would have
brought upon it. They were continuing to play politics,
having the election of 1920 particularly in view. I felt
it to be a matter of great importance, before their views
and representations made headway, that the President
should at once give the people an authoritative statement
of the meaning of the Treaty and of the Covenant, a re
view of the proceedings in Paris to show the temper and
spirit of the Conference, and particularly to clarify such
important parts of the Covenant as Article I, Section 3,
the withdrawal article; Article X ; Article X X I, dealing
with the Monroe Doctrine; Article X V , Section 8, cover
ing domestic affairs; and the section of the Treaty bearing
on Shantung. I, therefore, sent the President a telegram,
suggesting that he make a very clear and full statement of
the meaning of the Treaty, of the Covenant, and of these
debatable articles, and especially that he explain the func
tion of the Council and the bearing of the Covenant on
the constitutional powers of Congress.
The President did not at the time see fit to make a state
ment, and, in my judgment, he lost a great opportunity.
He gave his opponents time to fix their interpretations in
the minds of the people and to picture him as arrogant
and uncompromising. Apparently, at the time, the
President was over-confident. He is likely to be when a

l5l

question involving a moral issue and good faith is before
the people. He is a firm believer in the doctrine that truth
is mighty and will prevail. He firmly trusts the people
to perceive the moral quality of a problem and to pass the
right judgment upon it. Seeing an issue very clearly him
self, he trusts the masses of the people too implicitly also
to see it clearly and to see it as he does, in the short run as
well as in the long run. He relies too much on the simple
merit and goodness of a cause, and on the capacity of the
people quickly to form a right judgment, even when con
fronted with many issues and confused by skilful partisan
arguments. Furthermore, I think the President did not
adequately sense the change which had taken place in the
minds of the people since the Armistice and the headway
which his opponents had made in impressing their view
upon the public. He felt confident that he could success
fully appeal to the people over the heads of the Senatorial
opposition. He underestimated the difficulty of control
ling, by an appeal to the people, Senators from two to four
years away from reelection.
On Tuesday, August 19th, however, at the White House,
he met in conference the members of the Senate Com
mittee on Foreign Relations, including Senators Lodge
(chairman), McCumber, Borah, Brandegee, Fall, Knox,
Harding, Johnson, of California, New, Moses, Hitchcock,
Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, Smith, and Pittman.
The President opened the conference by reading a sum
mary statement. He said;
“ Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty o f writing out
a little statement in the hope that it might facilitate dis
cussion by speaking directly on some points that I know
have been points of controversy and upon which I thought
16]

an expression of opinion would not be unwelcome. I am
absolutely glad that the committee should have responded
in this way to my intimation that I would like to be of serv
ice to it. I welcome the opportunity for a frank and full
interchange of views.
“ I hope, too, that this conference will serve to expedite
your consideration of the Treaty of Peace. I beg that you
will pardon and indulge me if I again urge that practically
the whole task of bringing the country back to normal
conditions of life and industry waits upon the decision of
the Senate with regard to the terms of the peace.
“ I venture thus again to urge my advice that the action
of the Senate with regard to the Treaty be taken at the
earliest practicable moment because the problems with
which we are face to face in the readjustment of our na
tional life are of the most pressing and critical character,
will require for their proper solution the most intimate
and disinterested cooperation of all parties and all inter
ests, and cannot be postponed without manifest peril to
our people and to all the national advantages we hold most
dear. . . .
“ Our military plans of course wait upon it. We cannot
intelligently or wisely decide how large a naval or military
force we shall maintain, or what our policy with regard to
military training is to be until we have peace not only, but
also until we know how peace is to be sustained, whether
by the arms of single nations or by the concert of all the
great peoples. And there is more than that difficulty
involved. The vast surplus properties of the army in
clude not food and clothing merely, whose sale will affect
normal production, but great manufacturing establish
ments also which should be restored to their former

[7l

uses, great stores of machine tools, and all sorts of mer
chandise which must lie idle until peace and military
policy are definitely determined. By the same token,
there can be no properly studied national budget until
then.
“ The nations that ratify the Treaty, such as Great
Britain, Belgium, and France, will be in a position to lay
their plans for controlling the markets of central Europe
without competition from us if we do not presently act.
We have no consular agents, no trade representatives
there to look after our interests.
“ There are large areas of Europe whose future will lie
uncertain and questionable until their people know the
final settlements of peace and the forces which are to ad
minister and sustain it. Without determinate markets
our production cannot proceed with intelligence or con
fidence. There can be no stabilization of wages, because
there can be no settled conditions of employment. There
can be no easy or normal industrial credits because there
can be no confident or permanent revival of business.
“ But I will not weary you with obvious examples. I
will only venture to repeat that every element of normal
life amongst us depends upon and awaits the ratification
of the Treaty of Peace; and also that we cannot afford to
lose a single summer’s day by not doing all that we can
to mitigate the winter’s suffering, which, unless we find
means to prevent it, may prove disastrous to a large por
tion of the world, and may, at its worst, bring upon Europe
conditions even more terrible than those wrought by the
war itself.
“ Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of
the ratification of the Treaty except certain doubts with
[8]

regard to the meaning and implication of certain articles
of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and I must
frankly say that I am unable to understand why such
doubts should be entertained. You will recall that when I
had the pleasure of a conference with your committee and
with the Committee of the House of Representatives on
Foreign Affairs at the White House in March last, the
questions now most frequently asked about the League of
Nations were all canvassed with a view to their immediate
clarification. The Covenant of the League was then in
its first draft and subject to revision. It was pointed out
that no express recognition was given to the Monroe
Doctrine; that it was not expressly provided that the
League should have no authority to act or to express a
judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right
to withdraw from the League was not expressly recognized;
and that the constitutional right of the Congress to de
termine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently
safeguarded. On my return to Paris, all these matters
were taken up again by the Commission on the League of
Nations, and every suggestion of the United States was
accepted.
“ The views of the United States with regard to the
questions I have mentioned had, in fact, already been
accepted by the Commission, and there was supposed to
be nothing inconsistent with them in the draft of the Cove
nant first adopted— the draft which was the subject of
our discussion in March— but no objection was made to
saying explicitly in the text what all had supposed to be
implicit in it. There was absolutely no doubt as to the
meaning of any one of the resulting provisions of the
Covenant in the minds of those who participated in draft

ing them, and I respectfully submit that there is nothing
vague or doubtful in their wording.
“ The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an
understanding which is in no way to be impaired or inter
fered with by anything contained in the Covenant, and
the expression ‘ regional understandings like the Monroe
Doctrine’ was used, not because any one of the conferees
thought there was any comparable agreement anywhere
else in existence or in contemplation, but only because it
was thought best to avoid the appearance of dealing in
such a document with the policy of a single nation.
Absolutely nothing is concealed in the phrase.
“ With regard to domestic questions, Article X V of the
Covenant expressly provides that, if, in case of any dispute
arising between members of the League, the matter in
volved is claimed by one of the parties *and is found by the
council to arise out of a matter which by international
law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party,
the council shall so report, and shall make no recommen
dation as to its settlement.’ The United States was by
no means the only government interested in the explicit
adoption of this provision, and there is no doubt in the
mind of any authoritative student of international law
that such matters as immigration, tariffs, and naturaliza
tion are incontestably domestic questions with which no
international body could deal without express authority
to do so. No enumeration of domestic questions was
undertaken because, to undertake it, even by sample,
would have involved the danger of seeming to exclude
those not mentioned.
“ The right o f any sovereign state to withdraw had been
taken for granted, but no objection was made to making
[xo]

it explicit. Indeed, so soon as the views expressed at the
White House conference were laid before the Commission,
it was at once conceded that it was best not to leave the
answer to so important a question to inference. No pro
posal was made to set up any tribunal to pass judgment
upon the question whether a withdrawing nation had in
fact fulfilled ‘ all its international obligations and all its
obligations under the Covenant.* It was recognized that
that question must be left to be resolved by the conscience
of the nation proposing to withdraw; and I must say that
it did not seem to me worth while to propose that the
article be made more explicit, because I knew that the
United States would never itself propose to withdraw
from the League if its conscience was not entirely clear as
to the fulfilment of all its international obligations. It
has never failed to fulfil them and never will.
“ Article X is in no respect of doubtful meaning when
read in the light of the Covenant as a whole. The Council
of the League can only ‘ advise upon’ the means by which
the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to.
Unless the United States is a party to the policy or action
in question, her own affirmative vote in the Council is
necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous
vote of the council is required. I f she is a party, the
trouble is hers anyhow. And the unanimous vote of the
council is only advice in any case. Each government is
free to reject it if it pleases. Nothing could have been
made more clear to the Conference than the right of our
Congress under our Constitution to exercise its independ
ent judgment in all matters of peace and war. No
attempt was made to question or limit that right. The
United States will, indeed, undertake under Article X

to ‘ respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence
of all members of the League/ and that engagement con
stitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation. But
it is a moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Con
gress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it
in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience
only, not in law.
“ Article X seems to me to constitute the very backbone
of the whole Covenant. Without it, the League would be
hardly more than an influential debating society.
“ It has several times been suggested, in public debate
and in private conference, that interpretations of the sense
in which the United States accepts the engagements of
the Covenant should be embodied in the instrument of
ratification. There can be no reasonable objection to
such interpretations accompanying the act of ratification
provided they do not form a part of the formal ratification
itself. Most of the interpretations which have been sug
gested to me embody what seems to me the plain meaning
o f the instrument itself. But if such interpretations
should constitute a part of the formal resolution of ratifi
cation, long delays would be the inevitable consequence,
inasmuch as all the many governments concerned would
have to accept, in effect, the language of the Senate as the
language of the Treaty before ratification would be com
plete. The assent of the German Assembly at Weimar
would have to be obtained, among the rest, and I must
frankly say that I could only with the greatest reluctance
approach that assembly for permission to read the Treaty
as we understand it and as those who framed it quite cer
tainly understood it. I f the United States were to qualify
[12]

the document in any way, moreover, I am confident from
what I know of the many conferences and debates which
accompanied the formulation of the Treaty that our ex
ample would immediately be followed in many quarters,
in some instances with very serious reservations, and that
the meaning and operative force of the Treaty would pres
ently be clouded from one end of its clauses to the other.
“ Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, if I have been entirely un
reserved and plain-spoken in speaking of the great matters
we all have so much at heart. If excuse is needed, I trust
that the critical situation of affairs may serve as my justi
fication. The issues that manifestly hang upon the con
clusions of the Senate with regard to peace and upon the
time of its action are so grave and so clearly insusceptible
of being thrust on one side or postponed that I have felt it
necessary in the public interest to make this urgent plea,
and to make it as simply and as unreservedly as possible.
“ I thought that the simplest way, Mr. Chairman, to
cover the points that I knew to be points of interest.”
There are several points in the foregoing statement of
the President which may well be emphasized. The first
is his reminder to the Committee that in a former confer
ence with the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the House and the Senate, the questions which were
being most frequently raised had all been canvassed, that
the Covenant was then in its first draft, and that all the
suggestions made had been incorporated. The second
point is that Article X could not commit the United States
to any policy without her own consent, because, in the
first place, the vote of the Council, on which the United
States would have a representative, had to be unanimous,
that the vote of the United States would, therefore, be

necessary, and that she would be in effect advising herself.
He pointed out also that the Council could only give
advice, and that each government, exercising its judgment
in the circumstances, would be free to follow or to reject
the advice if it pleased.
Even more interesting were his remarks on interpreta
tions or reservations. He did not object to interpretative
reservations of the Covenant, saying:
“ There can be no reasonable objection to such inter
pretations accompanying the active ratification provided
they do not form a part of the formal ratification itself.
Most o f the interpretations which have been suggested to
me embody what seems to me the plain meaning of the
instrument itself. But if such interpretations should con
stitute a part of the formal resolution of ratification, long
delays would be the inevitable consequence, inasmuch as
all the many governments concerned would have to ac
cept, in effect, the language of the Senate as the language
o f the Treaty before ratification would be complete.”
He pointed out that the assent of Germany, itself, would
have to be obtained.
This seemed to me to be a reasonable position to take.
Reservations accompanying the Treaty, but not forming a
part of the act of ratification, would have put the world
on notice as to the attitude of the United States and would
have served every purpose. It is obvious that amend
ments or reservations, affecting the structure of the League
itself, not simply interpreting it, would require action.
The matter was then open for discussion. Many
questions were asked, but Senator Lodge, the chairman,
did not seem to take much interest in the proceedings. He
spoke only once or twice.

In answer to questions, the President again and again
said that he did not object to interpretative reservations
accompanying the act of ratification, but that he would
regard amendments affecting the structure, or reservations
made a part of the act of ratification, as objectionable for
the reasons he had indicated, particularly as such action
would cause delay. Answering Senator McCumber he
said:
“ We differ, Senator, only as to the form of action. I
think it would be a very serious practical mistake to put
it in the resolution of ratification; but I do hope that we
are at liberty, contemporaneously with our acceptance of
the Treaty, to interpret our moral obligation under that
article.”
As to the matter of withdrawal, in answer to a question
from Senator Borah, the President answered flatly that,
if a country should give notice of withdrawal, it would be
the sole judge of whether or not it had fulfilled its obliga
tions. “ The only restraining influence,” he added,
“ would be the public opinion of the world.”
Many times he answered questions regarding Article
X. He stated emphatically that the obligation assumed
under Article X to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrities of the members of the
League was not a legal but a moral obligation, and that
the United States would interpret this obligation. When
Senators Borah and Knox asked the President specifically
this question: “ Suppose that it is perfectly obvious and
accepted that there is an external aggression against some
power, and suppose that it is perfectly obvious and ac
cepted that it cannot be repelled except by force of arms,
would we be under any legal obligation to participate?”*

the President answered: “ No, sir; but we would be under
an absolutely impelling moral obligation.”
Senator Harding then asked whether or not, if there
were only a moral obligation and each nation was to judge
o f this obligation, the whole thing would amount to noth
ing. The President, in effect, answered that it would
amount to a great deal, since every nation with a con
science would be called upon seriously to consider her moral
obligation and to decide solemnly whether, in her judg
ment, the circumstances required that she participate.
The President had great difficulty in getting this into the
minds of his hearers. Senator Borah wished to know
whether, under Article X , there would not be a transfer of
the power of decision from the Congress of the United
States to our representative on the Council. The Presi
dent answered in the negative, pointing out that our rep
resentative would act only on the advice of his govern
ment and that the government in advising him would
pursue the same course that it would otherwise pursue
in similar circumstances. Senator Harding, at a later
stage, again asked the President whether, if the obligation
under Article X was only a moral obligation, we should get
anything out of the compact. The President again replied
that there would be centred upon the problem the definite
opinion of the world. Mr. Harding replied, “ That is sur
rendering the suggestion of a moral obligation for this Re
public to the prejudices or necessities of the nations of the
Old World, is it not?” The President replied that there
would be no surrender. He tried again to explain that
any decision of the Council would require our assent
and that, in any event, its action would be only in the
way of advice which we would seriously consider and
[16]

act upon in the light of our best judgment in the circum
stances.
Questions as to other points were asked, and the Presi
dent patiently repeated his explanations. A few days
after the Conference, he remarked at a Cabinet meeting
that Senator Harding had a disturbingly dull mind, and
that it seemed impossible to get any explanation to lodge in
it.

CHAPTER XXII
TH E PRESIDENT GOES WEST

Discusses Article X Shantung, and the Effect of the Treaty on
Domestic Affairs and the Monroe Doctrine— Again Agrees to Res
ervations, if Attached to Treaty as Explanation of Our Position

A B O U T a week after this conference, the Senate
/ %
Committee began to vote amendments to the
/
^
Treaty of a very essential character, such as that
China should be substituted for Japan as the
nation which was to receive Shantung, and that the
United States should have as many votes in the assembly
as Great Britain and her self-governing colonies. On
September ioth the majority of the Senate Committee re
ported a number of amendments and reservations, all of
which were to be made a part o f the act of ratification.
Among the more important of the amendments were the
one dealing with the votes of Great] Britain and the one
transferring to China the rights given by the Treaty to
Japan. The most important of the reservations was the
one stating that the United States declined to assume any
obligation under Article X to preserve the territorial in
tegrity of any nation, except by action of the Congress
of the United States. Senator Lodge rejected these pro
posals.
In the meantime, such outstanding leaders o f thought
in the nation as former President Taft, M r. Henry W.

[ 18]

Taft, Mr. George W. Wickersham, and President Lowell of
Harvard, were advocating the ratification of the Treaty,
including the Covenant, and were giving explanations of
the debatable provisions substantially similar to some of
those given by the President. On the contention that the
League created a superstate, and that the freedom of the
Congress of the United States would be limited, President
Lowell said:
“ Vigorous objection has been made in the United
States to a super-sovereign league that would have author
ity to order this country what to do in case of an attack
against another member of the League. The objection is
not without cogency; but it does not apply to the Cove
nant of Paris, either in its original or its amended form,
for that Covenant has adopted as its basic principle the
automatic type of league, fixing the obligations of the
members and the sanctions for violation in the pact itself,
instead of leaving them to be determined by a represen
tative body. The Council of the League is, indeed, at
liberty, and even enjoined, to advise or recommend further
action by the members, but no member assumes any obli
gation to follow the advice unless it chooses so to do.
The language is in that respect perfectly clear and consist
ent, unless we are to construe such words as ‘ advise/
‘ propose,’ and ‘ recommend’ in a sense quite contrary to
their ordinary meaning. How completely this is true
will be clearly seen when we examine in detail the articles
of the Covenant.”
As to Article X , former President Taft said that it was
the embodiment of a principle which we had entered the
war to maintain, that it answered the German doctrine
that might makes right, and that it would lessen the prob

ability of war and o f our being drawn into one. “ Article
X ,” he said, “ is one of the great steps forward provided in
the League for the securing of general peace.”
Just before the beginning of September, the President,
recognizing the strength of the opposition and that the
people were not getting a true picture of the Treaty and of
the Covenant, decided that he ought to make an appeal to
the people, and, therefore, to take a trip through the nation.
A number of his friends, including his physician, warned
him that, after all he had been through, he would probably
endanger his life. A t one of the Cabinet meetings, it was
intimated to him that he had better not take the trip as it
might kill him. He promptly replied that he would be
willing to give his life for the cause. It was obvious that
he would not be dissuaded from the undertaking.
On his Western trip, from September 4th to September
25 th, the President travelled ten thousand miles, going as
far to the northwest as Seattle and as far to the southwest
as San Diego. He made in all thirty-seven speeches, at
times as many as three in one day. His chief thought was
to emphasize the need of immediate peace, the fact that
the Treaty was the best that could be secured in the cir
cumstances, that the Covenant was a necessary piece of
machinery for effective future readjustments, that it would
be a place where the public opinion of the world might
focus, and that we would sacrifice no American interest by
entering it and assuming a position o f leadership. The
main debatable points he explained again and again.
The place of the Covenant in the Treaty, he explained
as follows:
“ I want to remind you how the permanency of peace is
at the heart o f this treaty. This is not merely a treaty of
[20]

peace with Germany. It is a world settlement; not affect
ing those parts of the world, of course, which were not
involved in the war, because the Conference had no juris
diction over them, but the war did extend to most parts
of the world, and the scattered, dismembered assets of
the Central Empires and of Turkey gave us plenty to do
and covered the greater part of the distressed populations
of the world. It is nothing less than a world settlement,
and at the centre of that stands this covenant for the
future which we call the Covenant of the League of
Nations. Without it the Treaty cannot be worked, and
without it it is a mere temporary arrangement with Ger
many. The Covenant of the League of Nations is the
instrumentality for the maintenance of peace.”
The following will sufficiently indicate his statements to
the people on the chief points in dispute:
i . The six votes of Great Britain in the Assembly.
“ But, you say, ‘ We have heard that we might be at a
disadvantage in the League of Nations.’ Well, whoever
told you that either was deliberately falsifying or he had
not read the Covenant of the League of Nations. I leave
him the choice. I want to give you a very simple account
of the organization of the League of Nations and let you
judge for yourselves. It is a very simple organization.
The power of the League, or rather the activities of the
League, lie in two bodies. There is the Council, which
consists of one representative from each of the principal
Allied and Associated Powers— that is to say, the United
States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, along
with four other representatives of smaller powers chosen
out of the general body of the membership of the League.
The Council is the source of every active policy of the
[2 1 ]

League, and no active policy of the League can be adopted
without a unanimous vote of the Council. That is ex
plicitly stated in the Covenant itself. Does it not evi
dently follow that the League of Nations can adopt no
policy whatever without the consent of the United States?
The affirmative vote of the representative of the United
States is necessary in every case. Now, you have heard
of six votes belonging to the British Empire. Those
six votes are not in the Council. They are in the As
sembly, and the interesting thing is that the Assembly
does not vote. I must qualify that statement a little,
but essentially it is absolutely true. In every matter
in which the Assembly is given a voice, and there are only
four or five, its vote does not count unless concurred in by
the representatives of all the nations represented in the
Council, so that there is no validity to any vote of the
Assembly unless in that vote also the representative of the
United States concurs. That one vote of the United
States is as big as the six votes of the British Empire.
I am not jealous for advantage, my fellow citizens, but I
think that is a perfectly safe situation. There is no valid
ity in a vote, either by the Council or the Assembly, in
which we do not concur. So much for the statements
about the six votes of the British Empire.
“ Look at it in another aspect. The Assembly is the
talking body. The Assembly was created in order that
anybody that purposed anything wrong should be sub
jected to the awkward circumstance that everybody could
talk about it. This is the great assembly in which all the
things that are likely to disturb the peace of the world or
the good understanding between nations are to be exposed
to the general view, and I want to ask you if you think it
[22 ]

was unjust, unjust to the United States, that speaking
parts should be assigned to the several portions of the
British Empire? Do you think it unjust that there should
be some spokesman in debate for that fine little stout
republic down in the Pacific, New Zealand? Do you
think it was unjust that Australia should be allowed to
stand up and take part in the debate— Australia, from
which we have learned some of the most useful progressive
policies of modern time, a little nation of only five million
in a great continent, but counting for several times five in
its activities and in its interest in liberal reform? Do you
think it unjust that that little republic down in South
Africa, whose gallant resistance to being subjected to any
outside authority at all we admired for so many months
and whose fortunes we followed with such interest, should
have a speaking part? Great Britain obliged South
Africa to submit to her sovereignty, but she immediately
after that felt that it was convenient and right to hand
the whole self-government of that colony over to the very
men whom she had beaten. The representatives of South
Africa in Paris were two of the most distinguished generals
of the Boer army, two of the reales t men I ever met, two
men that could talk sober counsel and wise advice along
with the best statesmen in Europe. To exclude General
Botha and General Smuts from the right to stand up in
the parliament of the world and say something concern
ing the affairs of mankind would be absurd. And what
about Canada? Is not Canada a good neighbour? I
ask you, Is not Canada more likely to agree with the
United States than with Great Britain? Canada has a
speaking part. And then, for the first time in the history
of the world, that great voiceless multitude, that throng

hundreds of millions strong in India, has a voice. . . .
I, for my part, have no jealousy whatever of those five
speaking parts in the assembly. Those speaking parts
cannot translate themselves into five votes that can in
any matter override the voice and purpose of the United
States.”
2. Article X .
“ Go to other matters with which I have less patience,
other objections to the League. I have spoken of Article
X . Those who object to Article X object to entering the
League with any responsibilities whatever. They want
to make it a matter of opinion merely, and not a matter
of action. They know just as well as I know that there is
nothing in Article X that can oblige the Congress of the
United States to declare war if it does not deem it wise to
declare war. We engage with the other nations of the
world to preserve as against external aggression— not as
against internal revolution— the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of the other members of
the League; and then, in the next sentence, it is said that
the Council of the League of Nations shall advise with
regard to the measures which may be necessary to carry
out this promise on the part of the members. . . .
These gentlemen would have you believe that our armies
can be ordered abroad by some other power or by a com
bination of powers. They are thinking in an airtight com
partment. America is not the only proud nation in the
world. I can testify from my share in the counsels on
the other side of the sea that the other nations are just as
jealous of their sovereignty as we are of ours. They would
no more have dreamed of giving us the right o f ordering
out their armies than we would have dreamed of giving

them the right to order out our armies. The advice can
come from the United States only after the United States
representative votes in the affirmative.”
He stated his position again as to this article in slightly
different form, asserting that it was absurd to talk about
the League being a supergovernment, saying:
“ That affords emphasis to the point I wish you to keep
distinctly in mind with regard to reservations and all the
qualifications of ratification which are being discussed.
No active policy can be undertaken by the League without
the assenting vote of the United States. I cannot under
stand the anxiety of some gentlemen for fear something is
going to be put over on them. I cannot understand why,
having read the Covenant of the League and examined its
constitution, they are not satisfied with the fact that every
active policy of the League must be concurred in by a
unanimous vote of the Council, which means that the
affirmative vote of the United States is in every instance
necessary. That being the case, it becomes sheer non
sense, my fellow citizens, to talk about a supergovernment
being set up over the United States; it becomes sheer
nonsense to say that any authority is constituted which
can order our armies to other parts of the world, which
can interfere with our domestic questions, which can direct
our international policy even in any matter in which we do
not consent to be directed. We would be under our own
direction just as much under the Covenant of the League
of Nations as we are now. . . .
“ What is the Covenant for? To hear most of the de
bate, you would think that it was an ingenious contrivance
for a subtle interference with the affairs of the United
States. On the contrary, it is one of the most solemn

covenants ever entered into by all the great fighting powers
of the world that they never will resort to war again with
out first having either submitted the question at issue to
arbitration and undertaken to abide by the verdict of the
arbitrators or submitted it to discussion by the Council
of the League of Nations, laying all the documents, all the
facts, before that council, consenting that that council
should lay all those documents and all those facts before
the world; they agree to allow six months for that discus
sion, and, even if they are not satisfied with the opinion,
for it is only an opinion in that case, rendered by the
Council, they agree not to go to war for three months after
the opinion has been rendered. There you have nine
months' submission to the moral judgment of the world.
In my judgment, that is an almost complete assurance
against war.”
3 . Monroe Doctrine.
As to the Monroe Doctrine, he had this to say:
“ ‘ But the Monroe Doctrine/ I must admit to you, my
fellow citizens, I do not know how the Monroe Doctrine
could be any more explicitly accepted than it is in the
Covenant of the League of Nations. It says that nothing
in the Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the
validity of the Monroe Doctrine. What more could you
say? . . .
I tell you, my fellow citizens, that is the
most extraordinary sentence in that treaty, for this
reason: Up to that time, there was not a nation in the
world that was willing to admit the validity of the Monroe
Doctrine. I have made a great many speeches in my life,
perhaps too many, but I do not think that I ever put so
much of what I hope was the best in me as I put in the
speech in the Conference on the League of Nations in
[26]

favour of the Monroe Doctrine, and it was upon that oc
casion that it was embodied. And we have this extraor
dinary spectacle, of the world recognizing the validity of
the Monroe Doctrine. Yet these gentlemen seem to want
something more. What more could you get? Shall we
get them to express their belief in the deity of the Monroe
Doctrine? They accept it for the first time in the history
of the world, and they say that they will do nothing that
will interfere with it. I must submit that it is absolutely
irrational to ask for anything more.”
4.

"Domestic affairs.

That domestic affairs were not within the province of
the League, he emphasized in the following language:
“ But there is the question of somebody interfering with
the domestic policies of the United States— immigration,
naturalization, tariffs; matters of that sort. There, again,
I cannot understand or feel the weight of the difficulty,
because the Covenant says that if any international diffi
culty is brought under discussion and one of the parties
claims and the Council finds that it is a matter of domestic
jurisdiction, the Council shall cease to discuss it and shall
make no report about it. The only way you could make
the document more clear would be by enumerating the
domestic questions you had in mind. Very well. I ask
any lawyer here if that would be safe? Might you not be
in danger of leaving out something ? Might you not be in
danger of not mentioning something that would after
ward become important? The danger of making a list
is that the mention of the things you do mention con
stitutes the exclusion of the things you do not mention.
Inasmuch as there is no dispute of any authoritative stu
dents of international law that these matters that we are

most concerned about— immigration, naturalization, tariff,
and the rest— are domestic questions, it is inconceivable
that the Council should ever seek to interfere with or to
discuss such questions, unless we had ourselves deliber
ately made them matters of international agreement, and
even the opponents of the League admit they would be
suitable and proper subjects for discussion.”
5.

Shantung.

He took great pains to explain the provision of the
Treaty with reference to Shantung. He pointed out that
Germany had acquired Shantung by force and that
America at the time had not protested, that Japan had
been allowed by a treaty signed on our own territory to
take from Russia the concession of Port Arthur which had
belonged to China, and that the negotiations leading to
this treaty had taken place under the direct intervention
o f President Roosevelt, at Portsmouth. And he contin
ued:
“ The Treaty was written here; it was written under the
auspices, so to say, of our own public opinion, but the
government o f the United States was not at liberty to pro
test and did not protest; it acquiesced in the very thing
which is being done in this treaty. What is being done
in this treaty is not that Shantung is being taken from
China. China did not have it. It is being taken from
Germany, just as Port Arthur was not taken from China
but taken from Russia and transferred to Japan. Before
we got into the war, Great Britain and France had entered
into solemn covenant by treaty with Japan that, if she
would take what Germany had in Shantung by force of
arms, and also the islands lying north of the Equator which
had been under German dominion in the Pacific, she could
m

keep them when the peace came and its settlements were
made. They were bound by a treaty of which we knew
nothing, but which, notwithstanding our ignorance of it,
bound them as much as any treaty binds. This war was
fought to maintain the sacredness of treaties. Great
Britain and France, therefore, cannot consent to a change
of the Treaty in respect of the cession of Shantung, and
we have no precedent in our history which permits us even
to protest against it until we become members of the
League of Nations. . . . But that is not all. America,
as I have said, was not bound by the agreements of Great
Britain and France on the one hand, and Japan on the
other. We were free to insist upon a prospect of a differ
ent settlement, and at the instance of the United States
Japan has already promised that she will relinquish to
China immediately after the ratification of this treaty all
the sovereign rights that Germany had in Shantung Prov
ince— the only promise of that kind ever made, the only
relinquishment of that sort ever achieved— and that she
will retain only what foreign corporations have all over
China— unfortunately, but as a matter of fact— the right
to run the railroad and the right to work the mines under
the usual conditions of Chinese sovereignty and as eco
nomic concessionaires, with no political rights or military
power of any kind. . . .
"And the alternative? If you insist upon cutting out
the Shantung arrangement, that merely severs us from
the Treaty. It does not give Shantung back to China.
The only way you can give Shantung back to China is
by arms in your hands, armed ships and armed men,
sent against Japan and France and Great Britain. A
fratricidal strife, in view of what we have gone through!

We have just redeemed France. We cannot, with arms
in our hands, insist that France break a covenant, how
ever ill judged, however unjust; we cannot as her brothers
in arms commit any such atrocious act against the fratern
ity of free people. So much for Shantung. Nobody can
get that provision out of that treaty and do China any
service whatever, and all such professions of friendship
for China are empty noise, for the gentlemen who make
those professions must know that what they propose will
be not of the slightest service to her.”
6. Reservations.
And again and again he pointed out that while he was
opposed to amendments to the Treaty and to reserva
tions which were made a part of the act of ratification be
cause the whole thing would have to be done over again,
he was not opposed to interpretative reservations. His
explanations were along the following lines:
“ You will say, ‘ Well, why not go in with reservations?’
I wonder if you know what that means. . . .
“ The Treaty is not susceptible of misunderstanding. I
do not object to painting the rose or refining fine gold;
there is not any phrase in the Covenant of the League of
Nations that can legitimately be said to be of doubtful
meaning, but if the Congress of the United States wants to
state the meaning over again in other words and say to the
other nations of the world, ‘ We understand the Treaty to
mean what it says,’ I think that is a work of supereroga
tion, but I do not see any moral objection to it. But
anything that qualifies the Treaty, anything that is a
condition to our ratification of it, must be submitted to
all the others, and we must go over this process again; this
process which took six months of intensive labour, which

[30]

took six months of very difficult adjustment and arrange
ment, which quieted jealousies, which allayed suspicions,
which set aside controversies, which brought about the
most extraordinary union of minds that was ever brought
about in so miscellaneous an assembly, divided by so many
interests. All that must be gone over again, and in the
meantime the world must wait and its unrest grow deeper,
and all the pulses of life go slower, waiting to see what is
going to happen, all because the United States asks the
other governments of the world to accept what they have
already accepted in different language. That is all that it
amounts to; I mean, all that the reasonable reservations
amount to. Some of them amount to staying out alto
gether, some of them amount to a radical change of the
spirit of the instrument, but I am speaking now of those
which some men of high conscience and of high public
purpose are seriously pressing in order that there may
be no misunderstanding. You can avoid a misunder
standing without changing the document. You can avoid
a misunderstanding without qualifying the terms of the
document, because, as I have said and shall say again and
again, America is at liberty as one of the voting members of
the partnership to state how she understands the articles
of copartnership.”
In passing, he adverted to the possibility of a separate
peace with the Central Empires and said:
“ A separate peace with the Central Empires could ac
complish nothing but our eternal disgrace, and I would like,
if my voice could reach him, to let this German counsellor
know that the red he sees upon the horizon is not the red
of a new dawn, but the red of a consuming fire which
will consume everything like the recent purposes of the

Central Empires. It is not without significance, my fellow
citizens, that coincidentally with this debate with regard
to the ratification of this treaty the whole pro-German
propaganda has shown its head all over the United States.
I would not have you understand me to mean that the
men who are opposing the ratification of the Treaty are
consciously encouraging the pro-German propaganda. I
have no right to say that or to think it, but I do say that
what they are doing is encouraging the pro-German prop
aganda, and that it is bringing about a hope in the minds
of those whom we have just spent our precious blood to
defeat that they may separate us from the rest of the world
and produce this interesting spectacle, only two nations
standing aside from the great concert and guaranty of
peace— beaten Germany and triumphant America.
“ See what can be accomplished by that. By that the
attitude of the rest of the world toward America will be
exactly what its recent attitude was toward Germany,
and we will be in the position absolutely alien to every
American conception o f playing a lone hand in the world
for our selfish advantage and aggrandizement. The thing
is inconceivable. The thing is intolerable. The thing
can and will never happen.”
And finally he reminded his audiences of the purposes
for which we had entered the war, its cost in wealth and
in human lives, and the duty that the nation and he, him
self, owed to the men who had made the great sacrifice.
Concerning the nation's duty and its pledge, he said:
"W e went into this war to do a thing that was funda
mental for the world, and what I have come out upon this
journey for is to ascertain whether the country has forgot
ten it or not. I have found out already. The country

has not forgotten, and it never will permit any man who
stands in the way of the fulfilment of these great pledges
ever to forget, the sorrowful day when he made the at
tempt.”
“ What o f our pledges to the men that lie dead in
France? We said that they went over there, not to prove
the prowess of America or her readiness for another war,
but to see to it that there never was such a war again. It
always seems to make it difficult for me to say anything,
my fellow citizens, when I think of my clients in this case.
M y clients are the children; my clients are the next gen
eration. They do not know what promises and bonds I
undertook when I ordered the armies of the United States
to the soil of France, but I know, and I intend to redeem
my pledges to the children; they shall not be sent upon a
similar errand.
“ Again and again, my fellow citizens, mothers who lost
their sons in France have come to me and, taking my hand,
have shed tears upon it not only, but they have added,
*God bless you, Mr. President!’ Why, my fellow ci tizens,
should they pray God to bless me? I advised the Congress
of the United States to create the situation that led to the
death of their sons. I ordered their sons overseas. I
consented to their sons being put in the most difficult
parts of the battle line, where death was certain, as in the
impenetrable difficulties of the forest of Argonne. Why
should they weep upon my hand and call down the bless
ings of God upon me? Because they believe that their
boys died for something that vastly transcends any of the
immediate and palpable objects of the war. They be
lieve, and they rightly believe, that their sons saved the
liberty of the world. They believe that wrapped up with

the liberty of the world is the continuous protection of
that liberty by the concerted powers of all civilized people.
They believe that this sacrifice was made in order that
other sons should not be called upon for a similar gift— the
gift of life, the gift of all that died— and if we did not see
this thing through, if we fulfilled the dearest present wish
of Germany and now dissociated ourselves from those
alongside whom we fought in the war, would not something
of the halo go away from the gun over the mantelpiece, or
the sword? Would not the old uniform lose something
o f its significance? These men were crusaders. They
were not going forth to prove the might of the United
States. They were going forth to prove the might of
justice and right, and all the world accepted them as
crusaders, and their transcendent achievement has made
all the world believe in America as it believes in no other
nation organized in the modem world. There seems to
me to stand between us and the rejection or qualification
of this treaty the serried ranks of those boys in khaki,
not only these boys who came home, but those dear ghosts
that still deploy upon the fields of France.
“ M y friends, on last Decoration D ay I went to a beauti
ful hillside near Paris, where was located the cemetery of
Suresnes, a cemetery given over to the burial of the Amer
ican dead. Behind me on the slopes was rank upon rank
o f living American soldiers, and lying before me upon the
levels of the plain was rank upon rank of departed Amer
ican soldiers. Right by the side of the stand where I
spoke there was a little group of Frenchwomen who had
adopted those graves, had made themselves mothers of
those dear ghosts by putting flowers every day upon those
graves, taking them as their own sons, their own beloved,

because they had died in the same cause— France was
free and the world was free because America had come!
I wish some men in public life who are now opposing the
settlement for which these men died could visit such a
spot as that. I wish that the thought that comes out of
those graves could penetrate their consciousness. I wish
that they could feel the moral obligation that rests upon
us not to go back on those boys, but to see the thing
through, to see it through to the end and make good their
redemption of the world. For nothing less depends upon
this decision, nothing less than the liberation and salva
tion of the world.”
His final words to the people of the nation on this ad
venture were as follows:
“ The arrangements of justice do not stand of them
selves, my fellow citizens. The arrangements of this
treaty are just, but they need the support of the combined
power of the great nations of the world. And they will
nave that support. Now that the mists of this great
question have cleared away, I believe that men will see
the truth, eye to eye and face to face. There is one thing
that the American people always rise to and extend their
hand to, and that is the truth of justice and of liberty and
of peace. We have accepted that truth and we are going
to be led by it, and it is going to lead us, and through us
the world, out into pastures of quietness and peace such
as the world never dreamed of before.”

CHAPTER

XXIII

THE PRESIDENT’ S COLLAPSE

Ignorance of His Condition Amongst Cabinet— President
Advises Against the Incorporation of Lodge Reservations in Treaty
— Agrees to Hitchcock Reservations— The Treaty Beaten

N THEmorning of September 26th, word reached
me that the President had given up his trip and
was hurrying to Washington. It was reported
that he was due in Washington on Sunday the
twenty-eighth. I realized thatonly a very serioussituation
would cause him to abandon the trip. I heard that he had
suffered some sort of collapse. I was exceedingly appre
hensive. On Monday I sent a note of sympathy and
some flowers to the White House. The rumour was that
the President was very nervous and could not sleep. I
had nothing to go upon except rumours. There was no di
rect or authoritative word of any sort even to members of
the Cabinet from the White House or from the physician.
I regarded it as a serious mistake for those in touch with
the situation not to give the public, and especially the
Cabinet, the fullest and frankest information about the
President’s condition. We canvassed the matter among
ourselves but none of us could furnish any light.
On Friday, October 3d, I saw Secretary Baker at the
Shoreham. When he saw me, he said: “ I am scared
literally to death.” He looked it. Saturday, I saw Tu
multy at the Shoreham. He gave me the first direct word
136]

I had had concerning the President. He said that the
President was paralyzed in one leg and one arm. He ex
pressed grave alarm over the situation. We agreed that
it would be one of the tragedies of the ages if the President
was incapacitated or were to become incapacitated.
Sunday I happened to lunch at the Shoreham. I saw
the Vice President and Mrs. Marshall sitting at one of
the tables. I went up to them and paid my respects.
The Vice President was evidently much disturbed and
expressed regret that he was being kept in the dark about
the President’s condition. He asked me if I could give
him the real facts, which I was unable to do. I could not
even repeat what had been told to me, because it had been
said in confidence. The Vice President expressed the view
that he ought immediately to be informed; that it would be
a tragedy for him to assume the duties of President, at
best; and that it would be equally a tragedy for the people;
that he knew many men who knew more about the affairs
of the government than he did; and that it would be espe
cially trying for him if he had to assume the duties without
warning. He showed resentment that the doctors were
keeping the situation a mystery so far as he especially was
concerned, and asserted that they ought to be frank with
the public. I told him that I hoped to be in a position to
know more the next day.
On Friday, October 3d, I had received word from Secre
tary Lansing that there would be a meeting of the Cabinet
in the Cabinet room, Monday at eleven o’clock, to con
sider the situation. He had sent this word when the news
iwas spread that the President’s condition was worse. I
was surprised when I received the call for a meeting on
jan unusual day, as I was apprehensive that our meeting

at an odd time would arouse undue apprehension. But
I said that I would attend the meeting. When we met
Lansing said that it was necessary to decide whether or
not we should continue to carry on the government— that
there was nothing to guide us as to who would decide the
question of the ability of the President to discharge the
duties of his office.
After the Secretary of State had outlined the situation,
someone suggested that, if it was necessary to take the
matter up at all, we should do so only after we had se
cured direct information as to the President’s condition
and that we should first consult the President’s physician.
It was decided to ask Doctor Grayson to meet us and to
tell us everything he could. While we were waiting we
talked informally about the legal situation. There were
no pressing matters requiring the President’s decision
and signature, and, therefore, there was no need for haste.
Garfield was incapacitated from July 2d to September
19th, and no action was taken.
Doctor Grayson and Mr. Tumulty soon came into the
Cabinet room. Doctor Grayson stated that the President’s
condition had improved over Sunday, but that he could(
not say when he would be out of danger— that the scales
might tip either way. He added that they might tip the
wrong way especially if he was harassed by business mat
ters, and that he should be bothered as little as possible.
He told us that the President’s mind was very clear, but,
that he was suffering from a nervous breakdown, from in
digestion and a depleted system. Doctor Grayson was
asked if he could tell us more exactly what was the trouble.
He replied that he could add nothing to what he had al
ready said. He added with a sort of twinkle in his eye:
m

“ The President asked me what the Cabinet wanted with
me and by what authority it was meeting while he was in
Washington without a call from him.’’ He said that the
President showed no little irritation when he heard that
we were holding a Cabinet meeting.
After some further discussion of the matter, the Secre
tary of State asked Doctor Grayson to tell the President
that we met primarily to express our interest in his con
dition, to get information about him, to extend our sym
pathy, and to consider such departmental matters as
needed attention, as there had been no Cabinet meeting
for a month.
This seemed to me to be an inadequate statement. It
looked as if the Secretary for some reason had changed
his mind as to the purpose of the meeting since the mem
bers had begun to gather. If he had called the meeting
for the regular day, it might have been sufficient and rea
sonable for him to say that we had held Cabinet meetings
at the request of the President during his absence, that
we had had no meeting for a month and that, since he was
ill, it seemed not inappropriate or in any way at variance
with his views that we should meet. Our meeting at the
regular time, as I have stated, would have been reassuring
to the public, properly creating the picture in their mind
that the government was going ahead. But the message
the Secretary sent was hardly a satisfactory explanation
for our meeting at an unusual time.
The problem presented by the illness of the President is
one for the handling of which machinery ought to be
created. The Cabinet is in good position to pass upon
the government’s exigencies, perhaps in better position
than any other body, but, for various reasons, it is not

the body that should be charged with the final determina
tion of the inability of a president to discharge his duties.
The Congress also is not the proper body. It might be
of different political complexion from the President and
there might be situations in which partisanship would
enter. It would seem that either a Commission should be
set up composed possibly of Supreme Court justices, mem
bers of the Cabinet, and members of Congress, to sit as a
jury and to determine the matter, or the determination
might be left to the Supreme Court. But whatever may
be the best machinery, it is clear that some machinery
should be set up.
In the meantime, the fight over the League continued,
the lines of opposition being more tightly drawn. As the
battle developed, apparently the disposition of the oppo
sition changed. An able Republican Senator said that, in
his opinion, Lodge had not started the fight on the League
with the thought that he could kill it, but rather with the
hope that he might give it a Republican veneer, partly
for political purposes and partly to impair die prestige of
Mr. Wilson, but that as time passed and such Senators as
Borah, Johnson, and Reed, became more and more out
spoken and hostile, he discovered, much to his surprise,
that the League could be killed and that he then set out
to kill it. Lodge’s way of putting it was that he proposed
to Americanize the Treaty and the Covenant. In other
words, he would show the people that the Republicans
had sufficiently rewritten the Treaty to save the situation.
Amendments and reservations were proposed, debated,
adopted, or rejected, until in November, 1919, the Lodge
resolution o f ratification, containing fourteen amendments
or reservations) was voted upon and rejected by the vote
[40]

of 41 “ ayes” to 51 “ noes,” 3 not voting, most of the Dem
ocrats voting against the Lodge ratification resolution.
Just before the vote was taken, Senator Lodge had inserted
in the record a letter from PresidentWilson, dated Novem
ber 18, 1919, and addressed to Senator Hitchcock.
The White House,
Washington, 18 November, 1919.
My

dear

Senator:

You were good enough to bring me word that the Dem
ocratic Senators supporting the Treaty expected to hold a
conference before the final vote on the Lodge resolution of
ratification and that they would be glad to receive a word
of counsel from me.
I should hesitate to offer it in any detail, but I assume
that the Senators only desire my judgment upon the allimportant question of the final vote on the resolution
containing the many reservations by Senator Lodge. On
that I cannot hesitate, for, in my opinion, the resolution
in that form does not provide for ratification but, rather,
for the nullification of the Treaty. I sincerely hope that
the friends and supporters of the Treaty will vote against
the Lodge resolution of ratification.
I understand that the door will probably then be open
for a genuine resolution of ratification.
I trust that all true friends of the Treaty will refuse to
support the Lodge resolution.
Cordially, and sincerely, yours,
{Signed) W o o d r o w W i l s o n .
Hon. G. M. Hitchcock,
United States Senate.

The resolution of ratification containing fourteen amend
ments or reservations was as follows:
“ R E SO L V E D (two thirds of the Senators present con
curring therein), T hat the Senate advise and consent to
the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany con
cluded at Versailles on the 28 th day of June, 1919, subject
to the following reservations and understandings, which
are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution
of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or
bind the United States until the said reservations and un
derstandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted
by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this
resolution of ratification by at least three of the four
principal Allied and Associated Powers, to wit, Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan:
“ 1. The United States so understands and construes
Article I that in case of notice of withdrawal from the
League of Nations, as provided in said Article, the United
States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its inter
national obligations and all its obligations under the said
Covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by
the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution
of the Congress of the United States.
“ 2. The United States assumes no obligation to pre
serve the territorial integrity or political independence of
any other country or to interfere in controversies between
nations— whether members of the League or not— under
the provisions of Article X , or to employ the military or
naval forces of the United States under any article of the
Treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the
Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole
power to declare war or authorize the employment of the
[42]

military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act
or joint resolution so provide.
“ 3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United
States under Article X X II, Part I, or any other provision
of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action
of the Congress of the United States.
“ 4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the
right to decide what questions are within its domestic
jurisdiction, and declares that all domestic and political
questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs,
including immigration, labour, coastwise traffic, the tariff,
co.nmerce, the suppression of traffic in women and chil
dren, and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all
other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction
of the United States and are not under this treaty to be
submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the con
sideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League
of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or rec
ommendation of any other power.
“ 5. The United States will not submit to arbitration
or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the
League of Nations, provided for in said Treaty of Peace,
any questions which in the judgment of the United States
depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, com
monly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said Doctrine is
to be interpreted by the United States alone and is here
by declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said
League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any pro
vision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Ger
many.
“ 6. The United States withholds its assent to Articles
CLVI, CLVII, and C LV III, and reserves full liberty of

action with respect to any controversy which may arise
under said Articles between the Republic of China and the
Empire of Japan.
“ 7* The Congress of the United States will provide
by law for the appointment of the representatives of the
United States in the Assembly and the Council of the
League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for
the participation of the United States in any commission,
committee, tribunal, court, council, or conference, or in
the selection of any members thereof and for the appoint
ment of members of said commissions, committees, tri
bunals, courts, councils, or conferences, or any other
representatives under the Treaty of Peace, or in carrying
out its provisions, and until such participation and ap
pointment have been so provided for and the powers and
duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no
persons shall represent the United States under either said
League of Nations or the Treaty of Peace with Germany
or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of
the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United
States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said
commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or
conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the
United States.
“ 8. The United States understands that the Repara
tions Commission will regulate or interfere with exports
from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to
the United States, only when the United States by act or
joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or
interference.
“ 9. The United States shall not be obligated to con
tribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the
[44]

secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or con
ference, or other agency, organized under the League of
Nations or under the Treaty or for the purpose of carrying
out the Treaty provisions, unless and until an appropria
tion of funds available for such expenses shall have been
made by the Congress of the United States.
“ 10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any
plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the
Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of
Article VIII, it reserves the right to increase such arma
ments without the consent of the Council whenever the
United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in
war.
“ u . The United States reserves the right to permit,
in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking
state, as defined in Article XVI of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, residing within the United States or in
countries other than that violating said Article X VI, to
continue their commercial, financial, and personal re
lations with the nationals of the United States.
“ 12. Nothing in Articles CCX CV I, CCX CV II, or in
any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section,
or annex of the Treaty of Peace with Germany shall, as
against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any
confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise
illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the
United States.
“ 13. The United States withholds its assent to Part
X III (Articles C C C X X C V II to C C C C X X V II, inclusive)
unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter
make provision for representation in the organization es
tablished by said Part X III, and in such event the partici

pation of the United States will be governed and condi
tioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.
“ 14. The United States assumes no obligation to be
bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the
Council or Assembly in which any member of the League
and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of
empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote,
and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision,
report or finding of the Council or Assembly arising out of
any dispute between the United States and any member of
the League if such member, or any self-governing domin
ion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it po
litically has voted.”
A little later in the day, Senator Underwood of Alabama
offered the following straight resolution of ratification:
“ RESOLVED (two thirds of the Senators present con
curring therein), That the Senate do advise and consent
to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany
concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919-”
This resolution was rejected by almost'a straight party
vote, 38 “ ayes” to 53 "noes,” 4 not voting. Therefore,
the Senate was unable to ratify the Treaty, with reserva
tions as proposed either by Lodge or by Hitchcock, or
without reservations; and the Senate adjourned the same
day.
This leaves the country and the world in confusion.
Our action will impair our prestige and prevent us from
assuming leadership at a time when it would be most
gladly accepted and would count for most. It will retard
the processes of recovery. It leaves us in a state of war
with Germany and will make it difficult for trade to re
open. It leaves the executive departments in suspense
(46]

in reference to many measures which are purely war
measures.
As time passed, no progress was made in the matter of
the •ratification of the Treaty. Shortly before Jackson
Day (January 8th), I was informed that the President
would prepare and send to those present at the Jackson
Day banquet in Washington, a letter dealing mainly with
the Treaty situation. Tumulty spoke to me about it
after Cabinet meeting Tuesday, January 6th, and stated
that he wished to bring the Attorney General and the
Under-secretary of State to my office to go over the letter
with me. He did so at 4:30. He read the letter at the
conference. It was unsatisfactory. The President said
in it that he could not accept the Senate’s action, that its
action and the delay left the stage set for the old plots,
that the world was left without a treaty, that Germany
was free to become a menace once more, and that she need
not give up armaments, or Alsace-Lorraine, or make rep
aration. I did not say so, but I doubted if the President
had had anything to do with the preparation of this
letter. I could not understand how he could make such
statements. I suggested that the letter be changed. It
contained erroneous statements. There was a Treaty.
All the other powers had agreed to the Versailles Treaty.
The fact was that we only had not accepted it. Germany
was not free to become a menace. She would have to
give up armaments and surrender Alsace-Lorraine and
properly make reparation. Germany’s armament was
already largely gone; her fleet was gone, and France al
ready had Alsace-Lorraine. The letter, as it stood, I said,
would arouse great adverse comment and would irritate
the Allies.

The statement that the only course left was for the
nation to have a referendum on the Treaty at the next
election was, I thought, unwise. It was a flat declaration,
in effect, against further attempts to agree on reservations
and would, if assented to, make the Treaty a partisan
issue in an election, while the people were in bad humour
and might be interested in many other things besides the
Treaty. The conference asked me to revise the address.
In the circumstances, I agreed to do what I could to
alter the letter. I realized that it would be difficult to do
more than reshape the statements which contained errors
of fact or interpretation. I knew that it would be im
possible to avoid saying that our acceptance of the Treaty
should be left to a referendum. I revised the letter to
indicate plainly that the President was not opposed to
reservations of an interpretative character but that if the
Senate did not accept the Treaty outright or with such
reservations, the only course left would be to submit the
matter to the people.
I sent the revised letter to Tumulty at twelve o’clock
Wednesday. On the afternoon of the eighth, I called
him up and asked if there was any news. He replied
that everything was fine and that the letter as revised
would be substantially accepted.
A t the banquet the letter was read. Apparently, the
audience approved the President’s statement that he
would accept reservations as indicated but that, if the
Senate persisted in its course, the Treaty should be sub
mitted to a referendum.
About this time Mr. Bryan managed to give the people
the benefit o f his views on the Treaty. Among other
things, he informed the people that minorities were sup

posed to conform, and that, since the Republicans had
organized the Senate, the President ought to have let
them assume responsibility and have their way. He
overlooked the little facts that the Constitution does not
provide for majority ratification of treaties but for a
two thirds majority, and that the Senate did not act be
cause it could not get a two thirds vote on any proposition.
On January 31st, a few weeks later, Lord Grey published
a letter in a London paper in which he indicated that the
Allies would show a sympathetic attitude toward the
ratification of the Treaty with the Lodge reservations and
that the British Empire would not resent the amendments
except the one providing a modification of the provision
dealing with its six votes in the assembly. People in
Washington were more surprised at this action of Lord
Grey’s than I was, because, at a dinner in Washington, I
happened to be standing within a foot of him and Lodge
and could not avoid overhearing him sympathetically com
menting on Lodge’s handling of the Treaty and on his res
ervations. In spite of the fact that the President had
said in August, 1919, to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, that he would accept interpretative reservations,
in spite of the fact that he reiterated this in his speeches
on his Western trip, in spite of the fact that he restated it
in his Jackson Day letter, apparently his position did not
get over to the people; and many very intelligent men were
insisting that the President was committed to the ratifi
cation of the Treaty without the “ change of a dot of an
i or the cross of a /.” This, of course, I knew to be untrue
and wondered why it was that it was so difficult to get his
attitude before the public. I knew, not only from his
speeches but from other sources, what the President’s

attitude was. On February 9, 1920, when the Treaty
again came before the Senate for consideration, Senator
Hitchcock read the following letter:
The White House,
January 26, 1920.
My

dear

Sen ato r H

it c h c o c k :

I have greatly appreciated your thoughtful kindness in
keeping me informed concerning the conferences you and
some of your colleagues have had with spokesmen of the
Republican party concerning the possibility of ratification
of the Treaty of Peace, and send this line in special ap
preciative acknowledgment of your letter of the twentysecond. I return the clipping you were kind enough to
inclose.
To the substance of it I, of course, adhere. I am bound
to. Like yourself, I am solemnly sworn to obey and
maintain the Constitution of the United States. But I
think the form of it very unfortunate. Any reservation
or resolution stating that “ the United States assumes no
obligation under such and such an article unless or except”
would, I am sure, chill our relationship with the nations
with which we expect to be associated in the great enter
prise of maintaining the world’s peace.
That association must in any case, my dear Senator, in
volve very serious and far-reaching implications of honour
and duty which I am sure we shall never in fact be desirous
of ignoring. It is the more important not to create the
impression that we are trying to escape obligations.
But I realize that negative criticism is not all that is
called for in so serious a matter. I am happy to be able
to add, therefore, that I have once more gone over the
[50]

reservations proposed by yourself, the copy of which I re
turn herewith, and am glad to say that I can accept them
as they stand.
I have never seen the slightest reason to doubt the good
faith of our associates in the war, nor ever had the slight
est reason to fear that any nation would seek to enlarge
our obligations under the Covenant of the League of
Nations, or seek to commit us to lines of action which,
under our Constitution, only the Congress of the United
States can in the last analysis decide.
May I suggest that with regard to the possible with
drawal of the United States it would be wise to give to the
President the right to act upon a resolution of Congress in
the matter of withdrawal? In other words, it would seem
to be permissible and advisable that any resolution giving
notice of withdrawal should be a joint rather than a con
current resolution.
I doubt whether the President can be deprived of his
veto power under the Constitution, even with his own con
sent. The use of a joint resolution would permit the
President, who is, of course, charged by the Constitution
with the conduct of foreign policy, to merely exercise a
voice in saying whether so important a step as withdrawal
from the League of Nations should be accomplished by a
majority or by a two thirds vote.
The Constitution itself providing that the legislative
body was to be consulted in treaty making, and having
prescribed a two thirds vote in such cases, it seems to me
that there should be no unnecessary departure from the
method there indicated.
I see no objection to a frank statement that the United
States can accept a mandate with regard to any territory

under Article X III, Part I, or any other provision of the
Treaty of Peace, only by the direct authority and action
of the Congress of the United States.
I hope, my dear Senator, that you will never hesitate to
call upon me for any assistance that I can render in this
or any other public matter.
Cordially and sincerely, yours,
W

oodrow

W il s o n .

It will be noted that in this letter the President stated
that he was glad to say that he accepted Senator Hitch
cock’s reservations as they stood. These reservations
were as follows:
“ 2. The United States assumes no obligation to
employ its military or naval forces of the economic boy
cott to preserve the territorial integrity or political in
dependence of any other country under the provisions of
Article X , or to employ the military or naval forces of the
United States under any other article of the Treaty for
any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress,
which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to de
clare war, shall, by act or joint resolution so provide.
Nothing herein shall be deemed to impair the obligation
in Article X V I concerning the economic boycott.”
Proposed substitute reservations by Mr. Hitchcock to
take the place of those proposed by Senator Lodge:
“ That any member nation proposing to withdraw from
the League on two years’ notice is the sole judge as to
whether its obligations referred to in Article I of the
League of Nations have been performed as required in
said article.
“ That no member nation is required to submit to the

League, its council, or its assembly, for decision, report, or
recommendation, any matter which it considers to be in
international law a domestic question such as immigra
tion, labour, tariff, or other matter relating to its internal
or coastwise affairs.
“ That the national policy of the United States known as
the Monroe Doctrine, as announced and interpreted by
the United States, is not in any way impaired or affected
by the Covenant of the League of Nations and is not sub
ject to any decision, report, or inquiry by the Council or
Assembly.
“ That the advice mentioned in Article X of the Cove
nant of the League which the Council may give to the
member nations as to the employment of their naval and
military forces is merely advice which each member nation
is free to accept or reject according to the conscience and
judgment of its then existing government, and in the
United States this advice can only be accepted by action
of the Congress at the time in being, Congress alone under
the Constitution of the United States having the power
to declare war.
“ That in case of a dispute between members of the
League, if one of them have self-governing colonies, domin
ions, or parts which have representation in the Assembly,
each and all are to be considered parties to the dispute,
and the same shall be the rule if one of the parties to the
dispute is a self-governing colony, dominion, or part, in
which case, all other self-governing colonies, dominions, or
parts, as well as the nation as a whole, shall be considered
parties to the dispute, and each and all shall be disqualified
from having their votes counted in case of any inquiry
on said dispute made by the Assembly. ”

On February n th , amendments were offered by bi
partisan conferees but were rejected by Senator Hitch
cock, the Administration leader.
On March 19th, the Treaty again came before the
Senate for final vote. The resolution of ratification and
the reservations or amendments were substantially similar
to those rejected on November 19,1919, and need not be
repeated. The Treaty was rejected at this time by a
Vote of 49 “ ayes” to 39 “ noes.” On May 15th, the Knox
resolution, introduced in the Senate some time before, pro
posing a separate treaty with Germany and amended to
eliminate the request that the President should negotiate
a separate treaty with Germany, passed the Senate by a
vote of 43 to 38. Among the affirmative votes were
three Democratic Senators: Reed of Missouri, Shields of
Tennessee, and Walsh of Massachusetts. On M ay 21st,
it passed the House by a vote of 228 to 139. And on May
27th, it was vetoed by the President in a message in which
he said that he was unwilling to become a party to an
action which would stain the honour of the United States.
The next day, an effort was made to pass the resolution
over the President’s veto, but it failed by a vote of 219 to
152. And thus the deadlock continued.
Certain Republican agencies are assiduously disseminat
ing the representation that the Treaty failed because of the
obstinacy of the President. They are leading the public
to believe that he insisted on die Treaty without the
“ change of a dot of an i or the cross of a
It is difficult
for me to see how a fair-minded man can accept the view
that the President, because of his stubbornness, is mainly
responsible for the failure of the Senate to ratify the
Treaty, for the following reasons:

(1) In the first place, it would have entailed no risk or
danger to the United States, if it had promptly accepted
the Treaty as it was presented. On the contrary, it
would have promoted peaceful adjustments in the world
and have advanced the welfare of this country. It is
pure nonsense to say that the League creates a superstate,
or that it would in any way impair the independence of
action of any department of our government, or that it
jeopardize any of our fundamental interests. The
League can take no effective action without the unanimous
vote of the Council. We would have been represented
on the Council. The assent of our representative would
have been necessary for any effective action. His assent
would not have been given without instructions from our
government. No President would have given instruc
tions in any essential matter, especially in any matter in
volving war, without full consultation with Congress and
the necessary action by Congress. Furthermore, if the
Council acted, its action would have been only advisory
and the judgment of Congress would have had to be exer
cised as to all the facts in the case and the final course of
this government.
(2) The President repeatedly asserted that he was
not opposed to interpretative reservations which would
make the position of this country clear and which would
clarify the meaning of the Covenant. All that he asked
was that these reservations accompany the act of ratifica
tion instead of being made a part of it. Unquestionably
this would have put the world on notice as to our position
and would have been accepted. They would have served
every useful purpose. He objected to reservations which
would change the structure of the League or to amend

ments, because these would have to go back to the various
ratifying parties to the Treaty, including Germany. And
such a course was unnecessary. The President’s view on
this point seems to me to have been reasonable.
(3) He specifically and publicly assented to the Hitch
cock reservations which covered all matters of real vital
import.
(4) On the other hand, Lodge and the majority of theSenate Committee on Foreign Relations strenuously resisted
every effort to ratify the Treaty except on the basis of the
Lodge reservations, incorporated in the act of ratification.
Certainly, the stubbornness was not all on one side.
Unquestionably, the President was stubborn; and I be
lieve that his stubbornness was, in the main, justified.
But can it be fairly said that he alone was stubborn?
I have not been aware of the fact that Lodge, Borah,
Brandegee, Johnson, and Reed were soft and pliable.
Which side was the more unyielding is certainly debat
able, at least. Even if the President had indicated that
he was willing to have the Treaty ratified with the Lodge
reservations and the Senate had acted accordingly it is
by no means certain that any good would have resulted.
The members of the League, and especially Great Britain
and the Dominions, might have refused to accept the
amendments and admit us to the League. I doubt, too,
whether Lodge would, at this stage, have let the Treaty
go through even with his own reservations, if he had had
warning that the Democrats in the Senate would accept
them. This view is based partly upon general impres
sions and partly upon the following incident.
At Cabinet meeting, one day, when the Treaty was
under consideration, the President was called to the

telephone. It was stated that a Senator wished to
speak to him. He came back and said that a conference
was being held and that a form of statement on Article
X had been worked out, which, it was understood,
Lodge would accept. The President asked what we
thought about the matter. We instantly replied that he
should authorize the Senator to proceed. He said that
he would do so and returned to the telephone to give his
assent. Before we adjourned, the President answered
the telephone again. When he returned, he remarked
that there was nothing doing— that Lodge would not ad
here to his understanding. Later, on the floor of the
Senate, Lodge was charged with his failure to stand by
his agreement. It is probable that the matter could not
have been carried through unless, at the time of the final
vote on the reservations, the Democrats, on word from
the President, had suddenly joined in an affirmative vote.
It seems clear, as I have stated, that Lodge, for various
reasons, passed through an interesting mental transition
in respect to the League. He, himself, had advocated an
association stronger than the League. When the Treaty
was brought back to this country, it would appear that
Lodge’s first thought was that it would be popular to per
mit the Treaty’s ratification, but, as I have said, with
just sufficient changes to enable him to ascribe credit to
the Republicans. Later, because of attacks made on the
Treaty and the Covenant, by “ irreconcilable” Senators,
and particularly by a large section of the press, he began
to change his mind and to feel that it would be possible
and popular to defeat the Treaty.
The situation then was that the matter was to be left
for determination of the American people in a solemn ref

erendum. The Democratic party in its platform flatly
declared for the League of Nations and applauded the
President’s courage. It rejected the Republican view.
The Republican party announced its approval of an
agreement among nations to preserve the peace of the
world. It advocated an international association based,
upon international justice. Its plank seemed to call for
an instant and general international conference, whenever
peace was threatened by political action. It approved
the stand of the Senators who insisted upon reservations.
The suggestion of occasional general international con
ferences, whenever peace was threatened, was, of course,
not new. It was a suggestion that the world return to
pre-war practices which had failed. It evidenced no
awareness of changed conditions, or of a need for a perma
nent body, which should study situations, seek to remove
the causes of friction, and prevent disturbances of peace.
The campaign itself was hectic. It was obvious that
the League would be only one of numerous factors on
which the people would base their judgments. It was
clear that all the forces of unrest would operate. No
clear stand was taken by the Republican party and it
was impossible to get a frank declaration from the Re
publican candidate as to the course he would pursue.
Senator Harding revealed the same inability or unwilling
ness to understand the meaning of the Covenant which he
had revealed when the President received the Foreign
Affairs Committee in August, 1919. He indulged in reck
less assertions, such as that the League was utterly impo
tent, that it could not be a preventive of wars, and that
Europe was abandoning the League. He went further,
apparently, than his platform by declaring as follows:

“ The other type is a society of free nations, or an asso
ciation of free nations, or a league of free nations, animated
by considerations of right and justice, instead of might and
self-interest, and not merely proclaimed an agency in pur
suit of peace, but so organized and so participated in
as to make the actual attainment of peace a reasonable
possibility. Such an association I favour with all my
heart, and I would make no fine distinction as to whom
credit is due. One need not care what it is called. Let it
be an association, a society, or a league, or what not, our
concern is solely with the substance, not the form thereof.”
Later, a body of thirty-one eminent Republican leaders
assured the people of the nation that the quickest way for
them to get the nation into the League was to vote for
the Republican candidate. It is incredible that this could
have been done without the knowledge of the Republican
National Committee and also of Senator Harding.

CHAPTER XXIV
APPOINTED SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Financial Conditions in 1920— The President Asks Lansing to
Resign— Appointment of Bainbridge Colby

AW OKE Sunday morning, January 25, 1920, at five
o’clock, with the grippe. I was aching and chilly and
had a temperature of 101. At 11 *.301 was called up by
the White House and was told that Mrs. Wilson
wished me to call at 4:30 that afternoon. I hesitated for a
moment, on account of my slight illness, but finally said
that I would be glad to call as requested. There were three
things, any one of which I imagined the President possibly
wished to canvass with me— the Treasury vacancy, the
Treaty situation which I had been discussing with Tu
multy, or a successor to Lane, whose resignation had been
announced in the press. Later, I called .up the White
House, spoke to Mrs. Wilson, and told her I had a cold and
fever. I added that perhaps she would be afraid to have
me come on her account. She replied that she had a cold
herself and would take a chance if I would. She said:
“ I am not afraid of you, if you are not afraid of me.”
I called at the appointed time. Mrs. Wilson was in the
downstairs sitting room. She greeted me very graciously
and discussed various matters until the servants had
finished serving tea. Then she said: “ You are wondering
why I wanted to see you and why I sent for you this after
noon. O f course, you know that I did not ask you to take

the trouble to come merely to drink tea. The President
asked me to tell you that he is very anxious for you to
accept the Secretaryship of the Treasury. He is reluctant
to have you give up Agriculture, but still he thinks he
now needs you more in the Treasury. He thought of
putting you there twice before— first, when McAdoo
thought of resigning, and second, when he did resign— but
could not make up his mind to have you leave the Depart
ment of Agriculture.”
When she finished, I said: “ Please give my greetings to
the President and tell him that I am very grateful to him
for this further evidence of his confidence. I am in the
harness until March 4, 1921, if he wishes it, and as long
as I am with him I will dig stumps, or act as Secretary of
the Treasury, or assume any other task he assigns me.”
Mrs. Wilson smiled and replied: “ That is very interesting.
That is just what the President said you would say.”
Mrs. Wilson said that the President would like to know
whether I had anybody in mind to suggest for Secretary of
Agriculture. I asked if he was thinking about anybody.
She answered: “ Yes, Meredith.” I replied that Meredith
came from the right section, that he was in touch with
agricultural problems through his newspaper, and that it
seemed to me that he ought to fill the position acceptably.
I told her that I had at one time sounded him out as to
whether he would take the Assistant Secretaryship, that
I had suggested him for membership on the War Agricul
tural Council, and that I had mentioned his name for
membership on the Industrial Conference, but that I
knew very little about his intellectual ability and whether
he was Cabinet size or not. I added: “ If I had to select
a Secretary of Agriculture, I would draft President W. O.
[61]

Thompson of the University of Ohio. He is a man of very
independent judgment. He is an independent in politics,
but I understand that he voted for Mr. Wilson both in
1912 and in 1916. He is a man of unusual ability, of
great wisdom, and of sound views. He has been the
Dean of the Presidents of the Land-Grant colleges. I
know of no one who stands higher in the agricultural field
among leaders and sensible thinkers.”
She then asked whether I had anybody in mind whom I
could suggest for the position of Secretary of the Interior.
She added: “ The President is somewhat embarrassed.
Secretary Lane has resigned— in the press. The President
has not yet been officially informed of his going. He
would like your judgment.” I told her that I had nobody
in mind at the moment, but that I would think it over.
She said that the President would really prefer somebody
not from the Far West, since the Interior Department
problems lie mainly in the West, and that it was difficult
to find a Western man who would take a sufficiently de
tached or national view.

When I went to the Treasury, much nonsense was being
talked concerning the economic situation in the United
States and in the foreign field. It was clear to me that
there was no short cut to recovery either at home or
abroad. There is no short road to a stabilization of ex
change. It can be rectified only when the underlying
economic forces are satisfactorily operating and production
and trade improve. The exchange will be stabilized
when a reasonable recovery from the effects of the war is
made. This will be hastened if Europe will stop fighting,
disarm as largely as possible, cut down" expenditures,
stop the printing presses, and abate foolish trade restric

[62]

tions. Incidentally, the Allies must be reasonable in
their exactions against the Central Powers. They must
give them a chance. They, too, have been hard hit. The
indemnity amount will have to be reduced and fixed; and
it must be recognized that no substantial payments can be
made in the near future. The world cannot recover as
long as the central part of Europe is in chaos; and unless
assistance is rendered, Germany and Austria will sink
deeper into the mire and draw others in with them. If
the Allies want actually to get something, they must ask
less. They could not take what they ask even if Germany
could produce it and give it. French producers would
bitterly fight the importation of large quantities of com
petitive German commodities.
In the meantime, Europe will have to cut down her con
sumption and to import less. Exports from the United
States will decline. Prices will fall, especially prices of
agricultural products. Europe will first try to produce
her own foodstuffs, and she will turn in part to other coun
tries where she can get them at lower rates. At any rate,
if we export, we must take lower prices. That this would
occur, I warned the farmers in the fall of 1918 and through
out 1919. I predicted before and just after the Armistice
that, on the return of peace, there would probably be a
period of optimism and of feverish trading, that there
would then begin a decline, especially of agricultural
prices, that this would start an agrarian movement, and
that the farmers, in ignorance of underlying causes, would
see a conspiracy on the part of the bankers to ruin them.
I felt that the farmers would not be able to control their
production quickly and that, because of the lessened de
mand from Europe, for the reasons I have indicated, and

for the further reason that we had stopped lending Europe
money, prices might go very low. And yet, business men
were urging that farmers produce and produce. I pro
tested against this in the Industrial Conference in Wash
ington in the late fall of 1918, saying that farmers should
not be urged to produce as much as they had or more,
unless business men were prepared to protect them
against a drop in price. This, I knew, could not be done.
I warned the Conference that a drop in general prices
would come and that, if they were prudent, they would
arrange to weather the storm. I advised farmers to return
to a balanced agriculture and to pursue practices best
suited to their own needs and to those of their community.
I urged this in official statements and in addresses in the
latter part of 1918, and, especially, in 1919 and 1920.
On February 10, 1920, I received a letter from the
Secretary of State, telling me that, on the seventh, he had
received a letter from the President indicating that he
would not consider it proper for the Cabinet to meet except
at his personal summons. The Secretary stated that in
view of this letter, he had requested the Executive Office
to notify the members of the Cabinet that there would be
no meeting on the tenth and no further meetings unless
they were summoned by the President, himself. This is
the letter:
The Secretary of State,
Washington,
February 10, 1920.
My

dear

M r. Secr eta r y :

I received on the seventh a letter from the President in
dicating that he did not consider it proper for the Cabinet

President Wilson and his C abinet in 1920

to meet except at his personal summons. In view of this
letter, I requested the Executive Office to notify the mem
bers of the Cabinet that there would be no meeting to-day,
and in compliance with the intimation contained in the
letter there will be no meetings in the /uture unless sum
moned by the President himself.
I am notifying the other Cabinet Officers to this effect.
Very sincerely yours,
R o b e r t L a n s in g .

Honourable David F. Houston,
Secretary of the Treasury.
I was puzzled over this letter. I wondered what was
back of it. We had been having Cabinet meetings during
the President’s absences. When he first went to Paris,
he requested us to hold Cabinet meetings, which we did.
When he went West for a long absence, we continued to
hold Cabinet meetings. When he returned, evidently
very ill, although he was in Washington, it seemed not only
natural but desirable that we should hold Cabinet meet
ings for its effect on the public mind. The public was ex
cited. It seemed that it would be a good thing to hold
up the picture before the public that the government was
going forward with its ordinary activities in about the
usual way. The only question I had when the Cabinet
meeting was held, after the President’s return from the
West, was as to the time fixed by the Secretary of State
for the first meeting. It was called for an unusual day.
It was called, so far as I knew, by Mr. Lansing without
consultation. It would have been better to call it for
the usual day. It seemed obvious that calling it for an
unusual day would raise questions. Several members of

the Cabinet doubted the wisdom of holding meetings at
all.
We could, of course, take no action as a Cabinet. We
could, however, in this way more conveniently discuss
matters of* general interest and particularly of depart
mental interest. And we could, if necessary, after can
vassing problems, advise the President of our conclusions.
We did so specifically in respect to the coal and railroad
situations. In the coal matter, I, myself, went over to
the White House at the request of the Cabinet to explain
our views to Mrs. Wilson for transmission to the President.
The President replied in writing and raised no question
about our meeting. Obviously, it would have been
possible and better if the matter of continuing to hold
Cabinet meetings had been taken up with the President
and we had ascertained his wishes in respect to them.
On Saturday, February 14th, I dined at a friend’s house.
Doctor Grayson was there. I talked to him about a
number of matters. I stressed especially the d u rability
of the President’s filling vacancies on the Tariff Commis
sion. The Chairman of the Commission had been dis
turbed about these vacancies for a long time. I asked
Doctor Grayson to tell the President that I thought the
vacancies should be filled and that it would be desirable for
him to appoint a man who would be recognized as a regular
Republican. I said that the Commission should be obvi
ously bi-partisan. It had been said that it was essential
to get someone not too much identified with the protected
industries. I remarked that this seemed to me not to be
the main question; that it would be difficult to get a good
business man and a Republican who had not been tied to
something, that the chief consideration was to get an able
[ ]

and honest man and then to trust him and his colleagues,
and that this was essential to keep the Commission out of
politics. It would not do to assume that a man could not
take a broad or fair view because of his particular business
relations.
Apparently, it was difficult for the President, except
during the war, to get his consent to appoint a straightout Republican even to a bi-partisan board. As a rule,
he selected men who belonged to the Progressive wing,
some of whom had gone off with Mr. Roosevelt, deserting
the Republican party. He seemed to feel that it would be
difficult for such a regular Republican to take a fair and
unbiassed view. I regarded this as unfortunate from
many points of view. I knew that the regular Republi
cans would not consider it fair play, and that when they
came to power they might retaliate. Such a course would
necessarily mean the breakdown of any bi-partisan regu
latory board, or board of inquiry. And it would necessar
ily lead to Republican resentment and opposition.
Doctor Grayson told me that the President had asked
for Lansing’s resignation. I was surprised, not that
Lansing was asked to resign, but that he should have been
asked to resign at that time. From what I had heard, the
question was raised in my mind why he had not been asked
to go sooner. I recalled that the President had said to me
originally that he would not appoint Lansing, because he
had no imagination and would not oppose him to his face
in any serious matter. It was apparent, after Lansing
came back from Paris, that he was not in sympathy with
the President on vital points in the Treaty. He did not
succeed in disguising his differences. It came to me in
various ways that he was against the Shantung settlement

and against Article X , and that he thought it would have
been better merely to provide that the members of the
League should respect one another’s territorial integrity
and neutrality. It was believed that Lodge and also cer
tain diplomats knew his views. It had come out in the
hearing before the Committee of the Senate, when the
President was in the West, that Lansing had not been in
sympathy with the President.
I asked Doctor Grayson if he knew who would succeed
Lansing. He said that the President was very much wor
ried; in fact, that he was worrying himself sick over the
matter. I asked him why. He replied that the President
was no longer in position to write his notes and papers as
he formally was, and that he wanted somebody who had
great facility in this direction. I said that it would be
very easy to get a fine man very near at hand. Grayson
asked whom I had in mind. I replied: “ Frank Polk, of
course.” “ Just what I told him,” Grayson said. I
added: “ Polk is every inch a gentleman. He has ability.
He knows the domestic and foreign situations. He has
good judgment. He has a fine spirit and good sense. He
knows Europe and is well liked. The Treasury has many
points of contact with the State Department and, with
Polk at the head of the State Department, I could co
operate with him easily in common matters.” I re
marked further that Polk had great loyalty and courage
and that, if I had a dozen villains attacking me at the same
moment, I did not know anybody I should prefer to have
at my side. Doctor Grayson again observed that the
President wanted somebody who had special facility in
writing. I replied then that I would make another sug
gestion. “ Let him make Polk Secretary of State. Have
[ ]

him send word to President Alderman, of the University of
Virginia, to come to see him. Let him tell Alderman
that, as he is sick, he would like to draft him into the State
Department as First Assistant Secretary, with nothing to
do but write.” I asserted that Alderman could say
“ N o” to foreign diplomats in words which would make
them weep in gratitude for his considerate refusal. I
added that I felt sure that Alderman, although his health
was not good, would not refuse, in the circumstances.
Grayson said: “ I am going to see the chief before he goes
to sleep, and I shall tell him exactly what you have said.”
The following morning, Bainbridge Colby’s appoint
ment appeared in the papers. That afternoon I saw
Doctor Grayson near the Treasury. I asked him what
had happened. He replied that he saw the President and
gave him my message, and that the President smiled a
grim smile and said: “ You and Houston are freight
wagons. Why did you not think of this yesterday after
noon? I have already acted.”
The Lansing correspondence appeared Saturday. In
the circumstances, I was somewhat surprised that the
President placed emphasis on Lansing’s action in calling
the Cabinet meetings. It was apparent that there was
more back of the correspondence than appeared. I re
called Doctor Grayson’s statement, at our first Cabinet
meeting after the President’s illness, that the President
was irritated over the report that we were meeting, and
wanted to know by whose authority we had met, adding
that, if he had wanted us to meet, he would have let us
know.
A Cabinet meeting was held in the President’s study in
the old Cabinet room in the White House proper on April

13th. This was the first meeting with the President since
August, 1919, the first meeting since he went on his
Western trip. I arrived several minutes late. The Pres
ident was already seated behind a desk at the far end of
the room. I noted that I was ushered into his presence
by the White House aide, and was announced by him to
the President. This struck me as singular, and I won
dered why it was done. The President looked old, worn,
and haggard. It was enough to make one weep to look
at him. One o*f his arms was useless. In repose, his face
looked very much as usual, but, when he tried to speak,
there were marked evidences of his trouble. His jaw
tended to drop on one side, or seemed to do so. His voice
was very weak and strained. I shook hands with him and
sat down. He greeted me as of old. He put up a brave
front and spent several minutes cracking jokes. Then
there was a brief silence. It appeared that he would
not take the initiative. Someone brought up the railroad
situation for discussion. The President seemed at first to
have some difficulty in fixing his mind on what we were
discussing. Doctor Grayson looked in the door several
times, as if to warn us not to prolong the discussion unduly
for fear of wearying the President. The discussion drag
ged on for more than an hour. Finally, Mrs. Wilson came
in, looking rather disturbed, and suggested that we had
better go.
A t the next meeting, on Tuesday, April 27th, the Presi
dent seemed rather better and took a much more lively
part in the discussions.

CHAPTER XXV

The President Requests Draft of a Veto of Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Appropriation— Vetoing the Budget Measure Be
cause of Its Encroachments— Opinions on the Budget

OR some time, it had been apparent that mem
bers of Congress were bent, not only on obstruct
ing the President in his policies, but also upon
having Congress usurp certain executive func
tions. They had planned, when we entered the war,
to have a Congressional Committee on the conduct of
the war, such as existed during the Civil War. It
would be a fatal thing to have such a body now, just as it
was almost fatal then. If the Congress had succeeded in
its plans to interfere in the conduct of the war, it would
have made as great a mess of things as it did, not only in
the Civil War, but also in the Mexican War. In both
these wars, Congress hideously failed as a military agency.
It would have been irritating, if it had not been amusing,
to hear charges of Presidential usurpation, of which there
was none, when, as a matter of fact, there were glaring
instances of Congressional invasion of the executive field.
This fact had come to my attention months before, when I
was in the Department of Agriculture. In May, 1920, it
came out sharply in connection with the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Bill for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1921.

On April 15, 1920, I wrote the President a personal
letter, calling his attention to the increasing disposition
on the part of the Congress to encroach upon fields clearly
in the province of the executive. I pointed out a number
of proposals and provisions of law evidencing this dis
position, including the transfer of the Bureau of Efficiency
from the executive to the legislative, the Commission on
Public Buildings, and the provision relating to printing.
I suggested that, in view of the seriousness of the matter,
he obtain the opinion of the Attorney General. Nothing
was done until the passage of the Appropriation Bill re
ferred to. On M ay 3d, I wrote the President the following
letter:
The Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington,
M ay 3, 1920.
D

ear

M r. P

r e s id e n t :

I return herewith Bill H. R. 12610, “ making appropri
ations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses
of the government for the fiscal year ending June 30,1921,
and for other purposes,” and recommend that you veto
this bill. Section 8 of the bill amends Section 11 of the
Act approved March 1, 1919, by adding a proviso pro
hibiting mimeographing, multigraphing, and other proc
esses used for the duplication of typewritten and printed
matter, except under such regulations as may be adopted
by the Congressional Joint Committee on Printing.
Previously the jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on
Printing has been limited to public printing and binding
and distribution of publications. Whatever may be said
for the existing administrative powers of this Joint Com

mittee of Congress, the provision contained in this bill
is such an encroachment upon the province of the execu
tive that I feel it should be brought to your attention.
For the Committee to undertake to establish regulations
governing every process for duplicating typewritten
matter means that it proposes to enter into every depart
ment of the government and determine what information
shall be made public. For instance, the Treasury habitu
ally makes public current information concerning the
financial operations of the government which will be of
general interest. I think that the Treasury of the United
States should not be subjected to the meddling of a Joint
Committee of Congress in a matter of this sort. I believe
the same principle ought to govern in every other depart'
ment. No question of coordination is involved; each
department has its own typewriters, stenographers, and
supplies of paper and duplicating machinery. Under the
terms of the bill, the Joint Committee on Printing would
have the power to prohibit even the making of carbon
copies of anything other than official correspondence and
office records. I believe that the time has come when
you should make an issue of this legislative usurpation of
executive functions, particularly when it arises on such a
matter as the attempt of the Joint Committee on Printing
to exercise a censorship over the executive departments.
I consider it one of the first duties of the Treasury in par
ticular to make public information concerning its financial
operations, and I should feel very much concerned indeed
to see such a provision as this become a law. It seems to
me it involves a very important principle.
Quite obviously the question is one which must affect
other departments as well as mine, and I have no doubt

you will wish to consult other members of the Cabinet
and ascertain their views.
In this connection, I call your attention to my personal
letter of April 15, 1920. The Senate amendment trans
ferring the Bureau of Efficiency from the jurisdiction of
the President to that of the Congress, mentioned in that
letter, was eliminated in conference, but the provision en
larging the powers of the Joint Committee on Printing, as
outlined above, was retained.
The Treasury has two other objections to the bill which
I feel obliged to call to your attention in view of my recom
mendation that the bill be vetoed, although I should not
regard them as sufficiently serious in themselves to warrant
a veto.
Cordially yours,
D. F. H o u s t o n .
Secretary.

The President,
The White House.
The President replied in his own handwriting that he
would be very grateful if the Secretary of the Treasury
would draft a veto message for him.
On receiving this direction, I decided that it would be
desirable for me to confer with the Attorney General as
I had advised the President. I did so and was referred
to the Solicitor General, who gave me an informal state
ment to the effect that he was unable to advise that the
A ct was unconstitutional. I was not satisfied with his
opinion, but I felt obliged, in the circumstances, not only
to inform the President of it, but also, partly to relieve
him from embarrassment, formally to withdraw my ten

tative recommendation that he veto the bill, which I did
under date of May 7th as follows:
The Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington,
May 7, 1920.
D

ear

P r e s id e n t :

I received your note asking me to prepare for your con
sideration a message vetoing the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Appropriation Bill for the reasons suggested
in my letter to you of the 3d instant. I shall of course be
glad to prepare the message if after reading this letter
you still desire me to do so.
It was my own view that the proviso in Section 8 of the
bill, that no journal, magazine, periodical, or similar
government publication shall be printed, issued, or dis
continued by any branch or office of the government serv
ice unless authorized under regulations prescribed by the
Joint Committee on Printing, and that nothing should be
mimeographed or multigraphed other than official cor
respondence, would not only interfere with administrative
work, but that it constituted an invasion of the executive
power and was unconstitutional. It was upon the as
sumption thac this proviso did constitute an invasion of
the executive power and was unconstitutional that I ten
tatively suggested that you should veto the measure. I
felt, however, that you would desire that I consult the
Department of Justice as to the legal phase of the matter,
particularly in view of the fact that in my personal letter
to you of April 15 th I had suggested that the Attorney
General be requested to inquire into the constitutionality
of several pending legislative proposals, including the one

now under consideration. I therefore asked the advice
of the Attorney General. He referred me to the Solicitor
General, who informally advises me that the proviso does
not constitute an invasion of the Executive power and is
constitutional. He bases his opinion on the wide control
of Congress over the public funds and its right to impose
conditions with respect to their expenditure.
While I still think thatsuch legislation is administratively
objectionable, I am of the opinion that, since the consti
tutional objection cannot be raised, it would be inadvisable
for you to veto the bill because it contains this proviso.
I think that at some time in the future the propriety of
such legislation may be raised on its merits and a recon
sideration be secured, and that the defects as to the two
items of appropriation can also be cured in time to prevent
any great inconvenience. In these circumstances, I feel
obliged to withdraw my tentative recommendation that
you veto the bill, and to suggest that you sign it.
Faithfully yours,
D. F. H o u s t o n .
The President,
The White House.
The President noted in his own handwriting on the
letter which he returned:
“ I still hold your original view and would be greatly
obliged for a draft of a veto.
“ W. W ”
Immediately upon receipt of this direction, I prepared
a veto message which the President transmitted to Con

[76]

gress under date of May 13, 1920.
lows:

It is, in part, as fol

To t h e H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s :
I am returning, without my signature, H. R. 12610,
“ An Act Making Appropriations for the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial Expenses of the Government for
the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1921, and for other
purposes.”
I object to, and cannot approve, Section 8 of the bill,
which amends Section 11 of the Act approved March 1,
1919, as follows:
“ Sec. 8. That Section 11 of the Act entitled ‘ An Act
Making Appropriations for the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Expenses of the Government for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1920, and for other purposes’ is hereby
amended by striking out the first proviso and inserting
the following in lieu thereof:
“ Provided, That hereafter no journal, magazine, pe
riodical, or similar government publication, shall be
printed, issued, or discontinued by any branch or officer
of the government service unless the same shall have been
authorized under such regulations as shall be prescribed
by the Joint Committee on Printing, and such publications
shall not contain any commercial advertisements: Pro
vided, further, That the foregoing provisions of this sec
tion shall also apply to mimeographing, multigraphing,
and other processes used for the duplication of type
written and printed matter, other than official correspond
ence and office records.”
Without raising any constitutional question, I think
that this section, which would give the Congressional

Joint Committee on Printing power to exercise censorship
over the executive departments, is an encroachment on the
functions of the Executive and incompatible with good
government. I am in entire sympathy with the efforts of
the Congress and the departments to effect economies in
printing and in the use of paper and supplies, but I do not
believe that such a provision as this should become law.
I should also call attention to the fact that by its terms
the section in question absolutely forbids mimeographing,
multigraphing, and other duplicating processes in the
executive departments (except as permitted by regu
lations established by the Congressional Joint Committee
on Printing) and thus imposes a flat prohibition against
the exercise of executive functions.
I f we are to have efficient and economical business
administration of government affairs, the Congress, I be
lieve, should direct its efforts to the control of public
moneys along broader lines, fixing the amounts to be
expended and then holding the executive departments
strictly responsible for their use. This can be accom
plished by the enactment of legislation, establishing an
effective budget system which I have heretofore urged.
The Congress and the Executive must function within
their respective spheres. Otherwise, efficient and re
sponsible management will be impossible and progress
impeded by the wasteful forces of disorganization and
obstruction. The Congress has the power and the right
to grant or deny an appropriation, or to enact or refuse to
enact a law; but once an appropriation is made or a law is
passed, the appropriation should be administered or the
law executed by the executive branch of the government.
In no other way can the government be efficiently man

aged and responsibility fixed. The Congress has the right
to confer upon its committees full authority for purposes
of investigation and the accumulation of information for
its guidance, but I do not concede the right, and certainly
not the wisdom, of the Congress endowing a committee of
either House or a joint committee of both Houses with
power to prescribe “ regulations” under which executive
departments may operate. Under Section 8 of the bill,
responsibility cannot be definitely placed upon either the
executive departments or the Joint Committee on Print
ing. It falls between them.
I regard the provision in question as an invasion of the
province of the Executive and calculated to result in un
warranted interferences in the processes of good govern
ment, producing only confusion, irritation, and distrust.
The proposal assumes significance as an outstanding
illustration of a growing tendency which I am sure is not
fully realized by the Congress itself and certainly not by
the people of the country. For that reason, I am taking
the liberty of pointing out a few examples of an increasing
disposition, as expressed in existing laws and in pending
legislative proposals, to restrict the executive departments
in the exercise of purely administrative functions.
I do not care to discuss here the powers which previously
have been conferred upon the Congressional Joint Com
mittee on Printing, as they have passed into law, but I
do feel that it is proper to point to a few specific examples
of the administrative authority exercised by the Com
mittee under existing law in order to indicate the incon
gruity and inconsistency that already exist and which
would be accentuated and aggravated if Section 8 of the
bill under consideration were enacted into law. In this

connection, I invite the attention of the Congress to a
letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on
Printing to the Public Printer, under date of March 19,
1920, replying to a request from the latter for a ruling by
the Committee as to the application to certain printing of
Section 89 of the Printing Act of 1895, restricting the
printing of reports, publications, and documents to 1,000
copies each. In the communication mentioned, the
Public Printer is “ directed” to apply that section of the
law in accordance with the “ opinion” rendered by the
Chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing. To my
mind, the opinion mentioned is nothing more or less than
a direction to an executive officer in the performance of
his executive duties. The printing laws may give the
Congressional Joint Committee on Printing authority to
make interpretations of the law, but if they do, I think it
is a most unwise procedure and the statute should be
revised.
Another example of the exercise of administrative
authority by the Joint Committee on Printing is to be
found in a resolution adopted by that 'Committee on
April 2, 1920, prohibiting any person connected with any
department of the government from furnishing any pub
lication for free distribution to any private individual,
corporation, or agency, in lots to exceed fifty copies “ with
out first making application to the Joint Committee on
Printing.”
I also invite attention to the creation by law of what is
known as the Public Buildings Commission, consisting of
two Senators, two Representatives, the Superintendent
of the Capitol Buildings and Grounds, the officer in charge
of public buildings and grounds, and the Supervising
[80]

Architect or acting Supervising Architect of the Treas
ury.
That Commission, by law, is given "absolute control
of and the allotment of all space in the several public
buildings named, or buildings leased by the United States
in the District of Columbia, with the exception of the
Executive mansion and office of the President, Capitol
Building, the Senate and House office buildings, the
Capitol power plant, the buildings under the jurisdiction
of the regents of the Smithsonian Institution, and the
Congressional Library Building.”
The Commission possesses the absolute power to order
the several executive departments and independent
establishments out of any of the buildings which they
occupy, and, as a matter of fact, has direcjed various
branches of the public service to vacate or to occupy
specific space. It is organized and operates as a Con
gressional Commission and appears in the Congressional
Directory under the heading “ Congressional Commissions
and Joint Committees.” The Senators serving upon it
are appointed by the President of the Senate, the Repre
sentatives serving upon it are appointed by the Speaker of
the House, while the other officials composing the Com
mission are specifically named in the law. Its work,
nevertheless, so far as it involves the allotting of space for
administrative services and of ordering executive depart
ments to move units into or out of government owned or
leased buildings, is distinctly executive in character.
In considering bills containing the provisions mentioned
above, I was willing to overlook the objectionable features
for the time being with the thought that they were de
signed as exceptional and temporary measures to meet

unusual conditions. To permit such expedients to serve
as precedents or accepted rules for legislation, would, in
my judgment, be most unfortunate and destructive of
proper principles for the orderly and efficient management
of the government’s business. I feel very strongly that
the authority carried in Section 8 of the bill herewith
returned should not be conferred upon a legislative com
mittee and that the entire section should be stricken
from the measure.
W

oodrow

W il s o n .

The White House,
M ay 13, 1920.
The House in which the bill originated sustained the
President’s veto and the bill was passed by both Houses
with the objectionable section omitted, and I thereupon
advised the President to sign the bill, which he did. This
is one of the few instances in this difficult period in which
Congress sustained the President’s veto. - This action
should put a stop to these particular efforts of Congress to
usurp and to hamper the Executive.
. A more interesting but less nagging and irritating in
vasion of the Executive function occurred in the bill
passed toward the close of the session of Congress in
June, 1920, to provide a national budget system. This
was embodied in the section covering the removal of the
Comptroller General and the Assistant Comptroller
General, the provision being, in effect, that these officers,
although appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, might be removed at any time by a
concurrent resolution of Congress after notice and hearing,
when in their judgment these officers, or either of them,

were deemed incapacitated or inefficient or guilty of neg
lect or malfeasance in office.
The bill was sent to me by the President with the usual
request that I advise him as to whether I saw any ob
jection to its approval. After reading the measure, I
became convinced that the provision for the removal of
the officers mentioned was in violation of the Constitution,
taking away from the President a power which he had
under the Constitution. It is the duty of the President
to uphold the Constitution, and he could not approve the
bill with an unconstitutional provision in it. I consulted
with the officers of the Department and with the Solicitor
General of the United States and advised the President
that he should not approve the measure with the pro
vision mentioned. He then requested that I prepare a
veto message. I did so, and he transmitted it to the
Congress June 4, 1920. It was as follows:
To t h e H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s :
I am returning, without my signature, H. R. 9783, “ An
Act to provide a national budget system, an independent
audit of government accounts, and for other purposes.”
I do this with the greatest regret. I am in entire sym
pathy with the objects of this bill and would gladly ap
prove it but for the fact that I regard one of the provisions
contained in Section 303 as unconstitutional. This is
the provision to the effect that the Comptroller General
and the Assistant Comptroller General, who are to be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, may be removed at any time by a concurrent
resolution of Congress after notice and hearing, when,
in their judgment, the Comptroller General or Assistant

Comptroller General is incapacitated or inefficient, or
has been guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in
office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpi
tude, and for no other cause and in no other manner ex
cept by impeachment. The effect of this is to prevent
the removal of these officers for any cause except either
by impeachment or a concurrent resolution of Congress.
It has, I think, always been the accepted construction of
the Constitution that the power to appoint officers of this
kind carries with it, as an incident, the power to remove.
I am convinced that the Congress is without constitutional
power to limit the appointing power and its incident, the
power of removal derived from the Constitution.
The section referred to not only forbids the Executive
to remove these officers, but undertakes to empower the
Congress by a concurrent resolution to remove an officer
appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. I can find in the Constitution no warrant
for the exercise of this power by the Congress. There is
certainly no express authority conferred, and I am un
able to see that authority for the exercise of this power is
implied in any express grant of power. On the contrary,
I think its exercise is clearly negatived by Section 2 of
Article II. That section, after providing that certain
enumerated officers and all officers whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for shall be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
provides that the Congress may by law vest the appoint
ment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of
departments. It would have been within the consti
tutional power of the Congress, in creating these offices,

to have vested the power of appointment in the President
alone, in the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, or even in the head of a department. Regarding
as I do the power of removal from office as an essential
incident to the appointing power, I cannot escape the con
clusion that the vesting of this power of removal in the
Congress is unconstitutional, and therefore I am unable
to approve the bill.
I am returning the bill at the earliest possible moment
with the hope that the Congress may find time before
adjournment to remedy this defect.
W

oodrow

W il s o n .

The constitutional point raised was promptly debated
in the House. On the question, whether the House would
pass the bill over the objections of the President, the vote
was in the negative and the President’s veto was sustained.
Later, the matter was taken up and the House passed
the measure with the objectionable provision eliminated,
providing simply that the Comptroller should hold office
for good behaviour. When the revised measure came to
the Senate, it was discussed briefly, but the Senate ad
journed without taking action.
I particularly regretted this outcome. Budgetary pro
cedure and practice were matters in which I had had a
very deep interest for more than twenty-five years. A t
Harvard, under Dunbar, I had studied the history of
budgets in the leading constitutional countries of Europe,
their practices, and their administration, and had can
vassed thoroughly the situation in this country. Sub
sequently, I had frequently considered the matter of
a proper budget system for the Federal Government as

well as for the states. It had been specifically brought
to my attention by a civic body in 1913, and I had dis
cussed with it the history of our Federal practices, the
reasons for them, and the urgent need of change. We had
inherited from England the principle of popular control
of the government purse. We had provided that all
financial measures must originate in the lower House.
We did not, at the time, perceive that the legislative body
in England was really coming to dominate the executive,
and to direct the government through a responsible com
mittee. It is reasonably clear that those who framed
the government had in mind a Congressional rather than
an Executive budget. They could not anticipate the de
velopment of our Congressional system and that there
would be in time more than a dozen committees dealing
directly with appropriations and revenues. It is true
that the Secretary of the Treasury had come to be re
quired by Congress to submit an annual Book of Esti
mates, but this was really a clerical task. He accepted
the estimates of the heads of departments, the only check
being that the President, himself, must approve the esti
mates of the heads of departments. This was done by
President Wilson. The Secretary of the Treasury, him
self, however, had no official responsibility and could
not bring any actual pressure to bear. In 1912, the
President ordered the various heads of departments to
prepare two sets of estimates, one in accordance with the
existing practice, and one in accordance with forms recom
mended by the President’s Commission on Efficiency.
This, the Congress promptly attempted to block, provid
ing in an appropriation bill that, until otherwise directed,
the estimates should be submitted only as required by law.

[86]

On September 19, 1912, in a letter to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the President maintained that Congress had no
right to interfere with his plan and directed the Secretary
of the Treasury and the heads of departments to prepare
the statements according to his order of July 10th. Here
the matter rested until the formulation of the measure
which the President vetoed. Because, as I have said,
of my long interest in the matter, I was peculiarly dis
tressed by the failure of the Senate to pass the revised
bill which did not contain the objectionable feature. It
would have been a great satisfaction to me to have partici
pated in the organization of a budget system, even though
it was very partial and incomplete. It was also a matter
of general regret to the President, as he indicated in his
message. It would have been easily possible for the
Senate to act.
I have stated that the measure provided for an in
complete budget system. As a matter of fact, the most
important feature of a budget system, from many points
of view, was not incorporated, namely, limitations on
the Congress, itself, as to what it should do with the esti
mates when they reached it. Broadly speaking, the act
provided for unified estimates and for an effective audit.
The evils most commonly complained of, however, in our
budget practices grow out of the Congressional han
dling of the estimates. There has always been much log
rolling in Congress. There was no unified view of ap
propriations and no coordination of appropriations and
receipts. It is apparent that we shall not have a budget
system until Congress adopts rules affecting its consider
ation of the estimates. In Great Britain, where the
budget practice has reached its highest and best develop

ment, the Parliament in reality makes a contract with the
Executive to run the government for so much a year. It
never thinks of giving the Executive more than it asks
for, and it does not usually diminish the items or seriously
alter the proposals for revenue changes. The Congress
could provide by rule that it would make no increases in
the estimates recommended by its own committees, and
it might perhaps make a rule that its committees should
not recommend an increase in the estimates except by an
unusual majority, say two thirds. In my Annual Report
for 1920, submitted to the Congress, I touched upon the
budget, indicating the merits and defects of the proposed
measure. As to the matter just referred to, I said:
“ In the second place, the budget should receive initial
consideration by the Congress through a single great
budget committee for each House. These committees
should consider both the appropriations and the ways of
raising the revenue to meet them. There should be a rule
that, after the committees have made their reports, no
addition can be made to any item in the budget except by
an unusual vote, such, for instance, as two thirds. It
would be an important achievement if the Congress would
go further and, as far as the budget presented by the Presi
dent is concerned, impose a limitation on the right to
increase any item either in committee or on the floor, un
less recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury or
approved by two thirds of the membership of the Con
gress. The Congress should, of course, retain the right
to reduce items in the budget, but if the President is to be
held responsible for a financial programme it should exer
cise restraint in increasing the budget as submitted by
him. In order that there may be no interference with the

[88 ]

constitutional right of the Congress to appropriate money
apart from the budget, it appears to me that such appro
priations should be made in separate bills. These should
also provide for the necessary revenue to meet the pro
posed expenditures in case the estimated revenues of the
government are not sufficient. A plan of this character
would definitely place the responsibility for expenditures
before the people of the country.”
I also expressed the opinion that, while the responsi
bility for the preparation of the budget should be placed
upon the President, he should meet this responsibility
through the Secretary of the Treasury as the chief fiscal
officer of the government, saying:
“ I believe that the budget bureau should be established
in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury. He is the
officer charged by law to provide funds for expenditures.
It would appear that the preparation of the budget should
be the principal function of the chief government finance
officer. It is indefensible that he should be charged with
the duty of keeping an adequate balance in the general
fund to meet any and all demands and denied any word
with respect to the determination of the expenditures of
the government outside his own department. To place
the budget bureau in the office of the President, as is
sometimes urged, would mean the creation of an establish
ment likely to overshadow, or to be overshadowed by, the
great departments of the government and, what is more
important, would mean a division of responsibility with
respect to receipts and expenditures which should be
centralized under one control. The Secretary of the
Treasury, acting for the President, should have power to
reduce and revise the estimates. Under his direction the

bureau of the budget should make a continuous study
of the various government agencies, with a view to the
elimination of duplicated work and wasted effort. If
this responsibility is placed upon the Treasury, the
Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Public Health Service,
the Office of the Supervising Architect, the General
Supply Committee, and the prohibition unit of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue simultaneously should be transferred
to the jurisdiction of some other department, as recom
mended later in this report.”
The objection had been offered that other heads of
departments would resent the power accorded to one of
their colleagues. M y own judgment is that they would
not resent that as much as they would the power accorded
to a subordinate officer created by the act. They would
have frequent opportunities to confer with the Secretary
of the Treasury and they would recognize that after all
he was acting, as all of them were, under the President.
I believe that making someone else than the Secretary of
the Treasury responsible under the President for the
budget will in time be found to give rise to complications
and seriously to interfere with the effectiveness of the
Secretary of the Treasury in the discharge of his duties
as the chief fiscal officer of the government.

CHAPTER

XXVI

POLITICS AND FINANCE

The President’s Belief in Cox’s Election and Vindication of
League President’s Attitude toward Harding— Financial Pro
gramme in 1921 to Abolish Excess Profits Tax, Reduce Super
Tax to 25 per cent., and Repeal Nuisance Taxes

—

URING the summer of 1920, the public mind
was fixed mainly on the course of the campaign.
Cabinet meetings were relatively few. On
Tuesday, October 19th, the regular Cabinet
meetings were resumed and were held in the President’s
study in the main part of the White House. The President
had not changed much in appearance in the interval. He
still looked weak and strained. As before, he was seated
at his desk when we entered, and each of us was an
nounced to him. It was evident that his eyesight had
been impaired. He evidently had difficulty in distinguish
ing us at a distance. I recall someone saying at this time
that he had practically lost the sight of one eye and had
not had the use of it for some time, and that the other was
impaired.

Again I was impressed with the fact that the President
would not take the initiative in bringing matters to the
attention of the Cabinet or in discussions. For several
minutes things dragged somewhat embarrassingly. The
President’s mind seemed inactive until a discussion was
started, and then he would become alert and take part in

the discussion, expressing himself admirably. He thought
better and spoke better than most of his associates, and
displayed all his old-time courage.
The matter of the approaching election was mentioned
by a member of the Cabinet. The President expressed a
very strong conviction of its favourable outcome. He
said that he was confident that Cox would be elected and
that the League would be the issue with which the people
would mainly concern themselves, and that on it they
would go with Cox. He said that the people were a good
jury, that they were especially fitted to pass judgment on
matters of a moral character, that the causes upheld by
the Democrats were moral causes and were sound, and
that the people would see this and act accordingly.
I did not share the President’s confidence. I agreed
with him that the people judge rightly as a rule in the
long run. I said this, but stated that the run had not
been long enough and that the people could play the mis
chief in the short run. I added that the issues were very
complex, that people had been hit in many directions by
the war and its aftermath, that there was much soreness
and some hysteria, that there had been.no effective presen
tation of the Democratic views, and that there had been
very effective misrepresentation by many agencies. I
felt, too, that Mr. Cox had not at first made a very satis
factory campaign. A t the outset he held aloof from Mr.
Wilson and avoided the League. Apparently, the faction
which had urged him as the nominee was not particularly
favourable to the League, and at first he seemed to take
his cue from them. He wasted much time on charges of
corruption which he had difficulty in proving. Finding
that he was not making headway, he turned about when

it was too late and made a zealous campaign for the
League.
What a drop there will be to either Cox or Harding. If
Mr. Harding is elected, the contrast will be painful. It
will be somewhat tragic to have a man of Mr. Wilson’s
intellect and high standards succeeded by a man of Mr.
Harding’s mediocre mind and ordinary standards of think
ing and action. At this time, particularly, the nation
needs a leader, and Mr. Harding will not be a leader. He
cannot be. He has never stood for any great cause. He
knows very little, has no vision, very little sense of
direction, and no independence. He was not nominated
to lead. He was selected because he was colourless and
pliable. If he is elected, he will be the tool of such tried
leaders as Lodge, Penrose, and others. He will play the
game of the Senate. The Senate will be supreme. The
old policies will be revived. Protection will raise its head
again and raise it higher than ever. The revolt of the
people against the Paine-Aldrich Tariff Bill will be for
gotten. This element of the Republican party which
will be in the ascendant knows exactly where it is going.
It will go back to where it was before 1915. What a
trial it will be to have to witness Mr. Harding’s efforts to
think and his efforts to say what he thinks.
At the Cabinet meeting, Tuesday, November 2d, some
one referred to the approaching election and said to the
President that he was apprehensive as to Cox’s chances.
The President interrupted him and said in substance:
“ You need not worry. The American people will not
turn Cox down and elect Harding. A great moral issue
is involved. The people can and will see it. In the long
run, they do the right thing. They are on to the Re

publicans. I am receiving letters from people throughout
the country which indicate that they are not going to be
deceived.”
Believing myself that Cox would be defeated, and fear
ing the possible effects on the President of the shock, I
spoke up and again said that I, too, was inclined to think
that Cox would not succeed. I gave my reasons briefly.
I added, however, that I did not believe that Harding’s
success would mean the final loss of the fight for the
League, that sooner or later the country would decide
that it would have to go in, and that it would some day
do so. I added: “ Whatever the verdict be in this elec
tion, you may be certain that history will justify your
course. It will give your Administration a high place for
its foreign as well as for its domestic achievements, and
above all, for giving the country a pure and sincere govern
ment free from the dictation of any groups, and for heroic
efforts to secure a just peace.”
The President thanked me but said: “ You need not
worry. The people will not elect Harding.”
I somewhat dreaded to go to Cabinet meeting Tuesday,
November 9th, after the election. I could not help feel
ing that the President, particularly in his state of broken
health, might show bad effects from the defeat of Cox
and from his disappointment. I had forgotten for the
moment that he was a sturdy Scotch Presbyterian. He
looked worried but somewhat better physically. He
showed no concern whatever for himself, but he expressed
grave concern for the country and for the world. He felt
that progress toward peace and restoration would be
greatly retarded.

A member of the Cabinet said: “Mr. President, you can

put Mr. Harding and the Republican party in a hole.
All you have to do is to put the Treaty on the Vice
President’s desk.”
The President quickly interrupted him, saying: “ But
I do not wish to put Mr. Harding in a hole. The situation
of the nation and of the world is too serious to make it
thinkable that I or any good citizen should desire to
hamper the next President. I should like to help Mr.
Harding, and I hope that every good citizen will try to
help him.”
The calendar year 1921 was an exceptionally difficult,
and, therefore, exceptionally interesting year in the
Treasury. It was interesting because of the size and
character of the financial operations, of the chance pre
sented for advancing a programme for handling the floating
debt and the Victory Loan, and of the opportunity for
suggesting a plan of taxation; and it was certain to be
trying because of the necessity of dealing with those whose
interests had been seriously hit in the aftermath of the
war.
The very scale of operations, in itself, was striking.
The nation had been called upon in a few years to spend
about $16,000,000,000 more than it had spent in the entire
time from the adoption of the Constitution to the begin
ning of the war, that is, about $42,000,000,000. Much of
the expenditure had been met from taxation, as was the
case in Great Britain. And it was because of this that
this nation was able to carry on in orderly fashion, just
as drastic taxation had kept Britain’s finances on a vastly
more solid footing than those of any other European
country. These two countries had resorted to heavy
taxation from the outset. In one year, England raised

by taxes more by a billion dollars than France raised in
the five years following the outbreak of the Great War.
Other Continental nations pursued a less sound policy
even than France; and, if nothing else had happened, they
would have become practically fiscally bankrupt. Conti
nental nations had never shown a willingness or an ability
to fight wars by taxing the people. Only democracies
have shown the wisdom, ability, and courage to do this.
The year 1920 stands out in our history to date as the
year in which the largest collections were made from the
people through taxation, the total ordinary receipts being
in excess of $6,700,000,000.
But in spite of the enormous sacrifices which the
people made, there had been accumulated a huge public
debt, which, in August, 1919, amounted to more than
$26,596,000,000. O f this, there was outstanding in
the form of loan and tax certificates approximately
$3,268,000,000. And there was the Victory Loan of
about $4,250,000,000, which would in whole or in part
become a floating debt after May, 1923.
The most pressing task was the handling of the.Treasury
certificates to meet in part the current requirements of
the government. The chief financial operations of the
Treasury during the year centred around these certificates.
There had to be frequent offerings. In fact, during the
period from February, 1920, to February 15, 1921, there
were thirteen such offerings, ranging in amount from
$100,000,000 to $500,000,000 at a time. And the amount
subscribed ranged from about $130,000,000 to approxi
mately $590,000,000, the subscriptions to the thirteen
offerings exceeding $4,000,000,000.
When I went to the Treasury, the offerings had been in

rates out of line with the market rates. The Treasury
was, therefore, exercising a predominating influence in
the financial market and vitally affecting the entire busi
ness of the country, somewhat adversely. The certificates
were being taken, but too many of them were lodging in
the hands of the subscribers and were not being dis
tributed satisfactorily to investors. This was an un
desirable and a menacing situation. The first issue after
I went to the Treasury was on March 15th, at a 4 f per cent,
rate, and although the books were open for almost two
weeks, the total amount subscribed was only $201,000,000.
In April, an issue at a higher rate was made. This process
continued until the rate was in line with the market rate
and the certificates were put on an investment basis.
Subscriptions became heavy, and the distribution of the
certificates among investors proceeded satisfactorily.
In thinking of the Treasury's enormous transactions
during and following the war, one would have been
staggered had he not had a full appreciation of the virility
and financial strength of the nation. I had made it a
special point to try to keep up with the growth of the
nation, and I was aware of its enormous development. I
knew something of the nation’s productive power, of the
ability of the people to meet financial burdens, and of the
margin which would permit even greater saving if they
had the desire and the will power to make them. Having
this in mind, on one occasion I asked the Actuary of the
Treasury to give me an estimate of what the people were
spending in twelve months on what the law classed as
luxuries. He reported this amount to be $22,000,000,000,
nearly enough to extinguish the entire national debt. The
items greatly interested me. They were as follows:

Chewing g u m .............................................
C a n d y .........................................................
Soft drinks.................................................
Ice cream.....................................................
Confections.................................................
Cereal beverages.......................................
Cigarettes...................................................
C ig a rs.........................................................
Cigar and cigarette holders......................
Tobacco and snuff.....................................
Toilet soaps, etc..........................................
Jewellery, watches, etc...............................
Perfumery and cosmetics..........................
Admissions to places of amusement and
d u e s .........................................................
Pianos, organs, victrolas, etc.....................
Fur articles.................................................
Carpets, rugs, luxurious wearing apparel,
etc.............................................................
Hunting garments, liveries, firearms and
shells.......................................................
Art w orks...................................................
Y a c h ts.........................................................
Portable electric fa n s ................................
Sporting goods...........................................
Luxurious service.......................................
Luxuries in hotels and restaurants..........
Luxurious articles of food, e tc..................
Other luxuries, including joy riding, pleas
ure resorts, races, etc..............................
Automobiles and parts...............................

$ 50,000,000
1,000,000,000
350,000,000
250,000,000
350,000,000
230,000,000
800,000,000
510,000,000
1,000,000
800,000,000
400,000,000
500,000,000
750,000,000
800,000,000
250,000,000
300,000,000
1,500,000,000
60,000,000
25,000,000
1,000,000
8,000,000
25,000,000
3,000,000,000
75,000,000
5,000,000,000
3,000,000,000
2,000,000,000

Think of one item— an expenditure of $50,000,000 a year
for chewing guml It occurred to me that people who
could chew $50,000,000 worth of chewing gum in one
year could accomplish anything.
I was also interested in discovering what part of our
entire national expenditure up to 1920 had gone into
constructive undertakings and what part had been
used for war or destructive purposes. I asked the
Actuary to give me this figure, and he reported that of the
$67,000,000,000 which the nation had expended to June
30, 1920, about $58,000,000,000 of it had been expended
for war, including the interest on the public debt (which
was mainly a war debt), pensions, and other things, while
$9,000,000,000 had been spent for ordinary civil activ
ities.
A third thing occurred to me in this connection as I
happened to look at the portrait of the first and greatest
Secretary of the Treasury, which was hanging on the wall
on my left. I was thinking of the enormous receipts
which were coming into the Treasury and the correspond
ing expenditures. I was just in the act of approving a
railroad voucher for $40,000,000. It occurred to me to
ask how much the Treasury had received and how much
Secretary Alexander Hamilton had handled in the six and
a quarter years of his direction of the Treasury. I dis
covered that the amount was approximately $28,000,000
for the entire period, and that one warrant which I was
then approving, and which was a minor transaction, ex
ceeded this amount by $12,000,000. But I reflected that
it was more difficult for him and the nation to raise and
handle the small amounts in that day than it was for us
to handle the large amounts in our day, and that it was

not any more difficult to think straight in billions than it
was in hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars.
There was a further task in connection with the debt
and that was to suggest a programme which would in
volve the orderly working of a sinking fund and other
operations for the retirement of the debt. This was
worked out under the direction of the brilliant Assistant
Secretary, Mr. Leffingwell, and his successor, Mr. Parker
Gilbert.
The second task which confronted the President and the
Treasury related to taxation. It was necessary, in the
first place, that everything possible be done to secure the
maximum of economy. And this, the President insisted
upon; and with his approval I laid special emphasis upon
it in my report to the Congress. We particularly warned
the Congress and the people against any new raids on the
Treasury. More especially, we took a sharp and effective
stand against the soldiers* bonus. With the President’s
full approval, I not only wrote on May 18, 1920, to Mr.
Fordney a letter opposing a bonus in any form “no matter
how financed, but I went before the Committee of Ways
and Means and emphasized my reasons against such a
proposal.
We realized, however, that, in spite of the utmost
economy, it would be necessary for the time being, in
order to meet the requirements of the government and
to proceed with the public debt programme in sensible
fashion, to keep receipts from taxation for several years,
that is, until about the end of 1923, to approximately
$4,000,000,000. It was not possible, therefore, at the
time, to make recommendations for tax reduction as a
whole such as we would have liked to make. It was
[100]

desirable, however, to make suggestions for tax reform
or revision; and this I did in some detail, notwithstanding
the fact that I knew that Congress would be sensitive in
the matter. The following are the chief items of the
recommendations:
(1) The abolition of the excess profits tax, primarily
because of its complexity and of its lack of equity as
among different classes of business.
(2) The reduction of surtaxes to approximately 25 per
cent, making the total maximum income tax, including
the normal tax, 31 per cent.
(3) The abolition of the nuisance taxes.
(4) The necessity of having a final determination of
a taxpayer’s liability and the settlement of tax claims.
Also, in this connection, I urged that, in the matter of
providing a budget system, the Congress go much further
than it had gone in the bill which the President vetoed,
namely, as I have heretofore stated, that it should place
limitations on itself in handling the estimates.
I also outlined the situation with reference to the loans
to the Allies, opposed the cancellation of this indebted
ness, and suggested that the course to pursue was to pro
ceed under the terms of the existing law and to have the
demand notes of the Allies funded into long-term bonds.
Finally, I suggested that certain non-fiscal activities,
such as public health, public buildings, and prohibition,
be transferred from the Treasury to some other depart
ment, and urged the creation of the position of Under
secretary of the Treasury, and that more attractive
financial conditions be created so that the Treasury could
secure and retain in key positions men of the requisite
ability and experience.

The foregoing problems and activities were interesting
and important, but they were not nagging. The things
which plagued those who had the official responsibility
in respect to them grew out of the general economic
situation. After the Armistice, a wave of optimism swept
over the nation; business men had a feeling that, since
the war had closed, business would quickly set up, and
enterprises were entered upon to an extent not justified
by the underlying conditions. About the time of the
Armistice, I had predicted that this would happen. I
had stated that there would be a period of rather feverish
activities because of the close of the war, that prices
would mount even higher, and that there would then come
a collapse. I urged that caution should be observed by
business men and that farmers should redirect their
activities along lines suited to their own community
needs. Very soon there was a nation-wide outcry against
the mounting prices and the high cost of living. In fact,
the pressure was so great that there were many confer
ences, including official conferences, to see what steps, if
any, could be taken to afford relief. If was recognized
that little or nothing could be done as long as the people
were extravagant, as long as there was reckless specu
lation, and until production set up on a larger scale both
here and abroad. Some indications of a change appeared
toward the close of 1919. Industries showed signs of
hesitation. This tendency became more marked the
latter part of February, 1920. The prices of manufactur
ing commodities in some cases fell and then, very sud
denly, toward the beginning of summer, it became evi
dent that there would be a great decline in the prices of
foodstuffs.

CHAPTER

XXVII

THE FARMERS BEGIN TO DEMAND RELIEF

A Delegation Demanding Federal Aid for German Cotton Pur
chases— The Hysteriafor Revival of the War Finance Corporation

E W ERE no sooner out of the difficulties
presented by the high cost of living than we
were confronted by a more difficult situation,
that caused by the sharp decline of prices of
agricultural commodities, about midsummer and there
after. The first impulse of many who were hit by the
declining prices was to turn to the government, and
especially to the Treasury, as the sole recourse for their
salvation. This disposition had developed before the war.
It was reinforced during hostilities. I was flooded by
letters demanding that the Treasury do something. Many
delegations appeared, insistently urging that the Treasury
see that the high prices that had prevailed were main
tained, and even demanding that in some way they be
enabled to secure even higher prices.
This tendency can be illustrated by reference to the
visit of one of the many groups which was most insistent.
I was asked to meet a large delegation from the South.
I agreed to do so. About forty appeared. Before the
meeting, several Senators came in another door and told
me in substance that they knew I could not do what the
delegation was going to urge, but that they had to appear
to be sympathetic, and that they hoped that I understood

[10 3]

their situation. I felt like telling them that I did, and
that I clearly recognized that they were taking an unfair
position, that, if they agreed with me, it was their duty
to tell their constituents the truth. I listened for an hour
or more to reports by various members of the conference
of conditions with which I was entirely familiar. I knew
that the price of cotton had suddenly dropped nearly 50
per cent. I inquired what I could do. The leader an
nounced that I could lend money to the farmers of the
South. I pointed out that this would not secure a market
for their cotton and that the government was not buying
cotton and could not assist them in that way. The
leader then announced that the trouble would be remedied
if Germany were enabled to buy Southern cotton. I said
that would be true if Germany wanted the cotton and had
the money or the credit to secure it. One of the Senators
jumped up and said that we had to assist Germany. I
asked him how. He replied that we could lend her
money. I reminded him that we were still in the state of
war with Germany as the Senate had not ratified the
Treaty of Peace. I also asked him on what security the
Treasury could lend money to Germany, even if it had
the power, as the Allies had a claim on what little resources
Germany had. He shouted that I could lend on German
bonds. I asked him if he would lend money to Germany
on German bonds, or if he, a cotton planter, would sell his
cotton to Germany and take German bonds. He said that
of course he would. I asked him to consider the mat
ter carefully, because that very morning a representa
tive from Germany had called on me to see if by any
means she could secure cotton. I told the Senator that I
felt sure that I could arrange for him to secure all the
[104]

German bonds he would take if he would give his cotton
in exchange. I asked if he would make the exchange.
He replied that he declined to be quizzed in any such
fashion. The conference ended without result.
It was not true, of course, that exports were not going
forward to Europe. As a matter of fact, they continued
to go in stupendous volume. In 1918, the last year of
the war, their value was $6,149,000,000. In 1919, it
approximated $8,000,000,000. In the first quarter of
1920, the exports exceeded those for the first quarter of
1919. The business agencies of the country were finding
means to facilitate exports to Europe in amazing quanti
ties, and a large percentage, in fact, approximately 50
per cent., consisted of agricultural products. But the
prices for these were not so high as the farmers had been
receiving or desired to receive. The trouble arose from
the fact that the war had closed, that the first thing
Europe undertook to do was to produce her food supplies
and return to such countries as Australia and Argentina,
from which they had been shut off during the war by the
submarine. This was coupled with the fact that the
farmers could not quickly control their supply as manu
facturers could, and had an immense outpouring of com
modities. The war had caused prices to rise greatly. The
close of the war caused prices to fall, particularly the
prices of commodities the supply of which was great,
as in the case of agricultural products.
The ignorant part of the community, including many
demagogues, in and out of public life, unable or unwilling
to see the facts, resorted to the easy and usual practice
of attributing the financial ills to the banking machinery
of the country, even going so far as to charge that there
[105]

was a deliberate conspiracy on the part of the Reserve
Board and of many bankers to crush the farmers. Their
usual way of putting it was that the Federal Reserve
Board was deflating the farmers. It was obvious that
they did not know what they really meant. They did not
really understand what is meant by deflation. They
knew that there was a fall in the prices of certain com
modities, and they called that deflation. They were
unaware that by deflation is meant a lessening of the
money or credit of the nation, and that a decrease of the
volume of credit in itself would affect all prices equally.
If there was real deflation and it alone was operating,
there would not be at the same time, because of it, a
tremendous drop in farm prices, a smaller decline in
prices of many industrial products, and an increase in
the prices of others. Their easy explanation also did not
account for the great fall of prices of farm products in the
other countries of the world. The truth is that, while
some prices, particularly those of farm products, greatly
declined, there was no real deflation. There was no de
cline in the volume of credit during 1920, when prices of
agricultural products dropped so sharply. There was, as
a matter of fact, an enormous increase. Between the date
of the Armistice and October 1,1920, the loans and invest
ments of all banks increased more than $7,000,000,000,
and the Federal Reserve notes more than $740,000,000.
In the period from January 23,1920, to the end of Septem
ber, by which time the drop in agricultural products
had occurred, the loans and investments of all the banks
expanded a billion dollars or more, and the Federal
Reserve note circulation $460,000,000. What is more
important is the fact that accommodations extended to
[106]

agriculture, industry, and commerce, increased in the
same period between $3,000,000,000 and $4,000,000,000.
From the beginning of the crop-moving season in July,
to October 16th, the bills discounted and purchased by
the Federal Reserve banks gained at an average rate of
$22,000,000 a week, and the Federal Reserve note circu
lation at the rate of $20,000,000. The peak of the
credit expansion was not reached until the close of the
year. When the declining loans appeared, in 1921, it
was not primarily because of any action of the Federal
Reserve System but because business had fallen off and the
demand for loans had decreased.
What the Federal Reserve System did, and it was a
very important thing, was to save the nation from a
financial collapse and from going in the direction that
Poland, Austria, Russia, and other continental countries
had gone, of stupendous inflation. The Federal Reserve
banks, recognizing the danger and the vast amount of
unwarranted speculative activities, did take steps to
attempt to control further enormous expansion. The
main criticism at the time was that they acted too late and
too weakly. They first made some change in rediscount
rates in the latter part of 1919. They made further
changes in 1920. It was necessary to do this, not only
to prevent undue expansion for speculative purposes, but
to protect the banking reserves. They had reached or
were reaching the legal limit and in some cases were
below the limit. Loans for speculative purposes were
discouraged and reduced so that loans for legitimate pur
poses might remain high and might even be increased.
The desire of the Board was to facilitate essential busi
nesses. And special consideration was given to demands
[107]

for loans on agricultural paper. There was not only no
contraction but, as I have said, a considerable expansion.
And there was not a great deal which could be done, ex
cept of a temporary character, to aid the people in dis
tress. Time alone, and the readjustment of the industry
of this nation and of the world, could bring the necessary
relief. It was clear that steps could be taken directly to
organize financial relief mainly through the banks of the
Northwest, for the aid of the farmers. This had been
done during the war through the $5,000,000 which I
got the President to set aside. And I had approved in
principle a measure which could not come up for final
action before I left Washington, a proposal that Congress
appropriate a large sum of money for the aid of farmers
particularly in the West and South, to be extended
through banks.
In the circumstances, a clamour set up for a revival of
the War Finance Corporation. It was contended that,
under the power which it then had of lending money to
exporters to facilitate exports to Europe, it might do
something to restore and maintain higher prices for farm
products. A t my request, in May, 1920, the activities
of the War Finance Corporation had been suspended. It
was a war agency. A t the time there was a great cry that
all war agencies should be abolished. It was desirable
that they should cease to function. Up to May, the
Corporation had rendered very little assistance through
the only power it had which bore on the situation. To
November, 1920, the advances to aid exports had not
exceeded $47,000,000, while the total exports in the year
ran at the rate of $8,000,000,000. Before taking the
action of suspending the activities of the Corporation, I
[108]

advised with the President, received his cordial assent, but
told him that I thought I had better consult certain
leaders in the Senate. I did so. After two long con
ferences, they agreed with me that I should suspend the
activities of the Corporation, and they went even further.
They told me that if I would frame a bill to place it in
liquidation they would pass it.
The agitation for relief became hysterical. The de
mand that the War Finance Corporation should resume
operations was insistent. I was confident that it would
be unwise and futile to revive the Corporation. I was
convinced that there would be few legitimate applications
from exporters of agricultural commodities for loans and
that its activities would have no appreciable effect on
prices. I had to continue to meet delegations of Congress
men and of interested groups and I had to write many
letters explaining the situation and the reason for my
course.
In this period I received support in Washington only
from the President and from my colleagues in the Trea
sury, including my associates on the Federal Reserve
Board, with one exception. I received support from many
intelligent people throughout the nation and was encour
aged by letters from various parts of the country.
I made it a point to keep the President informed about
this difficult and nagging state of affairs. I did this in
Cabinet meeting, particularly in October, because I had
become aware that two of my associates in the Cabinet
did not understand the situation and did not agree with
me, and that it was being said that they thought I
was taking the wrong stand. Several representatives
and visitors informed me that one of my colleagues had
[109]

told them that he took a different view from mine. A t
the Cabinet meeting I summarized the situation for the
President. I told him about the pressure and about the
numerous conferences I was having. I outlined the
character of the discussion and my conclusions. Two of
my colleagues in the Cabinet made it clear during the
discussion that they had a different view from mine. The
President listened patiently for a little while, then ex
pressed his absolute concurrence with me and approval of
the position which I had taken. He added: “ I admire
your optimism and your patience in attempting to argue
this matter with the people who are interested, and
particularly with members of Congress, many of whom
know better.” One of my colleagues interrupted, indi
cating that he was sympathetic with those who were insist
ing that the Treasury do something. The President
showed some impatience and said: “ Let’s talk about
something more interesting. It is no use trying to
reason with people into whose minds reason has never
entered.”
The Congress persisted and passed a resolution direct
ing, in effect, the revival of the activities of the War
Finance Corporation. Following the usual custom, the
President sent the resolution to me, requesting me to
inform him whether I had any objection to its approval.
I replied that I had and that in my judgment it should be
vetoed. He then directed me to prepare a veto message,
which I did, and which he sent to the Senate. I insert the
message, in part, because it gives a further picture of the
conditions and additional reasons for the Administration’s
belief that artificial efforts would be abortive and would
only mislead the farmers. The letter from the Presi[no]

dent’s private secretary, my reply, and the message, in
part, follow:
The White House,
Washington,
December 23, 1920.
My

dear

M r. Secr eta r y :

The President directs me to send you the accompanying
Joint Resolution, S. J. Res. 212, Joint Resolution directing
the War Finance Corporation to take certain action for the
relief of the present depression in the agricultural sections
of the country, and for other purposes, with the request
that you inform him, at your earliest convenience, whether
there are any objections to its approval.
Sincerely yours,
J. P. T u m u l t y .
Secretary to the President.
Hon. D. F. Houston,
Secretary of the Treasury.

December 30, 1920.
D e a r M r . P r e s id e n t :

I am sending herewith for your consideration the draft
of a message vetoing S. J. Res. 212. It is long, but I be
lieve that a somewhat full survey will serve a useful pur
pose.
Faithfully yours,
D. F. H o u s t o n .
The President,
The White House.
[in ]

To t h e S e n a t e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s :
I am returning, without my signature, S. J. Res. 212,
“ Joint Resolution directing the War Finance Corporation
to take certain action for the relief of the present depres
sion in the agricultural sections of the country, and for
other purposes.”
This Resolution was passed by the Congress apparently
in view of the recent sudden and considerable fall in
prices, especially of agricultural commodities, with the
thought that some European countries to which certain
products were customarily shipped before the war might
again be enabled to resume their importation, and that
larger masses of domestic exports to European countries
generally might be stimulated, with the resulting en
hancement of domestic prices. I am in full sympathy
with every sound proposal to promote foreign trade along
sound business lines. I am not convinced that the method
proposed is wise, that the benefits, if any, would offset the
evils which would result, or that the same or larger
advantages cannot be secured without resort to govern
ment intervention. On the contrary, I apprehend that
the resumption of the Corporation’s activities at this
time would exert no beneficial influence in the situation in
which improvement is sought, would raise false hopes
among the very people who would expect most, and would
be hurtful to the natural and orderly processes of business
and finance.
Large government credits were extended during the
war to certain European governments associated with us
in the struggle. These ceased several months after the
Armistice, except for commitments already made. They
should not now be resumed, either directly or indirectly.
[112]

The recent Brussels Conference, composed of experts
from many European countries and from other nations,
itself expressed the opinion that further credits should not
be accorded directly by governments. I do not believe
that they should be accorded indirectly.
Exports of domestic products have not declined since
the Armistice. On the contrary, they have greatly in
creased. From an aggregate value before the war of less
than
billions of dollars, and of about 6 billions the last
year of hostilities, they rose in the calendar year 1919 to
more than $7,900,000,000, and this figure will probably be
exceeded this calendar year. For the first eleven months
of this calendar year we exported more than 71 billion
dollars’ worth of domestic merchandise.
These have
been largely privately financed. The difficulty in the
way of still larger exports does not seem to lie so much in
the lack of financial ability here as in Europe’s lack of
means to make payment. Her productive energies and
the services which she renders have not yet reached a
point where they balance the value of commodities taken
from this nation, and her ability to furnish for additional
exports securities which business men would feel justified
in taking is restricted. The experts of the Brussels
Conference reported that “ one of the chief obstacles to the
granting of credits is the absence in borrowing countries
of sufficient securities for ultimate repayment.”
Under the law, if the activities of the Corporation were
resumed, no direct advances could be made to producers
and, if they could be, they would not accomplish the
objects in view. They would not create demand for our
products. They could be made only to exporters or to
banks engaged in financing exports and if they did in some

[i 13]

measure stimulate exports they would probably not have
the effect apparently most desired, of substantially in
creasing those of agricultural commodities. Already,
with the larger volume of exports which Europe is taking
from us, she is exercising her option of taking a smaller
volume of some of our principal agricultural products,
such as meats, presumably because she herself has be
come more largely self-sufficient, or is again providing
herself with supplies from distant countries which,
with the opening up of shipping since the Armistice,
have once more found their place in the markets of the
world.
It is highly probable that the most immediate and con
spicuous effect of the resumption of the Corporation’s
activities would be an effort on the part of exporters to
shift the financing of their operations from ordinary com
mercial channels to the government. There is no ques
tion that the borrowing of the government should be
limited to the minimum requirements, and that the gov
ernment should not be called upon further to finance
private business at public expense. To the extent that
Europe is able to furnish additional securities, private
financial institutions here will doubtless find means of
giving the necessary accommodation. Through reliance
on such enterprises, rather than through government in
tervention, may we expect to secure a return to stable
business relations. For many months there has been a
demand that war agencies should be abolished and that
there should be less government interference with busi
ness. I have sympathized with this view, and believe
that it is applicable to foreign trade as well as to domestic
business. I am of the opinion that now, more than two

years after the Armistice, the nation should resume its
usual business methods and return to its reliance on the
initiative, intelligence, and ability of its business leaders
and financial institutions.
We shall not witness an immediate satisfactory adjust
ment of domestic and international trade relations. The
burdens of war are not lifted when the fighting ceases.
One sad thing about war is that it leaves behind it a
legacy of economic ills and of suffering from which there
is no escape. Conditions, however, are improving both
here and abroad. The difficulties with which we are now
confronted are of small consequence in comparison with
those which we have met and overcome. Fuller resto
ration awaits the adoption of constructive measures of
large consequence: the secure establishment of a just peace
in the world; the cessation of fighting everywhere; the
more complete resumption in Europe of the normal
courses of industry, the return of her people to sounder
fiscal and banking policies, and the breaking down within
her borders of harmful restrictions
W

oodrow

W il s o n .

The White House,
3 Jan., 1921.
In the absence of support of any consequence among
the general run of public officials in Washington, I de
rived what consolation I could from the conviction that
the right course was being pursued. M y main comfort,
however, came from the fact that the President fully
understood the situation and was, I knew, strongly behind
what was being done. As usual, I knew that if I could
decide on the right course and pursue it, he would give

me the strongest sort of backing. If I had not known
this, I would scarcely have been willing to struggle with
the forces with which I had to contend. Under any other
chief, under a chief who was hesitant or lacking in courage,
the task would not have been worth while.

CHAPTER

XXVIII

ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE WAR DEBTS

—

The fVording of the Debt Contract Rathbone's Mission to Great
Britain— Chamberlain Suggests United States Offer Cancellation
— Message Refusing —Correspondence with Lloyd George—Ameri
can Policy Outlined

URING 1920, the problem presented by the
loans to foreign governments had given the
Treasury a great deal of concern. But the
worry was internal until the early part of 1921.
Then, extracts appearing in the papers and an agita
tion precipitated by one of the papers and furthered by
a Senator caused official recognition to be taken of the
matter by the Senate. A Senate resolution was passed
requesting the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish certain
information. For various reasons, I preferred to present
the whole matter to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and on February 12, 1921,1 did so.
When we entered the war it was generally believed, as
I have elsewhere stated, that the largest assistance we
could render the Allies would be through economic and
financial measures. Within a few days after our entry
into the struggle, the Congress passed an act, that of
April 24, 1917, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury
to establish credits in favour of foreign governments en
gaged in war with enemies of the United States, and to
the extent of these credits to make advances to such

governments through purchase of their respective obli
gations at par. Three other acts were passed before the
Armistice, and the total credits authorized as fixed by the
appropriations were $10,000,000,000. The net credits
actually established up to November 15,1920, aggregated
approximately $9,710,000,000, of which the principal
amounts in round numbers were:
To Great Britain........................
France....................................
I taly........................................
Belgium..................................
R ussia....................................

$4,277,000,000
3,048,000,000
1,666,000,000
349,000,000
188,000,000

The amounts received by the foreign governments under
these credits were to meet their commitments in the
United States for food and military supplies. The deal
ings in every case were single and direct with each of
the several governments, and not indirect and unified.
The suggestion had been made by one government that it
would stand in a way as sponsor for other governments
and be the vent through which these loans should flow.
This suggestion was flatly rejected by the Secretary of the
Treasury. The acts of Congress authorizing the loans,
which acts must have been known to the foreign govern
ments, make it clear that the governments were to be
dealt with separately and on their own responsibility.
Certainly, every act after the first one does so. The
Second Liberty Bond Act authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to establish credits for “ any foreign govern
ment” waging war with enemies of the United States, and
to purchase “ from such foreign governments respectively
the several obligations.” It was directed by the acts that
[118]

the obligations of foreign governments should bear the
same rate of interest and contain in essence the same terms
and conditions as those of the United States. It was
contemplated that they should be long-term obligations.
In the course of the financial operations, short-term
obligations were accepted and the Secretary of the
Treasury was authorized to convert any such short-term
obligations into long-time bonds, maturing not later than
the bonds of the United States.
The certificates indicating the indebtedness of foreign
governments were signed in the name of the respective
governments by their representatives designated to the
Treasury by the Department of State as being authorized
to sign them in the name and on behalf of the respective
governments. The following is a skeleton copy of an
obligation received under one of the acts.
C e r t if ic a t e

I ndebtedness

$ [Amount in Figures]
The government of [name of foreign government],
for value received, promises to pay to the United States
of America, or assigns, the sum of [number of dollars in
words] on demand, with interest from date hereof at the
rate of [rate per cent.] per cent, per annum. Such princi
pal sum and the interest thereon will be paid without de
duction for any [name of foreign government] taxes,
present or future, in gold coin of the United States of
America of the present standard of weight and fineness at
the Subtreasury of the United States in New York, or,
at the option of the holder, at the Treasury of the United
States in Washington.

This certificate will be converted by the government of
[name of foreign government] if requested by the Secretary
of the Treasury of the United States of America, at par
with an adjustment of accrued interest into an equal par
amount of [rate per cent.] per cent, convertible gold bonds
of the government of [name of foreign government], con
forming to the provisions of acts of Congress of the United
States known, respectively, as Second Liberty Bond Act,
Third Liberty Bond Act, and Fourth Liberty Bond Act.
If bonds of the United States issued under authority of
said acts shall be converted into other bonds of the
United States bearing a higher rate of interest than 4^
per cent, per annum, a proportionate part of the obli
gations of the government of [name of foreign govern
ment] of this series acquired by the United States under
authority of said acts shall, at the request of said Secre
tary of the Treasury, be converted into obligations of
said government of [name of foreign government], bearing
interest at a rate exceeding that previously borne by this
obligation by the same amount as the interest rate of the
bonds of the United States issued upon such conversion
exceeds the interest rate of [rate of this obligation] per
cent, but not less than the highest rate of interest borne by
such bonds of the United States.
[Signature of representative of foreign government]
For the government of [name of foreign government]
Dated th e ----- day o f -----It will be particularly observed that the foreign govern
ment signing such a certificate pledged itself, if requested
by the Secretary of the Treasury, to convert the certificate
[120]

at par into gold bonds conforming to the provision of the
acts of Congress.
It became the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to
secure the compliance by foreign governments with their
obligations and to see that the governments proceed with
the funding. In spite of approaches by the Secretary of
the Treasury to certain foreign governments to get them
to comply with the law, little or no headway was made.
The only country which seemed even to face the matter
seriously and to show signs of compliance was Great
Britain. It seemed impossible to induce France, Italy,
and other governments, to direct their thoughts toward
the matter of funding. And this in spite of the fact
that they had signed a certificate pledging themselves to
fund at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The first discussion over the funding of the demand
obligations was in 1917. It soon died down. The real
discussions began in the autumn of 1919, when Mr.
Rathbone, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, then in
charge of foreign loans, went to Paris. He made little
headway there. In April, 1920, he went to London and,
for a month or more, was in active discussion with the
British Treasury as to the funding of the British Govern
ment’s obligations. He carried the negotiations to the
point where I believed that a full agreement would be
reached and that I would soon receive the agreement for
final action. I had been in communication with Mr.
Rathbone, and all the difficulties seemed to have been
ironed out.
But just at this juncture, on May 25th, Mr. Rathbone
received a communication from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer stating that he had reported to the Cabinet the
[121J

tenor of the discussions. He suggested that Mr. Rathbone, who had temporarily gone to the Continent, see him
again before he sailed for America. Before Mr. Rathbone
had time to reply, he received a telephone message quot
ing a telegram from the Chancellor to the effect that it
would be unnecessary for him to return to London. The
Cabinet had given the matter consideration. The Prime
Ministers of Great Britain and France had had a con
ference at Hythe, and on the initiative of the French, an
agreement had been reached that the settlement of the
debts between them and other European Allies should
proceed on parallel lines with the reparation debts. The
matter of the European indebtedness to America had not
been discussed, it was stated. But it was concluded to
be necessary that the treatment of the British debt to the
United States which was intended to form a basis for
settlements with other nations should be canvassed in its
relation to the general situation. It was added that the
Prime Minister, who had discussed the matter with
President Wilson in Paris, proposed to resume the dis
cussions directly with the President.
This put an end to the negotiations by Mr. Rathbone
in Europe. He soon returned home.
Prior to this, following a conversation between Mr.
Leflingwell, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Counsellor of the British Embassy in Washington,
there was transmitted to me informally by the British
Counsellor under date of February 9th, a telegram from
Mr. Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It dis
cussed briefly the financial difficulties in Europe and closed
by saying that they would welcome a proposal for a
general cancellation of any governmental war debts. It is
[122]

to be noted that Mr. Chamberlain did not propose a can
cellation, but indicated his disposition to welcome a pro
posal. The situation seemed to me to justify a prompt
answer. I prepared such an answer and transmitted it
to the President for his consideration and approval. He
promptly returned the message with his approval noted
upon it in pencil in his own writing, and I transmitted it
to the Chancellor through Mr. Lindsay, the Counsellor.
It was as follows:
March i, 1920.
D

ear

L in d s a y :

Mr. Leffingwell has handed me your note of February
9th, enclosing a message from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. I have read the Chancellor’s message with
considerable interest, and shall be pleased to have you
transmit to the Chancellor the enclosed reply from me.
I am, my dear Mr. Lindsay,
Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) D. F. H o u s t o n .
Honourable Ronald C. Lindsay,
Counsellor, British Embassy,
2339 Massachusetts Avenue,
Washington, D. C.
M

e s s a g e from t h e

Secretary

C h ancellor

of th e

reasu ry to th e

xch equer

Your recent message through the British Embassy, in
which among other things you suggest a general cancel
lation of inter-governmental war debts, has been received,
[m ]

and Rathbone has transmitted a copy of the communi
cation sent him by Blackett dealing with the funding of
the demand obligations of the Allied governments held by
the United States and England respectively, in which the
same subject is raised.
I concur with your view that the financial and economic
problems of all the world are closely connected and that
Great Britain and the United States naturally look with
concern upon the difficulties which confront Continental
Europe. The United States Treasury has been greatly
interested in information reaching it concerning the
situation of Great Britain, and has viewed with pleasure
and satisfaction the progress which your government has
been making toward a return to a peace basis. While we
are at present confronted with difficult problems, our
financial situation is not at all critical. On the con
trary, it is such that I have reason to think that credits
from private sources may be made available to Conti
nental Europe on sound and adequate security and on
terms which recognize the world-wide shortage of capital
resulting from five years of warfare.
Funding of the short-term obligations into long-term
obligations is a matter as to which no question has been
raised by our Congress, and there should be no difficulty
in dealing with this phase of the proposed arrangements
in the manner outlined by Mr. Rathbone. As you have
no doubt heard from Mr. Rathbone, it may be impossible
to reach, without Congressional approval, a final settle
ment in respect to the interest accruing during the next
two or three years.
I regret that conditions are such as to cause you concern
in respect to the Anglo-French loan maturing this fall, and
[124]

sincerely hope you will have no difficulty in making satis
factory arrangements to take care of it.
As to the engagement of the British Government in
respect to advances for the purchase of silver under the
Pittman Act, this matter is being dealt with by Mr. Rath
bone, who undoubtedly will give full consideration to any
proposal that you have to make in that connection. It is
unfortunate that the Indian Government has not seen
fit to take steps to limit the importation of gold into
India. Failure to do this is making heavy demands on
our gold reserves. If continued, this is likely materially
to impair the ability of our financial markets to assist
Europe.
As to the general cancellation of inter-governmental
war debts suggested by you, you will, I am sure, desire
that I present my views no less frankly than you have
presented yours. Any proposal or movement of such
character would, I am confident, serve no useful purpose.
On the contrary, it would, I fear, mislead the people of
the debtor countries as to the justice and efficacy of such
a plan, and arouse hopes the disappointment of which
could only have a harmful effect. I feel certain that
neither the American people nor our Congress, whose
action on such a question would be required, is prepared
to look with favour upon such a proposal.
Apparently, there are those who have been labouring
for some time under the delusion that the inevitable
consequences of war can be avoided. As far back as
January, a year ago, before it could possibly be foreseen
whether any measures were necessary other than the
adoption of sound economic policies, various schemes, in
cluding that of a cancellation of inter-governmental war

debts, were launched. Of course, I recognize that a
general cancellation of such debts would be of advantage
to Great Britain, and that it probably would not involve
any losses on her part. As there are no obligations of the
United States Government which would be cancelled
under such a plan, the effect would be that in consideration
of a cancellation by the United States Government of the
obligations which it holds for advances made to the
British Government and the other Allied governments the
British Government would cancel its debt against France,
Italy, Russia, and her other allies. Such a proposal does
not involve mutual sacrifices on the part of the nations
concerned. It simply involves a contribution mainly by
the United States. The United States has shown its
desire to assist Europe. Negotiations for funding the
principal of the foreign obligations held by the United
States Treasury and for postponing or funding the interest
accruing during the reconstruction period are in progress.
Since the Armistice, this government has extended to
foreign governments financial assistance to the extent of
approximately four billions o f dollars. What this gov
ernment could do for the immediate relief of the debtor
countries has been done. Their need now is for private
credits. The indebtedness of the Allied governments
to each other and to the United States is not a present
burden upon the debtor governments, since they are not
paying interest or even, as far as I am aware, providing
in their budgets or taxes for the payment of either princi
pal or interest. A t the present time, the foreign obli
gations held by the government of the United States do
not constitute a practical obstacle to obtaining credits
here, and I do not think that the European countries
[126]

would obtain a dollar additional credit as a result of the
cancellation of those obligations. The proposal does not
touch matters out of which the present financial and
economic difficulties of Europe chiefly grow. The relief
from present ills, in so far as it can be obtained, is pri
marily within the control of the debtor governments and
peoples themselves. Most of the debtor governments
have not levied taxes sufficient to enable them to balance
their budgets, nor have they taken any energetic and ade
quate measures to reduce their expenditures to meet their
income. Too little progress has been made in disarma
ment. No appreciable progress has been made in de
flating excessive issues of currency or in stabilizing the
currencies at new levels, but in Continental Europe
there has been a constant increase in note issues. Private
initiative has not been restored. Unnecessary and unwise
economic barriers still exist. Instead of setting trade and
commerce free by appropriate steps there appear to be
concerted efforts to obtain from the most needy discrimi
natory advantages and exclusive concessions. There is
not yet apparent any disposition on the part of Europe to
make a prompt and reasonable definite settlement of the
reparation claims against Germany or to adopt policies
which will set Germany and Austria free to make their
necessary contribution to the economic rehabilitation of
Europe.
After taking all the measures within their power, one or
more of the debtor governments may ultimately consider
it necessary or advantageous to make some general
settlement of their indebtedness. In such a case, they
would, I presume, propose to all creditors, domestic and
foreign, a general composition which would take into

[1 2 7 ]

account advantages obtained by such debtor country
under the Treaty of Peace. How the American people
or the American Congress would view participation in
such a composition, I cannot say. It is very clear to me,
however, that a general cancellation of inter-governmental
war debts, irrespective of the positions of the separate
debtor governments, is of no present advantage or neces
sity. A general cancellation as suggested would, while
retaining the domestic obligations intact, throw upon the
people of this country the exclusive burden of meeting the
interest and of ultimately extinguishing the principal
of our loans to the Allied governments. This nation has
neither sought nor received substantial benefits from the
war. On the other hand, the Allies, although having
suffered greatly in loss of lives and property, have, under
the terms of the Treaty of Peace and otherwise, acquired
very considerable accessions of territories, populations,
economic and other advantages. It would therefore
seem that, if a full account were taken of-these and of the
whole situation, there would be no desire or reason to call
upon the government of this country for further contri
butions.
*
*
*
When Mr. Rathbone’s cable came announcing the
breaking off of the negotiations and conveying the in
formation that the Prime Minister desired to communi
cate directly with the President, I thought it necessary
that the matter be not permitted to drop and that I should
prepare a communication to be sent to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer. This I did and, after receiving approval
from the President, I transmitted the following:
“ I have consulted with the President concerning a
[128]

cable which we have received from Mr. Rathbone,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a letter
from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to him, in which he
states that the Cabinet, before proceeding further with the
consideration of detailed proposals for the treatment of
the British debt to the United States Government, feel
that their applicability to the general situation must be
further explored, and that there are raised questions of
great importance unsuited for departmental treatment
between the two treasuries; and that the Prime Minister
will communicate on this subject with the President. A
copy of the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer
and a copy of Mr. Rathbone’s reply to the Chancellor, of
which I approve, are attached hereto. The President has
approved my expressing the position of this government,
which is as follows:
“ The letter above referred to from the Chancellor to
Mr. Rathbone and Mr. Rathbone’s reply are the outcome
of negotiations which have been conducted for many
months between the British and the American treasuries
and which in effect began at the inception of our loans
to the British Treasury. The communication from the
Chancellor to Mr. Rathbone is the more surprising in that
Mr. Rathbone had been in Europe in this connection for
six months, the last of which he spent in London for the
sole purpose of conducting with the British Treasury dis
cussions which had resulted in agreement on nearly all
points, including the exchange of the demand obligations
of the British Government held by this government into
time obligations, and there was fair promise that agree
ment would be reached speedily on the few matters that
remained to be settled. We are especially surprised that
[129]

the negotiations should thus have been terminated on the
ground that the applicability of detailed proposals for the
treatment of the debt of the British Government to the
American Government in the general situation must be
further explored, and that this raises questions of im
portance too great for departmental treatment between
our two treasuries. On several occasions during the
Peace Conference, suggestions were made with a view to
injecting the subject of the debts among the Associated
and Allied governments into the question of the settle
ment to be made with the enemy. This government then
took the position that its loans to the respective Allied
governments have no relation to the other indebtedness of
those governments or to the German Government to
them, and that matters relating to the indebtedness of any
government to this government were properly to be dealt
with by the treasuries of the two countries and not at the
Peace Conference. All proposals contradictory to this
principle were rejected. The position of this government
has not changed.
“ With reference to so much of the Chancellor’s letter
as states that discussions on this subject took place at
an earlier period between the President and the Prime
Minister, and that the Prime Minister proposes now to
resume these discussions and will send a communication
for the President’s consideration, the President recalls
that he stated his views at length in a letter dated the
5th of M ay, 1919, to the Prime Minister. The views so
expressed have been maintained constantly since that
time, and this government now adheres to them, and holds
the opinion that no useful purpose can be served by now
reopening such questions. Although this government

fully realizes that a wise and constructive policy regarding
the reparations due from Germany will greatly accelerate
the rehabilitation of Europe and consequently the power
of the debtor governments to pay what they owe, only
future developments can show whether or not the ability
of any allied government to discharge its indebtedness is
dependent upon what it collects from Germany.
“ Should the British Government conclude that matters
concernirflg British obligations held by the United States
are not a departmental matter, to be dealt with by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the fact would remain that
as to such obligations and all other obligations received
by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States on
account of advances made by him under the Liberty Bond
acts, Congress has delegated only to the Secretary of the
Treasury the power within certain limitations to deal with
them. Since questions concerning the British indebted
ness to the United States arise only out of the existence of
such obligations or under the laws under which they were
received and necessarily concern the disposition of them,
it is» proper and necessary that such questions be dealt
with by the American Treasury. The Secretary of the
Treasury must adhere to the position which he has always
maintained and which, as he understood, had been ac
cepted by the British Government, that matters concern
ing the disposition and payment of the obligations of the
British Government held by this government must be
dealt with independently of the debt due from other
governments to the British Government or of the financial
position of such other governments. We had, however,
hoped that the British and American treasuries might
agree that the obligations to be received by them from

governments debtor to both in exchange for the obli
gations now held might be similar as to maturity, rate of
interest, and certain other matters.”
The matter drifted for some months. I assumed that
there would be a prompt communication from Mr. Lloyd
George to the President, but nothing came from him until
August 5, 1920. In the course of his letter, he touched
upon the reparation question and said that it was the
view of the French Government, which had been made
known to the British Government, that France could not
remit any part of the reparations due under the Treaty
except as a part of an all-round settlement of Inter-allied
indebtedness. He added that the British Government
would agree to any equitable arrangement for a reduction,
provided such a reduction applied all round.
There was nothing new in this. Mr. Lloyd George had
taken the matter up with the President early in the course
of the negotiations in Paris. He transmitted to the
President a document dated April, 1919. It revealed that
the thought in the minds of the Allies was thajt the loans of
the United States should be tied up with reparations, that
there should be a joint consideration of debts, and that if
the reparations were reduced our loans should be scaled
accordingly. It proposed, among other things, that
German bonds to the face value of £1,200,000,000 at 4
per cent, and 1 per cent, for sinking fund, should be issued,
that certain bonds should be issued by the other enemy
countries, and that these should be guaranteed jointly and
severally by the enemy states. It further provided that,
if any of the enemy guarantees fell down, they should be
guaranteed by the Allied and Associated governments,
by the Scandinavian governments and Holland and
[132]

Switzerland. In the event of any of the guaranteeing
governments failing to meet their guarantees, the remain
ing states should make good their failure. The proceeds
of most of the bonds were to be paid over on account of
sums due for reparations. The bonds were to be ac
cepted at their par value with interest in payment of all
indebtedness between any of the Allied and Associated
governments. They were to be acceptable as collateral
for loans at the central banks of all the issuing -or guaran
teeing states. The United States, Great Britain, and
France were to guarantee 20 per cent, each, Italy and
Japan 10 per cent, and the other states the remainder.
The effect of this would have been to make anything that
we might receive dependent upon German reparations
and to make the United States the principal effective
guarantor of the transaction.
The President replied under date of May 5th, emphati
cally turning down the proposition, pointing out the im
possibility of our acceptance and the lack of equity in the
proposal. Incidentally, he pointed out the injury which
the reparation claims, as they stood, would do to Germany
and the harm which uncertainty would cause the Allies.
Mr. Lloyd George’s letter of August 5, 1920, was
presented to me and, after full consideration, I drafted a
reply for the President’s approval and for his transmission
to the Prime Minister. In the early part of October, the
President transmitted a reply to Mr. Lloyd George, the
pertinent parts of which are as follows:
“ I turn now to the problem of inter-allied indebtedness,
which you raise. I must deal with this matter with great
frankness, as I am sure you wish me to do. It is desirable
that our position be clearly understood in order to avoid

any further delay in a constructive settlement of repa
rations which may arise from the hope that the debts of
this government can form a part of such settlement. It
will be helpful if first of all I indicate our legal situation.
“ The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized by United
States law to arrange for the conversion of the demand
obligations of the British Government into its obligations
having a fixed date of maturity, in accordance with the
agreement of the British Government to make such ex
change on demand contained in its existing obligations.
In connection with such exchange, the Secretary of the
Treasury has authority to arrange for the postponement
of interest payments. No power has been given by the
Congress to any one to exchange, remit, or cancel any part
of the indebtedness of the Allied governments to the
United States represented by their respective demand
obligations. It would require Congressional authority
to authorize any such dealing with the demand obligations
and, as stated in the letter of November 18, 1919, from
Mr. Rathbone to Mr. Blackett of the British Treasury,
the Congress has the same authority to authorize any
disposition of obligations of the British Government held
by the United States, whether represented by demand
obligations or by obligations having a fixed date of ma
turity. It is highly improbable that either the Congress
or popular opinion in this country will ever permit a can
cellation of any part of the debt of the British Govern
ment to the United States in order to induce the British
Government to remit, in whole or in part, the debt to
Great Britain of France or any other of the Allied govern
ments, or that it would consent to a cancellation or re
duction in the debts of any of the Allied governments as an

inducement toward a practical settlement of the repa
ration claims. As a matter of fact, such a settlement in
our judgment would not in itself increase the ultimate
financial strength of the Allies.
“ You will recall that suggestions looking to the cancel
lation or exchange of the indebtedness of Great Britain
to the United States were made to me when I was in Paris.
Like suggestions were again made by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer in the early part of the present year.
The United States Government, by its duly authorized
representatives, has promptly and clearly stated its un
willingness to accept such suggestions each time they have
been made and has pointed out in detail the considerations
which caused its decision. The views of the United States
Government have not changed, and it is not prepared to
consent to the remission of any part of the debt of Great
Britain to the United States. Any arrangements the
British Government may make with regard to the debt
owed to it by France or by the other Allied governments
should be made in the light of the position now and here
tofore taken by the United States, and the United States,
in making any arrangements with other Allied govern
ments regarding their indebtedness to the United States
(and none are now contemplated beyond the funding of
indebtedness and the postponement of payment of in
terest) will do so with the confident expectation of the
payment in due course of the debt owed the United States
by Great Britain. It is felt that the funding of these de
mand obligations of the British Government will do more
to strengthen the friendly relations between America
and Great Britain than would any other course of dealing
with the same.

“ The United States Government entirely agrees with
the British Government that the fixing of Germany’s
reparation obligation is a cardinal necessity for the renewal
of the economic life of Europe and would prove to be most
helpful in the interests of peace throughout the world;
however, it fails to perceive the logic in a suggestion in
effect either that the United States shall pay part of
Germany’s reparation obligation or that it shall make a
gratuity to the Allied governments to induce them to fix
such obligation at an amount within Germany’s capacity
to pay. This government has endeavoured heretofore
in a most friendly spirit to make it clear that it cannot
consent to connect the reparation question with that of
inter-governmental indebtedness.
“ The long delay which has occurred in the funding of
the demand obligations is already embarrassing the
Treasury, which will find itself compelled to begin to col
lect back and current interest if speedy progress is not
made with the funding. Unless arrangements are com
pleted for funding such loans and in that connection for
the deferring of interest, in the present state of opinion
here, there is likely to develop a dangerous misunderstand
ing. I believe it to be highly important that a British
representative with proper authority proceed to Washing
ton without delay to arrange to carry out the obligation
of the British Government to convert its demand obliga
tions held by our Treasury into long-time obligations.
“ The United States Government recognizes the im
portance, in the interests of peace and prosperity, of se
curing the restoration of financial and industrial stability
throughout Europe. The war debts of the Allied govern
ments, the treaty obligations of Germany under the rep

aration clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the annexes
thereto, and of other enemy and ex-enemy countries under
the treaties negotiated with them, the administration of
countries under the mandates provided for by such
treaties, and the existing arrangements between the
governments of various countries, have or may have an
important bearing in making plans to accomplish such
restoration. It is the view of the United States Govern
ment that in accrediting a representative to Washington
for the purpose mentioned, it might prove expedient that
the British Government should authorize him to enter
into discussions of all of these matters with the proper
representatives of the United States Government.”
When I ascertained that this letter had been sent, I in
quired if the Treasury might again take up the matter. I
received an affirmative answer. I approached the British
Ambassador and suggested the desirability of concluding
negotiations. I was informed that Britain would soon
send a representative here to continue the discussion.
And here the matter rested.
It seemed to me unfortunate that there should have
been any delay. I was convinced that delay would simply
give interested persons an opportunity to make trouble,
and that suspicion and ill-feeling might result. I regarded
it as particularly unfortunate that certain positions should
be taken by one of the leading governments in reference
to this matter. I knew that it would not help matters to
place the debts due the United States in the same category
with reparations claimed from Germany. When we made
the loans, those eagerly seeking them did not suggest that
their funding or their repayment be made dependent on
what they might subsequently receive from any direction,

especially from reparations from Germany. They did
not then know, of course, that they would receive repara
tions from Germany. They did not then know that they
would be victorious over Germany. Any reparations
were made possible by the participation of the United
States in the war, and by her financial aid. The United
States from the outset had vigorously protested against
the excessive amount of reparations which was fixed. It
would not sit well to have any nation assert that her re
payment of loans would depend upon her receipt of rep
arations and be a part and parcel of them, that if there
was any reduction in the reparations amount, which, of
course, was an impossible amount, the United States must
help make up the difference by cancelling her loans in
part or whole. I was confident that the people of the
United States, while they might be prepared to recognize
all the economic facts and be generous, would not be put
in the position of paying part of an indemnity amount
which in the nature of things could not be paid by Ger
many. The further argument that we should cancel our
debts because we did not enter the war soon enough was
likewise irritating. Whether we were ter enter the war
or not and when was a decision for us alone to make. Like
wise, the suggestion that we had not, in fact, pooled our
resources with the Allies, and especially the suggestion
that Great Britain had acted as an intermediary for her
Allies and as a guarantor for their debts to us, was as irri
tating as it was untrue.
In my report for 1920, 1 reviewed the matter of credits
and indicated my strong opposition to a cancellation of
the foreign loans and pointed out that the American peo
ple would scarcely entertain with favour the proposition

to cancel them without consideration, realizing that, if the
debts were cancelled, they must pay the taxes to meet the
interest and to redeem the principal. I then believed and
still believe that generous terms would be made, and
especially if this country were convinced that the Allies
would settle down to readjustment along sound lines and
would abate many of the evils that tend to cause friction
and war. I emphasized the fact that the reasonable and
proper course to take at the time was to proceed under
the terms of the law, and for those indebted to fund their
demand notes into obligations with a distant maturity,
with rates of interest, low at first and later gradually
increasing, coupled with authority for the time being to
defer interest payments. I recognized that the period of
maturity should be a very long one and that it would do
this country no good, looking at the matter broadly, to
receive any payments of either interest or principal in the
existing state of international finance and international
trade.

CHAPTER XXIX
THE LAST DAYS OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Luncheon at the White House— Requested to Draft Veto of Tariff
on Ag-icultural Products— Farewell Letter

N TH U RSDAY, February 24th, Mrs. Houston
and I, at the invitation of the President and
Mrs. Wilson, went to the White House for
luncheon. This was the first time that we had
taken any meal with the President and Mrs. Wilson when
no other guests were present. It was a somewhat pa
thetic experience. The President looked fairly well and
made a brave show of good spirits. He repeated a great
many of his favourite stories and was exceptionally
kindly and friendly.
I asked him what he thought of the new Cabinet. He
replied that he did not have mind enough to encompass
the entire body, and asked which I had particularly in
mind. I was more especially concerned with the Secretary
of the Interior, Senator Fall. I had known of his attitude
toward conservation. He was one of a crowd that we had
been fighting for a number of years. I knew that he had
about the same interest in the conservation of the natural
resources of the nation that a tiger has in a lamb, and I
was astounded when I noticed his appointment.

When I mentioned his name, the President said he had
never wanted to hit a man in his life as badly as he did
Senator Fall on a certain occasion. He reminded us of

[140]

the fact that, after his serious illness, Senator Fall had
called at the White House, as the President expressed it,
“ as a member of a smelling committee,” to find out
whether he was all there or not, and added: “ I was lying
in bed flat on my back. After the committee had dis
cussed certain matters with me and had, I think, discov
ered that I was very much all here, the committee turned
to leave. Senator Fall paused a moment and said: ‘ Mr.
President, I want you to know that I am praying for you.’ ”
The President remarked: “ If I could have got out of bed,
I would have hit the man. Why did he want to put me
in bad with the Almighty? He must have known that God
would take the opposite view from him on any subject.”
As we were leaving, he walked on his crutches with me
as far as the elevator, making headway with great diffi
culty. As we parted, he laid his hand on my arm and
with some emotion simply said: “ Houston, old man, God
bless you.” This was the first evidence of personal affec
tion or emotion I ever saw him exhibit.
The last important matter affecting the Treasury I had
to take up with the President was the bill imposing
temporary duties upon agricultural products and for
other purposes. The President had the bill sent to me
with the usual request that I advise him whether I had any
objections to his approval. I replied that I had objec
tion and prepared and sent to him for his consideration
a veto message which he transmitted to the Congress.
It was as follows:
T h e H o u se o f R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s :
I return herewith, without my approval, H. R. 15275*
an act imposing temporary duties upon certain agricul

tural products to meet present emergencies, to provide
revenue, and for other purposes.
The title of this measure indicates that it has several
purposes. The report of the Committee on Ways and
Means reveals that its principal object is to furnish relief
to certain producers in the nation who have been unable
to discover satisfactory markets in foreign countries for
their products and whose prices have fallen. Very little
reflection would lead any one to conclude that the meas
ure would not furnish in any substantial degree the relief
sought by the producers of most of the staple commodi
ties which it covers. This nation has been for very many
years a large exporter of agricultural products. For
nearly a generation before it entered the European war,
its exports exceeded its imports of agricultural commodi
ties by from approximately $200,000,000 to more than
$500,000,000. In recent years this excess has greatly
increased, and in 1919 reached the huge total of
$1,904,292,000. The excess of exports of staple products
is especially marked. In 1913, the uation imported
783,481 bushels of wheat valued at $670,931, and in 1920,
3^,848,648 bushels worth $75,398,834; while it exported
in 1913, 99,508,968 bushels worth $95,098,838, and in
1920, 218,280,231 bushels valued at $596,957,796. In
the year 1913, it imported 85,183 barrels of wheat flour
valued at $347,877, and in 1920, 800,788 barrels valued
at $8,669,300; while it exported in the first year, 12,278,206
barrels valued at $56,865,444, and in 1920, 19,853,952
barrels valued at $224,472,448. In 1913, it imported
$3,888,604 worth of corn, and in 1920, $9,257,377 worth,
while its exports in the first year were valued at
$26,515,146, and in 1920, at $26,453,681. O f unmanu

factured cotton in 1920 it imported approximately
300,000,000 pounds valued at $38,743,000, while it ex
ported more than 3,179,000,000 pounds, worth over
$1,136,000,000.
O f preserved milk in the same year it imported
I3>33jj812 worth and exported $65,239,020 worth. Its
imports ijn the same year of sugar and wool of course
greatly exceeded its exports. It is obvious that for the
commodities, except sugar and wool, mentioned in the
measure, which make up the greater part of our agricul
tural international trade, the imports can have little or
no effect on the prices of the domestic products. This is
strikingly true of such commodities as wheat and corn.
The imports of wheat have come mainly from Canada
and Argentina and have not competed with the domestic
crop. Rather they have supplemented it. The domestic
demand has been for specific classes and qualities of
foreign wheat to meet particular milling and planting
needs. They are a small fraction of our total production
and of our wheat exports. The price of wheat is a world
price; and it is a matter of little moment whether the Ca
nadian wheat goes directly into the markets of the other
countries of the world or indirectly through this country.
The relatively small quantity of corn imported into this
country has a specialized use and does not come into com
petition with the domestic commodity.
The situation in which many of the farmers of the coun
try find themselves cannot be remedied by a measure of
this sort. This is doubtless generally understood. There
is no short way out of existing conditions, and measures
of this sort can only have the effect of deceiving the farm
ers and of raising false hopes among them. Actual relief

can come only from the adoption of constructive measures
of a broader scope, from the restoration of peace every
where in the world, the resumption of normal industrial
pursuits, the recovery particularly of Europe, and the dis
covery there of additional credit foundations on the basis
of which her people may arrange to take from farmers and
other producers of this nation a greater part of their sur
plus production.
One does not pay a compliment to the American farmer
who attempts to alarm him by dangers from foreign com
petition. The American farmers are the most effective
agricultural producers in the world. Their production is
several times as great for each worker as that of their
principal foreign rivals. This grows out of the intelligence
of the American farmer, the nature of his agricultural
practices and economy, and the fact that he has the as
sistance of scientific and practical agencies which in re
spect to variety of activity, of personnel, and of financial
support exceed those of any other two or three nations in
the world combined. There is little doubt-that the farm
ers of this nation will not only continue mainly to supply
the home demand but will be increasingly called upon to
supply a large part of the needs of the rest of the world.
What the farmer now needs is not only a better system
of domestic marketing and credit, but especially larger
foreign markets for his surplus products. Clearly, meas
ures of this sort will not conduce to an expansion of the
foreign market. It is not a little singular that a measure
which strikes a blow at our foreign trade should follow so
closely upon the action of Congress directing the resump
tion o f certain activities of the War Finance Corporation,
especially at the urgent insistence of representatives o f the

farming interests, who believed that its resumption would
improve foreign marketing. Indeed, when one surveys
recent activities in the foreign field and measures enacted
affecting the foreign trade, one cannot fail to be impressed
with the fact that there is consistency only in their con
tradictions and inconsistencies. We have been vigorously
building up a great merchant marine and providing for
improvement of marketing in foreign countries by the
passage of an export-trade law and of measures for the
promotion of banking agencies in foreign countries. Now
it appears that we propose to render these measures abor
tive in whole or in part.
I imagine there is little doubt that, while this measure
is temporary, it is intended as a foundation for action of a
similar nature of a very general and permanent character.
It would seem to be designed to pave the way for such
action. If there ever was a time when America had any
thing to fear from foreign competition, that time has
passed. I cannot believe that American producers, who in
most respects are the most effective in the world, can have
any dread of competition when they view the fact that
their country has come through the great struggle of the
last few years, relatively speaking, untouched, while their
principal competitors are in varying degrees sadly stricken
and labouring under adverse conditions from which they
will not recover for many years. Changes of a very radi
cal character have taken place. The United States has
become a great creditor nation. She has lent certain
governments of Europe'more than $9,000,000,000, and as
a result of the enormous excess of our exports, there is an
additional commercial indebtedness of foreign nations to
our own of perhaps not less than $4,000,000,000. There

are only three ways in which Europe can meet her part
of her indebtedness, namely, by the establishment of
private credits, by the shipment of gold, or of commodities.
It is difficult for Europe to discover the requisite securities
as a basis for the necessary credits. Europe is not in a
position at the present time to send us the amount of gold
which would be needed, and we could not view further
large imports of gold into this country without concern.
The result, to say the least, would be a larger disarrange
ment of international exchange and disturbance of in
ternational trade. I f we wish to have Europe settle her
debts, governmental or commercial, we must be pre
pared to buy from her, and if we wish to assist Europe
and ourselves by the export either of food, of raw mate
rials, or of finished products, we must be prepared to wel
come commodities which we need and which Europe will
be prepared, with no little pain, to send us.
Clearly, this is no time for the erection here of high
trade barriers. It would strike a blow at the large and
successful efforts which have been made by many of our
great industries to place themselves on an export basis.
It would stand in the way of the normal readjustment of
business conditions throughout the world, which is as
vital to the welfare of this country as to that of all the
other nations. The United States has a duty to itself as
well as to the world, and it can discharge this duty by
widening, not by contracting, its world markets.
This measure has only slight interest so far as its pros
pective revenue yields are concerned. It is estimated that
the aggregate addition to the nation’s income from its
operation for ten months would be less than $72,000,000,
and of this more than half would arise from the proposed

[146}

duty on sugar. Obviously, this and much more can be
secured in ways known to the Congress, which would be
vastly less burdensome to the American consumer and
American industry.
The rates, however, have a peculiar interest. In practi
cally every case, they either equal or exceed those estab
lished under the Payne-Aldrich Act, in which the principle
of protection reached its high-water mark, and the enact
ment of which was followed by an effective exhibition of
protests on the part of the majority of the American peo
ple. I do not believe that the sober judgment of the masses
of the people of the nation, or even of the special class
whose interests are immediately affected by this measure,
will sanction a return, especially in view of conditions
which lend even less justification for such action, to a
policy of legislation for selfish interests which will foster
monopoly and increase the disposition to look upon the
government as an instrument for private gain instead of
an instrument for the promotion of the general well being.
Such a policy is antagonistic to the fundamental principle
of equal and exact justice to all, and can only serve to re
vive the feeling of irritation on the part of the great
masses of the people and of lack of confidence in the
motives of rulers and the results of government.
W

oodrow

W il s o n .

The White House,
3 March, 1921.
Tuesday, March 1,1921, we held our last Cabinet meet
ing. It had been decided to hold it in the regular Cabinet
room in the executive offices. I arrived a few minutes
early and saw the President coming through the White

House grounds toward the room. He was walking with
great difficulty. It was a brave but tragic spectacle. I
turned away and walked into an adjoining room so that he
might get seated, and then I entered and took my place
at his left. We discussed a few measures which were still
before the Congress, and something was said about the
part the President would take in the exercises during the
inauguration. He had not then had presented to him
the full plans. He made it clear that he expected and in
tended to carry out his full part in the exercises.
A brief pause ensued. Then one of the members of the ,
Cabinet asked the President how he was going to pass his
time and if it was likely that he would write a history of the
Administration. The President replied that he would not
write a history of his Administration, saying that he was
too near the events and too closely personally associated
with them to make it desirable or possible for him to do so.
He said, in substance: “ I cannot write a history of these
eight years. It is unnecessary for me to attempt to write
anything new. The people know everything that I have
thought. There has been nothing which it was necessary
or desirable for me to keep secret.” The same member
of the Cabinet said: “ But you must do something! What
will you do?” The President reflected a moment and
said: “ I am going to try to teach ex-presidents how to be
have.” Then he added: “ There will be one very difficult
thing for me, however, to stand, and that is Mr. Harding’s
English.”
After the business was disposed of, our minds naturally
turned to the experiences of our eight strenuous years to
gether and particularly to the President’s personal strug
gles and heroic endeavours. A short pause ensued.
[148]

Then the Secretary of State, properly speaking first, said
in effect:
“ Mr. President, if I may presume to voice the senti
ments of my colleagues, I have the honour of saying that
it has been a great distinction to serve you and with you
in the most interesting and fateful times of modern his
tory. It has been a most satisfactory and inspiring
service. We shall keep watch of your progress toward
better health with affectionate interest and shall pray
that your recovery may be rapid.”
It was then my part to say something. I turned to
ward the President and started to speak but noticed that
he was struggling under a powerful emotion and was trying
to control himself. His lips were trembling. He began
to speak but hesitated a moment as tears rolled down his
cheeks. Then he said, brokenly: “ Gentlemen, it is one of
the handicaps of my physical condition that I cannot
control myself as I have been accustomed to do. God
bless you all.” This was a very touching statement.
No greater trial could come to a Scotch Presbyterian
whose whole philosophy of life was self-control, to be un
able to master himself.
We got up quietly, shook hands with him, bade him
farewell, and left the room. That afternoon I returned
to my office and dictated this letter which I sent him on
Thursday:
March 3,1921.
D

ear

M r . P r e s id e n t :

I feel impelled to say just a word to you before I vacate
my office and our official relations are severed. I need not
tell you that I have felt greatly honoured by my associa

tion with you in one of the greatest periods of American
history. You conferred on me great distinction in making
me first the head of the Department of Agriculture and
later the head of the Treasury Department. These hap
pen to be the departments of government dealing with
activities in which my interests for many years have
mainly centred. I have therefore derived immense in
terest, pleasure, and satisfaction from supervising their
activities, including not only the problems of rural life
and of finance, also those of commercial and farm-Ioan
banking, not to speak of many others. A t all times my
problems have been numerous and difficult, but my tasks
have been rendered tolerable by your unfailing support. I
have had no doubt at any time of the principle by which
I should be guided. I knew that the principle was the
one by which you yourself are guided. I have known you
too long and been associated with you too intimately not
to know that there is only one question in which you are
interested, and that is whether a given course is right or
wrong. M ay I say that I have had knowledge of the
fact that no other man has occupied your position who
was so well prepared by training and experience to pass
judgment on problems in this spirit or who had in higher
degree the willingness and courage to follow the course
deemed to be in the public interest? I am serenely con
fident that the sober judgment of the people of this nation
now is that you have given the nation as effective and as
clean an administration as it has ever had, and that no
man in the world has laboured more valiantly and success
fully than you to promote real and civilized purposes.
I know that the verdict of history will be to this effect.
I have deeply appreciated your many personal courte

sies. I have been distressed that your numerous tasKs
weighed on you and almost overwhelmed you physically,
and I have followed with immense satisfaction your course
of recovery. I hope that you will be rapidly restored to
normal physical strength.
May I say just another personal word? I feel that I
cannot close this note without an expression of indebted
ness to Mrs. Wilson, and of admiration for the part she
has played and the judgment she has shown in dealing
with important matters.
With great affection and gratitude, I am,
Faithfully yours,
D. F. H o u s t o n .
The President,
The White House.

AN E S T I M A T E OF
WOODROW WILSON

AN E S T I M A T E OF WOODROW W IL SO N
HUS far the record speaks for itself. It gives the
story of things as I saw them, for the day, or the
week, or the month or, in a few instances, for a
longer period, when no new developments ap
peared and there seemed to be no special need for re
cording anything. The memoranda having been made
at the time, little opportunity was offered to look back
ward or forward, and an effort was made not to do so.
The comments are those of the moment, on the happen
ings of the moment, and there is, therefore, little in the
record in the way of broad criticism or of a controversial
nature.
Perhaps it would be wiser to stop with the record, but
I find it difficult to resist the temptation to take a some
what freer range, in particular to give my estimate of the
central figure of the period, and, for that matter, the cen
tral world figure in this great period of the world’s history.
I prefer to yield to the temptation and run the risk of being
counted unwise and even rash. It is rash to attempt to
give an estimate of any man— to say that he was thus and
so, and that he acted from such and such motives. No
man fully understands himself, or is able always, even
after reflection, to state satisfactorily to himself the
grounds of his decision and the reasons for his action.
It is peculiarly risky for any one to essay to analyse
Woodrow Wilson and to picture what manner of man he
was and why he acted as he did on many of the smaller

and larger matters rapidly pressing upon him for decision
in the most momentous and rapidly shifting scenes of
modern history. It was easy for omniscient persons on
the outside to ascertain and determine at the time why he
did certain things and what he should have done. They
were hampered neither by facts nor by responsibility; and
many of those who were most vocal, at a time of great
national peril even, were more concerned with making
political capital than they were in soberly discovering the
right course. Not a few of them of the prima donna type
were constantly seeking the limelight and were deeply
resentful of the fact that in such stirring and dramatic
times others had the leading roles and positions of power.
There were a few conspicuous leaders of the opposing
party, some in political positions of influence, others in
private life who were peculiarly affected with this resent
ment and could not conceal it. They revealed it at all
times, frequently in harmful ways— in outbursts of furious
criticism or in petty partisan tactics. It is not necessary
that I mention names. They will reaclily occur to the
reader.
Few men see a thing or a man in the same light, and I
do not for a moment assume that any one else will accept
my estimate of Woodrow Wilson in full, or even in large
measure. It is not even satisfactory to me, and I shall
doubtless revise it as I get sidelights from his other friends,
from his critics, and from new materials.
The sum of Mark Twain's later philosophy about man
is that he is the creature of heredity and environment.
How far this is sound is a matter for debate, but there is no
question that there is a measure of truth in. St. Woodrow
Wilson revealed sharply the influence of his heredity and

of his environment. He came from stern ancestors and
for fifty-eight years of his life his environment was con
fined and specialized. “ My ancestors,” he said, "were
troublesome Scotsmen, and among them were some of
that famous group that were known as Covenanters.”
His maternal grandfather was a Scotsman. He was a
Scotch Presbyterian. He was a Calvinist; a follower of
John Knox. He was at one time a missionary in Canada
and later became the pastor of a church in Chillicothe,
Ohio. He was a graduate of the University of Glasgow.
Woodrow Wilson’s father was also a Presbyterian of a
severe, intellectual type. He was a graduate of Jefferson
College, Pennsylvania. At one time, he taught in a
Presbyterian school. He was a student in a theological
school at Alleghany; also in the Theological School at
Princeton; Professor of Rhetoric in Jefferson College;
then a Professor in Hamden-Sidney, a Presbyterian col
lege in Virginia; a Presbyterian preacher, and a professor
of Theology in Columbia, South Carolina. Woodrow
Wilson’s uncle, Dr. James Woodrow, of Scotch ancestry,
was also a Presbyterian theologian. He was a graduate
of a German university; a scientist and linguist; a highly
refined, intellectual type of scholar; a versatile man of
affairs; a stubborn, relentless fighter for his convictions
and for intellectual freedom. I knew him well and had
the good fortune to be with him much during the stress
of the period when he was being tried for heresy because
of his views on evolution.
Furthermore, Woodrow Wilson’s first wife was the
daughter of a Presbyterian clergyman and the grand
daughter of one. Truly, Woodrow Wilson was the son of
the manse; and his environment was that of the manse

until he changed it for that of the college. The first
college he attended— Davidson in North Carolina, founded
by followers of Witherspoon of Princeton— was Presby
terian, and Princeton, where he spent four years as a
student, is, of course, strictly Presbyterian in descent.
From 1874 to October 20,1910, with the exception of one
year, Woodrow Wilson’s environment was that of the
college.
Wilson was, therefore, a dyed-in-the-wool Scotch
Presbyterian, a Scotch-Presbyterian Christian, with all
that that implies— in philosophy, ethics, morals, stand
ards of conduct, and practices. Those who do not recog
nize this waste their time in trying to understand him,
and to those who do recognize and remember this those
who evilly gossiped about him will sink into their proper
places. There were many such evil-minded, stupid crea
tures gossiping during Woodrow Wilson’s life, and there
are still some left. They abounded in Washington, which,
in a way, is the national headquarters of gossips, who,
with more money than brains or morals, occupy a position
o f commonplace social leadership and who, having no
worthy intellectual interest to commend them, busy
themselves with manufacturing and disseminating un
wholesome rumours about those in high political positions,
particularly about the President. 11 has always interested
me to observe that the lower classes everywhere, through
out history, have taken a peculiar pride in imputing im
morality to their rulers. Few Presidents have escaped
and few hereafter will escape. Washington, Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, Roosevelt, and Wilson have
all been victims of their venom. The more outstanding the
character, the more venomous have been their assaults.

I said that Woodrow Wilson was a Scotch-Presbyterian
Christian. With him God was an immanent presence.
He was with him in the White House, and if he could dis
cover what He wanted, he gave no heed to what anybody
else or everybody else wanted or thought. Reference has
been made to the meeting of the Cabinet before our forces
took Vera Cruz, when he startled the Cabinet by asking
those who still believed in prayer to pray over the matter.
That he cfid so constantly admits of no doubt. Mr. Wil
son believed in an Over-ruling Providence. This is re
vealed in many of his addresses, and there is abundant
evidence of his solemn reliance on Its guidance. To il
lustrate, in his address to the Confederate Veterans at
Washington, June 5, 1917, he said:
“ Many men, I know, particularly of our own generation,
have wondered at some of the dealings of Providence,
but the wise heart never questions the dealings of Provi
dence, because the great, long plan as it unfolds has a maj
esty about it and a definiteness of purpose, an elevation
of ideal, which we are incapable of conceiving as we tried
to work things out with our own short sight and weak
strength.”
This recognition of an Over-ruling Providence was
strikingly reflected in a statement Mr. Wilson made not
long before his death. A friend who was visiting him ex
pressed deep regret that the nation still had not ratified
the Treaty of Versailles or entered the League of Nations.
Mr. Wilson said, in substance: “ I am not so sure that the
delay is not for the best. The people should be unmistak
ably back of the government’s action. After all, Provi
dence knows more about these things than any of us.
Any one is a fool who questions Its ways.”

It follows that Mr. Wilson had a strong belief in the
might of right. In all my contacts with him, in every
thing I heard him say, I was impressed by this more
than by anything else, viz.: That he was interested above
all things in discovering what was right: what was the
right thing to say and the right course to pursue. He was
nervous only about the possibility of being wrong. The
only real appeal one could make to him was on the right or
wrong of a matter. He had little stomach for compro
mises of any sort, and none for compromises which had
a shade of the compromising in them. He was content
when he felt that he had arrived at the heart of a matter
and had the right of it. He was then prepared to go ahead
regardless of consequences. In his assessment of meas
ures, personalities, personal equations, personal ambitions,
and self-seeking were ruthlessly brushed aside. He had,
in his processes and actions, in very high degree, the ele
ment of objectivity. In all his thinking and actions in the
field of government and economics, his mind directed
itself to the merit of the question, and he assumed that
others were equally unselfish and devoted. He, of course,
regarded government as an agency for promoting the
general welfare through the establishment of justice and
rules of conduct and through the creation of conditions
under which each individual or group of individuals could
most satisfactorily work out its own salvation. He recog
nized, of course, that government was cooperation, and
that certain things could better be done by joint action
than by individual effort, and that without cooperative
effort through government certain things could not get
done at all. He resented the theory of personal, or
group, or sectional favour, or special privilege. He like[160]

wise detested the idea of paternalism and patronage, and
that government should be used to foster certain interests
or classes on the assumption that they would pass on to
the public its share of the benefit.
Mr. Wilson had something more than this objectivity
in all public matters. He was strikingly selfless, or unself
ish. He had no personal ends to serve and no thought of
attempting to serve them. It was difficult to get him to
take any interest in himself; and in my eight years of con
tact with him, it never occurred to me at any time to raise
a question as to how a proposed course of action might
affect him or his fortunes. I knew that he would resent it.
On a few occasions, when someone ventured a suggestion
of the kind, he met with a very prompt and stern rebuke.
Mr. Wilson worked for the approval of his own con
science and for that of mankind, or as he expressed it, for
t-he verdict of history.
He was utterly sincere when he asserted that he had
never been interested in fighting for himself, but that he
was always intensely interested in fighting for the things
he believed in. He was speaking naturally when he said
that it was a matter of personal indifference to him what
the verdict of the people was in 1916.
Never at any time did he attempt to make personal
capital out of his high position. He was humbled rather
than exalted by it, and his keen wit penetrated quickly the
atmosphere with which lesser spirits surrounded them
selves when they descended upon Washington in their
official dignity. He was amused at the front the average
man threw when he assumed high position, and especially
when one of them heard himself addressed as, for instance,
“ Senator” or “ Mr. Secretary.” “ There are two sorts of
[161]

men who come to Washington,” he said: “ those who swell
and those who grow, and the former are greatly in the
majority.” Those little understood him who represented
that his main motive in going to Europe was to capitalize
his position and to win personal glory and acclaim. This
representation was as cruel as it was untrue. He went to
Europe through his stern sense of duty to the nation and
to those whom he had sent to Europe to offer their lives
for humanity.
Having this high conception of his position and of gov
ernment, this selfless and objective state of mind, he had a
deep suspicion of the ordinary run of professional politi
cians and an innate hostility to them. They appeared to
him to have primarily only a selfish interest in the govern
ment and to be determined to use it mainly for personal
ends and the ends of their friends and adherents. He
could not easily bring himself to take interest in the solici
tude of Senators and Congressmen for their political fences
and their desire to keep them in order by seeking local and
national positions for their party supporters. Doubtless
he carried this attitude too far. Doubtless he took too
little account of poor human nature, its weaknesses and
foibles. Calvinists habitually do so. Doubtless he was
disposed unconsciously to subject it to an unduly severe
strain. Possibly he could have yielded something without
sacrificing principle. If he had done so, he might have
been a more successful party leader and had back of
him to the end a united fighting force instead of finally
a disorganized and half-hearted Congressional line-up,
but if he had I should not now cherish the same admi
ration for him that I had from the beginning and still
have.

Mr. Wilson’s faith in the people was a complement and
a natural resultant of his Christian philosophy and his re
liance on Providence. He had a deep faith in the moral
judgments of the people. “ I have found that the flame of
moral judgments burns just as bright in the man of humble
and limited experience as in the scholar and man of affairs,”
he said to his audience more than once. He relied on the
unselfishness of the people of the lower walks of life and,
like Lincoln, believed that in the long run they would do
the right thing. In his oration on Lincoln he paid elo-1
quent tribute to men of humble station:
“ No more significant memorial could have been pre
sented to the nation than this. It expresses so much of
what is singular and noteworthy in the history of the
country; it suggests so many of the things that we prize
most highly in our life and in our system of government.
How eloquent this little house within this shrine is of the
vigour of democracy! There is nowhere in the land any
home so remote, so humble, that it may not contain the
power of mind and heart and conscience to which nations
yield and history submits its processes. Nature pays no
tribute to aristocracy, subscribes to no creed of caste, ren
ders fealty to no monarch or master of any name or kind.
Genius is no snob. It does not run after titles or seek by
preference the high circles of society. It affects humble
company as well as great. It pays no special tribute to
universities or learned societies or conventional standards
of greatness, but serenely chooses its own comrades, its
own haunts, its own cradle even, and its own life of ad
venture and of training. Here is proof of it. This little
hut was the cradle of one of the great sons of men, a man
of singular, delightful, vital genius, who presently emerged
[163]

upon the great stage of the nation’s history, gaunt, shy,
ungainly, but dominant and majestic, a natural ruler of
men, himself inevitably the central figure of the great plot.
No man can explain this, but every man can see how it
demonstrates the vigour of democracy, where every door is
open, in every hamlet and countryside, in city and wilder
ness alike, for the ruler to emerge when he will and claim
his leadership in the free life. Such are the authentic
proofs of the validity and vitality of democracy.
“ Here, no less, hides the mystery of democracy. Who
shall guess this secret of nature and providence and a free
polity? Whatever the vigour and vitality of the stock
from which he sprang, its mere vigour and soundness do
not explain where this man got his great heart that seemed
to comprehend all mankind in its catholic and benignant
sympathy, the mind that sat enthroned behind those
brooding, melancholy eyes, whose vision swept many an
horizon which those about him dreamed not of— that mind
that comprehended what it had never seen, and under
stood the language of affairs with the ready ease of one
to the manner born— or that nature which seemed in its
varied richness to be the familiar of men of every way of
life. This is the sacred mystery of democracy, that its
richest fruits spring up out of soils which no man has pre
pared and in circumstances amidst which they are the least
expected. This is a place alike of mystery and of reas
surance.
“ It is likely that, in a society ordered otherwise than
our own, Lincoln could not have found himself or the path
o f fame and power upon which he walked serenely to his
death. In this place, it is right that we should remind
ourselves of the solid and striking facts upon which our
[164]

faith in democracy is founded. Many another man be
sides Lincoln has served the nation in its highest places of
counsel and of action whose origins were as humble as his.
Though the greatest example of the universal energy,
richness, stimulation, and force of democracy, he is only
one example among many. The permeating and allpervasive virtue of the freedom which challenges us in
America to make the most of every gift and power we
possess, every page of our history serves to emphasize and
illustrate. Standing here in this place, it seems almost
the whole of the stirring story.
“ Here Lincoln had his beginnings. Here the end and
consummation of that great life seem remote and a bit
incredible. And yet there was no break anywhere be
tween beginning and end, no lack of natural sequence any
where. Nothing really incredible happened. Lincoln
was unaffectedly as much at home in the White House as
he was here. Do you share with me the feeling, I wonder,
that he was permanently at home nowhere? It seems to
me that, in the case of a man— I would rather say of a
spirit— like Lincoln, the question where he was is of little
significance, that it is always what he was that really ar
rests our thought and takes hold of our imagination. It
is the spirit always that is sovereign. Lincoln, like the
rest of us, was put through the discipline of the world— a
very rough and exacting discipline for him, an indispens
able discipline for every man who would know what he
is about in the midst of the world’s affairs; but his spirit
got only its schooling there. It did not derive its char
acter or its vision from the experiences which brought it
to its full revelation. The test of every American must
always be, not where he is, but what he is. That, also, is

of the essence of democracy, and is the moral of which
this place is most gravely expressive.
“ We would like to think of men like Lincoln and
Washington as typical Americans, but no man can be
typical who is so unusual as these great men were. It
was typical of American life that it should produce such
men with supreme indifference as to the manner in which
it produced them, and as readily here in this hut as amidst
the little circle of cultivated gentlemen to whom Virginia
owed so much in leadership and example. And Lincoln
and Washington were typical Americans in the use they
made of their genius. But there will be few such men
at best, and we will not look into the mystery of how and
why they come. We will only keep the door open for
them always, and a hearty welcome— after we have recog
nized them."
Again he said:
“ I believe in the ordinary man. If I did not believe
in the ordinary man, I would move out of a democracy
and, if I found an endurable monarchy, I-would live in it.
“ The very conception of America is based upon the
validity of the judgments of the average man. . . .
I
call you to witness that the average judgments of the
voters of the United States have been sound judgments.”
Mr. Wilson longed to have the people like him and
applaud his course. He craved popularity, but only on
its own basis. This was his statement of it:
" I am sometimes very much interested when I see gen
tlemen supposing that popularity is the way to success in
America. The way to success in this great country, with
its fair judgments, is to show that you are not afraid of
anybody except God and His final verdict. I f I did not
I166]

believe that, I would not believe in democracy. If I did
not believe that, I would not believe that people can gov
ern themselves. If I did not believe that the moral
judgment would be the last judgment, the final judgment,
in the minds of men as well as the tribunal of God, I could
not believe in popular government. But I do believe
these things, and, therefore, I earnestly believe in the
democracy, not only of America, but of every awakened
people that wishes and intends to govern and control its
own affairs.”
This is a stern code, but only a natural expression of
his whole philosophy of life. It was not of late fruitage;
he came by it early. He was a great admirer of Burke,
Bright, and Pitt. Several times I heard him say that he
was so familiar with Burke’s writings, and they were so
much a part of him, that he could not be sure whether he
was using his own phraseology or Burke’s. He wrote
essays on Bright and Pitt, and they also aided him to
formulate his principles. Writing of Bright in 1888 he
says:
“ The lessons of his life are not hard to seek or hard to
learn. It is that duty consists not in the cultivation and
practice of the arts of intrigue, nor in the pressure of all
the crooked intricacies of the paths of party management,
but in the lifelong endeavour to lead first the attention and
then the will of the people to the acceptance of truth in its
applications to the problems of government; that not the
adornments of rhetoric, but an absorbing love of justice
and truth and a consuming, passionate devotion to princi
ple, are the body and soul of eloquence; that complete
identification with some worthy cause is the first and great
prerequisite of abiding success.”
£167]

In contemplating the life of Pitt, writing in 1887, he
gives his ideal of statesmanship:
"Statesmanship, that resolute and vigorous advance
towards the realization of high, definite, and consistent
aims, which issue from the unreserved devotion of a
strong intellect to the service of the state and to the
solution of all the multiform problems of public policy.”
In criticizing Pitt, he made a further revelation of his
own thought. In the same article he adds this:
“ And yet his errors were many and grave. They were,
however, such as are incident upon a policy whose authors
seek with whole-souled ardour, with keen enthusiasm, to
carry out great principles in all their integrity. Such a
policy is always admirable, in the abstract, but, in prac
tice, seldom safe. In a free government, founded upon
public opinion, the governmental machinery is so nicely
balanced, opposite parties, opposing forces of thought,
generally exercise powers so nearly equal that great princi
ples must be worked cautiously, step by step, seldom at
taining triumphant ascendency by a course of uninter
rupted success— by only a few bold strokes. Public
opinion must not be outstripped, but kept pace with.”

It is not a little singular that one who so aptly and dis
criminatingly pointed out the error of Pitt in pressing
relentlessly for the acceptance of a great principle, should
himself not have taken the principle to heart when he was
facing a great struggle over a programme in which he was
equally concerned.
It is possible that he might have had larger success in
his fight for the Treaty if he had worked more cautiously
and had not striven “ to attain triumphant success by a
few bold strokes.”

Mr. Wilson’s thinking was, I believe, hampered by two
things. In the first place, his mind was a single-track
mind. He frequently acknowledged this characteristic.
In writing to George Harvey he said, “ Every day I am
confirmed in the judgment that my mind is a one-track
road and can run only one train of thought at a time.”
He made a similar confession publicly a number of times.
He was right. He had difficulty in quickly turning his
thoughts and attention from one problem to another, or in
seeing many things at the same moment, or in quick suc
cession. Doubtless, this trait caused him to fail to see all
the implications of statements he made. It also helps to
explain his limiting himself more exclusively to a particular
field— to the field of Foreign Affairs— than he would have
done if he had been differently constituted. It further
helps to explain his very complete reliance on his sub
ordinates in other fields. It is good administration for a
chief to select the right sort of subordinates and then to
trust them, but he must and will, if he possesses adminis
trative ability of the highest order, be alert to know their
problems; to be aware of the extent to which they handle
them properly and to get rid of them if they do not do so.
Because of this defect, Mr. Wilson was not an administra
tor of the first rank, but, as an administrator, I should say
that he was superior to Lincoln.
Mr. Wilson’s other defect arose, in part, from the fact
that for so long a time he led a cloistered life, shut off in a
measure from the busy world of affairs. This reinforced
a certain intellectual tendency, inbred or acquired. It
does not appear that Mr. Wilson ever had any large ex
perience in the business world, or intimate knowledge of
business gained at first hand. Its processes were known
life!

to him mainly as the results of research and academic sur
vey. With the details of business and all that they in
volve, he was not intimately acquainted. Details are of
the essence of business. They are dominating and con
trolling, and sound processes and thinking based on them
may conflict with deductions from premises based on an
inadequate survey and grasp of them. Timothy Dwight,
writing in 1802, had this to say:
“ In the closet no man ever becomes acquainted with
either the concerns or the character of men, or with the
manner in which business ought to be conducted. The
general principles of political science a scholar may under
stand equally with those of other sciences. But of busi
ness, which is necessarily done in detail if done to any pur
pose, the mere scholar literally knows nothing. He may
be able to write a good political book, but he cannot do
political business, because he never has done it. A plain
man, educated in the business of a town, will easily show
him that, in knowledge of this kind, he is an infant; and
that, whatever may be his genius or his acquisitions.
“ A large proportion o f the citizens of this state have
actually sustained one public office, and multitudes, sev
eral, and have of course been personally concerned in
transacting public business. Hence they have already
known by experience the difficulties incident to public
concerns, and are, in a degree superior to what is usually
found elsewhere, prepared to form judicious opinions con
cerning the measures of the Legislature. I have heard
laws discussed by plain men with more good sense than
any mere scholar could have displayed on the same sub
jects. B y these men they were canvassed as to their oper
ation on the actual interests of themselves, and others.
[170I

By a scholar they would have been examined as to their
accordance with preconceived general principles. The
former were certain means of determining on the merits
of a law; the latter only probable, and very imperfect.”
His lack of actual experience in business and of in
timate contacts with its processes, details, and its man
agers, coupled with a suspicion of the plans and ideals of
those in charge of big business— a suspicion which a
generation ago had much foundation— led Mr. Wilson at
times to use extreme expressions and to take courses of
action which the whole present situation did not warrant,
and it created in him a tendency unduly to distrust success
ful business men.
In view of his general capacity to assess things and to
take stock of his own ability and peculiarities, it is some
what singular that he did not more fully sense this dis
ability. It is the more singular, when it is recalled that
he pointed out that such knowledge and experience con
stituted one of Cleveland’s greatest elements of strength.
Writing of Cleveland in 1897, he said:
“ His mind works in the concrete; lies close always to
the practical life of the world, which he understands by
virtue of lifelong contact with it. He was no prophet of
novelties, but a man of affairs; had no theories, but strove
always to have knowledge of fact.”
I would not have it understood that I think this defect
bulked large in Mr. Wilson’s thinking and action; that it
substantially marred his conduct and his usefulness as a
leader; that I might give a higher rating to someone who
had a mastery of business details and lacked Mr. Wilson’s
other tremendous, valuable powers; or that a, so-called,
practical person could approximately as well have served

the nation as he did, particularly in the great crisis during
which he served. I have not been greatly impressed by
the capacity of the average business man in his own line
and I have been still less impressed by the capacity of the
practical business man for the business of statesmanship.
Experience in the Great War did not justify his being
placed on a pedestal for his performance in governmental
fields. The business man has his limitations— many of
them— and one of them is to be quick to distrust those
who have not been made as he was made and do not fully
share his thoughts, and especially to distrust one who
gets out of the beaten path, thinks new thoughts, and
clothes them in unconventional phrases. No man is
perfect. There are no supermen, not even the Germans.
Mr. Wilson was not a superman and would have been the
first to resent the intimation that he was.
There is a passage in Jowett’s Plato which is illuminat
ing. It has a very direct application to the matter under
discussion:
“ The question whether the ruler or statesman should be
a philosopher is one that has not lost interest in modern
times. In most countries of Europe and Asia there has
been someone in the course of ages who has truly united the
power of command with the power of thought and reflec
tion, as there have been also many false combinations of
these qualities. Some kind of speculative power is neces
sary both in practical and political life; like the rhetorician
in the Phasdrus, men require to have a conception of the
varieties of human character, and to be raised on great oc
casions above the commonplaces of ordinary life. Y et
the idea o f the philosopher-statesman has never been popu
lar with the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot
[172]

take the world into his confidence or make them under
stand the motives from which he acts; and also because
they are jealous of a power which they do not understand.
The revolution which human nature desires to effect step
by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him
in a single year of life. They are afraid that, in the pursuit
of his greater aims, he may disregard the common feelings
of humanity. He is too apt to be looking into the distant
future or back into the remote past, and unable to see
actions or events which, to use an expression of Plato’s,
‘ are tumbling out at his feet.’ Besides, as Plato would
say, there are other corruptions of these philosophical
statesmen. Either ‘ the native hue of resolution is sicklied
o’er with the pale cast of thought,’ and at the moment
when action above all things is required, he is undecided;
or general principles are enunciated by him in order to
cover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the world
has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others;
or, in some cases, he has been converted into a courtier,
who enjoys the luxury of holding liberal opinions, but was
never known to perform a liberal action. No wonder that
mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of this
class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For,
as we may be allowed to say, a little parodying the words of
Plato, ‘ they have seen bad imitations of the philosopherstatesman.’ But a man in whom the power of thought
and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present,
reaching forward to the future, ‘ such a one,’ ruling in a
constitutional state, *they have never seen.’
“ But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of
political life, so the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail
in extraordinary crises. When the face of the world is

beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the distance, he
is still guided by his own maxims, and is the slave of his
inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs
of the times; instead of looking forward, he looks back; he
learns nothing and forgets nothing; with ‘ wise saws and
modern instances’ he would stem the rising tide of revolu
tion. He lives more and more within the circle of his own
party, as the world without him becomes stronger. This
seems to be the reason why the old order of things makes
so poor a figure when confronted with the new, why
churches can never reform, why most political changes
are made blindly and convulsively. The great crises in
the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesias
tical positiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of
principles, which have lost their hold upon a nation. The
fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be compared
to madness; they grow upon him, and he becomes possessed
by them; no judgment of others is ever admitted by him
to be weighed in the balance against his own.”
Wilson could not stoop to employ the arts which many
men use to gain favour and popularity. He had little
aptitude for the game of practical politics and resented its
practices. He was weak in the technique of managing
and manipulating men, and he had no desire to gain
strength in this art. He relied on the strength of the
(cause in which he was interested.
Wilson was sensitive, shy, and reserved. He was a
gentleman and could not and would not try to capitalize his
personal advantages. There were intimacies to which he,
like other true gentlemen, would not admit the public,
and he naturally assumed that right-minded men would
not seek to be admitted to them. These were inhibitions

resulting from temperament and generations of good
breeding. He could only with difficulty attempt to reveal
himself, and when he did so, he had only moderate success.
Evidently, he was speaking subjectively when, in the
course of his Lincoln address, he said:
“ I have read many biographies of Lincoln; I have
sought out with the greatest interest the many intimate
stories that are told of him, the narratives of near-by
friends, the sketches at close quarters, in which those who
had the privilege of being associated with him have tried
to depict for us the very man himself ‘ in his habit as he
lived’ ; but I have nowhere found a real intimate of Lin
coln's. I nowhere get the impression in any narrative or
reminiscence that the writer had, in fact, penetrated to
the heart of his mystery, or that any man could penetrate
to the heart of it. That brooding spirit had no real
familiars. I get the impression that it never spoke out in
complete self-revelation, and that it could not reveal itself
completely to any one. It was a very lonely spirit that
looked out from underneath those shaggy brows and com
prehended men without fully communing with them, as
if, in spite of all its genial efforts at comradeship, it dwelt
apart, saw its visions of duty where no man looked on.
There is a very holy and very terrible isolation for the con
science of every man who seeks to read the destiny of
affairs for others as well as for himself, for a nation as well
as for individuals. That privacy no man can intrude upon.
That lonely search of the spirit for the right perhaps no
man can assist. This strange child of the cabin kept com
pany with invisible things, was born into no intimacy
but that of its own silently assembling and deploying
thought.”

Wilson himself had no real familiars. He admired
many men, had an affection for them and trusted them,
but with only a few men did he seem to be at real ease.
And these were men who had few angles and who seldom
indulged in belligerent attitudes or stubborn opposition.
I may be permitted to say that he seemed to have con
fidence in me, but if I were to judge by the times he sought
to see me socially or outside official contacts, I should say
that he was either highly indifferent to me or that he dis
liked me. But I understood the situation thoroughly
and was entirely willing and content to have matters as
they were. In fact, I strongly sympathized with him.
The only time I came into such social personal relation
with him, up to the close of the Administration, was when
he invited me to play a game of golf with him. He took
me out in his car. I beat him easily, which he did not in
the least mind. He was courteous and considerate to the
last degree, but we did not have a very easy time of it,
possibly because both of us, being Scotch, were a trifle
reserved and somewhat shy. The only time he ever
showed a trace of intimate personal affection for me was
when I lunched with him just before he went from the
White House.
Just as Wilson had something in common with Lincoln,
whom undoubtedly he had much in his thoughts, so also
in these qualities of gentlemanly reserve and aloofness he
resembled Robert E. Lee. In reading parts of Sir Fred
erick Maurice's recent book on Lee, I found myself
thinking of Wilson, as, for instance, when he says:
“ Lee was never what is called a man’s man. He did
not drink. He did not smoke. He had no taste for the
ordinary amusements and weaknesses of the male sex.

[ i 7 6J

While he had a limited number of professional friends and
loved the companionship of service he opened his heart to
no man. He needed some outlet for his natural reserve
and it was to a woman he turned when he felt that need.”
And again:
“ Such, then, was one side of Lee’s private life, but there
was another at which I have as yet barely hinted, a side
more dominant than even his love of wife, and children,
and home, and that was his love of God. He believed in
the living God, the Father, the Judge of the Earth. He
had not the smallest doubt but that to God all things are
possible, that by faith mountains might be moved. . . .
“ If Robert E. Lee, soldier and Christian, was such ‘ as
every man in arms would wish to be,’ he was not a ‘ happy
warrior.’ A t any time in his life it would have given him
more joy to have won a soul to God than to have gained a
victory. I agree with Mr. Gamaliel Bradford that Lee
had one intimate friend— God.”
The difficulty Wilson had in freely meeting people, aside
from his temperament, was reinforced by a certain philos
ophy he entertained, by the stress under which he worked
and by his physical state. He would not seek out men to
consult with,but, within the limits of his time and strength,
he did see people who sought him on business. He would
play no favourites; and I think the fact that he could not
see certain individuals, whom he might have liked to con
fer with more frequently without seeming to play favour
ites and creating ill feeling, caused him to limit his con
tacts; and on account of the fact that he was never very
robust and that the demands on him were terrific, he felt
it imperative to limit his social contacts to the minimum.
Wilson was undoubtedly aware of the popular impres
ts ? ]

sion that he was not approachable. In his address to the
Press Club in New York in June, 1916, he touched upon
this matter, saying:
“ I have heard some say that I was not accessible to
them, and when I inquired into it, I found they meant that
I did not personally invite them. They did not know how
to come without being invited, and they did not care to
come if they came on the same terms with everybody else,
knowing that everybody else was welcome whom I had
time to confer with.”
Wilson was a man of strong emotions, but he suppressed
them. He had them thoroughly disciplined and rigidly
kept them down. His inheritance and his philosophy com
bined to this end. His was the philosophy of self-mastery.
His injunction to young men was to cultivate self-control.
This philosophy he elaborated admirably in his lecture
to students on “ When a Man Comes to Himself.” It
was painful to him to let himself go and to show his feel
ings; and the only time I ever saw him. lose his grip on
himself was at the final Cabinet meeting, to which ref
erence has been made.
If what has been said is substantially a correct analysis
of Wilson’s character and temperament, it will cause cer
tain special cases of personal relation to fall into their
proper perspective. It will not explain everything, but
it will explain much. There are those who will see noth
ing in the picture I have given. They will continue to
prefer to adopt a simpler theory and to picture him merely
as an unfeeling, ungrateful, ruthless person. It is not
infrequently said that he was an ingrate, that he used
men and then dropped them, that men might act for him
but not with him, and that most of those who had been

his friends had been repudiated by him or had voluntarily
renounced him. Of course, I do not accept this verdict.
Many men continued to work for him, and many men
did work with him. I both worked for him and with him
for eight years with increasing affection, respect, and ad
miration. M y criticism, looking at the whole matter and
the entire period broadly, was that he erred rather on the
side of patience, loyalty, and generosity. The cases
pointed to and played up largely from partisan motives
are the exceptions and prove the rule.
The cases of George Harvey and McCombs present no
difficulty to me. There was nothing in common between
Wilson and Harvey. Wilson was a Liberal. Wilson was
a Progressive— one of the greatest Progressives of the age,
with a sense of direction, knowing where he was headed
and how he proposed to get there. He differed in this re
spect from those Progressives who, like the beetle, mistake
energy for progress, who in reality know nothing of his
tory; who are, in fact, constantly seeking to promote pro
grammes which have time and time again been demon
strated to be futile; and who are, therefore, merely out of
date and behind the times, and whose chief asset is capac
ity for noise. I suspect that if Harvey had at the begin
ning understood Wilson and appreciated the fact that he
was a sincere Liberal with a stern sense of duty, he would
never have sponsored him. In the actual break, we have
a typical illustration ofWilson’s objective habit of thought.
In his interview with Harvey, he discussed the point raised
as to whether Harvey’s constant activity was injurious
publicly and personally, and when he gave his opinion
frankly he had no thought that any offence was taken.
His letters to Harvey afterward revealed his grief that any

offence was given and also his eagerness to make amends.
His first letter was as follows:
"Every day I am confirmed in the judgment that my
mind is a one-track road and can run only one train of
thought at a time! A long time after that interview with
you and Marse Henry at the Manhattan Club, it came
over me that when (at the close of the interview) you
asked me that question about the Weekly I answered it
simply as a matter of fact and of business, and said
never a word of my sincere gratitude to you for all your
generous support, or of my hope that it might be con
tinued. Forgive me, and forget my manners!”
To this letter Colonel Harvey sent this reply:
"Replying to your note from the University Club, 1
think it should go without saying that no purely personal
issue could arise between you and me. Whatever any
body else may surmise, you surely must know that in
trying to arouse and further your political aspirations
during the past few years, I have been actuated solely by
the belief that I was rendering a distinct public service.
“ The real point at the time of our interview was, as you
aptly put it, one simply ‘ of fact and of business,-’ and
when you stated the fact to be that my support was hurt
ing your candidacy, and that you were experiencing diffi
culty in finding a way to counteract its harmful effect, the
only thing possible for me to do, in simple fairness to you,
no less than in consideration of my own self-respect, was
to relieve you of your embarrassment so far as it lay within
my power to do so, by ceasing to advocate your nomina
tion. That, I think, was fully understood between us
at the time, and, acting accordingly, I took down your
name from the head of the Weekly's editorial page some
[i 80]

days before your letter was written. That seems to be all
there is to it.
“ Whatever little hurt I may have felt as a consequence
of the unexpected peremptoriness of your attitude toward
me is, of course, wholly eliminated by your gracious
word's.”
Mr. Wilson acknowledged this note, saying:
“ Generous and cordial as was your letter written in re
ply to my note from the University Club, it has left me
uneasy, because, in its perfect frankness, it shows that I
did hurt you by what I so tactlessly said at the Knicker
bocker Club. I am very much ashamed of myself, for
there is nothing I am more ashamed of than hurting a
true friend, however unintentional the hurt may have
been. I wanted very much to see you in Washington,
but was absolutely captured by callers every minute I
was in my rooms, and when I was not there was fulfilling
public engagements. I saw you at the dinner but could
not get at you, and, after the dinner, was surrounded and
prevented from getting at you. I am in town to-day, to
speak this evening, and came in early in the hope of catch
ing you at your office.
“ For I owe it to you and to my own thought and feeling
to tell you how grateful I am for all your generous praise
and support of me (no one has described me more nearly
as I would like myself to be than you have); how I have
admired you for the independence and unhesitating
courage and individuality of your course; and how far I
was from desiring that you should cease your support of
me in the Weekly. You will think me very stupid— but
I did not think of that as the result of my blunt answer
to your question. I thought only of the means of con[181]

vincing people of the real independence of the Weekly's
position. You will remember that that was what we dis
cussed. And now that I have unintentionally put you in a
false and embarrassing position, you heap coals of fire on
my head by continuing to give out interviews favourable
to my candidacy! All that I can say is that you have
proved yourself very big, and that I wish I might have an
early opportunity to tell you face to face how I really
feel about it all. With warm regard,” etc.
As far as Lansing is concerned, the only questions which
are likely to give a reader of his book any trouble are these:
Why did Lansing see fit to continue in service when he
knew he was opposed to his chief on matters of funda
mental importance, matters so near to Wilson’s heart?
Why did Wilson not ask for his resignation much
earlier? When the President asked Lansing to resign he
did not give the public the facts of the case, and in con
sequence Lansing for a time was regarded, especially by
partisan people, as a martyr. When Lansing published
the facts it became apparent that he should not have
stayed in the Cabinet as long as he did.
I asked Mr. Wilson if he had read Lansing’s book, and
he replied with a smile, “ No, I have not, but I am sure
if it suits Lansing it would suit me.”
The cases of Walter Page and Colonel House are es
sentially different. Nothing has been published as to
the President’s thought in either case. Page’s letters and
House’s memoirs have revealed the extent of their lack
of sympathy with the President’s course from time to time.
But the President, to the last, expressed his affection
for both men. I heard him say more than once that Page
was the best letter writer he knew, and that, when his let[182]

ters appeared at the proper time, they would make themost
interesting contribution to the story of the period.
Wilson belonged to the aristocracy of brains. He was
an intellectual thoroughbred. His mind, which was of
high quality, had been refined and disciplined by years of
hard study and by years of teaching. His faculties were
always thoroughly at his command. He did not have to
labour and strain for results. He was quick to grasp the
essential points in a complex problem or set of facts, to
get to the heart of the matter under discussion, to see
facts in their proper relation, and to arrive at a sound con
clusion; and long and careful training, combined with
natural talent, gave him the ability to express his thoughts
tersely, artistically, and eloquently, without apparent
effort and without prolonged preparation. In all the
years in which I listened to him talking, informally, in
Cabinet meetings, or elsewhere, I never detected a word
or phrase out of place, or heard him use a bungling sen
tence. He was one of three men I have known whose con
versation or address, taken down and reported by an in
telligent stenographer, could be published without any
real need of editing. The other two were his uncle, Dr.
James Woodrow, and President Eliot. What this means,
even the average well-trained man well knows. Most of
them probably experience a feeling of humiliation when
their spontaneous utterances are taken by stenographers
and returned to them. They find more difficulty in
straightening out their expressions than they would in re
writing the statement.
I had many opportunities to note the President’s skill
in expressing himself and to admire his command of his
faculties. One which stands out in my mind clearly was

when he signed the Farm Loan Act. Two Congressmen,
much interested in the measure, asked me if I thought
the President would be willing to have them present when
he signed the Act, if he would use two pens and give one
to each. I told them I would ascertain the President’s
wishes. He promptly acquiesced. We joined him in his
office. He signed the measure, using two pens, which he
gave to the Congressmen. Then he stood up and said a
few words. He had had little or no time to familiarize
himself with the subject matter, but he dealt with it very
intelligently and in very apt language. He said:
“ I am very glad to have a modest part in this piece of
legislation. It is high time that something were done to
provide additional financial assistance for the farmer.
Our existing banking machinery, while helpful to the farm
er as to all other citizens, because it has secured and as
sured safe banking and provided a national currency and
credit, has been adapted primarily to the needs of the
manufacturer and the merchant. Their turnover is rapid,
their assets are liquid. There has been a gap. There has
been need of an agency, under understandingmanagement,
reaching out intimately and to the rural district, and oper
ating on terms suited to the farmers’ needs. The farmer
is the servant of the seasons. The gap has now been
filled.”
This was the whole argument in a nutshell.
Certainly, in point of formal education, Wilson was the
best trained man who ever occupied the White House.
He had received the best training that American universi
ties could furnish, and he had supplemented this by long
years of study as a professor and as a lecturer. He was a
student of history. He saw things in their perspective in
[184]

systematic, orderly fashion. He knew the limitations of
things. He had been a profound student of American
institutions and problems, and had developed knowledge
of foreign governments and foreign history. Mr. Wilson
was a pioneer among Americans in the study of foreign
arrangements and governmental policies. His book,
“ The State,” dealing with comparative governments, was
the first in the field; and Wilson was instructing America
about foreign matters before most of his critics had escaped
from the bondage of provincialism.
It was a genuine pleasure to talk with Wilson, to engage
in conference with him and to discuss light or serious, sim
ple or complex matters with him. He could be light and
gay. Nobody could or did tell so many good or apt stories
as he; and yet he did not manufacture stories or lug them
in by the ears. They appeared naturally, they came
quickly; and his sallies, while seldom biting and never
bitter, were keen and enlightening. He was witty rather
than humorous, in this characteristic resembling the best
English and New England thinkers and speakers rather
than the typical American. His wit never verged on the
doubtful or the vulgar. He naturally resented vulgarity
and irreverence.
One reason why it was a pleasure to discuss matters with
Wilson is that he was quick and did not have to be edu
cated. One could assume more with him than with al
most any other person I have known. And he was pa
tient, very patient, patient even of dullness. He was much
more patient than I would dream of being, or ever desired
to be. I saw him many a time sit and listen with courtesy
to long-drawn-out statements by men of mediocre capacity
and litde information, who had had scant opportunity to

form useful judgments, and who usually obscured the sub
ject at every turn. Not infrequently I almost writhed in
agony and in ill-concealed irritation, but Mr. Wilson never
gave a sign. I have, therefore, always been greatly
amused by representations that he would not take counsel
or listen to advice. Some of those, including one or more
members of his Cabinet, who gave currency to this view,
could only mean that he did not frequently take their ad
vice or heed their views; and he was wise, because their
views, as a rule, were of little assistance, their knowledge
was scanty and impressionistic, and their judgment bad,
and yet they desired to seem to be in the President’s in
timate counsel and to be in the limelight.
It is not true that Wilson did not consult his Cabinet on
new departures and policy, or on important matters. He
did; and he would have done so more freely had he not
known that the very ones— and they were few in number
— who criticized him for failure to do so made it difficult
for him to do so by their persistent practice of heralding
everything to the public, whether it was wise or timely or
not.
And, Mr. Wilson was not what I would call obstinate.
He was slow in arriving at conclusions. He took pains
to get light and all the facts; and then, when he thought
he had all he could get or needed, he made up his mind.
Then he was difficult to move. This was as it should
have been. I admired him for this trait. He was diffi
cult to move because it was not easy to give him better
reasons for a different course than he had for the one he
proposed to take, but he was not immovable. Better rea
sons and sound reasoning would alter his views, and
changed conditions would modify them. A number of
[186]

times I witnessed him change his views quickly, views
which he strongly entertained. He altered his views on
preparedness. He altered his views on proposed state
ments, such as his notes to Germany; and he swung round
completely on the proposal for a tariff commission. As I
have pointed out, when a tariff commission was proposed,
he resisted it. He stated that the old commissions had
been futile and he thought that the new one might be. I
argued for a commission not to take the tariff out of poli
tics, which is a futile suggestion, but to give the public
and the Congress information. He finally accepted the
suggestion. I am now inclined to think that his first
view was right and that I was wrong. The conception was
a good one, and the law was well conceived; but it has been
pretty well demonstrated that the Commission cannot
get the facts to the public for its education and that Con
gress will pay little attention to its economic findings.
O f course, it need not be emphasized that it was a mistake
to give the Commission power, with the President’s ap
proval, to alter tariff rates. This radically changed
its status from a fact-finding body to a piece of political
machinery. It puts the whole body into politics. The
flexible provision is a futile conception. With the average
Republican administration in power, the flexing will al
ways be upward or the rates will remain as they were.
With the average Democratic administration, the flexing
will be downward. This power ought immediately to be
taken away from the body; and then, if it becomes clear
that its findings cannot compel public attention, or that
Congress will ignore them, the law creating the Commis
sion ought to be repealed. In such case, the Commission
will only be an expensive luxury.

Mr. Wilson knew, of course, that he was charged with
being inflexible and unchangeable. On January 27, 1916,
on his preparedness tour, referring to the matter, he
said:
“ Perhaps when you learned, as I daresay you did learn
beforehand, that I was expecting to address you on the
subject of preparedness, you recalled the address which I
made to Congress something more than a year ago, in
which I said that this question of military preparedness
was not a pressing question. But more than a year has
gone by since then, and I would be ashamed if I had not
learned something in fourteen months. The minute I
stop changing my mind with the change of all the circum
stances of the world, I will be a back number.
“ There is another thing about which I have changed
my mind. A year ago I was not in favour of a tariff
board, and I will tell you why. Then the only purpose of
a tariff board was to keep alive an unprofitable controversy
. . . But the circumstances of the present time are
these: There is going on in the world under our eyes an
economic revolution. No man understands that revolu
tion; no man has the elements of it clearly in his mind.
No part of the business of legislature in regard to inter
national trade can be undertaken until we do understand
it; and members of Congress are too busy, their duties are
too multifarious and distracting to make it possible within
a sufficiently short space of time for them to master the
change that is coming.”
Mr. Wilson, as I knew him, was not dictatorial, and I
do not believe that the facts warrant any such view.
Certainly, I did not find him so in my official relations with
him. I was with him in two departments for eight years,
[188]

dealing with many important matters. He did not, in the
entire time, give me any order or make any substantial
suggestion to me and he did not refuse to accept any rec
ommendation I made to him or disapprove any course of
action I proposed. Also, I saw no sign of a dictatorial
spirit in my observation of his relations with any other
of his subordinates or associates.
He was scrupulous in his observances of the proprieties
and of the law and constitution in dealing with independ
ent bodies and with the coordinate powers— Congress and
the Supreme Court. He respected the independence of
such bodies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Civil Service, the Federal Trade, and the Tariff Commis
sions. He instantly repelled any suggestion that any sort
of pressure, direct or indirect, should be brought to bear on
any of them. He knew too well that if they were not
above suspicion their usefulness would be impaired.
But Wilson did conceive himself, as President, to be the
leader of his party. In his address to Congress, on cur
rency legislation, June 28, 1913, he said: “ I have come to
you as the head of the government and the responsible
leader of the party in power.” A little later, on July 4th,
at Gettysburg, he made the same claim, saying: “ I have
been chosen the leader of the nation. I cannot justify the
choice by any qualities of my own, but so it has come about
and here I stand.” This was a novel note for a President
to sound; and I have no doubt that it caused many in the
opposition to prick up their ears and paved the way for
partisan tactics. But it was not a new note for Wilson.
Also, it was probably not news to the scholarly leader of
the Senate minority, Henry Cabot Lodge. He knew, as
other students were aware, that for more than a quarter

[189]

of a century Wilson had been a critic of Congressional
government and had urged changes in machinery, in at
titude and in practices, which should bring about greater
responsibility in our government and lodge responsibility
for leadership in the President. Lodge, as editor of the
International Review, had, in 1879, published the article
by Wilson written when he was a Senior at Princeton, deal
ing with this subject at length. In fact, from the time
Wilson was twenty years old until he was forty-seven, the
defects of Congressional government and the desirability
of developing responsible leadership were the main themes
of his writings and addresses.
When one considers closely what is required to get a
solution of any matter of consequence, one is always as
tonished to find that a reasonably good conclusion is
reached, and when all the problems of a government or
business are thought of, it seems miraculous that chaos
does not reign. It takes lots of trouble to run any part of
the world, but the world keeps moving and Congress even
works after a fashion, and, on the whole, not so badly.
The main defect of Congress or Congressional govern
ment, Wilson insisted, is that it is leaderless or irresponsi
ble. The remedy, he contended, is to adopt Cabinet
government. In support of his contention, he set out the
advantages usually claimed for responsible or parliamen
tary government. Perhaps his fullest exposition of this
contention is that in his article in the Overland Monthly,
January, 1884:

“ In seeking an escape from the perplexity,” he wrote,
“manifestly the safest course is to content ourselves with
travelling ways already trodden, and look to the prece
dents of our own race for guidance. Let, therefore, the

[190]

leaders of parties be made responsible. Let there be
set apart from the party in power certain representatives
who, leading their party and representing its policy, may
be made to suffer a punishment which shall be at once per
sonal and vicarious when their party goes astray, or their
policy either misleads or miscarries. This can be done by
making the leaders of the dominant party in Congress the
executive officers of the legislative will; by making them
also members of the President’s Cabinet, and thus at once
the executive chiefs of the departments of State and the
leaders of their party on the floor of Congress; in a word,
by having done with the standing committees, and con
stituting the Cabinet advisers both of the President and of
Congress. This would be Cabinet government.
“ Cabinet government is government by means of an
executive ministry chosen by the chief magistrate of the
nation from the ranks of the legislative majority— a
ministry sitting in the legislature and acting as its execu
tive committee; directing its business and leading its
debates; representing the same party and the same prin
ciples; ‘bound together by a sense of responsibility and
loyalty to the party to which it belongs,’ and subject to
removal whenever it forfeits the confidence and loses the
support of the body it represents. Its establishment in
the United States would involve, of course, several con
siderable changes in our present system. It would neces
sitate, in the first place, one or two alterations in the Con
stitution. The second clause of Section Six, Article I, of
the Constitution runs thus: ‘ No Senator or Representa
tive shall, during the term for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil office under the authority of the
United States which shall have been created, or the emolufo il

mcnts whereof shall have been increased, during such
time; and no person holding any office under the United
States shall be a member of either House during his con
tinuance in office.’ Let the latter part of this clause read:
‘ And no person holding any other than a Cabinet office
under the United States shall be a member of either House
during his continuance in office,’ and the addition of four
words will have removed the chief constitutional obstacle
to the erection of Cabinet government in this country.
The way will have been cleared, in great part, at least, for
the development of a constitutional practice, which,
founded upon the great charter we already possess, might
grow into a governmental system at once strong, stable,
and flexible. Those four words being added to the Con
stitution, the President might be authorized and directed
to choose for his Cabinet the leaders of the ruling majority
in Congress; that Cabinet might, on condition of acknowl
edging its tenure of office dependent on the favour of the
Houses, be allowed to assume those privileges of initiative
in legislation and leadership in debate which are now
given,by an almost equal distribution, to the standing com
mittees; and Cabinet government would have been in
stituted.*’ Additional amendments, he pointed out, would
be necessary. The terms of the President and Congress
would have to be lengthened. In closing this article he
said:
“ So long as we have representative government, so long
will the Legislature remain the imperial and all-over
shadowing power of the state; and so long as it does remain
such a power, it will be impossible to check its encroach
ments and curb its arrogance, and at the same time pre
serve the independence of the Executive, without joining

[192]

these two great branches of government by some link,
some bond of connection, which, whilst not consolidating
them, will at least neutralize their antagonisms, and, possi
bly, harmonize their interests. A Cabinet committee
would constitute such a bond; for it would, as we have
seen, be a body which, from its very nature and offices,
would be at once jealous of the pretensions of the Houses
and responsible for the usurpations of the Executive; in
terested, and, therefore, determined to yield not a jot of
their lawful executive authority, and yet bound to admit
every just claim of power on the part of their legislative
colleagues.
“ That must be a policy of wisdom and prudence which
puts the executive and legislative departments of govern
ment into intimate sympathy and binds them together in
close cooperation. The system which embodies such a
policy in its greatest perfection must be admired of all
statesmen and coveted of all misgoverned peoples. The
object of wise legislation is the establishment of equal
rights and liberties amongst the citizens of the state, and
its chief business, the best administration of government.
Legislatures have it constantly in charge, and specially
in charge, to facilitate administration; and that charge
can be best fulfilled, of course, when those who make and
those who administer the laws are in closest harmony.
The executive agents of government should stand at the
ear of the Legislature with respectful suggestions of the
needs of the Administration, and the Legislature should
give heed to them, requiring of them, the while, obedience
and diligence in the execution of its designs. An execu
tive honoured with the confidence of the Legislature, and
a Legislature confiding itself with all fullness of trust, yet

with all vigilance, to the guidance of an executive acknowl
edging full responsibility to the representatives of the
people for all its acts and all its counsels; this is a picture
good to look upon— a type of effective and beneficent selfgovernment. The changes in our form of government
which the establishment of such a system would involve
are surely worth making if they necessitate no sacrifice of
principle.
“ It cannot be too often repeated that, while Congress
remains the supreme power of the state, it is idle to talk of
steadying or cleansing our politics without in some way
linking together the interests of the Executive and the
Legislature. So long as these two great branches are
isolated, they must be ineffective just to the extent of the
isolation. Congress will always be master, and will always
enforce its commands on the Administration. The only
wise plan, therefore, is to facilitate its direction of the
government, and to make it at the same time responsible,
in the persons of its leaders, for its acts of control, and for
the manner in which its plans and commands are executed.
The only hope of wrecking the present clumsy misrule of
Congress lies in the establishment of responsible Cabinet
government. Let the interests of the Legislature be indis
solubly linked with the interests of the Executive. Let
those who have authority to direct the course of legislation
be those who have a deep personal concern in building up
the executive departments in effectiveness, in strengthen
ing law, and in unifying policies; men whose personal rep
utation depends upon successful administration, whose
public station originates in the triumph of principles, and
whose dearest ambition it is to be able to vindicate their
wisdom and maintain their integrity.

“ Committee government is too clumsy and too clan
destine a system to last. Other methods of government
must sooner or later be sought, and a different economy
established. First or last, Congress must be organized
in conformity with what is now the prevailing legislative
practice of the world. English precedent and the world’s
fashion must be followed in the institution of Cabinet
government in the United States.”
Thirteen years later, August 4, 1897, Wilson made
Leaderless Government the subject of an address before
the Virginia Bar Association. He gave the same picture
of the shortcomings of our system. He again pointed out
our leaderless situation. Congress, he contended, could
not lead:
“ The President cannot lead. . . . My studies have
taught me this one thing with a definiteness which cannot
be mistaken: Successful governments have never been con
ducted safely in the midst of complex and critical affairs
except when guided by those who were responsible for
carrying out and bringing to an issue the measures they
proposed; and the separation of the right to plan from the
duty to execute has always led to blundering and ineffi
ciency; and modern representative bodies cannot of them
selves combine the two. . . .
If you would have the
present error of our system in a word, it is this— that Con
gress is the motive power in the government and yet has
in it nowhere any representative of the nation as a whole.
Our Executive, on the other hand, is national; at any rate,
may be made so, and yet has no longer any place of guid
ance in our system. It represents no constituency, but
the whole people; and yet, though it alone is national, it
has no originative voice in domestic national policy.

“ The sum of the matter is, that we have carried the ap
plication of the notion that the powers of government
must be separated to a dangerous and unheard-of length
by thus holding our only national representative, the
Executive, at arm’s length from Congress, whose very com
mission it seems to be to represent, not the people, but the
communities into which the people are divided. We
should have Presidents and Cabinets of a different calibre
were we to make it their bounden duty to act as a com
mittee for the whole nation to choose and formulate mat
ters for the consideration of Congress in the name of a
party and an administration; and then, if Congress con
sented to the measures, what they are already— a com
mittee to execute them— make them work and approve
themselves practicable and wise. And that is exactly
what we ought to do. We should have not a little-light
thrown daily, and often, when it was least expected, upon
the conduct of the departments, if the heads of the de
partments had daily to face the representatives of the
people, to propose, defend, explain administrative policy,
upon the floor of the Houses, where such a plan would put
them: and heads of departments would be happy under
such a system only when they were very straightforward
and honest and able men. I am not suggesting that initi
ative in legislation be by any means confined to the Admin
istration— that would be radical, indeed— but only that
they be given a free, though responsible, share in it— and
that, I conceive, would bring the government back very
nearly to the conception and practice of Washington. It
would be a return to our flrstmodels of statesmanship and
political custom.
“ I ask you to put this question to yourselves: Should we
[196J

not draw the Executive and Legislature closer together?
Should we not, on the one hand, give the individual lead
ers of opinion in Congress a better chance to have an in
timate part in determining who should be President, and
the President, on the other hand, a better chance to ap
prove himself a statesman, and his advisers capable men
of affairs, in the guidance of Congress? This will be done
when the Executive is given an authoritative initiative in
the Houses. I see no other way to create national figures
in the field in which domestic policy is chosen, or to bring
forward tested persons to vote for. I do not suggest
methods— this is not the place or the occasion; I suggest
an idea— a way out of chaos: the nationalization of the
motive power of the government, to offset the economic
sectionalization of the country; I suggest the addition to
Congress, which represents us severally, of a power, con
stituted how you will, which shall represent us collec
tively in the proposing of laws; which shall have the
right as of course to press national motives and courses
of action to a vote in the Congress. This will not sub
ordinate Congress; it may accept the proposals of the
Administration or not, as it pleases (it once took a scolding
from Washington himself for not accepting them); but the
country will at least have a mouthpiece, and not all of
policy will lurk with committees and in executive sessions
of the Senate.”
By this time Wilson was apparently less confident as
to the specific remedy or machinery that should be set up.
He no longer suggested concrete amendments. I think
his mind was beginning to take a slightly different slant.
After this time, so far as I know, he did not again urge a
change to Cabinet government. Certainly, after he went

to Washington, I never heard him refer to the proposal.
There were, however, two items of it left, which he em
phasized and put into practice. One was the habit of ap
pearing before Congress to deliver his messages, and the
other was his assumption of leadership of his party and of
the nation.
I think Wilson had never really thought through this
problem which interested him for so many years. While
exalting the power of leadership of the President, he was
advocating changes in governmental machinery which
would necessarily have made the President a figurehead.
And he did not apparently recognize that, if his scheme
were adopted, it would involve a complete breakdown of
our Constitution and of our Federal form of government.
At one time I entertained, in even more extreme form,
the views expressed by Wilson down to 1897. I was ° f
the opinion that we should go further than he desired or
anticipated we would go if we began with his scheme. I
later undertook to revise the statement of my views, which
I had written, to see if I could improve it, and only suc
ceeded in convincing myself that I was wrong. This, if
it proves nothing more, indicates that I have been openminded in the matter.
It is very easy to draw an indictment, not only of
Congress, but also of the relation existing between Con
gress and the Executive. In fact, it is easy to draw an
indictment of our entire form of government. It has been
frequently drawn. It is usually easier to criticize than it
is to defend or construct.
It is charged that it takes too long to get an expression
of the nation’s will on important matters. Why did it
take nearly three years to get a peace with Germany?
[198]

Why has the matter of our attitude toward the League
been so long in debate? On these great matters, other
nations quickly formed their decision and took their stand.
Why did it take so many years to get tax legislation?
Why has the policy of protection been in question for
more than a hundred years? Why is it that it requires
so much time for the will of the American people to get
itself expressed ? Who can say what the will of the Ameri
can people is on a number of great public issues ?
Why do we, who claim to be the most democratic peo
ple in the world, place so many restrictions on the ex
pression of our will? Why do we almost alone among the
nations preserve a system of checks and balances? Why
is it that representatives elected in November do not take
their seats until the fourth of March following at the
earliest, and not until thirteen months after election in case
no special session is called? Why has the Senate a com
plete check on the House? Why has the Executive a veto
on the action of both? And why should the Supreme
Court have power to declare what the Congress says is
law to be no law?
No such checks exist in any other great constitutional
country. Even Canada, our largest near neighbour, oper
ates under a system in which the popular dominion
assembly is dominant, both in legislative and executive
matters. And all but two of her provinces proceed in
ordinary fashion with a single legislative body popularly
elected governing the state through their committees and
cabinets.
It is charged that there is too much friction between
the legislative and the executive branches and too much
consequent waste and inefficiency. Why, during the war,

was it solemnly proposed to create a Congressional Com
mittee on the conduct of the war? Why, during the war
and immediately thereafter, were there created about
ninety Congressional committees to find out what had
happened? Why does Congress persist in hampering
heads of departments by numerous narrow statutory re
strictions? Why does it set up committees, such as those
on printing and space, with power to administer law in re
lation to publications and working quarters? Why is it
that, on important matters, the Executive attempts to go
in one direction and Congress insists on going in another?
Obviously, the government has faults. Obviously, it is
not a logically perfect scheme, and its parts do not operate
with the perfection of a highly sensitive and delicate piece
of well-oiled machinery. I recognize the faults; but I
question the soundness of the chief representations made
by Mr. Wilson. I dissent from his conclusion and am
opposed to his remedy. The view is too academic. It
overlooks the life of the government and the temper of
our people.
I do not believe that Congress has lost its position as a
predominant force in the government, or that the Presi
dent has become the predominant force. I do not believe
that it was intended that either should be predominant,
or that either can become predominant, or should be per
mitted to do so. I do believe that, in the long run, if
there is a tendency in either direction, it will be for the
Congress more and mote to become the controlling factor.
Nor do I believe that the chief source of legislative evil is
the lack of responsible contact between the executive and
the legislative branches. And I feel reasonably certain
that, when the matter is debated to a conclusion, it will
[200]

not be decided that bringing the members of the Cabinet
face to face in Congress for the purposes of discussion
would accomplish anything of importance or would be re
garded as desirable.
At present, heads of departments are accorded every
opportunity through reports, through appearance before
committees of Congress, and through frequent contacts
with leaders, to present all matters or measures of con
sequence demanding Congressional action. They are
always given courteous and full hearing and consideration.
Such of their subordinates as they desire to have appear
before committees of Congress are also accorded the fullest
consideration and attention. In such manner, the Cabi
net is in position, not only to educate large numbers of
members of Congress, but also the leaders in their respec
tive fields who by reason of full membership and consti
tutional standing in the Congress will, in the nature of
things, be given a more sympathetic hearing than would
an executive officer who is not a full and regular member
of either House.
There is, as a matter of fact, vastly more executive and
legislative contact than the public generally is accustomed
to believe. When the same party is in control of all
branches— and if it is not, there will be confusion under
any set of conditions— if a Cabinet officer knows his busi
ness it is possible, as a rule, to secure cooperation in the
framing of legislative measures and the execution of a
programme. This has been demonstrated over and over
again. When measures so framed and programmes so out
lined come up before Congress for debate and determina
tion, it seems reasonably clear that the handling of such
matters by regular Congressional members,occupying posi[201]

tions of responsibility on terms normally of good fellow
ship even with their opponents, would be more effective
than the attempt of heads of departments for whom the
Congress is in no wise responsible and as to whom there
would be much jealousy.
Cabinet members, merely with the status suggested,
would be in an embarrassing position. They would re
semble more than anything else the traditional bumps on
logs. They would be a target for heckling. Furthermore,
members of the Cabinet, selected as heretofore presum
ably for administrative fitness or because of their com
manding position before the public, would not necessarily
be particularly qualified to participate in Congressional
debates or to assume legislative leadership. It would im
mediately become incumbent on the President in selecting
his heads of departments to consider men more from the
point of view of skill in parliamentary discussion and
legislative leadership than of their qualities as administra
tors. It is seldom that the same man unites in high degree
both the requisite qualifications, and it is. a matter of
common knowledge that many of the most competent
administrative heads have not had aptitude for parlia
mentary business. It is also a matter of common knowl
edge that men who have ranked high among Congressional
leaders who have been given Cabinet appointments have
not demonstrated fitness for administrative positions. It
is also obvious that if members of the Cabinet were ac
corded the privilege of taking full part in the transaction
of Congressional business they would have little or no
time for the supervision of the departments under their

charge.
If we are to take any step at all in this direction with a
[202]

hope of accomplishing beneficent reforms and securing
large results, we must, it seems to me, go the entire dis
tance. We cannot eat our cake and have it also. We
cannot retain the benefits of our Constitution and Federal
form and at the same time secure in measurable degree
the advantages of a parliamentary or responsible system of
government. The question then arises whether we should
go the entire distance.
Such a change would be revolutionary. It would mean
a complete overthrow of our present scheme of govern
ment. To operate in its full perfection, it would be neces
sary for us to adopt the parliamentary system in its full
ness. Briefly stated, this would mean: that the House
of Representatives would become the dominant factor in
our Federal Government both in legislation and in adminis
tration; that the Administration would be directed by a
committee responsible mainly to the House of Represent
atives; that the Senate would lose, at least in part, its
position as a coordinate body, just as has the House of
Lords in England; that the President would become a
formal executive, that is, in large measure, a figurehead,
losing his veto power; that the Supreme Court would lose
its power to declare laws unconstitutional; that there
would be elections, not at stated intervals, but whenever
the government seemed to lose the confidence of the
country; and therefore, that our Constitution would
cease to exist except as a variable and shifting force, its
character to be determined in each instance at the will of
the dominant body.
This is the picture of the only government in the world
where it can be said that the parliamentary system exists
in its full and satisfactory form, that is, in England.

Here, as is well known, the House of Commons is domi
nant. It governs through the Cabinet, in effect selected
by the House. The House of Lords will not stand in the
way of the House of Commons when the opinion prevails
that the nation is behind the House. The general rule is
that the House of Lords must, in matters of legislation,
especially in financial matters, give way to the House of
Commons. The King has no real executive functions.
He is only the head of the dignified part of the Constitu
tion. The real executive head is the Prime Minister, and
the King has little option as to whom he shall ask to take
the Premiership. He must send for the man, no matter
how distasteful, who can lead the majority in the House
and ultimately lead the nation. He has vetoed no meas
ure of importance for generations, and could not do so.
And*as is well known, the British courts have no power to
interfere with the measure passed by Parliament in the
way of declaring it unconstitutional. They can only in
terpret the law.
It is claimed that this arrangement makes it easier for
the will of the people to find expression. This, theoreti
cally and logically, is true. In this respect, taking as a
test of democracy the ease with which the will of the people
can break through machinery and find expression, the
English arrangement is more democratic than ours. It is
claimed also that it leads to the presence and continuance
in public life of abler men, promotes leadership, enables the
people of the nation to have presented to them in more
influential manner the pressing important problems, and
that it is conducive to popular education.
That there is something in these contentions admits of
little doubt. But that things are as they are in Great
[204]

Britain because of the piece of machinery called the re
sponsible ministry or of the body of understandings sup
porting it, or that things would be here as they are in
Great Britain, or on the whole that there would be marked
improvements, I do not believe. Those who take the
opposite view seem to me to overlook more essential
factors and to overrate the value of machinery itself.
They seem to me to attribute certain faults here to ma
chinery whose explanation lies in other directions and to
ascribe merits to machinery in Great Britain which are
due to things deep down in the historical and social struc
ture back of the frame of government. It has come to
pass in this country that there is an inclination to place
undue reliance on legislation and on machinery, and this
warning uttered by Boutmy, the French publicist, to his
countrymen, may well be heeded by us: “ Constitutional
mechanism has no value and efficiency in itself, independ
ently of the moral and social forces which support it or
put it in motion.’* Bryce, in similar vein, years ago, had
this to say:
“ All governments are faulty; and an equally minute
analysis of the Constitution of England, or France, or
Germany would disclose mischiefs as serious, relatively to
the problems with which those states have to deal, as
those we have noted in the American system. To any
one familiar with the practical working of free govern
ments, it is a standing wonder that they work at all.
What keeps a free government going is the good sense and
patriotism of the people, or of the guiding class, embodied
in usages and traditions which it is hard to describe, but
which find, in moments of difficulty, remedies for the in
evitable faults of the system. Now, this good sense and

[205]

that power of subordinating sectional to national interests
which we call patriotism exist in higher measure in Amer
ica than in any of the great states of Europe. And the
United States, more than any other country, are governed
by public opinion, that is to say, by the general sentiment
of the mass of the nation, which all the organs of the
national government and of the state governments look
to and obey.”
Again, he says:
"The English Constitution, which we admire as a mas
terpiece of delicate equipoises and complicated mecha
nism, would anywhere but in England be full of difficulties
and dangers. It stands and prospers in virtue of the tra
ditions that still live among English statesmen and the
reverence that has ruled English citizens. It works by a
body of understandings which no writer can formulate,
and of habits which centuries have been needed to instil.”
Let us note some of the claims made for a responsible
ministry system. Perhaps the leading claim is that it
secures prompt expression of the will of the people and
obviates delay in settling vexing questions. Too much is
made of this, and too little is made of the fact that the
delay is due to the failure of the people of the nation to
make up their minds. This delay occurs in times of con
fusion, in countries where there are responsible ministries.
It has occurred in Great Britain and in France since the
Armistice. The nation has been in doubt. The policy
has lagged. The main result has been frequent changes of
government. Likewise, in the United States, in periods of
confusion, until the people have made up their minds, there
is delay. When they have thrashed a matter out and
come to a conclusion, that conclusion finds expression.

[206]

The quarrel is rather with the people than with the ma
chinery of government. And the need of delay for due
consideration was recognized by the founders of the na
tion, and checks were accordingly provided. The illustra
tions in this direction are too numerous and too fresh in
the minds of readers to justify citing.
A second and leading claim is that a responsible system
of government attracts into public life and retains there a
larger number of able and experienced men. England is
cited as an illustration. Here again, too much is claimed
for mechanism. The explanation in England largely is
that there is a governing class of aristocratic origin, that
it is not difficult for such men to secure access to public
office, and that they have the leisure and the inclination
to seek and to hold positions. It is by no means clear
that, if we had a responsible system of government, we
should secure and retain in public life an adequate number
of our ablest men. I know of no reason for believing that
constituencies would, in making their selections, vote from
different motives from those which now actuate them.
Democracy does not and will not necessarily seek its
ablest men to hold political positions. They are rather
inclined, on the whole, to seek men of an average quality
whose thinking and motives run more nearly with their
own. Democracy does not seem to be able to stand for
very long the strain of living up to the thinking of men
of the highest standards and the greatest intellects.
On the other hand, it seems more likely that the main
effect would be a lower level of ability in the chief adminis
trative positions of the nation. If the avenue to Cabinet
positions were through the House of Representatives and
the Senate, it is probable that very many men whom, un

[207]

der our present arrangement, we could secure for heads of
departments, would not offer themselves for Congressional
seats with the possibility ultimately of being designated
for the Cabinet, or if they did, that they would be
elected. This may be unfortunate, but it is probably true.
Furthermore, if the heads of departments were selected
from the leaders of the majority in Congress, unless more
severe restrictions were imposed than we now have on the
selection of departmental personnel, it is probable that
the departments would be very much more political
minded than they are.
In general, it would seem that this country has not
reached the point in the growth of its habits and traditions
where it would be willing to dispense with some checks
on the expression of the public mind. It is one thing for
a government of an old and settled country with welldefined traditions and habits to have greater freedom of
action. It is one thing for a nation with ruling classes
into the majority of whose population reverence has been
instilled, and which is provincial and limited in its outlook,
to have such a government. It is one thing for a nation
whose area is less than that of the state of Oregon to have
such a government. It would be interesting to see one of
our states attempt the experiment. But it would be an
other thing for a country as big as the United States of
America with its traditions in the course of rapid develop
ment, with large numbers of its people newly arrived, with
greater similarity of economic conditions than exist in
many smaller countries, with a more fluid state of mind,
and more processes for the stimulation o f impulses, to
attempt the operation of a similar system.
And can it be said, after all, that our machinery, which is
[208]

pictured as so defective, has been an obstacle to progress?
Are we behind any other nation in the world in the mass
of legislation intended to accomplish reforms? Are our
financial and economic policies less satisfactory? Are we
suffering from too little legislation? Have we been back
ward in ministering through legislative programmes to
the welfare of the masses of the American people or to any
great class or section of them? It is common knowledge
that we are in the forefront of progress, so far as legislation
can affect it, in nearly every field of national activity. A
better case should be made out before we undertake
seriously to effect fundamental changes.
Certain things can be done which will result in bettering
the relations of the legislative and the executive depart
ments and in securing better results also in other direc
tions. These things I shall briefly indicate.
In the first place, the Congress should promptly take
two steps which are essential to the completion of a bud
get system. If it is legal, rules should be adopted by
which the committees should not make changes in the esti
mates except by more than a majority vote and then when
the committees have made their reports, the Congress,
itself, should not make changes in the reports except
by an abnormal majority. This is not without prece
dent in this country. At least one state has a provision
of this sort. It goes without saying that the responsibil
ity should also be placed upon the Executive for suggesting
revcTrue changes to meet budget requirements. Unless
these two things are done, we shall deceive ourselves into
thinking that we have accomplished a great deal in the
direction of budgetary practice.
A second thing which can be done and should be done,
[209]

to the relief both of the members of Congress and the
Executive, is to place all except a very few officers and
employees of every department of the government in the
classified service. There is no reason why the personnel
of every department should not be approximately as fully
covered by the classified service and taken out of the hands
of politicians as is that of the Department of Agriculture.
This department is in many respects the best department
of the government, and this is due in no small measure to
the fact that only a few of its officers are not appointed for
merit, such as the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, and
the Chief of the Weather Bureau. It is'o f the highest
importance that such departments as the Treasury and
the Interior be ordered in similar fashion. The results
would be far-reaching.
Finally, the people must see to it that the government
takes steps to secure and retain in certain positions of
great responsibility individuals of the highest integrity, of
exceptional ability, and of wide experience. Certainly,
the people are entitled to as good service and to as high
order of talent in the public business as are commanded
by private enterprise. It is ridiculous for such a person
as the Under-secretary of the Treasury, responsible for
financial operations of enormous magnitude, to be called
upon to serve the people for a smaller compensation than
that received by many lesser subordinates in banks and
other private institutions. The government does not
need to pay salaries as high as those given in industry,
but it should pay enough to retain able and experienced
servants. It should pay them enough to live decently, to
save something, and to work without undue apprehension
a* to the future of their families. It should pay enough
[210]

to get the best talent and to keep it. The right men in
government service, as in industry, are cheap at any rea
sonable price. The wrong men are expensive at any price.
This great nation can amply afford to pay for the best
talent to serve it. And it is very unjust and a little short
of indecent for it to permit such conditions as the present
to continue. It should not countenance a situation where
men must serve it at a sacrifice, and where only the wellto-do can afford to hold office without sacrifice. It is
undemocratic to permit the present situation to continue.
Democracy for us, we believe, is the best form of govern
ment. It is a difficult one. It is being called upon to
face increasingly complex problems. Its performance
will depend in no small measure on the quality of its ad
ministrators. If these are mediocre, while our democracy
may persist, its performance will be below the high stand
ard which it should set and to which it aspires.
In the final analysis, whether a government is to succeed
or fail, and whether it is to work well or badly, depends on
the character of the population and particularly upon the
capacity and standards of the electorate. In the past, our
machinery of government has worked reasonably satis
factorily, not mainly because of the merits of the ma
chinery but primarily because the people were competent.
Whether our population with its recent large admixtures
of people from countries with radically different habits of
thought, states o f mind, and backgrounds of experience, is
as competent as it was formerly or will remain so is a mat
ter for debate. There can be no debate, however, over the
fact that with increasing complexities, economic and poli
tical, it is essential that it not only be as competent as it
formerly was, but that its standards be constantly raised.
[211]

The right handling of problems implied in these remarks is
now one of the most pressing problems confronting us.
This involves the imposition of wise restraints on the ad
mission of immigrants and the persistent employment of
the best possible educational effort free from partisan bias
and misrepresentation to educate our present population
in the discharge of its civic tasks. The right kind of
people can run any sort of government. The wrong sort of
people cannot run any kind of government.
Wilson was, I think, wrong in picturing the earlier
Presidents as leaders in the sense that they, as Presidents,
moulded Congress to their ways of thinking. “ Presi
dents," he said, in 1897, “ were leaders intil Jackson went
home to the Hermitage.” If he meant they were leaders
of the government rather than leaders of the people, he was
mistaken. Washington had a great hold on the people,
and for a long time was very influential with Congress,but
when parties developed, it came about that he could not
direct Congress, and in his last years Congress not only
opposed him successfully, but in reality subjected him to
insult. Jefferson was a great manipulator of men. He
headed a small-sized popular revolution, and through his
hold on the people, he had little trouble with Congress,
in which his friends were dominant. Jackson, likewise,
was for years a popular idol, but his political going was
very rough, his fights with Congress were continuous, and
his machinery finally went to pieces. Lincoln never really
controlled Congress; and if he had lived, Congress, under
Stevens and Charles Sumner, as I have before remarked,
would have broken him. “ Cleveland,” Wilson said,
“ was, in the earlier years of his Administration, the type
of the normal Constitutional Executive. He filled his
[212]

messages with very definite recommendations, but thought
it no part of his function to press his preferences in any
other way upon Congress. . . .
He has been the sort
of President the makers of the Constitution had vaguely
in mind: more man than partisan; with an independent
executive will of his own; hardly a colleague of the Houses
so much as an individual servant of the country, exercising
his powers like a chief executive rather than a party
leader.” But Cleveland developed; according to Wilson:
“ Mr. Cleveland grew to the measure of his place. . . .
The breath of affairs was at last in his lungs and he gave
his party a leader.”
But Wilson does not remind us that being a leader of a
party is different from being the leader of the government,
and especially of Congress; and leadership of Congress was
the aim which he had in mind for so many years. And he
could not then see that Congress would turn against
Cleveland.
It is entirely proper and necessary for a President to
have views and convictions. It is essential at all times
that he urge them before Congress and the people. It is
necessary that he do so at times, even though he may know
that he will go down to defeat. If he can influence Con
gress and the people and secure their support, well and
good. If he cannot, he must bide his time. He may be
wrong. At any rate, the people must have time to make
up their minds. Those favouring measures will continue
to be impatient of delay; those opposing them will rejoice.
Our forefathers figuredout that delays mightoccur. They
decided that delays in a democracy might not be detri
mental, and, in the main, delays have not seriously im
paired the fortunes of the nation. At times they have

worked to the nation’s good. A t any rate, Wilson, after
he went to Washington, ceased to agitate for a change in
government that would make the President the responsi
ble leader in the government and of the government, and
conceived himself only as a leader of his party and as a
spokesman for the people.
While, according to Wilson, he was the leader of his
party and, while he acted accordingly, with considerable
effectiveness, incidentally stimulating partisan opposition
because he set himself up as a partisan leader— opposition
which he might otherwise have escaped in part— it cannot
be said, I believe, that he did not recognize the place of
Congress in our system and what was due it. On the
contrary, he went even beyond the necessary bounds in
observing its place and powers. He fought to get through
Congress what he believed to be in the nation’s interest,
and, when necessary, sought to influence public opinion
and to get its backing. But in all matters of national
importance, particularly in the field of foreign affairs, in
respect of which he, as President, was vested with great
power, he went out of his way to keep Congress informed
of developments and to reveal his thinking to it. Time
and time again, although he knew that he had power to do
things, he appeared before Congress to lay before it the
situation and the essential things which lay in his thought.
He did this for many reasons, particularly because, know
ing that grave action might be necessary, and, knowing
that Congress might be called upon to act, he desired it to
know everything that he knew to enable it to register its
dissent if it desired, and to have its backing and that of the
country if the time came to strike.
attitude
early revealed. On April 20, 1914,
[214]

This

when the trouble with Huerta became acute, in his first
message after the Tampico incident, he said:
“ No doubt I could do what is necessary in the circum
stances to enforce respect for our government without
recourse to the Congress, and yet not exceed my con
stitutional power as President; but I do not wish to act
in a matter possibly of so grave consequences, except in
close conference and cooperation with both the Senate and
the House.” During the war he did exercise vast powers.
As President and Commander in Chief of the Army he had
great powers given him by the Constitution. If he had
not exercised them, his most active critics of what they
pleased to call his dictatorial conduct would more savagely
have criticized him for timidity and weakness.
Wilson also strikingly revealed his desire to keep Con
gress informed, both before the close of the war and after
ward, in respect to his thinking as to the terms of peace
and as to the machinery which should be set up after the
war to maintain peace. Time and time again, he appeared
before the Senate and revealed his full thought in these
directions.
But perhaps some will say that, aside from war activities
and functions, in the ordinary domestic affairs of the
nation, there was under his guidance a deliberate policy
of centralization and tendency to make the Federal
Government an arbiter and controller of the life and des
tinies of the individual and the nation. There was a
growth of legislation and activity of the Federal Govern
ment during Wilson’s eight years. There was a striking
growth before his time. The nation has steadily ex
panded. Its affairs have become vastly more complex.
It was natural that the Federal Government’s activity

should correspondingly increase just as the activities of
states and municipalities have expanded. These will
proceed. Of course, the tendency ought to be watched
and controlled; we can easily go too fast and too far.
But it is absurd to charge Mr. Wilson with a deliberate
policy to exalt the Federal Government at the expense
of the states.
Undoubtedly, we are too prone to assume that prog
ress can be promoted or made by legislation. O f neces
sity, in the beginning of our national life, we had to lay
broad foundations of organic law and had to place many
laws on the statute books. We were pioneering a con
tinent and we have attributed a large part of our progress
to legislation. WTe have got in the habit every time a
situation develops or any thought occurs to anybody, or
to any group— and we have many men and women who
are very busy and active— of passing a Federal or state
law to remedy the situation or to uplift something orsomebody. We have come too greatly to ignore the respon
sibility resting upon individuals for self and community
improvement. Apparently we are beginning to recog
nize that there is a limit to what legislation can do, and to
recognize that we can easily overload our state, Federal,
and city governments.
But the people are responsible, and the people alone
can apply the corrective. It seems to be difficult to get
this thing into the heads of the people, viz.: That they,
and they alone, are responsible for the expanding activ
ities of government and for mounting expenditures.
They are responsible both affirmatively and negatively,
by aggression and by neglect. There is a general
view to the contrary. It is the accepted opinion that
[216]

agencies in Washington— Congressmen or executive de
partments or both— are to blame. This is sheer non
sense. Congress reflects what appear to be the wishes of
the people, and in no small measure is resistant to pressure
brought to bear upon it. Heads of departments, as a rule,
are constantly in the position of opposing requests for as
sistance in securing funds, coming from groups of inter
ested outsiders. I know that, in two departments, I
spent much more time in opposing demands for money
than I spent in attempting to secure money for the serv
ices. There are not enough people in Washington to
commit the American people to the enormous and rapid
increase in governmental activities, and to consequent
large expenditures. The actual outcome is partly the
result of the growth of the nation in population and in
dustry, with increasing economic complexities. We gain
a nation of about twenty-five million people every twenty
years; but the expansion in spending is greater than it
should otherwise be, because of the prodigious energy of
interested groups. Very many of the most vigorous
critics of government extravagance are themselves mem
bers of groups and associations, or are interested in move
ments to extend the functions of the Federal Government
and to increase its cost. This man or group demands a
new department of public health or welfare; that one, a
department of education; another, a department of avia
tion ; another, of public works. This group fights fiercely
fot the soldiers’ bonus; that one, for an appropriation for
maternity work; and another, for special aid to this or
that class in society, particularly for the farmers. One
association advocates a special appropriation for engi
neering research in the agricultural colleges, similar to
[217]

those granted for agriculture; another one agitates for
agricultural-settlement appropriations or for larger mili
tary preparedness. Very few emergency situations of
consequence arise in any part of the Union which do not
result in offensives against the Treasury. Plant and
animal disease outbreaks, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
and sudden drastic economic changes, all lead to hurry-up
calls for action from the Federal Government, and the ap
pearance in Washington of groups of lobbyists. Let a
bug, which is supposed to be destructive, appear in some
state, and, in a short time, state commissioners of agricul
ture, accompanied by interested citizens and Senators and
Representatives, are likely to put in their appearance, de
manding Federal funds; and not infrequently they get
them, even though the head of the department concerned
makes an adverse report. Some time ago, the corn borer
made its dlbut in Massachusetts. The Department of
Agriculture was promptly advised. Its experts began a
survey; they reported that the pest was likely to spread,
but, as I recall it, that it was doubtful whether it would
be particularly destructive, and that, in any event, it could
not be exterminated without such wholesale destruction
of vegetation of all sorts as to make the undertaking im
practical. They suggested that it might be worth while
to secure funds with which to do some experimental work.
In the meantime, the State Commissioners got active.
A general meeting was called, and the Commissioners were
about to go on record demanding a Federal appropriation
of many millions of dollars, when the Federal experts
interposed, with the result that the demands were greatly
modified. The pressure for relief from various classes of
farmers who are in trouble on account of reduced farm

[2181

prices, and for flood sufferers, is too fresh in the public
mind to need more than passing mention. During the
war, the President made available, from his special fund,
$5,000,000, to be lent to farmers in certain states of the
West where drought conditions had prevailed for three
successive years. Many farmers there were in a critical
situation, and it was desirable, for obvious reasons, that
they be aided to save themselves and their homes. The
relief was accorded as a war measure, and was a sub
stitute for proposals in Congress involving appropriations
of from twenty-five to fifty millions of dollars. In the
spring of 1921, more than two years after the Armis
tice, pressure was exerted to secure a special fund from
Congress. It was successful, and two billions of dol
lars were made available for loans mainly to farmers in the
Northwest.
The people, even state officials, have come to look to
the Federal Government for funds; in part, because of the
difficulty of securing state support; at times, because the
state legislature may not be in session and may not
meet for several years; and in part, because it is normally
more difficult to get money from near-by and financially
hard-pressed local bodies. I am not now trying to pass
judgment on the merit of such appeals: I am merely con
cerned with the processes by which the people themselves
stand back of movements which cause increased Federal
expenditures. Doubtless, this will continue. Groups will
persist in their activities. The public, generally, will ex
haust itself with criticism and with complaints of high
taxes. The remedy lies with the public. The first thing
for it to realize and accept is that it is responsible; that it
can have what it wants. If it persists in its attitude of
[219]

indifference while groups continue to be aggressive, it will
continue to be victimized. The people can, if they wish,
keep the groups under control. They can make it plain
that the groups are not the American people, and that
they usually make a noise out of all proportion to their
numbers.
Wilson was keenly aware of the dangers of excessive or
premature legislation and of overloading the government.
He had a clear view of the nature and limits of laws and
frequently emphasized the correct conception and practice.
This was his definition of good legislation:
“ Constructive legislation, when successful, is always the
embodiment of convincing experience and of the mature
public opinion, which finally springs out of such experi
ence. Legislation is a business of interpretation, not of
origination.”
Again he said:
“ It is in this spirit that we all ought to regard the laws,
that we all ought to criticize the laws, and that we all
ought to cooperate in the enforcement of the laws. Gov
ernment, gentlemen, is merely an attempt to express the
conscience of everybody, the average conscience of the
nation, in the rules that everybody is commanded to obey.
That is all they are. If the government is going faster
than the public conscience, it will presently have to pull
up. If it is not going as fast as the public conscience, it
will presently have to be whipped up. Because the public
conscience is going to say, ‘ We want our laws to express
our character'; and our character must have this kind of
solidity underneath it, the moral judgment o f right and
wrong. The only reason we quarrel with reformers some
times is because they are, or suppose that they are, a little
[220]

more enlightened than the rest of us, and they want us all
of a sudden to be just as enlightened as they are, and we
cannot stand the pace. That is all that makes us uneasy
about reformers. If we could get our second wind, if we
could keep up the pace as long as they do, we might be
able to run as fast as they do, but we are more heavily
weighted with clay than they are. We cannot go as fast.
And we like companionship. We want to wait for the
rest of them. We do not want to be in a lonely advance
climbing some heights of perfection where there is no
good inn to stop at overnight.”
In July, 1916, he further elaborated his view before the
Citizenship Convention in Washington, in these words:
“ When you ask a man to be loyal to a government, if
he comes from some foreign countries, his idea is that he is
expected to be loyal to a certain set of persons like a ruler
or a body set in authority over him, but that is not the
American idea. Our idea is that he is to be loyal to certain
objects in life, and that the only reason he has a President
and a Congress and a Governor and a State Legislature
and courts is that the community shall have instrumental
ities by which to promote those objects. It is a cooper
ative organization expressing itself in this Constitution,
expressing itself in these laws, intending to express itself
in the exposition of those laws by the courts; and the idea
of America is not so much that men are to be restrained
and punished by the law as instructed and guided by the
law. That is the reason so many hopeful reforms come
to grief. A law cannot work until it expresses the spirit
of the community for which it is enacted, and if you try
to enact into law what expresses only the spirit of a small
coterie or of a small minority, you know, or, at any rate,
[221]

you ought to know, beforehand that it is not going to work.
The object of the law is that there, written upon these
pages, the citizen should read the record of the experience
of this state and nation; what they have concluded it is
necessary for them to do because of the life they have
lived and the things that they have discovered to be ele
ments in that life.”
Wilson was a stern and stubborn fighter for the causes
he believed in. He was as stubborn as “ Old Hickory,”
whom he had much in his mind and whom he pictured as
“ a forthright man, who believed everything he did believe
in fighting earnest” ; adding, “ In public life he is the only
sort of man worth thinking about for a moment. If I was
not ready to fight for everything I believed in, I would
think it my duty to go back to Washington and take a
back seat. . . . The United States had almost for
gotten that it must keep its fighting ardour in behalf of
mankind when Andrew Jackson became President.”
Wilson did not seek a fight for its own sake, but he did
not shirk it, and when he entered into it, he did so with
great zest. “ To judge by my experience,” he said, “ I
have never been able to keep out of trouble. I have
never looked for it, but I have always found it. If any
man wants a scrap that is an interesting scrap and worth
while, I am his man. I warn him that he is not going to
draw me into a scrap for his own advertisement, but if he
it looking for trouble that is the trouble of men in general
and I can help a little, why, then, I am in for it.” And
Wilson always fought in the open and fought fairly. He
was always ready to take the fight to the people and to
drag any cause before them. He believed in letting the
people know everything there was to know about the
[222]

government. There were no secret recesses or dark
corners in which he wished to hide things. “ Nothing,”
he contended, “ is so good for putrefaction as fresh air.”
Wilson, as the President, was a partisan, in the sense
that he set himself up as leader of his party, but not in the
sense that he had a blind or unreasoning devotion to a
party. He was interested in party only as a necessary
agency in a constitutional democratic government, but,
to him, it was not an end in itself. He always put the
country high above party. He clearly recognized that
neither of the great parties was normally in position to
press its plans, regardless of men of independent minds.1
Speaking in Indianapolis, on January 8, 1915, on Jack
son Day, he said:
“ My friends, what I particularly want you to observe is
this: that politics in this country does not depend any
longer upon the regular members of either party. There
are not enough regular Republicans in this country to take
and hold national power; and I must immediately add
that there are not enough regular Democrats in this
country to do it either. This country is guided and its
policy is determined by the independent voter. . . .
I am not an independent voter, but I hope I can claim to
be an independent person, and I want to say this distinctly:
I do not love any party any longer than it continues to
serve the immediate and pressing needs of America. I
have been bred in the Democratic party; I love the
Democratic party; but I love America a great deal more
than I love the Democratic party; and when the Demo
cratic party thinks that it is an end in itself, then I rise up
in dissent. It is a means to an end, and its power de
pends, and ought to depend, upon its showing that it

knows what America needs and is ready to give it what it
needs.”
Wilson thought clearly, and he had great capacity
to express his thoughts. He was a literary artist by
temperament and stern training. As an expositor of
moral principles, he alone, among our other Chief Execu
tives, can claim a place with Lincoln. Both of them fell
upon times when great skill in exposition was of supreme
moment; and it seems a little less than providential that
this was so. Lincoln formulated for the nation, in im
perishable words, the moral meaning of the struggle in
which he was leader; and Wilson, in the Great War, fixed
the thinking of his own country on high moral grounds
and pitched the ideals of the Allies on a higher plane than
even their own leaders had been able to do. And it is a
matter of common knowledge that He powerfully affected
the thinking of the people of the enemy powers and was
instrumental in breaking their morale. If testimony of
this were needed, it might be found in the complaints of
no less an authority than Ludendorff. He complained
bitterly that, not the armies of the Allies, but the mis
chievous propaganda of Wilson had defeated the German
people. Wilson’s thoughts and their expressions, there
fore, were factors of enormous importance, not less by
reason of the appeal which they made to the conscience of
our people, the crusading spirit which they instilled into
our boys and their heartening effect upon the Allies, than
by their disturbing influence upon the minds of the people
of the Central Powers.
But, as a writer for the untrained and undiscriminating
reader and as a speaker, Wilson was not without a marked
defect. He said too much in too few words and, when he
[224]

had finished a thought, he let it drop. Several times I
heard him laughingly remark in Cabinet meetings that he
did not care how much any one said provided he said it
in a few words. He studied his subject carefully, di
gested all the facts he could assemble, and then painted
his picture with as few strokes as possible. His state
ments were based on wide knowledge and were the result
of prolonged reflection. He uttered conclusions and did
not take the trouble to reveal the steps he had taken or his
mental processes. He wrote from a broad background of
history and literature, and, not infrequently, his forms
of expression were unconventional and not familiar to the
average man, expressions whose origin and implication few
of his half-educated audiences knew or could grasp. He
habitually paid his audiences the compliment of appealing
to their intelligence and of assuming that they knew more
than they did.
Wilson coined very few phrases. Only a few of them
struck the popular mind. Some of them were unfortunate.
Some of them it would have been better if he had not
used. Two of them, “ Too proud to fight” and “ Peace
without victory,” were the causes of violent criticisms, as
was the sentence, “ The objects which the statesmen of the
belligerents on both sides have in mind are virtually the
same, as stated in general terms to their own people.”
The two phrases and the sentence given were used at a
time of great emotional excitement, at a time when the
Allies were in dire straits and making heroic efforts to sus
tain themselves. They exasperated many people, many
ordinarily fair-minded people, whose feelings were deeply
involved and who did not stop to consider the surrounding
circumstances and just what Wilson had in mind. And,
[225]

of course, they were seized upon by partisans of all degrees
and played up out of their context by a powerful partisan
press. Certainly, it would have been better if Wilson
had stopped to explain more fully what was in his mind.
The phrases and the sentence did not disturb me at the
time, or give me any concern, except for the fact that I
knew that they would be misinterpreted. I knew what
Wilson meant, and I agreed with his thought. It was
particularly unfortunate that he used the phrase, “ Too
proud to fight” just when he did. At the time, he was
being criticized for timidity and lack of understanding of
the issues of the struggle. It was used in an address in
Philadelphia, May 10, 1915, only three days after the
sinking of the Lusitania, and three days before the first
Lusitania note was sent. A t this time, groups of people,
particularly in a few Eastern cities, were greatly excited by
the tragedy and were clamouring for immediate action.
They instantly associated this utterance with the sub
marine controversy and saw in it a deliberate reference to
the Lusitania incident, and a cowardly announcement
that nothing could push Wilson into manly action.
Of course, Wilson, when he was speaking, did not have
the Lusitania controversy in mind. With his customary
single-track habit of thought, he was dealing, before
foreign-born citizens after a naturalization ceremony,
with the meaning of America and with their responsi
bilities. His mind easily dropped into an expression, a
dote parallel to which he was familiar with because of his
long residence in the South. A t the time he lived in the
South, duelling was still practised. It survived until
after 1880. I was familiar with the prevailing habit of
thought and expression. I had frequently heard men
[226]

say that they had too much self-respect to be insulted by
persons of a certain sort or to notice a challenge from them
— they were too proud to notice or to fight such persons.
Wilson’s full thought he expressed as follows: “ The ex
ample of America must be a special example. The
example of America must be the example, not merely of
peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace
is the healing and elevating influence of the world and
strife. Is not there such a thing as a man being too proud
to fight? There is such a thing as a nation being so right
that it does not need to convince others by force that it is
right.” Very little of this utterance, except the phrase
itself, was ever referred to or published. Partisans used
the phrase out of its context for their own purposes.
Neither was the trouble taken to point out that this same
thought was not new with Wilson, and that he had em
ployed it at least twice before.
In his special message on Mexico, August 27, 1913, he
said: 1
“ Meanwhile, what is it our duty to do ? Clearly, every
thing that we do must be rooted in patience and done with
calm and disinterested deliberation. Impatience on our
part would be childish and would be fraught with every
risk of wrong and folly. We can afford to exercise the
self-restraint of a really great nation, which realizes its
own strength and scorns to use it.”
And again later, on April 20,1915, after his Philadelphia
address, speaking before the Associated Press of New
York, he said:
“ M y interest in the neutrality of the United States is
not the petty desire to keep out of trouble. I am inter
ested in neutrality because there is something so much
[227]

greater to do than to fight; there is a distinction waiting
for the nation that no nation has ever yet got, that is
the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery.
Whom do you admire most among your friends? The
irritable man? The man out of whom you can get a
‘ rise’ without trying? The man who will fight at the
drop of the hat, whether he knows what the hat is dropped
for or not? Don’t you admire, and don’t you fear, if you
have to contest with him, the self-mastered man, who
watches you with calm eye and comes in only when you
have carried the thing so far that you must be disposed of?
That is the man you respect. That is the man, who, you
know, has at bottom a much more fundamental and
terrible courage than the fighting man. Now, I covet for
America this splendid courage of reserve moral force, and
I wanted to point out to you gentlemen simply this.”
Wilson was soon to reveal strikingly to the nation and to
the world just what he meant. He did this effectively
before he decided that the time had come for us to fight.
In speaking to the Railway Business Association of New
York, January 27, 1916, he said:
“ If there is one passion more deeply seated in the
hearts of our fellow countrymen than another, it is the
passion for peace. No nation ever more instinctively
turned away from the thought of war than this nation
to which we belong. . . . But, gentlemen, there is
something that the American people love better than they
love peace. They love the principles upon which their
political life is founded. They are ready at any time to
fight for the vindication of their character and honour.
They will not at any time seek the contest, but they will
not cravenly avoid it; because, if there is one thing that
[228]

the individual ought to fight for and that the nation
ought to fight for, it is the integrity of its own convictions.
I would rather surrender territory than surrender those
ideals which are the staff of life of the soul itself.”
The use of the phrase “ Peace without victory” also was
unfortunate. Wilson recognized that it would be criti
cized and asked to be permitted to put his own interpre
tation upon it, but part of his interpretation did not help
the matter. It was asking too much of human nature—
of the Allies, facing a life-and-death struggle, not to seek
a victory over the Germans. He pointed out that victory
would mean peace forced upon the vanquished, accepted
in humiliation, leaving a resentment and a bitter memory.
Victory always leaves a sting in the vanquished, and the
Allies proposed that there should be a sting. What
Wilson, of course, had in mind was that the peace which
should follow victory should be a just peace and, there
fore, a permanent peace, and that it was of the utmost
importance that when the victory was won the victors
should be reasonable. He, of course, apprehended that
they would not be reasonable; and what occurred in Paris
and what has occurred since have demonstrated that his
apprehensions were well grounded. Even with all his
power, he could not get terms of peace which were
wholly reasonable. He knew from the beginning that he
was unlikely to succeed in attaining his aims in full; and
for the further reason that he knew that peace must be
organized and backed by civilized nations, when he felt
the temper of the Allies in Paris, he insisted upon placing
the Covenant of the League in the Treaty. Only now,
after passion has somewhat abated and realities are being
faced, is there prospect of a reasonably just and secure
[229]

peace. If one is attained, it will be substantially along the
lines which Wilson indicated.
In declaring that the objects of the belligerents were
virtually the same, as stated by their leaders to their own
people, Wilson was unquestionably correct. Leaders of
nations, on both sides in every war, have always pro
claimed the righteousness of their cause. They did so in
the late war, and, as they proclaimed them, their objects
were virtually the same. We need only remember the
state of mind of people on both sides in our Civil War.
But to say what Wilson did say and to say that the bel
ligerents were actually fighting for the same principles
are two utterly different things; and Wilson did not say
and did not believe for a moment, at any time, that the
objects of the two sides to the struggle were equally good.
There was not a moment, from the time when the Ger
mans first moved to the end, when he thought that their
cause was righteous or justified and when he did not
apprehend that we might have to step in. It was because
Wilson perceived this that, from the early days of the
struggle, he embarked on his campaign of education to
enlighten our own people, to secure unity when it would
be needed, and a just peace when Germany was crushed,
a#hc believed she would be.
It was pure tragedy that a man like Wilson, who knew
what war means, who had witnessed the horrors of its
aftermath, who detested it as a method of settling diffi
culties and thought it stupid, should have been called upon
to lead this nation into war. He spoke from his heart and
experience when he said to Congress, in his War Message:
“ It is a fearful thing to lead this great nation into war” ;
***! he held back more than two and a half years for many
[230]

reasons. I thought at the time, and still think, that he
was right in his thinking and his action at each stage of
the developments. A t no point did I think the time had
come for us to strike till we did strike; and I anxiously
watched every step with utter sympathy for the Allies.
I did not always agree with every part of Wilson's reason
ing, but I accepted and endorsed his conclusions and
course of action. I was influenced neither by the desires
nor by the criticisms of the Allies of our course; and I was
not disturbed by the mutterings of the pro-Ally Amer
icans. I said frequently during the course of the develop
ments that the Allies would continue to criticize us as long
as we did not do exactly what they desired us to do, just
as they would furiously applaud us if we did act according
to their notions, and especially if we entered the war.
My sole concern was what was our duty as Americans.
Going in or staying out of the war and the time of it were
matters solely for us to determine as American citizens,
in the light of America’s interests.
Naturally, the situation became tense when the Lusi
tania was sunk. Many citizens, especially in Eastern
cities, were for immediate action. As I have already
indicated, I was in California when the news of the sink
ing of the Lusitania came. I was in the West for five
weeks following this tragedy. I realized clearly then that
the majority of the people were not even thinking of this
nation’s entering the struggle. I was in most parts of the
Union several times between 1915 and the spring of I9i7>
and at no stage, up to that time, were the masses of the
people ready for this nation’s participation. Wilson, too,
had full knowledge of the state of mind of the great ma
jority of the people. His attitude immediately after the

sinking of the Lusitania is well pictured by Tumulty in his
book, where he says:
‘“ I am bound to consider in the most careful and
cautious way the first step I shall take, because once
having taken it I cannot withdraw from it. I am bound
to consider beforehand all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the sinking of the Lusitania and to calculate
the effect upon the country of every incautious or unwise
move. I am keenly aware that the feeling of the country
is now at fever heat, and that it is ready to move with me
in any direction I shall suggest, but I am bound to weigh
carefully the effect of radical action now based upon the
present emotionalism of the people. I am not sure
whether the present emotionalism of the country would
last long enough to sustain any action I would suggest to
Congress, and thus, in case of failure, we should be left
without that fine backing and support so necessary to
maintain a great cause. I could go to Congress to-morrow
and advocate war with Germany, and I feel certain that
Congress would support me, but what would the country
say when war was declared, and finally came, and we were
witnessing all of its horrors and bloody aftermath. As the
people pored over the casualty lists, would they not say:
"W hy did Wrilson move so fast in this matter? Why
didn’ t he try peaceably to settle this question with
Germany ? Why could he not have waited a little longer?
Why was he so anxious to go to war with Germany, yet,
at the same time, why was he so tender of the feelings
of Great Britain in the matter of the blockade? ” Were I
to advise radical action now, we should have nothing, I am
afraid, but regrets and heartbreaks. The vastness o f this
country; its variegated elements; the conflicting cross

currents of national feelings bid us wait and withhold
ourselves from hasty or precipitate action. When we
move against Germany, we must be certain that the whole
country not only moves with us but is willing to go for
ward to the end with enthusiasm. I know that we shall
be condemned for waiting, but in the last analysis I am
the trustee of this nation, and the cost of it all must be
considered in the reckoning before we go forward.'
“ Then, leaning closer to me, he said: ‘ It will not do for
me to act as if I had been hurried into precipitate action
against Germany. I must answer for the consequences
of my action. What is the picture that lies before me?
All the great nations of Europe at war, engaged in a death
grapple that may involve civilization. My earnest hope
and fervent prayer have been that America could withhold
herself and remain out of this terrible mess and steer clear
of European embroilments, and at the right time offer
herself as the only mediating influence to bring about
peace. We are the only great nation now free to do this.
If we should go in, then the whole civilized world will be
come involved. What a pretty mess it would be! Amer
ica, the only nation disconnected from this thing, and
now she is surrendering the leadership she occupies
and becomes involved as other nations have. Think of
the tragedy! I am not afraid to go to war. No man fit
to be President of this nation, knowing the way its people
would respond to any demand that might be made upon
them, need have fears or doubts as to what stand it would
finally take. But what I fear more than anything else
is the possibility of world bankruptcy that will inevitably
follow our getting into this thing. Not only world chaos
and bankruptcy, but all of the distempers, social, moral,

and industrial, that will flow from this world cataclysm.
No sane man, therefore, who knows the dangerous ele
ments that are abroad in the world would, without feeling
out every move, seek to lead his people without counting
the cost and dispassionately deliberating upon every
move.’ ”
His attitude was frequently later revealed in public
addresses. It was strikingly revealed in his statement at
Los Angeles, September 20, 1919, on his Western tour, as
follows:
“ I remember how anxiously I watched the movements
of opinion in this country during the months immediately
preceding our entrance into the war. Again and again I
put this question to the men who sat around the board at
which the Cabinet meets. They represented different
parts of the country; they were in touch with the opinion
in different parts of the United States, and I would fre
quently say to them, ‘ How do you think the people feel
with regard to our relation to this war ?’ And I remember
one day, one of them said, ‘ Mr. President, I think that
they are ready to do anything you suggest/ I said,
‘ That is not what I am waiting for. That is not enough.
If they do not go in of their own impulse, no impulse that I
can supply will suffice, and I must wait until I know that
I am their spokesman. I must wait until I know that I
am interpreting their purpose. Then I will know that I
have got an irresistible power behind me.’ And that is
exactly what happened.
"That is what is now appreciated as it was not at first
appreciated on the other side of the sea. They wondered
and wondered why we did not come in. They had come
to the cynical conclusion that we did not come in because

we were making money out of the war and did not want to
spoil the profitable game; and then, at last, they saw what
we were waiting for, in order that the whole plot of the
German purpose should develop, in order that we might
see how the intrigue of that plot had penetrated our own
life, how the poison was spreading, and how it was noth
ing less than a design against the freedom of the world.
They knew that when America once saw that, she would
throw her power in with those who were going to redeem
the world. And at every point of the discussion I was
attempting to be the mouthpiece of what I understood
right-thinking and forward-thinking and just-thinking
men with regard to party or section in the United States
to be purposing and conceiving, and it was the conscious
ness in Europe that that was the case that made it
possible to construct the peace upon American principles.”
Wilson’s reasons for inaction were many and complex.
He strongly felt that America alone could keep the bal
ance of the world’s thought and be prepared to succour the
world and effect the necessary readjustments when the
struggle ended. This was dominant in his thought for
some time, in fact, even after we declared war and peace
was concluded. He frequently expressed this view. In
his Jackson Day speech at Indianapolis, January 8,1915*
he said:
“ Look abroad upon the troubled world! Only America
at peace. Among all the great powers of the world only
America saving her power for her own people! Only
America using her great character and her great strength
in the interest of peace and of prosperity. Do you not
think it likely that the world will some time turn to
America and say: ‘ You were right and we were wrong.

You kept your head when we lost ours. You tried to keep
the scale from tipping, and we threw the whole weight of
arms in one side of the scale. Now, in your self-possession,
in your coolness, in your strength, may we not turn to you
for counsel and for assistance?’ Think of the deepwrought destruction of economic resources, of life, and of
hope that is taking place in some parts of the world, and
think of the reservoir of sustenance that there is in this
great land of plenty! May we not look forward to the
time when we shall be called blessed among the nations,
because we succoured the nations of the world in their
time of distress and of dismay? I, for one, pray God that
that solemn hour may come, and I know the solidity of
character and I know the exaltation of hope, I know the
big principle with which the American people will respond
to die call of the world for service. I thank God that
those who believe in America, who try to seem her people,
are likely to be also what America herself, from the first,
hoped and meant to be—the servant of mankind.”
In his address to the Associated Press in New York,
April 20,1915, he again touched upon this theme, saying:
"The world’s affairs are drawing to a climax. We are
the only great nation disengaged. The nations will turn
to us for the cooler assessment. We shall some day have
to assist in reconstructing the processes of peace. We are
the mediating nation of the world. We mediate the
blood and sentiments of the world. We are compounded
of many nadons. We understand all nations.”
And in Chicago, on January 31, 1916, he again urged
the point in these words:
“ And those of us who are charged with the responsi
bility of affairs have realized very intensely that there

was a certain sense in which America was looked to to keep
the balance of the whole world’s thought.
“ And America was called upon to do something very
much more than that, even; profoundly difficult, if not
impossible, though that be, she was called upon to assert
in times of war the standards of times of peace. . . .
“ We have believed and I believe that we can serve even
the nations at war better by remaining at peace and hold
ing off from this contest than we could possibly serve
them in any other way. Your interest, your sympathy,
your affections may be engaged on the one side or the
other, but no matter which side they are engaged on, it is
your duty even to your affections in this great affair to
stand off and not let this nation be drawn into the war.
Somebody must keep the great stable foundations of the
life of nations untouched and undisturbed. Somebody
must keep the great economic processes of the world of
business alive. Somebody must see to it that we stand
ready to repair the enormous damage and the incalculable
losses which will ensue from the war, and which it is hardly
credible could be repaired if every great nation in the
world were drawn into the contest.”
Whether Wilson’s notion that we should and would be
the succouring and mediating nation was his own idea or
was first suggested by Walter Page, I do not know, but it
is certain that Page, through 1914, strongly held this view
and urged it on the President. On August 9, 1914, he
wrote:
“ Be ready, for you will be called upon to compose this
huge quarrel. I thank Heaven for many things— first,
the Atlantic Ocean; second, that you refrained from war in
Mexico; third, that we kept our treaty— the Canal Tolls

victory, I mean. Now, when all this half the world will
suffer the unspeakable mutilation of war, we shall pre
serve our moral strength, our political powers, and our
ideals.”
Wilson omitted no opportunity to make approaches as a
mediator, but, of course, they had to be made with great
care. Among other things he did, he sent the note asking
both sides to state the terms on which they might consider
making peace. This was a forlorn hope, but it served a
useful purpose. It enabled the Allies to place themselves
before our people in a favourable light. The Germans
could say nothing which would not queer them further
in America.
As matters developed, Wilson realized that the moment
might come when efforts to protect our rights, to save our
honour, and to effect mediation might fail, and that we
would have to go in. He knew, however, the state of
mind of the people and kept closely in touch with senti
ment in all sections of the country and of Congress. He
knew that the masses of the people, particularly in the
South and West, were not really thinking about our
getting into the war until after the beginning of 1917.
He had in mind the difficulty which he experienced in
getting Congressional support even for the army increases
proposed in 1915. He actually did not succeed in getting
the army bill through till August, 1916. He was con
fronted, too, until February, 1916, with a serious threat
of the passage of the McLemore Resolution warning
Americans off the high seas. He was, of course, aware of
the large foreign elements which were naturally friendly
to the Central Powers, and of the fact that large numbers
of people, particularly in the South, had been especially
[238I

irritated with Great Britain because of her interference
with the shipment of cotton to Central Europe.
In 1917, he said to Tumulty:
“ Tumulty, from the very beginning I saw the end of
this horrible thing; but I could not move faster than the
great mass of our people would permit. Very few under
stood the difficult and trying position I have been placed
in during the years through which we have just passed.
In the policy of patience and forbearance I pursued, I
tried to make every part of America and the varied ele
ments of our population understand that we were willing
to go any length rather than resort to war with Germany.
As I told you months ago, it would have been foolish for
us to have been rushed off our feet and to have gone to
war over an isolated affair like the Lusitania. But now
we are certain that there will be no regrets or looking back
on the part of our people. There is but one course now
left open to us. Our consciences are clear, and we must
prepare for the inevitable— a fight to the end. Germany
must be made to understand that we have rights that she
must respect. There were few who understood this policy
of patience. I do not mean to say this in a spirit of
criticism. Indeed, many of the leading journals of the
country were unmindful of the complexities of the situ
ation which confronted us.”
He, therefore, realized the need of educating the people
and steadily pursued a definite course of laying issues be
fore them and Congress. This was his broader objective
in his Preparedness tour. In Pittsburgh, January 29,
1916, he said:
“ While a year ago it seemed impossible that a struggle
upon so great a scale should last a whole twelvemonth, it

has now lasted a year and a half, and the end is not yet,
and all the time things have grown more and more diffi
cult to handle.
“ It fills me with a very strange feeling sometimes, my
fellow citizens, when it seems to be implied that I am not
the friend of peace. If these gentlemen could have sat
with me reading the dispatches and handling the ques
tions which arise every hour of the twenty-four, they
would have known how infinitely difficult it had been to
maintain the peace, and they would have believed that I
was the friend of peace. But I also know the difficulties,
the real dangers, dangers not alone about things that I
can handle, but about things that the other parties handle
and I cannot control.
“ It amazes me to hear men speak as if America stood
alone in the world and could follow her own life as she
pleased. We are in the midst of a world that we did not
make and cannot alter; its atmospheric and physical
conditions are the conditions of our own life also, and,
therefore, as your responsible servant, I must tell you
that the dangers are infinite and constant.”
He returned to this topic at Milwaukee, January 31,
1916, saying:
“ I feel that I am charged with a double duty of the
utmost difficulty. In the first place, I know that you are
depending upon me to keep this nation out of the war.
So far I have done so, and I pledge you my word that, God
helping me, I will if it is possible. But you have laid
another duty upon me. You have bidden me see to it
that nothing stains or impairs the honour of the United
States, and that is a matter not within my control; that
depends upon what others do, not upon what the govem

ment of the United States does. Therefore, there may at
any moment come a time when I cannot preserve both the
honour and the peace of the United States. . . .
“ We want war, if it must come, to be something that
springs out of the sentiments and principles and actions
of the people themselves.”
Wilson’s position in the early stages of the war met with
approval and support even from such pugnacious leaders
as Roosevelt, who, of course, cordially resented and de
tested Wilson. Roosevelt’s hindsight was quite different
from his foresight. After certain events, and after the
war fever spread, he was very vocal as to what he would
have done, but in September, 1914, he was quite clear that
nothing could be done about Belgium and preferred that
we should so act as to be in position to mediate. In an
article in the Outlook of September 22, 1914, he said:
“ Our country stands well-nigh alone among the great
civilized powers in being unshaken by the present world
wide war. For this we should be humbly and profoundly
grateful. . . .
As regards the actions of most of the
combatants in the hideous world-wide war now raging, it is
possible sincerely to take and defend either of the opposite
views concerning their actions. . . . When Russia
took part, it may well be argued that it was impossible
for Germany not to come to the defence of Austria, and
that disaster would surely have attended her arms had she
not followed the course she actually did follow as regards
her opponents on her western frontier. . . .
I wish
it explicidy understood that I am not at this time passing
judgment one way or the other upon Germany for what
she did to Belgium. . . .
I am merely calling at
tention to what has actually been done in Belgium, in

accordance with what the Germans unquestionably
sincerely believe to be the course of conduct necessitated
by Germany’s struggle for life. . . . It is neither
necessary nor at the present time possible to sift from the
charges, countercharges, and denials the exact facts as to
the acts alleged to have been committed in various
places. . . .
I think, at any rate, I hope, I have
rendered it plain that I am not now criticizing, that I am
not passing judgment one way or the other, upon Ger
many’s action. I admire and respect the German people.
I am proud of the German blood in my veins. When a
nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, from
whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national
life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to
save itself from death, and to perpetuate its life. . . .
The rights and wrongs of these cases where nations vio
late the rules of abstract morality in order to meet their
own vital needs can be precisely determined only when all
the facts are known and when men’s blood is cool. . . .
I am not at this time criticizing the particular actions of
which I speak. . . .
“ . . . A deputation of Belgians has arrived in this
country to invoke our assistance in the time of their
dreadful need. What action our government can or will
take I know not. It has been announced that no action
can be taken that will interfere with our entire neutrality.
It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain
entirely neutral, and nothing but urgent need would
warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way
or the other. . . . Neutrality may be of prime ne
cessity in order to preserve our own interests, to main
tain peace in so much of the world as is not affected by
[242]

the war, and to conserve our influence for helping toward
the reestablishment of general peace when the time comes;
for if any outside power is able at such time to be the
medium for bringing peace, it is more likely to be the
United States than any other. . . .
Of course, it
would be folly to jump into the gulf ourselves to no good
purpose; and very probably nothing that we could have
done would have helped Belgium. We have not the
smallest responsibility for what has befallen her, and I am
sure that the sympathy of this country for the suffering
of the men, women, and children of Belgium is very real.
Nevertheless, this sympathy is compatible with full
acknowledgment of the unwisdom of our uttering a single
word of official protest unless we are prepared to make
that protest effective, and only the clearest and most
urgent national duty would ever justify us in deviating
from our rule of neutrality and non-interference. . . .
. . Every public man, every writer who speaks
with wanton offensiveness of a foreign power or of a
foreign people, whether he attacks England or France or
Germany, whether he assails the Russians or the Japanese,
is doing an injury to the whole American body politic.
We have plenty of shortcomings at home to correct before
we start out to criticize the shortcomings of others.”
Later, the spirit of partisanship got the better of Roose
velt, and during the remainder of the period he was
difficult factor, but Wilson gave little heed to him.
It was easy for people— Roosevelt, Page, and others—
to say that if the President, when the Lusitania was sunk,
had boldly declared that we should join the Allies, he
would have carried the people with him; it is another thing
to know this. I have a suspicion that he would have had

hard sledding. It is possible that he would have had
strong partisan opposition to such a course, a large ele
ment in Congress against him and no such unity in the
Nation as he did have when we did enter the war.
Furthermore, we certainly struck at an opportune time.
What might have happened if we had gone in in 1915
when Germany and the Central Powers were still strong?
I do not know. The war might have dragged along for
several years. War weariness might have overtaken this
country as it had some of the Allies; the sacrifices of life
and th'e financial burdens would have become staggering.
Wre would certainly not have paused in our efforts to carry
the load of fighting three thousand miles from home, but
serious complications might have set up. On the other
hand, Russia might have stayed in the war, Bulgaria
might have joined the Allies, and the end might have been
speedy. But such speculations are idle.
Wilson led the nation into war at the right moment— the
moment when Germany abandoned all pretences, broke her
promises, declared her intention to resume unrestricted sub
marine warfare, and undertook to dictate the course we
should follow. Then Uncle Sam rolled up his sleeves and
made it plain that he was “ free, white, and twenty-one”
and would see whether anybody could tell him what he
could or could not do. From this moment. Wilson had
back of him a united and determined people, and he knew it.
Wilson hated the thought of war. He knew what it
meant, but he accepted the challenge with the same poise
and calm courage that he had manifested in the more
difficult former trial of maintaining peace.
Wilson’s knowledge of the meaning of war and what the
new task involved and his boldness were made m anifest

at the outset and were evident at eachstage of the develop
ment, from first to last. There was no hesitating. He
did not waver for an instant, and he had at no time any
doubt as to the issue. With him, it was a foregone con
clusion. There was in him the spirit of the Crusader and
of the Roundhead. He would have immediate and good
execution of the enemy, for the good of their souls and for
the glory of God.
In his war message, he said:
“ It is a war against all nations. American ships have
been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has
stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people
of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and
overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has
been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind.
Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it.
The choice we make for ourselves must be made with
a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment
befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We
must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be
revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might
of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human
right, of which we are only a single champion.”
And again he declared:
“ There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable
of making: we will not choose the path of submission and
suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people
to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we
now array ourselves are no common wrongs: they cut to
the very roots of human life.
“ With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical
character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsi

bilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to
what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the
Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial Ger
man Government to be, in fact, nothing less than war
against the government and people of the United States;
that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has
thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps
not only to put the country in a more thorough state of
defence but also to exert all its power and employ all its
resources to bring the government of the German Empire
to terms and end the war.
“ What this will involve is clear. It will involve the
utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with
the governments now at war with Germany, and, as in
cident to that, the extension to those governments of
the most liberal financial credits, in order that our re
sources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will
involve the organization and mobilization of all the ma
terial resources of the country to supply the materials of
war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the
most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient
way possible.”
He was glad that the matter had come out into the open:
“ We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose be
cause we know that in such a government, following such
methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the
presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to
accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no
assured security for the democratic governments of the
world. We are now about to accept gauge of battle with
this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the
whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pre

tensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the
facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight
thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the
liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included:
for the rights of nations great and small, and the privilege
of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of
obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy.
Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of
political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We
desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities
for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices
we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions
of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when
those rights have been made as secure as the faith and
the freedom of nations can make them.
“ Just because we fight without rancour and without
selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we
shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel
confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without
passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the prin
ciples of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for."
His closing paragraph was reminiscent of the days of the
Revolution:
“ It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of
the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing
you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial
and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this
great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and
disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in
the balance. But the right is more precious than peace,
and we shall fight for the things which we have always
carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of

those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own
governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations,
for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and
make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can
dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we
are and everything that we have, with the pride of those
who know that the day has come when America is privi
leged to spend her blood and her might for the principles
that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she
has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.”
There will be no compromise:
“ I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it.
All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall
appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with
which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to
redeem the world and make it fit for free men like our
selves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we
do. Let everything that we say, my fellow countrymen,
everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring
true to this response till the majesty and might of our
concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat
the force of those who flout and misprize what we honour
and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force,
and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and peace
shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America
conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall de
termine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore,
but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the
utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and
triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the
world, and cast every selfish dominion down to the dust.”

Wilson’s voice was like the voice of a prophet of old:
“ The military masters under whom Germany is bleed
ing see very clearly to what point Fate has brought them.
If they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power
both abroad and at home will fall to pieces like a house of
cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about
now more than their power abroad. It is that power
which is trembling under their very feet; and deep fear has
entered their hearts.”
And again he cried:
“ For us there is but one choice. We have made it.
Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand
in our way in this day of high resolution when every
principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made
secure for the salvation of the nations. We are ready to
plead at the bar of history, and our flag shall wear a new
lustre. Once more we shall make good with our lives and
fortunes the great faith to which we were born, and a new
glory shall shine in the face of our people.”
And finally he exclaimed:
“ It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested
purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are
banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the
preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear
of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly
constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is
righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as
well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy,
the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For
this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy
of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war, and
for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

“ A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of
the people have been opened and they see. The hand of
God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favour,
I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights
of His own justice and mercy.”
From the moment the country entered the war, Wilson
took a stand which was of the first importance— that
politicians should not hamper the army and the navy.
This was unique in American history. It was obvious
that politicians in Congress would attempt to meddle in
military matters, as they had in all previous wars, particu
larly in the Mexican and Civil wars, causing unnecessary
sacrifices of lives and property and endangering the nation
itself. In no other directions in our history has Con
gressional action been so inefficient and baneful as in its
interference with the direction of military matters, and
in no other way has its stupidity been so strikingly ex
hibited. If an exception should be made, it would be
made in its conduct during the periods of reconstruction
which have followed our wars. At the outset, in the
beginning of our last war, elements in Congress again set
out to meddle and to control military policies, but Wilson
opposed a firm front to the attempt and stopped it. Con
gress was then free to do its great part in making available
for the struggle the resources of the nation. This part it
played nobly. In stopping it from interfering with the
conduct of war, Wilson saved Congress from itself.
One of his first notable actions was his calling upon the
military experts to recommend a soldier to command the
army. On their recommendation he selected General
Pershing, and, having selected him, he left him free. His
part was to back up the leaders of the army and of

own

the navy. What they wanted would be provided; whom
Pershing wanted in France would be sent and no others.
Beyond this, the next thing Wilson did was to urge
boldness and aggressiveness. One needs only to recall his
letter to Admiral Sims and his address to the officers of the
Atlantic Fleet. In this address, he said:
“ Now, the point that is constantly in my mind, gentle*
men, is this: This is an unprecedented war and, therefore,
it is a war in one sense for amateurs. Nobody ever before
conducted a war like this, and therefore nobody can pre
tend to be a professional in a war like this. Here are two
great navies, not to speak of the others associated with
us, our own and the British, outnumbering by a very great
margin the navy to which we are opposed, and yet casting
about for a way in which to use our superiority and our
strength, because of the novelty of the instruments used,
because of the unprecedented character of the war, be
cause, as I said just now, nobody ever before fought a war
like this, in the way that this is being fought at sea, or on
land either, for that matter. The experienced soldier—
experienced in previous wars— is a back number so far as
his experience is concerned; not so far as his intelligence
is concerned. His experience does not count, because he
never fought a war as this is being fought, and therefore
he is an amateur along with the rest of us. Now, some
body has got to think this war out. Somebody has got
to think out the way, not only to fight the submarine,
but to do something different from what we are doing.
“ We are hunting hornets all over the farm and letting
the nest alone. None of us knows how to go to the nest
and crush it; and yet I despair of hunting for hornets all
over the sea when I know where the nest is and know that

the nest is breeding hornets as fast as I can find them. I
am willing for my part, and I know you are willing be
cause I know the stuff you are made of— I am willing to
sacrifice half the navy Great Britain and we together have
to crush out that nest, because, if we crush it, the war is
won. I have come here to say that I do not care where it
comes from, I do not care whether it comes from the young
est officer or the oldest, but I want the officers of this navy
to have the distinction of saying how this war is going to
be won. The Secretary of the Navy and I have just been
talking over plans for putting the planning machinery of
the navy at the disposal of the brains of the navy and not
stopping to ask what rank those brains have, because,
as I have said before and want to repeat, so far as experi
ence in this kind of war is concerned, we are all of the
same rank. I am not saying that I do not expect the
admirals to tell us what to do, but I am saying that I want
the youngest and most modest youngster in the service to
tell us what we ought to do if he knows what it is. Now,
I am willing to make any sacrifice for that. I mean any
sacrifice of time or anything else. I am ready to put
myself at the disposal of any officer in the navy who
thinks he knows how to run this war. I will not under
take to tell you whether he does or not, because I know
that I do not, but I will undertake to put him in com
munication with those who can find out whether his idea
will work or not. I have the authority to do that and I
will do it with greatest pleasure. . . .
“ We have got to throw tradition to the wind. Now, as
I have said, gentlemen, I take it for granted that nothing
that I say here will be repeated and therefore I am going
to say this: Every time we have suggested anything to the
[252]

British Admiralty, the reply has come back that virtually
amounted to this, that it had never been done that way,
and I felt like saying: ‘ Well, nothing was ever done so
systematically as nothing is being done now.’ Therefore,
I should like to see something unusual happen, something
that was never done before; and inasmuch as the things
that are being done to you were never done before, don’t
you think it is worth while to try something that was
never done before against those who are doing them to
you. There is no other way to win, and the whole
principle of this war is the kind of thing that ought to
hearten and stimulate America. America has always
boasted that she could find men to do anything. She is
the prize amateur nation of the world. Germany is the
prize professional nation of the world. Now when it
comes to doing new things and doing them well, I will
back the amateur against the professional every time,
because the professional does it out of the book and the
amateur does it with his eyes open upon a new world and
with a new set of circumstances. He knows so little
about it that he is fool enough to try to do the right thing.
The men that do not know the danger are the rashest men,
and I have several times ventured to make this suggestion
to the men about me in both arms of the service: Please
leave out of your vocabulary altogether the word ‘ pru
dent.' Do not stop to think about what is prudent for a
moment. Do the thing that is audacious to the utmost
point of risk and daring, because that is exactly the thing
that the other side does not understand, and you will win
by the audacity of method when you cannot win by
circumspection and prudence. I think that there are
willing ears to hear this in the American Navy and the

American Army because that is the kind of folk we are.
We get tired of the old ways and covet the new ones.
“ So, gentlemen, besides coming down here to give you
my personal greeting and to say how absolutely I rely
on you and believe in you, I have come down here to say
also that I depend on you, depend on you for brains as
well as training and courage and discipline.”
Wilson’s determination and success in keeping the
hands of the politicians off the army and the navy will be
rated one of his great contributions to the nation in this
time of stress. For it, Wilson is entitled to the gratitude
of all the people. It is to be hoped that the precedent he
set will be followed for all time.
Wilson habitually took the long view. He preferred
to go down to defeat fighting for a cause which he knew
some day would triumph than to gain a victory of an
issue which he was confident would in time be shown to be
false. He played for the verdict of history.
What history will say of Wilson, I do not know. That
he will figure largely in it is obvious. It is unavoidable
that he should. He was a central figure in this nation,
and one of the central figures of the world in the period of
its most colossal tragedy. Quoting him, I may say:
“ We find every truly great mind identified with some
special cause. His purposes are steadfastly set in some
definite direction. The career which he works out for
himself constitutes so important a part of the history of
his times that to dissociate him from his surroundings
were as impossible as it would be undeservable.”

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
T h e A c h ie v e m e n t s o f t h e

D e m o c r a t ic P a r t y

Extracts from Speeches Delivered During the Campaign of igi6

HE Democratic party has now been in power for
about three and a half years. Even its oppo
nents admit that its record has been striking, and
they do not dare to attack it specifically. The
party’s achievements in this short period have been greater
than those of the Republican party during a period three
or four times as long. It is impossible within the limits of
your patience to give this record in any detail. I can re
view only a few of the larger accomplishments and indicate
their significance. I shall deal mainly with what the Ad
ministration has done for the farmer and shall, I believe,
demonstrate that the farmer, in simple justice, should
support the Administration. It has kept its promises.
It has kept faith with the farmers, and they will keep
faith with it.
“ You recall the political situation before the fourth of
March, 1913. For years the tariff had been a dominant
issue. There was a general demand for its revision. The
Republican party, in their platform of 1912, had declared
that some of the schedules were too high and should be
reduced, The Progressive party charged that the PayneAldrich tariff was unjust, especially to labour, and de
manded that it should be so reformed that some of its
benefits should reveal themselves in the pay envelope of

the labourer. The Democratic party promised prompt
revision downward. It faithfully kept this pledge, as it
has numerous others. You know the outcome. In re
sponse to an overwhelming demand from the American
people, the Democratic party promptly attacked the
problem and passed the Underwood Tariff Law. Its
action was conservative and wise and was in the interest
of the masses of the American people. This action was
coincident with a great expansion of American manu
facturing and a new era in American trade.
“ I shall not weary you with a discussion of the tariff in
its relation to existing conditions. You are not seriously
concerned about it. It is obvious that this nation was
never more prosperous than it is to-day, and that never
before were more labouring people at work with higher
wages.
“ But there is one point which deserves comment.
Republican leaders, finding themselves embarrassed in
trying to raise the usual alarms, have looked to the
future, have attempted to frighten you by what may
happen when the war closes, and demand that the old
high protection party be returned to power to safeguard
this nation against the fierce competition of Europe. I
am amazed at their audacity. I can conceive no greater
insult to the intelligence of a great people. That Europe
at the close of this war should be in condition to compete
with this country, especially on more favourable terms
than before, is unthinkable. Some would have you
believe that, while the conflict rages and while trade
barriers exist, the industries of Europe, especially of the
Central Powers, are pouring out masses of products, which,
when peace comes, will flood this nation. Could any[258]

thing be more unlikely? Do you realize that from twentytwo to twenty-five million men in Europe are under arms?
Do you not know that from 55 to 60 per cent, of the arti
sans of Europe are at the front, and that the people who
are not fighting are working to supply those who are?
Never before has there been anything like this war. This
is a war of nations, of whole peoples, a war in which the
entire economic and industrial life of the people is re
directed for purposes of destruction. It is impossible
that there should be in any of these nations a great
reservoir of useful commodities which the nations them
selves have not long ago consumed.
“ By what process do they arrive at the conclusion that
stricken Europe will be a more formidable foe? Is war a
blessing? Is it the path to national economic supremacy?
Would they advise this nation to start a war in order to
get ready to meet competition? If they mean what they
say and are interested mainly in profits, as they are,
certainly, they should urge war. Consider what this
war is doing. Think of the demoralization of industry,
the destruction of property, the waste of capital. What
gain accrues from the slaughter of millions of working
men and of alert industrial leaders, from many more
millions of wounded and maimed, of widows and helpless
children? Bear in mind the burden of debt piling up,
greater than anything ever imagined in the history of
the world. Even now the interest charge on the war debt
in each nation must equal its former entire national
budget. When peace comes, will not the process of re
direction of industry, of recovery and reconstruction, be
slow and painful, covering generations? Clearly the
thought of this great people will be engaged, not in

planning to resist fierce and brutish competition, but to
extend aid and succour. The most hopeful sign now
visible to thoughtful men is the growing appreciation of
the folly of international selfishness and a determination
to effect an adjustment on another basis. The old plan
spelled war and is doomed. Is it not a sorry figure our
opponents cut when they try to frighten the people of
this great nation, increasing in efficiency, with the danger
of competition from invalid Europe, and in urging them
to renewed and more aggressive selfish enterprises? Those
who do so have no vision and are no friends of humanity
and permanent peace. . . .
“ Already the American farmer is the most efficient
farmer in the world. He does not produce more per acre.
It is not necessary for him to do so. And it would be un
wise for him to undertake to do so. But he does produce
from two to five times more per man, or per unit of labour
and capital, than any other farmer in the world. He is
still pioneering a continent with immense undeveloped
resources before him. He is more alert and uses more
and better machinery and has more powerful instrumen
talities at his service than have the farmers of any other
nation. He now masters his rivals in the field of competi
tion, and will more and more easily hold his own in the
race for agricultural supremacy.
“ And yet the protected interests have attempted to
convince the American farmer that he is in danger from
competition abroad, even in his own market. Those who
raise this alarm do not pay a compliment to the intelli
gence of the American farmer. There is and has been no
substantial competition in competitive agricultural com
modities. The greatest and most impartial expert au[260]

thority on the American tariff has asserted without
qualification that, for the most part, tariff duties levied on
agricultural imports were simply dust in the farmer’s eyes
and a sop to him to get his support for protective rates on
manufactured products. In none of the three years from
1914 to 1916, inclusive, did the percentage of imports of
corn to the domestic production exceed h of 1 per cent.,
of wheat -nr of one per cent., of oats 2 per cent., and of
potatoes 1 iV per cent. And in each of the three years
from 1914 to 1916, inclusive, the exports of corn ex
ceeded the imports by from 34,000,000 to 40,000,000
bushels, the exports of wheat by from 140,000,000 to
331,000,000, the exports of oats by from 98,000,000
to 100,000,000, and the exports of potatoes by from
2,750,000 to 4,750,000. Further illustrations are fur
nished in the statistics of meat imports and exports. In
none of the three years did the percentage of imports
of meat (beef, mutton, and pork) to the total domestic
production exceed iiV per cent., while, at the same
time, the exports of these products exceeded the imports
by from 900,000,000 to 1,800,000,000 pounds.
“ These achievements [outlined on pp. 257-270] would
have done credit to three or four administrations in
normal times with nothing unusual to harass the Presi
dent and Congress. The astounding thing about it is
that this record was made, not in normal times, but in
time of the greatest upheaval the world has known,
when the thought of your Chief Executive and your
representatives was absorbed by many difficult and
delicate foreign problems.
“ This record would amply justify at the hands of the
fair-minded voters of the nation a favourable verdict.
[26!]

But even a greater service has been rendered by the
President to the farmers and the whole nation in the field
of foreign affairs.
“ From the outset there were grave foreign questions
to be dealt with. Our memory is short. Have you for
gotten Japan and the delicate controversy extending over
many months? You know the outcome. An adjustment
was reached and our friendly relations with Japan have
persisted. Mexico I need not remind you of. We in
herited that situation, and it has been with us to the
present time. The exact final conclusion no human being
can predict. But you do know several things. You re
call the declaration of the President that, in dealing with
the nations to the south of us, this great Republic would
refuse to give its moral countenance to any individual who
undertook to promote revolution for his selfish ends.
You remember his announcement of the humane and just
policy ‘ that the people of small and weak states had the
right to expect to be dealt with exactly as the people of
big and powerful states would be,’ and that in dealing
with the people of Mexico he has acted on that principle.
You do know that he has saved this republic from the
shameless disgrace of a war with the downtrodden, hap
less, and helpless people of Mexico. You do know that he
refused to give the moral support of this great nation to
a selfish, drunken despot who was trying to fasten his
tyrannical rule on the Mexican people; and you approve
his action. You recall the difficult problems presented
in the European field because of the new instrumentalities
of war employed. You remember the submarine contro
versy. The President of these United States demanded
of Germany that the lives of passengers on merchantmen
[262]

should not be jeopardized, and that their method of using
this instrument of destruction should be changed. She
has promised compliance.
“ These are the large results. They have been secured
without the sacrifice of national honour, and millions of
people applaud Woodrow Wilson for saving this nation
the horrors of war. In this foreign field, Woodrow Wilson
has expressed the will of the overwhelming masses of
American people. He has preserved neutrality with such
an even balance that he satisfies none of the extremes at
home or abroad. Under him, democracy has expressed
itself in diplomacy; and it is interesting to contemplate
what might have been the course in Europe if democracy
had been given all the facts and had had an opportunity
to express its will.
“ But apparently this outcome does not please the
opposition. Nothing that the President has done is right;
everything is wrong. At best, if what he has done is
right, his way of doing it has been wrong. And yet what
definite alternatives have they offered or do they offer?
Do they suggest anything except that Wilson is wrong
in everything? Their candidate promises absolute and
adequate protection to property and life abroad. How?
He neglects to say, by the use of force, the effective
alternative.
“ After many months Mr. Hughes says that he would
have recognized Huerta. After many months Mr. Taft
says he would have recognized Huerta. Do the American
people agree that this government should have recognized
him? Another leader says that he would have kept out
of Mexico entirely or would have intervened. Is it not
likely that, if he means what he says, he would have inter[263]

vened? They criticize the taking of the Custom House
at Vera Cruz. Do you remember what caused it? Do
you recall the seizure of our seamen from a naval boat
carrying the American flag? Admiral Mayo did in this
instance what American admirals have done since our
flag was first hoisted. There were other incidents—
the imprisonment of a seaman from our fleet at Vera
Cruz and the withholding of an official dispatch. It was
clear that Huerta was bent on retaliation for non-recog
nition, and that there could be no headway as long as he
occupied his usurped position. The President said he
must go. The Vera Cruz Custom House was seized and
he went! What would the critics have said if the Presi
dent had failed to sustain Admiral Mayo? Can you not
imagine the ravings of the martial gentleman from Oyster
Bay? Mr. Elihu Root, in his recent Union League Club
speech, reviews the history of this business and criticizes
it. Has he not a short memory? Does he recall an
incident in Washington following the occupation of Vera
Cruz and the tender of good offices of the A. B. C. Powers ?
Does he not remember that with emotion he called at
tention to the unhappy conditions in Mexico and con
cluded with these words: ‘ Thank Heaven, we have a
President in whose lofty character, in whose sincerity of
purpose, in whose genuine desire to do what is right, wise,
patriotic, and what is best for the country and humanity,
we can all trust absolutely. I trust in it. . . . I have
confidence in the character and purpose of the President
of the United States. He is my President, and I will stand
behind him in his leadership.’ That was Root the inter
national lawyer.
“ In the submarine matter, they appear to reveal the
[264]

wisdom of hindsight. From the outset, they assert, they
would have made the German Emperor keenly aware of
the American spirit. Of course, the German Emperor
was sitting up nights trying to analyse the American
spirit. They would have prevented the sinking of the
Lusitania. Ample warning, they cry!— warning given
through an advertisement in a New York paper immedi
ately before the vessel sailed! One would have sent for
the German Ambassador! Another would have seized
German ships which enjoy the courtesy of our harbours!
What would England have said to the holding up of one
of her government vessels because of a newspaper adver
tisement? What would Germany have said if the mer
chant marine of her citizens had been seized? Such
vapouring is childish!
“ There is no part of the foreign policy which they do
not attack, and yet many matters pertaining to it are still
under negotiation. How amazing, then, it is that their
candidate should have proclaimed that he would not dis
cuss the recent exploits of the German submarines near
our own coast because he might embarrass the Adminis
tration. How consistent this is and how difficult to ex
plain, except on the theory that what he conceives to be a
present problem should not be mentioned by him for fear
he might be asked to say what he would do about it— a
thing he dreads apparently above all things.
“ What is his foreign programme? You have a right to
know. He tells you he will not meddle with things that
do not concern us. Does anybody propose the contrary?
He does say that we will not merely talk about the rights
of small states but will observe them. Is this not the
Democratic policy which he attempts to appropriate?

Does he succeed in convincing you that any alternative
to the President’s course might have been effectively
attempted except one involving bluster and perhaps force?
What conclusion can you draw from the utterances of
their candidate and of his trusted lieutenants?
“ Mr. Roosevelt, whom Mr. Hughes endorses by tele
gram, tells us that Mr. Hughes must be elected and that
there must be a direct reversal of the policy of the Presi
dent. This administration, ‘ these false servants of the
people,’ he shrieks, ‘ have taught the people to enjoy soft
ease and swollen wealth.’ This, incidentally, reveals his
interesting conception of who the people are. Certainly,
the people cannot be the masses of the United States; for
they are not conscious of enjoying ‘ soft ease or swollen
wealth.’
“ What would constitute a direct reversal of the policy
of the President? Have you not a right, in these grave
issues, to know the specifications? If these men get into
power and are men of conscience, they must make a
change. In what direction, they do not reveal. . . .
“ They tell us that you have been humiliated, that ‘ the
conscience of the people has been seared,’ that ‘ ignomini
ous infamy’ has been heaped upon the nation. Is it true?
Are you conscious of humiliation and dishonour? Are
your consciences seared? Are these gentlemen better
judges of the honour of the American nation than you
are, or more ready to vindicate it? They tell us that each
belligerent despises us. For what? Must it not be in the
last analysis because we are not at war on its side? How
quickly the enthusiasm and admiration of any one of
them for us would manifest themselves if we should join
[266]

“ The partisan critics and the belligerents may despise
you for not wanting war, if they wish, but this is your
country. The war raging abroad is not your war. You
are vitally interested in many of its issues, but you are not
responsible for it. Your will in these matters should pre,
vail, and on these foreign issues you have a clear right to
a specific statement from the opposition and to express
your will on their proposal. The present policy is morally
right, and the conscience of the people is clear. ‘ No man
is so well informed or wise who can, without wicked pre
sumption, impose on a hundred million people his opinion
of the right and wrong of the European war and found a
policy on it.’
“ What do they offer you in any direction? What
specific thing does the Republican platform propose?
I recall one: the proposal in favour of woman suffrage by
state action; and it their candidate has cast aside. Nor
in the speech of acceptance of their candidate can you
find any specific recommendation on any controversial
matter. The only issue which he has succeeded in par
tially retaining, the eight-hour issue— the strike issue—
has arisen since he resigned to save the country. . . .
“ Is there not general surprise and disappointment over
Mr. Hughes? Did you not expect from him a clear and
specific announcement of issues and proposals, and are
you not entitled to it? Only one thing is clear: The whole
programme of the Republican leaders is this— anything
to beat Wilson. They are bent on trying to get into
power by pursuing the course of least danger, by taking
the least chance of offending anybody. They are pursu
ing the policy of ‘ stalling,’ of trying to back into power, as
it were, to get the support of people whom they would
[267]

offend if they declared their purpose. Was the President
not right in asserting that they cannot go in any direction
for the reason that they would have to go in many di
rections at the same time? They assume that, if the
people are not informed, there will be votes to place them
in power. This is not complimentary to the American
voters. They cannot be fooled on everything all the time.
“ Really, how can they make a programme? Whom
will they satisfy? How can there be an effective adjust
ment of affairs between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hughes,
between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft, Mr. Gifford Pinchot and Senator Smoot, Mr. Raymond Robbins and
Senator Warren, Mr. William Allen White and Mr.
Penrose, and the belligerent pro-Ally and the equally
belligerent pro-German? Contemplate their candidate’s
plight! Are you not reminded of the chameleon? You
remember the experiment of the man who placed it first
on a piece of red cloth and it turned red; on a piece of
green cloth and it turned green; on a piece of yellow cloth
and it turned yellow; on a piece of blue cloth and it turned
blue; and then on a piece of plaid and it was paralyzed.
Mr. Hughes has the impossible task of attempting ‘ to
coordinate the incongruous’ or to harmonize the contra
dictory and irreconcilable. What can the country expect
from a party with such elements and such leaders? I
have sympathy for the great rank and file of the Republi
can party. They are as patriotic and as honest as other
American citizens. But I am concerned with those in
positions of leadership. Their party split and went on
the rocks before 1912. It is more motley and irreconcil
able to-day. . . .
“ What about his associates? The present more un[268]

manageable aggregation is in the hands of the same old
leaders. The men who controlled the Republican Con
vention of 191a controlled the Republican Convention of
1916, and are in immediate control of the candidate’s
campaign. If the Republicans should capture the Senate
these same men will control it. What is their programme?
Where are they going? You know what the Democrats
have done and in what direction they are headed. Have
you any doubt where the reactionary Republican leaders
are headed? Do they not remind you of the darkey
whose friend met him and asked: ‘ Whar yo’ gwine?’ He
replied: ‘ I’m not gwine nowhar. I done been whar I
gwine.’ The Republican party under these leaders has
been where it is going, has only one aspiration, and that
is to go back to where it was, to the good old days of
government by special interests, to the days of Mark
Hanna. . . .
“ Woodrow Wilson quickly dispersed the lobby and rid
the executive and legislative offices of the government of
the presence of gentlemen who attempt to use ‘ influence
instead of argument.’ I recall my own experience during
the first weeks in Washington. How difficult it was to
transact business without interference— without the nuis
ance of the presence of the attorneys of special interests!
And I recall that, after the notice of their activities was
issued to the American people by the President, I have
been able each day to attend to my duties without
interference. If the American people could fully realize
just what this means, 80 per cent, of them would vote
to return Woodrow Wilson to the White House. He has
declined pressure to sacrifice money and men in Mexico,
secured the revision of the tariff without dictation, and
[269]

given the nation a sound banking system. These things
indicate one reason why Woodrow Wilson is hated. He
cannot be controlled. . . .
“ I have appealed to you as to a jury. I have presented
the case. You know the record, and now, may I ask
what is your estimate of the man who, under the American
people to whom he has appealed, is primarily responsible
for what has occurred ?
“ Is there any great business enterprise anywhere on
earth that would for a moment dream of displacing a
manager who had done as well by it as Woodrow Wilson
has by this nation? From just and fair-minded, intelli
gent men, there can be but one answer, and I confidently
expect an overwhelming verdict of approval from the
voters of this nation the seventh day of November.”

APPENDIX
W hy W e W ent
I.

II
W ar*

SUBMARINE WARFARE AND THE PRUSSIAN AUTOCRACY

H Y is the United States at war with Ger
many? Why all this preparation, expense,
and jeopardy of thousands of American lives?
Are we fighting the battles of England, France,
Italy, and Russia? Are we in the war to pull the chest
nuts of the Allies out of the fire? Are we fighting to help
them recover lost territory or to acquire new possessions?
Why do we fight at all? Why not employ peaceful
means? Why not negotiate?
These questions are now being asked not infrequently,
especially by German propagandists, by a few disloyal
natives, and by some unintelligent and unpatriotic paci
fists. Such people imagine that the time is opportune.
They imagine that many Americans are astounded and
resentful over the prospect of enormous expenditures,
burdens of taxation, and sacrifice of life. They assume
that there is, or will be, a reaction; that the people have
short memories. They place reliance on the fact that the
scene of conflict is remote, that our people cannot appreci
ate that a defensive war can be waged by forces at a
distance, and that aggressive action may be in the highest
degree defensive.

^Statements prepared in June, 1917, for the Committee on Public Information.

[271]

The main answer to these enemies of America within
and without is simple. We are at war with Germany
primarily to assert and to defend our rights, to make good
our claim that we are a free nation, entitled to exercise
rights long recognized by all the nations of the world, to
exercise these rights without restraint or dictation from
the Prussian autocracy and militarists, to have the kind
of institutions we wish, and to live the kind of life we
have determined to live. We are at war with Germany
because Germany made war on us; sank our ships, and
killed our citizens who were going about their proper
business in places where they had a right to be, travelling
as they had a right to travel. We either had to fight or
keep our citizens and ships from the seas around England,
France, and Italy, or to have our ships sunk and our people
killed.
We did not make this war. Germany made war on
America, and only after exercising great patience and en
during grievous wrongs did we formally declare this to be
a fact. For more than two years Germany had committed
hostile acts against our sovereignty, destroying the prop
erty and lives of our citizens, acts which, if committed by
any smaller power or power nearer home, would have led
to a quick demand from our people for a belligerent re
sponse. By turns, as it suited Germany’s needs, she was
apologetic and contemptuous, conciliatory and dictatorial,
full of promises and heedless of them, finally repudiating
her most solemn obligations. In the meantime, while
we were extending hospitality to her diplomats here and
representing her abroad, she was carrying on a hostile
propaganda within our own borders as well as abroad,
promoting plots to destroy our plants, and attempting to
[27a]

sow dissension among our people. Recall the history of
our negotiations with Germany, of our attempts to secure
justice by diplomatic, peaceful means.
February 4, 1915, Germany declared that on and after
February 18, 1915} she would regard the waters around
Great Britain and Ireland, including the Channel, as a
war zone, and that “ every enemy merchant ship would be
destroyed without possibility of avoiding danger to crew
and passengers.” She pointed out that it would not
always be possible to prevent neutral vessels from becom
ing victims of submarine attack. This action was without
the colour of justification in international law. Her only
legitimate course was to declare and to effect a blockade
and then, having done so, to intercept enemy vessels,
discriminating between enemy and neutral vessels, enemy
and neutral cargoes, in the case of neutral ships captured
to take to prize courts only those carrying contraband, to
sink vessels only in extraordinary circumstances, and in
every case to give safety to crews and passengers and to
preserve all papers of ships sunk or captured. Because of
the Allied fleets, it was impossible for Germany to do these
things by the use of instruments heretofore employed.
She could attempt them only with a new device— the
submarine.
Unquestionably, new conditions of war had arisen and
new means of waging it had come into existence; and just
as it was recognized that fleets could not be held to a close
blockade of ports, the old three-mile blockade, so it was
tacitly admitted that a submarine could not be expected
to capture and take a ship into port, but might sink it,
provided it practised visit and search for purposes of
discrimination, safeguarded the lives of crew and passenlm ]

gers and therefore gave ample warning to vessels and did
not sink them in places or under conditions in which noncombatants could not secure safety. These things, under
international law, it was necessary that Germany have
her submarine commanders do, or that she set aside inter
national law and make necessity the only law, make law
to suit herself and the desperate conditions into which she
had brought herself by her own aggressive action.
The justification Germany attempted to give was that
England had declined to respect in full the Declaration of
London, had extended unnecessarily the list of contra
band, had brought unfair pressure on neutrals, had de
clared the North Sea a seat of war, and was warring, not
only on the military forces of Germany, but on the whole
civilian population as well. She ignored the fact that
England and her allies had fleets which, by the use of
practices recognized by law, could maintain a blockade
and which up to this time they have maintained without
sinking ships or killing non-combatants. Germany could
not do these things and had no right to whine because the
Allies could. She is certainly the last nation in the world
to demand that only military forces be considered as
involved in the war. For centuries, Prussia had recog
nized clearly, more clearly than any other government,
that a whole nation makes war, had proceeded early to
organize herself on that basis, and had gone out to extend
and had repeatedly succeeded in extending her possessions
by force against laws of right and morality. Her tender
consideration for the civilian population, and her view of
the extent to which it should be exempted from the pres
sure and horrors of war are amply illustrated by her deal
ings in Belgium, northern France, Poland, Serbia, and

on the high seas. Certainly, Germany ought to have
thought of England’s fleet and the possibility of being cut
off before she so recklessly embarked in war. She did
not establish, and has not yet established, even an approxi
mately effective blockade. She impertinently warned
neutrals to keep their citizens off merchant vessels and
out of the war zone. Neutral citizens had, and have, a
perfect right to travel on unarmed or even defensively
armed enemy merchant vessels and to go where they
please on the high seas. To have acceded to such insolent
dictation from Germany would have amounted to a waiver
of international law and right and to the doing of an
unneutral act against the Allies, just as would compliance
with the suggestion made by Germany on February 16th
and frequently repeated, that neutrals cease to ship arms
and munitions to the Allies. Germany knew that neu
trals had a perfect right to do this. She herself had
exercised the same right more than once. She knew the
dealers in this country would have filled munitions orders
for her and that it was no fault of ours that she could not
secure them. These things, too, she ought to have
thought of before she provoked hostilities.
On February n th , this government replied, contesting
Germany’s position and warning her that it would hold
her to a strict accountability and take every necessary
step to safeguard American lives and property and to se
cure a full enjoyment of their rights on the high seas.
March 1 2 ,1915, the Allies issued a decree in which they
declared that it was necessary to prevent merchandise
from reaching Germany directly or through neutrals.
They, however, asserted in taking this step that they
would not follow Germany in her cruel and barbarous

methods, and would not in their intention endanger neu
tral vessels or the lives of non-combatants; that they
would act in strict conformity with the laws of humanity.
On March 28th, a German submarine sank the Falaba,
drowning an American citizen; on May 1st, the Gulflight,
drowning two American citizens; and on May 7th, the
Lusitania, drowning 114.
These acts were followed by a protest from this govern
ment on May 13th in which a demand was made for dis
avowal of the action of the commander of the submarine in
sinking the Lusitania and for reparation. This govern
ment informed Germany that it would omit no word or
act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of
maintaining the rights of the United States and of its
citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise. On May
28th, Germany replied, placing the responsibility for the
sinking of the Lusitania on Great Britain and the British
shipping company, asserting that the Lusitania was an
auxiliary cruiser, which was false; that it was armed,
which was equally false; and that the company permitted
it to carry munitions, which it had a right to do. On the
1st of June, the German Government asserted that the
attack on the Gulflight was an unfortunate accident, that
the submarine commander was in no wise to blame, and
expressed regret and stated that it would pay damages.
On the 9th of June, the government of the United States
replied to Germany's Lusitania note, denying the state
ments, as to the character of the Lusitania and as to her
armament, asserting that it was sunk without warning,
solemnly renewed its representations, and asked assur
ances that American ships and the lives of American
citizens be not put in jeopardy. A month later, Germany
[276]

answered, saying that she was compelled to meet the
British blockade, and that if her submarine commander
had practised visit and search, the submarine would have
been destroyed. She cynically added that in any event
it was to have been expected that a mighty ship like the
Lusitania would remain above the water long enough for
its passengers to get off. The sinking of this ship, she
hypocritically represented, revealed with horrible clear
ness to what jeopardy of human lives the manner of con
ducting war employed by her adversaries led. American
ships, she promised, would not be hindered from their
legitimate business, and lives on neutral vessels would
not be jeopardized. This was promise number one. She
decreed that neutral vessels must be properly marked,
sufficient notice be given in advance, and a guaranty be
furnished that they would not carry contraband. She
impudently informed us that she would agree to a proposal
to increase by instalments the number of vessels avail
able for the passenger service by placing a reasonable
number of neutral ships under the American flag. She
informed us that American citizens did not need to travel
to Europe on enemy vessels and that she was merely
following England’s example in declaring a part of the
high seas an area of war. In her singular psychology, a
mere declaration by her was to be given the same regard
and weight as an established fact. With her lack of a
sense of humour, she apparently could see no difference be
tween an effective blockade maintained by England and a
paper blockade announced by her. Accidents suffered by
neutrals on enemy ships in such an area could not be
judged differently from those suffered in a war zone on
land. If this country could not secure a sufficient number

of neutral ships, then the German Government would per
mit it to place four enemy vessels under its flag.
Of course, the Secretary of State answered that Ger
many’s reply was unsatisfactory. It did not indicate how
the principles of international law and humanity could be
applied. It proposed a partial suspension of them, which
in effect set them aside. This government noted Ger
many’s assurance, made once more, as to the freedom of
the seas, that the character and cargoes of merchant
vessels would be first determined and that lives of noncombatants would not be jeopardized. The United
States demanded the disavowal of the fact of the com
mander of the submarine, and reparation for injuries. It
renewed the warning to Germany and advised her that
the repetition of such an act against the rights of the
United States affecting her citizens would be regarded as
deliberately unfriendly.
Less than a month after this definite representation,
Ambassador Page sent notice from London of the sinking
of the Arabic, with a loss of three American lives. Five
days later, the German Ambassador expressed the hope
that the United States would await full information before
acting, and asserted that, if American lives were lost,
it was not in accordance with the intention of the German
Government. A week later, he gave this assurance:
“ Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without
warning and without safety of non-combatants provided
that they do not try to escape or offer resistance.” This
was promise number two. He added that this policy was
decided upon by his government before the Arabic was
sunk. This was followed, on September 7th, by word
from the German Government through Ambassador
[278]

Gerard that the Arabic was sunk because it planned to
attack the submarine; that the government could not ad
mit indemnity even if the commander was mistaken; and
that if he was, the government would be willing to submit
the case to The Hague. On the fourteenth, after receiv
ing the facts, Mr. Lansing wrote that the Arabic was not
warned and did not try to ram the submarine. On
October 5th, Bernstorff replied that the German Govern
ment rules had been made so stringent that no repetition
of the Arabic case was possible, admitted the validity of
the evidence against the Arabic's attempt to ram the sub
marine, expressed regret at the occurrence, disavowed the
act, and offered indemnity. This was promise number
three.
On January 7, 1916, the German Ambassador gave
notice that German submarines in the Mediterranean
would destroy any vessels, passenger as well as freight, but
only after the safety of passengers and crew had been
assured. Three months later, Germany reopened the
whole subject, rehashing the old arguments, and, with
obvious insincerity, expressed the conviction that the
United States would appreciate her point of view. Ger
many was evidently getting ready to break all her prom
ises.
On March 27th, the State Department sent Ambassador
Gerard word that there was much evidence that the
Channel passenger steamer Sussex was sunk by a torpedo,
March 24th, with 328 passengers on board. It asked for
information concerning the following ships which, with
Americans on board, were sunk: The Englishman, the
Manchester Guardian, the Eagle Pointy and the Berwindale,
all sunk within a comparatively short time. The German

Government replied on April n th , saying either that it
did not have sufficient information to form an opinion, or
that it was doubtful if the sinking was traceable to a sub
marine, or that the ship attempted to escape. It asserted
that the Sussex was not torpedoed, and frivolously
represented that the German commander made a sketch
of a vessel torpedoed at the time in question and that this
sketch did not look like the picture of the Sussex in the
London Graphic. If, however, the commander was
mistaken, Germany would be willing to submit the case
to The Hague. In other words, she made a false state
ment about the matter and agreed that if her statement
was proven to be false she would arbitrate. Within a
week, this government replied that the Sussex was tor
pedoed; that this was not an isolated case; that it was
clear Germany had made indiscriminate destruction a
deliberate policy, contrary to assurances given again and
again; that the United States had been willing to wait
till the course of Germany was susceptible of only one
interpretation; and that that time had been reached.
It added: “ Unless the Imperial German Government
should now immediately declare in effect an abandonment
of its recent methods of submarine warfare against passen
ger and freight carrying vessels the government of the
United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic
relations with the German Empire altogether.” The
next day the President addressed the Congress to the same
effect.
On May 4th, Germany replied that she was alive to the
possibility that the Sussex was torpedoed, admitting, in
effect, that she was caught in having made a false state
ment. Her commanders, she asserted, had orders to con[280]

duct warfare in accordance with visit and search except in
the case of enemy trade with enemy ships in the war zone.
As to these she gave no assurance and claimed that she had
never given any. She regretted that the United States
did not extend the same sympathy to the German civilian
population that it did to the victims of submarine warfare.
However, she was willing to go the limit: “ In accordance
with the principles of law German submarines will exer
cise visit and search before sinking merchant vessels
recognized by law if they do not attempt to escape or
resist.” This was promise number four. The United
States, however, must make England restore the freedom
of the seas; that is, make her surrender her naval advan
tage. If she did not succeed, then Germany would be
facing a new situation. The United States replied, ex
pressing satisfaction that Germany had abandoned her
indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels and her
expectation that there would be a scrupulous execution
of the altered policy. She could not even discuss the sug
gestion that respect by Germany for the rights of the
United States should depend on the conduct of any other
government affecting the rights of neutrals. Responsi
bility in such matters was absolute, not relative.
In the latter part of the year there were rumours that
Germany would make suggestions concerning peace. It
was suspected that her action would be insincere and
would be intended to affect the public sentiment of neu
trals, especially that of a portion of the population of the
United States. On December 12th, the German Chan
cellor indicated that Germany might be willing to discuss
peace. A few days later, the President sent substantially
identical notes to the powers, suggesting the desirability

of a statement of terms on the basis of which they would
be willing to discuss peace. This thought, of course, had
long been in the President’s mind and had no connection
with the utterances of the German Chancellor. Germany
replied, declining to state terms and proposing direct
negotiations. On January 13, 1917, England and France
complied with the suggestion of the President and stated
their terms.
Germany’s insincerity was made clear. She was posing
as a victor and wished to enter into peace negotiations
only provided she was regarded as a victor and on the
basis of her retention of conquered possessions. Previously
her preparations, including her submarine fleet, had not
been matured. She drew the negotiations out intermi
nably to gain time. It was also now made obvious that
her aim in proposing peace was to create a favourable
attitude among certain parts of the American people, to
throw the responsibility on the Allies for prolonging the
war, and to lay a predicate for her policy o f submarine
ruthlessness.
On January 31st, on the pretext of acknowledging re
ceipt of the President’s address to the Senate, Germany
expressed regret that the attitude of the Allies, their
lust for conquest, made peace impossible. This, she pro
claimed, created a new situation, to which reference was
made in a former note, and called for a decision. That
decision was nothing less than to violate all her solemn
pledges, to extend the submarine zone to Great Britain,
France, and Italy, and to sink all ships. She was confi
dent that this action would lead to a speedy termination
of the war and would be understood by the United States.
As a favour to this country, she would permit it to send
[282]

one steamer a week each way to a particular port, Fal
mouth. She fixed the day for arrival, Sunday, and the
day for departure, Wednesday. The ship must be striped
with three stripes each a meter wide, white and red alter
nating, and a guaranty must be given that it carry no
contraband.
The President promptly executed his warning to Ger
many, severing diplomatic relations with the German
Empire on February 3d. Immediately the President laid
the matter before Congress and informed it of his action.
American ships, however, remained in port as they ar
rived, as did those of other neutrals, and Germany was
achieving her ends by menace. On the same day, the
Housatonic, an American steamer, was sunk, and on
February 13th the Lyman M. Law. It was obvious that
a further step must be taken, or this country would be
impotent and would be playing into the hands of the
Prussian autocrats. Therefore, on February 2<)th the
President asked Congress for authority to arm merchant
vessels and even then said that war, if it came, could come
only by the act of Germany.
In the period from February 26th to April 2d, six Amer
ican ships were sunk with loss of many lives. Ships of
other neutrals were destroyed and Americans were
murdered. In this whole period, 226 American citizens,
many of them women and children, were killed. Armed
neutrality obviously was ineffective. The country was
experiencing all the disadvantages of war without any of
the rights or effectiveness of a belligerent. Only one
alternative was left.
On April 2d the President appeared before Congress and
recommended that a state of war be declared against the

German Government. The Congress accepted the recom
mendation by a vote of 373 to 50 in the House of Repre
sentatives and 82 to 6 in the Senate.
If we had not accepted the challenge of the war-mad,
desperate, dictatorial, contemptuous, hypocritical, and
mediaeval Prussian militarists, we would have had to ad
mit that we were not a free nation, that we preferred peace
at any price and were interested only in the fleshpots.
This country either had to swallow its own words, abdicate
its position as a free sovereign power, concede that it had
no rights except those which Germany accorded it, hold its
citizens and ships away from Europe, or to recognize the
plain fact that Germany was acting in a hostile manner
against it, fight to defend its rights, fight for humanity
and the cause of civilization and free peoples everywhere,
joining its power with the other free nations of the world
to put an end to autocratic and brute force. There was
one choice we could not make— we were incapable of
making. We could not “ choose the path of submission
and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our
people to be ignored or violated.”
Does not this review make it plain what it would mean
to the world if Germany should win, and if free, demo
cratic, law-supporting nations like Great Britain and
France were destroyed, if Europe should fall under the
domination of Germany, headed by the Prussian military
autocrats who know no right except might, who believe
that small and peace-loving nations have no standing,
and who attach no sanctity to a pledge, no matter how
solemn? If Prussian militarism should be permitted to
dominate, then the Anglo-Saxon fight for free institutions
and liberty, persisting from Runnymede to Yorktown, its
[284]

fight against the absolute rights of kings and barons, with
its Magna Charta, its Bill of Rights, its Declaration of
Independence, and the heroic fight of the French people
for liberty, would have been made in vain. Has it not
become patent that Prussia is the last great stronghold
of feudal absolutism; that in fighting Prussian autocracy
the modern nations are truly assisting the Germans, who
are only in part conscious of their servitude, to gain what
England, France, and America have had for generations;
and that we are surely finally about to make the world
safe for democracy and humanity?
II.

THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY AUTOCRACY

What is this Prussian military autocracy against which
is arrayed four fifths of the world? How has such an
influence persisted in a nation which many have regarded
as foremost in science, in sociology, and in some respects in
community living? Does it really exist? Many Amer
icans find difficulty in believing that there is such a force
to-day in Germany. This is natural. They have, for
the most part, until recently, thought almost exclusively
in terms of German art, education, science, including
medicine, and industry. For many generations Amer
icans went to school in Germany. German university
training was considered almost a prerequisite for aca
demic advancement. German industry was known to
be making giant strides. Germany was assumed to stand
for the maximum of efficiency in everything. It was the
home of science, the final expression of modernism.
In respect to all these things, the world’s impressions
contained a large amount of error. Germany has never
[285]

been supreme in science. In discovery, in creative science,
and in invention she has lagged behind England and
France and has been inferior to this country. Her pe
culiar merit has been that she has made a system of
science, organized it back of industry and especially
back of those industries which are fundamental to mili
tary pursuits, and has applied it intelligently and per
sistently. Especially in applied chemistry has her achieve
ment been marked. In industry her chief performance
has been to organize it through every possible form of
state aid or support. Prussia in particular has been
highly organized at the top. She is really a great public
corporation for military and industrial purposes. She is
a feudal estate writ large and, as such, well administered.
She has been overorganized and organized on an unsound
basis; and there is truth in the assertion that much of her
dissatisfaction with pre-war conditions was due to the
unwholesomeness of her economic situation. In a measure
she was trying to lift herself by her bootstraps. She was
strong at the top and weak at the bottom. Taking it by
and large, Prussia is not and never has been as efficient as
the United States or Great Britain. These have been
insufficiently organized at the top, but they have been
immensely strong in their foundations; and what organ
ization they have had has been in the main for peace and
not for war.
Americans, even those who travel and read much, have
not concerned themselves deeply about foreign political
institutions. They have taken note of what lay on the
surface and have not always carefully examined it. They
have observed that German cities are orderly and clean,
that Germany is a confederation, and that suffrage for the
[286]

Reichstag is universal. It was not unnatural for them
hastily to assume that German institutions are modern,
as her science is, and that they were therefore democratic.
It is not uncommon for people to be deceived by names
and appearances, especially in politics.
To understand Germany politically, we must examine
her history and fix our attention on Prussia. There are
two Germanies to-day: Modern Germany, Germany of
the masses, kindly, orderly, and industrious; political
Germany, governmental Germany, mediaeval, absolutist,
militarist, aggressive. The latter is passing; the former
is the Germany of to-morrow.
About the time of the discovery of America, the Hohenzollern family ruled over an insignificant tract surrounding
the village of Berlin. In 1611, its power was extended by
the union of the Mark of Brandenburg and the Duchy of
Prussia. In 1640 a strong character, Frederick William,
came into power. He exercised despotic rule, but put his
house in order and developed a relatively strong standing
army with which to make further headway by force, as
opportunity might offer. In 1688, the date of the Res
toration in England, and the beginning of her orderly
constitutional government, Frederick the Third, an
ambitious individual, became head of the house. His
title was Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia.
He was anxious for recognition— for the title of king. The
War of Spanish Succession was about to begin. His
overlord, the Holy Roman Emperor, needed assistance.
Frederick was prepared to trade and promised the aid of
his army in exchange for the title of Elector of Branden
burg and King of Prussia. This he secured in 1701.
Here was the first phase of the contact with Austria, the
[287]

last of which is seen in our own day in the complete sub
ordination of Austrian to Prussian influence.
In 1713, a violent, brutish person, Frederick William
the First, began to reign. Like his ancestors, he kept his
eye on the main chance, husbanded his resources, and
added to his army, which at his death numbered 80,000,
an immense trained force for that day and time. He, too,
was ready by force to add to his patrimony at the expense
of any convenient neighbour. It was left to his successor
to make use of what he had prepared. In 1740 the
Emperor of Austria, Charles the Sixth, the last of the male
line of Hapsburgs, died. He had bound the leading
powers by solemn pledge to recognize as his successor his
daughter, Maria Theresa. Frederick, the Great Frede
rick, promptly gave Maria Theresa strong assurance of
friendship and support, having it in mind at the very
time to commit a crime against her. He suddenly moved
his army against her province of Silesia, and after eight
years of desperate warfare appropriated it. He at least
made no pretence of virtue, and is reported to have said:
“ Ambition, interest, and the desire of making people talk
about me carried the day and I decided for war.”
Prussia was defeated and humiliated by Napoleon in a
quick campaign in 1806, but the liberal movements of the
period scarcely affected her. She bided her time and laid
her plans. Her next considerable advance was made in
1864, when she induced Austria to join her in taking
Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark. Austria received
Holstein; and in 1866 Prussia picked a quarrel with her
and quickly vanquished her, appropriating Holstein and
annexing Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort, which
had taken sides with Austria. Thus she rounded out her
[288]

territory. When the Prussian Parliament protested that
force was not a sufficient justification for what had been
done to Denmark, Bismarck replied: “ Our right is the
right of the German nation to exist, to breathe, to unite.”
The claim of a place in the sun, the doctrine of necessity,
and the right of might are not of recent appearance in
Prussian history. They have been the outstanding
characteristics of her thinking and practice since she
emerged from mediaeval obscurity.
The next step was the crushing of France in 1870-71,
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the imposition of
Prussian leadership on Germany under the guise of a
confederation. No wonder Bernhardi wrote: “ The les
sons of history confirm the view that wars which have been
deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had
the happiest results.” No wonder Prussia believes that a
great army is the corner stone of her well-being as a nation
and that war is a positive good if it succeeds.
So Prussia has come to dominate Germany. She now
seeks to dominate the whole of Central Europe and a part
of Asia; and if she gains what she wants in this war, she
will persistently lay her plans for the next great aggressive
move.
Prussia is Germany. She has three fifths the area and
five eighths the population. The German Empire is a
federation only in name. Bismarck’s aim was to make
Prussia supreme in Germany and Germany supreme in
Europe. He knew how to do the job. This is the under
lying fact: Prussia is Germany, and Prussia politically is
feudal. In such a system, sovereignty is the private right
of rulers. The prince may deal with his people as private
individuals do with their lands. Recendy, we had a clear
[289]

practical illustration of this in Germany. The ruler of
Waldeck got into debt. He could not raise the money
to equip his army. He therefore sold his rights, his pos
sessions, and his peoples to the King of Prussia and went
to Italy to live on his income. The people exist for the
government and not the government for the people.
Frederick William was not joking when he wrote: “ Sal
vation belongs to the Lord and everything else is my
affair” ; or again, “ We are lord and king and can do what
we will.” Neither was the present Kaiser when he as
serted: “ We Hohenzollerns take our crown from God
alone and to God alone are we responsible in the fulfil
ment of our duty.” He was simply revealing the true
inwardness of his royal mediaeval mind and of Prussian
politics, speaking from the background of centuries of
feudal traditions. Prussia is a feudal state. It practises
paternalism on a large scale in this modern day, as did
the Duchy of Prussia on a small scale centuries ago. It
asserts the divine right of the king and of aristocrats to
rule.
Prussian governmental arrangements to-day of all
grades are the legal expression of the economic interests
and domination of the large landowners and of their
recent allies, the great industrial leaders. Feudal estates
still persist in the kingdom, with their principal strong
holds in East Prussia, Posen, and Pomerania. In Prussia
31 per cent, of the land is in estates of more than 250 acres,
large holdings for central and western Europe; in Posen
55 per cent, and in Pomerania 52 per cent. The average
size of 8,365 estates in East Prussia is 1,132 acres; of
2,793 ’n Pomerania, 1,380 acres. Many of these are very
large and are owned by descendants of feudal lords. The
[290]

great landholder, the junker, is an individualist inde
pendent, militaristic, conservative, in favour of armed
strength, condescending to inferiors, with a feeling for
power, and with the instincts of a soldier, a supporter of
monarchy as long as monarchy has a strong arm and sup
ports him and his interests. At first, the junker fought
the new industrial class, but a reconciliation was effected,
and recently the powerful leaders of the two classes have
cooperated. The caste system prevails everywhere. So
ciety is stratified and the individual in each stratum is
trained for his duties in his particular sphere. Education
and society, as well as the army, are organized on this
basis; and there is no small truth in the witticism that
“ every Prussian is satisfied because he has somebody be
low him to kick.” Royalty, the junkers, and the great
industrial leaders run Prussia, and Prussia runs Germany.
"B u t,” it may be asked, “ how can this be? The
Reichstag is the popular house of the Imperial Parliament,
and its members are elected by universal suffrage. Is this
not conclusive evidence of popular participation and con
trol?” Let us see. In the first place, the electoral dis
tricts for the Reichstag have not been changed since they
were formed in 1871, when Germany was dominantly
agricultural, rural. The great increase in population has
been in the cities, and these are the homes of the Lib
erals and Radicals. It would have been dangerous to
change the districts. This would have given the Liberals
and Radicals full representation. To-day Berlin should
have at least twenty representatives, and elects only eight.
The number of voters in agricultural districts equal to
those of Berlin returned forty-eight members. In 1907
twenty seats were won by the Conservatives with an
[291]

average vote of 10,500, and six by Socialists with an
average vote of 77,500. The average vote for all Socialist
members was 67,000 and for all Conservatives 25,680.
Th^ significance of this can readily be seen when it is
stated that out of 12,260,000 votes cast in 1912, 1,662,000
were National Liberal, 1,996,000 represented the strength
of the Centre party, 1,126,000 that of the Conservative,
and 5,750,000 that of the Socialist and Radical parties.
But in reality this makes very little difference. The
Reichstag is little more than a debating society. It was
intended to be nothing more, to be a “ sop” to the pro
gressives. Its powers are great on paper, but exceedingly
small in reality. It has the constitutional function of
passing on the budget, but the principal revenue laws are
permanent. The Reichstag can neither increase nor de
crease the schedules, nor make any change in the existing
situation unless the King of Prussia wishes it. This
comes about in this way: The Bundesrath is the upper
house of the Imperial Parliament. Its members are
delegates from the various states, representing several
state governments and not the people. They vote
according to instructions, and one member may cast the
vote for any delegation. Fourteen members can defeat
any measure, and the Government of Prussia— that is, the
King of Prussia— controls twenty votes.
The Reichstag does not really initiate legislation. Im
portant measures are first discussed in the Bundesrath,
then they go to the Reichstag, and back to the Bundesrath
for approval. The initiative for the most part comes from
the Chancellor, who is also Prime Minister of Prussia.
The ruler, as Emperor, may instruct the Chancellor to
prepare a measure, as King he may order him to introduce
[292]

it and may direct amendments to be made and prevent
changes. As Emperor he may promulgate the law, and
as King he administers it in Prussia. There is no imperial
cabinet. The Chancellor is the only minister. The
other heads of departments act independently of each
other but under the supervision of the Chancellor. The
Chancellor is not in the slightest degree responsible to
Parliament or to the people, but solely to the Emperor,
and this by reason of the fact that he is also Prime Minis
ter of Prussia and represents the King of Prussia in the
Bundesrath. When Von Bethmann-Hollweg became
Chancellor he emphasized this fact, asserting, " I do not
serve Parliament,” adding that he would not play the
role of servant of the people’s representatives. The
Chancellor does not sit in the Reichstag as such, but as
Prussian delegate to the Bundesrath, all members of
which have a right to sit in the lower house and there to
support their measures.
Of the 397 members of the Reichstag, Prussia sends
236. The body can be dissolved at any time by the
Bundesrath, with the consent of the Emperor. This
power has been used effectively three times to break down
the resistance of the Reichstag: in 1878, when it refused
to pass the bill to suppress the Socialists; in 1887, when
it would not agree to fix the size of the army for seven
years; and in 1893, when it declined to change the military
system. In each case, the new body did what the govern
ment demanded. Since the principal financial arrange
ments are matters of standing law, if the Reichstag refuses
to pass a new budget increasing allowances, or passes one
reducing them, the government can be carried on on the
old basis without any action on the part of Parliament.

We find a parallel for this in English history in the days
of the Stuarts.
The upper house, the Bundesrath, consists of 61 in
structed delegates, usually officers of state, frequently
ministers, voting under instruction and appointed without
fixed tenure. Of this number, Prussia controls twenty.
This body and the King of Prussia dominate the Reichs
tag.
By the constitution, the presidency of the confederation
belongs to the King of Prussia. He appoints the Chan
cellor and most other officers, directs foreign affairs, com
mands the army and navy of the whole empire, inspects
and disposes of troops, appoints all officers whose com
mands include the contingent of the state, and the selec
tion of all general officers is subject to his approval.
Prussian military regulations are enforced throughout the
empire. The Emperor declares defensive war, and there
is no authority to determine what war is defensive and
what offensive. Bismarck’s principal aim was to create
a powerful military state. All the world knows how well
he succeeded.
Many of the foregoing important direct powers belong
to the Emperor. Obviously larger powers accrue to him
by virtue of the fact that he is King of Prussia and that
Prussia is Germany. The Emperor, as such, has no ma
terial rights in legislation, no authority to appoint or to
disapprove laws, yet he constantly does these things. He
has no power to issue decrees, yet here also, says Zorn,
the German publicist, “ The monarchical principle, with
out legal provisions, and indeed contrary to them, has
forced recognition. . . . We, Wilhelm, by grace of
God, German Emperor, order with the consent of the

Bundesrath.” Again Zorn says, “ The inspiring forces of
the world’s history and the magnitude of his actual power
have given the Emperor a position wholly different from
what was legally intended and places him on a par with
monarchical emperors— we see how formally inspired and
even constitutional provisions lose their force in face of
the constraining necessities of national life.” So the
Prussianizing of Germany is complete. There is normally
a higher law in Germany than the constitution. That
law is the law of necessity or might.
Let us take a more intimate view of Prussia and ascer
tain what are the arrangements of this dominant member,
what chance is afforded the people for expression. Take
her Parliament, the Landtag. What does it represent?
Is there a government responsible to the people? The
Landtag has two chambers, the house of lords and lower
house. The former is a mediaeval body composed of
princes of royal blood, members who are independent
princes of the Holy Roman Empire, or hereditary mem
bers designated at will by the King, and others designated
by him at will or on nomination of landholders. The King
can control it at any time by appointing new members.
It now has a membership of 300, one third hereditary
nobles with large estates—-junkers— and one third domi
nated by landholders—junkers. It is a class assembly,
far removed from the people.
The lower house is composed of members elected in
directly by an electoral body. One member is selected
in each district. The electoral body is selected in this
fashion: One third of it is designated by the large tax
payers who pay the first third of the taxes, one third by
those who pay the second third of the taxes, and the re

mainder by the rest of the voters. From 3 to 5 per cent,
of the voters choose one third of the electors; from 10 to
12 per cent, a third, or about 15 per cent, of the voters
choose 213 of the electors. In 2,200 districts one man
selects a third of the electors. In 1908 the number of
votes cast was 2,215,000. The Social Democrats, with
601,000 votes, elected seven members. They should
have secured 105. The Conservatives, with 356,000
votes, elected 152. They were entitled to 62. The
Clericals, with 502,000 votes, won 104 seats, instead of
88, their proper number. The Liberal party secured 28
instead of 40. In East Prussia the number of inhabitants
to a representative was 63,000; in Berlin 170,000. Berlin
secured nine votes and should have had 24. One fourth
the population in agricultural districts selected 161 mem
bers; one fourth in the cities elected 41. Remember, too,
that the ballot is not secret, and that pressure is con
sistently brought to bear on the lower-class voter. The
municipal councils are selected in the same way. The
classes rule.
The province is the highest subdivision of Prussia. Its
chief executive is appointed by the King. Its legislative
body is not elected by the people but by legislative bodies
of the next lowest subdivisions, the circles and the munici
palities. The president may veto the action of the body
if it goes beyond its jurisdiction. Its measures must be
approved by the King, who may dissolve it at will.
The circle is the chief local subdivision. Its principal
administrative officer is appointed by the president of
the province. The members of its legislative body, the
Kreistag, are divided between the cities and the rural
districts, not more than one half to the cities. The mem[296]

bers assigned to the cities are not elected directly by the
people, but by the municipal assemblies, which represent
property. The rural members are divided into two equal
groups: The great landowner and large taxpayer of the
rural community elect half; the other half are elected
indirectly by a body composed (i) of those who pay a
small tax, (a) of proprietors of manors, and (3) of electors
selected by rural communal assemblies. To be a voter
even for one of these electors who shares the doubtful
privilege of joining larger taxpayers and owners of
mediaeval manors in selecting half the rural members of
the local assembly the other half of which is controlled
absolutely by wealth, the individual himself must be a
small taxpayer. This is certainly placing the individual,
the man, politically at the vanishing point.
There is no manhood suffrage in Prussia, in Germany,
where it counts for anything. It does not count for any
thing so far as the Reichstag is concerned. Evidently,
in Prussia, it is non-existent. Landowners and men of
industrial standing are strongly intrenched. They have
dug themselves in and made their administrative and
legislative trenches of reinforced concrete. The junker is
not only on top; he is pyramided, Autocracy, absolutism,
is supreme.
Granted that the ruling class does its paternalistic job
for the people as well as such a job can be done by a few
for the many, at best it must be inadequately done; for no
part of the people can understand the needs of all the
people and satisfy them as well as all the people can.
Granted, I say, that the job, for a paternalistic job, is well
done, still the essential nature of the regime is unsound,
unmodern, mediaeval, and out of tune with modern tenden

cies. This governing class, believing in expansion by
armed force, provoked war, violated the neutrality of
Belgium, directed the submarine campaign, sweeping
aside international law and custom built up through the
centuries, sinking great passenger and freight vessels like
the Lusitania, the Arabic, and the Sussex, slaughtering
women and children. It ordered the deportation of
Belgian civilians, planned and executed the campaign of
spying and violence in this and other neutral countries,
and directed the submarine negotiations with all its
evasions, cynicism, and duplicity, again and again making
solemn promises, constantly violating them, and, finally,
brazenly breaking their most solemn pledge to a great,
patient, peaceful power. These people entertain the
mediaeval notion that one nation’s prosperity is another
nation’s menace, that it is to the interest and happiness
of one nation to dominate other peoples and areas, and
that small nations have no rights which strong nations
need to protect and have no justification for existence.
The President told us that, for a little while, he was un
able to believe that such things would, in fact, be done by
any government as have been done by Germany during
this war. It was difficult for the American people to
credit it. It is yet difficult to believe that the great
masses of the German people, if they were fully informed,
would sanction it. It is only through a knowledge of the
character and mediaeval ideals of the few who dominate
Prussia and Germany that we can begin to understand it.
With such information, we can more easily appreciate
what was in the President’s mind when he said: “ We have
no quarrel with the German people. . . .
It was not
upon their impulse that their government acted in enter

ic ]

ing the war. It was not with their previous knowledge or
approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to
be determined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples
nowhere were consulted by their rulers and wars were pro
voked and waged in the interests of dynasties or by little
groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use
their fellow men as tools. . . .
A steadfast concert
for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership
of democratic nations. No autocratic government could
be trusted to keep faith within it and to observe its cove
nants. . . . We are accepting this challenge of
hostile purposes because we know that in such a govern
ment, following such methods, we can never have a friend;
and that in the presence of its organized power, always
lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose,
there can be no assured security for the democratic govern
ments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage
of battle with the natural foe of liberty and shall, if
necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check
and nullify its pretensions and power. We are glad now
that we see the facts with no veil of false pretences about
them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world
and for the liberty of its peoples, the German people in
cluded; for the rights of nations great and small and the
privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of living
and obedience.” Was he not clearly right when he
asserted in his answer to His Holiness the Pope: “ We can
not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a
guaranty of anything that is to endure unless explicitly
supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and
purpose of die German people themselves as the other
peoples of the world would be justified in accepting.

Without such guaranties, treaties of settlement, agree
ments for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration
in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconsti
tutions of small nations, if made with the German Govern
ment, no man, no nation can depend on. We must await
some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples
of the Central Powers” ?

Steps

V ic t o r y *

HIS is a day of big things, of staggering ques
tions, of unprecedented undertakings, and of in
credible happenings. It is almost true that the
incredible is the only believable and the impos
sible the only attainable. One cannot be shocked or
surprised or diffident any more. Therefore, I entertained
with complacency the suggestion that I meet you here
and discuss the theme of the evening.
It is unnecessary for me to confess that I am not wise
enough to dispose of this subject to your satisfaction or to
my own. I am not equal to it; but I have the satisfaction
of knowing that all of you are not, and even all of us at this
head table are not. Perhaps a unified allied council may
discover, indicate, and take all the necessary steps, but I
am reasonably certain that nothing less will suffice.
There is one thing I like about the subject. It evidences
the right spirit, the requisite determination, and a com
mendable and justifiable optimism. It assumes that we
must and shall win, and win without undue delay. It im
plies that, having put our hand to the plough, we will not
turn back, or even look back, and that we refuse to enter
tain the suggestion of possible failure.

♦This subject was suggested by the officers of the Economic Club of New York
City, and it will be noted that the address was delivered before the dub on Decem
ber 6, 1917.

FIRST AND LAST STEPS TO EARLY VICTORY

A clear, fixed, unalterable purpose to attain the ends we
had in mind in accepting Germany’s challenge, based on a
thorough appreciation of the meaning of this struggle and
a willingness to make all necessary sacrifices, I regard as
the first and last most essential steps to an early victory.
This war is a test of the spirit of nations, even more than
of their material resources and strength. The issue of it
depends on the relative intelligence, moral qualities, and
attitude of the people engaged. Never before has there
been a war which so effectively demanded the highest
exhibition of intellectual capacity and also the unfaltering
display of will power and moral courage. No more im
portant duty confronts the leaders of thought everywhere
than that of informing the national mind and of sustaining
and confirming its spirit and purpose. Public opinion
must be anchored, and the motive for terrible sacrifices be
firmly fixed. No matter what the difficulties, no matter
what the seriousness of the strain, there can be no faltering.
Civilization cannot afford to entertain the thought of de
feat. The challenge of Germany went to the roots of free
dom and of national existence. There is no halfway house.
Proposals to parley with an unbeaten enemy, who proclaims
himself victor, indicate nothing less than a willingness to
admit defeat. They spell relaxation of effort and demorali
zation. They mean assent to Prussia’s century-old policy
of extending her mediaeval patrimony by force and of grad
ually imposing her will on the world. They mean nothing
more than a truce, “ a truce with usury,” a mere interrup
tion of the strain and its assumption at a later day with in
terest compounded. All history points to this conclusion.
[302]

THE PACIFIST A CONSTANT MENACE

No greater dangers confront democracy than those
which may arise from drifting, from mental or moral
fatigue, from confused advice, from entertaining dangerous
fallacies, and indulging in friendly optimistic sentiments
toward an implacable enemy. These are the dangers
which extreme partisanship and pacifism breed. The
pacifist is a constant menace; the mere partisan a criminal;
and especially obnoxious is the vain omniscient partisan
to whom the future is an open book, who alternately rags
the public and assaults its enemies, censures everybody
and everything except himself, indulges in irresponsible
criticisms and misrepresentations, causing unwarranted
popular confusion and unrest, generally giving aid and
comfort to the enemy. These things must be abated
through force of an educated public opinion if possible,
but, in any event, must be abated.
PEOPLE WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES

The indications to date are numerous that the people of
this nation as a whole have an effective appreciation of the
meaning of the struggle and a willingness to make large
sacrifices. It is only necessary to go among them to real
ize the strength of their sentiments and determination.
Everywhere I have been impressed with the sound sense
and fine spirit of the great majority of our citizens. In
respect to patriotic attitude, I have confirmed my suspi
cion that there were no geographical boundaries to it, no
North, no South, no East, no West, and that no section has
a monopoly of intelligence or patriotism.
We may also judge conclusively the state of mind of the

people by the action of Congress. This body represents
public opinion. It does not adopt and pursue a course of
action if the people are hostile. In six months, that body
has given to popular sentiment an expression without
parallel in parliamentary annals. The first great step
toward winning this war was taken when the President of
the United States, on April 2d, in advising Congress to
declare the existence of a state of war with Germany,
pointed out what war would involve and demand. The
striking thing about that historic address was not so much
,the advice it contained, momentous as that was, but rather
the clear perception it revealed of the magnitude of the
task before the nation.
RESPONSE OF CONGRESS

The response of Congress was prompt and adequate. It
authorized and directed the President to employ the entire
naval and military forces of the Union and pledged to the
government all the resources of the nation to bring the
conflict to a successful termination. The task of making
good this pledge was entered upon and discharged in such
manner as to startle many at home and to amaze even
foreigners who had become habituated to prodigious oper
ations.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE LAW AND THE WAR

Clearly Congress for the time being had taken the neces
sary steps to make good its pledge of placing the resources
of the country at the disposal of the government. A t the
same time, it created or authorized the creation of essential
administrative agencies. In respect to administrative
[3041

agencies, important developments had already taken
place. Most striking and significant of all was the enact
ment of the Federal reserve law and the creation of the
Reserve Board and banks. This action obviously was
taken without suspicion that the world was on the verge
of war and that we would soon be involved. 11 was taken
to insure better banking conditions in time of peace, and
especially to enable us to weather financial storms. Be
fore the reserve act was passed, the nation, as you well
know, had no adequate banking system. Its financial
arrangements had never been able to withstand strain
either in peace or in war. In each of our considerable
struggles, we had promptly suspended specie payments,
with all its attendant disabilities and burdens. But now,
after four years of world financial strain, such as no finan
cier dreamed it possible for the world to bear— I might say
for six years, because there was a world-wide financial
chill for at least two years before 1914, due to apprehension
of war and to the undoubted financial preparations made
by the Central Powers— after this long strain and the
shock of the last six months, our finances are sound and
we are proceeding in orderly fashion. For this reason, and
because of our obligation to extend liberal credits, it is
not extravagant to say that no greater contribution to
the winning of this war has been or will be made than
through the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913
and the successful establishment of the system well in ad
vance of trouble.
ORGANIZATION OF CONSULTING BOARDS

Steps toward preparedness in respect to other highly
essential interests were taken much before war was de>

clared. Their significance was not grasped by the public
at the time. For the most part, they have been over
looked. Pursuant to an act of Congress of March 3,
1915, two years before the war, the President appointed
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, com
posed of the most eminent students of the subject. In
connection with the work of this committee, and in
part through its labours, has been developed our enormous
aviation programme and expansion. Likewise, during the
summer of 1915, the Secretary of the Navy organized the
admirable Naval Consulting Board with Edison as chair
man and 2 representatives elected by each of n great
engineering and scientific societies. Furthermore, on
September 7, 1916, after a long and unfortunate delay
caused by unintelligent opposition, the shipping act was
passed, creating a board with large powers and appropriat
ing fifty millions of dollars for the construction, purchase,
charter, and operation of merchant vessels suitable for
naval auxiliaries in time of war. This was the beginning
of the present huge shipbuilding programme whose speedy
execution is of paramount importance.
THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

But that is not all in the way of early preparedness. On
August 29,1916, the Council of National Defence, consist
ing of six heads of departments and of an advisory com
mission of seven, nominated by the council and appointed
by the President, was created. The council was charged
with the duty of mobilizing military and naval resources,
studying the location, utilization, and coordination of
railroads, waterways, and highways, increase of domestic
M

production for civil and military purposes, the furnishing
of requisite information to manufacturers, and the creation
of relations which would render possible the immediate
concentration of national resources.
The creation of the Council of National Defence was not
the result of sudden inspiration. 11 was directly suggested
by the activities of two very important groups of individ
uals. In March, 1916, a committee from the five great
medical and surgical associations, having an aggregate
membership of from 70,000 to 100,000, was formed. It
met in Chicago on April 14, 1916, and tendered to the
President the services of the medical men of the nation.
In March, also, representatives of five engineering organ
izations, with a membership of 35,000, met in New York
and formulated a plan to make an inventory of the
country’s producing and manufacturing resources. The
thought and purposes of these two bodies were brought to
the attention of the President, and their consideration re
sulted in recommendations for the creation of the Council
of National Defence.
NEW AGENCIES CREATED

Thus, a number of months before war was declared,
agencies had been created covering, at least in outline,
many of the essential new activities. Seven of these of
peculiar importance had begun to find themselves and to
chart their course. I refer to the Shipping Board, the
aviation, the medical, the manufacturing, the transpor
tation, the munitions, and the labour committees. When
war came these bodies gready speeded up their work.
Others were created— among them, the Food Administra
te©7]

tion, the Fuel Administration, the War Trade Council,
the War Trade Board, and the War Industries Board.
THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD

The last is of unique importance, and yet its work is
little understood. Its members are the direct representa
tives of the government and of the public interest. The
tasks of the board are stupendous. It acts as a clearing
house for the war industries’ needs of the government,
determines the most effective ways of meeting them, the
best means of increasing production (including the crea
tion of new facilities), the priority of public needs and also
of transportation. It considers price factors, the labour
aspects of industrial operations, large purchases of com
modities where market values are greatly affected, and
makes appropriate recommendations to the Secretaries of
War and Navy. Judge Lovett is in immediate charge of
priorities, Mr. Baruch of raw materials, and Mr. Brookings
of finished products. These three constitute a commis
sion for the approval of purchases by the Allies in this
country from credits made through the Secretary of the
Treasury. I need only remind you of the items of the
appropriations for supplies, ordnance, and other things to
impress you with the magnitude of the board’s task. Its
machinery is not yet perfect, but it is working, and I am
sure that no step will be omitted to make it as nearly ade
quate as possible. If a better scheme can be devised, it
should be promptly adopted. It is obviously of the high
est importance that the resources of the nation, made
available by Congress, should be administered with the
utmost skill and effectiveness.

[3°81

MOBILIZATION OF TALENT

No machinery is of great value unless it is properly
manned. The right sort of men is the first requisite of
any kind of successful enterprise. I believe this requisite
has been satisfied and that the Nation is mobilizing for this
emergency additional men of as high character and fine
talent as it possesses. Where so many are involved special
mention is invidious, and I cite the names of the following
merely as samples: Willard, Gompers, Baruch, Rosenwald,
Coffin, Martin, and Godfrey; Hoover, Garfield, Vanderlip,
Davison, Vauclain; McCormick, Thomas D. Jones,
Lovett, Brookings, and Frayne; Dr. Anna Shaw, Mrs.
Philip Moore, Mrs. Cowles, Mrs. Catt, Miss Wetmore,
Mrs. Lamar, Mrs. Funk, Mrs. McCormick, and Miss
Nestor; and Doctors Simpson, Crile, Janeway, Flexner,
Vaughn, Mayo, and Welch— all fine types of American
citizenship, only a few of the hundreds working in their
respective spheres in the nation and in the states, having
no selfish end to serve, working with an eye single to the
public interest and to the winning of this war, giving
freely their services in as fine spirit as the nation ever
witnessed, revealing the real strength of democracy.
So much, and perhaps more than enough, as to the Con
gressional pledge of resources and the creation of ma
chinery. Let us turn to other matters which I am sure
you have in mind. I know you are asking what is being
accomplished. What are the results? Obviously, some
of them it would be inadvisable to indicate. Others I can
only hint at. For the most part they have been detailed
to the public through one agency or another from time to
time. I shall try to summarize.
[309]

THE ARMY CANTONMENTS

The nation has to-day in all branches of its military
services under arms and in training more than 1,800,000
men, some in France, some on the ocean, and others in
camps or at their posts of duty at home. Approximately
ten and a half millions of men have been enlisted in the
regular army, incorporated in the National Guard, or regis
tered under the draft act. Those registered but not yet
called out are being classified on the basis of national
need. Rapid headway has been made in training sub
ordinate officers, and the gigantic undertaking of pro
viding suitable quarters or camps for the men in training
has practically been finished. The nation now has 35
army cantonments— 16 for the National Army, 16 for the
National Guard, 2 at points of embarkation, and 1 for the
Quartermasters’ Training School— all complete in respect
to buildings or tents, lighting, sanitary arrangements,
and temporary roads. The National Army cantonments
were completed within the time set by the General Staff.
What this involved cannot easily be set forth. It en
tailed the selection of sites, the planning of buildings, the
securing of responsible contractors, the mobilization of
labor, the assembling of materials, and the construction of
modern hospitals and roads. These camps alone cover
150,000 acres and called for the use of 75,000 carloads of
materials, including 500,000,000 feet of lumber. Their
cost was approximately $128,000,000. The work was
begun June 15 th and the finishing touches were put on by
December 1st. In addition 16 canvas camps for the
National Guard were completed at a cost of approximately
$48,000,000. Thus local habitations were quickly pro10]

vided for the new army, superior in respects to ventilation
and conveniences to the best practice of Europe.
Five instrumentalities or factors highly necessary for
victory, it may be asserted without hesitation, are de
stroyers— the enemies of the submarine— airplanes, ships,
medical service, and food. What of these?
TO FIGHT THE SUBMARINE

Of the first, the torpedo-boat destroyers, all I may say
is that the construction programme of the navy contem
plates 787 ships of all types, at an estimated cost of
$1,150,000,000, including additional destroyers costing
$350,000,000. The latter are to be of uniform standard
model, large and fast. Some are to be built within 9
months and all within 18 months. This vast and ur
gent undertaking required a great extension of building
facilities, and as private capital was unable or unwilling to
make the extensions, the government had to do so. When
completed, these plants belong to the nation. I may add
that these destroyers will require thousands of men to
man them, but that they are being trained, and when the
vessels are completed the crews will be ready.
CONTROL OF THE AIR

The work for the control of the air grows apace. Of the
great aviation training fields, 17 in number, 2 are old, 1 is
rebuilding, 7 were practically completed by September 1st,
and 7 others will be finished within two weeks. In addi
tion there are in operation to-day at leading universities
10 ground schools giving preparatory instruction in flying.
Finishing courses are being given to our students in most
of the Allied countries, and more than 30 experienced for

eign air service veterans have been loaned to us for duty
in Washington and elsewhere. The building programme
calls for 20,000 machines. It will be expedited by reason
of a great and interesting achievement, that of a standard
ized engine, something which no European nation has
developed even after three and a half years of war. This
accomplishment is in line with the best American tradi
tions and was made with unique speed. What standardi
zation of the engine and of its parts means in respect to
speed and quantitative production, in repairs and economy
of materials, need not be dwelt upon. It has been esti
mated that the service, when in full strength, will require
a full force of 110,000 officers and enlisted men, an army
greater than our regular military force of a few months
ago.
PROVIDING MORE SHIPS

All agree that the enemy submarine must be destroyed.
In the meantime, shipping sunk by them must be replaced.
England must not be starved. Supplies to all the Allies
must go forward without interruption. Our own troops
must be transported and provided with everything es
sential for effectiveness and comfort, and domestic trans
portation of men and commodities be maintained and
greatly increased. Furthermore, commodities must be
brought here from many distant places. Therefore we
must have ships, more ships, at once. Nothing more
urgent. How is this matter proceeding? In the first
place, the Shipping Board, on August 3d, commandeered
426 vessels either in course of construction for domestic
or foreign account or contracted for, with a tonnage of
more than 3,000,000. Thirty-three of these ships, with

a tonnage of 257,000, have been completed and released.
Ex-German and Austrian ships with a capacity of 750,000
tons have been taken over for government use. The
Fleet Corporation has contracted for 948 vessels with a
total tonnage of 5,056,000, of which 375, with a tonnage of
one and a third million, are wooden; 58, with a tonnage
of 270,000, are composite; and 515, with a capacity of
3,500,000, are steel. All these ships have an aggregate
tonnage of 8,835,000, or nearly a million and a half tons
greater than that of the regular merchant marine of the
nation in 1916. Contracts for 610,000 tons additional are
pending. The total building programme calls for more
than 10,000,000 tons, and it is proposed that a considerable
part of it shall be executed by the end of 1918. The na
ture of this task may be more easily appreciated when it is
remembered that the construction in the United States for
1916 did not exceed 400,000 tons, and that the average
for the five years preceding was 350,000. At present,
there are 100 yards building ships, exclusive of 20 building
the commandeered vessels, and of these 100, 70 are new.
The policy of standardization has been pursued and five
classes of ships have been adopted.
MEDICAL ORGANIZATION

I have already referred to the preliminary steps toward
medical organization. Further action was promptly
taken. An inventory was made of the medical resources
of the nation, of doctors, nurses, and others who could be
called by the Surgeon General, and of hospitals and sup
plies. Courses in modern military medicine and surgery
for third- and fourth-year students were formulated and
adopted by 75 of the 95 medical schools in January, 1917*

It was known that 80 per cent, of the instruments used
in this country were made in Germany. It was necessary
to develop their production here, and to facilitate this, the
first essential step was to introduce standardization, to
resort to staple articles. More liberal standards were
authorized, and the variety of types was greatly reduced.
Instead of scores of kinds of scissors, a dozen were agreed
upon. Instead of many sorts of needles, forceps, and re
tractors, two, three, or four types were adopted. Manu
facturers were given priority of materials and consequently
full military orders will be delivered in less than eight
months. It is illuminating that one concern, taking its
chances, had manufactured according to specifications,
by the time it was awarded a contract, enough material
to require 10 carloads of lumber for packing. This was
the result of the efforts of 75 of the most eminent medical
specialists of the nation, working with the military staff in
contact with 250 leading manufacturers.
The peace strength of the medical forces of the army was
531 and of the navy 480. Now the Surgeon General of
the army has in his regular force and in the new enrollment
of physicians actually accepting commissions 16,432, a
number sufficient for an army of two and one third millions
and a dental force of 3,441, adequate for an army of
3,400,000. The navy now has 1,795 medical officers, a
number in excess of present needs. The Red Cross has
enrolled 15,000 trained nurses, organized 48 base hospitals
with 9,600 doctors, nurses, and enlisted men, 16 hospital
units with smaller staffs to supplement the work of the
base hospitals, is furnishing supplies to 35 hospitals of all
sorts in France, and since May has raised more than

$ 100,000,000.

ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

What shall I say about the organization of agriculture
for the production of food, clothing, and other materials?
It is unnecessary to dwell upon the need of an adequate
supply of food for the civilians and soldiers of this nation
and also for those of the nations with whom we are as
sociated. When we entered the war, this country was
and had been facing an unsatisfactory situation in respect
to its supply of foods and feedstuff's. The production in
1916 of the leading cereals was comparatively low, aggre
gating 4.8 billions of bushels as against 6 for 1915, 5 for
1914, and 4.9 for the five-year average. The wheat crop
had been strikingly small, and it was certain that, on
account of adverse weather conditions, the output for 1917
would be greatly curtailed. The situation was no better
in respect to other conspicuously important commodities,
such as potatoes and meats. The need of action was
urgent and the appeal for direction insistent. The nation
looked for guidance primarily to the Federal department
and to the state agencies which it had so liberally sup
ported for many years. It was a matter of great good
fortune that the nation had had the foresight, generations
before, in another time of national stress, in 1862, to lay
soundly the foundations of agriculture. In respect to
agencies working for the improvement of rural life, the
nation was prepared. In point of efficiency, personnel,
and support it had establishments excelling those of any
other three nations combined, and a great body of alert
farmers who were capable of producing two or three times
as much per unit of labour and capital as the farmers of
Europe.

Steps were quickly taken to speed up production. In
a two-day session at St. Louis, the trained agricultural
officers of the country conceived and devised a programme
of legislation and organization, the essential features of
which have not been successfully questioned, and the
substantial part of which has been enacted into law and
set in operation. Initiative was not wanting in any
section of the Union. Effective organizations quickly
sprang up in all the states, and the services of experts
everywhere immediately were made available. The re
sponse of the farmers was prompt and energetic. Weather
conditions for the spring season were favourable and the
results are that crop yields have been large and that the
nation is able, not only to feed itself, but in considerable
measure to supply the needs of those with whom we are
cooperating.
That the farmers of the nation have generously re
sponded to the appeals for increased production, and that
much has been done to insure a large supply of foods and
feedstuffs, justifies no let-down in their activities or in
those of all agricultural agencies. On the contrary, even
greater efforts must be put forth in the coming months, if
we are to meet fully the civilian and military demands.
There must be no break-down on the farms, no failure of
foods, feedstuffs, or clothing. Especially must we have
a more abundant supply of meats and fats to replenish the
stores of the long-suffering Allies.
DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING AGRICULTURE

Many difficulties confront the agricultural forces.
Fertilizers are scarce, farm machinery has advanced in
price, and transportation is burdened. To secure an

adequate supply of labour everywhere will demand our
best energies. Especially serious to the farmer is the task
of retaining on his farms his regular year-round help. An
army could not be raised without taking men from every
field of activity, and it would have been unfair to any class
to have proposed its complete exemption. The problem
is a constructive one. Mere complaint is useless. Our
aim is to secure even greater production from the labour
on the farms; and it must be attained. Farmers in the
same community must cooperate with one another more
actively. Forms of labour not heretofore regularly or
fully utilized must be employed, and plans for the shifting
of labour from places where the load has passed to com
munities where there is urgent need must be perfected.
Whether more drastic action will be needed remains to be
seen. General conscription would present many diffi
culties. Several things are certain. Relatively nonessential industries must be prepared to release labour and
capital for essential undertakings; and, either through
state or Federal action, any able-bodied individuals who
can but will not do useful work must be pressed into the
service.
UNITY IN ACTION

It would appear, then, that the courses we must follow,
the directions we must take to win victory, have been
indicated and charted. While corrections and extensions
will be made, I am confident that the important essential
steps have been taken and that success will come rather
through steadying and expediting these than through any
novel enterprises. Unquestionably the coordination of
all domestic agencies, governmental and private, must

be perfected so that the Nation may direct its great
energies and resources with full effect against the enemy.
I am equally confident that the most “ practicable co
operation in counsel and action with the governments
now at war with Germany” must be secured. What
specific form that shall take I am not wise enough to
suggest; but that there must be unity of policy and
effort, the wisest utilization of our combined resources,
and the most skilful strategical handling of military and
naval forces on the basis of international and not of
particularistic interests under an unhampered, common
control seems to admit of no manner of doubt. Mistakes
may be made even then, but not so many or as fateful ones
as may be made if there are as many programmes as there
are nations involved. Campaigns cannot otherwise be
successfully conducted and battles won against great
powers having the advantage of interior lines and of a
single, absolute directing mind. The solution of this
problem is the present pressing need for victory now or
later.
FINANCIAL BURDEN BORNE NOW

Furthermore, we must keep in the forefront of our
thinking the imperative necessity for maintaining the
integrity and soundness of our finances. To this end, it
seems to me the people of the nation, after adjustments
have been made to changed industrial conditions and to
the new revenue leg'olation, must be prepared increasingly
to meet the burdens of this war through just and equitable
taxation. If they can be convinced of the plain truth,
that the easiest way temporarily and ultimately to bear
the financial burdens of war is to meet them as they rise,

as largely as possible through taxation, the task will be
relatively simple. This is a fact, but not an obvious one.
Centuries of unsound traditions and many delusions stand
in the way. There is the singular misapprehension that,
by borrowing, the burden of waging a war to that extent
can be shifted to future generations. If this were true,
there would be no definable limit to the extent and variety
of war the present generation could wage. The truth
is that in a nation like ours, not borrowing abroad, whether
control of wealth is secured through taxes on all or in part
through loans from the few, the people pay for the war as
it proceeds, and that if the books were closed at the end
of the war, the nation would have paid for it. The iron,
the steel, the coal, the clothing, the shoes, the lumber, the
ammunition, the guns, and the ships secured by the
government are used and destroyed at the time, and, for
the most part, cannot later be enjoyed. By borrowing,
a burden, it is true, is placed on the people after the war,
but it is a burden of restitution. A credit relation is set
up, and an obligation on the part of all is incurred to pay
back with interest the wealth the nation has used. The
main fact is that the wealth is taken and consumed by the
nation at the time. The burden is borne while the war is
on. As I see it, there are only two really plausible argu
ments that may be made for resorting mainly to loans—
one a psychological argument, namely, that the people do
not effectively appreciate the necessity for the war, and
would be impatient or resentful; the other, a physical one,
that it is difficult in time to devise an equitable measure,
to administer it, and to secure revenue promptly. The
former argument should appeal more strongly in an
autocracy than in a democracy, and especially in one

13191

which so quickly perceived the justice and need of a con
scription of men. The second applies with diminishing
force as the war is prolonged and time is afforded for
action.
PRODUCING AND SAVING

I f it be true that the burden of war is actually borne at
the time, then it follows that the capacity of a nation to
wage war is measured by its ability to maintain production
and especially to save— to abstain from luxuries, and to
stop waste. Hence the importance of our many appeals
in this direction.
And let us not be deluded by inflated reports of the
rapid growth of our wealth into thinking that we can meet
the burdens of this war without further increased pro
duction and economy. There is danger of this when
figures come from responsible sources without proper
interpretation and explanation. In such times as these,
statements of wealth in terms of dollars may mean
relatively little. The nation, for instance, has been
informed that the value of the 1917 output of farm
products is twenty-one billions of dollars, whatever that
is— a sum equal to the total appropriations and authori
zations made by Congress in its last session for war
purposes. Newspapers have written editorials about it.
Weare told that no land ever before produced so great farm
values, that it is providential that these blessings are heap
ed upon a worthy people, and that America has the will to
place this unexampled treasure at the service of the world.
These statements are true, and very misleading. The
simple fact is that the actual volume of agricultural things
produced, bushels of cereals, bales of cotton, number of
[320]

hogs and sheep, and some other things, is smaller than in
1915, and that consumers simply generally get much less
for a dollar. The same statement may be made in a
measure as to the reported statistics of industrial pro
duction. It is highly important that these things be seen
in the right light, and that they are not permitted to im
pair the motive for saving.
Now, taxes have this advantage over loans: They more
directly enforce economy. It is true that, whether we
part with our wealth through taxes or the loan of our
savings, we shall have less to spend on ourselves, but it is
not always true that we make our loans from our realized
savings. Just there is the difficulty. To pay our sub
scription, we not infrequently resort to borrowing beyond
our willingness to save, and thereby set in operation
processes which may result in undue expansion of credit.
Taxation, especially on consumption, more particularly on
luxuries, tends more directly to enforce saving, to keep the
general level of prices steady, to check investment in
non-essential directions, and to release capital and labour
for urgent needs. But, after all, large sums must be se
cured through loans. Borrowing in itself will not neces
sarily bring about an undue expansion of credit and an
advance in prices. It may promote saving. It will do so
if payments are made from funds on hand or with savings
from current income. It is, therefore, of the first im
portance to the successful prosecution of the war that the
disposition of the people to economize be stimulated.
The conception of the war savings certificate plan was,
for this purpose, a peculiarly happy one, and its promotion
must receive the cordial support and indorsement of fi
nancial leaders everywhere.

PATRIOTISM AND PROFITS

That we have the physical resources to win this war, if
they are properly conserved, I entertain no doubt; that we
have these in larger measure than any other nation in the
world is a matter of common knowledge. We have not
yet fully realized the enormous power of the country.
If in the ’sixties, when we were a simple, crude, un
developed nation, doing things, relatively speaking, on an
“ ox-cart” basis, with the question yet undetermined
whether we were to be one nation or two, we could wage
the mightiest war up to that time and issue from it with
unrivalled power, what can we not do to-day, with a
united people and with immeasurably greater resources,
if our spirit is right and our purpose is steadfast? Unless
the descendants of the men who followed Grant and Lee
are degenerate, there can be no question of the ultimate
outcome. It is time for each individual to search his
heart and to purge his mind and purpose of selfish motives
and for each class in society to think in terms of the
nation rather than in terms of its own interest. It is no
time for any class to hug to its bosom the delusion that it
possesses a monopoly of patriotism. Human nature is
pretty evenly distributed, and no little selfishness mani
fests itself in every direction. Unfortunately, there are
self-seekers in every group, men who assume the attitude
that, if they are to make additional efforts to increase pro
duction or to serve the country, the nation must pay them
the price. Their patriotism, it is implied, needs to be
stimulated. This is impossible because there is no
foundation to work upon. I have heard many manu
facturers solemnly assert that if the government wished

them to speed up their operations, to extend their plants,
or to take additional trouble in any direction, it must
guarantee to them an abnormally large profit in addition
to the requisite allowance for amortization. One of them
recently suggested to me that he was getting weary of the
burdens he had assumed, and that if the government
wished him to continue or to undertake new tasks, it
would have to induce him to do so by permitting him
greatly to increase his profits. What would he or others
say of a soldier, of the man drafted into the army, who
protested that for so much he would go to the seaboard,
but if the government wished him to go abroad, it must
stimulate him with a 25 per cent, increase in his pay, or,
if he went to the front trenches, with 50 per cent?
In the words of the President, “ Patriotism has nothing
to do with profits in a case like this. Patriotism and
profits ought never in the present circumstances be
mentioned together. It is perfectly proper to discuss
profits as a matter of business . . . but it would be
absurd to discuss them as a motive for helping to serve
and save our country. . . .
In these days of our su
preme trial, when we are sending hundreds of thousands
of our young men across the seas to serve a great cause,
no true man who stays behind to work for them and sus
tain them by his labour will ask himself what he is per
sonally going to make out of that labour. No true patriot
will permit himself to take toll of their heroism in money
or seek to grow rich by the shedding of their blood.”
THE INDIVIDUAL’ S DUTY

I can conceive that each individual, no matter what
class in society he belongs to or what service he renders,

whether he be a manufacturer, a farmer, a labourer, a
lawyer, a scientist, or a soldier, will take pains to see that
he attains for himself and his operations the highest de
gree of efficiency and give the maximum service or product
to the nation at the lowest cost consistent with efficient
operation and effective standards of living; but it is in
conceivable to me that any citizen who dares to call him
self a patriot should ai.n to do less or to seek mere selfish
advantage. It is obviously the duty of each civilian to
reveal by his conduct the same standards of patriotism,
devotion, and sacrifice, if necessary, either of life or
property, that we expect from the men whom we send to
the front directly to bear the brunt of battle. I am confi
dent that it is in this spirit that most of the people of the
nation are viewing their obligations and that the great
body of public sentiment will permit no other attitude to
manifest itself in those who are less right-minded. There
can be no slacking, no turning back. The rights of the
nation must be vindicated and its institutions preserved.
Those who would keep the people of the world from going
about their business in orderly and decent fashion must
be taught a lesson, once for all. Guaranties that there
shall be no recurrence of such a world calamity as the
present must be enforced. A finish must be made once
for all to all things feudal, humanity be safeguarded, de
mocracy impregnably intrenched, and the lesson be forced
home that the worthy and tolerable national aspiration
is to have a clean national household from cellar to attic,
and a durable and righteous peace must be secured, in
accordance with the recent history-making declaration
of the President, in itself a great step toward victory— a
peace on the basis of reparation, justice, and security.

APPENDIX
A

ddress

e l iv e r e d
in

F ort W orth , T

arch,

exas,

1918

HERE is no man who has always regarded the
prospect of engaging in a great war with greater
reluctance or with greater repugnance than I
have done during the whole of my life. There is
no man more convinced than I that we could not have
avoided doing so without national dishonour. I am fully
alive to the fact that every nation which has ever en
gaged in any war has always invoked the sacred name of
honour. Many a crime has been committed in its name.
There are some being committed now. All the same,
national honour is a reality, and any nation that disre^
gards it is doomed.”
These are not my words, but they might well be— they
exactly express my views; and, if I may judge from your
applause, they express yours also. They have a familiar
ring and appeal to our deepest instincts and convictions.
They are the words of the foremost champion of democracy
in Great Britain, the present great Prime Minister, Mr.
Lloyd George, and were uttered a short time after Great
Britain entered the Great War.
Nine years ago, I had the singular good fortune to sit in
the House of Commons and witness this great leader’s
struggle to carry the British people a few stages further
along the road of democracy through his striking economic

proposals; but, before his task was completed, he was
compelled to turn aside from it, for the time being, to de
fend and safeguard the very foundations of democracy.
To-day, we find him devoting all his energies to this new,
unexpected, and more momentous undertaking, labouring
valiantly to preserve democracy against the assaults of its
last great foe, from the last great stronghold of autocracy
and feudalism.
Now aligned with him and his European colleagues in
this great struggle is the foremost spokesman of democracy
in the world, our own President, Woodrow Wilson. How
long and patiently he laboured to keep this nation at peace
and to preserve its neutrality without sacrificing its honour
is too well known to justify emphasis. Such patience and
forbearance have never before been exhibited by the head
of any great state. You do not need to be reminded of the
bitter criticism to which he was subjected at home and
abroad. You know that he yielded only when failure to
act would have meant the sacrifice of every principle
which the American people hold sacred and for which they
have always been willing to fight, and would have involved
the submission of this great nation to the dictation of an
arrogant power.
I shall not offend your intelligence by entering into an
extended exposition of the reasons which led this country
into this war, or by attempting a detailed justification of
its participation. Still, it is well to bear the record in
mind and keenly to perceive the issues involved; for it is
true, as someone has said, that the last word of the theory
of war is that the strength of a nation in battle is measured
by the hold which the causes and purposes of war have on
the minds and hearts of the people. What is the record?
13^6]

On February 4, 1915, Germany declared a war zone
around Great Britain and said that every merchant ship
would be destoyed without possibility of avoiding danger
to crew and passengers. She pointed out that it would not
always be possible to prevent neutral vessels from becom
ing victims of submarine attack.
This action was without the colour of justification in
international law or practice. Germany’s only legitimate
course was to declare and effect a blockade and then,
having done so, to intercept enemy vessels, discriminating
between enemy and neutral vessels, enemy and neutral
cargoes; and, in the case of neutral ships captured, to
take to prize courts only those carrying contraband, and in
every case to give safety to crews and passengers. Be
cause of the Allied fleets, it was impossible for Germany to
do these things by the use of instruments heretofore em
ployed. She could attempt them only with a new device
— the submarine. Unquestionably, new conditions of
war had arisen and new means for waging it had come into
existence; and such recognition of changed conditions as
was consistent with international law and the laws of
humanity was tacidy granted.
The justification Germany attempted to give was that
England was using her fleet to the detriment of the whole
civilian population of Germany. She should have thought
of this possibility before she recklessly involved the civil
ized world in this catastrophe. She is certainly the last
nation in the world to demand that only military forces be
considered as involved in the war. For centuries, more
clearly than any other nation, Prussia had recognized that
a whole nation makes war, and had proceeded to organize
herself on that basis. Her tender consideration for

civilian populations, and her view of the extent to which
they should be exempted from the pressure and horrors of
war are amply illustrated by her dealings in Belgium,
northern France, Poland, Serbia, and on the high seas.
Her representations had only one intention and that was
to deceive the neutral nations of the world. She imperti
nently warned us to keep our citizens off merchant vessels,
on which they had a right to be, and out of her war zone,
into which they had a perfect right to go. To have ac
ceded to such dictation from Germany would have
amounted to a waiver of international law and right and
to the doing of unneutral acts against the Allies. Our
government protested.
Then came the sinking of ships, including the Lusitania,
and the drowning of American citizens. You recall the
false representations made by Germany. She asserted
that the Lusitania was an auxiliary cruiser, which was
false; that it was armed, which was equally false; and that
the company permitted it to carry munitions, which it
had a right to do. She cynically added that, in any event,
a mighty ship like the Lusitania ought not to have sunk in
twenty-one minutes. It ought to have remained afloat
long enough for its passengers to get off. The sinking of
this vessel, she hypocritically represented, revealed with
horrible clearness to what jeopardy of human lives the
manner of conducting war employed by her adversaries
had led. But she promised that American ships would
not be hindered from legitimate business and that lives on
neutral vessels would not be jeopardized. This was prom
ise number one. Next came the sinking of the Arabic
and the promise of the German Government that liners
would not be sunk by submarines without warning and
[328]

without safety of non-combatants. This was promise
number two. Later, she added that rules had been made
so stringent that no repetition of the Arabic case was possi
ble. This was promise number three. Then followed
the torpedoing of the Sussex with 328 passengers on board;
and many other merchantmen were sunk. The German
Government first pretended that she had not torpedoed
the Sussex. She frivolously represented that the com
mander had made a sketch of the vessel torpedoed at the
time in question and that this sketch did not look like the
picture of the Sussex in the London Graphic ! She finally
admitted in effect that she had made a false statement;
but assured this country again that, in accordance with
the principles of law, visit and search before sinking
would be exercised in the case of merchant vessels recog
nized by law, if they did not attempt to escape. This was
promise number four.
Early in 1917, the German Government suddenly re
pudiated all her solemn pledges and declared that she
would extend the submarine zone and sink all merchant
vessels. She insolently informed this country that she
would permit it to send one steamer a week to a particular
port. She fixed the day for arrival as Sunday and the
day for departure as Wednesday. This ship had to be
striped with three stripes a meter wide and a guarantee
given that it carried no contraband.
“ Keep your people at home,” she ordered. “ Tie up
all your ships except one. Stripe it as I dictate; let it sail
on the day I fix; send it to the port I designate. Tell your
manufacturers to keep their products in their warehouses.
Let your surplus foodstuffs go to waste. Tell your farmers
to keep their millions of bales of cotton, their grain, and

their meat at home till I order otherwise. Set aside inter
national law and accept my law of necessity till I crush the
great modern free states of Europe. Stand by till I
finish with them and then maybe I will attend to you.
Although our spies are operating among your people in
Mexico, Japan, and elsewhere, even while you give hos
pitality to our ambassador, and although our agents are
destroying your plants and our submarines are killing your
citizens, stand aside. These things are necessary for our
economic and military well-being. These are my orders.
This is my law of necessity— I made it.”
Such were the commands of the military overlords of
Prussia to one hundred millions of free people, in defiance
of every rule of international law and of every principle of
humanity. They were the final expression of Prussian
whim, the arrogant assertion of the law of necessity set up
and interpreted exclusively by her, to be changed as she
might see fit, the assertion of the supreme right of might.
What would we do about it? What answer would we
make?
What answer was there except one? Life is precious;
but not at the sacrifice of everything that makes it worth
while. National peace is desirable; but not at the cost of
everything that makes a nation worth saving. No man
worthy of the name of American citizen in such a situation
could fail to exclaim with Patrick Henry: ‘‘Is life so dear or
peace so sweet as to be purchased at the price of chains
and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God. I know not
what course others may take, but as for me, give me
liberty or give me death,” or fail to say, with the Arch
bishop of York: “ We must be free or die who speak the
tongue that Shakespeare spoke and faith and morals hold

that Milton held.” What would Washington have said?
And Jefferson, and Samuel Adams, and Andrew Jackson?
What Lincoln and Davis? Lee and Grant? Sherman
and Stonewall Jackson? What Albert Sidney Johnson,
Hampton, Gordon, Wheeler, Sheridan, Hancock, and
hosts of men who died that the nation might live? What
did you say then? What do you say now? For my part,
I would rather see this nation gloriously fail fighting for
freedom with great England, heroic France, Italy, and
Belgium, and see it pass from the pages of history than
see it survive in the greatest ease and luxury submissive
in any respect to the dictation of Germany.
So, at this late day, this stupid, wicked challenge came
from the last great stronghold of feudalism in the world to
the world’s greatest free nation. It was the last of a series.
It must be the last forever.
It had first been issued to little Serbia. You remember
the circumstances. An Austrian prince had been slain
in a neighbouring province stolen by Austria. The blame
was fixed on Serbia. Demands which would have been
unthinkable in connection with any of the great nations of
the earth were made on her, touching the very roots of her
sovereignty. England and Russia advised her to make
every concession short of her independence. Serbia com
plied. She would press punishments for incitements
against Austria, suppress demonstrations in educational
institutions, remove officers proved to be guilty of acting
against Austria, institute proceedings against persons
suspected of being engaged in the plot, stop illicit traffic in
arms, report her action to Austria, accept collaboration of
Austrian officials to see that these things were done, and
submit any doubtful matters to arbitration. But all this

was without avail. It became clear, as Sir Edward Grey
asserted, that Austria, backed by Germany, was not aim
ing at settlement or adjustment. She intended to crush
a small state and to open the road to Bagdad. Serbia re
sisted, flung back two Austrian armies, and then, facing
both Austria and Germany, paid for her love of liberty by
martyrdom.
Russia mobilized to stop the outrage. Germany, know
ing the conditions in Russia, was not afraid of her, but she
was concerned about her great ally on the West. She
turned to France and challenged her to state her inten
tions. France did not desire war. She was in her most
pacific mood and unprepared, but she replied that a treaty
with her was a sacred thing and that she would keep her
word and preserve her honour. How she has done so,
the whole world knows.
Belgium was next assaulted. She was informed by
Germany that she would be invaded by France and could
not repel the invaders, and that it was “ necessary" that
she should anticipate any hostile attack. Germany would
feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of
hostility against herself the fact that Germany would be
forced to enter Belgian territory! I f Belgium maintained
a friendly neutrality, Germany would guarantee her pos
sessions. Should she oppose the German troops and
throw obstacles in the way of their march, she would be
compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy!
Belgium replied that France had pledged herself to re
spect Belgian neutrality. If France should fail to fulfil
her obligation, she would be resisted. The treaties of
1839, confirmed by those of 1870, vouched for the independ
ence of Belgium under the guarantee of powers, notably

of the government of Prussia. The attack on her inde
pendence would constitute a flagrant violation of inter
national law and no strategic necessity could justify such
violation. “ The Belgian Government, if they were pre
pared to accept the proposals submitted to them, would
sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty
toward Europe. Conscious of the part which Belgium
has played, they refuse to believe that the independ
ence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of
the violation of her neutrality.” In short, the Belgian
Government replied that she would respect her pledged
faith and that Belgium “ was a nation and not a military
highway.”
Great Britain was the next on the list. Germany at
tempted to seduce and deceive her and did not have sense
enough to see that she was asking Great Britain to disre
gard and set aside her most sacred convictions and most
deeply rooted habits, the very foundations of her national
life, securely laid through the centuries. England had
asked Germany and France to state their intentions with
reference to Belgium. France had replied that she had
pledged her faith, and that, of course, she would keep her
word. Germany temporized. Finally, England fixed a
limit of time. Her ambassador at Berlin was instructed
to secure a definite answer. On the fourth of August, he
saw the foreign minister, who stated that German troops
had that morning entered Belgium, that they had to ad
vance by the quickest and easiest way so as to be able to
get well ahead with their operations and strike some de
cisive blow. The southern line had too few roads and too
many strong fortresses. Rapidity of action was the great
German asset. It was “ necessary” for her to go through

Belgium. It was a matter of life and death. To get at
great France she must destroy little Belgium and murder
her women and children! It was “ necessary ” !
The English Ambassador remarked that this was very
serious and he would see the Chancellor. The Chancellor
was excited and harangued the Ambassador for twenty
minutes, saying that England’s action was terrible to a
degree. Just for a word, “ neutrality,” which in war had
so often been disregarded— just for a scrap of paper,
Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation.
It was like striking a man from behind while he was
fighting for his life. He held Great Britain responsible for
all the terrible events that might happen.
Nothing in history is finer than the reply of the British
Ambassador. “ If for strategical reasons it was a matter
of life and death for Germany to advance through Belgium,
violate her solemn pledge and the latter's neutrality, so
it was a matter of life and death for the honour of Great
Britain that she should keep her solemn engagements.”
“ But at what a price!” exclaimed the Chancellor. “ The
fear of consequences,” the Englishman replied, “ could
scarcely be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn
engagements." The German Chancellor, in his speech
before the Reichstag the same day, announcing that Ger
man troops had occupied Luxembourg and invaded
Belgium, admitted that it was contrary to the dictates of
international law, but that the Germans were compelled
to ride roughshod over legitimate interests of the govern
ments of Luxembourg and of Belgium. “ For the wrong
which we are thus doing we will make reparation as soon
as our military object is attained.” In other words, to
get at a strong nation, the German Government, on the

[3341

plea of necessity, deliberately made up her mind to wipe
out a nation small in territory but great in spirit.
And then came our turn.
Even now these things sound incredible. Can you ex
plain them on rational grounds, or on any theory of morals
or justice? Is Germany simply crazy? Or is she merely
four or five centuries behind the times, a belated exponent
of a mediaeval state of mind and of outworn doctrines?
What is this fateful force which has so disturbed mankind
and against which is arrayed four fifths of the world?
How is it to be accounted for? What are its purposes?
To understand Germany politically, we must first of all
fix our thoughts on Prussia and consider her history; for
Prussia is Germany, having three fifths of her area and
five eighths of her population. By slow degrees, Prussia
has come to dominate all Germany. Prussia is Germany
and also Austria, and now seeks immediately the control
of the whole of Central Europe and part of Asia. If
she gains what she wants in this war, she will again quietly
lay her plans and prepare for the next great aggressive
move.
About the time of the discovery of America, the Hohenzollem family ruled an insignificant tract surrounding the
village of Berlin. In 1611, its power was extended by the
Union of Brandenburg and the Duchy of Prussia. In
1640, when England was dealing with arbitrary force,
giving the finishing blow to feudalism, uprooting the law
of necessity, of whim, of divine right, cutting off the head
of its king, Charles Stuart, a strong and forceful character
assumed the direction of Prussia. He inaugurated a
dynastic policy which has been relentlessly pursued to the
present moment. He put his house in order, developed a

strong standing army, and stood ready to expand his do
minions by force, as opportunity might offer. In 1688, the
date of the beginning of orderly constitutional govern
ment in England, a more ambitious individual, Frederick,
became the head of the house. He was anxious for recog
nition, for the ti tie of king. The war between his overlord,
the Holy Roman Emperor, and Spain, was about to begin.
The Emperor needed assistance. Frederick was prepared
to trade and promised the aid of his army in exchange for
the title of King of Prussia. This he secured in 1701, and
this date marks the beginning of a series of steps which in
our own day has led to the vassalage of Austria to Prussia.
In 1713, a violent, brutish person, Frederick William the
First, ascended the throne. Like his ancestors, he organ
ized the whole nation, husbanded his resources, and devel
oped an army of 80,000 men, an immense trained force for
that day and time. He, too, stood ready to expand his
mediaeval estate by force at the expense of any convenient
neighbour. It was left to his successor, Frederick, socalled “ The Great,” to make use of what had been pre
pared, to invoke the law of necessity, to make of a solemn
obligation a scrap of paper, and, on a large scale, once more
to “ do the bandit stunt.” In 1740 the Emperor of
Austria, the last of the male line of Hapsburgs, died. He
had bound the leading powers by solemn pledge to recog
nize as his successor his daughter, Maria Theresa, and to
confirm her in her possessions. Frederick promptly gave
Maria strong assurance of friendship and support, having
it in mind at the very moment to commit a crime against
her. Suddenly moving his army against her province of
Silesia, after eight years of desperate warfare, he appro
priated it.

Prussia was defeated and humiliated by Napoleon in
1806; but she bided her time and laid her plans. Her next
considerable piece of robbery was in 1864, when she in
duced Austria to join her in taking Schleswig and Holstein
from Denmark. She then turned upon Austria, took from
her her part of the booty, and in addition annexed four of
her considerable possessions. The Prussian parliament
still had some conscience left and protested that force was
not a sufficient justification for what had been done to
Denmark. Bismarck replied: “ Our right is the right of
the German nation to exist, to breathe, and to unite.”
And so, at this early time, necessity as a rule of law and
the right of might were formally announced as the guiding
principles of this government.
The next step toward domination was the annexation of
Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 and the imposition of Prussian
leadership on Germany in the guise of a confederation. In
these transactions, we plainly see the leading characteristic
of Prussia as a government and the guiding principles of
her politics. “ Stand ready at all times with overwhelm
ing force to take advantage of every opportunity and to
secure control of peoples and territories by force.” Is
it any wonder that her writers hold that the lessons of
history confirm the view that wars which have been de
liberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the
happiest results ? Is it surprising that the Emperor asserts
that the German sword is his best protection, that a great
army is the corner stone of his well-being, and that war is
a positive good? Prussia believes that it is “ necessary”
for her welfare and happiness increasingly to dominate
areas of the world by force and to subject people to her
military and economic supremacy. To the ruling family,

and to its immediate associates, Germany is a mediaeval
estate, to be extended by every conceivable device, with
out reference to equity or law.
To-day Germany’s governmental arrangements of all
grades are the legal expressions of the economic interests
and domination of big landowners and of great industrial
leaders. There is nowhere in the Empire any real recog
nition of the right of the great masses of the people effec
tively to participate in government. In the Imperial
arrangements, the upper house is the controlling body, but
it can do nothing without the assent of the King of Prus
sia, because he has a veto on its action. The lower house,
elected by universal suffrage, is simply a sop to the masses.
It is not even a free debating society. It has no initiative
in legislation. I f it does not do what the King of Prussia
desires, he can carry on the government on the existing
basis without its assent. If he wishes to extend his powers
the Reichstag must assent or he will dissolve it; and in
every case where it has differed from him and been dis
solved, the new body has done his will.
In Prussia itself, which is the controlling force, in the
legislative bodies from the highest to the lowest, the
junker and the industrial magnates are intrenched. Less
than 15 per cent, of the voters have the controlling voice
in selecting the members of the Prussian Diet. There is
no manhood suffrage in Prussia, in Germany, anywhere
where it counts for anything. It does not count for any
thing in the Reichstag. In Prussia it is non-existent.
The junker is not only on to p ; he is pyramided. Au
tocracy, absolution, culminating in the Kaiser, is supreme.
Since the formation of the Confederation, the Emperor’s
powers, instead of being restricted, have steadily expanded

and, with or without legal sanction, constitutional re
strictions have been thrown aside. “ The monarchical
principle,” says a leading German publicist, “ without
legal provisions and, indeed, contrary to them, has forced
recognition. The inspiring forces of the world’s history
and the magnitude of his actual powers have given the
Emperor a position wholly different from what was legally
intended. We see how even constitutional provisions
lose their force in the face of constraining necessities of
national life.”
The state of mind of the ruling classes is hopelessly
mediaeval and out of harmony with the modern world.
Witness its expression in the recent address of the Kaiser
to his troops: “ Remember that the German people are the
Chosen of God. On me, the German Emperor, the Spirit
of God has descended. I am His sword, His weapon, and
His vicegerent. Woe to the disobedient and death to
cowards and unbelievers.” What blasphemy! The
Spirit of God descending on the man who decorates naval
commanders responsible for the drowning of hundreds of
women and children! The Spirit of God descending on
the man whose military commanders sanction the mutila
tion of children and the rape of women in Belgium, France,
Serbia, and Poland!
Here we still see mediaevalism stupidly strutting before
the offended eyes of men and of God! And so it is that, in
its final analysis, the great issue that has been joined is
the issue between mediaevalism and modernism, between
the rule of necessity and might and the rule of right, be
tween the rule of whim and the rule of law. We people of
the modem world had thought that we had made an end
to such things and freed ourselves from them for ever: that

England had given the finishing touch to the rule of divine
right and of whim when she cut off the head of the Stuart;
and that France had done the same when, two centuries
later, she acted in similar drastic fashion. But we had
been blind to the realities of central Europe and had failed
to take note of the fact that modern means of transpor
tation and electricity had made the Western world of our
day much smaller than the Thirteen Colonies were a
hundred years ago, when they proclaimed their independ
ence.
We have discovered that there is truth in Jefferson’s
assertion that liberty is a tender plant and that, as it
grows from more to more, it has to be watered by the blood
of patriots. We have discovered that independence in
this world is not a thing which can for all time be secured
by what is done at a given place on a particular day. We
have learned that the process of civilizing the world and of
subjecting the disorderly to the rule of law is a slow one.
There must be another Fourth of July for all the world,
and we are now in the midst of making it good. But I
verily believe that, when we this time set the world free
from Germany, its independence will not again be seriously
menaced; for Germany is its last great foe.
We are now engaged in this task. Will you complete
it? Can you stand the test? It is “ up to you.” This is
your fight and not merely that of the boys at the front.
It is the fight of every man and woman in America. It
means that all of us must be on our toes and pull together.
This war is a test of the spirit of nations even more than of
their material resources and strength. In the words of
the Archbishop of York: “ Force will fail unless there is
moral conviction behind the nation,” and every individual

proclaims in historic language: "Here I stand; I can do no
other. So help me God.” A clear, fixed, unalterable
purpose to attain the ends we had in mind in accepting
Germany’s challenge, I regard as the first and most es
sential step to victory. Never before has there been a
war which so effectively demanded the highest exhibition
of intellectual capacity and also the unfaltering display of
will power and moral courage.
The way through this grim business is the only way out.
There can be no turning back, no faltering, and no hesita
tion. This war will not be won by a miracle or by en
chantment. The quickest way to win it, the cheapest way
if you please, is to put into the struggle every ounce of our
will, intelligence, and power as quickly as possible where
it will be most effective.
It will not be won by the soap-box orators. It will not
be won by professional pacifists. If the soap-box orators
and professional pacifists could win a war against the
Germans, the Russians would have been in Berlin long
ago. There is only one man in the nation to whom we
should look for guidance amidst the confusion of tongues,
and his is the most potent figure in this field in the world.
This war will not be won by the omniscient, irrespon
sible critic or by pestiferous persons whose chief aim is to
keep in the limelight. They rarely have enough sense to
do constructive work, and like the beetle, mistake energy
for efficiency. They simply add additional elements of
confusion and unrest.
This war will not be won by the pin-headed politician
who has his eye on the next election, or by the extreme
partisan who alternately rags the public and assaults its
enemies, criticizing everything and everybody except

himself. He is afraid of nothing so much as he is of losing
his office. He seeks to profit by "patrioteering” and
omits no opportunity to hamper the President and the
people.
This war will not be won by those individuals of loose,
dispersed, and confused minds who preach a cult of in
ternationalism and profess to see nothing in our life and
institutions different from what they find in the mediaeval
countries of Europe. They deceive themselves by phrases
and have never caught the meaning of the American spirit.
It will not be won by those who spread the doctrine of class
consciousness, promote the theory of class struggle, and
who really mean to secure the dominance of their class.
Their plans will not prevail. The world has not been
working in vain for centuries to develop a common
consciousness, a world opinion. It would gain nothing
by tearing down an old dominant class and setting up a
new one. Government by classes and class interest is
passing from the earth. It is the German plan and is the
antithesis of democracy. The American people will have
none of it. I need scarcely add that German agents and
German sympathizers in this country will not win this
war for America and democracy. They are present and
active and will ceaselessly labour to play on the hopes and
prejudices of the masses of the people.
This war will not be won by those timid people who fear,
or who pretend to fear, that the President seeks to be a
dictator and demands a grant of unnecessary arbitrary
powers, or by those who indulge themselves in refined and
hair-splitting disquisitions on the Constitution, unduly
obstructing the passage of measures necessary for the
safety o f the nation. The President desires no power

which is not essential for the prosecution of this struggle
against the Kaiser, and he desires it only so long as it is
necessary to do this job.
All these persons, the people and the government must
attend to at the proper time in orderly ways. They are
obstructing the national will and are endangering the
nation’s safety. They are giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. They are endangering the lives of more of your
sons, brothers, and husbands, and involving you in im
mense unnecessary additional financial burdens.
We have undertaken the biggest task of our lives. Our
work is cut out for us. We must see it through to a suc
cessful end. We shall not fail.
We are aligned with the free forces of the world and have
back of us the conscience of civilization. I agree with the
Archbishop of York that, in the ultimate analysis, there
must be some power that can change the hearts of the
German people which alone can make them fit associates
for free and self-governing peoples; but in the meantime
we must keep our powder dry and go through. This
German plan of world empire will fail as other similar
plans have failed. It is not the first time that it has been
tried. The Persians tried it and were halted at Marathon
and Salamis. Alexander attempted it and did not even
get back home; Rome sought it and was finally over
whelmed by barbarians; Napoleon played for the same stake
and ended his days at St. Helena. The Kaiser in his
time will learn his lesson. This old world is not going
backward. It is not going the way of the Kaiser. It is
going the way of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wood
row Wilson.
We must frankly face the fact that we cannot attain

success without great sacrifices, sacrifices of human life
and of property. We may as well be prepared for them.
The financial burden of war, in spite of anything we can
do, is borne at the time war is waged. It cannot be
shifted to future generations. Let us have no illusions
about this. You cannot shift the burden. You merely
create the credit relation of all to a few who lend their
means and an obligation for repayment. The iron, the
steel, the food, the clothing, and the ships are used and
destroyed at the time and, for the most part, cannot be
used again. If this were not so, then there would be no
limit to the war a nation might wage. The ability of a
people to wage war is measured by its ability to produce
and to save. The government has called on you to do
these things in the name of Liberty, and is calling again.
You will not fail it.
Especially must we produce foods and feeds tuffs and
save them. The farmers will do their part. But an
obligation more real than ever rests upon the towns and
the cities to aid them by every constructive means, to
aid them with finance and to aid them with labour. Last
year, in spiteof all thedifficulties to be overcome— and they
were many— the farmers planted the largest acreages in
the history of the nation, produced record crops, and
especially increased the numbers of the principal classes
of live stock. I am confident that they will again over
come difficulties and generously supply, not only the needs
of this nation but, to a considerable extent, of Europe. In
this matter economic interest runs with patriotism.
That we have the physical resources to win this war,
I entertain no doubt. That we have them in larger
measure than any other nation in the world is a matter

of common knowledge. We have not yet fully realized
the enormous power of the country. If, in the ’sixties,
when we were a simple, crude, undeveloped nation doing
things, relatively speaking, on an “ ox-cart” basis, with
the question yet undetermined whether we were to be one
nation or two, we could wage the mightiest war up to that
time and issue from it with unrivalled power, what can we
not do, with a united people and with immeasurably
greater resources, if our spirit is right and our purpose is
steadfast!
It is time for each individual to search his heart and to
purge his mind and purpose of selfish motives, and for
each class in society to think in terms of the nation rather
than in terms of its own interest. It is no time for any
class to hug to its bosom the delusion that it possesses a
monopoly of patriotism. Human nature is pretty evenly
distributed, and no little selfishness manifests itself in
every direction. I can conceive that each individual, no
matter what class of society he belongs to or what service
he renders, whether he be a manufacturer, a farmer, a
labourer, a lawyer, a scientist, a soldier, will take pains
to see that he attain for himself and his operations the
highest degree of efficiency and give the maximum service
or products to the nation at the lowest cost consistent with
efficient operation and effective standards of living; but it
is inconceivable to me that any citizen who dares to call
himself a patriot should aim to do less or to seek mere
selfish advantage. It is obviously the duty of each civilian
to reveal by his conduct the same standards of patriotism,
devotion, and sacrifice, if necessary, either of life or prop
erty, that we expect from the men whom we send to the
front directly to bear the brunt of battle.

There can be no slacking. If the free, democratic, lawabiding nations like Great Britain, Belgium, and France
are destroyed, if Prussian militarism is permitted to dom
inate, then the Anglo-Saxon fight for free institutions and
liberty, persisting from Runnymede to Yorktown, its
fight against the absolute right of kings and barons, with
its Magna Charta, its Bill of Rights, its Declaration of
Independence, and the heroic fight of the French, of the
Italians, of the Belgians, and of other free peoples, for
liberty, will have been made in vain. The rights of the
nation must be vindicated and its institutions preserved.
Those who would keep the people of the world from going
about their business in orderly and decent fashion must
be taught a lesson once for all. Guarantees that there
shall be no recurrence of such a world calamity as the pres
ent must be enforced. A finish must be made to things
feudal, humanity safeguarded, and democracy impregnably intrenched. The lesson must be forced home that
peoples shall no longer be put under subjection by force,
that the only worthy and tolerable national aspiration is
to have a clean national household from cellar to attic;
and a durable and righteous peace must be secured in ac
cordance with the recent history-making declaration of
the President— a peace on the basis of reparation, justice,
and security.

THE END

INDEX

INDEX
A. B. C. powers offer mediation in Mexican
embroglio, 117.
Agricultural Advisory Committee of great
service during the war, 343.
Agricultural Educational Extension Act, ap
proved by the President, 204.
Agriculture, programme of the D epartm ent,
199; greatly increased production necessary
on account of the war, 258; part played by
the different organizations during the war,
329jf.
Alderman, E. A., letter on necessity of war with
Germany, 247#; is suggested by Secretary
Houston as First Assistant Secretary of State,
II, 69.
Ancona, protest to Austria against the sinking
of, 153.
Anti-trust law should be explicitly defined, 110.
Appropriation Bill of 1920, brings out Congres
sional invasion of the executive field, II, 71;
its veto recommended by Secretary Houston,
72, 75; its signing suggested by him, 76; is
vetoed by President Wilson, 76; is signed
by President Wilson after revision, 82.
Arabic, sunk in violation of German promises,
152.
Armaments, limitation of—See Article VIII.
Arming of merchantmen, discussed by the
Cabinet, 233; President Wilson, failing in
support of Congress, directs that arming be
done, 241.
Armistice, German note discussed by Cabinet,
308; discussion of Austrian note, 319; ac
ceptance of the Fourteen Points, 320; Con
gress addressed by President Wilson and
informed of conditions, 325.
Army, preparations for enlargment, 158.
Army Appropriation Bill, passage of, 182.
Article I, Lodge ratification resolution limits
its application, II, 42; Hitchcock reserva
tion limits its application, 52.
Article VIII, Lodge ratification resolution limits
its application, II, 45.
Article X, President Wilson explains that it
does not limit Congress in matters of peace
and war, II, 11,15,24; President Wilson calls
it “ the very backbone of the whole Cove
nant,'* 12; Senate Committee on Foreign Re
lations reports reservation opposing obliga

tions under it. 18; defended by William H
Taft, 19; Lodge ratification resolution limits
its application, 42; Hitchcock reservation
limits its application, 52, 53; is opposed by
Secretary Lansing, 68.
Article XV, President Wilson explains that it
places domestic questions beyond League
jurisdiction, II, 10, 27; Lodge ratification
resolution limits its application, 43; Hitch
cock reservation limits its application. 52.
Article XVI, Lodge ratification resolution
limits its application, II, 45.
Austrian armistice note, discussed by Cabinet
319.
Aviation, Naval Flying Corps created, 181.
Baker, Secretary Newton D., his position on
severance of diplomatic relations with
Germany, 229; advises raising of great army,
and inauguration of universal training, 243;
able conduct of his difficult task, 280; com
ments on President Wilson’s collapse, II, 36.
Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur James, answer to
President Wilson's peace note, 224; arrives
in Washington at head of British Mission,
267; playing tennis with, 271, 274; at Wash
ington’s Tomb, 275; amazed at our war prep
arations, 277.
Baltimore Convention, the contest between
Champ Clark and Woodrow Wilson, 7.
Ball, Senator-elect L. Heisler, signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Banking, system of United States compared
to those of Europe, 100.
Banking—Set also Federal Reserve System.
Barrett, C. S., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 343.
Baruch, Bernard M., member Advisory Com
mission, Council of National Defence, 184.
Bernstorff, in the Lusitania controversy, 152;
given his papers on severance of diplomatic
relations, 231*
Bemhardi, comments on successful wars, II,
289.
Bethmann-Hollweg, T. von, denies responsi
bility to Parliament, II, 293.
Bismarck, Count Otto von, expresses theory of
right of might, II, 289.
Bolshevism, President Wilson’s fear of prop

[3491

aganda in Europe, 321, 324; in Switzer
land. 347.
Bonus—5 « Soldier*’ bonus.
Borah, Senator William E„ signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II* 2; inserts in
the Congressional Record a copy of the
Treaty, 4; questions President Wilson in
conference on the meaning of the Treaty, 15,
16.
Boutray, £raile, emphasizes value of public
opinion supporting legislation, II, 206.
Boys’ dubs, their work during the war, 337.
Brcndegee, Senator Frank B., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Breckinridge, Henry, resigns as Assistant
Secretary of War, 179.
Brigham, Elbert S., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 344.
Bright, John, President Wilson describes the
lessons of his life, II, 167.
British Mission, arrives in Washington, 267;
visits Mount Vernon, 275.
Brown, W. L., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Bryan, William Jennings, his free silver de
lusion, 4; at the Baltimore Convention, 8;
at the Wilson inauguration, 28; at the pre*
liminary Cabinet meeting, 35; characteris
tics of the war, 37; at first Cabinet meeting,
40; an old-fashioned partisan, 42; against
repeal of Panama Canal tolls, 59; goes to
California to investigate Japanese question,
60; tirade against opinions of army and
navy officers, 66; his lack of administrative
ability, 8UJ; discovers a way out in the
Panama tolls dilemma, 113; attitude on
Mexican question, 133; on the Lusitania
sinking, 136; acciaes Cabinet of being proAlly, 137; sends the President his resigna
tion, 140; attends Cabinet meeting after
restgnatKA, 142; gives reasons for resigning,
146; thinks that President Wilson should
have given way to the Senate on the Treaty,

11, 48.
Bryce, Viscount James, emphasises value of
public opinion supporting legislation, II,
206; describes peculiarities of the English
constitution. 206.
Budget, Secretary Houston urges Congres
sional limitation on handling estimates, II,
101; Congress should complete the budget
system, 209.
"Bunk/* predominates at all party conven
tions, 198.
Burleson, Postmaster-General Albert S., at the
inauguration. 28; at the first Cabinet meet

ing, 35, 41; advocate of the merit system in
government positions, 41; favours severance
of diplomatic relations with Germany, 229.
Buttrick, Dr. Wallace, becomes interested in
Dr. Knapp’s farm demonstration work, 203.
Cabinet government, President Wilson proposes
its adoption, II, 190,195; Secretary Houston
criticizes President Wilson’s proposal of its
adoption, 198.
Cabinet members, order of precedence, 34;
question of their appearing before Congress,
55; indiscretions regarding giving out in
formation, 87; as campaign orators, 211.
Calder, Senator William M., signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
California, the Japanese question, 51, 60.
Campbell, Milo D., member National Agricul
ture Advisory Committee, 343.
Central powers, President Wilson calls incon
ceivable a separate peace with them, II, 31.
Chamberlain, Austen, would welcome proposal
to cancel war debts, II, 122.
China, attitude of the Administration toward
the Six-power Loan, 44, 49; toward recogni
tion of the Republic, 49, 59, 60.
Civil service, should be extended, II, 210.
Clark, Champ, opponent of Woodrow Wilson
at Baltimore Convention, 7.
Cleveland, Grover, his campaign in Massa
chusetts, 2; his administration not supported
by his party, 3; President Wilson terms
him a man of affairs, II, 171; President Wil
son says he developed into a party leader, 213.
Coker, David R., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 344.
Colby, Bainbridge, is appointed Secretary of
State, II, 69; speaks at the last Cabinet meet
ing* 149.
Coffin, Howard E., member Advisory Com
mission, Council of National Defence, 184.
Cotton, discussion of Federal aid with delega
tion of Southern farmers, II, 104.
Cotton Futures Act, enactment, 206.
Council of National Defence, establishment
authorised in Army Appropriation Bill,
182; its personnel, 184; reports of progress,
245; asks Herbert Hoover to return and
advise on handling food supply, 263.
Cox, Governor James M., President Wilson
expresses confidence in his election, II, 92,
93, 94; criticism of his campaign, 92; predic
tion of his defeat, 94.
Currency problem, discussed at Cabinet meet
ing, 47; passage of the Federal Reserve Act,
90.

Cummins, Senator Albert B., signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Curtis, Senator Charles, signs Lodge's anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Daniels, Secretary Josephus, at the inaugura
tion, 28; at the first Cabinet meeting, 35;
his position on severance of diplomatic re
lations with Germany, 229.
Dargan, Congressman George W., his early
opinion of Bryan, 36.
Declaration of War by Congress, 256.
Democratic Convention, at St. Louis, names
Wilson and Marshall and adopts the Wilson
platform, 191. >
Democratic party, weakness of its campaign
organization, 215; its 1920 platform approves
of the League, II, 58.
Demowski, thinks Polish people will work
together, 327.
Dillingham, Senator William P., signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Dodson, W. R., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Domestic questions—See Article XV.
Draft, advocated by Council of National
Defence, 246.
Dwight, Timothy, describes the scholar’s ignor
ance of business, II, 170.
Economic Club of New York City, address
before, on “ Steps to Victory,” 281, II, 301.
Economy, is demanded by President Wilson
and Secretary Houston, II, 100.
Edge, Senator-elect Walter E., signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Education, its importance to government, II,
212.
Eliot, President Charles W„ at the ratification
meeting of Cleveland's nomination, 2; on
Mr. Hughes’ candidacy, 214.
Everett, William, works for Cleveland’s elec
tion, 2.
Fall, Senator Albert B., is appointed Secretary
of the Interior, II, 140; angers President
Wilson, 141.
Farm labour, organized distribution during
the war, 339.
Farm Loan Act, as aid to farmers, 207.
Farm loans, proposals for, 58; President Wil
son in message to Congress points out
fanner's need of better credit conditions, 80.
Farmers, appeal to the Treasury to maintain
high prices for agricultural commodities, II,
103; are said to be deflated by the Federal

Reserve System, 106; receive financial relief
through Northwestern banks, 108; demand
revival of the War Finance Corporation, 106,
109; President Wilson maintains they need
a better system of domestic marketing,
credits and larger foreign markets, 144.
Federal Aid Road Act, as an aid to the fanner,
208.
Federal Reserve Act, approved by the Presi
dent and becomes a law, 90; choosing the
Federal Reserve cities, 94ff; its enactment
a great contribution to the winning of the
war, II, 305.
Federal Reserve System is charged with
deflating the farmers, II, 106; prevents a
financial collapae and inflation, 107; banks
are accused of acting too late and too weakly,
107.
Federal Trade Commission, provided for, 196,
Femald, Senator Bert
signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Foch, General, to dictate terms of Armistice.
321.
Food Administration, its work during the war,
332.
Food Production Act, purposes and appropria
tion for, 331, 336.
Food supply, part played by the agricultural
organisations during the war, 329ff.
Foodstuffs, unsatisfactory supply at beginning
of the war, 256.
Forests, attempt of Interior Department to
wrest control from Department of Agricul
ture, 125.
France, Senator Joseph Irwin, signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Francis, Ex-Governor D. R., his surprise at
Mr. Houston’s appointment, 23.
Frelinghuysen, Senator J. S., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
French Mission, arrives in Washington, 272;
visits Mount Vernon, 275.
Funk, Eugene D., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 343.
Garrison, Secretary, at the first Cabinet meet
ing, 35; on defence of the Philippines against
Japan, 66; proposes to resign as not in sym
pathy with Administration, 130; has plans
for army preparedness, 160; resigns owing to
lack of sympathy with Administration's
National Defence policy. 16417General Education Board gives financial aid
to Dr. Knapp's farm demonstration work,
203.
Gentry, N. H., member National Agricultural

Advisory Committee, 343.
Germany, controversy with, over sinking of
Lusitania, Arabic, and other ships with
Americans on board, 135#; wants to buy
American cotton, II, 104; President Wilson
succeeds in submarine controversy with her,
262; is charged with making war on America,
272; makes four promises regarding sub
marine warfare, 277, 328; is dominated by
Prussia, 285.
German reparations are not yet reasonably
settled, II, 127, 132; Lloyd George proposes
that war debts be settled in connection with
them, 132.
Gifford, Walter S., appointed Director of
Council of National Defence and Advisory
Commission, 184.
Gilbert, Assistant Secretary S. Parker, pre
pares programme for retirement of the
national debt, II, 100.
Girls' Clubs, their work in food production
during the war, 337.
Grain Standards Act, enactment, 206.
Grattan, John, member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Godfrey, Hollis, member Advisory Commission,
Council of National Defence, 184.
Gompers, Samuel, member Advisory Commis
sion, Council of National Defence, 184.
Gordon, Wesley G., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 344.
Government, President Wilson’s view of, II,
160, 162.
Grayton, Dr. Cary Travers, reports to the
Cabinet on President Wilson’s collapse, II,
38.
Great Britain, President Wilson explains that
her six Assembly votes cannot menace the
United States, II, 21; is the only country
having Cabinet government in its full and
satisfactory form, 203; Viscount Bryce
describes peculiarities of the English con
stitution, 206.
Grey, Viscount Edward, indicates that the Allies
will accept ratification with the Lodge reser
vations, except the one affecting England’s six
vote* in Assembly, II, 49.
Crotwa, Senator Aale J., signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robin, II, 3.
Hagan, J. N., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Hagenbarth, Prank J., member National
Agricultural Advisory Committee, 343.
Hale, Senator Frederick, signs Lodge's antileague Round Robin, II, 2.

Hamilton, Alexander, his difficulties as Secre
tary of the Treasury, II, 99.
Harding, Senator W. G., signs Lodge's anti
league Round Robin, II, 2; questions
President Wilson in conference on the mean
ing of the Treaty, 16; criticized by President
Wilson, 17, 148; makes no clear statement
on the League during his campaign, 58;
prediction that if elected he will be led by the
Senate, 93; President Wilson thinks his
election will retard world peace and restora
tion, 94.
Harrah, W. W.» member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Harvey, George, his constant advocacy in Har
per's Weekly objected to by Wilson, 19; had
nothing in common with President Wilson,
II, 179.
Highways, passage of the Federal Aid Road
Act, 208.
Hitchcock, Senator G. M., rejects amend
ments offered by bipartisan conferees, II, 54.
Hoover, Herbert, asked to advise with Council
of National Defence in handling of food
supplies, 263.
House, Colonel E. M., sounds Mr. Houston as to
acceptance of Cabinet position, 9; further
correspondence, 10-13; his dinner for the
Wilaon-Houston talk, 18; his unselfish in
terest in political affairs, 21; President Wil
son’s views of him still unpublished, II, 182.
Huerta, his refusal to salute our flag after Tam
pico incident leads to seizure of Vera Cruz,
114#.
Hughes, Charles Evans, nominated for the
Presidency, 188,190; not an aggressive candi
date, 212.
Hunt, C. W., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Immigration, its restriction is a pressing prob
lem, II, 212.
Immigration bill, discussed at Cabinet meet
ing, 127.
Immorality is always imputed to outstanding
Presidents, II, 158.
Inauguration of President Wilson, 29.
Income tax adopted as measure of defence, 185.
Interallied debts—See War debts.
Interlocking directorates. President Wilson
asks for laws prohibiting, 110.
Interned German ships, their disposal discussed
at Cabinet meeting, 246.
Jackson, Andrew, President Wilson describes
him, II, 222.

James. Senator Ollie, at a disadvantage in
making a speech sitting down, 107.
Japan, dominance feared by President Wilson,
229.
Japanese question, discussed at meeting of the
Cabinet, 51, 60; the threat of war, 61; Presi
dent Wilson’s answer to Japan's protests,
65; the second Japanese note submitted to
the Cabinet, 72.
Jeffers, H. W., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Joffre, General, in Washington with French
Mission describes the battle of the Marne,
273; at Washington’s Tomb, 275.
Johnson, Senator Hiram W., signs Lodge’s anti*
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Jowett, Benjamin—See Plato.
Keyes, Senator-elect Henry W., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
King, Solicitor-General Alexander C., declares
Appropriation Bill of 1920 is constitutional,
II, 74, 76.
Knapp, Seaman A., directs farm demonstra
tion work, 203.
Knox, Senator Philander C., signs Lodge's
anti-League Round Robin, II, 2; serves notice
that the Covenant must be separated from
the Treaty, 4; questions President Wilson
in conference on the meaning of the Treaty,
15.
Knox resolution, passes the Senate and the
House, II, 54; is vetoed by President Wilson,
54; fails to pass over the President's veto, 54.
La Follette, Senator, heads pacifist filibuster,
239.
Lane, Secretary Franklin, at the inauguration,
28; at the first Cabinet meeting, 35; efforts
to take jurisdiction over all water power,
125; opinion on the Mexican question, 133;
does not inform President Wilson of his
resignation, II, 62.
Lansing, Robert, thought not big enough for
Secretary of State, 141; receives the ap
pointment, 149; calls Cabinet meeting after
President’s Wilson’s collapse, II, 37; explains
why Cabinet met without the President's sum*
mons, 39; informs the Cabinet that it will
meet only when summoned by the President,
64; President Wilson asks for his resignation,
67; ia not in sympathy with President Wil
son on the Treaty, 67; his correspondence
with President Wilson appears, 69; President
Wilson has not read his book, 182.
Latin America, disturbed political conditions

discussed at Cabinet meeting, 43; Preaident
Wilson explains attitude before Southern
Commercial Congress, 76.
League of Nation*, report on plan adopted by
Peace Conference presented to French
Foreign Office by Preaident Wilaon, 367;
immediately attacked by Senators, 368; Sen
ator Knox serve* notice that the Covenant
must be separated from the Treaty, II, 4;
President Wilaon denies that it inpairs the
Monroe Doctrine, 10, 26; A. Lawrence
Lowell denies that it creates a superstate, 19;
President Wilaon maintains that the Treaty
cannot be worked without it, 20; Preaident
Wilaon deniea that it ia a auperstate, 25;
President Wilaon maintains that its purpose
ia to prevent war, 25; is approved by the
Democratic 1920 platform and opposed by
the Republican, 58.
League to Enforce Peace, assembly addressed
by President Wilaon, 354; endorsed by Roose
velt and others, 355#.
Lee, Robert E., Sir Frederick Maurice's esti
mate of his character, II, 176.
Leffingwell, Assistant Secretary R. C„ pre
pares programme for retirement of the na
tional debt, II, 100.
Legislation, is defined by Preaident Wilson
as the embodiment of experience, II, 220,

221

Lenroot, Senator I. L., signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Lever, Congressman A. F., an aid to the De
partment of Agriculture and the fanner, 201.
Limitation of armaments—St* Article VII.
Lincoln, Abraham, President Wilaon considers
typical of American genius, II, 163; President
Wilaon believes he could not completely
reveal himself, 175.
Lincoln, Isaac, member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Lind, John, sent to Mexico with offer of media
tion, 72.
Lloyd George, David, proposes to resume dis
cussion of war debts with President Wilson,
II, 122; proposes that war debts be settled
in connection with German reparations, 132;
comments on national honour and war, 325.
Lobby, President Wilson’s statement on, 71.
Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, accuses Presi
dent Wilson of vacillation in question of
arming merchantmen, 238; criticism of
President Wilson’s message to the German
people, 305; attacks plan for League of
Nations, 368; offers resolution in favour of
concluding peace with Germany before

considering proposal of a league of nations,
II, 1; reads names of Senators who would
have voted for his anti-league resolution, 2;
takes little interest in President Wilson’s
conference with Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on the meaning of the
Treaty, 14; rejects proposals of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on the
Treaty, 18; proposes to Americanize the
Treaty and the Covenant, 40; inserts in
Congressional Record a letter to Senator
Hitchcock from President Wilson, 41; is
opposed to ratification of Treaty even with
his reservations, 57; fails to adhere to agree
ment on Article X, 57; decides that the
Treaty's defeat will be popular, 58; was
familiar with President Wilson’s views on
congressional government, 190.
Lodge ratification resolution, is defeated, II,
40; its fourteen amendments or reservations,
42; Lord Grey indicates that the Allies will
accept it, except reservation affecting Eng
land’s six votes in Assembly, 49.
Low, Maurice, much disturbed over Peace note
sent the Powers by President Wilson, 220.
Lowell, A. Lawrence, advocates ratification of
the Treaty, II, 18; denies that the League
creates a superstate, 19.
Ludendorff, General, complains that President
Wilson’s propaganda defeated the German
people, II, 224.
Lusitania, the sinking, and treatment of the
question by President and Cabinet, 131#;
its fate associated with President Wilson’s
" Too proud to fight" speech, II, 226; Presi
dent Wilson considers the consequences of a
declaration of war after its sinking, 232;
controversy regarding its fate, 276.
Luxuries, Secretary Houston receives estimate
of nation's luxury bill, II, 97.
McCormick, Senator-elect Medill, signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
McCoy, Joseph S., submits estimate of nation’s
luxury bill, II, 97; submits estimate of civil
and military expenditures, 99.
McCumber, Senator, questions President Wil
son m conference on the meaning of the
Treaty, II, 15.
McLean, Senator George P., signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
McLemore Resolution, its passage threatens,
II, 238.
Mahoney, D. O., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 343.
Mandates, Lodge ratification resolution pre

vents acceptance except by Congressional
action, II, 43.
Marshall, Vice President Thomaa R., comments
on President Wilson's collapse, II, 37.
Massie, David M., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 344.
Maurice, Sir Frederick, his estimate of Lee’s
character, II, 176.
McAdoo, William G., at the inauguration, 28;
at the first Cabinet meeting, 35; does not
consult Cabinet on his own problems, 68;
on trip with Mr. Houston to arrange for
Federal Reserve cities, 96; not in favour of
peace note sent the Powers by President
Wilson, 219; advocates action against Ger
many, 229; insists on arming of merchant
men, 234, 235; advocates strong prepara
tions for war, 243; advises caution and
moderation in armistice discussion, 315.
McCall, Governor, advises going slow in arm
ing merchantmen, 234.
McDonald, Capt. Bill, on LaFollette, 239.
McPherson, resigns as stenographer to go to
the trenches, 282.
Manhattan Club, President Wilson’s speech
before, on Preparedness, 161.
Martin, Franklin, member Advisory Commis
sion, Council of National Defence, 184.
Masaryk, congratulated on outcome of peace
settlement, 327.
Matthews, Nathan, works for Cleveland's
election, 2.
Maximilian, Prince, as German Chancellor asks
President Wilson to take steps for peace, 306.
Mayo, Admiral, insists on Mexico saluting our
flag after Tampico incident, 114.
Meat supply, difficulty of increasing during
the war, 339.
Meredith, Edwin Thomas, qualifications for
the Secretaryship of Agriculture, II, 61.
Mexico, the question of recognition of Huerta,
69; the attempt at mediation, 72; President
Wilson in address before Southern Com
mercial Congress explains attitude toward
Latin America, 76; the Dolphin episode and
other incidents result in seizure of Vera
Cruz and severance of diplomatic relations,
114; the National Guard mobilized on the
border, 180; defence of America’s policy
toward her, II, 262.
Monroe Doctrine, President Wilson denies that
it is impaired by the Covenant, II, 10, 26;
is declared outside League jurisdiction by
Lodge ratification resolution, 43; is declared
outside League jurisdiction by Hitchcock
reservation, 53.

Montana, attitude of her people toward the
war, 312.
Moore, John Bassett, expresses opinion that
United States courts could set aside Cali
fornia's Japanese land law, 61.
Moses, Senator George H., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
National budget system bill contains a section
invading the executive function, IIf 82; is
vetoed by President Wilson, 83; passes the
House in amended form, 85; fails to pass the
Senate, 85; omits the most important feature
of a budget system, 87.
National debt, programme for its retirement
prepared by Assistant Secretaries Leffingwell and Gilbert, II, 100.
National Guard, mobilization on the Mexican
border, 180; preferred by President Wilson
over a large regular army, 158; attitude to
ward, in the Preparedness campaign, 158#.
Naval Reserve created, 181.
Navy, strengthening of, in Preparedness
campaign, 181.
New, Senator Harry S., signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Newberry, Senator-elect Truman H., signs
Lodge's anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Olney, Richard, works for Cleveland’s election.
2; comment on weakness of Hughes* candi
dacy, 213.
Panama Canal tolls. President Wilson for
repeal, 59; President Wilson delivers mes
sage to Congress, 112.
Page, Logan Waller, his surprise at Mr. Hous
ton’s appointment, 26.
Page, Senator Carroll S., signs Lodge's anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Page, Walter H., urges appointment of Mr.
Houston as Secretary of Agriculture, 16;
his appointment to the Court of St. James's,
62; urges repeal erf Panama tolls, 113; gives
talk to heads of Dept, of Agriculture on
writing good English, 202; President Wilson
appreciated his letters, II, 183; urges Presi
dent Wilson to be prepared for mediation,
237.
Parliamentary
government—See
Cabinet
government.
Payne-Aldrich Tariff, endorsed by President
Taft, 6; revolt against it will be forgotten, II,
• 93; its rates equalled or cxcteded by those
of a bill imposing temporary duties on agri
cultural products, 147; general demand for
its revision, 257.

Peace Commission, its composition, 348.
Peace note sent the Powers by P re sid e n t Wil
son, 217#.
Peace overtures of Chancellor Maximilian
to President Wilson, 306; the German note,
308.
“ Peace without victory/* phrase in President
Wilson’s address to the Senate, 226.
Penrose, Senator Boies, signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Fferigord, Lieut. Paul, his lectures throughout
the South on conditions in fighting area,
283#; incident at Great Falls, Mont., 313.
Phipps, Senator-elect Lawrence C.» signs
Lodge’s anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, President Wil
son describes his greatest error, II, 168.
Plato, concludes that the philosopher-*tatea
man will fail in routine while the politician
will fail in extraordinary crises, II, 172.
Poindexter, Senator Miles, attacks plan for
League of Nations, 368; signs Lodge's anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Polk, Frank, is suggested as Lansing's succes
sor, II, 68.
Pratt, William F., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 344.
Preparedness, national defence legislation urged
in President Wilson's Second Annual Mes
sage, 122, 126; plans of the War Depart
ment for enlargement of army, 158, 180;
plans of Navy Department, 181.
Progressive party, organizes and nominates
Roosevelt for Presidency, 6; its Chicago
Convention a fiasco, 189.
Prohibition enforcement, recommendation that
it be transferred from the Treasury to some
other department, II, 101.
Railroads, President Wilson asks for laws
prohibiting interlocking directorates and
freeing railroads from great financial in
terests, 110.
Rathbone, Assistant Secretary Albert, fails
to secure funding of British and French war
debts, II, 121, 128.
Redfiekl, Secretary William Cox, at the first
Cabinet meeting, 35; favours severance of
diplomatic relations with Germany, 229.
Reed, Senator, attacks plan for League at
Nations, 368.
Religion of Ptesident Wilson, II, 159.
Reparations—S*t German reparations.
Reparations Commission, its action limited
by Lodge ratification resolution, II, 44.
Republicans, many at bead of emergency
boards, 279.

Republican leaders, their opposition to the
Treaty due to their desire to belittle President
Wilson’s prestige, II, 5, 40, 56.
Republican party, its 1920 platform is opposed
to the League, II, 58; thirty-one leaders ad
vise voting for Harding, II, 59.
Requin, Colonel, explains Foch's tactics at
the battle of the Marne, 274.
Holding, George C., member National Agricul' tural Advisory Committee, 344.
Roosevelt, Theodore, infuaes a new spirit into
national life and policies, 4; in opposition to
President Taft's reflection organizes the
Progressive party, 6; on a league for enforc
ing peace, 355; criticism of President Wilson,
359; defends American neutrality at the out
break of the war, II, 241; charges that the
Wilton Administration has accustomed the
people to soft ease, 266.
Root, Elihu, expresses confidence in President
Wilson’s leadership in foreign affairs, II,
264.
Rosenwald, Julius, member Advisory Commis
sion, Council of National Defence, 184.
Rural finance and marketing, investigational
work by Dept, of Agriculture, 205.
Russell, John E., works for Cleveland’s elec
tion, 2.
Russell, William E., works for Cleveland’s
election, 2.
Rnssian Revolution, discussed by the Cabinet,
244.
Sanson, Marion, member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Scott General Hugh L., his acquaintance with
Villa, 117.
Shantung, Senate Committee on Foreign Re
lations reports amendment to the Treaty
giving it to China, II, 18; President Wilson
explains and defends its settlement by the
Treaty, 28; its settlement by the Treaty not
accepted by the Lodge ratification resolution
43; its settlement by the Treaty is opposed
by Secretary Lansing, 67.
Sherman, Senator Lawrence Y., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Shipping bill, passage urged in President Wil
son's Second Annual Message, 122.
Six-power Loan to China, attitude of the Ad
ministration toward, 44, 49.
**Smelling committee,” visits President Wilson*
II, 141.
Smoot, Senator Reed, signs Lodge's antileague Round Robin, II, 2.

Soldier settlement scheme, its defects, 351.
Soldiers’ bonus is opposed by President Wil
son and Secretary Houston, II, 100.
South America, disturbed political conditions
discussed at Cabinet meeting, 43; President
Wilson explains attitude in address before
Southern Commercial Congress, 76.
Southern Commercial Congress, in address
before President Wilson, explains attitude
on Latin America, 76.
Spencer, Senator Lawrence C., signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin II, 2.
States' rights, encroachment of Federal
Government on them, II, 218.
"Steps to Victory,” address before Economic
Club of New York City, 281, II, 301.
Sterling, Senator Thomas, signs Lodge's anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Stuart, Henry C., member National Agricul
tural Advisory Committee, 343.
Submarine, unrestricted warfare announced
by Germany and new war zones established,
227.
Submarine controversy, President Wilson suc
ceeds in it, II, 262; its history, 273, 327, 328.
Sugar, the fight for the tariff, 50, 67; production
in United States should not be encouraged,
68.
Sundry Civil bill, objection to proviso ex
empting labour and farm organizations from
prosecution, 70.
Sussex, Germany’s explanation of sinking
unsatisfactory, 153.
Sutherland, Senator Howard, signs Lodge’s
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Swanson, Senator Claude A., objects to intro
duction of Lodge’s anti-league resolution,
II, 2.
Taft, Henry W., advocates ratification of the
Treaty, II, 18.
Taft, William H., his administration, 5; op
position to his reflection causes party split
and makes opportunity for the Democratic
party, 6; cables to President Wilson his
League suggestions, II, 4; advocates ratifica
tion of the Treaty, 18; defends Article X, 19.
Tariff, the Payne-AIdrich measure, 6; dis
cussion by the Cabinet of the President’s
message, 47; message delivered to Congress
by the President in person, 52; President
Wilson's statement on the lobby, 71; Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act approved by the
President, 74. See also P ayn e-Aldrich Tariff
and Underwood Tariff.

Tariff Commission, idea opposed by President
Wilson but later adopted, 196; II, 187, 188.
Taxation revision recommended, II, 101.
Thompson, W. O., qualifications for the
Secretaryship of Agriculture, II, 61.
Townsend, Senator Charles E., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
Trusts, President Wilson lays before Congress
his views on the question, 109.
Tumulty, Joseph P., comments on PresidentWil*
son’s collapse, II, 36; reads President Wilson’s
Jackson Day letter to Secretary Houston,
47; quotes President Wilson on the conse
quences of a declaration of war after the
sinking of the Lusitania, 232.
Tyson, C. J., member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 344.
Underwood, Senator Oscar W., offers resolution
of ratification of the Treaty, II, 46.
Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act, approved by
the President, 74; its passage is coincident
with great expansion of industry and trade,
11, 258.
United States Tariff Commission should not
be enabled to alter tariff rates, II, 187.
United States Treasury, its certificates are put
on an investment basis, II, 97; programme for
retirement of national debt prepared by
Assistant Secretaries Leffingwell and Gil
bert, 100; recommendation that non-fiscal
activities be transferred to another depart
ment, 101; receives appeals to maintain
high prices for agricultural commodities,
103; is authorized to establish credits for
Allied governments for purchase of food and
military supplies, 117; receives certificates
of indebtedness for war-time loans to Allied
government, 119; makes little progress in
funding war debts, 121.
Universal military training, favoured by Coun
cil of National Defence, 245.
Versailles Treaty, Senator JBorah inserts a
copy in the Congressional Record, II, 4; is
presented to the Senate by President Wilson,
4; Senator Knox serves notice that it must
be separated from the Covenant, 4; its mean
ing discussed in conference of President
Wilson with the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 6; President Wilson does
not object to interpretative reservations,
12, 14, 15, 30, 48, 49, 50, 55; Senate Com
mittee on Foreign Relations reports several
amendments and reservations, 18; its rati

fication advocated by WiUiam Howard Taft
Henry W. Taft, George W. Wickersham, and
A. Lawrence Lowell. 18; explained to the
people by President Wilson’s thirty-seven
speeches, 20; President Wilson maintains
that it cannot be worked without the Cove
nant, 20; President Wilson maintains that its
terms are just, 35; Lodge ratification resolu
tion is defeated, 40; fourteen amendments
or reservations of Lodge ratification resolu
tion, 42; Underwood ratification resolution
is defeated, 46; is the subject of President
Wilson's Jackson Day letter, 47; William J.
Bryan thinks that President Wilson should
have given way to the Senate, 48; Lord Grey
maintains that the Allies will accept ratifica
tion with the Lodge reservations, 49; Sena
tor Hitchcock’s reservations, 52; is rejected
by final vote of the Senate, 54; Republican
agencies claim that its failure is due to Presi
dent Wilson's obstinacy, 54; Senator Lodge
is opposed to ratification even with his
reservations, 57; Senator Lodge decides that
its defeat will be popular, 58; Secretary Lans
ing is not in sympathy with President Wilson
on its vital points, 67.
Villa, Pancho, and his friendship with General
Scott, 117.
Viviani, Rent, arrives in Washington at head
of French Mission, 272; at Washington's
Tomb, 275.
Wadsworth, Senator J. W., Jr., signs Lodge's
anti-league Round Robin, II, 2.
War debts, their cancellation opposed, II,
101, 125. 128, 138; are incurred by purchase
of food and military supplies, 118; are se
cured by certificates of indebtedness of the
Allied government. 119; Assistant Secretary
Albert Rathbone fails to secure funding by
British and French governments, 121, 128;
Austen Chamberlain would welcome proposal
to cancel them, 122; do not constitute a
present burden on the debtor nations, 126;
Lloyd George proposes that they be settled
in connection with German reparations,
132; President Wilson rejects Lloyd George's
proposal, 133.
Warehouse Act, enactment, 206.
War Finance Corporation, its revival de
manded, II, 106, 109; its activities revived
by Congressional joint resolution. 110;
Congressional joint resolution reviving its
activities is vetoed by President Wilson, 110,

112

War preparations, amounts authorised by

Congress, 277; special services created, 278;
under non-partisan management, 279.
Warrm, Senator F. E., signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robin, II, 2.
Washington. George, on the compensation of
government officers in relation to the expense
of upholding their positions, 15.
Water-power legislation, urged in President
Wilson's Second Annual Message, 122, 125.
Watson, Senator James E., signs Lodge’s anti
league Round Robm, II, 2.
Wells, Rolla, telegram to National Democratic
Committee at Baltimore Convention endors
ing Wilson, 8; accepts Treasuryship of
Campaign Committee, 9.
White, Chief Justice, applauds President
Wilson's advice to Congress to declare
state of war with Germany, 254.
Wickersham. George W., advocates ratification
of the Treaty, II, 18.
Willard, Daniel, Chairman Advisory Com
mission Council of National Defence, 184;
Chairman Council of National Defence, 184.
William II, claims to be responsible to God
alone, II, 290. 339.
Williams, John Sharp, approves President
Wilson’s message to Congress advising dec
laration of war with Germany, 255.
Williams, John Skelton, at the hearings for
deciding Federal Reserve cities, 108.
Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, James, turns
over the Department, 38.
Wilson, Oliver, member National Agricultural
Advisory Committee, 343.
Wilson, Secretary William B., at the first Cabi
net meeting. 35.
Wilson, Woodrow: at the Baltimore Conven
tion, 7; early acquaintance with, 17; appre
hensions as to his executive ability and
capacity for team work, 18; talk with on
tariff, taxation, and currency at Col. House’s
dinner, 18; his inauguration. 29; at the first
meetings of the Cabinet, 33, 39; attitude to
ward political appointments, 40, 48; ex
plains position toward Latin America, 43;
to be his own Secretary of State, 44; his
statement regarding Six-power Loan to
China, 44; his tariff message, 47; resolves to
deliver his mrwgri to Congress in person,
48^ 53; interested in establishment of stable
government in China, 49; disrnssrw the Japa
nese question, 51; brings up question of
Pmkm Canal tolls at Cabinet meetiiv. 59;
far recognition of China. 59; answer to
Japan's protests against California exclusion
laws, 66; appMwl tetnm pitinn nf Huerta, 69;

objects to proviso in Sundry Civil bill, 69;
his statement on the lobby, 71; delivers
message to Congress on the currency, 73,
80; and on the Mexican situation, 73; ap
proves Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act, 74;
in address before Southern Commercial
Congress explains attitude toward Latin
America, 76; patient and tolerant toward
certain advisers, 88; signs Federal Reserve
Act, 90; lays before Congress his views on the
Trust question, 109; against interlocking
directorates and great financial interests
but for freedom of railroads, 110; reads be
fore Congress his message on Panama tolls,
112; orders fleet to Mexican waters, 114;
and taking of Vera Cruz, 116; death of his
wife, 120; urges Congress to provide for
internal taxes to offset revenues lost through
war in Europe, 121; in his Second Annual
Message urges water-power legislation, pas
sage of the shipping bill, and preparation for
national defence, 122; states he will veto the
immigration bill, 127; proposes further warn
ing to the Mexican factions, 133; treatment
of the Lusitania question, 135#; appears
before Congress to advise it concerning
situation with Germany, 155; against a large
regular army, depending on a strengthened
National Guard, 158; Preparedness measures,
159; on his change of mind, 161; correspond
ence with Secretary of War Garrison on
events incident to the latter’s resignation,
165#; letter to Ass’t-Sec’y Breckinridge
accepting resignation, 179; asks Congress to
provide revenues for defence programme, 185;
renominated for the Presidency, 191; atti
tude toward hyphenated Americans, 193;
approves Agricultural Educational Extension
Act, 204; his peace note and its unfavourable
reception, 217#; his address to the Senate
on the peace aftermath, 224; addresses Con
gress announcing severance of diplomatic
relations with Germany, 231; attitude on
arming of merchantmen, 234; characterisa
tion of filibuster group in the Senate, 240;
his Inaugural Address devoted to foreign
problems, 240; appears before Joint Session
of Congress to advise that body to declare
existence of a state of war with Germany,
2&30T; his propaganda through psychology,
301#; reply to Prince Maximilian's peace
overtures, 306; his Mount Vernon Fourth of
July address, 307; cfiariasinn of German arte
proposing armistice,
reply to the note,
317; discussion of Austrian note, 319; at
Cabinet meeting advises of acceptance of the

Fourteen Points, 320; fear of Bolshevism in
Europe, 321, 324; addresses Congress, in
forming of signing of Armistice and its con
ditions, 325; determines to attend Peace
Conference at Paris, 349; addresses Congress,
350; sails for France, 353; his address before
League to Enforce Peace, 354; his addresses
in France and England, 360; address at open
ing of conference, 363; presents report of
plan for the League of Nations at French
Foreign Office, 367; on arrival in Washington
begins campaign for the Covenant, 368;
leaves for Paris again, II, 1; welcomes Wil
liam H. Taft's offer to cable his League sug
gestions, 4; presents Treaty to the Senate,
4; rejects Secretary Houston's suggestion
of a full statement on the meaning of the
Covenant, 5; confers with Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the meaning of
the Treaty, 6; does not object to interpreta
tive reservations to the Covenant, 12, 14,
15, 30, 48, 49, 50, 55; criticizes Senator
Harding, 17, 148; decides to appeal to the
people on the Treaty and the Covenant, 20;
maintains that the Treaty cannot be worked
without the Covenant, 20; explains that
Great Britain's six Assembly votes cannot
menace the United States, 21; explains that
Article X cannot force Congress to declare
war, 24; denies that the League is a super
state, 25; maintains that the Covenant's pur
pose is to prevent war, 25; denies that the
Monroe Doctrine is impaired by the Cove
nant, 26; explains and defends Treaty settle
ment of Shantung, 28; calls a separate peace
with the Central Empires inconceivable, 31;
recalls America's purposes in entering the
war, 32, 33; believes that the Treaty terms
are just and will be supported by America,
35; gives up his Western trip, 36; is irritated
at meeting of Cabinet without his summons,
39, 68; opposes Lodge ratification resolution,
41; his Jackson Day letter is revised by
Secretary Houston, 48; accepts Senator
Hitchcock's reservations, 52, 56; is charged
with the Senate’s failure to ratify the
Treaty, 54; appoints Secretary Houston Sec
retary of the Treasury, 61; forbids Cabinet
meetings without his summons, 64; prefers
not to appoint regular Republicans, 67;
naka for Secretary Lansing’s resignation, 67;
is worried about choice of a new Secretary
of State, 68; appoints Bainbridge Colby to
succeed Lansing, 69; again attends Cabinet
meeting, 69; vetoes Appropriation Bill of
1920* 76; signs revised bill, 82; vetoes national

budget system bill, 83; his eyesight is im
paired, 91; expresses confidence in Cox'*
election, 92, 93, 94; thinks Harding’s election
will retard world peace and restoration, 94;
wants to help Harding, 95; insists upon
economy, 100; opposes the soldiers' bonus,
100; provides for agricultural relief, 108,
approves suspension of War Finance Cor
porationV activities, 109; approves Secretary
Houston's stand on agricultural relief, 109.
110, 115; vetoes Congressional joint resolu
tion reviving War Finance Corporation’s
activities, 110, 112; approves Secretary
Houston’s answer to Austen Chamberlain’s
telegram on war debts, 123; rejects Lloyd
George's proposal to settle war debts in con
nection with German reparations, 133;
recommends immediate funding of British
war debt, 136; comments on Senator Fall,
140; vetoes bill imposing temporary duties
on agricultural products, 141; holds last
Cabinet meeting, 147; says he will not write
a history of his Administration, 148; his
parting words to the Cabinet, 149; was a
victim of gossips’ assaults, 158; his view of
government, 160, 162, 220; went to Europe
through sense of duty, 162; his faith in the
people, 163, 166; was an admirer of Burke,
Bright, and Pitt, 167; admits he has a singletrack mind, 169, 180; was unfamiliar with
business, 169; was not a politician, 174; is
compared with Lincoln and Lee, 176; had
nothing in common with Colonel Harvey,
179; does not give out facts behind Secretary
Lansing's resignation, 182; alters his views
on preparedness, 187, 188; was not dictato
rial, 188; proposed adoption of Cabinet
government, 190, 195; defines legislation as
the embodiment of experience, 220, 221;
some of his phrases were unfortunate,
225; considers the consequences of a declara
tion of war after the sinking of the Lusiioni*,
232; argues for inaction in order that
America may aid in post-war reconstruction,
235, 236; maintaining declaration of war
could come only when the country was pre
pared for it, 239; describes America's pur
pose in entering the war, 245; extols aggres
siveness of amateur military force, 2SI;
self-government of the German
peoples as prerequisite of peace* 298, 299;
comments on patriotism and profits, 223; is
described by Secretary Houston as the fore
most spokesman of democracy in the world,
263.
Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow, confers with Secretary

£3591

Houston on the Secretaryship of the Treasury,
of Agriculture, and of the Interior. II, 61;
learns Cabinet's views on coal situation. 66.
Woman Suffrage, its adoption by state action is
approved by the Republican platform but
cast aside by Charles Evans Hughes, II 267.
Woodrow. Dr, James, an able educator, 17.
Work! War, its effect on the United States,

118#; events leading to America's participa
tion, II, 271, 326; necessary steps to Allied
victory, 301.
Zapata, his threatened capture of Mexico
City, 117.
Zorn denies that Kaiser is a constitutional
monarch, II, 294.

Full text of Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920 : with a Personal Estimate of the President : Volume 2

FRASER